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ENTERED,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1867,  by 

D.  APPLETON  &  COMPANY, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York. 


TO    THE    PUBLIC. 


THOSE  who  are  asked  to  read  a  history  have  a  right  to 
inquire  "by  what  authority  its  statements  are  made,  and  what 
claims  the  work  has  to  authenticity  and  accuracy. 

To  such  questions  the  author  of  this  history  replies,  that  the 
whole  material  for  the  work  has  been  drawn  from  documents 
in  possession  of  the  Navy  Department,  so  that  its  narrative 
rests  upon  the  highest  possible  authority. 

The  author  feels  that  he  can  in  no  manner  adequately  repay 
the  kindness  with  which  the  honorable  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
the  Assistant  Secretary,  and  other  officers  of  the  Department, 
placed  at  his  disposal  whatever  could  elucidate  the  part  which 
the  Navy  bore  in  our  great  national  struggle ;  and  equal 
thanks  are  due  from  him  to  the  chief  officers  of  the  Navy  for 
the  aid  they  have  cheerfully  rendered,  enabling  him  to  impart 
a  freshness  and  life  to  the  work  which,  without  their  assistance, 
would  have  been  impossible. 

Through  the  kindness  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  he  has 
had  free  access  to  the  navy-yards  and  ships,  and  to  the  Ordnance 
Department,  and  nothing  has  been  withheld  that  could  properly 
be  granted ;  while  the  connection  of  the  writer  with  the  Naval 
Academy,  and  his  residence  in  Washington,  have  given  him 


4  TO   THE   PUBLIC. 

facilities  for  collecting  the  materials  for  such  a  history  that 
leave  little  or  nothing  to  desire.  This  material  has  been 
wrought  into  its  present  shape  in  the  earnest  hope  that  it  may 
aid  in  setting  the  work  of  the  Navy  in  its  true  light  before 
the  public,  so  as  to  convince  the  people  how  much  the  country 
is  indebted  for  its  triumph  and  present  security  to  those  who 
organized  and  directed  its  operations,  and  to  those  who  so  suc 
cessfully  guarded  our  long  coast-line  and  the  communications 
of  the  Army,  and  who  fought  our  battles  on  the  rivers  and 
on  the  sea. 

WASHINGTON,  October,  1866. 


PREFACE. 


THE  campaigns  and  battles  of  the  Revolution  did  not  gain 
for  the  Americans  a  very  brilliant  military  reputation ;  not  be 
cause  of  any  lack  of  courage  or  skill  in  our  soldiers,  but 
because  they  were  regarded  merely  as  giving  evidence  of  per 
sonal  bravery  on  the  part  of  undisciplined  militia,  and  not  as 
indicating  any  remarkable  genius  for  the  art  of  war. 

'Nor  did  any  one  then  fear  that  the  young  Republic  would 
soon  become  a  nation,  capable  of  organizing  war  on  a  scale  so 
vast  as  to  alarm  all  Western  Europe,  a  military  power  second 
to  none  in  the  world.  Europe,  and  especially  England,  was 
first  startled  by  the  operations  of  our  Navy  in  our  second  war. 
The  ease  with  which  some  of  their  finest  frigates  and  sloops 
were  sunk  or  captured  by  American  vessels  of  the  same  rate, 
filled  England  with  amazement  and  alarm.  The  character  of 
our  ships,  the  manner  in  which  they  were  manoeuvred,  the 
havoc  wrought  by  our  guns,  were  all  without  precedent  in 
naval  war ;  and  England  and  France  saw  in  these  victories  the 
first  foreshadowings  of  a  great  naval  power,  which  in  a  not 
remote  future  might  dispute  with  either  or  both,  the  supremacy 
of  the  seas,  and  perhaps  exclude  them  from  the  Western  Con 
tinent. 

From  that  time  the  naval  and  commercial  power  of  the 
United  States  has  attracted  the  attention  of  Europe  more  than 


PEEFACE. 


any  other  feature  of  our  growth,  because  they  knew  that  how 
ever  large  our  fighting  force  on  land  might  be,  we  should  be 
unable  to  check  them  in  any  designs  upon  this  continent  unless 
our  naval  strength  should  become  equal  to  their  own. 

With  England  and  France,  therefore,  the  most  interesting 
question  connected  with  our  affairs  has  been,  whether  we  could 
create  a  truly  formidable  Navy.  Our  naval  strength  was  the 
standard  by  which  they  measured  their  power  to  attack,  and 
ours  to  defend.  They  did  not  believe  it  possible  for  us  to  pro 
duce  a  Navy  in  a  few  months  which  could  both  seal  up  our 
long  line  of  sea-coast  and  defy  their  own  most  formidable  ships, 
and  this  mistaken  judgment  was  the  main  influence  in  deciding 
their  policy  in  regard  to  American  affairs.  A  history  of  the 
Navy,  then,  is  a  history  of  that  power  by  which  Europe  gauges 
our  national  importance,  and  by  whicji  our  rank  among  nations 
is  assigned :  because,  until  a  true  Christian  civilization  prevails, 
the  nobler  attributes  of  a  nation  will  be  overlooked  in  view  of 
its  ability  to  carry  on  a  great  war  ;  and  because,  if  the  United 
States  should  ever  wage  a  great  European  war,  the  battles 
would  be  mainly  upon  the  seas. 

"While  our  Army  has  done  a  work  beyond  all  praise,  and 
has  settled  the  question  of  our  ability  to  defend  our  territory 
against  any  force  which  could  be  brought  here,  the  Navy  has 
saved  us  from  foreign  intervention  that  could  not  have  been 
otherwise  avoided,  while  at  the  same  time  its  labors  in  putting 
down  the  rebellion  have  been  far  greater  than  has  been  gener 
ally  supposed. 

The  glorious  achievements  of  the  Army  have  been  set  forth 
by  so  many  skilful  writers,  that  they  have  become  familiar,  as 
they  should  be,  even  to  children.  This  is  well.  Let  our  soldiers 
and  their  deeds  be  held  in  grateful  remembrance  while  we  re 
main  a  nation.  Their  steadfast  loyalty,  their  long-enduring 
courage,  their  wonderful  skill  in  all  the  arts  of  war,  and  the 
facility  with  which  a  veteran  and  victorious  army  dissolved 


PREFACE.  7 

itself  and  joined  the  mass  of  society  in  the  peaceful  works  of 
life,  these  are  not  likely  to  be  overstated  by  the  historian,  or 
overestimated  by  the  people. 

The  calling  into  existence  and  maintaining  in  efficient  con 
dition  a  blockading  fleet  of  six  hundred  vessels  has  been  pro 
nounced  in  Europe  the  great  fact  of  the  war,  and  this  will  be 
the  judgment  of  impartial  history.  And  yet  the  energy,  the 
promptitude,  the  successful  boldness,  the  comprehensive  plan 
ning,  the  skill  in  the  choice  of  means  evinced  by  the  Navy  De 
partment  during  the  wrhole  war,  have  made  but  slight  impres 
sion  upon  the  popular  mind,  because  the  people  are  in  a  great 
degree  ignorant  of  the  facts,  and  the  officers  and  sailors  of  our 
six  hundred  ships  so  constantly  and  successfully  employed,  have 
occupied  but  a  small  space  in  the  public  thought ;  because  so 
little  is  known,  except  of  the  main  incidents  of  some  of  the 
more  important  battles. 

By  the  pencil,  the  photograph,  by  letters  from  thousands  of 
soldiers  to  friends  at  home,  by  eloquent  speakers,  by  countless 
pens  of  "  ready  writers,"  every  movement  of  our  armies  has 
been  made  to  pass  as  distinctly  before  the  minds  of  millions  as 
if  seen  by  the  bodily  eye.  The  people  have  been  made  to  feel 
almost  as  deep  an  interest  in  the  scenes  of  the  camp,  the  march, 
the  bivouac,  the  picket  and  skirmish  line,  the  battle-field,  and 
hospital,  as  if  they  had  been  actual  spectators  of  all.  But  with 
the  Navy  it  has  been  widely  different.  Few,  comparatively, 
have  seen,  and  fewer  still  have  attempted  to  describe  the  scenes 
on  board  our  ships — the  perils,  the  daring,  the  skill  of  our  sea 
men,  whether  in  the  exciting  chase  or  in  those  battles  that  have 
astonished  Europe.  The  results  of  our  great  victories  have  been 
given,  but  very  few  among  us  have  any  clear  conception  of  the 
scenes  on  board  a  ship,  whether  engaged  in  the  usual  duties  of 
the  blockading  squadron,  or  in  the  chase  of  a  blockade-runner, 
or  during  the  progress  of  a  fight. 

The  object  of  this  history,  therefore,  is  not  only  to  prepare 


PREFACE. 


a  truthful  record  of  some  of  the  most  important  and  least 
known  events  of  the  war,  but  to  present  the  work  of  the  cre 
ation  of  the  Navy  and  its  subsequent  operations  so  clearly  be 
fore  the  public  mind,  that  the  people  shall  become  familiar  with 
them  as  they  now  are  with  scenes  in  the  Army ;  and  if  this  can 
be  successfully  done,  the  writer  believes  that  they  will  feel  again 
that  enthusiasm  for  the  Navy  which  thrilled  all  hearts  when 
Preble,  and  Hull,  and  Bainbridge,  and  Porter,  and  Stewart, 
and  Decatur,  and  Perry,  and  McDonough,  won  for  themselves 
and  their  country  an  undying  renown. 

Another  topic  demands  a  brief  notice  here.  The  political 
agitations  which  moved  the  country  so  profoundly  soon  after 
the  close  of  the  war,  have  made  it  difficult  for  a  great  majority 
of  the  American  people  to  judge  impartially  any  man,  how 
ever  great  his  services  were  during  the  war,  who  afterward  ap 
proved  of  the  policy  of  President  Johnson.  Although  the  his 
tory  of  the  course  of  the  Navy  Department,  and  the  operations 
of  the  Navy  during  the  rebellion,  does  not  reach  the  political 
struggle  that  succeeded  the  war,  still  the  history  of  the  actors 
in  it  will  be  viewed  now  through  the  heated  and  distorting  me 
dium  of  party  politics,  and  some  will  perhaps  deem  the  praise 
bestowed  in  this  volume  upon  the  management  of  the  Navy 
Department  to  be  somewhat  too  decided  and  warm.  Whatever 
encomium  is  here  found  is,  in  the  judgment  of  the  author,  de 
manded  by  the  undoubted  facts  in  the  case,  and  is  abundantly 
supported  by  official  documents. 

Future  historians  will  assign  to  the  politicians  of  the  day 
their  proper  positions.  The  object  of  this  work  is  to  present 
the  history  of  the  Navy  during  the  war,  and  to  award  praise  or 
censure  to  the  actors  in  those  scenes,  without  reference  to  their 
subsequent  political  course.  Only  thus  can  impartial  justice 
be  done,  thus  only  can  a  reliable  history  of  that  period  be 
written. 

During  the  continuance  of  the  great  struggle,  the  Navy  De- 


PREFACE.  9 

partment  was  in  perfect  sympathy  with  the  Union  party  of  the 
country,  and  it  is  this  period  only  which  the  present  Yolume 
covers.  It  is  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  war,  and  not  of  the 
political  conflicts  that  followed. 

~No  candid  history,  based  on  official  statements,  will  deny 
that  the  Department  was  conducted  during  the  war  with  emi 
nent  ability,  energy,  and  success,  with  an  integrity  not  to  be 
questioned,  and  that  it  was  ever  ready  to  assert  the  dignity  of 
the  country  and  maintain  her  honor. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

CHAP.  I. — INTRODUCTORY, 13 

II. — ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  NAVY  DEPARTMENT, 19 

III. — THE  OFFICE  OF  THE  ASSISTANT  SECRETARY. — THE  MENTAL  FORCE 

STORED  WITH  THE  PEOPLE,  AND  EVER  READY  FOR  USE. THE  MlAN- 

TONOMOH'S  VISIT  TO  EUROPE, 66 

IV. — FURTHER  DETAILS  OF  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT,  OFFICE 

OF  CHIEF  CLERK,  ETC., 70 

V. — THE  CONDITION  OF  THE  COUNTRY,  AND  THE  STATE  OF  PUBLIC  OPINION 

AT  THE  TIME  OF  MR.  LINCOLN'S  INAUGURATION,      .        .        .        .75 

VI. — THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  BLOCKADE, 83 

VII. — THE  WORK  REQUIRED  OF  THE  NAVY, 89 

VIII. — THE  MEANS  AT  THE  DISPOSAL  OF  THE  NAVY  DEPARTMENT  WHEN  THE 

WAR  BEGAN, 97 

IX. — THE  FIRST  MEASURES  ADOPTED  FOR  THE  INCREASE  OF  THE  NAVY,        .  107 
X. — THE  IDEAS  WHICH  GOVERNED  THE  DEPARTMENT  IN  THE  CONSTRUCTION 

OF  NEW  VESSELS, 117 

XL — THE  IRON-CLAD  NAVY, 141 

XII. — THE  INVENTOR  OF  THE  MONITOR, 169 

XIIL— THE  MONITORS, 172 

XIV. — THE  DIFFERENT  CLASSES  OF  MONITORS, 185 

XV.— THE  RELIEF  OF  FORT  SUMTER, 244 

XVI. — AMERICAN  ORDNANCE, 269 

XVII. — THE  RELIEF  OF  FORT  PICKENS, 296 

XVIII. — THE  BEGINNING  OF  THE  CONFLICT. — RESCUE  OF  THE  FRIGATE  CONSTI 
TUTION,  305 

XIX. — OPERATIONS  ON  THE  POTOMAC, 310 

XX. — FIRST  IMPORTANT  NAVAL  EXPEDITION. — CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTERAS 

FORTS, 331 

XXL — THE  MONITOR  AND  THE  MERRIMACK, 358 

XXII. — CAPTURE  OF  ROANOKE  ISLAND. — OPERATIONS  IN  PAMLICO  AND  AL- 

BEMARLE   SOUNDS, 377 


12  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

XXIII. — CAPTURE  OF  NEWBERN  AND  FORT  MACON, 391 

XXIV. — DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  REBEL  FLEET  AT  ELIZABETH  CITY,      .        .       405 

XXV. — EXPEDITIONS  TO  HAMILTON,  WASHINGTON,  AND  FRANKLIN,       .         .418 

XXVI. — EXPEDITION  TO  HILTON  HEAD,  AND  CAPTURE  OF  THE  FORTS,  .        .       428 

XXVII. — CAPTURE  OF  FORT  CLINCH,  FERNANDINA,  AND  ST.  MARY'S,         .         .  451 

XXVIII. — MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  REBELS. — OPERATIONS  ON  THE  SOUNDS,  INLETS, 

AND  RIVERS, 464 

XXIX.— FALL  OF  FORT  PULASKI, 487 

XXX. — THE  NAVY  OF  THE  WEST  AND  OUR  INLAND  WATERS  IN  ITS  RELATIONS 

TO  OUR  NAVAL  POWER  AND  THE  FUTURE  POLICY  OF  OUR  COUNTRY,     491 

XXXI. — THE  MISSISSIPPI  SQUADRON, 495 

XXXII. — BEGINNING  OF  ACTIVE  OPERATIONS  ON  THE  WESTERN  RIVERS,       .       508 
XXXIII. — CAPTURE  OF  FORT  HENRY. — EXPEDITION  UP  THE  TENNESSEE,    .        .515 

XXXIV. — CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON, 528 

XXXV. — OPERATIONS  AGAINST  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN,     .         .  534 
XXXVI. — THE  BATTLE  OF  PITTSBURG  LANDING. — THE  WORK  OF  THE  GUNBOATS 

IN  THAT  ACTION, 558 

XXXVII. — FURTHER  OPERATIONS  ON  THE  TENNESSEE. — MOVEMENTS  ON  THE  MIS 
SISSIPPI. — ATTACK  ON  FORT  PILLOW. — FIGHT  WITH  THE  GUNBOATS,  5G6 
XXXVIII. — BATTLE  WITH  THE  REBEL  FLEET  AT  MEMPHIS,  AND  CAPTURE  OF  THE 

CITY, 574 


HISTORY  OF  THE  NAVY 

DURING  THE  GKEAT  REBELLION 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

EACH  true  state  has  a  distinctive,  individual  character.  Its 
political,  religious,  and  social  institutions,  and  all  the  forms 
which  its  civilization  assumes,  are  but  the  embodying  of  national 
ideas.  Every  great  nation,  whether  ancient  or  modern,  stands 
forth  separate,  and  even  peculiar,  as  if  endowed  with  an  actual 
personality.  Each  one  has  shaped  a  form  of  religion,  a  style  of 
art,  an  architecture,  and  a  literature  of  its  own,  different  from  all 
others  ;  and  even  in  the  army  and  navy,  in  weapons  and  meth 
ods  of  fighting,  the  national  traits  appear. 

Colonies  retain  of  course,  for  a  long  time,  the  peculiarities 
of  the  mother  country,  and  assume  but  slowly,  if  at  all,  any  dis 
tinctive  features.  It  could  not  be  expected,  therefore,  that  an 
American  nation,  with  an  individual  character,  should  suddenly 
appear  upon  this  continent.  Up  to  the  present  hour  we  have 
no  truly  national  literature,  or  architecture,  or  costume ;  we  have 
no  art,  or  oratory,  or  poetry,  which  can  be  called  distinctively 
American,  and  which  have  originated  here.  They  are  all  mod 
ifications  or  imitations  of  European,  and  principally  of  English 
civilization.  We  are  not,  it  is  true,  mere  copyists.  American 
thought  has  moulded  what  we  have  adopted,  and  in  the  arts 
which  multiply  man's  power,  and  lessen  the  amount  of  labor  to 


14:  2  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

obtain  given  results,  in  all  that  tends  to  lighten  the  burdens  of 
the  people,  and  increase  their  comforts  and  intelligence,  we 
have  far  outstripped  the  rest  of  the  world. 

"We  have  at  length,  however,  through  the  pressure  of  the  war, 
become  in  truth  and  in  deed  a  nation.  We  are  a  consolidated 
state,  we  are  clothed  with  the  attributes  of  a  great  national 
power ;  and,  from  this  time,  we  may  probably  date  the  begin 
nings  of  a  distinctive  American  civilization.  We  have  acquired 
the  consciousness  of  strength ;  we  have  obtained,  through  the 
war,  the  materials  for  a  literature  and  a  history.  The  war  itself 
had  many  distinctive  and  original  features.  It  has  been  con 
ducted  as  no  other  war  has  been.  It  was  an  American  battle. 
It  was  fought  on  such  a  scale,  with  such  masses  of  men,  with 
such  vast  combinations,  and  with  such  weapons,  as  Europe  never 
had  seen.  It  was,  in  fact,  the  first  grand  national  American  act ;. 
and,  more  than  all  else,  the  Navy  has  been  an  original  creation, 
a  true  outgrowth  of  distinctive  American  thought.  In  fact,  from 
its  beginning,  the  Navy  has  been  the  embodying  of  truly 
American  ideas;  and  whatever  question  there  maybe  in  regard 
to  any  other  feature  of  our  civilization,  no  one  will  deny  that 
there  are  American  ships,  American  cannon,  and  an  American 
Navy. 

In  the  Army,  European  methods  have  been  made  more 
effective  than  ever  before  by  the  intelligence,  the  skill,  and  per 
sistent  courage  of  the  American  soldier ;  yet  in  the  system  of 
attack  and  defence,  in  tactics  and  strategy,  there  has  been  little 
that  is  new  and  peculiar ;  but  the  long,  swift  steamboat,  the 
clipper-ship,  with  its  great  spread  of  canvas,  and  its  unequalled 
speed,  the  heavy  frigate,  the  frigate-like  corvette,  the  armored 
ship,  adopted  in  Europe,  and  last  the  Monitor,  these  and  our 
"  big  guns  "  are  original  creations ;  they  are  the  fruits  of  Ameri 
can  thinking,  the  exponents  of  American  character ;  and  these, 
our  thoughts,  have  had  power  to  revolutionize  the  naval  archi 
tecture  and  naval  warfare  of  the  world. 

It  is  believed,  therefore,  that  the  Navy,  with  the  armament 
of  our  war-vessels,  and  our  ships  of  commerce,  form  the  best  ex 
ponent  of  our  power  of  invention  which  the  nation  has  yet  pro 
duced  ;  the.  highest  proof  yet  given  to  the  world  that  a  new 
national  life-power  is  building  here  a  state  with  characteristics 


INTRODUCTORY.  15 

as  marked  and  peculiar  as  any  of  the  great  nations  of  antiquity— 
a  nation  presenting  new  forms  of  civilization,  and  representing, 
in  many  important  features,  the  foremost  thought  of  the  age. 

The  maritime  nations  of  Europe  have  employed  all  their  in 
ventive  genius  and  skill,  their  science  and  mechanical  art,  in 
perfecting  their  navies,  and  making  them,  as  they  hoped,  irre 
sistible.  The  Americans  in  a  few  months,  and  as  the  first  re 
sult  of  earnest  effort,  have  produced  ships  and  armaments,  be 
fore  unknown,  that  have  rendered  useless,  and  virtually  stricken 
out  of  existence,  the  great  navies  of  the  world.  Not  only  have 
the  most  formidable  wooden  vessels  been  reduced  to  utter  weak 
ness  and  helplessness,  but  the  proudest  armored,  broadside  ship 
of  Europe,  such  as  was  deemed  impregnable,  would  be  de 
stroyed  in  a  fight  with  some  of  the  new  American  vessels  almost 
as  easily  as  the  wooden  walls  themselves.  Such  results  should 
be  studied  by  the  people,  because  they  show  the  originating  arid 
independent  power  of  American  mind,  when  operating  on  a 
large  scale,  and  competing  with  the  whole  of  Europe. 

The  most  remarkable  successes  of  the  war — those  which 
startled  Europe,  which  caused  England  and  France  to  feel  that 
their  naval  supremacy  had  been  stricken  down  by  blows  not 
aimed  at  them — were  gained  by  means  unknown  before,  by  new 
applications  of  principles,  and  by  hitherto  unheard-of  uses  of 
machinery. 

The  new  American  artillery,  the  new  war-ships,  the  changes 
wrought  in  old  vessels  by  a  new  armament,  the  almost  instanta 
neous  transformation  of  a  commercial  marine  into  a  blockading 
squadron,  that  could  seal  up  the  sea-coast  from  the  Potomac  to 
the  Kio  Grande,  these  are  without  any  parallel  in  the  history  of 
war.  They  have  no  relation  to  the  old  stereotyped  naval  and 
military  forms  and  methods ;  they  are  the  creations  of  fresh  and 
independent  thinkers,  who  have  been  rudely  criticised,  ridiculed, 
and  condemned  as  visionary  or  imbecile,  because  their  thoughts 
were  beyond,  or  outside,  the  common  range  of  mind  and  of  pro 
fessional  experience. 

A  mere  narration,  then,  of  the  events  of  such  a  war  can,  in 
no  proper  sense,  be  received  as  a  history  of  that  war.  The  men 
who  planned  the  methods  of  the  battle,  who  contrived  the  new 
instruments  used,  the  ideas  out  of  which  the  successful  action 


16  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

sprung,  the  manner  in  which  the  new  theories  stood  the  test  of 
practice,  the  stern  ordeal  of  the  fight — these  should  enter  into 
the  history ;  and  those  forces  which  lie  back  of  events,  and  by 
which  events  are  produced,  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be  re 
vealed. 

True  history  records  the  birth  of  ideas,  the  progress  of 
thought,  and  then  relates  the  actions  which  are  the  results  of 
thought ;  and  if  to  these  is  added  a  proper  setting  forth  of  the 
leading  spirits  of  the  age,  the  originators  of  thought,  then  the 
movement  of  society,  and  the  living  forces  which  produced  and 
controlled  the  movement,  are  presented. 

To  relate  the.  mere  fact  that  the  Monitor,  a  small  turreted 
ship,  armed  with  eleven-inch  guns,  engaged  the  Merrimac,  a 
large  armored,  broadside  frigate,  and  that  after  a  four  hours' 
fight  the  frigate  was  compelled  to  withdraw,  would  add  very 
little  to  real  history  ;  but  the  story  becomes  history  when  we 
learn  the  perils  of  that  solemn  hour,  when  we  are  made  ac 
quainted  with  the  men  who  organized  the  fight,  and  with  those 
who  conducted  it,  and  when  we  are  taught  to  consider  that  the 
conflict  was  not  between  the  mailed  ships,  their  guns  and  crews, 
nor  even  between  the  North  and  the  South,  but  between  Eu 
ropean  and  American  thought ;  for  the  South  had  adopted,  in 
the  Merrimac,  the  European  form  of  the  iron-clad,  with  the  ex 
ception  of  the  sloping  side.  The  battle,  therefore,  was  to  decide 
whether  the  American  people  had  thinking  power  equal  to 
their  great  occasion,  and  the  decision  of  that  one  question  was 
to  determine  whether  Europe  or  America  should  control  this 
Western  Continent.  Yiewed  in  this  light,  the  first  battle  of  the 
iron-clads,  in  Hampton  Roads,  becomes  one  of  the  most  impor 
tant  events  in  the  real  history  of  our  age. 

Two  main  ideas,  which  will  be  dwelt  upon  more  at  large  in 
subsequent  chapters,  have  shaped  the  American  Navy,  and  they 
are  the  exact  opposite  of  those  adopted  by  the  maritime  powers 
of  Europe.  One  is,  to  diminish  the  number  of  guns  and  increase 
the  weight  of  the  shot,  which  has  been  carried  put  in  the  arma 
ment  of  our  wooden  ships,  almost  from  the  beginning  of  the 
Navy.  The  other,  the  Monitor  idea,  is,  to  reduce  the  exposed 
surface  of  the  iron-clad  vessel  so  much,  that  on  this  small  surface 
it  can  carry  an  impregnable  armor,  while  in  the  two  guns  of 


INTRODUCTORY.  17 

the  armament  is  concentrated  the  weight  and  force  of  a  heavy- 
broadside  ;  and  the  turret,  by  which  the  guns  can  be  turned  to 
any  point  in  the  horizon,  gives  in  part  the  advantage  of  a 
greater  number  of  cannon. 

The  European  plan  has  been  to  increase  the  number  and 
penetrating  power  of  comparatively  small  guns,  and  enlarge  the 
ship  to  carry  them.  The  Americans  have  chosen  for  the  attack 
the  smashing  power  of  the  heavy  shot,  and  for  the  defence  a 
small  surface  of  invulnerable  armor.  In  the  battle  of  Hampton 
Roads,  America  sent  forth  her  two  national  ideas,  imperfectly 
expressed  in  the  original  Monitor,  to  challenge,  not  only  the 
South,  but  Europe,  to  a  contest  for  supremacy  on  the  seas.  The 
event  showed  that,  in  the  construction  and  armament  of  ships, 
America  had  been  thinking  ahead  of  Europe,  had  indeed  out- 
thought  the  world.  God  was  leading  this  nation  to  the  posi 
tion  of  the  world's  teacher  in  the  application  to  political  and  so 
cial  life  of  those  principles  upon  which  the  progress  of  the  race 
depends,  and  that  four  hours'  fight  demonstrated  that  she  has 
the  power  needed  for  a  great  leader  among  the  nations ;  and 
that  Europe,  so  far  from  checking  the  progress  of  our  Republic, 
must  herself  yield  to  the  force  of  American  thought. 

Those  who  expect  to  find  in  these  pages  a  history  similar  to 
those  which  have  recorded  the  events  of  previous  wars  will,  of 
course,  be  disappointed.  The  ships,  the  armaments,  the  ma 
noeuvres,  the  tactics  and  strategy  of  former  battles  have  passed 
away  as  completely  as  the  catapult  and  battering-ram,  the  hel 
met,  and  mail,  and  spear. 

The  old  sailing  ship,  around  which  clusters  all  the  former  ro 
mance  of  the  sea,  is  now,  in  battle,  only  a  useless  incumbrance, 
except  as  a  floating  battery,  to  be  towed  into  and  out  of  action. 
The  terrible  shell  has  displaced  the  solid  shot  for  most  of  the 
ordinary  operations  of  a  fight.  Fortifications  that  could  defy 
the  mightiest  squadrons  of  sailing  ships  that  ever  floated,  are  de 
molished  by  steamers  without  serious  injury  to  themselves ;  and 
narrow  channels,  where  a  sailing  vessel  would  be  perfectly  help 
less,  are  easily  threaded  by  steam  gunboats,  sweeping  away  all 
]and  forces  that  come  within  reach  of  their  long-range  guns. 

It  is  not  a  record  of  sea  fights  between  squadrons  or  single 
ships,  for  few  such  took  place,  and  none  of  them  were  similar  to 
2 


18  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

what  the  world  had  known ;  and  yet,  beyond  all  previous  wars 
on  the  water,  this  was  one  of  continual  battle.  In  the  ordinary 
course  of  operations  in  former  warfare,  few  vessels  had  more 
than  one  battle  in  a  long  cruise.  Many  for  months,  and  many 
during  a  whole  war,  were  not  engaged  in  a  single  fight,  roaming 
the  ocean  in  vain  in  search  of  a  foe. 

But  in  this  rebellion  it  was,  except  with  the  blockading 
squadrons,  a  scene  of  almost  daily  and  even  nightly  battle — not 
often  with  ships,  but  with  forts  and  earthwork  batteries,  with 
ambushed  riflemen  and  field  batteries,  taken  from  point  to  point, 
on  rivers  where  our  steamers  were  passing,  and  with  torpedoes 
in  the  channels  and  harbors,  and  torpedo-boats  by  night. 

It  was  a  war  which,  with  its  new  machinery  and  new 
methods  of  operation,  disproved  all  former  theories,  set  at  naught 
all  calculations  of  previous  experience,  and  introduced  the  sailor 
to  new  ships,  to  such  cannon  as  he  had  never  before  handled,  to 
places  where  a  war-ship  had  never  floated  before,  and  to  such 
fighting  as  had  never  been  seen  on  the  deck  of  a  vessel. 

While,  therefore,  the  reader  will  meet  with  less  of  the  usual 
events  of  a  -naval  war,  there  will  be  found  a  greater  variety  of 
new  and  stirring  incident  than  has  been  known  in  any  previous 
naval  conflict ;  and  the  daily  perils  and  labors  of  our  seamen 
were  greater  than  any  to  which  sailors  had  been  exposed  before. 
They  had  none  of  the  repose  which  is  obtained  by  a  long  cruise, 
in  which  the  only  labor  is  to  sail  the  ship,  but  every  day 
brought  its  new  dangers  and  its  exhausting  toil. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAYY  DEPARTMENT. 

THE  conception  which  so  many  form  of  a  department,  as 
composed  of  a  secretary  and  his  clerks,  will  convey  no  adequate 
idea  of  the  Navy  Department.  In  some  of  its  features  it  seems 
more  like  an  independant  organization  than  a  mere  branch  of 
the  General  Government.  Its  relations  and  responsibilities  to 
the  central  power  are,  it  is  true,  the  same  with  those  of  the 
other  departments,  yet  it  seems  further  removed  than  they  from 
general  knowledge  and  observation.  Its  operations  and  its 
wants  are  not  so  easily  understood,  because  they  are  necessarily 
less  known ;  and  hence,  perhaps,  except  when  winning  great  vic 
tories,  it  is  apt  to  be  regarded  with  indifference,  and  even  with 
suspicion.  Its  field  of  action  and  its  whole  work  are  peculiar, 
and  therefore  its  organization  must  be  peculiar  also.  It  com 
bines  in  itself  so  many  branches  of  knowledge  and  labor,  that  it 
is  quite  impossible  for  one  man,  however  great  and  wise,  to  be  a 
proficient  in  them  all;  and  hence,  the  men  who  superintend 
these  different  branches  must  hold  to  the  chief,  the  relation,  not 
of  clerks,  but  rather  of  cabinet  officers.  It  is  clear  that  the 
head  of  such  a  Department  should  be  a  statesman,  a  constitu 
tional  lawyer,  a  judge  of  international  law  and  national  obliga 
tions.  He  should  be  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  political 
movements  of  the  country,  and  familiar  with  all  its  interests, 
while  at  the  same  time  he  should  be  a  man  of  sound  judgment 
in  general  business  affairs  and  should  possess  executive  ability 
of  the  highest  order. 

But  such  a  man  would  be  very  unlikely  to  know  much  of 
many  things  belonging  peculiarly  to  naval  science,  a  knowledge 
of  which  is  indispensable  to  the  proper  conduct  of  the  Depart 
ment  ;  and  hence  the  business  which  belongs  to  the  naval  pro- 


20  HISTOET   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

fession  is  divided  into  bureaus,  the  heads  of  which  are  skilled  in 
the  particular  branches  committed  to  their  care. 

It  was  found,  moreover,  that  the  amount  of  business  pressing 
upon  each  of  these  bureaus  was  so  great  as  to  completely  absorb 
its  head  in  the  management  of  his  own  particular  department, 
giving  him  little  time  for  the  consideration  of  questions  of  gen 
eral  policy ;  and  as  the  Secretary  could  not  be  expected  to  study 
in  person  the  wants  and  operations  of  these  bureaus,  some 
method  was  needed  by  which  these  could  be  arranged  and  com 
bined,  and  presented  in  a  general  view  for  the  consideration  and 
decision  of  the  Secretary  himself. 

The  vast  operations  of  the  Department  itself  during  the  war 
were  naturally  divided  into  two  great  branches :  one  relating  to 
affairs  belonging  particularly  to  the  Navy,  and  perhaps  more  spe 
cifically  to  professional  matters ;  and  the  other  embracing  civil 
transactions  and  the  whole  business  machinery  and  operations  of 
the  Department.  At  the  head  of  the  first  named  of  these  divi 
sions  was  placed  the  Assistant  Secretary,  who,  having  been  him 
self  an  officer  of  the  Navy  of  long  experience  and  acknowledged 
skill,  was  supposed  to  be  a  competent  judge  of  whatever  belonged 
to  ships,  their  outfit  and  armament,  and  of  such  plans  as  might 
be  proposed  for  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the  Navy.  At  the 
head  of  the  other  was  one,  called  simply  the  Chief  Clerk,  a  name 
which  does  not  adequately  describe  the  importance  of  the  office, 
for  upon  him  was  laid  not  merely  the  superintendence  of  the 
clerical  force,  but  the  direct  management  of  a  large  portion  of 
the  business  operations  of  the  Department.  He  was  really  a 
confidential  secretary  placed  over  one  branch  of  the  affairs  of 
the  Department,  while  the  Assistant  Secretary  supervised  that 
which  belonged  specifically  to  the  ships,  their  outfit,  armament, 
and  operations — the  plans  and  suggestions  of  both  these  offi 
cers  being,  of  course,  submitted  to  and  decided  upon  by  the  Sec 
retary  himself. 

Such,  during  the  war,  was  the  general  organization  and 
movement  of  the  Department ;  but  the  dividing  lines  were  not 
always  strictly  observed,  because  all  were  working  in  harmony 
and  had  confidence  in  each  other.  Each  wrought  in  his  own 
department,  giving  aid  and  counsel  elsewhere  when  needed,  and 
each  strengthening  as  he  could  the  hands  of  the  Secretary. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  .         21 

The  ability  of  a  man  to  direct  a  government,  to  command 
an  army,  or  to  control  a  department,  is  often  shown,  more 
clearly  in  the  selection  of  his  assistants  than  in  the  operations 
in  which  they  subsequently  engage. 

The  reason  of  this  is  apparent.  It  implies,  first,  a  clear  con 
ception  of  the  nature  of  his  office,  and  of  the  plans  to  be  exe 
cuted  ;  and  then  the  rare  sagacity  to  judge  of  the  fitness  of  men 
for  special  positions  and  particular  work.  The  man  who  pos 
sesses  this  power  is  able,  as  a  general  rule,  to  command  success. 

The  Secretary  of  the  ISTavy  showed  himself  capable  of  so  or 
ganizing  his  Department,  that  each  head  of  a  bureau  seemed 
eminently  suited  to  his  place,  and  all  worked  harmoniously  and 
skilfully  together  for  the  common  end. 

The  manner  in  which  the  Department  was  conducted  affords, 
however,  the  most  convincing  proof  of  the  fitness  of  its  officers 
for  the  high  positions  to  which  they  were  called.  Their  friends 
may  proudly  point  to  their  administration  of  affairs  as  the  best 
possible  evidence  of  their  integrity,  their  patriotism,  and  ability. 
It  is  idle  to  pretend  that  such  results  could  have  been  reached 
by  men  of  ordinary  capacity,  or  that  the  chief  of  so  successful 
an  administration  had  no  special  adaptation  to  the  grave  duties 
of  his  office.  The  papers  which  from  time  to  time  were  ad 
dressed  to  Congress  direct,  or  to  the  various  conimittees,  present 
very  clearly  the  comprehensiveness  of  the  views  of  this  depart 
ment  of  our  Government. 

Yery  early  in  the  struggle  the  real  policy  of  France  and 
England  was  apparent  to  the  members  of  the  Government ;  and 
so  soon  as  it  was  fully  revealed  in  the  Trent  case,  the  Secretary, 
as  head  of  the  Navy,  felt  it  to  be  his  peculiar  duty  to  warn  his 
countrymen  of  the  danger,  and  induce  them,  if  possible,  to  avoid 
a  foreign  war  by  such  an  exhibition  of  naval  strength  as  would 
forbid  an  attack. 

Congress  was  urged  to  consider  the  fact  that  a  foreign  war 
must  be  waged  almost  exclusively  upon  the  ocean ;  and  that,  in 
view  of  the  settled  hostility  of  England  and  France,  we  ought 
to  prepare  ourselves  to  cope  with  their  navies,  through  which 
alone  they  can  strike  us.  It  was  urged  that  fear  of  our  power, 
and  especially  of  our  naval  strength,  must  always  be  our  best 
security  against  foreign  aggression.  Competent  persons  were 


22  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

^ 

sent  to  Europe  to  examine  the  dock-yards,  machine-shops,  and 
other  means  and  appliances  for  the  construction  and  mainte 
nance  of  the  navies  of  the  great  powers ;  and  it  was  shown  how 
inadequate  all  our  means  were  for  maintaining  a  great  war  on 
the  sea,  not  because  of  any  lack  of  inventive  power,  or  mechan 
ical  skill,  or  of  suitable  material,  but  because  our  navy-yards, 
our  dock-yards,  our  machine-shops,  and  our  founderies  were  all 
on  a  contracted  scale,  and  wholly  inadequate  to  meet  the  de 
mands  of  a  great  war,  and  especially  a  foreign  war.  The  re 
ports  of  the  Department  set  in  strong  light  the  fact  that  such 
vast  establishments  as  the  nation  requires  cannot  be  extempo 
rized  in  an  hour  of  need  and  peril;  and  that  we  should  not  sup 
pose  that  because  we  could  suddenly  fit  out  an  effective  block 
ading  squadron  from  our  merchant  marine,  we  could  also,  from 
the  same  source,  provide  ships  capable  of  meeting  on  equal 
terms  the  vessels  which  France  and  England  have  built  espe 
cially  for  war,  with  every  improvement  which  modern  science 
can  suggest. 

The  position  of  the  Department  in  regard  to  the  question 
of  blockade  is  set  forth  in  a  subsequent  chapter  devoted  to  that 
point.  The  Secretary  saw  distinctly,  and  urged  upon  the  at 
tention  of  the  Government,  the  essential  point  that  the  rebel 
lion  should  be  treated  as  a  domestic  question,  with  which 
foreign  powers  had  no  concern;  that  the  insurgents  were 
traitors,  to  be  dealt  with  according  to  our  own  laws,  and  as 
entitled  to  no  belligerent  rights  and  no  public  recognition  of 
any  kind,  and  denying  that  they  were  in  any  sense  a  govern 
ment  among  the  nations. 

It  will  doubtless  be  interesting  to  the  reader  to  know  some 
thing  of  the  life  of  the  chief  of  the  ]STavy  Department  previous 
to  the  time  when  he  was  called  to  the  head  of  this  important 
branch  of  the  Government.  A  few  facts  on  this  point  have 
been  collected,  but  the  most  important  part  of  his  life  is  em 
braced  in  his  official  career,  and  that  is  exhibited  by  his  acts  as 
they  appear  in  the  pages  of  this  work.* 

*  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  was  born  in  Glastenbury,  in  the  county 
of  Hartford,  Conn.,  July  1,  1802.  His  parentage  was  of  the  primitive  Puritan 
Btock.  Thomas  Welles,  the  original  emigrant  of  the  family,  settled  in  Hartford  as 
early  as  1636.  He  was  the  first  treasurer  of  the  colony,  and  subsequently  its  Gov- 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  23 

Had  the  policy  proposed  by  the  Department  been  adopted 
by  the  Government,   and   if  then  England  and   France  had 

ernor.  The  estate  in  Glastenbury,  where  Mr.  Welles  was  born,  was  purchased  of 
the  Indians  by  Governor  Welles  in  1640,  and  has  never  been  alienated  from  the 
family,  being  now  the  property  of  his  only  surviving  brother.  Mr.  Welles  was 
several  years  at  the  Episcopal  Academy  in  Cheshire,  Conn.,  and  at  a  later  period  he 
was  with  Captain  Partridge,  at  Norwich  University.  Subsequently  he  read  law  with 
the  late  Chief-Justice  Williams,  and  afterward  with  the  Hon.  W.  W.  Ellsworth,  since 
a  Judge  of  the  Supreme  Court  of  Connecticut.  In  January,  1826,  he  became  editor 
and  one  of  the  proprietors  of  the  Hartford  Times.  Mr.  Welles  continued  to  edit 
that  paper  until  the  close  of  Jackson's  administration,  and  was  one  of  its  principal 
contributors  until  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise. 

In  1827  he  was  elected  to  the  Legislature,  and  was  the  youngest  member  of  that 
body.  He  was  repeatedly  reflected  until  1835,  when  he  was  appointed  by  the  Legis 
lature  Comptroller  of  Public  Accounts. 

In  the  politics,  legislative  action,  and  important  measures  of  the  State,  for  more 
than  thirty  years,  Mr.  Welles  has  borne  a  distinguished  part,  and  the  policy  advocated 
by  him  has  ultimately  been  successful. 

In  1835  Mr.  Welles  married  Mary  Jane  Hale,  of  Lewistown,  Pennsylvania,  daugh 
ter  of  Elias  W.  Hale,  a  distinguished  lawyer  of  Central  Pennsylvania. 

Upon  the  election  of  Judge  Niles  to  the  Senate,  Mr.  Welles  was,  in  1836,  ap 
pointed  postmaster  at  Hartford,  then  one  of  the  largest  and  most  important  dis 
tributing  offices  in  the  country.  He  remained  in  this  office  until  1841,  when  he  was 
removed  by  President  Harrison.  In  1842  he  was  elected  by  the  people  comptroller, 
the  constitution  having  been  changed,  making  that  office  an  elective  one.  His  ad 
ministration  of  the  duties  of  the  comptroller's  office — the  chief  financial  office  of 
the  State — was  marked  by  distinguished  ability,  and  gave  satisfaction  to  all  parties. 

In  1846  Mr.  Polk,  unsolicited  and  very  unexpectedly,  tendered  him  the  office  of 
chief  of  one  of  the  naval  bureaus,  which  he  retained  until  the  summer  of  1849. 

On  the  adjustment  of  the  financial  question,  during  the  administration  of  Mr. 
Polk,  Mr.  Welles  considered  the  mission  of  the  old  parties  at  an  end — nothing  but 
their  organizations  and  the  prejudices  and  antagonisms  engendered  by  them  remain 
ing.  In  the  mean  time,  new  questions  relating  to  the  territorial  policy  of  the  Govern 
ment  as  connected  therewith  arising,  Mr.  Welles,  adhering  to  his  original  principles, 
maintained  the  Jeffcrsonian  doctrine  that  slavery  was  the  creature  of  local  law, 
and  should  not  be  extended  into  the  Territories  through  the  agency  or  by  the 
instrumentality  of  the  Federal  Government.  The  repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise, 
followed  by  the  Kansas  aggression,  led  to  new  party  organizations.  The  Republican 
party  came  into  existence,  and,  sympathizing  in  this  movement,  Mr.  Welles  took  an 
early  and  active  part  in  it,  and  was  the  candidate  of  that  party  for  Governor  in  1856. 
From  the  day  of  its  inception  Mr.  Welles  threw  his  whole  power  and  influence 
into  the  Republican  movement.  He  was  appointed  by  the  Convention  in  Philadelphia, 
in  1856,  a  member  of  the  Republican  National  Committee,  and  was  one  of  its  execu 
tive  members  then  and  until  after  Mr.  Lincoln's  election.  He  was  also  chairman  of 
the  Connecticut  delegation  to  the  Chicago  Convention.  On  the  formation  of  the  Re 
publican  party,  the  establishment  of  a  paper  to  sustain  the  views  of  that  party  in 
Connecticut  became  necessary,  and  the  Hartford  Press,  now  one  of  the  leading  and 


24  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

declared    as    they  did   both  parties   equal    belligerents,  they 
would  have  been  bound  by  this  concession  of  belligerent  rights 

most  influential  journals  in  the  State,  was  commenced,  and  Mr.  Welles  was  one  of  its 
principal  contributors. 

When  Mr.  Lincoln  took  the  Presidential  chair,  in  March,  1861,  Mr.  Welles  was 
invited  to  a  seat  in  the  Cabinet,  as  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  The  breaking  out  of  the 
rebellion  soon  made  it  evident  that  the  post  was  one  of  the  greatest  responsibility. 
In  the  language  of  the  annual  report  of  the  Secretary,  dated  December  2,  1861, 
"  the  Navy  was  called  upon,  at  the  same  time,  to  prepare  for  and  accomplish  a  triple 
task,  more  arduous,  it  is  believed,  in  some  respects,  than  has  before  been  demanded 
of  the  maritime  power  of  any  government."  This  was — 

"  1.  The  closing  of  all  the  insurgent  ports  along  a  coast  line  of  nearly  three 
thousand  miles,  in  the  form  and  under  the  exacting  regulations  of  an  international 
blockade,  including  the  naval  occupation  and  defence  of  the  Potomac  River,  from  its 
mouth  to  the  Federal  capital,  as  the  boundary  line  between  Maryland  and  Virginia, 
and  also  the  main  commercial  avenue  to  the  principal  base  of  our  military  operations. 

"  2.  The  organization  of  combined  naval  and  military  expeditions  to  operate  in 
force  against  various  points  of  the  Southern  coast,  rendering  efficient  cooperation 
with  the  position  and  movements  of  such  expeditions  when  landed,  and  including 
also  all  needful  naval  aid  to  the  Army  in  cutting  off  intercommunication  with  the 
rebels,  and  in  its  operations  on  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries ;  and 

"  3.  The  active  pursuit  of  the  piratical  cruisers  which  might  escape  the  vigilance 
of  the  blockading  force  and  put  to  sea  from  the  rebel  ports." 

Some  idea  of  the  labor  necessary  effectually  to  enforce  the  blockade  along  a  line 
of  coast,  subsequently  ascertained  by  official  data  to  be  three  thousand  five  hundred 
and  forty-nine  statute  miles  in  length,  may  be  formed  from  the  fact  that  in  this  coast 
are  one  hundred  and  eighty-nine  openings,  in  one  hundred  and  forty-four  of  which 
vessels  drawing  at  least  six  feet  of  water  can  enter. 

The  whole  management  of  the  Navy,  under  the  administration  of  Mr.  Welles,  in 
dicates  successful  administrative  ability.  It  has  been  quiet  and  unobtrusive,  but 
firm  and  sagacious.  No  department  of  the  Government  has  been  more  ungenerously 
assailed,  and  sometimes  from  quarters  unexpected,  and  where  it  might  have  antici 
pated  support ;  but  the  results  have  evinced  the  wisdom  and  the  grasp  of  the  Secretary, 
who  was  persistent  and  resolute  under  all  discouragements,  infusing  a  patriotic  and 
Union  sentiment  into  the  service,  and  animating  it  with  a  spirit  which  has  made  itself 
felt  in  successful  conflicts  that  have  added  to  our  naval  renown. 

In  the  performance  of  official  duty,  however  arduous  and  important,  Mr.  Welles 
always  avoided  all  obtrusiveness  and  ostentation.  He  never  sought  to  create  a  sen 
sation.  Clearness  and  sobriety  of  judgment,  enlarged  and  accurate  appreciation  of 
the  wants  of  that  arm  of  public  defence  which  he  has  been  called  to  strengthen 
and  to  wield,  indefatigable  industry  and  perseverance  in  labor,  and  an  unshaken 
firmness  of  purpose,  resulting  from  patient  reflection  upon  which  his  conclusions 
have  been  formed — these  are  some  of  the  qualities  which  characterized  him  as  an  ad 
ministrative  officer. 

The  character  of  Mr.  Welles  is  better  illustrated  by  the  manner  in  which  his 
department  was  conducted,  as  will  very  clearly  be  shown  in  the  course  of  the  his 
tory. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  25 

to  us  as  against  themselves  and  their  ships ;  while  our  Govern 
ment,  in  all  its  dealings  with  the  insurgents  themselves,  would 
still  have  been  at  liberty  to  treat  the  insurrection  as  a  domestic 
question,  and  the  insurgents  as  guilty  of  treason.  This  is  true, 
because  England  could  determine  by  proclamation  only  her  own 
relations  to  us  and  to  them,  but  had  no  authority  to  decide  in 
what  manner  the  rebels  should  be  treated  by  the  Government 
of  the  United  States.  If  we,  then,  chose  to  blockade  the  South 
ern  ports,  England  and  France  could  not  complain,  because 
they  had  proclaimed  the  rebels  to  be  lawful  belligerents.  If  we 
had  chosen,  instead  of  a  blockade,  to  close  our  ports,  they  had  no 
right  to  interfere  with  a  question  which  we  declared  a  domestic 
one,  with  which  other  nations  could  have  no  concern.  Had 
these  principles  been  clearly  stated  and  firmly  held  in  the  be 
ginning,  the  Government  asserting  its  own  unlimited  sover 
eignty  over  the  rebels,  exercising  as  against  England  and  her 
ships  the  belligerent  rights  she  conceded  to  us,  and  dealing  with 
the  rebels  as  a  sovereign  with  subjects  in  revolt  and  guilty  of 
treason,  then,  at  the  close  of  the  war,  no  one  could  have  dis 
puted  that  the  insurgents  were  simply  captured  traitors,  who 
had  forfeited  every  civil  and  political  right,  and  the  question 
of  their  being  readmitted  to  their  former  position  and  privileges 
when  they  laid  down  their  arms  could  never  have  been  raised. 

On  the  other  hand,  had  the  Government  boldly  stated  and 
firmly  held  the  doctrine  which  was  really  implied  in  the  man 
ner  of  establishing  the  blockade,  though  not  asserted,  that  the 
Confederates  had  established  a  government  and  must  be  treated 
according  to  international  law,  and  as  belligerents,  which  idea 
was  acted  upon  in  establishing  a  system  of  exchanges  of  prison 
ers,  then  their  allegiance  with  the  United  States  was  really 
severed,  and  at  the  close  of  the  war  they  had  only  the  rights  of 
conquered  enemies,  with  no  shadow  of  a  claim  to  be  admitted 
to  any  share  in  the  Government. 

The  influence  of  the  Navy  Department  upon  another  impor 
tant  feature  of  national  policy  may  be  properly  mentioned  here. 
It  is  not  generally  known  that  the  very  first  blow  struck  by  the 
Government  at  the  system  of  slavery  came  from  the  Navy  De 
partment.  The  very  first  step  in  the  right  direction  was  taken 
by  Secretary  Welles.  In  this  respect,  the  Navy  was  in  advance 


26  HISTORY   OF    THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

of  every  other  department  of  the  Government ;  it  was  the  true 
pioneer  in  that  policy  which  deprived  the  rebels  of  their 
strength,  and  resulted  in  universal  emancipation.  The  decks 
of  our  ships  were  the  places  where  first  of  all  the  manhood  of 
the  slave  was  recognized,  where  first  he  felt  himself  protected 
by  the  American  flag.  If  nothing  else  had  been  done  by  the 
Navy  during  the  war,  it  should  still  be  endeared  to  every  true 
patriot,  to  every  true  friend  of  Christian  freedom,  because,  in  ad 
vance  of  all  other  movements,  it  struck  the  fetter  from  the  slave 
by  authority  of  one  of  the  departments  of  the  Government. 

Long  before  the  Fugitive-Slave  Law  had  been  repealed,  and 
while  the  officers  of  the  Army  were  returning  to  their  masters 
the  slaves  who  were  ready  and  anxious  to  fight  our  battles,  as 
well  as  to  secure  their  own  freedom,  the  deck  of  the  national 
ship  furnished  to  them  a  secure  asylum — a  spot  not  subjected 
to  the  search  of  the  master,  and  from  which  the  fugitive  could 
not  be  forced  away. 

The  Department  took  at  first  the  bold  and  true  position  that 
the  Government,  as  such,  knew  nothing  of  slaves — that  it  rec 
ognized  men  only ;  and  that  if  a  loyal  man,  from  a  rebel  State, 
came  on  board  our  ships,  whether  black  or  white,  he  was  to 
receive  protection,  and  in  no  case  was  he  to  be  returned  to  his 
master.  Nor  did  the  measures  of  the  Department  cease  with 
bare  protection.  It  was  seen  that  the  slaves  were  an  element 
of  strength  which  should  not  only  be  subtracted  from  the  rebels, 
but  that  it  should  be  added  to  our  own  power,  and  thus  the 
cause  of  the  rebellion  would  receive  a  double  detriment.  The 
Secretary,  therefore,  in  advance  of  all  movements,  even  in  Con 
gress,  and  as  early  as  July  22,  1861,  issued  the  following  order, 
occasioned  by  the  letters  which  are  here  presented  : 

IT.  S.  STEAMER  MINNESOTA,  HAMPTON  ROADS,  July  18, 1861. 
HON.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy  : 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  to  the  Department  copies  of 
reports,  July  15  and  17,  of  Commander  0.  S.  Glisson,  of  the  Mount 
Vernon,  with  a  request  by  him  to  me  that  I  shall  instruct  him  what  to 
do  with  the  negroes  on  board  his  vessel,  and  with  others  that  may  come. 

If  negroes  are  to  be  used  in  this  contest,  I  have  no  hesitation  in 
saying  they  should  be  used  to  preserve  the  Government,  not  to  destrov  it. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  27 

These  men  are  destitute.     Shall  I  ration  them  ?     They  may  be  ser 
viceable  on  board  our  storeship. 

Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  H.  STRINGHAM, 
Flag-Officer,  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 


U.  S.  STEAMER  MOUNT  VERNON,  RAPPAHAXNOCK,  July  15, 1861. 

SIR  :  I  have  to  report  that  this  morning  at  daylight  we  observed  a 
boat  adrift  near  Stingaree  light-house.  We  manned  a  boat,  armed  her, 
and  sent  her  with  an  officer  to  pick  up  the  boat,  and  to  ascertain  who 
was  in  the  light-house. 

At  8  h.  30  m.  the  boat  returned,  bringing  with  her  six  negroes  who 
had  deserted  from  the  shore  during  the  night,  and  taken  shelter  in  the 
light-house,  casting  their  boat  adrift  to  avoid  detection. 

They  appear  to  be  very  much  frightened,  and  state  that  the  people 
on  shore  are  about  arming  the  negroes,  with  the  intention  of  placing 
them  in  the  front  of  battle.  Their  taking  this  course  has  caused  much 
excitement  amongst  the  negro  population,  who  are  deserting  in  every 
direction.  Two  other  boats  made  their  escape  last  night,  with  hope  of 
being  picked  up  by  some  vessel  passing  in  the  bay. 

I  have  rationed  these  negroes  on  board  of  this  vessel,  until  I  receive 
orders  from  you  as  to  their  disposal.     Enclosed  I  forward  you  a  list  of 
these  slaves,  together  with  a  list  of  the  names  of  their  owners. 
I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

O.  S.  GLISSON,  Commander  U.  S.  Navy. 
To  Flag- Officer  SILAS  H.  STRINGHAM, 

Commanding  the  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron,  etc.,  etc. 

U.  S.  STEADIER  Morxi  VERNON-,  RAPPAHANNOCK,  July  17, 1861. 
SIR  :  I  have  to  report  that  three  more  slaves,  named  respectively 
Lewis  Ransom,  Robert   Brooks,  and   Albert  Hutchings,  belonging  to 
John  H.  Dunlavey,  of  Matthews  County,  Virginia,  gave  themselves  up 
this  morning. 

"Will  you  please  inform  me  how  I  shall  dispose  of  these  men,  and 
how  I  shall  act  in  future  when  they  come  on  board  ?  They  say  that,  if 
they  should  be  returned,  they  would  be  murdered. 

We  are  all  well  on  board,  and  every  thing  is  quiet  off  the  Rappa- 
hannock.  I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

O.  S.  GLISSON,  Commander  U.  S.  Navy. 
To  Flag-Officer  SILAS  H.  STRINGHAM, 

Commanding  the  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 


28  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  July  22, 1861. 

SIB  :  Your  dispatch  No.  70,  in  relation  to  certain  negroes  who  have 
fled  from  Virginia  and  are  on  board  the  Mount  Yernon — asking  what 
disposition  shall  be  made  of  them — is  received. 

It  is  not  the  policy  of  the  Government  to  invite  or  encourage  this 
class  of  desertions ;  and  yet,  under  the  circumstances,  no  other  course 
than  that  pursued  by  Commander  Glisson  could  be  adopted  without 
violating  every  principle  of  humanity.  To  return  them  would  be  im 
politic  as  well  as  cruel ;  and,  as  you  remark,  "  they  may  be  made  ser 
viceable  on  board  our  storeship,"  you  will  do  well  to  employ  them. 
I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flay- Officer  S.  H.  STRINGHAM, 

Commanding  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron, 
Hampton  Roads,  Va. 

For  this  order  the  Secretary  will  not  fail  to  receive  from 
every  friend  of  freedom  and  from  every  true  patriot  the  honor 
due.  It  not  only  commands  a  right  thing  to  be  done,  but  it 
asserts  a  motive  worthy  both  of  the  statesman  and  the  Christian. 
To  return  them,  he  says,  would  be  contrary  to  every  principle 
of  humanity;  a  right  noble  'assertion.  The  deck  of  an  Ameri 
can  ship  shall  not  become  at  the  demand  of  a  slave-master,  a 
spot  where  every  principle  of  humanity  shall  be  violated,  in  de 
livering  up  the  fugitive.  The  American  sailor  and  the  flag 
shall  not  thus  be  disgraced. 

And  the  Secretary  further  states  that  it  would  be  impolitic 
as  well  as  cruel,  to  return  these  men  to  slavery.  Thus  early 
he  adopted  the  only  statesmanlike  policy  of  conducting  the 
war  on  the  true  principles  of  war.  He  never  adopted  himself, 
nor  sanctioned  for  others,  the  well-nigh  fatal  course  of  regarding 
the  conspirators  as  friends  who  had  forfeited  no  rights,  and 
who  must  not  be  weakened  or  distressed  by  using  or  destroying 
their  property,  or  by  freeing  and  employing  their  slaves. 

Nor  does  this  course  subject  him  to  any  proper  charge  of 
violating  the  laws  of  the  Constitution,  because  the  Fugitive- 
Slave  Law  was  not  then  repealed. 

He  saw  from  the  beginning,  what  was  afterward  admitted 
by  all  but  rebels  and  their  friends— that  the  traitors  had  for 
feited  all  rights  by  their  act  of  war,  and  had,  therefore,  lost 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  29 

whatever  title  they  claimed  before  the  war  to  control  the  ser 
vices  of  a  loyal  man.  The  following  order,  dated  September 
25,  1861,  will  show  how  early  the  Department  settled  another 
important  question ;  and  all  can  now  see  that  if  it  had  been 
treated  firmly  and  steadily  in  the  same  manner,  at  the  same 
time,  in  the  Army,  the  war  would  have  been  finished  far  sooner 
than  it  actually  was  : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  September  25, 1861. 

SIR  :  The  Department  finds  it  necessary  to  adopt  a  regulation  with 
respect  to  the  large  and  increasing  number  of  persons  of  color,  common 
ly  known  as  "  contrabands,"  now  subsisted  at  the  navy-yards  and  on 
board  ships-of-war. 

These  can  neither  be  expelled  from  the  service,  to  which  they  have 
resorted,  nor  can  they  be  maintained  unemployed,  and  it  is  not  proper 
that  they  should  be  compelled  to  render  necessary  and  regular  services, 
without  a  stated  compensation.  You  are  therefore  authorized,  when 
their  services  can  be  made  useful,  to  enlist  them  for  the  naval  service, 
under  the  same  forms  and  regulations  as  apply  to  other  enlistments. 
They  will  be  allowed,  however,  no  higher  rating  than  "boys,"  at  a  com 
pensation  of  ten  dollars  per  month  and  one  ration  per  day. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flay- Officer  S.  F.  DuPoNT, 

Commanding  South  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron,  and  others. 


This  settled,  so  far  as  the  Navy  Department  was  concerned, 
a  policy  which  was  not  finally  determined  upon  in  the  Army  and 
by  Congress  until  1863.  The  following  letter,  dated  July  2, 
1862,  will  show  that  the  enlistment  of  negroes  in  the  Navy  was 
carried  on  precisely  as  it  was  for  others,  and  from  the  early  part 
of  the  war  the  true  policy  was  adopted  and  steadily  pursued : 

NAVT  DEPARTMENT,  July  2, 1862. 

SIR:  Among  the  persons  known  as  "contrabands,"  who  have  sought 
the  protection  of  the  United  States,  please  ascertain  if  there  are  any  men 
physically  competent  to  enlist  in  the  Navy  for  service  in  the  Pacific,  at 
landsmen's  wages. 

If  so,  a  vessel  will  be  sent  to  take  one  hundred  and  fifty  of  them 
to  the  Isthmus.  About  the  same  number  could  be  used  advantageously 


30  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

in  the  vessels  now  fitting  for  sea,  as  shipping  does  not  keep  pace  with 
the  naval  wants. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flag- Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT, 

Commanding  S.  A.  B.  Squadron,  Port  JRoyal,  S.  C. 


In  giving  what  is  considered  to  be  this  just  praise  to  the 
Department,  it  is  not  forgotten  that  occasional  and  fitful  efforts 
were  early  made  by  some  of  the  officers  of  the  Army  to  establish 
a  similar  policy,  nor  that  Secretary  Cameron  recommended  the 
employment  of  the  slaves ;  but  the  policy  for  the  Army  was  not 
established,  and,  on  the  contrary,  the  main  influence  of  that  de 
partment,  in  the  first  years  of  the  war,  was  thrown  in  the  oppo 
site  direction ;  and  the  orders  of  leading  generals,  such  as  Hal- 
leek,  McClellan,  Sherman,  Hooker,  and  even  the  modifications 
by  the  President  of  Secretary  Cameron's  report,  all  prove  that 
no  cherishing,  welcoming  influence  was  extended  by  the  Army, 
as  a  whole,  to  the  slave  until  his  services  became  a  military  ne 
cessity. 

In  the  Navy,  on  the  other  hand,  he  was  from  the  very  first 
kindly  received,  protected,  and  employed  for  wages ;  and  almost 
from  the  first,  the  colored  able-bodied  loyal  men  were  freely  en 
listed  without  any  regard  to  what  their  previous  condition  had 
been.  The  Navy  really  inaugurated  the  policy  of  emancipation, 
which,  when  afterward  made  general,  was  the  means  of  saving 
the  country. 

Surrounded  as  the  Government  was  by  traitors  on  every 
side  in  the  beginning  of  the  war,  in  every  department,  and  in 
every  field  of  its  operations,  it  was  impossible  to  ferret  them  all 
out,  and  rid  the  service  of  their  dangerous  and  corrupting  pres 
ence  ;  but  the  intense  hostility  of  the  Secretary  to  every  form  of 
disloyalty  made  him  ever  watchful  to  discover  and  prompt  to 
punish  or  reprove  the  least  unfaithfulness  which  endangered  our 
cause. 

The  Department  was  not  disposed  to  tolerate  even  apathy. 
It  especially  and  justly  demanded,  that  every  officer  in  the  ser 
vice  of  the  Government  should  devote  his  best  talents  to  his 
country's  interest ;  and  sometimes,  as  in  the  case  mentioned  in 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  31 

one  of  the  letters  here  quoted,  it  was  willing  to  risk  a  possible 
injustice  rather  than  to  peril  the  national  cause.  The  result  of 
this  vigilance  was,  that  the  Navy  was  very  thoroughly  purged  of 
the  disloyal  element,  and  very  few  remained  whose  hearts  were 
not  in  the  work.  The  apathetic,  the  inefficient,  the  hesitating, 
delaying  ones  were  removed  as  fast  and  far  as  it  was  possible  to 
do  it ;  and  no  more  unjust  charge  was  ever  made  than  that  of 
inactivity  and  inefficiency  which  some  brought  against  the  Navy. 
The  country  during  the  war  knew  little  of  the  labors,  and  perils, 
and  hardships  of  our  seamen.  The  following  letters  will  show 
how  anxiously  the  condition  of  the  Navy  was  watched  : 


[CONFIDENTIAL.] 

NAVY  DEPART3IENT,  Auffust  &4, 1861. 

SIR  :  There  are  complaints  and  rumors  of  unfaithful  and  disloyal  offi 
cers  in  the  squadron  under  your  command.  Many,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped 
most,  of  these  complaints  are  without  substantial  foundation ;  but  it  is 
undeniable  that  the  Navy  has  been  sadly  demoralized,  and  it  is  appre 
hended  there  may  be  some  tainted  with  infidelity  to  the  Government 
they  profess  to  serve.  Justice  to  the  true  and  patriotic  officers  who  are 
nobly  vindicating  their  own  honor  and  that  of  the  Navy  in  these  days  of 
peril,  as  well  as  the  first  obligation  which  all  owe  to  the  Government 
and  the  country,  require  the  arrest  and  prompt  dismissal  of  every  officer 
tainted  with  disloyal  sentiments. 

You  will,  therefore,  be  vigilant  to  scrutinize  and  detect  any  symp 
toms  of  treason  or  infidelity,  tempering  decision  with  moderation,  and 
exercising  a  nice  and  calm  discretion,  avoiding  giving  offence  that  shall 
touch  the  sensibilities  of  a  faithful  officer  on  points  where  he  is  most 
sensitive.  In  these  matters  all  of  us  have  thankless  but  necessary  duties 
to  perform. 

I  send  herewith  a  copy  of  a  letter  received  at  the  Department  from 
a  gentleman  of  the  first  respectability.  You  will  endeavor  to  investigate 
the  facts  communicated,  and  if  satisfied  they  are  authentic,  take  imme 
diate  means  to  have  the  matter  corrected. 

Very  respectfully,  etc., 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flay- Officer  WM.  MERVINE, 

Commanding  Gulf  Blockading  Squadron, 

Key  West,  Florida. 


32  HISTOEY    OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

[CONFIDENTIAL.] 

NAVT  DEPARTMENT,  November  25, 1861. 

SIR  :  Since  the  efficiency  of  the  blockade  depends  ia  a  great  measure 
upon  the  professional  skill  of  each  individual  commander,  the  Department 
enjoins  upon  the  flag-officers  a  vigilant  supervision  of  the  movements  of 
each  vessel  under  their  command.  A  large  number  of  most  efficient  steam 
ers  are  being  pressed  to  completion,  and  the  Department  desires  to  assign 
these,  as  far  as  the  public  service  will  admit,  to  those  officers  who  have 
performed  at  sea  most  faithfully  the  duties  of  the  blockade.  You  will, 
therefore,  keep  the  Department  advised  of  the  relative  merit  of  each  and 
every  commander  attached  to  your  squadron,  and  take  care  that  no  case 
of  individual  merit,  or  the  reverse,  occurs  without  a  full  investigation 
and  report  to  the  Department.  The  Department  also  desires  a  particular 
report  relative  to  the  officers  formerly  in  the  Navy  and  now  serving  un 
der  acting  appointments,  and  those  now  attached  to  sea-going  vessels 
who  are  on  the  retired  list.  As  full  authority  is  given  to  the  flag-officers 
to  send  home  the  inefficient  and  apathetic,  and  make  any  changes  in  the 
commanding  officers  that  the  public  service  demands,  the  Government 
will  hold  them  responsible  for  the  efficiency  of  each  single  ship.  Kank 
has  its  merits,  but  no  consideration  will  be  given  to  it  unless  accompa 
nied  with  earnest  devotion  to  the  suppression  of  this  rebellion,  and  pro 
fessional  fidelity  to  the  duties  imposed. 

Very  respectfully,  etc., 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flag- Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT, 

Commanding  South  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron, 

Port  Royal,  S.  C.,  and  other  flag-officers. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  May  30, 1862. 

SIR  :  The  Department  addressed  to  you  a  letter,  dated  23d  ultimo, 
the  closing  paragraph  of  which  required  a  reply,  rather  than  a  simple 
acknowledgment  of  its  receipt.  At  a  period  like  this,  surrounded  as 
the  Government  has  been  by  traitors  and  lukewarm  supporters,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  Department  to  require  of  all  its  officers  an  acknowledgment 
of  their  intentions,  without  equivocation  or  evasion.  If  you  are  on  the 
side  of  the  Government  in  this  unholy  rebellion,  you  should  have  no  hes 
itation  in  writing  the  fact.  If  otherwise,  you  should  vacate  your  com 
mission  at  once.  You  will  also  explain  the  meaning  of  the  sentence  in 
your  letter  to  Captain  Gardner,  wherein  you  state  your  willingness  to 
abide  by  the  oath  while  you  remain  in  the  service. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 


OEGANIZATION   OF   THE   XAVY   DEPARTMENT.  33 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  October  2, 1861. 

SIR  :  *  *  *  *  At  a  time  like  this,  the  Department  must  insist 
on  its  right  and  duty  to  make  such  selections  as  it  deems  will  best  pro 
mote  the  public  welfare,  without  regard  to  personal  pretensions ;  and 
while  it  would  treat  with  all  tenderness  and  kindness  every  officer,  and 
especially  veterans  like  yourself,  it  cannot  permit  individual  considera 
tions  to  influence  and  control  its  action. 

That  "  the  best  energies  of  your  mind  and  body  have  been  assidu 
ously  and  laboriously  devoted  to  carrying  out  the  instructions  of  the 
Government "  may  be  admitted  without  the  formality  of  a  court ;  but  all 
men  are  not  alike  constituted,  and  other  and  different  qualities,  mental 
or  physical,  than  yours  may  be  deemed  requisite  at  this  period,  with 
out  the  implication  of  crime  or  fault  on  your  part.  In  selecting  you  to 
command  the no  partiality  was  exercised,  nor  has  any  prejudice  in 
duced  a  change.  Only  the  true  and  best  interests  of  the  country  have' 
been  consulted  in  what  has  been  done,  and  the  Department  must  judge 
of  men  as  well  as  means  best  adapted  to  carry  into  effect  its  views. 

Neither  the  time  nor  the  service  in  this  crisis  can  be  wasted  in 
courts  of  inquiry  or  courts-martial,  growing  out  of  the  substitution  of 
one  officer  for  another  for  any  duty.  Mere  forms  and  rank  cannot  be 
permitted  to  control  efficient  and  necessary  action  in  an  emergency  like 
this,  nor  can  officers  be  withdrawn  from  duty  unless  for  reasons  of  great 
public  necessity.  As  no  such  necessity  exists  in  consequence  of  substi 
tuting  one  officer  for  another  as ,  I  must  decline  ordering  a  court  of 

inquiry  or  a  court-martial  in  your  case. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 


So  great  was  the  peril  of  the  country,  in  the  Secretary's  opin 
ion,  from  disloyal  officers,  that  the  measures  he  felt  compelled 
to  adopt  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  Union,  were  thought  by 
some  to  be  needless  and  unjust.  But  the  life  of  the  nation  was 
at  stake,  and  it  was  thought  better,  even  if  temporary  injustice 
should  be  done  to  some,  that  at  all  hazards  that  life  should  be 
guarded  against  treason. 

At  the  breaking  out  of  the  rebellion,  many  officers  from  the 
Southern  States  were  on  foreign  stations,  whose  sentiments  were 
unknown,  and  in  regard  to  whom,  considering  the  example  of 
so  many  nearer  home,  there  was  much  to  fear.  It  could  not  be 
doubted  that  they  would  be  urged  by  every  possible  influence 
3 


34:  H1STOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

to  unite  with  their  States  against  the  General  Government ;  and 
should  they  do  so,  the  national  ships  under  their  command  could 
be  easily  taken  into  Southern  ports,  and  thus  the  traitors  would 
at  once  be  supplied  with  a  navy. 

The  Secretary  took  the  precautionary  measure  of  relieving 
such  officers  from  command,  even  when  there  was  no  special 
reason  to  doubt  their  loyalty ;  and  thus  the  Navy  was  secured 
against  a  possible  peril.  In  some  cases  it  w^as  found  that  no 
cause  existed  for  such  removals ;  and  then  a  prompt  explanation 
and  the  proper  amend  were  made,  and  ample  justice  was  done. 
The  following  is  one  of  the  letters  in  regard  to  such  cases,  and 
will  serve  to  explain  the  Secretary's  course : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  October  14, 1861. 

SIR  :  Your  letter  of  July  10th,  written  before  you  were  aware  that  the 
Department  had  relieved  you  of  your  command,  as  well  as  subsequent 
dispatches,  and  your  personal  report  on  Saturday  last,  the  clay  of  your 
return,  have  impressed  me  most  favorably  in  regard  to  your  loyalty  and 
patriotism  as  an  officer,  and  your  high  sense  of  duty  and  honor  as  a  man. 

Among  the  most  painful  and  trying  duties  that  have  devolved  upon 
me  in  administering  the  affairs  of  this  Department,  has  been  that  of  de 
ciding  what  course  of  policy  to  pursue  toward  officers  from  the  regions 
that  are  in  insurrection  who  were  intrusted  with  positions  of  responsibil 
ity  on  distant  stations.  Not  knowing  their  opinions  and  feelings  on 
questions  involving  the  integrity  of  the  Union  and  the  existence  of  the 
Government,  unable  to  ascertain  them,  except  indirectly,  and  by  infer 
ence  and  conclusions  drawn  from  their  associations  and  other  circum 
stances,  neither  satisfactory  nor  reliable,  I  was  compelled  to  act  in  some 
instances  with  apparent  harshness,  and  with  a  severity  I  did  not  feel  tow 
ard  gentlemen  sensitive  as  regarded  their  honor  and  professional  obli 
gations.  Such  was  my  action  in  sending  an  officer  to  relieve  you  against 
whom  there  was  not  an  imputation,  and  of  whom  I  knew  nothing  derog 
atory  as  an  officer  or  a  man.  Others  from  the  same  section,  who,  until 
the  culmination  of  the  conspiracy,  had  served  long  and  apparently  with 
fidelity,  and  whom,  until  their  disloyalty  was  disclosed,  I  had  no  reason 
to  distrust,  assumed  that  their  obligations  to  their  State  or  section  were 
paramount  to  their  allegiance  to  the  country.  Some  who  had  been  most 
trusted  had  proved  most  faithless.  Without  any  means  in  my  posses 
sion  to  discriminate  between  the  faithful  and  the  faithless,  I  was  com 
pelled  to  act,  and  in  doing  so  I  have  done  yourself  and  others  injustice. 
It  was  an  unavoidable  necessity,  and  it  gives  me  pleasure,  I  assure  you, 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   NAVY    DEPARTMENT.  35 

to  atone  so  far  as  I  can  now,  personally  and  officially,  for  tlie  wrong  in 
flicted,  by  expressing  to  you,  as  I  do  most  earnestly,  my  profound  regret 
that  I  had  no  means  of  knowing  your  sentiments  as  I  now  know  them, 
and  to  say,  as  I  do  in  all  sincerity,  that  had  I  known  them  in  season,  you 
would  not  have  been  detached  from  your  command. 

Your  letter — the  promptings  of  a  generous  mind — satisfies  me  that 
you  have  a  right  appreciation  of  my  motives,  and  of  the  overruling  ne 
cessity  by  which  I  was  compelled  to  act. 

Wishing  you  every  success,  and  hoping  the  Government  will  have  an 
opportunity  of  availing  itself  of  your  active  services, 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 


The  standing  charge  which,  without  fail,  comes  from  some 
quarter  against  every  administration  and  every  department,  is 
extravagance  and  carelessness  in  the  use  of  the  public  funds. 
It  would  have  been  an  unheard-of  thing  if  no  one  had  brought 
such  an  accusation  against  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  The 
manner  in  which  the  Department  first  undertook  to  provide 
itself  with  ships  for  a  blockading  squaolron  is  described  in 
another  chapter.  The  purchase  was  committed,  first  of  all,  to 
officers  of  the  Navy,  assisted  by  business  men.  The  spirit  and 
intention  of  the  Department  are  wrell  set  forth  in  the  following 
letter,  addressed  to  all  the  officers  who  had  this  business  in 
charge.  Investigations  made  by  those  who,  from  personal  feel 
ings,  endeavored  to  show  mismanagement  in  the  Navy,  failed 
to  disclose  any  thing  in  the  operations  of  the  Department  at 
variance  with  the  tone  and  policy  of  this  letter  of  instructions. 
Abuses  of  confidence,  perhaps,  can  be  shown,  for  all  men  are  not 
strictly  upright ;  but  evidently  the  Secretary  did  what  he  could 
to  guard  the  public  interests  : 

NAVY  DEPAHTMENT,  September  20, 1861. 

SIR  :  Under  the  present  exigencies  of  the  service,  the  large  pur 
chases  and  repairs  of  vessels,  and  other  expenditures,  great  power  is  del 
egated  to  you,  and  with  it  great  responsibility.  In  exercising  the  au 
thority  with  which  you  are  necessarily  invested,  and  especially  in  all 
that  involves  the  expenditure  of  money,  I  feel  it  a  duty  to  urge  upon 
you  a  strict  regard  to  economy. 

Let  me  also  urge  upon  you  the  importance  of  promptness  in  prepar- 


36  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

ing  and  equipping  the  vessels,  and  that  you  devote  your  whole  time  and 
attention  to  the  completion  and  discharge  of  the  duties  with  which  you 
are  intrusted.  We  are  in  the  midst  of  a  formidable  rebellion,  and  every 
man  is  required  to  use  his  best  efforts  in  behalf  of  his  country. 

Promptitude,  vigilance,  and  economy  are  urged  upon  you.  Scruti 
nize  closely  all  bills  that  you  approve,  for  you  will  be  held  to  a  close 
accountability,  not  only  for  dispatch,  but  for  expenditures. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 


INSTRUCTIONS  IN  EEGAED  TO  THE  BLOCKADE,  URGING  "WATCHFULNESS,  AC 
TIVITY,  AND  THE  FIEM  ASSERTION  OF  OUE  EIGHTS. 

It  was  thought  by  some,  during  the  war,  to  be  a  proof  of 
remissness  or  incompetency  in  the  management  of  the  iN"avy, 
that  so  many  vessels  were  enabled  to  run  the  blockade ;  and  it 
was  believed  that  those  whose  success  wras  known,  were  only  a 
part  of  a  much  larger  number  equally  successful,  of  which  the 
public  knew  nothing.  Two  facts  were  overlooked :  first,  the 
extreme  difficulty  of  maintaining  an  efficient  blockade  along  a 
coast-line  three  thousand  five  hundred  miles  long,  and  this  coast, 
by  its  bays  and  sounds,  presenting  a  double  front  to  be  guarded 
for  a  large  part  of  the  entire  distance,  so  that  the  wonder  was 
that  any  thing  could  be  kept  out,  rather  than  that  some  escaped 
the  vigilance  of  our  cruisers  ;  and  second,  it  was  the  interest  of 
the  rebels  to  publish  every  instance  of  success,  so  as  to  encour 
age  others,  and  show  the  inefficiency  of  the  blockade,  and  induce 
foreign  powers  to  disregard  it,  if  possible.  The  activity  and 
success  of  the  blockading  squadron  is  now  clearly  proved  by  the 
great  and  acknowledged  destitution  throughout  the  South,  and 
by  the  significant  fact  that  at  the  close  of  the  war  the  cotton 
which  still  remained  in  the  South,  and  which  could  not  be 
shipped  because  of  the  stringency  of  the  blockade,  was  worth  in 
currency  $400,000,000,  or  in  gold  $300,000,000,  which  amount 
came  in  various  forms  to  the  relief  of  the  nation.  The  follow 
ing  letters  will  show  the  spirit  of  the  Department,  the  principles 
upon  which  the  blockade  was  conducted,  and  especially  the 
firmness  with  which  American  rights  were  insisted  upon  in  the 
case  of  the  French  tobacco  at  Eichmond,  when  the  State  De 
partment  seemed  inclined  to  grant  the  right  of  shipment : 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  37 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  April  10, 1862. 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  reference  to  this  Depart 
ment  of  your  letter  of  the  2d  instant,  addressed  to  the  honorable  Secretary 
of  War,  communicating  the  request  of  M.  Mercier,  the  minister  of  France, 
for  a  permit  for  an  agent  to  visit  Richmond  for  the  purpose  of  having 
some  tobacco,  the  property  of  French  subjects,  delivered  into  the  hands 
of  the  French  consul  there.  The  Secretary  of  War  also  furnishes  me 
with  a  copy  of  his  letter  to  you,  in  which  he  considers  the  question  in 
volved  as  one  affecting  the  blockade. 

The  "request"  of  M.  Mercier,  which  you  mention  as  being  trans 
mitted  with  your  letter,  did  not  accompany  it,  and  the  Department  is 
not  therefore  informed  whether  any  step  further  than  the  mere  delivery 
of  the  tobacco  into  the  hands  of  the  consul  is  contemplated.  If  not,  I 
think  the  question  of  a  permit  is  not  a  matter  pertaining  to  the  Navy 
Department. 

Under  no  circumstances,  however,  can  the  tobacco  be  permitted  to 
be  exported  during  the  existing  blockade  of  Virginia. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Hon.  WM.  H.  SEWARD,  Secretary  of  State. 


NAVT  DEPARTMENT,  September  25, 1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  received  your  letter  of  the  24th  instant,  reporting  the 
proceedings  of  the  flotilla,  and  in  reference  to  trade  with  the  Virginia 
shore. 

You  will  allow  no  vessel  to  import  or  export  merchandise  at  any 
port  of  the  blockaded  country.  Alexandria  is  the  only  port  open  for 
general  traffic  within  the  limits  of  your  command. 

You  will  not  regard  what  are  called  "  permits  "  from  any  officer  ex 
cept  the  Secretaries  of  the  Treasury,  War,  or  Navy,  as  authorizing  the 
ingress  or  egress  of  any  vessel  in  violation  of  the  blockade. 

There  must  be  no  favoritism  or  license  given  to  any  one  or  more 
of  our  countrymen  to  traffic  within  the  blockaded  region,  or  to  import 
or  export  merchandise.  That  would  be  justly  considered  as  evasive  of 
the  blockade,  and  in  bad  faith. 

No  officer  of  the  Army  or  Navy  is  authorized  to  grant  permits,  and 
you  will  seize  all  vessels  engaged  in  illegal  traffic. 

Such  vessels  as,  under  the  authority  of  the  War  or  Navy  Depart 
ment,  may  be  engaged  to  carry  supplies  to  the  Army  or  Navy,  will  take 
no  return  cargo  from  the  territory  blockaded.  The  blockade  is  intended 


38  HISTORY   OF    THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

to  interdict  all  trade  whatever  with  the  country  blockaded,  during  its 
continuance,  and  should  be  rigidly  enforced. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Commodore  A.  A.  HARWOOD, 

Commanding  Potomac  Flotilla,  etc.,  Washington,  D.  C. 


NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  August  29, 1862. 

SIR  :  Yours,  No.  85,  bearing  date  the  18th  instant,  inquiring  of  the 
Department  whether  it  is  expedient  to  seize  ships  that  are  from  Liver 
pool,  bound  to  Nassau,  or  from  one  British  port  to  another,  has  been  re 
ceived. 

In  reply,  the  Department  directs  that  yon  visit,  without  regard  to 
their  clearance  or  destination,  all  vessels  not  being  public  armed  ships- 
of-war  of  foreign  powers,  and  that  in  the  case  of  all  vessels  carrying  cargo 
or  engaged  in  commerce,  and  not  being  regular  mail  steam-packets  en 
gaged  in  the  regular  and  stated  mail  service  of  foreign  governments,  you 
will,  during  the  visit,  exercise  the  unquestioned  belligerent  right  of 
search;  and  if  upon  strict  search  it  shall  appear  that  arms  or  contraband 
of  war  constitute  the  cargo  or  such  part  thereof  as  would  render  aid  to 
the  enemy,  then  you  will  exercise  the  no  less  unquestioned  belligerent 
right  of  seizing  such  cargo  and  vessel  and  sending  in  the  same  for  adju 
dication. 

This  being  an  ungracious  task,  it  should  be  done  in  a  spirit  and 
manner  not  offensive.  Judgment  and  discretion  must  be  exercised.  To 
seize  does  not  necessarily  involve  condemnation  ;  the  courts  will  adjudge 
the  whole  question  of  prize  or  no  prize.  The  more  specitic  and  detailed 
instructions,  recently  transmitted,  will  guide  the  officers  in  their  duty. 

The  Department  has  made  it  a  special  object  to  obtain,  and  commu 
nicate  to  the  commanding  officers  of  the  squadrons  enforcing  the  block 
ade,  information  in  regard  to  vessels  which  were  preparing  or  believed 
to  be  preparing  to  give  aid  to  the  insurgents.  The  information  derived 
in  various  ways  may  not  always  be  authentic,  and  is  of  such  a  character 
as  should  not  be  communicated  to  the  captured  parties.  It  is  a  mere 
indication  to  our  own  officers  to  guide  and  assist  them  in  their  duties. 
A  search  will  corroborate  and  confirm  the  intelligence,  if  correct ;  and 
without  a  search  that  shall  furnish  reason  to  believe  the  vessel  has  con 
traband  of  war,  or  is  designed  to  violate  the  blockade,  or  in  some  way 
aid  the  insurgents,  she  should  not  be  seized. 

I  am  thus  particular  on  this  point,  because  it  has  been  intimated 
that  some  officers  construed  the  indication  that  is  given  them  of  a  sus- 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE    NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  39 

pected  vessel,  into  an  order  for  her  seizure  without  a  search.  Others 
appear  not  to  have  informed  themselves  of  the  belligerent  right  of 
search,  and,  by  a  culpable  omission  of  its  enforcement,  have  permitted 
vessels  which  it  was  their  duty  to  have  seized,  to  pass  unmolested. 

It  is  to  avoid  a  repetition  of  these  errors  that  this  communication  is 
made  in  detail. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Commodore  JAMES  L.  LARDNER, 

Commanding  East  Gulf  Blockading  Squadron, 

Key  West,  Florida. 

[CONFIDENTIAL.] 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  September  3,  1861. 

SIR  :  The  condition  of  public  affairs  is  such,  that  the  country  de 
mands  that  the  best  men  in  the  service  should  be  called  upon  to  command 
her  navies  and  armies.  In  the  efforts  of  the  Government  to  suppress 
the  causeless  conspiracy  that  has  been  organized  against  it,  high  and  re 
sponsible  duties  devolve  on  the  Navy,  and  especially  on  the  squadron  in 
the  Gulf.  It  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  interdiction  of  commerce 
with  the  insurgents  should  be  rigidly  enforced;  and  to  that  end  the  best 
talents  in  the  service  are  required  at  every  point  on  the  extended  coast 
guarded  by  our  squadrons.  The  energy  and  promptitude  displayed  by 
yourself  on  various  occasions  have  impressed  the  Department  with  the 
conviction  that  the  country  will  be  benefited  by  assigning  you  to  a  more 
responsible  position,  and  I  have  therefore  intrusted  to  you  the  command 
of  the  squadron  in  the  Gulf.  From  the  orders  and  instructions  hereto 
fore  issued  to  your  predecessor,  and  which  he  will  transfer  to  you,  the 
general  views  and  policy  of  the  Department  and  the  Government  will 
be  obtained.  But  much,  after  all,  must  be  committed  to  the  judgment 
and  discretion  of  the  flag-officer,  who  will  make  his  own  decisions  and 
act  on  his  own  responsibility,  without  waiting  orders  or  receiving  specific 
instructions  from  the  Department,  in  the  emergencies  that  must  necessa 
rily  arise.  It  is  because  I  have  confidence  in  your  judgment,  as  well  as 
in  your  energy  and  force  of  character,  that  I  have  called  you  to  this  im 
portant  command. 

You  have  a  difficult  duty  to  perform,  but  this  you  will  meet  with 
alacrity,  and  I  feel  assured  will  surmount,  to  your  own  and  the  country's 
satisfaction. 

To  lock  up  the  outlets  of  the  great  central  valley  of  the  continent,  so 
that  her  products  in  that  portion  of  the  insurgent  States  shall  not  reach 


40  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

the  ocean,  and  so  that  the  craving  wants  of  her  population  for  the  prod 
ucts  of  other  lands  shall  not  be  supplied  while  their  hands  are  raised 
against  the  Government,  will  demand  your  special  attention. 

I  need  not  enlarge  upon  its  importance,  and  of  the  embarrassments 
you  will  experience  in  closing  the  passes  and  numerous  bayous  and  inlets 
along  the  whole  coast.  These  difficulties  will  present  themselves  to  you ; 
and  on  the  resources  of  your  own  mind,  with  such  assistance  as  the  De 
partment  can  send  you,  must  you  rely  to  remove  them.  Such  informa 
tion  as  we  receive  will  be  forwarded  to  you  from  time  to  time  by  the 
first  opportunity. 

Some  important  suggestions  in  relation  to  closing  the  Mississippi  by 
fortifications  as  well  as  by  vessels  have  been  made,  and  will  demand  your 
earnest  and  immediate  attention.  The  batteries  on  Ship  Island  and  at 
other  important  points  have  perhaps  become  formidable,  and  may  require 
additional  force  to  demolish  or  capture  them. 

But  on  these,  and  indeed  all  other  questions,  we  shall  rely  on  your 
capacity,  sound  discretion,  judgment,  and  decision.  In  these  I  have 
great  confidence,  as  well  as  in  the  rightfulness  of  our  cause. 

There  are  in  our  Navy  ability  and  power  which,  if  drawn  out  and 
given  scope,  will  do  honor  to  the  service  and  the  country.  The  ambition 
and  energies  of  these  men  must  not  be  repressed  by  mere  forms ;  and 
times  and  exigencies  like  these  will  develop  character  and  efficiency. 
Such  materials  you  will  have  opportunity  to  encourage  and  promote,  and 
I  commend  them  to  your  consideration. 

Report  frequently  and  fully  to  the  Department.  Wishing  you  every 
success,  and  in  the  belief  that  you  will  attain  it, 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flag-Officer  W.  W.  McKsAN, 

Commanding  G-ulf  Blockading  Squadron,  Key  West,  Fla. 

[CONFIDENTIAL.] 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  September  18,  1861. 

SIR  :  The  conspiracy  against  the  Government  and  the  Union  is  of 
so  formidable  a  character,  and  has  been  so  long  persisted  in,  that  more 
vigorous  and  energetic  action  must  be  taken  for  its  suppression.  It  is 
essentially  necessary  that  the  Navy  should  at  this  time  put  forth  all  its 
strength,  and  demonstrate  to  the  country  and  to  foreign  powers  its  use 
fulness  and  capability  in  protecting  and  supporting  the  Government  and 
the  Union.  There  must  be  no  commercial  intercourse  with  the  ports 
that  are  in  insurrection  ;  and  our  Navy  must,  by  its  power,  energy,  and 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  41 

activity,  enforce  the  views  of  the  President  and  the  Government  on  this 
subject.  Privateers  to  depredate  on  our  commerce,  and  rob  our  country 
men  pursuing  their  peaceful  avocations,  must  not  be  permitted.  As  an 
important  part  of  our  operations,  there  are  also  to  be  demonstrations  at 
points  upon  the  coast  that  will  hereafter  be  indicated,  in  the  prosecuti.on 
of  the  policy  adopted  to  quell  the  insurrection. 

So  far  as  is  practicable,  in  the  time  and  with  the  means  and  material 
that  could  be  made  available,  the  Department  has  provided  the  vessels 
and  the  force  requisite  to  cany  into  effect  the  policy  of  the  Government; 
and  on  the  ability  of  our  naval  officers,  and  their  proper  selection  for 
and  adaptation  to  the  duties  committed  to  them,  depend  the  faithful  and 
successful  execution  of  the  great  work  of  enforcing  national  supremacy, 
and  maintaining  our  laws  and  our  rights  on  our  extended  maritime  fron 
tier.  In  view  of  the  great  responsibility  that  devolves  on  our  flag- 
officers  in  this  emergency,  the  necessity  of  constant  supervision  and  at 
tention,  and  the  important  movements  projected,  it  is  advisable  there 
should  be  a  subdivision  of  the  squadron  on  the  Atlantic  coast  It  is 
also  indispensable  that  the  Department  should  avail  itself  of  the  best 
talents  in  the  service,  and  no  Navy  in  the  world  has  better,  provided  an 
opportunity  is  afforded  for  its  development.  Rank  has  its  merits  and 
claims,  is  always  to  be  respected,  and  in  peaceable  times  may  be  recog 
nized  and  regarded ;  but  when  difficulties  like  the  present  are  impending, 
the  Department  cannot  permit  its  action  to  be  restricted,  and  the  welfare 
of  the  country  endangered,  by  this  consideration  merely. 

I  have  made  these  general  preliminary  observations  that  you  may  be 
possessed  of  the  policy  of  the  Department  and  the  Government  in  carry 
ing  forward  hostilities  to  the  final  consummation  of  the  great  work  be 
fore  us. 

The  division  of  the  Atlantic  Squadron  would  probably  have  involved 
the  retirement  of  Flag-Officer  Stringham ;  but  that  gentleman  having 
tendered  his  resignation  in  advance  of  the  consummation  of  the  pro 
posed  arrangement,  you  will  proceed  forthwith  to  relieve  him,  and  carry 
into  effect  the  orders  which  he  will  deliver  to  you. 

Your  ultimate  command  will  embrace  the  waters  of  North  Carolina 
and  Virginia,  exclusive  of  the  Potomac ;  but  until  the  arrival  of  Captain 
Du  Pont,  who  has  been  designated  for  the  Southern  division,  you  will 
assume  the  command  and  direct  the  movements  of  the  entire  squadron 
to  Cape  Florida. 

It  is  the  especial  wish  of  the  Department  that  the  preparations  made 
at  no  inconsiderable  labor  and  expense  for  the  obstruction  of  the  inlets 
on  the  North  Carolina  coast,  neglected  since  the  capture  of  Ilatteras, 
which  was  but  a  part  of  the  original  expedition,  should  be  executed  with 


42  IIISTOEY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

as  little  delay  as  possible.  In  the  instructions  of  the  3d  September, 
directions  are  given  not  to  sink  vessels  in  Ocracoke  Inlet ;  but,  on  further 
advisement,  it  is  deemed  necessary  that  it  should  be  done  on  the  inner 
bulkhead. 

Leaves  of  absence  to  the  officers  arriving  at  Hampton  Roads  cannot 
be  granted  except  in  cases  of  sickness. 

Whatever  force  you  consider  necessary  to  prevent  the  egress  of  the 
armed  steamers  of  the  rebels  from  James  River,  you  can  keep  in  Hamp 
ton  Roads ;  but  you  will  notify  General  Wool  that  blockading  is  your 
principal  duty,  and  you  will  govern  yourself  accordingly. 

Very  respectfully,  etc.,          GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flag-Officer  L.  M.  GOLDSBOROUGH, 

Appointed  to  command  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron, 

Hampton  Roads,  Va. 

[CONFIDENTIAL.] 

NAYT  DEPARTMENT,  October  12, 1861. 

SIR  :  In  order  to  suppress  the  present  insurrection,  and  maintain 
our  Union  and  nationality,  the  Government  cannot  delay  vigorous  and 
effective  measures  upon  our  Southern  coast.  By  the  proclamation  of  the 
President  on  the  19th  of  April,  a  blockade  has  been  declared,  and  com 
mercial  intercourse  with  the  region  of  country  that  is  in  insurrection 
interdicted.  In  order  to  carry  into  effect  the  measures  of  the  Govern 
ment,  which  are  persistently  sought  to  be  evaded,  and  to  extinguish  the 
rebellion,  it  is  necessary  to  take  possession  of  certain  important  points 
upon  our  Southern  coast  where  our  squadrons  may  find  shelter  and  have 
a  depot,  and  from  which  the  loyal  citizens  of  these  quarters  may  be  pro 
tected. 

In  examining  the  various  points  upon  the  coast,  it  has  been  ascer 
tained  that  Bull's  Bay,  St.  Helena,  Port  Royal,  and  Fernandina,  are  each 
and  all  accessible  and  desirable  points  for  the  purposes  indicated,  and 
the  Government  has  decided  to  take  possession  of  at  least  two  of  them. 
Wliich  of  the  two  shall  be  thus  occupied  will  be  committed  to  your  dis 
cretion  after  obtaining  the  best  information  you  can  in  regard  to  them. 
Much  must  necessarily  be  left  to  the  combined  wisdom  and  judgment  of  ' 
yourself  and  the  general  in  command,  after  you  shall  have  obtained  the 
facts  and  details. 

The  long  and  elaborate  investigation  which  you  have  given  the  sub 
ject  during  the  summer  and  fall  as  a  member  of  the  Board  selected  for 
that  especial  object,  enables  you,  with  the  free  communication  you  have 
had  with  the  Department,  to  bring  to  the  subject  a  very  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  whole  details  and  purposes  of  the  Government. 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  43 

The  men  and  means  embarked  in  this  expedition  are  of  such  magni 
tude,  that  the  country  has  reason  to  expect  therefrom  great  and  gratify 
ing  results.  It  is  believed  that  no  more  effective  blows  can  be  inflicted 
upon  those  who  are  engaged  in  this  causeless  and  unnatural  rebellion 
than  by  naval  expeditions  and  demonstrations  on  the  coast. 

Great  power  is  necessarily  intrusted  to  you,  and  with  it  great  confi 
dence  in  your  discretion,  courage,  and  ability  to  guide  and  direct  the 
energies  of  the  brave  and  loyal  men  who  gladly  peril  their  lives  under 
your  lead  to  vindicate  the  nationality  of  the  flag,  sustain  the  integrity 
of  the  Union,  maintain  the  supremacy  of  the  Constitution,  and  enforce 
the  execution  of  the  laws.  On  your  well-directed  efforts  and  those  of 
your  associates  will  depend  in  a  great  degree  the  speedy  and  successful 
termination  of  this  unhappy  contest. 

It  is  proper  that  I  should  enjoin  upon  you  to  improve  every  favorable 
opportunity  to  cultivate  friendly  feelings  with  the  people,  and  induce 
them  to  return  to  their  duty  and  their  allegiance.  Impress  upon  them 
the  desire  of  the  Government  and  their  fellow-citizens  for  a  return  of 
those  peaceful  relations  which  once  existed,  and  which  ought  never  to 
have  been  interrupted.  Your  acts  and  words,  on  all  occasions,  you  will 
make  correspond  with  these  declarations. 

The  military  force,  which,  under  the  direction  of  the  Secretary  of 
War,  accompanies  the  naval  expedition,  will  cooperate  with  you  for  the 
purpose  of  taking  possession  and  holding,  as  stated,  at  least  two  of  the 
places  that  have  been  enumerated,  and,  in  concert  with  you,  taking  other 
measures  for  maintaining  the  national  authority  and  enforcing  the  execu 
tion  of  the  laws. 

By  a  recent  order  of  the  President,  a  copy  of  which  has  been  for 
warded  to  you,  flag-officers  rank  as  major-generals;  but  no  officer  of 
the  Army  or  Navy,  whatever  may  be  his  rank,  can  assume  any  direct 
command,  independent  of  consent,  over  an  officer  of  the  other  service, 
excepting  only  when  land  forces  are  expressly  embarked  in  vessels-of- 
war  to  do  the  duty  of  marines. 

The  President  expects  and  requires,  however,  the  most  cordial  and 
effectual  cooperation  between  the  officers  of  the  two  services,  in  taking 
possession  of  and  holding  the  posts  and  positions  on  our  Southern  coast, 
which  are  designated  in  these  instructions,  and  will  hold  any  commander 
of  either  branch  to  a  strict  responsibility  for  any  failure  to  procure  har 
mony  and  secure  the  objects  proposed. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flag- Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT, 

Commanding  South  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron,  etc., 


44  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  January  23, 1862. 

SIR  :  The  importance  of  a  rigorous  blockade  at  every  point  under 
your  command  cannot  be  too  strongly  impressed  or  felt.  By  cutting 
off  all  communication,  we  not  only  cripple  and  distress  the  States  in  in 
surrection,  but  by  an  effective  blockade  we  destroy  any  excuse  or  pre 
text  on  the  part  of  foreign  governments  to  aid  and  relieve  those  who 
are  waging  war  upon  the  Government. 

There  is  a  manifest  desire,  if  not  determination,  in  certain  quarters, 
to  break  the  blockade,  and  the  apology  therefor  will  be,  if  possible,  a 
want  of  vigilance  or  efficiency  on  the  part  of  our  squadrons  in  guarding 
the  coast  in  such  a  manner  as  to  interdict  communication.  While  con 
fiding  to  your  practical  knowledge  and  judgment  the  disposition  of  the 
vessels  committed  to  you,  I  have  felt  it  my  duty  to  warn  you  of  the  dif 
ficulty  alluded  to,  and  at  the  same  time  to  suggest  that,  except  when  re 
quired  by  pressing  necessity,  there  should  not  be  a  concentration  of 
vessels  at  any  given  point,  but  that  they  should  be  spread  so  as  to  make 
the  blockade  effective  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  coast  under  your 
supervision.  Most  of  the  important  posts  are  well  guarded,  though  oc 
casionally  we  hear  that  a  vessel  has  run  the  blockade  in  bad  weather  or 
in  darkness,  or  at  points  least  likely  to  attract  attention.  Every  case  of 
this  kind,  I  have  reason  to  believe,  is  noted  and  laid  up  as  evidence  that 
the  blockade  is  not  effective,  and  therefore  is  to  be  disregarded  by  those 
governments  whose  subjects  may  become  clamorous  for  supplies  from 
the  States  blockaded. 

The  Department  is  aware  of  the  difficulties  you  are  compelled,  to 
encounter ;  it  has  been  gratified  with  the  ability  and  resources  which 
you  have  brought  into  requisition  to  carry  out  the  policy  of  the  Gov 
ernment  ;  and  I  wish  in  this  communication,  warning  you  of  what  may 
be  apprehended  from  foreign  interference,  provided  there  is  any  want 
of  vigilance  or  effectiveness  in  any  quarter  in  keeping  up  a  rigid  block 
ade,  to  express  my  commendation,  and  also  my  confidence  that  you  will, 
even  in  this  stormy  season,  with  such  force  as  is  at  your  disposition,  in 
terdict  communication  at  every  point,  and  thus  destroy  any  pretence  for 
breaking  or  attempting  to  break  the  blockade. 

As  fast  as  we  can  augment  our  force  or  spare  vessels  from  other 
points,  we  shall  endeavor  to  reinforce  your  command ;  in  the  mean 
time  our  reliance  must  be  on  your  own  powers  and  capability  in  the 
squadron  that  you  have. 

I  am,  respectfully,  etc., 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flag- Officer  WM.  W.  MC!VEAN, 

Commanding  Gulf  Squadron,  etc.,  etc.,  and  others. 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  45 

[CIRCULAR  LETTER.] 

NAVT  DEPARTMENT,  August  IS, 1862. 

SIR  :  Some  recent  occurrences  in  the  capture  of  vessels,  and  matters 
pertaining  to  the  blockade,  render  it  necessary  that  there  should  be  a 
recapitulation  of  the  instructions  heretofore  from  time  to  time  given,  and 
also  of  the  restrictions  and  precautions  to  be  observed  by  our  squadrons 
and  cruisers. 

It  is  essential,  in  .the  remarkable  contest  now  waging,  that  we  should 
exercise  great  forbearance  with  great  firmness,  and  manifest  to  the  world 
that  it  is  the  intention  of  our  Government,  while  asserting  and  main 
taining  our  own  rights,  to  respect  and  scrupulously  regard  the  rights 
of  others.  It  is  in  this  view  that  the  following  instructions  are  explicitly 
given : 

first.  That  you  will  exercise  constant  vigilance  to  prevent  supplies 
of  arms,  munitions,  and  contraband  of  war  from  being  conveyed  to  the 
insurgents ;  but  that  under  no  circumstances  will  you  seize  any  vessel 
within  the  waters  of  a  friendly  nation. 

Secondly.  That,  while  diligently  exercising  the  right  of  visitation  on 
all  suspected  vessels,  you  are  in  no  case  authorized  to  chase  and  fire  at 
a  foreign  vessel  without  showing  your  colors  and  giving  her  the  cus 
tomary  preliminary  notice  of  a  desire  to  speak  and  visit  her. 

Thirdly.  That,  when  that  visit  is  made,  the  vessel  is  not  then  to  be 
seized  without  a  search  carefully  made  so  far  as  to  render  it  reasonable 
to  believe  that  she  is  engaged  in  carrying  contraband  of  war  for  or  to 
the  insurgents  and  to  their  ports,  directly  or  indirectly  by  transshipment, 
or  otherwise  violating  the  blockade ;  and  that,  if  after  visitation  and 
search,  it  shall  appear  to  your  satisfaction  that  she  is,  in  good  faith  and 
without  contraband,  actually  bound  and  passing  from  one  friendly  or 
so-called  neutral  port  to  another,  and  not  bound  or  proceeding  to  or 
from  a  port  in  the  possession  of  the  insurgents,  then  she  cannot  be  law 
fully  seized. 

Fourthly.  That,  to  avoid  difficulty  and  error  in  relation  to  papers 
which  strictly  belong  to  the  captured  vessel,  and  mails  that  are  carried, 
or  parcels  under  official  seals,  you  will,  in  the  words  of  the  law,  "  pre 
serve  all  the  papers  and  writings  found  on  board,  and  transmit  the 
whole  of  the  originals  unmutilated  to  the  judge  of  the  district  to  which 
such  prize  is  ordered  to  proceed  ; "  but  official  seals,  or  locks,  or  fasten 
ings  of  foreign  authorities,  are  in  no  case,  nor  on  any  pretext,  to  be 
broken,  or  parcels  covered  by  them  read  by  any  naval  authorities  ;  but 
all  bags  or  other  things  covering  such  parcels,  and  duly  sealed  or  fast 
ened  by  foreign  authorities,  will  be,  in  the  discretion  of  the  United 
States  officer  to  whom  they  may  come,  delivered  to  the  consul,  com- 


46  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

manding  naval  officer,  or  legation  of  the  foreign  government,  to  be 
opened,  upon  the  understanding  that  whatever  is  contraband  or  im 
portant  as  evidence  concerning  the  character  of  a  captured  vessel,  will 
be  remitted  to  the  prize  court  or  to  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Washing 
ton  ;  or  such  sealed  bags  or  parcels  may  be  at  once  forwarded  to  this 
Department,  to  the  end  that  the  proper  authorities  of  the  foreign  gov 
ernment  may  receive  the  same  without  delay. 

You  are  specially  informed  that  the  fact  that  a  suspicious  vessel  has 
been  indicated  to  you  as  cruising  in  any  limit  which  has  been  pre 
scribed  by  this  Department,  does  not  in  way  authorize  you  to  depart 
from  the  practice  of  the  rules  of  visitation,  search,  and  capture  pre 
scribed  by  the  laws  of  nations. 

Very  respectfully, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
Rear-Admiral  D.  G.  FARRAGUT, 

Commanding  Gulf  Squadron,  Shij)  Island,  and  others. 


NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  Apt^il  12, 1862. 

SIR  :  It  is  of  the  greatest  importance  that  the  exportation  of  an 
thracite  coal  from  ports  of  the  "United  States  to  any  and  all  foreign 
ports  should  be  absolutely  prohibited. 

The  rebels  obtain  the  coal  for  their  steamers  from  Nassau  and 
Havana,  and  the  fact  that  it  burns  without  smoke  enables  them  to  ap 
proach  blockaded  ports  with  greater  security,  as  all  other  coals  throw 
out  so  much  smoke  as  to  render  their  presence  visible  a  great  distance 
at  sea.  I  am,  most  truly,  sir,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
The  President  of  the  United  States. 

NAVT  DEPARTMENT,  April  26, 1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of 
the  24th  instant,  enclosing  a  copy  of  a  note  of  the  19th  instant,  ad 
dressed  to  you  by  the  charge  d'affaires  of  Denmark,  who  asks  if  the 
Danish  harbor  of  St.  Thomas,  in  the  West  Indies,  cannot  be  exempted 
from  the  operation  of  the  order  prohibiting  the  exportation  of  anthracite 
coal  to  foreign  countries.  The  friendly  feeling  of  the  Danish  Govern 
ment  is  felt  and  appreciated,  and  there  can  be  no  other  than  reciprocal 
kind  feelings  on  our  part  in  return.  I  do  not  doubt  that  it  would  be 
the  Disposition  of  the  Danish  authorities  to  prevent  an  abuse  of  the 
privilege  if  an  exception  were  made  in  their  case,  but  on  the  other  hand 
I  am  not  aware  they  could  prevent  it.  Unless  we  can  be  permitted  to 


ORGANIZATION    OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  47 

seize  the  rebel  steamers  which  may  resort  to  St.  Thomas  for  coal  and 
other  purposes,  our  true  course  is  to  prohibit  it,  and  to  treat  that  por 
tion  of  the  Danish  dominions  as  we  treat  the  rest  of  the  world.  If  they 
will  make  themselves  an  exception,  and  allow  us  a  privilege  which  others 
do  not  allow  us,  then  I  would  most  cordially  reciprocate  the  act,  and  ex 
tend  to  them  a  privilege  that  is  denied  to  others. 

Until  St.  Thomas  stands  in  different  relations  to  us  from  other  parts 
of  the  world,  in  the  treatment  of  the  rebels,  I  do  not  see  how  we  can 
favor  them  beyond  others. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Hon.  WM.  H.  SEWARD,  Secretary  of  State. 

NAVT  DEPARTMENT,  May  27, 1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  of 
the  22 d  instant,  enclosing  a  copy  of  a  reply  from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  to  whom  you  referred  a  communication  of  this  Department 
on  the  subject  of  permitting  residents  of  certain  counties  in  Virginia  to 
carry  their  grain  to  market. 

You  state  that  you  do  not  perceive  any  objection  to  granting  the 
privilege  asked,  upon  the  conditions  mentioned  in  the  letter  of  the  Sec 
retary  of  the  Treasury. 

The  Department  would  remark  that  authority  to  traffic,  sell  or  buy, 
within  the  region  blockaded,  is  inconsistent  with  the  blockade  itself. 
All  special  permits  must  be  attended  with  difficulty  by  whatever  power 
granted.  If  trade  or  traffic  is  open  to  one,  it  should  be  open  to  all.  In 
other  words,  the  blockade  must  continue  to  be  enforced,  modified,  or 
abandoned.  In  either  case  it  should  be  a  matter  of  governmental 
policy,  in  which  all  should  be  allowed  to  participate. 

I  know  not  that  there  is  any  objection  to  exempting  the  counties  in 
Virginia  where  we  have  military  possession  from  a  further  enforcement 
of  the  blockade.  On  the  contrary,  it  appears  to  me  that  if  the  inhabit 
ants  are  passive,  or  not  actually  disloyal,  that  commerce,  trade,  and  free 
intercourse  will  promote  friendly  feelings. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Hon.  WM.  H.  SEWARD,  Secretary  of  State. 

During  the  whole  period  of  Mr.  Welles's  administration  the 
Department  labored  most  earnestly  to  impress  upon  the  country 
and  upon  Congress  the  importance  of  creating  and  maintaining 


48  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

a  Navy  inferior  to  no  other,  as  our  only  security  against  a  foreign 
war.  In  these  efforts  the  Secretary  was  most  cordially  sup 
ported  by  his  associates  in  the  Department.  The  first  approach 
of  real  danger  from  abroad  will  not  fail  to  justify  every  demand 
which  the  Secretary  made  upon  the  country  for  enlarged  facili 
ties  for  building  and  maintaining  a  formidable  navy.  It  will 
certainly  be  seen,  at  no  remote  period,  that  these  earnest  admo 
nitions  originated  in  true  statesmanship,  and  that  the  economy 
which  was  so  strongly  urged  against  spacious  navy-yards,  dock 
yards,  and  machine-shops  is  only  wastefulness  in  disguise.  For 
when  a  great  emergency  comes  suddenly  upon  a  nation  unpre 
pared,  then  every  munition  of  war,  if  obtainable  at  all,  can  be 
procured  only  by  paying  the  greatest  prices  for  the  poorest 
quality.  Steam  has  brought  America  within  the  field  of  Euro 
pean  movement ;  and  if  her  power,  especially  upon  the  sea,  is 
less  than  that  of  the  mightiest,  she  will  be  trodden  down. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  June  9, 1862. 

SIR  :  I  had  the  honor  to  address  the  Naval  Committee,  under  date 
of  the  25th  March  last,  on  the  subject  of  armored  ships,  and  the  neces 
sity  of  preliminary  measures  in  the  future  construction  of  vessels  for  the 
naval  service.  The  fact  that  a  radical  change  has  commenced  in  the 
construction  and  armament  of  ships,  which  change  in  effect  dispenses 
with  the  navies  that  have  hitherto  existed,  is  obvious,  and  it  is  a  ques 
tion  for  Congress  to  decide  whether  the  Government  will  promptly  take 
the  initiatory  step  to  place  our  country  in  the  front  rank  of  maritime 
powers. 

It  is  unnecessary  that  I  should  recapitulate  the  suggestions  contained 
in  my  letter  of  the  25th  of  March,  but  I  would  again  call  your  attention 
to  them,  and  state  my  earnest  desire  that  Congress  should  take  action 
before  its  adjournment  on  the  subject,  not  only  of  supplying  itself  with 
the  armature  and  heavy  ordnance  for  ships,  but  the  substitution  by  the 
Government  of  iron  for  wood,  in  whole  or  in  part,  in  the  construction 
of  naval  vessels.  It  has  hitherto  been  supposed  to  be  the  true  interest 
of  the  Government  to  build  its  own  ships-of-war,  and  to  manufacture 
the  arms  and  most  of  the  articles  which  are  requisite  for  the  naval  ser 
vice.  This  necessity  has  arisen  chiefly  from  the  fact  that  naval  vessels 
and  naval  purposes  and  objects  are  in  many  respects  so  essentially  differ 
ent  from  those  of  the  mercantile  marine,  as  to  place  them  out  of  the 
usual  line  of  private  enterprise.  The  Government  has,  consequently,  to 
pay  an  extra  cost  for  extra  and  better  work.  In  naval  and  niilitarv  mat- 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  4:9 

ters  it  is  indispensable  that  vessels,  guns,  machinery,  and  every  thing 
pertaining  to  them  should  be  of  the  best  quality,  reliable,  and  always 
ready  at  any  moment  to  meet  the  public  necessities. 

The  Government  has  several  large  navy-yards  for  building  ships, 
and  the  introduction  of  steam,  which  is  necessary  for  and  made  ap 
plicable  to  all  naval  vessels  now  constructed,  has  compelled  it  to  erect 
extensive  shops  for  making  steam  machinery.  But  these  shops  are  in 
adequate  to  the  wants  of  the  Navy,  and  for  some  years  it  will  be  neces 
sary,  under  any  circumstances,  to  contract  for  much  the  larger  portion 
of  the  work  that  will  be  required. 

It  is  now  generally  conceded  that  vessels  for  fighting  purposes  must 
be  heavily  plated  with  iron,  if  they  are  not  built  entirely  of  that  mate 
rial.  In  this,  as  in  most  costly  fabrics,  economy  is  reached  through 
durability.  Iron  ship-building  is  new  in  this  country.  But  few  persons 
are  engaged  in  it,  and  it  is  a  novelty  in  our  navy-yards.  Heavy  iron 
beams,  shafting,  and  thick  iron  plates  can  be  procured  from  only  two  or 
three  parties,  and  then  in  limited  quantities,  and  subject  to  great  delay. 
Individuals  have  little  use  for  iron  of  such  magnitude  as  the  Navy  must 
have,  and  there  must  unavoidably  be  great  outlay  to  prepare  for  the 
execution  of  such  work.  With  only  the  Navy  for  a  purchaser,  there 
can  be  no  competition ;  and  the  Government  will  be  compelled,  under 
such  circumstances,  to  pay  almost  any  price  the  mills  and  forges  may 
demand.  No  inconsiderable  portions  of  an  iron  ship  can  be  made  and 
procured  at  the  ordinary  mills,  and  so  far  as  it  can  be  done,  it  may 
be  the  best  policy  to  be  so  supplied;  but  the  heavy  and  expensive 
portions  cannot  be  so  procured,  and  unless  the  Government  is  prepared 
to  execute  the  work,  it  will  be  subject  to  imposition,  and  its  vessels  to 
marked  inferiority. 

Other  nations,  whose  wooden  ships-of-war  far  exceed  our  own  in 
number,  cannot  afford  to  lay  them  aside,  but  are  compelled  to  plate 
them  with  iron  at  very  heavy  cost.  They  are  not  unaware  of  the  dis 
advantage  of  this  proceeding',  but  it  is  a  present  necessity.  It  must  be 
borne  in  mind,  however,  that  those  governments  which  are  striving  for 
naval  supremacy  are  sparing  no  expense  to  strengthen  themselves  by 
building  iron  vessels,  and  already  their  dock-yards  are  undergoing  the 
necessary  preparation  for  this  change  in  naval  architecture,  notwith 
standing  those  governments  have  at  their  command  the  greatest  expe 
rience  and  the  most  extensive  and  complete  iron  and  machine  factories 
that  private  enterprise  can  produce.  These  facts  are  suggestive  to  our 
Government,  and  I  desire  to  call  your  attention  to  the  necessity  of 
making  the  necessary  provision  for  ourselves  by  providing  the  means 


50  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

and  conveniences  for  building  and  repairing  a  Navy,  such  as  the 
strength  and  character  of  our  Government  and  country  require,  in 
order  to  maintain  its  true  position  among  maritime  powers. 

We  have  been  engaged  for  years,  and  have  spent  millions  in  our 
navy-yards  and  on  our  steam  machine-shops  for  ship-building  purposes, 
and  yet  have  not  been  able  to  keep  up  with  the  wants  of  the  Navy  and 
the  exigencies  of  the  service. 

It  is  not  the  part  of  wisdom  to  close  our  eyes  to  the  progress  of 
events,  nor  to  evade  the  responsibilities  that  properly  belong  to  us. 
The  creation  of  a  new  and  different  Navy,  such  as  the  development  of 
science  and  art  already  demonstrate  as  a  necessity,  calls  for  vigorous 
measures  and  prompt  and  energetic  action.  The  Government  should 
not,  in  justice  to  itself,  be  dependent  on  private  establishments  for  its 
most  important  and  expensive  works,  but  should  rely  upon  itself.  Great 
workfc,  however,  require  time  in  their  preparations,  and  lavish  expen 
ditures  cannot  hasten  them.  Congress  has  been  liberal  in  its  appro 
priations  for  building  vessels,  but  these  appropriations  cannot  be  made 
available  in  obtaining  the  proper  locations,  and  mills,  forges,  furnaces, 
and  shops,  all  of  which  are  requisite,  and,  which  to  be  secured  properly, 
need  time  and  careful  consideration. 

If  the  money  for  these  purposes  be  now  appropriated,  we  shall  com 
mence,  under  as  favorable  circumstances  as  any  nation,  the  construction 
of  a  Navy  adapted  to  the  wants  of  our  country  and  the  times.  No  na 
tion  can  have  an  advantage  over  us  if  we  avail  ourselves  of  our  means 
and  opportunities,  and  it  is  no  longer  doubtful  that  our  future  safety  and 
welfare  are  dependent  on  our  naval  strength  and  efficiency.  It  is  a  duty 
as  well  as  a  necessity  that  we  make  these  United  States  a  great  naval 
power.  We  owe  it  to  ourselves  to  commence  this  work  at  once,  and 
the  present  Congress  should,  in  my  opinion,  take  the  preliminary  steps 
for  laying  the  foundation  for  the  construction  of  a  Navy  commensurate 
with  the  wants  and  magnitude  of  the  country.  The  place  or  places, 
and  shops  and  tools  and  other  appurtenances  for  this  great  work,  must 
be  provided  in  season.  The  experience  we  have  had  admonishes  us  not 
to  permit  a  war  to  come  upon  us  unprepared,  yet  such  an  event  may 
be  pending,  and  the  responsibilities  and  calamities  that  would  follow 
neglect  should  be  a  warning  for  us  to  be  prepared.  No  amount  of 
money  would  repair  the  wrong  that  might  be  inflicted  from  present 
neglect.  A  million  or  two  of  dollars  judiciously  expended  at  the  pres 
ent  time  may  save  hundreds  of  millions  and  the  honor  of  the  nation 
after  hostilities  shall  have  commenced. 

I  have  made  these  suggestions  in  consequence  of  the  near  termina- 


OKGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  51 

tion  of  the  session,  without  any  movement  as  vet  for  establishing  the 
necessary  works  to  produce  the  heavy  iron  and  armature  that  will  here 
after  enter  into  the  construction  of  our  naval  vessels.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  either  of  our  present  navy-yards  is  best  adapted  to  the  purpose 
herein  indicated ;  but  if  so,  they  will  require  considerable  enlargement. 
The  subject  is  one  that  should  receive  careful  consideration,  and  I  would 
suggest  that  authority  be  given  to  designate  and  procure  one  or  more 
suitable  locations.  We  are  now  constructing  a  number  of  gunboats  by 
contract  on  the  Western  waters,  and  I  would  suggest  that  recent  expe 
rience  and  the  vast  resources  in  iron  and  other  capabilities  of  the  West, 
with  the  radical  change  in  naval  architecture,  demonstrate  the  propriety 
of  establishing  a  navy-yard,  foundery,  and  shops,  at  some  point  in  the 
valley  of  the  Mississippi.  Such  a  yard  and  its  attendant  establishments 
would  possess  many  advantages,  and  is  becoming  a  necessity.  I  com 
mend  it  to  your  attention,  with  the  other  subjects  alluded  to  in  this 
communication. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  etc., 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Hon.  JOHN  P.  HALE, 

Chairman  Naval  Committee,  U.  S.  Senate. 

In  December,  1864,  Congress  had  failed  to  respond  accord 
ing  to  the  wish,  of  the  Secretary,  and  he  returned  to  the  sub 
ject  again  in  his  report,  in  the  following  manner  : 

The  introduction  of  steam  as  a  motive  power  for  naval  vessels  is 
causing  a  revolution  in  maritime  warfare  which  the  ablest  minds  have 
long  predicted  would  be  the  result  of  this  agency,  but  which  is  not  yet 
to  its  fullest  extent  appreciated.  It  changes  the  whole  character  of 
blockade,  and  in  iuture  wars  it  will  be  found  that  a  few  fast  privateers 
by  steam  will  harass  or  annihilate  the  commerce  of  the  most  powerful 
belligerent  nations. 

Our  country  has  been  compelled  by  this  civil  war  to  take  the  initia 
tive  in  organizing  a  vast  steam  navy  with  which  to  establish  and  enforce 
the  blockade  of  our  whole  coast  from  the  Chesapeake  Bay  to  the  Eio 
Grande;  and  also  to  suppress  the  depredations  of  semi-piratical  pri 
vateers,  built  by  skilled  English  mechanics  in  English  ship-yards,  and 
manned  by  Englishmen,  which,  under  the  rebel  flag,  have  roved  the  ocean, 
destroying  our  merchant  shipping,  and  have  found  refuge  and  supplies 
in  English  and  neutral  ports. 

When  hostilities  commenced,  our  Government  had  provided  no  suit  a- 


52  IIISTOEY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAYY. 

ble  nav}7-yard  with  machine-shops  and  founderies  to  manufacture  the  ne 
cessary  machinery  for  our  rapidly  increasing  and  expanding  Navy ;  but  the 
Department  was  compelled  to  rely  on  the  few  private  establishments, 
which  it  could  divert  from  other  engagements,  for  the  immense  work 
that  was  calling  out  the  resources  of  the  nation. 

Great  embarrassment  was  experienced  in  consequence  of  this  neglect 
of  the  Government  at  the  very  commencement  of  the  war ;  and  although 
the  naval  service  and  the  country  are  suffering  constantly  from  this 
neglect,  measures  for  the  establishment  of  a  suitable  navy-yard  for  the 
construction  and  repair  of  iron  vessels,  their  armature  and  steam  ma 
chinery,  are  still  delayed. 

As  early  as  March,  1862,  and  on  several  occasions  since,  I  have  had 
the  honor  to  present  my  views  to  Congress  on  this  subject.  The  ear 
nestness  and  frequency  with  which  it  has  been  brought  forward  must  find 
an  apology  in  its  great  importance. 

It  has  never  been  the  purpose  of  the  Department,  in  any  of  its  sug 
gestions  or  recommendations,  to  increase  the  number  of  our  navy-yards, 
nor  to  alter  their  local  distribution.  The  yard  which  we  now  have  at 
Philadelphia,  is  altogether  inadequate  to  our  present  or  future  wants. 
It  was  proposed,  therefore,  to  substitute  a  new  one  on  the  Delaware,  in 
the  vicinity  of  Philadelphia.  League  Island,  within  the  limits  of  that 
city,  if  adopted  as  a  site,  must  gradually  absorb  the  works  at  the  present 
yard,  which  would  then  be  discontinued. 

All  of  our  present  navy-yards,  it  will  be  remembered,  were  established 
for  the  construction  and  repair  of  wooden  sailing  vessels.  Steam  and 
armored  vessels  have  superseded  these,  and  the  inability  of  our  present 
establishments  for  the  work  imposed  by  this  war  has  been  the  source  of 
inexpressible  anxiety,  and  often  of  great  disappointment  and  public 
injury.  To  relieve  the  navy-yards  from  work  which  they  have  but 
limited  means  to  execute,  and  to  secure  necessary  repairs,  the  Depart 
ment  has  been  compelled  to  establish  stations  for  machinery  and  means 
of  refitment  at  Mound  City,  Memphis,  New  Orleans,  Ship  Island,  Pen- 
sacola,  Key  West,  Port  Royal,  Beaufort,  Norfolk,  and  Baltimore.  But 
these  and  all  the  private  establishments  of  the  country,  besides  other 
calls  upon  them,  have  been  insufficient  to  keep  the  present  Navy  in  neces 
sary  order;  so  that,  if  to  the  duty  of  blockading  there  were  added  ocean 
conflicts  with  a  naval  power  by  which  our  ships  would  be  often  disabled, 
the  sad  spectacle  would  be  presented  of  our  naval  vessels  laid  up  in  time 
of  war  for  want  of  a  proper  establishment  with  the  shops  and  means  to 
repair  them. 

Our  country,  whose  strength  and  power  among  nations  must  ever  be 


OKGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPAKTMENT.  53 

identified  with  and  maintained  by  its  Navy,  and  which  possesses  in  such 
abundance  the  means  of  creating  and  sustaining  one,  has  not,  in  all  the 
navy-yards  combined,  the  appliances  possessed  by  single  establishments 
in  England  and  France.  Were  there  outside  of  our  navy-yards  estab 
lishments  to  perform  promptly  the  requisite  work  in  time  of  war,  I  should 
not  at  this  time  again  press  the  subject  of  a  navy-yard  for  iron-work  for 
the  construction  of  vessels  upon  the  consideration  of  our  authorities. 
But  although  the  Department  has  generally  been  ably  and  zealously 
seconded  in  its  efforts  by  private  contractors,  yet  the  fact  that  there  is  no 
customer  but  the  Government  for  much  of  this  heavy  class  of  iron-work, 
forbids  us  to  expect  that  individual  enterprise  will  be  prepared  to 
execute  it  without  full  remuneration  for  all  the  outlay  for  shops,  tools, 
and  machinery  which  may  be  required  in  preparation.  Besides  this, 
unlimited  time  is  taken  by  them  for  the  completion  of  the  work.  It 
may  be  proper  to  mention,  as  an  instance  of  the  delay  to  which  the 
Government  is  subjected,  that  in  October,  1862,  contracts  were  made  with 
a  manufacturer  of  reputation  and  ability  for  making  and  setting  up  the 
turrets  of  the  Tonawanda  and  Miantonomoh,  which  were  to  have  been 
completed  in  February,  1863,  but  they  will  probably  not  be  finished  until 
February,  1865,  two  years  after  the  expiration  of  the  time  specified  in  the 
contract.  At  the  commencement  of  hostilities  this  Department  had 
equipped,  and  at  its  immediate  disposal,  three  vessels-of-war.  Those 
which  were  laid  up,  and  those  which  were  recalled  from  abroad,  had  to 
undergo  extensive  repairs,  for  which  no  provision  had  been  made.  The 
Government  has  not  even  at  this  time  an  establishment  where  a  shaft  can 
be  made  for  our  steamers  or  a  plate  for  our  iron-clads.  The  frontage  or 
wharfage  at  all  our  navy-yards,  so  important  for  repairs,  is  less  than  is 
required  at  each  of  them. 

Our  next  contest  may  be  with  a  naval  power  which  will  attempt  to 
direct  upon  our  shores  a  course  of  operations  similar  to  those  which  we 
have  applied  to  the  Southern  coast  for  suppressing  the  rebellion.  One 
yard,  at  least,  where  iron  vessels,  iron  armor,  and  iron  shafting  can  be 
manufactured,  is  now  imperatively  necessary.  Among  the  considerations 
that  should  control  the  selection  of  a  site  for  such  a  yard  and  establish 
ment,  which  shall  become  the  depot  for  the  materials  collected  in  years 
of  peace  with  which  to  build  and  repair  our  naval  vessels,  and  where 
will  be  aggregated  machinery  and  tools  such  as  at  present  are  not  to  be 
found  in  this  country,  and  which,  when  once  procured,  could  not,  if  de 
stroyed,  be  easily  or  readily  replaced,  will  be  its  absolute  safety  from  at 
tack  by  sea  or  land.  So  far  as  is  possible,  we  should  avail  ourselves  of 
natural  advantages  in  obtaining  the  indispensable  security  for  such  an 


54  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

establishment,  without  depending  entirely  on  fortifications  and  artificial 
means,  which  would  be  more  costly  than  the  navy-yard  itself. 

The  additional  military  defences  of  Portsmouth,  England,  rendered 
necessary  by  the  proximity  of  that  great  naval  station  to  the  ocean,  and 
its  consequent  assailability  by  modern  ordnance,  are  now  being  con 
structed  at  an  expense  of  $50,000,000. 

These  letters  and  extracts  have  been  introduced  not  only  to 
illustrate  the  character  of  the  Secretary,  but  to  set  forth  the 
policy  which  was  adopted  by  the  Department,  and  which  was 
steadily  adhered  to  until  the  close  of  the  war.  The  exhibition, 
however,  is  necessarily  a  partial  one,  and  much  additional  light 
will  be  shed  over  the  whole  subject  in  the  progress  of  the  narra 
tive.  The  following  brief  summary  of  his  work,  submitted  in 
December,  1864,  when  nothing  important  remained  to  be  done, 
except  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher,  accomplished  soon  after,  and 
the  cordial  and  graceful  acknowledgment  of  his  obligations  to 
his  associates,  may  very  properly  close  this  notice  of  one  whose 
fame  will  increase  in  proportion  as  the  administration  of  his  De 
partment  is  understood  by  the  people.  He  and  his  associates 
may  trust  with  perfect  confidence  the  impartial  judgment  of 
the  future.  They  will  stand  on  the  page  of  history  as  having 
conducted  triumphantly  the  grandest  naval  operations  which  the 
world  thus  far  has  seen ;  as  having  accomplished,  both  in  the 
blockade  and  in  battle  with  forts,  what  Europe  declared  could 
not  be  done,  and  as  having  inaugurated  a  new  era  in  naval  war : 

In  this,  my  fourth  annual  report,  I  have  submitted  somewhat  in  detail 
the  condition  of  the  Department  and  the  service.  This  report  presents 
the  distribution  and  employment  of  a  maritime  force  which,  including 
the  additions  to  it  now  in  progress  and  near  completion,  constitutes  for  all 
the  purposes  of  defence,  if  not  of  attack  and  conquest,  the  most  power 
ful  national  navy  in  the  world.  In  four  preceding  similar  communica 
tions,  including  that  submitted  to  you  upon  the  assembling  of  Congress 
in  the  extra  session  of  1861,  it  has  been  my  duty  to  exhibit  the  methods 
and  measures  of  administration,  by  which,  from  a  comparatively  small 
beginning,  and  under  the  pressure  of  an  unexampled  exigency,  this  vast 
naval  power  has,  since  your  accession  to  the  Presidency,  been  brought 
into  existence ;  to  state  the  contributions  which  have  been  made  to  it 
from  our  commercial  marine ;  to  indicate  the  application  of  all  the  re 
sources  of  our  public  naval  establishments  to  its  construction  and  prep- 


ORGANIZATION   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.  55 

aration  for  service ;  to  show  how  individual  energy  and  skill  and  capital 
have  come  successfully  in  aid  of  insufficient  governmental  provision  for 
the  due  prosecution  of  the  work,  and  to  trace  in  general  outline  the  pro 
cesses  and  results  of  inventive  genius  and  scientific  experiment  which 
have  changed,  to  a  great  extent,  the  materials  and  forms  of  naval  struc 
ture  and  armor  and  armament,  and  have  enabled  our  country,  while  in  so 
brief  a  period  assuming  a  foremost  place  among  maritime  nations,  to 
create  also  a  new  era  in  the  development  and  application  of  naval  force. 

In  connection  with  such  account  of  the  sudden  creation  of  a  new 
American  naval  power,  it  has  been  at  the  same  time  my  privilege  in  these 
communications  to  make  official  record  of  a  series  of  naval  enterprises 
and  achievements  wholly  without  precedent  or  parallel.  No  previous 
conception  of  efficient  blockade  ;  no  former  endurance  under  the  fire  of 
fortified  batteries;  no  audacity  and  success  heretofore  known  of  naval  at 
tack  upon  such  fortresses,  through  formidable  submarine  obstructions 
spread  for  their  defence ;  no  similar  penetration  by  war-vessels  of  inter 
nal  waters  through  a  reach  of  navigation  almost  continental ;  no  other 
gigantic  scale  of  cooperation  of  naval  with  army  forces  in  expeditions 
and  combats  hundreds  of  miles  from  the  seaboard,  and  along  the  course 
of  rivers  precarious  and  dangerous  of  navigation,  can  anywhere  be  found 
of  a  character  to  compare  with  the  triumphs  in  all  these  forms  of  naval 
effort  which  it  has  been  the  duty  of  this  Department  during  the  past 
three  years  to  organize  and  to  report. 

If  in  the  prosecution  of  duties  so  arduous,  complicated,  and  exacting, 
the  trust  confided  to  this  Department  shall  appear  to  have  been  faithfully 
and  fitly  discharged,  then  certainly  my  acknowledgments  are  still  due, 
as  they  have  been  heretofore  expressed,  to  the  gentlemen  associated  with 
me  in  its  management,  to  the  whole  clerical  force,  to  the  several  chiefs 
of  bureaus,  and  especially  to  the  invaluable  services  of  the  Assistant 
Secretary  and  the  Chief  Clerk  of  the  Department. 

But  it  is  to  the  officers  and  men  of  our  naval  service  that  the  great 
renown  of  what  has  thus  been  done,  and  is  doing,  justly  belongs.  The 
best  administration  of  this  Department  can  do  little  more  at  any  time 
than  to  give  them  the  adequate  means  and  the  right  opportunity  of  action. 
To  them,  therefore,  first  and  always,  be  the  honor,  when  their  own  coun 
try  and  the  world  shall  recognize  in  this  expansion  and  these  exploits  of 
our  naval  power  a  spectacle  of  patriotic  and  virtuous  heroism  worthy  of 
the  cause  in  which  it  is  displayed,  and  of  the  national  life  which  it  illus 
trates  and  defends.  GIDEON  WELLES, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
To  the  President. 


CHAPTER  III. 


THE  OFFICE  OF  THE  ASSISTANT  SECRETARY.— THE  MENTAL  FORCE 
STORED  WITH  THE  PEOPLE,  AND  EVER  READY  FOR  USE.— THE 
MIANTONOMOH'S  VISIT  TO  EUROPE. 

ME.  LINCOLN,  emerging  from  poverty  and  obscurity,  and  as 
cending  to  the  highest  position,  drew  after  him  a  large  number, 
who,  like  himself,  started  from  among  the  ranks  of  the  laboring- 
people,  and  proved  themselves  capable  of  filling  and  honoring 
the  highest  station,  without  the  education  of  the  schools. 

This  suggests  two  facts,  which  have  an  important  bearing 
upon  the  future  of  our  country.  We  have  exhaustless  resources 
of  mental  power  treasured  up  with  the  people,  ready  to  be 
brought  forth  and  disciplined  for  use,  in  such  measure  as  the 
nation  may  require. 

Thanks  to  our  free  institutions,  the  masses  of  this  country 
are  already  so  far  lifted  above  the  brutalizing  effects  of  in 
feriority  and  toil,  that  the  mental  powers  are  not  crushed  or 
dwarfed ;  and  it  is  found  in  our  common  schools  and  higher 
seminaries  that  the  children  of  the  laboring  poor  are  quite  as 
likely  to  exhibit  intellectual  force  and  capacity  as  those  of  the 
wealthy.  This  would  not  be  true,  as  the  general  rule,  in  the 
first  generation,  at  least,  of  the  children  of  the  laborers  of  Eng 
land  or  Ireland,  or  even  of  our  own  freedmen ;  and  hence  it 
is,  that  we  have  generated  here  a  thinking  force,  a  brain-power, 
through  free  institutions  and  education,  far  in  advance  of  what 
the  nations  of  Europe  can  now  command.  We  are  far  ahead  of 
them,  and  we  shall  maintain  the  advance  position,  if  we  pre 
serve  the  rate  of  progress.  We  are  already  a  nation  of  thinkers. 
As  the  motive  power  of  a  steam-engine  is  estimated  by  horse- 


THE    OFFICE   OF   THE   ASSISTANT   SECRETARY.  57 

power,  so  the  fighting  force  of  a  nation  will  hereafter  be  calcu 
lated  by  its  brain-power ;  and  as  that  depends  upon  the  number 
of  educated  minds,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  a  country  of  universal 
freedom  and  universal  education  will  have,  in  the  future,  an 
overwhelming  advantage  over  one  where  the  masses  are  de 
graded  and  ignorant.  Battles  are  to  be  fought,  not  by  muscles, 
but  by  brains.  Labor-saving  and  time-saving  machinery  will 
be  used  in  war  as  successfully  as  elsewhere.  A  single  shot,  fired 
by  one  man  handling  his  gun  by  steam,  will  sink  a  ship  that 
once  hours  of  cannonading  by  a  hundred  guns,  worked  by  a 
thousand  men,  could  scarcely  accomplish.  The  Americans  have 
just  entered  upon  this  new  field  of  invention.  Labor-saving 
slaughtering-machines,  and  Monitors,  and  twenty-inch  guns,  and 
torpedoes,  are  impressive  indicators  of  what  they  may  accomplish 
hereafter. 

Hence  the  importance  of  the  fact  that  such  a  reserve  force 
of  mental  power  is  stored  up  among  the- people,  ready  for  use 
whenever  the  country  has  need.  Another  important  fact  is,  that 
men  thus  called  out  from  the  people,  the  working  class,  are  often 
found  capable  of  the  noblest  achievements  without  the  previous 
training  even  of  the  schools  devoted  to  their  professions.  This 
certainly  is  no  reason  why  the  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy 
should  not  receive  a  finished  education,  but  it  suggests  the 
question  whether  it  is  not  true,  that  sometimes,  in  a  critical  mo 
ment,  officers  are  restrained  by  theories  from  attempting  what  a 
bold  man,  unacquainted  with  all  the  possible  scientific  difficul 
ties,  might  not  only  attempt,  but  perform. 

It  is  known  that  some  of  the  best-educated  officers  of  the 
English  and  French  service  declared  it  impossible  to  capture 
New  Orleans ;  and  it  is  nearly  certain  that  such  men  would 
have  declined  to  make  the  attack,  on  the  ground  that  theoreti 
cally  and  scientifically  considered,  success  was  impossible. 
Yet,  according  to  Farragut's  higher  theory  of  dash  and  pluck,  it 
was  possible ;  and  practical  common  sense  and  courage  were 
found  to  be  wiser  than  the  formulas  of  the  schools.  It  is  said 
that  one  gallant  old  French  admiral  remained  angry  with  Far- 
ragut  till  the  end  of  his  life,  because  the  Yankee  admiral  took 
the  forts  when  it  was  scientifically  impossible ! 

In  like  manner,  it  is  said,  military  science  declared  Fort 


58  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Fisher  impregnable ;  but  Porter's  broadsides  smashed  both  the 
fort  and  the  theory ;  and  Terry  proved  that  a  place  theoreti 
cally  impregnable  could  be  practically  stormed  and  captured. 
Thus  the  war  has  demonstrated  more  clearly  than  ever  before, 
that  this  country  will  be  in  advance  of  other  nations  in  the 
means  of  attack  and  defence,  so  long  as  it  has  the  greatest  num 
ber  of  free,  intelligent,  independent  thinkers.  In  Europe  the 
mind  works  in  trammels,  by  rules  and  precedents,  restrained  on 
all  sides  by  fixed  theories  and  customs.  Here,  thought  travels 
unhindered  where  it  will,  and  therefore  it  brings  us  continually 
fresh  discoveries.  It  is  said  that  Europe  will  soon  have  Moni 
tors  and  15-inch  guns.  Be  it  so.  American  genius  has  not 
exhausted  itself.  When  the  nations  have  armed  themselves  as 
we  have  now  done,  the  ever-restless  and  ever-increasing  brain 
power  of  our  thinking  workers  will  devise  some  new  and  more 
effective  method  of  warfare. 

The  amount  of  mental  wealth,  more  valuable  than  that  of  all 
our  mines,  which  popular  education  has  created  among  the  people, 
and  which  is  held  as  the  reserved  power  of  the  nation,  is  in 
dicated  by  such  examples  as  that  of  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
the  JSTavy ;  and  some  facts  *  in  his  life  are  herewith  presented 

*GUSTAVUS  VASA  Fox  was  born  June  13,  1821,  in  Saugus,  Essex  County,  Massa 
chusetts.  His  father  was  a  country  physician,  in  moderate  circumstances,  and  was, 
therefore,  unable  to  give  his  child  the  advantages  of  a  classical  education.  He  re 
moved  from  Saugus  to  Lowell,  when  the  son  was  two  years  old ;  and  there  young 
Fox  received  only  such  an  education  as  was  afforded  by  the  common  schools  of  that 
town. 

In  January,  1838,  he  was  appointed  a  midshipman;  and  made  his  first  cruise  to 
the  Mediterranean,  in  the  Cyane,  with  Captain  John  Percival.  His  service  at  sea  was 
mostly  in  time  of  peace ;  and  though  few  incidents  occurred  worthy  of  a  place  in  his 
tory,  yet  his  was  not  altogether  a  fair-weather  experience.  He  was  on  the  Saratoga 
in  that  night  of  winter  storms,  when,  after  having  passed  out  of  the  harbor  of  Ports 
mouth,  she  was  unable  either  to  proceed  or  return,  and,  though  anchored  off  shore, 
could  not  furl  her  frozen  sails.  The  ship  could  only  be  saved  by  cutting  away  her 
masts,  and  after  great  exposure  and  suffering  of  the  crew.  Subsequently  he  was  in 
the  Independence,  a  fifty-gun  ship,  then  commanded  by  Commodore  Stewart,  when 
she  was  struck  by  a  white  squall,  whose  very  fury  may  be  said  to  have  saved  the 
vessel.  Its  first  blast,  while  it  laid  the  ship  nearly  on  her  beam-ends,  tore  away  her 
head  sails,  and  then  the  main  yard  was  broken,  and  thus  she  was  partly  relieved  from 
the  pressure  that  was  bearing  her  down.  Still,  as  her  head  sails  were  gone,  she  could 
not  be  brought  round  before  the  wind,  and  the  situation,  for  a  few  minutes,  was  peril 
ous  indeed,  for  she  was  thrown  so  far  over  as  to  be  filling  with  water.  In  this  erner- 


OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  ] 

of 
,^L!FORH^ 


THE   OFFICE   OF   THE   ASSISTANT    SECRETARY.  59 

in  order  to  show  that,  by  the  almost  universal  education  of 
our  children,  the  country  is  preparing  itself  for  any  possible 
emergency. 

A  glance  at  the  principal  events  in  this  brief  narrative  will 
show  how  well  they  were  calculated  to  prepare  Captain  Fox  for 
the  eminent  position  to  which  he  was  afterward  called. 

The  strictly  professional  education,  whatever  the  profession 
may  be,  however  it  may  tend  to  excellence  in  that  special  line 
of  action,  often  unfits  a  man  for  wide  and  liberal  views.  The 

gcncy  the  crew  were  sent  into  the  fore  rigging,  where  the  wind,  acting  upon  them  as 
upon  a  sail,  brought  her  slowly  round,  and  she  righted,  and  shook  the  waves  from 
her  as  she  came  before  the  wind. 

In  1844  Fox  passed  his  examination  at  Philadelphia,  and  was  appointed  a  passed 
midshipman  ;  and  made  a  cruise  on  the  coast  of  Africa  and  to  the  West  Indies  in  the 
Preble,  with  only  the  usual  incidents  belonging  to  such  a  service,  though  gathering  an 
experience  in  these  varied  scenes  which  was  to  be  of  use  in  future  years. 

In  1846  he  was  attached  to  the  coast  survey,  and  this  also  helped  to  prepare  him 
to  judge  of  the  important  questions  connected  with  the  blockade. 

1847  he  joined  Commodore  Perry's  squadron,  in  the  brig  Washington,  and  par 
ticipated  in  the  operations  of  that  squadron  against  the  Mexican  coast  and  ports. 
Then  for  the  first  time  he  learned,  though  on  a  small  scale,  something  of  the  opera 
tions  of  actual  naval  war.  In  comparison  with  what  has  been  since  done,  those 
things  appear  very  insignificant  now.  In  1848  he  went  out  to  the  coast  of  Brazil  and 
to  the  East  Indies  as  acting  master  of  the  Plymouth ;  and  in  1850  he  joined  the  Dol 
phin  as  executive  officer,  and  visited  the  islands  of  the  Pacific,  California,  and  the 
west  coast  of  South  America,  and  returned  by  Cape  Horn. 

In  1851  he  was  appointed  master,  and  in  1851  and  1852  was  on  board  the  mail- 
steamer  Baltic  as  chief  executive  officer,  running  between  New  York  and  Liverpool. 
In  December,  1852,  he  was  commissioned  as  lieutenant,  and  ordered  to  the  Princeton, 
which  was  the  flag-ship  of  the  fishing  squadron  under  Commodore  Shubrick.  In 
August,  1853,  he  was  detached  and  ordered  to  command  the  mail-steamer  Ohio,  run 
ning  between  New  York  and  Aspinwall.  1854  he  was  transferred  to  the  command 
of  the  new  mail-steamer  George  Law.  In  1855  he  was  detached  and  granted  one 
year's  furlough.  In  July,  1856,  he  resigned,  having  been  appointed  agent  of  the  Bay 
State  Mills,  at  Lawrence,  Massachusetts. 

In  this  school  Captain  Fox  was  trained  until  the  breaking  out  of  the  rebellion, 
when  his  spirit  was  so  stirred,  that  he  was  impelled  to  seek  for  some  active  service 
in  his  country's  cause ;  and  was  soon  pointed  out  to  Mr.  Lincoln  to  lead  the  expedi 
tion  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Sumter,  a  detailed  account  of  which  appears  in  another  part 
of  this  volume. 

In  May,  1861,  after  his  return  from  the  attempt  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter,  Captain 
Fox  was  appointed  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  entered  upon  the  discharge 
of  those  important  duties  in  which,  by  cordial  cooperation  with  the  Secretary,  and  by 
suggestions  which  his  own  previous  experience  enabled  him  to  make,  he  contributed 
largely  to  the  success  of  the  L'nion  cause. 


60  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

merely  professional  man  is  quite  likely  to  view  the  whole  world 
from  one  stand-point,  and  in  one  set  of  relations  only.  This  is  far 
from  being  a  reproach  to  professional  men ;  for  if  a  man  would 
perfect  himself  in  any  particular  branch  of  study  or  business, 
it  is  really  necessary  that  he  should  devote  himself  particu 
larly  to  that  in  which  he  would  excel.  A  general  education 
forbids  that  special  attention  to  any  one  subject  by  which  alone 
distinction  is  attained.  Necessarily,  however,  confining  the 
mind  to  one  sphere  of  action,  causes  this  to  assume  an  undue 
importance  in  relation  to  other  matters ;  and  one  who  feels  con 
scious  that  he  has  mastered  the  branch  to  which  he  has  devoted 
himself,  is  very  reluctant  to  receive  suggestions  from  other 
quarters,  or  to  believe  that  any  other  person  could  discover  any 
thing  in  his  field  that  had  escaped  his  own  notice. 

Hence  the  extreme  difficulty  with  which  professional  men 
can  be  induced  to  regard  with  favor,  much  less  adopt,  an  im 
provement,  however  valuable,  which  has  been  suggested  by  one 
outside  of  their  own  professional  circle.  It  is  probable  that  no 
class  of  men  are  more  likely  to  be  moulded  by  the  peculiarities 
of  their  profession  than  the  officers  of  the  Navy.  Confined  to 
a  great  extent  to  their  ships,  often  cut  off  for  weeks  and  even 
months  from  all  direct  intercourse  with  the  world  on  shore, 
they  become  of  course  very  much  absorbed  in  their  special  oc 
cupation,  and  lose  somewhat  their  interest  in  the  general  move 
ments  of  society.  This  is  well  for  the  country,  because  thus  its 
flag  on  the  sea  is  committed  to  those  who  have  made  its  defence 
their  special  study. 

But  if  an  officer  of  the  Navy,  or  of  the  Army,  were  to  be 
called  to  administer  affairs  in  a  position  demanding,  not  merely 
professional  skill,  but  general  knowledge  of  public  interests,  then, 
though  perfectly  competent  to  command  fleets  or  armies,  it  would 
be  necessary  that  his  mind  should  expand  "beyond  his  special 
sphere;  and  to  study  public  matters,  not  merely  from  the 
stand-point  of  the  soldier  or  sailor,  but  from  the  position  of  the 
statesman. 

The  long  service  of  Captain  Fox  in  the  Navy  was  quite  suf 
ficient  to  make  him  a  thorough  seaman,  to  bring  him  into  asso 
ciation  with  its  officers,  and  to  identify  him  with  its  interests. 
At  the  same  time,  an  important  part  of  this  service,  that  in 


THE   OFFICE   OF   THE   ASSISTANT   SECRETARY.  61 

which  lie  commanded  the  mail  and  passenger  steamers  to  Liver 
pool  and  Aspinwall,  brought  him  into  intimate  connection 
with  the  two  great  currents  of  American  travel,  the  European 
and  the  Californian ;  and  thus  to  the  experience  of  the  seaman 
was  added  that  liberalizing  knowledge  which  is  derived  both 
from  society  and  travel.  It  gave  to  his  mind  a  very  different 
culture  from  that  obtained  on  a  vessel-of-war,  and  fitted  him  to 
occupy  a  wider  sphere. 

His  resignation  of  his  place  in  the  Navy,  and  the  acceptance 
of  the  position  of  agent  of  one  of  the  great  manufacturing  estab 
lishments  of  Lawrence,  introduced  him  to  an  entirely  new  scene, 
and  a  new  class  of  duties.  As  this  position  demands  business 
capacity  and  executive  power  of  the  highest  order,  it  shows  the 
estimate  which  keen-sighted  business  men  then  put  upon  his 
character.  To  conduct  successfully  the  operations  of  one  of 
these  immense  establishments  requires  important  qualifications 
in  addition  to  those  which  form  a  skilful  commander  of  a  ship ; 
and  unless  the  owners  of  these  mills  had  believed  that  Captain 
Fox  possessed  these,  the  vast  interests  of  the  company  would 
never  have  been  confided  to  his  care.  They  are  able  to  com 
mand  the  best  administrative  and  business  talent  of  the  country ; 
and  to  be  selected  for  this  post  is  a  very  weighty  testimony  to 
the  ability  of  any  man. 

Here  a  new  class  of  interests  was  brought  before  him,  and 
the  world  was  viewed  from  still  another  point  of  view.  He  had 
already  an  experience,  gathered  in  almost  every  quarter  of  the 
globe,  and  from  all  classes  of  society,  and  finally  a  lesson  was 
learned  in  one  of  those  great  establishments  which  are  the  joint 
production  of  capital,  skill,  inventive  genius  of  the  highest  order, 
and  well-rewarded  labor. 

Here  the  wonderful  results  of  machinery  were  constantly 
under  his  eye — effects  so  marvellous,  that  a  great  factory,  with 
its  cunning  engines  all  in  motion,  and  doing  with  such  celerity 
and  certainty  all  their  various  work,  seems  as  if  itself  were  intel 
ligent  ;  as  if  wheels  and  spindles  and  looms,  shafts,  belts,  and 
pulleys  were  only  the  limbs  of  one  immense  and  curious  body, 
animated  by  a  directing  soul.  Such  a  scene,  where  almost  daily 
some  new  device  for  saving  labor  or  time,  or  for  obtaining 
greater  results  was  brought  forward,  by  the  restless  spirit  of  in- 


62  HISTORY    OF    THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

vention,  would  be  very  likely  to  bring  any  thoughtful  man  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  old  and  beaten  track  might  often  be 
abandoned  for  a  new  and  better  way. 

A  man  who  becomes  acquainted  with  the  progress  of  ma 
chinery,  both  here  and  in  Europe,  will,  unless  he  is  a  stereotyped 
man,  soon  learn  to  expect  that  present  methods,  however  ex 
cellent  they  may  seem,  and  however  time-honored  they  may  be, 
are  quite  likely  to  be  superseded  by  some  far  better  and  perhaps 
unexpected  contrivance. 

The  salient  points  of  the  Assistant  Secretary's  character  are 
easily  described.  His  views  of  affairs  are  of  the  most  compre 
hensive  character,  and  no  one  has  seen  more  clearly  than  he  the 
necessity  of  creating  and  maintaining  an  American  Navy  strong 
enough  to  protect  us  against  Western  Europe  ;  and  he  has  ably 
seconded  the  earnest  and  enlightened  efforts  of  the  Secretary 
to  awaken  the  country  to  a  proper  sense  both  of  its  need  and  of 
dangers  which  lie  in  the  not  remote  future.  He  has  executive 
ability  of  a  high  order,  and  promptness,  energy,  and  decision 
mark  all  his  operations. 

But  that  trait  which  has  attracted  more  attention  than 
any  other,  is  the  boldness  of  his  conceptions  in  regard  to  new 
methods  of  naval  war,  and  the  courage  with  which  he  has  de 
fended  and  helped  to  introduce  those  inventions  which,  at  first 
distrusted  and  sneered  at,  have  compelled  now  the  attention 
and  respect  of  the  world.  He  gave  an  earnest  support  to  the 
Secretary  in  introducing  the  Monitor,  and  this  support  was  the 
more  valuable  because  the  experiment  was  opposed  by  expe 
rienced  officers  and  constructors.  To  him  also  belongs  much 
of  the  credit  of  bringing  into  use  the  15 -inch  gun,  without 
which  the  Monitors  would  lose  very  much  of  their  importance. 
In  fact,  if  the  two  inventions  were  to  be  viewed  and  estimated 
separately,  it  would  be  deemed  by  many  that  the  new  ordnance 
is  likely  to  exert  a  more  decided  influence  upon  the  future  than 
the  armored  ship.  The  20-inch  gun  may  demonstrate  that 
armor  of  any  thickness  or  of  any  description  is  a  vain  defence 
against  the  guns  of  the  future. 

Perhaps  there  was  no  measure  adopted  by  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  during  the  war  which  more  truly  expressed  the  sagacity 
and  boldness  of  the  American  mind  than  the  laving  down  at 


THE   OFFICE   OF   THE   ASSISTANT   SECRETARY.  63 

once  a  fleet  of  ocean  cruisers  of  the  Ammonoosuck  class.  So 
soon  as  the  real  spirit  and  intentions  of  England  were  fully 
disclosed  in  the  affair  of  the  Trent,  it  was  determined  to 
prepare  to  meet  our  neutral  enemy  abroad  as  well  as  at  home, 
and  be  ready  to  kindle  a  flame  which  would  burn  before  her 
own  doors  as  brightly  as  along  our  coasts.  About  thirty 
steamers  were  immediately  put  upon  the  stocks,  whose  speed 
and  power  would  be  sufficient  to  sweep  the  commerce  of  Eng 
land  from  the  seas,  and  able  also  to  levy  contributions,  should  it 
be  deemed  proper,  from  any  spot  whose  protections  are  not  of 
the  most  formidable  character.  The  construction  of  these  im 
mense  steamers  went  rapidly  forward,  and  at  the  close  of  the 
war  England  found  herself  confronted  by  ships  nearly  ready  for 
service,  to  which  she  had  nothing  to  oppose,  and  which  excited 
a  well-founded  alarm. 

This  will  appear  by  the  following  extracts  from  a  letter  ad 
dressed  to  the  Duke  of  Somerset,  by  Captain  William  Horton, 
of  the  Royal  Navy,  and  from  a  lecture  by  the  same  gentleman, 
January  15,  1865  :  "  But  I  have  more  particularly  been  led  to 
consider  the  quality  and  equipment  of  the  ships  which  have 
latterly  been  constructed  in  America,  and  which  are  eminently 
calculated  to  cut  up  and  destroy  our  commerce  in  event  of  hos 
tilities.  The  floating  wealth  of  this  country,  incalculable  in  its 
value,  could  not,  with  the  naval  resources  we  now  possess,  be 
protected  in  any  degree  against  the  depredations  of  such  cruisers 
as  now  form  a  prominent  feature  in  the  Navy  of  the  United 
States.  Before  the  war  was  at  end,  it  was  determined  to  estab 
lish  a  class  of  vessels  for  foreign  service  possessing  great  speed, 
and  carrying  heavy  guns,  while  if  they  at  all  approach  the  idea 
upon  which  they  were  designed,  will  have  it  in  their  power  so 
long  as  they  continue  unopposed  by  more  numerous  ships  of  a 
superior,  or  at  least  of  equal  speed  and  armament,  effectually  to 
sweep  the  seas  of  any  commerce  against  which  they  may  be 
launched.  Such  ships  will  be  fit  to  fight  on  favorable  terms 
when  the  occasion  may  arise,  and  able  to  flee  beyond  possibility 
of  capture  from  any  description  of  vessels  now  existing  else 
where,  and  which  might  happen  to  carry  a  superior  armament 
or  thicker  sides."  England  has  thus  been  compelled  to  admit 
that  she  is  overmatched  upon  the  seas  by  our  unarmed  cruisers, 


64:  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

and  that  administration  of  the  Navy  Department,  which  has 
thus  suddenly  surpassed  England  both  in  iron-clad  and  wooden 
ships,  merits  the  gratitude  of  the  country.  It  detracts  nothing 
from  the  high  reputation  which  the  Secretary  has  nobly  earned, 
to  state  that  his  Assistant  contributed  largely  to  the  influ 
ence  by  wThich  not  only  the  Monitors  and  guns  of  large  calibre 
were  adopted,  but  also  those  new  ocean  cruisers  which  have  so 
suddenly  startled  Europe,  and  shown  them,  scarcely  less  than 
by  our  iron-clads,  that  the  United  States  would  be  a  very  dan 
gerous  enemy. 

In  the  spring  of  1866  Captain  Fox  having  finished,  as  he 
thought,  the  work  which  the  war  had  imposed  upon  him,  and 
thinking  that  his  services  were  no  longer  specially  needed  by 
the  Government,  proposed  to  avail  himself  of  an  offer  which, 
while  it  opened  to  him  a  wide  field  of  usefulness,  wrould  give 
him  a  much  larger  pecuniary  reward  than  could  be  derived 
from  any  official  position  in  the  Government.  But  before  his 
resignation  was  formally  tendered,  a  proposition  was  made  to 
send  one  of  our  Monitors  to  Europe,  and  he  sailed  in  her,  hav 
ing  been  selected  to  bear  a  letter  from  Congress  to  the  Emperor 
of  Russia.  It  seemed  peculiarly  fitting  that  he  should  accept 
this  position.  He  had  advocated  earnestly,  while  yet  an  un 
tried  experiment,  the  Monitor  iron-clad ;  he  had  declared  that 
a  properly  constructed  Monitor  would  not  only  be  safe  at 
sea,  but  would  be  easier  in  her  movements  than  a  broadside 
ship ;  and  when  the  opportunity  was  presented  he  showed 
that  his  confidence  in  what  he  had  advocated,  would  lead 
him  to  embark  in  the  first  Monitor  that  attempted  to  cross  the 
Atlantic. 

The  enemies  of  Ericsson's  invention,  and  those  who  ever  as 
sociated  Captain  Fox's  name  with  the  Monitors,  as  the  man  in 
their  judgment  responsible  for  their  introduction,  rejoiced  and 
sneered  when  it  was  announced  that  he  was  to  go  to  Europe  in 
the  Miantonomoh,  and  said  it  was  eminently  fitting  that  the 
man  who  had  introduced  these  "  iron  coffins  "  into  the  Navy, 
should  himself  be  buried  in  one  of  them  at  the  bottom  of  the 
ocean. 

When  the  performance  of  the  Monadnock,  reported  from 
time  to  time  from  points  where  she  touched  on  her  voyage  to 


THE    OFFICE   OF   THE   ASSISTANT   6ECEETAEY.  65 

San  Francisco,  made  it  probable  that  the  Miantonomoh  might 
refuse  to  sink  for  the  gratification  of  these  men,  they  endeavored 
to  escape  sinking  themselves  by  declaring  that  Mr.  Ericsson  and 
his  friends  had  abandoned  the  Monitor  form  of  ship,  and  were 
deluding  the  public  by  a  very  different  vessel  under  the  old 
name.  The  overhang,  it  was  said,  was  abandoned,  and  that 
was  the  essential  idea  and  thing  in  an  Ericsson  Monitor.  It 
is  so,  only  in  the  same  sense  that  it  was  essential  that  all 
steamboats  should  be  built  just  as  wide,  just  as  long,  and  just 
as  high  as  the  first  one  was  with  which  Fulton  started  from  the 
dock  in  New  York  ;  that  is  to  say,  the  overhang  has  no  neces 
sary  connection  whatever  with  a  Monitor  ship.  It  has  nothing 
to  do  with  the  idea  which  distinguishes  a  Monitor  from  the 
broadside  ship.  The  Miantonomoh  and  the  Monadnock  are  as 
truly  Monitors  as  the  one  which  fought  the  Merrimack.  And  if 
hereafter  some  quite  different  forms  of  hull  shall  be  invented — 
if  the  low  deck  and  revolving  turret  are  retained — the  ship  w^ill 
still  be  a  Monitor,  just  as  the  Roanoke  is  a  Monitor,  though  a 
very  imperfect  one,  because  in  her  transformation  the  high  sides 
of  the  broadside  frigate  are  partially  retained. 

The  Miantonomoh  left  St.  John's  on  the  5th  of  June,  and 
arrived  at  Queenstown  in  safety,  after  a  passage  of  ten  days 
and  eighteen  hours,  thus  settling  for  all  time  the  question 
whether  a  Monitor  could  cross  the  Atlantic.  But  the  deter 
mining  of  this  -  point  carried  with  it  many  others  that  are  still 
more  important.  It  was  a  double  triumph  for  the  inventor  and 
the  friends  of  this  novel  form  of  war-ship,  that  the  Monadnock 
should  have  reached  San  Francisco  at  nearly  the  same  time 
when  the  Miantonomoh  arrived  at  Queenstown,  the  one  having 
safely  traversed  both  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific,  and  the 
other  crossing  the  Atlantic  and  appearing  in  a  European  port 
with  even  less  difficulty  than  an  ordinary  steamer.  These  two 
trials  left  little  or  nothing  to  be  settled  by  future  experiment ; 
the  one  vessel  in  the  harbor  of  San  Francisco,  and  the  other  in 
Europe,  were  two  facts  which  fully  answered  all  the  argu 
ments  which  had  been  used  against  Monitors,  and  the  inferences 
to  be  drawn  from  the  performances  of  these  American  creations 
were  at  once  clearly  seen  by  all  the  nations  of  Europe. 

Seldom  has  any  greater  mortification  fallen  upon  a  proud 
5 


66  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

nation  than  was  felt  by  England  and  France  when  the  Mian- 
tonomoh  appeared  in  European  waters.  It  was  one  of  those 
stern  but  most  unexpected  retributions  by  which  God  so  often 
abases  human  pride.  Certainly  a  change  that  no  human  sa 
gacity  could  have  foreseen  had  been  wrought  in  the  relative 
positions  of  Europe  and  America  between  the  time  when  the 
exulting  cry  went  over  England  and  France,  "  The  great  re 
publican  bubble  has  burst !  "  and  the  hour  when,  after  the  rebel 
lion  had  been  crushed,  and  the  Republic,  more  firmly  compacted 
than  ever,  it  was  represented  in  their  ports  by  a  ship  which 
none  of  their  own  iron-clads  could  meet  without  speedy  destruc 
tion,  and  which  their  fortifications  could  not  shut  out  of  their 
harbors. 

The  threat  of  sending  the  Warrior  to  Washington  to  chastise 
American  pride  was  not  far  in  the  past,  when  an  American 
iron-clad  was  in  English  waters,  against  which  neither  Warriors 
nor  forts  could  have  made  their  cities  secure.  When  the 
Times,  after  the  iron-clad  fight  in  Hampton  Roads,  declared 
that  wooden  navies  were  virtually  annihilated,  the  English 
people  little  thought  that  the  time  was  so  near  when  they 
would  have  in  their  own  harbors,  open  to  inspection,  a  ship  of 
the  United  States  that  would  convince  Europe  that  their  broad 
side  iron-clad  navies  had  been  rendered  as  useless  as  the  wooden 
ships  had  been  before,  and  that  in  naval  construction  and  naval 
war  the  European  nations,  Russia  alone  excepted,  must  begin 
anew.  Especially  was  this  seen  when  it  was  understood  that 
such  a  ship  as  the  Miantonomoh  by  no  means  exhibited  the 
limit  of  power  for  a  Monitor  war-ship. 

From  an  inspection  of  the  Miantonomoh,  intelligent  Eu 
ropeans  could  easily  perceive  what  sort  of  an  antagonist  a 
Monitor  like  the  Puritan  would  be  with  still  thicker  turrets 
and  plating,  with  greater  speed,  and  with  her  20-inch  guns,  one 
blow  from  which  would  break  the  side  of  any  broadside  ship  in 
Europe. 

But  it  was  for  no  mere  display  of  national  pride  or  power 
that  the  Navy  Department  ordered  the  Miantonomoh  to  Europe. 
The  purpose  was  to  show  to  the  people  of  Europe  the  power 
of  free  institutions.  It  was  to  give  them  visible  and  tangible 
proof  that  the  thinking  force  of  a  free  republic  is  greater  than 


THE    OFFICE    OF   THE    ASSISTANT    SECRETARY.  67 

that  of  a  monarchy  when  the  masses  are  forced  down  and  held 
down,  and  mind  is  dwarfed  and  uneducated.  It  was  to  aid  in 
convincing  the  people  that,  in  war  as  well  as  in  peace,  the  simple, 
cheaper  methods  and  machinery  of  a  free  population  and  gov 
ernment  are  more  effective  than  the  more  costly  and  cumber 
some  establishments  of  a  monarchy ;  that,  in  short,  a  republic  is 
stronger  as  well  as  cheaper  than  the  kingly  throne.  The  visit 
of  the  Miantonomoh,  following  so  closely  the  putting  down  of 
the  rebellion,  was  well  calculated  to  swell  the  tide  of  emigration 
from  Europe,  adding  another  important  fact  to  the  accumulating 
evidence  that  a  government  that  could  put  down  a  conspiracy 
to  which  France  and  England  gave  their  sympathies  and  moral 
and  material  aid,  had  a  grand  and  inviting  future  before  it,  and 
offered  a  secure  home  to  the  people  of  all  nations. 

When  the  Assistant  Secretary  stepped  from  the  deck  of  the 
Monitor  upon  the  shore  of  Europe,  and  felt  that  the  great  revo 
lution  in  naval  construction  and  naval  war  for  which  some  had 
so  earnestly  contended,  was  now  virtually  complete,  and  nothing 
then  remained  but  to  apply  in  th,e  future  facts  and  principles 
already  established,  he  must  have  felt  that  they  were  rewarded 
in  full  for  their  labors  and  trials.  When  the  Miantonomoh  with 
her  15-inch  guns  anchored  in  Queenstown  harbor,  it  was  set 
tled  that  the  name  of  Ericsson  was  to  represent  a  new  era  in 
war.  Of  course  it  was  impossible  to  foresee  what  the  science 
and  inventive  genius  of  the  world  might  next  achieve ;  but 
when  it  was  thus  decided  that  a  Monitor  with  15-inch  tur 
rets  and  20-inch  guns  could  become  a  safe  and  swift  ocean 
cruiser,  it  demonstrated  one  all-important  fact — that  the  navies 
of  the  nations,  such  as  they  then  were,  must  speedily  disappear. 
Machines  might  be  invented  which  would  shatter  even  Monitors 
at  a  blow,  and  this  seemed  even  then  not  improbable ;  still  the 
old  navies  were  to  be  abandoned  as  nearly  useless.  Europe 
might  build  Monitors  and  guns  equal  or  superior  to  the  Amer 
ican  ;  still  the  fact  remained  that  their  navies  were  virtually  an 
nihilated,  and  in  the  race  for  power  the  United  States  had 
placed  itself  far  in  advance  of  Europe. 

The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  first  dispatch  sent  by 
Captain  Fox  to  the  Navy  Department,  describing  the  working 
of  the  Monitor  at  sea  : 


68  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAM  MONITOR  MIANTONOMOH,  ) 
QUEEXSTOWN,  IRELAND,  June  16,  1866.      [ 

SIR  :  The  United  States  side-wheel  steamer  Augusta  (third-rate), 
1,310  tons  (old  measurement),  Commander  A.  Murray,  senior  officer ; 
United  States  Monitor  iron-clad  Miantonomoh  (third-rate),  1,225  tons, 
Commander  J.  C.  Beaumont ;  and  United  States  side-wheel  steamer 
Ashuelot  (third-rate),  double-ender,  786  tons,  Commander  J.  C.  Feb- 
iger,  left  St.  John's,  Newfoundland,  Tuesday,  June  5th,  at  two  p.  M.,  and 
the  two  fonner  arrived  at  Queenstown,  Ireland,  Saturday,  the  16th  in 
stant,  at  four  p.  M.,  after  a  pleasant  trip  across  the  Atlantic  of  ten  days 
and  eighteen  hours.  The  Ashuelot  kept  on  to  Portsmouth.  The  ma 
terial  facts  of  the  passage  are  placed  in  the  form  of  an  abstract  log, 
attached  to  this  letter. 

There  remains  but  one  question  to  discuss  concerning  the  Monitor 
type  of  iron-clads  invented  by  Captain  Ericsson  :  Can  they  be  con 
structed  so  as  to  make  them  efficient  fighting,  sea-going  cruisers  ?  If 
not,  then  we  must  adopt  the  European  models,  abstain  from  any  further 
attempts  at  progress,  and  content  ourselves  with  a  naval  force  for  de 
fensive  purposes  only,  or  invite  new  schemes.  The  facts  with  regard  to 
the  behavior  of  this  vessel  in  a  moderate  gale  of  wind  and  heavy  sea, 
when  a  frigate  would  find  it  impossible  to  use  her  battery,  are  as  fol 
lows  :  Head  to  the  sea,  she  takes  over  about  four  feet  of  solid  water, 
which  is  broken  as  it  sweeps  along  the  deck,  and  after  reaching  the 
turret  it  is  too  much  spent  to  prevent  firing  the  15-inch  guns  directly 
ahead.  Broadside  to  the  sea,  either  moving  along  or  stopped,  her  lee 
guns  can  always  be  worked  without  difficulty  ;  the  water  which  passes 
across  the  deck  from  windward  being  divided  by  the  turrets,  and  her 
extreme  roll  so  moderate  as  not  to  press  her  lee  guns  near  the  water. 
Lying  in  the  same  position,  the  15-inch  guns  can  be  fired  directly  astern 
without  interference  from  water ;  and  when  stem  to  the  sea,  the  water 
which  comes  on  board  is  broken  up  in  the  same  manner  as  when  going 
head  to  it.  In  the  trough  of  the  sea  her  ports  will  be  liable  to  be 
flooded,  if  required  to  use  her  guns  to  windward.  This,  therefore, 
would  be  the  position  selected  by  an  antagonist  who  desired  to  fight  a 
Monitor  in  a  seaway.  An  ordinary  vessel,  high  out  of  water,  and  lying 
in  the  trough  of  the  sea  broadside  to,  is  attacked  by  a  wave  which 
climbs  up  the  side,  heels  her  to  leeward,  and  passing  underneath,  assists 
in  throwing  her  back  to  windward,  when  another  wave  is  met,  and  the 
heavy  lee  lurch  repeated.  A  wave  advancing  upon  a  Monitor,  in  a  simi 
lar  position,  finds  no  side  above  the  water  to  act  against ;  it  therefore 
climbs  aboard  without  difficulty,  heels  the  vessel  a  few  degrees  to  wind 
ward,  and  passes  quickly  to  leeward,  underneath.  The  water  which  has 


THE   OFFICE   OF   THE   ASSISTANT   SECRETARY.  69 

got  on  board,  having  no  support  to  push  it  on,  and  an  inclined  deck  to 
ascend,  becomes  broken  water,  a  small  portion  going  across  the  deck 
and  off  to  leeward,  but  the  largest  part  tumbling  back  to  windward, 
overboard,  without  sending  against  the  turret  any  thing  like  the  quantity 
which  first  got  on  deck.  The  turret  guns  thus  occupy  a  central  position, 
where,  notwithstanding  the  lowness  of  the  vessel's  hull,  they  are  more 
easily  and  safely  handled  in  a  seaway  than  guns  of  the  same  height 
above  the  water  in  a  broadside  vessel.  The  axis  of  the  bore  of  the 
1 5-inch  guns  of  this  vessel  is  six  and  a  half  feet  above  the  water,  and 
the  extreme  lurch  observed,  when  lying  broadside  to  a  heavy  sea  and 
moderate  gale,  was  seven  degrees  to  windward  and  four  degrees  to  lee 
ward,  mean  five  and  one-half  degrees,  while  the  average  roll  at  the  same 
time  of  the  Augusta — a  remarkably  steady  ship — was  eighteen  degrees, 
and  the  Ashuelot  twenty-five  degrees,  both  vessels  being  steadied  by 
sail.  A  vessel  which  attacks  a  Monitor  in  a  seaway  must  approach  very 
close  to  have  any  chance  of  hitting  such  a  low  hull,  and  even  then  the 
Monitor  is  half  the  time  covered  up  by  three  or  four  feet  of  water,  pro 
tecting  herself  and  disturbing  her  opponent's  fire.  From  these  facts, 
not  unknown  to  Monitor  men,  and  the  experience  we  have  derived  from 
the  use  of  such  vessels  during  the  war,  we  may  safely  conclude  that  the 
Monitor  type  of  iron-clads  is  superior  to  the  broadside,  not  only  for 
fighting  purposes  at  sea,  but  also  for  cruising.  A  properly  constructed 
Monitor,  possessing  all  the  requirements  of  a  cruiser,  ought  to  have  but 
one  turret,  armed  with  not  less  than  20-inch  guns,  two  independent  pro 
pellers,  the  usual  proportion  of  sail,  and  constructed  of  iron.  The  com 
forts  of  this  Monitor  to  the  officers  and  men  are  superior  to  those  of  any 
other  class  of  vessels  in  the  Navy,  arising  chiefly  from  her  steadiness, 
ample  accommodations,  artificial  ventilation,  and  the  great  quantity  of 
light  afforded  by  having  the  bull's-eye  overhead  instead  of  at  the  side. 
The  commander  and  lieutenant-commander,  and  several  of  the  officers, 
are  old  Monitor  men,  and  acquired  confidence  in  this  form  of  vessel  off 
Charleston  ;  nevertheless  the  officers  and  men  deserve  to  share  with  their 
comrades  in  the  Pacific  the  credit  which  attaches  to  extending  the  voy 
ages  of  ships  embracing  so  many  novelties. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  V.  Fox, 

Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 

^V^     Jf^^^Q^Ui^r^^     §£, 
^jJ\f  /rf        v 


SYWpt 


CHAPTEE  IV. 


FURTHER  DETAILS  OF  THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE  OF  CHIEF  CLERK,  ETC. 

IT  lias  already  been  suggested  that  the  title  of  Chief  Clerk 
of  the  Department  does  not  fully  express  the  importance  of  his 
position  or  the  nature  of  his  duties.  It  is  sometimes  spoken  of 
as  the  confidential  clerk  of  the  Secretary,  but  this  name  also 
fails  to  convey  a  true  idea  of  his  relation  to  the  business  of  the 
Department.  The  duties  and  labors  of  the  Navy  Department 
naturally  separate  into  two  divisions,  one  of  which  is  very 
properly  supervised  by  one  having  nautical  skill,  while  the  man 
agement  of  the  other  requires  great  business  capacity  and  a 
general  knowledge  of  business  affairs  rather  than  the  special  at 
tainments  of  the  seaman. 

On  the  Assistant  Secretary  devolved  what  more  particularly 
relates  to  nautical  affairs,  while  the  Chief  Clerk  was  placed  at 
the  head  of  the  business  branch  of  the  service ;  both  of  these 
officers  holding  nearly  the  same  general  relation  to  the  Secretary. 
William  Faxon*  held  this  position  during  the  war,  and  also 
during  a  portion  of  Mr.  Johnson's  administration. 

*Mr.  FAXON  was  born  in  Hartford,  Connecticut,  on  the  17th  of  April,  1822.  He 
connected  himself  early  in  life  with  a  newspaper  and  printing  office,  and  received  thus 
the  advantages  of  a  business  which  has  produced  more  good  scholars,  and  clear,  vigor 
ous  writers  than  any  other  in  this  country,  which  does  not  include  a  classical  education. 
After  having  made  himself  acquainted  with  this  business  in  the  office  of  the  Connec 
ticut  Courant,  and  having  prepared  himself  not  only  to  be  a  publisher,  but  a  writer, 
he  obtained  an  interest  in  that  paper  and  became  one  of  its  editors. 

The  Hartford  Evening  Press  (daily),  and  the  Connecticut  Press  (weekly),  the  first 
Republican  papers  in  Connecticut,  were  also  established  under  the  direction  of  Mr. 
Faxon,  in  February,  1856.  In  this  new  and  more  extended  sphere  of  action,  and  in  the 
daily  discussion  of  those  great  questions  which  have  since  upturned  the  very  founda- 


THE   OFFICE   OF   THE   CHIEF   CLERK.  71 

The  position  of  the  Chief  Clerk  makes  him  the  medium  of 
communication  between  the  Secretary  and  the  business  world  in 
all  those  matters  which  relate  to  the  practical  working  and  carry 
ing  out  of  the  plans  adopted.  Others  might  decide  upon  the 
form  and  size  of  a  ship,  but  the  actual  building  of  the  vessel, 
the  contracts,  the  payments,  these  must,  of  course,  be  committed 
to  the  proper  hands ;  but  for  the  general  supervision  of  these 
things,  as  well  as  for  a  condensed  statement  of  all,  the  Secre 
tary  depends  upon  the  Chief  Clerk.  The  same  is  true  of  all 
the  other  countless  operations  of  the  Department.  He  is  the 
engineer-in-chief  of  the  operating  force.  He  arranges  the  de 
tails,  and  also  sums  up  and  generalizes  results,  that  at  a  glance 
the  Secretary  may  survey  the  whole  field  and  understand  the 
condition  of  affairs. 

The  amount  of  business  which  passed  through  this  officer's 
hands  may  be  partially  seen  by  considering  that  about  six  hun 
dred  ships  were  purchased,  built,  or  hired  during  the  war ;  that 
armaments,  crews,  and  stores  were  to  be  provided  for  all  these ; 
that  contracts  for  guns,  for  machinery,  for  stores,  for  timber  and 
materials  of  all  descriptions  were  to  be  entered  into,  and  for 
all  these  payment  was  to  be  made  in  due  time.  These  things 
give  only  an  inadequate  idea  of  the  amount  and  variety  of 
business  that  was  constantly  demanding  attention,  and  which 
required  the  utmost  vigilance  and  unwearied  care.  To  arrange 
and  systematize  all  this,  to  divide  all  aright  among  the  ap 
propriate  bureaus,  to  conduct  or  supervise  the  correspondence 
which  did  not  require  the  Secretary's  own  hand,  was  particularly, 


tions  of  society,  and  in  both  social  and  political  relations  with  the  leading  men  of  the 
State,  Mr.  Faxon  acquired  the  influence,  the  breadth  of  view,  the  variety  of  information, 
and  the  firmness  of  conviction  which  fitted  him  for  the  important  part  which  he  has  since 
performed  iu  our  great  national  struggle.  He  was  thus  prepared  to  give  his  services 
to  his  country  not  merely  from  a  cool  sense  of  duty,  but  with  an  ardent  love  for  the 
right  and  for  the  Union  which  stimulated  all  his  powers.  His  knowledge  of  the  po 
litical  interests  and  movements  of  the  country  enabled  him  to  judge  of  the  bearing 
and  probable  effect  of  important  measures,  and  his  advice  was  often  sought  and  ever 
valued  by  the  Secretary. 

Scarcely  had  the  brief  sketch  of  the  Chief  Clerk  been  finished,  when  Captain  Fox, 
having  been  sent  to  Europe  in  the  Miantonomoh,  Mr.  Faxon  was  nominated  to  the 
Senate  as  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  was  at  once  confirmed,  without  an  op 
posing  voice. 


72  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

during  the  war,  a  task  which  demanded  uncommon  business  ac 
curacy  and  tact. 

The  quiet  of  the  Navy  Department  has  misled  many  a 
bustling  man,  who  has  rushed  in  from  the  show  and  bustle  and 
noise  of  Wall  Street  or  commercial  circles,  and  finding  himself 
in  a  spot  where  all  was  hushed,  no  Babel  of  brokers'  boards  or 
auction-rooms,  no  steam-engine's  roar  and  clatter,  has  concluded, 
while  the  perspiration  was  drying  on  his  own  face,  that  all  about 
him  were  either  asleep  or  unbearably  dull.  The  writer  has  heard 
very  busy  men  say  they  disliked  to  visit  the  Navy  Department, 
it  was  such  a  sleepy  place.  Members  of  Congress  going  from 
the  activities  and  lively  scenes  of  the  House  up  to  the  Depart 
ment,  find  all  so  still,  no  loud  debate,  or  universal  conversation 
or  stir,  that  they  feel  as  if  nothing  were  going  on. 

Correspondents  and  editors  of  some  newspapers  have  thought 
they  were  publishing  a  very  profound  observation  when  they 
described  the  Secretary  and  his  associates  as  dozing  over  the 
perils  of  the  country,  and  thousands  really  believed  that  dozing 
inactivity  reigned  over  all  the  operations  of  the  Department.  The 
War  Department  had  its  camps,  and  forts,  and  waving  banners 
everywhere,  its  pomp  of  armies,  its  march  of  columns  through 
the  streets,  the  tramp  of  its  cavalry,  its  rumbling  batteries,  its 
long  army  trains,  its  orderlies  dashing  swiftly  about,  and  thou 
sands  of  uniforms  flashing  on  prancing  steeds,  and  before  the 
eyes  of  the  people  daily  were  the  gay  pomp  and  circum 
stance  of  war,  and  all  could  see  that  something  was  being 
done.  And  great  and  glorious  things  were  indeed  done.  But 
the  public  made  an  egregious  mistake  when  they  concluded  that 
nothing  important  was  going  forward  in  the  quiet  rooms  of  the 
Navy  Department,  because  there  was  no  bustle  or  noise.  The  stir 
which  they  occasioned  was  up  and  down  three  thousand  miles 
of  coast,  along  thousands  of  miles  of  Western  rivers,  and  in  the 
harbors  of  the  South,  and  on  the  ocean  far  removed  from  the 
observation  of  the  public,  unheard  in  great  degree,  and  there 
fore  unknown.  Instead  of  dashing  orderlies  and  messengers 
rushing  to  and  from  the  Navy  Department,  the  unheard  tele 
graph  brought  and  received  its  orders,  and  the  public  saw  not 
the  fleets  that  these  orders  put  in  motion,  and  had  no  means  of 
estimating  aright  the  work  they  were  performing.  A  single 


THE    OFFICE   OF   THE   CHIEF   CLERK.  73 

stroke  upon  a  bell,  tlie  handing  of  a  dispatch  to  a  messenger, 
would  probably  be  all  that  an  observer  could  hear  or  see  of  a 
transaction  upon  which  the  most  important  interests  depended, 
and  he  might  therefore  suppose,  as  many  did,  that  little  or 
nothing  was  being  accomplished.  The  Chief  Clerk  obtained  a  re 
markable  knowledge  of  details.  In  collecting  the  materials  for 
this  history,  the  writer  seldom  knew  him  to  hesitate  in  regard  to 
any  point  respecting  which  information  was  needed.  He  either 
knew  himself  what  was  sought  for,  or  he  could  refer  to  the  book, 
or  the  record,  or  the  person  from  which  the  knowledge  could 
be  obtained ;  and  much  that  is  valuable  in  the  work  is  due  to  the 
unwearied  kindness  with  which  all  possible  aid  was  afforded. 
The  amount  of  work  which  he  was  able  to  perform  was  owing 
to  the  fact  that  all  his  means  were  orderly  disposed  and  always 
within  his  reach,  and  the  machinery  of  his  office  wrought  not 
only  with  rapidity  but  with  machine-like  accuracy.  By  com 
mon  consent  he  was  admirably  fitted  for  the  position  he  occu 
pied,  and  he  performed  a  work  during  the  war  much  more  im 
portant  than  is  generally  supposed. 

It  is  believed  that  such  a  difficult  and  gigantic  task  as  was  so 
successfully  performed  by  the  Navy  Department  was  never  be 
fore  executed  with  so  little  of  bustle,  or  surface  agitation  of  any 
kind.  It  was  due  very  much  to  the  fact  that  the  Secretary 
selected  his  subordinates  with  discrimination,  so  that  the  differ 
ent  branches  of  the  work  were  committed  to  those  who  were 
eminently  the  men  for  the  station,  and  that  all  worked  together 
in  harmony.  In  the  working  out  of  the  plans  of  the  Depart 
ment,  and  in  the  supervision  of  the  whole  business  machinery, 
by  which  results  were  to  be  reached,  the  Chief  Clerk  found  his 
appropriate  place,  a  wide  and  important  sphere  of  action,  which 
could  be  well  filled  only  by  one  of  great  business  talent  and 
skill.  The  power,  then,  with  which  the  Department  was 
worked,  was,  first  of  all,  the  combined  force  of  these  three 
minds,  each  laboring  in  its  own  sphere,  but  unitedly  to  a  com 
mon  end,  and  the  quiet  with  which  they  wrought  was  indicative 
not  of  inaction,  but  of  order  and  of  real  power. 

The  war  having  been  finished,  a  large  proportion  of  the 
business  of  the  peace  establishment  came  naturally  within  the 
sphere  which  the  Chief  Clerk  had  formerly  occupied,  and  Mr. 


74  HISTOEY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Faxon  found  himself  already  prepared  for  a  position  which  was 
new  rather  in  name  than  in  the  character  of  its  duties.  He 
brought  to  the  office  one  important  qualification,  the  faculty  of 
attending  to  a  great  variety  of  details  without  confusion,  and 
of  turning  easily  from  one  subject  to  another  and  giving  due 
attention  to  each.  Many  men  possessing  every  other  quality 
for  business  have  failed  from  the  lack  of  this.  Having  become 
occupied  with  one  affair,  a  sudden  interruption  is  apt  to  disturb 
them.  They  cannot  readily  call  off  the  mind  from  what  it  is 
considering  and  turn  to  the  new  question,  and  therefore  busi 
ness  drags  or  gets  into  confusion,  and  those  waiting  for  action 
become  impatient.  In  such  an  office  as  that  of  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  a  single  hour  will  sometimes  bring  what 
would  seem  an  almost  impossible  variety  of  affairs.  Senators, 
chairmen  of  House  committees,  contractors,  mothers,  wives, 
sisters,  to  inquire  where  their  friends  are,  men  who  seek  ap 
pointments  for  themselves  or  others,  clerks  with  all  kinds  of 
papers  to  be  inspected  or  signed,  men  with  every  sort  of  com 
plaints,  friends  to  make  a  call,  collectors  of  autographs,  perhaps 
a  historian  baffled  in  his  hunt  for  a  fact — all  these  sometimes 
crowd  a  morning  hour,  and  each  would  feel  insulted  or  grieved 
if  his  case  were  not  deemed  to  be  of  very  special  and  peculiar 
importance. 


CHAPTEE  V. 


THE  CONDITION  OF  THE  COUNTRY,  AND  THE  STATE  OF  PUBLIC  OPIN 
ION  AT  THE  TIME  OF  MR.  LINCOLN'S  INAUGURATION. 


THE  bearing  which  this  topic  has  upon  the  operations  of  the 
Navy  Department  will  be  seen  by  considering  that  if  the  war 
had  been  against  a  foreign  power,  the  united  loyalty  and  enthu 
siasm  of  the  people  would  have  rendered  the  task  of  the  Gov 
ernment  a  comparatively  easy  one.  Crippled  though  it  was  in 
its  resources,  while  a  wide-spread  sympathy  with  the  rebellion 
even  in  the  States  which  did  not  secede,  and  a  general  dispo 
sition  to  make  concessions  rather  than  resort  to  force,  would 
render  any  suitable  preparation  for  war  an  almost  impossible 
thing.  The  difficulties  of  the  situation  would  also  be  largely 
increased  if  the  proper  resources  of  the  Government  were  so 
disposed,  by  previous  treachery,  as  to  be  beyond  control. 

In  order,  therefore,  to  show  aright  the  work  actually  per 
formed  by  the  Navy  Department,  the  difficulties  which  beset, 
and  the  obstacles  which  were  surmounted,  it  is  necessary  to  pre 
sent  a  brief  statement  of  the  condition  of  the  country  at  the 
beginning  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration. 

Probably  no  nation  was  ever  more  completely  unprepared 
for  a  great  conflict  than  was  our  Government  when  the  rebels 
committed  their  first  hostile  acts  by  seizing  forts,  arsenals,  and 
ships.  A  dismantled  ship  without  an  armament,  a  fortress  with 
its  guns  dismounted  and  spiked,  and  the  garrison  gone,  would 
not  adequately  represent  the  utter  impotency  of  the  United 
States  for  attack  or  defence,  when  it  was  first  clearly  seen  that 
there  was  no  escape  from  war  without  yielding  both  the  nation's 
honor  and  life. 


76  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Many  who  were  rebels  in  heart  and  purpose  had  a  control 
in  the  Government  just  previous  to  the  war,  and  the  most 
powerful  minds  of  the  South,  and  some  even  at  the  North,  were 
conspiring  wTith  these  State '  officers,  so  to  destroy  the  credit 
of  the  Government,  so  to  dispose  of  the  ]STavy  and  Army,  so  to 
scatter  or  destroy  its  resources  or  transfer  them  to  the  possession 
of  the  South,  as  to  render  it  impossible  for  it  either  to  strike  an 
offensive  blow,  or  to  defend  itself  when  the  plan  of  the  traitors 
was  mature. 

The  little  Army  was  beyond  reach  on  the  frontier,  under 
command  of  General  Twiggs,  selected  for  his  work  ;  the  Navy 
was  chiefly  in  foreign  seas,  or  remote  from  the  spot  where  ships 
would  be  needed  most  and  soonest ;  forts,  arsenals,  ships,  navy- 
yards  were  placed,  so  far  as  possible,  in  charge  of  the  friends  of 
the  South  ;  and  in  every  one  of  the  Departments  of  the  Govern 
ment  were  men,  and  some  of  them  in  important  places,  who 
used  their  situations  as  far  as  possible  to  give  information  of 
every  plan  and  movement  of  the  Government,  and  to  aid  the 
plot  of  the  conspirators. 

In  addition  to  these  almost  insuperable  difficulties  of  a  ma 
terial  nature,  the  country  had  lost  much  of  its  moral  power. 
The  habit  of  yielding  to  Southern  dictation  seemed  to  have 
sapped  the  manhood  of  the  North.  The  life-force  of  the  nation 
was  absorbed  in  the  pursuits  of  peace,  and  peace  was  demanded 
by  every  interest  of  the  merchant,  the  manufacturer,  the  banker, 
and  the  man  of  wealth.  They  were  at  first  slow  to  put  a  higher 
estimate  upon  principle,  and  national  unity,  and  national  honor, 
than  they  did  upon  money. 

Many,  perhaps  most  of  our  leading  statesmen,  men  who 
largely  controlled  the  opinions  of  the  people,  were  entirely  mis 
taken  in  regard  to  the  intentions  of  the  Southern  leaders.  They 
could  not  believe  that  it  was  really  their  settled  purpose  to  or 
ganize  a  separate  government,  even  at  the  perils  and  cost  of 
war.  It  seemed  to  most  an  incredible  thing  that  men  who  not 
only  had  no  just  cause  of  complaint,  but  had  freely  enjoyed 
more  than  their  due  share  of  the  honors,  the  profits,  and  general 
blessings  of  our  common  Government,  whose  every  important 
demand  had  been  granted  by  the  North,  in  a  spirit  which  often 
passed  the  bounds  of  proper  concession,  could  plot  the  ruin  of 


CONDITION   OF  THE  COUNTRY.  Y7 

the  country  from  whose  protecting  power  and  cherishing  kind 
ness  they  had  received  their  all. 

Men  would  not  believe  that  Americans  could  be  guilty  of  so 
foul  a  crime,  and  therefore  the  very  enormity  of  this  iniquity, 
by  placing  it  beyond  belief,  gave  the  conspirators  a  temporary 
security,  and  time  to  perfect  their  plot.  They  retained  boldly 
their  places  under  the  Government,  using  their  positions  to  plan 
and  secure  the  success  of  their  cause.  This  also  was  for  a  time 
an  effectual  shield.  Who  could  believe  that  Americans  would 
cast  away  fidelity  to  a  trust,  honor,  manliness,  and  even  the 
solemnity  of  their  official  oaths,  and  remain  in  the  Depart 
ments,  in  the  Senate  and  House,  in  the  Army  and  Navy,  the 
recognized  officers  of  the  Government,  receiving  their  proper 
pay,  while  every  thought  and  feeling  of  their  hearts  was  false 
to  their  trusts,  and  every  act  was  that  of  a  deliberate  traitor  ? 

It  is  an  honorable  proof  of  the  superior  moral  condition  of 
the  North  that  it  could  form  no  conception  of  such  a  monstrous 
crime,  and  refused  at  first  to  believe  it  even  a  possible  thing. 
Hence  the  leading  thought  of  our  foremost  men  at  the  time  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  inauguration  seemed  to  be,  "  The  South  intends  in 
this  movement  only  to  obtain  some  fresh  concessions,  some  new 
guaranties  for  her  property  and  what  she  deems  to  be  her 
rights,  and  in  view  of  the  priceless  value  of  the  Union  we  must 
concede  to  the  utmost  limits  of  safety  and  honor."  What  those 
limits  were  it  is  well  perhaps  to  consider,  in  order  to  show 
what  the  state  of  the  public  mind  was  when  the  Navy  Depart 
ment  began  its  operations. 

At  the  close  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  administration  the  rebellion 
had  made  such  progress  that  from  Pennsylvania  to  Key  West 
only  three  forts,  Fortress  Monroe,  Sumter  with  its  handful  of 
eighty  men,  and  Pickens  at  Pensacola,  remained  to  the  Gov 
ernment  of  all  its  property  and  defences  on  the  Southern  coast ; 
and  because  this  general  statement  gives  no  clear  idea  of  the 
loss,  or  the  disadvantage  at  which  it  placed  the  Government, 
the  following  account  is  presented  in  detail  of  the  fortifications 
and  property  which  the  insurgents  seized  :  Fort  Moultrie  and 
Castle  Pinckney,  in  Charleston  harbor ;  Forts  Fisher,  Caswell, 
and  Macon,  commanding  the  entrance  to  Beaufort  and  Wilming 
ton  ;  Fort  Pulaski,  at  Savannah ;  Forts  Morgan  and  Gaines,  at 


78  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Mobile ;  Forts  Philip  and  Jackson,  below  New  Orleans  ;  Fort 
Pike,  on  Lake  Pontchartrain  ;  Forts  Barrancas  and  McKae,  at 
Pensacola ;  and  the  Army  and  all  the  public  property  in  Texas. 
Add  to  this  list  the  arsenals,  custom-houses,  mints,  post-offices, 
revenue  cutters,  and  sub-treasuries,  which  were  all  seized 
throughout  the  South,  and  it  is  estimated  that  the  rebels  had 
taken  from  the  Government  thirty  million  dollars'  worth  of 
property,  besides  seizing  nearly  all  the  defences  of  the  South, 
before  Mr.  Lincoln  was  inaugurated. 

It  is  not  surprising  that  the  boldest  and  truest-hearted  men 
should  have  been  startled  at  this  first  scene  in  the  tragedy ; 
and  there  is  perhaps  little  room  for  censure,  because  their 
first  efforts  were  to  avert  the  storm  by  hastening  with  various 
offers  of  concession.  True  it  is,  that  viewed  in  the  light  of 
subsequent  events,  some  of  the  propositions  made  seem  almost 
like  a  timid  surrender  of  the  very  manhood  of  the  North,  like 
the  abandonment  of  essential  principles ;  but  we  must  remem 
ber  that  the  light  of  this  day  had  not  then  risen  upon  the 
country. 

A  brief  statement  of  the  proffered  concessions  and  various 
efforts  for  peace,  will  show  how  opposed  to  war  was  the  heart 
of  the  country,  how  reluctant  to  begin  violent  resistance  even 
to  treason ;  and  this  will  reveal  some  of  the  difficulties  which 
beset  the  Navy  Department  as  well  as  other  branches  of  the 
Government. 

They  were  called  upon  to  inaugurate  war  on  the  most  stu 
pendous  scale,  while  many  of  our  most  trusted  leaders  were 
almost  on  their  knees,  desiring  peace  on  terms  that  seem  to  us 
humiliating  now,  and  which  demoralized,  almost  fatally,  the 
people  of  the  country.  Without  ships  or  materiel  and  the  whole 
country  averse  to  war,  the  Navy  Department  was  called  upon 
to  create  a  Navy  equal  to  that  of  France  or  England ;  and  when 
we  remember  that  this  work  was  actually  done,  let  the  country 
consider  whether  any  thing  less  than  consummate  business  skill, 
far-seeing  sagacity,  promptness,  energy,  and  executive  ability  of 
the  highest  order,  could  have  performed  the  task. 

Mr.  Buchanan's  administration  closed  with  the  declaration 
that  a  State  could  not  constitutionally  be  coerced,  a  sentiment 
which  would  annihilate  the  national  Government,  and  that  gave 


CONDITION   OF   THE   COUNTRY.  79 

full  sanction  to  every  doctrine  and  act  of  the  traitors.  "When 
we  consider  that  this  opinion  went  forth  from  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  clothed  with  all  the  official  power  of 
that  high  position,  and  that  it  came  from  the  chief  of  a  great 
Northern  party,  it  is  seen  that  it  was  an  efficient  instrument 
for  dividing  the  North,  for  misleading  and  corrupting  the  peo 
ple,  and  for  encouraging  the  hearts  of  the  traitors.  It  was  like 
attempting  the  moral  disarming  of  the  North,  the  sapping  of 
the  very  truths  and  principles  on  which  our  Government 
stands. 

It  is  sufficient  to  state  the  main  points  of  the  propositions 
which  the  leaders  of  the  Republican  party,  including  the  Presi 
dent,  made  to  the  insurgents  after  the  inauguration  of  Mr. 
Lincoln : 

They  offered  additional  guaranties  for  the  prompt,  faithful, 
and  unhindered  operation  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law. 

They  proposed  to  pay  the  full  value  of  every  slave  not  re 
covered,  through  any  assistance  given  in  the  Free  States  to  the 
fugitive. 

They  were  willing  to  amend  the  Constitution  so  as  to  place 
slavery  beyond  the  control  of  Congress,  and  render  it  forever 
secure  as  one  of  the  recognized,  rightful,  and  perpetual  institu 
tions  of  the  country. 

This  last  proposition  was  made  by  Mr.  Corwin  in  the  House, 
and  by  Mr.  Seward  in  the  Peace  Conference,  and  was  passed  as  a 
joint  resolution  by  a  two:thirds  majority  both  in  the  House  and 
in  the  Senate.  Is  it  possible  to  conceive  of  any  measures  better 
calculated  than  these  to  blind  and  sear  the  conscience  of  the 
North  ?  They  reduced  the  country  to  a  state  of  moral  impo- 
tency  in  regard  to  the  great  issues  before  it ;  and  how  could  the 
Departments  expect  or  even  hope  for  a  vigorous  response  when 
the  call  was  made  for  a  war  upon  those  who  declared  they  had 
seceded  in  order  to  build  an  empire  on  the  corner-stone  of 
slavery  ? 

What  was  the  crime  in  this,  when  the  Northern  leaders 
had  just  offered  to  assume  all  the  guilt  of  slavery,  and  make  it, 
by  the  Constitution  itself,  perpetual  ?  There  was  at  first  no 
moral  principle  to  which  to  appeal,  and  no  moral  basis  for  the 
war  to  rest  upon  ;  and  the  Navy  Department  felt  the  full  force 


80  HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

of  the  difficulty.  The  whole  service  seemed  for  a  time  to  be 
demoralized,  and  disloyalty  and  treachery  were  on  all  sides 
thwarting  the  plans  of  the  Government. 

The  following  is  related  as  one  only  among  the  countless 
phases  of  the  treachery  which  the  Navy  Department  was  called 
upon  to  meet  and  baffle :  In  the  earlier  stages  of  the  conflict 
the  rebels  were  particularly  anxious  to  obtain  information  con 
cerning  the  movements  of  the  Navy,  and  even  the  intentions  of 
the  Secretary.  They  knew  that  if  they  could  penetrate  the 
secrets  of  this  Department,  they  could  anticipate  any  attempt 
to  succor  Sumter  or  recapture  the  other  Southern  forts.  No 
art  which  could  be  devised  by  men  skilled  in  intrigue  was  left 
untried  to  gain  this  coveted  knowledge. 

In  the  evening  of  the  first  of  April,  1861,  a  package  was 
brought  from  the  President  by  his  private  secretary,  and  hand 
ed  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  which  contained  a  very  re 
markable  order.  At  that  time  Commodore  Stringham  was  per 
forming  the  duties  which  belong  to  the  chief  of  the  Bureau  of 
Detail,  a  bureau  not  then  created.  These  duties  involve  of 
course  the  most  intimate  and  confidential  relations  with  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy.  The  detailing  officer  would  necessarily 
know  the  whole  personnel  of  the  Navy,  the  position  and  duties 
of  every  officer,  and  even  every  movement  proposed  or  actual. 
With  this  officer  under  rebel  influences,  almost  the  private 
thoughts  of  the  Secretary  might  be  revealed  to  the  conspirators. 
The  loyalty  of  Commodore  Stringham  was  beyond  suspicion ; 
the  conspirators  knew  he  could  not  be  approached. 

The  order  already  mentioned  provided,  first  of  all,  for  the 
removal  of  Commodore  Stringham  to  a  distant  station,  to  take 
command  of  the  Home  Squadron ;  and  then  directed  the  Sec 
retary  to  appoint  in  his  place  Captain  Samuel  Barron,  with  spe 
cial  instructions  to  put  him  in  possession  of  full  information 
concerning  the  Navy,  its  officers,  and  its  movements.  The 
Secretary,  knowing  well  the  character  and  sentiments  of  Cap 
tain  Barron,  -went  immediately  to  the  President.  As  it  was 
quite  an  unusual  hour  for  such  an  interview,  the  President,  as 
the  Secretary  entered  his  room,  exclaimed,  pleasantly,  "  What 
have  I  been  doing  wrong  now  ? "  The  Secretary  showed  him 
the  order,  and  explained  to  him  that  the  sympathies  of  Barron 


CONDITION   OF   THE    COUNTRY.  81 

were  all  warmly  with  the  conspirators,  and  that  he  could  not 
think  of  having  a  man  thrust  into  his  Department  and  in  such 
a  position,  especially  one  whom  he  had  no  reason  to  trust.  The 
President  replied  that  he  had  signed  many  papers  that  day 
which  he  had  not  examined,  and  that  he  knew  nothing  himself 
of  Barren ;  that  he  had  signed  the  order  as  he  had  other  papers, 
trusting  to  those  in  whom  he  thought  he  ought  to  confide,  and 
concluded  by  telling  the  Secretary  to  pay  no  attention  to  the 
order  and  retain  Commodore  Stringham  in  his  place,  or  select 
for  it  any  other  man  whom  he  approved. 

It  is  unnecessary  perhaps  to  inquire  where  or  how  this 
dangerous  paper  originated,  but  it  must  have  passed  through 
high  places  somewhere  before  it  could  reach  the  desk  of  the 
President.  Two  facts  will  throw  much  light  upon  the  designs 
of  the  originator  of  this  order,  whoever  he  may  have  been. 

This  Captain  Samuel  Barron  is  the  man  who,  on  the  21st 
of  January  preceding,  had  been  selected  by  Secretary  Toucey 
to  proceed  to  Pensacola  and  prevent  any  United  States  vessels 
from  entering  the  harbor ;  the  negotiator,  as  supposed,  of  an 
armistice  entered  into  by  Mr.  Buchanan  and  the  leaders,  to 
which  the  commander  of  the  Sabine  refers  in  his  letter  to  Sec 
retary  Welles,  dated  "  Off  Pensacola,  April  1,  1861,"  in  which 
letter  he  states  that  he  declined  to  land  troops  sent  out  by  Gen 
eral  Scott,  because  he  had  previous  orders  from  the  Navy  De 
partment  to  the  contrary.  The  orders  to  which  he  refers  are 
those  from  Secretary  Toucey,  carried  out  by  this  Samuel  Bar 
ron,  and  which  forbade  any  United  States  vessels  from  entering 
the  harbor.  Barron  soon  after  deserted  his  flag  and  openly  es 
poused  the  rebel  cause,  and  was  one  of  the  very  first  officers 
captured  after  the  war  began. 

It  is  not  easy  to  mistake  the  design  of  an  order  which, 
if  carried  out,  would  have  placed  a  confidential  tool  of  the 
leaders  where  he  would  necessarily  have  known  most  of  the  se 
crets  and  designs  of  the  Navy  Department ;  where,  aided  by  the 
conspirators,  he  could  seriously  have  embarrassed  its  operations, 
and,  at  the  same  time,  keep  them  advised  of  every  movement 
of  the  Government. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  the  country  and  its  resources,  and 
such  the  opinions  and  feelings  which  pervaded  the  land ;  and 


82  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

such  were  the  views  and  propositions  of  our  leading  politicians 
and  statesmen,  when  at  length  the  North  cast  aside  its  wishes 
for  conciliation  and  peace  to  find  itself  betrayed,  stripped  of  its 
resources,  disarmed,  and  demoralized,  and  in  that  state  confront 
ing  a  rebellion  fully  organized,  perfectly  united,  armed  with 
the  spoils  of  the  Government,  confident  of  success,  enthusi 
astically  supported  by  France  and  England,  and  with  active, 
sympathizing  friends  spread  over  all  the  JSTorth. 

Under  such  circumstances  the  ISTavy  Department  was  called 
upon  to  perform  a  work  which  most  here  and  in  Europe  be 
lieved  to  be  an  impossible  task,  even  if  it  had  the  fleets  of  Eng 
land  or  France  at  its  disposal.  The  nature  of  this  work,  and 
the  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  Department  for  executing  it, 
will  form  the  subject  of  another  chapter. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  BLOCKADE. 

IN  the  very  beginning  of  the  rebellion  the  Government  was 
called  upon  to  decide  one  of  the  most  important  questions  of 
the  war.  Indeed,  when  viewed  in  the  light  of  subsequent 
events,  it  is  seen  to  have  been  the  point  on  which  the  policy 
of  foreign  nations  hinged,  and  which  necessarily  controlled  our 
own  toward  the  insurgents.  It  was  the  main  cause  which 
shaped  the  character  of  the  contest  both  abroad  and  at  home. 
That  question  was,  whether  the  Government  should  proclaim  a 
blockade,  or  declare  the  ports  of  the  insurgent  States  to  be 
closed.  The  Cabinet  was  divided  in  opinion,  and  from  the 
first  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  took  decided  ground  in  favor 
of  closing  the  ports,  a  position  which  he  never  abandoned,  and 
subsequent  events  have  abundantly  proved  his  sagacity  and  his 
statesmanship. 

On  the  19th  of  April,  1861,  the  President  issued  his  procla 
mation  establishing  a  "  blockade  "  for  the  ports  of  South  Caro 
lina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Florida,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  and 
Texas.  A  second  proclamation,  issued  on  the  27th  of  April, 
extended  this  "  blockade  to  the  ports  of  Virginia  and  North 
Carolina,"  and  thus  it  was  made  to  cover  the  whole  coast  of  the 
States  in  rebellion. 

On  the  13th  of  July,  1861,  Congress  evidently  supposing 
that  the  policy  of  the  Government  on  this  point  was  not  per 
manently  settled,  authorized  the  President  to  "  close  the  ports  " 
of  any  States  in  insurrection,  and  the  question  thus  presented 
between  this  course  and  a  "  blockade "  became  the  subject  of 
discussion  in  the  Cabinet. 


84  HISTOEY   OF    THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  adhering  to  his  opinion  that  the 
ports  should  be  dosed  instead  of  being  blockaded,  the  President 
requested  him  to  make  a  more  definite  statement  of  his  views 
in  writing. 

In  answer  to  this  request,  the  Secretary  presented  a  paper  to 
the  President,  on  the  5th  of  August,  1861,  of  which  the  follow 
ing  is  a  synopsis  ;  and  which  shows  how  clearly  Mr.  Welles  and 
those  who  acted  with  him,  at  this  early  stage  of  the  conflict, 
saw  all  the  main  bearings  of  this  grave  question,  upon  .our  rela 
tions  at  home  and  abroad. 

These  arguments  have  since  been  thrown  into  much  clearer 
light  and  bolder  relief,  by  the  positions  assumed  by  Lord  Russell 
in  his  correspondence  with  Mr.  Adams,  concerning  the  Alabama 
and  her  piratical  consorts. 

The  Secretary,  in  this  paper,  first  assumes  that  the  decision 
must  necessarily  determine,  so  far  as  the  act  of  our  Government 
could  do  it,  whether  the  conflict  should  be  regarded  as  a  mere 
insurrection  on  the  part  of  the  Southern  States,  and  therefore  a 
domestic  affair,  or  wrhether  we  should  proclaim  it  a  true  war 
between  independent  powers,  to  be  governed  by  the  rules  and 
practice  of  international  law. 

He  urged  this  view  from  the  generally  conceded  fact,  that  a 
blockade  can  be  established  only  against  the  ports  of  a  foreign 
power,  and  referred  to  the  opinion  of  eminent  jurists,  that  a  na 
tion  cannot  blockade  its  own  ports ;  but  that  commerce  must 
be  excluded  from  them,  if  at  all,  by  closing  them. 

Prom  this  principle  of  international  law  he  argued,  that  to 
establish  a  blockade  of  the  Southern  ports  would  be,  in  effect, 
and  according  to  the  usages  of  the  law  of  nations,  to  proclaim 
them  lawful  belligerents,  and  invested  with  all  the  rights  of  an 
independent  power;  remove  from  them  the  name  and  the 
odium  of  a  rebellion ;  give  to  their  cause,  in  the  eyes  of  many, 
the  moral  basis  of  justifiable  revolution,  and  impart  to  it  a 
strength  which  it  could  not  otherwise  obtain. 

That  to  be  consistent,  their  collectors,  revenue  officers, 
clearances,  registers,  etc.,  must  be  recognized  as  legitimate. 

The  Secretary  reminded  the  President,  that  in  all  our  pol 
icy,  both  legislative  and  executive,  we  were  treating  the  rebels, 
as  such,  as  mere  insurgents,  and  that  the  Government  could  not 


THE    QUESTION   OF   THE   BLOCKADE.  85 

occupy  this  position  in  its  general  policy,  and  then  change  its 
ground  to  suit  its  convenience,  and,  by  proclaiming  a  blockade, 
admit  them  to  be  independent  and  lawful  belligerents.  They 
could  not  be  treated  both  as  rebels,  guilty  of  high  treason,  and 
also  as  engaged  in  lawful  war. 

He  proceeded  to  point  out  the  difference  between  a  blockade 
and  a  closing  of  ports.  The  first  carries  with  it  the  consequen 
ces  already  mentioned ;  the  last  removes  the  whole  contest  from 
the  sphere  of  international  law,  makes  of  it  purely  a  domestic 
question,  and  brings  every  one  attempting  to  enter  a  port  thus 
closed,  under  our  municipal  laws,  to  be  treated  according  to  the 
decision  of  our  own  courts ;  while  it  would  leave  the  rebels  in 
their  proper  position,  and  with  their  true  name  and  character  as 
traitors. 

The  manly  American  spirit  which  has  characterized  the 
Department  and  the  Navy  during  the  whole  war  is  well  exhib 
ited  in  the  following  extract  from  the  Secretary's  paper.  The 
country  may  feel  assured  that  the  honor  of  the  nation  has  ever 
been  safe  in  the  hands  of  the  Navy  : 

"  Our  right  as  a  nation  to  close  our  own  ports  will  not,  I  take  it  for 
granted,  be  questioned,  or  be  permitted  to  he  questioned.  They  are 
within  our  own  jurisdiction  and  control,  and  the  right  cannot  be  sur 
rendered  to  foreign  dictation  without  a  surrender  of  our  nationality. 

"  I  am  aware  that  Lord  John  Russell  has  recently  asserted  a  contrary 
opinion,  evidently  intended  as  an  admonition  to  us ;  in  which  lie  under 
takes  to  maintain  that  the  power  and  authority  of  a  government  over  its 
own  ports  is  less  in  a  period  of  insurrection  or  civil  commotion  than  in 
peaceful  times.  In  'other  words,  Great  Britain  declares  that  when  a 
country  needs  to  exercise  its  authority  most,  it  shall  be  dispossessed  of 
that  authority  by  foreign  interference  ;  that  when  the  integrity  of  a 
country  is  threatened  by  insurgents,  foreign  governments  will  interpose 
and  assert  dismemberment  to  be  a  foregone  conclusion ;  that  national 
law  is  inoperative  when  its  enforcement  is  essential  to  national  existence ; 
that  we  must  rely  upon  the  law  of  nations  as  expounded  by  the  British 
admirals,  instead  of  our  own  laws  and  our  own  officers,  for  governing  our 
own  country,  and  regulating  its  domestic  affairs.  I  do  not  admit  the 
morality  nor  tlie  legality  of  the  reasoning  of  the  British  minister,  nor 
do  I  believe  the  British  Government  would  tolerate  such  dictation  or 
interference  in  her  domestic  affairs.  Were  there  no  fear  of  Great 


86  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Britain,  no  threat  or  apprehension  from  foreign  powers,  should  we  hesi 
tate  for  one  moment  on  this  question  of  closing  our  own  ports  ?  If  not, 
shall  we,  in  our  misfortune,  submit  to  the  arrogance  and  dictation  of 
foreign  governments  in  relation  to  our  domestic  affairs  ? " 

Again,  the  Secretary  says,  in  regard  to  this  measure  of  clos 
ing  the  ports : 

"  It  is  one  strictly  national  and  rightful,  attended  with  no  doubts  or 
difficulties,  except  from  foreign  interference,  which  should  not  be  per* 
mitted  to  control  our  internal  domestic  affairs  for  a  moment." 

In  these  sentiments,  the  true  American  spirit  speaks  in 
manly  tones — the  same  spirit  that  animated  the  Navy  of  1812. 
Whoever  else  may  have  hesitated  or  quailed  at  a  foreign  threat, 
the  Navy  never  did  less  than  proudly  and  firmly  defend  the  na 
tional  honor. 

The  Secretary  next  asserts  his  fear  that  the  long  coast-line 
of  more  than  three  thousand  miles  could  not  be  effectually 
guarded  by  any  force  at  our  command.  In  this  he  but  shared 
the  opinion  of  all  Europe,  who  sneered  at  the  idea  of  such  a 
blockade ;  and  it  is  not  at  all  surprising  that  in  common  with 
all  his  associates  he  should,  at  that  early  period  of  the  rebellion, 
have  underrated  the  power  and  resources  of  the  country,  or  was 
not  fully  aware  of  the  energy  and  executive  ability  of  the  De 
partment  of  which  he  was  the  chief,  and  which  he  so  signally 
manifested  in  the  hour  of  trial. 

The  advantages  of  the  Secretary's  plan  are  so  great  and  so 
manifest,  as  viewed  in  the  light  of  what  has  since  occurred, 
that  it  seems  marvellous  they  should  not,  even  then,  have  been 
clearly  seen.  Had  that  plan  been  adopted,  it  would  have  been 
a  clear,  decided,  and  continual  proclamation  to  the  world,  that 
the  United  States  considered  those  in  arms  against  the  Govern 
ment  to  be  rebels  and  traitors  ;  and  that  it  claimed  the  right  to 
treat  them  as  such,  and  not  as  lawful  belligerents.  Nor  would 
this  position  have  precluded  the  Government  from  making  an 
arrangement  for  the  exchange  of  prisoners,  for  such  an  agreement 
could  be  made  even  with  a  band  of  robbers,  without  acknowl 
edging  them  to  be  engaged  in  a  lawful  occupation. 

There  could  have  been  no  fitting  out  from  British  or  other 


THE  QUESTION  OF  THE  BLOCKADE.  87 

ports  of  such  piratical  cruisers  as  the  Alabama,  because  there 
would  have  been  no  belligerents  at  the  South,  and  consequently 
no  neutrals  abroad.  The  Government,  after  it  had  declared, 
through  Mr.  Seward's  dispatch  to  Mr.  Adams,  May  21,  1861, 
that  it  would  treat  privateers  in  the  insurgent  service  as  pirates, 
would  not  have  been  compelled  to  abandon  its  position,  and 
receive  and  treat  them  as  prisoners  of  war,  because  the  block 
ade  had  virtually  recognized  them  as  belligerents. 

It  is  true  that  Jefferson  Davis  threatened  to  retaliate,  and 
take  life  for  life,  if  the  Government  should  execute  as  pirates 
any  whom  it  might  capture  at  sea  ;  but  to  assert  the  right  and 
maintain  the  principle  would  have  been  no  more  difficult  or 
dangerous  than  to  declare  them  rebels  on  the  land,  and  guilty 
of  treason,  and  then  exchange  them  as  prisoners  of  war. 

Had  the  insurgents  been  sternly  held,  from  first  to  last,  to 
all  the  just  consequences  of  rebellion  and  treason,  our  first  de 
cided  successes  would  have  thrown  the  moral  influence  of  the 
world  against  them ;  the  proper  stigma  would  have  been  at 
tached  to  their  cause,  and  they  would  have  been  shorn  of  their 
strength  and  confidence  together.  At  the  very  worst,  could  any 
conceivable  form  of  retaliation  have  equalled  the  horrors  of 
murdering  our  brave,  true-hearted  men,  as  they  did  by  thou 
sands  and  thousands,  in  those  Southern  prisons  ? 

In  the  South  were  many  scenes  of  fatal  violence  to  soldiers 
and  Union  men ;  and  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  now,  that 
had  the  Government  closed  the  ports,  and  had  it  treated,  from 
first  to  last,  all  captured  on  the  sea  as  pirates,  and  all  on  the 
land  as  guilty  of  treason,  and  then  punished  or  showed  mercy 
according  to  its  own  discretion,  it  would  have  saved  at  least  a 
hundred  thousand  Northern  lives.  Had  the  ports  been  closed, 
the  Government  would  not  have  sanctioned  the  doctrine,  that 
the  States,  by  seceding  and  commencing  hostilities,  gained  the 
status  of  an  independent  or  foreign  power,  a  position  virtually 
conceded  to  them  by  the  blockade,  nor  would  it  have  incurred 
the  charge  of  inconsistency,  since  so  freely  made,  in  demanding 
that  the  Southern  leaders  should  sue  for  pardon,  as  rebels,  guilty 
of  treason,  when  by  the  blockade  they  had  been  presented  to  all 
the  world  as  having  belligerent  rights.  The  establishment  of  the 
blockade  strengthened  the  insurgents'  cause,  both  at  home  and 


88  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

abroad,  because,  in  their  opinion,  and  in  the  estimation  of  Eu 
rope,  it  conceded  to  the  Confederates  a  separate  national  existence. 
If  there  was  fear  of  England,  will  not  every  true  American  re 
spond  to  the  sentiment  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  when  he 
said  that  no  menace  from  a  foreign  power  should  deter  us  from 
asserting  our  rights  and  maintaining  our  honor  ? 

Had  the  policy  of  closing  the  ports  been  adopted,  England 
would  have  been  deprived  of  the  main  shelter,  from  behind 
which  she  has  carried  on  against  us  a  covert  war ;  nor  would 
she,  when  charged  with  precipitancy  in  declaring  the  rebels 
belligerents,  have  been  able  to  reply,  as  she  has  done :  "  Your 
Government  was  the  first  to  acknowledge  them,  by  proclaiming 
a  blockade." 

Such  is  a  brief  statement  of  the  facts  concerning  this  impor 
tant  question ;  and  the  country  will  not  fail  to  appreciate  the 
high  sense  of  national  honor,  the  true  American  spirit,  and  the 
true  statesmanship,  that  marked  the  course  of  the  Navy  De 
partment  in  that  trying  hour. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE  WORK  REQUIRED  OF  THE  NAVY, 

WHEN  it  was  decided  to  blockade  our  ports,  instead  of 
closing  them,  a  work  was  laid  upon  the  Navy,  the  magnitude  of 
which  is  entirely  unknown  to  most  of  the  people,  because  very 
few  are  acquainted  with  the  facts,  and  fewer  still  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war  had  any  clear  idea  of  what  was  necessary  to  be 
done. 

The  conflict  was  so  novel  in  its  character,  that  there  were  no 
precedents  to  consult,  and  no  old  landmarks  to  guide.  A  sin 
gle  example  will  show  how  far  many  of  our  foremost  men  were 
from  understanding  the  real  nature  of  the  war,  and  of  the  task 
which  had  been  committed  to  the  Navy.  The  Navy  Depart 
ment,  at  first,  selected  some  of  the  most  prominent  and  trusted 
shipping  merchants  in  New  York,  and  consulted  with  them,  as 
an  informal  board  of  advisers,  in  regard  to  the  purchase  and  fit 
ting  out  of  vessels;  and  when  twenty  had  been  obtained,  one  of 
the  most  eminent  of  these  advisers  gave  it,  as  his  opinion,  that 
it  would  require  thirty  more  sailing  vessels  to  complete  the 
blockade.  The  idea  of  maintaining  a  blockade  with  a  steam- 
fleet,  had  then  entered  the  minds  of  few  outside  of  the  Depart 
ment  and  its  officers. 

Take  this  proposition  from  an  experienced  shipping  mer 
chant,  to  obtain  thirty  more  sailing  vessels  to  complete  the 
blockade,  and  place  it  by  the  side  of  the  fact  that  it  actually  re 
quired  nearly  six  hundred  vessels — most  of  them  steamers — to 
seal  up  our  coast-line,  and  it  will  be  seen  that,  before  the  Navy 
Department  could  take  any  very  important  steps,  it  was  ne 
cessary  to  convince  even  well-informed  men  of  the  greatness 


90  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

of  the  work  to  be  done.  In  order  to  understand  the  diffi 
culty  of  maintaining  on  our  shores  an  effective  blockade,  one 
must  consider  the  peculiar  formation  of  the  coast.  The  true  outer 
coast-line,  from  the  northern  boundary  of  Virginia  to  Mexico,  is 
more  than  three  thousand  miles  in  length  ;  and  had  it  been  ne 
cessary  merely  to  guard  imports  of  the  principal  cities  of  the 
South,  the  task  would  have  been  comparatively  easy.  But  this 
external  coast-line  is  merely  the  outer  edge  of  what  may  almost 
be  called  a  series  of  islands — some  long,  some  short,  some  wide, 
and  others  very  narrow — stretching  along  the  whole  Atlantic 
shore,  behind  which  there  are  sounds  and  connecting  channels, 
forming  an  almost  continuous  line  of  water,  navigable  for  small 
vessels,  from  Norfolk  to  Florida.  This  outer  coast-line  is  cut 
through  by  almost  countless  navigable  inlets,  communicating 
with  the  bays  and  channels  within,  and  also  with  an  inner  coast 
line,  even  more  extensive  than  the  outer  one.  So  that,  al 
though  the  main  port  of  a  city  might  be  effectually  guarded, 
the  small,  swift  blockade-runner  might  pass  through  some  inlet, 
far  above  or  below,  and  glide  securely  to  her  destination,  along 
these  inner  sounds  and  channels. 

Along  all  this  internal  coast,  and  up  and  down  the  rivers 
and  bays,  an  active  commerce  might  be  carried  on  while  the 
blockading  fleet  was  guarding  the  sea  entrances  to  the  main 
harbors  of  important  towns.  What  rendered  the  work  still 
more  difficult  was,  that  these  inlets,  opening  often  through  shift 
ing  sands,  are  constantly  changing,  so  that  the  channel  of  to 
day  may  be  closed  to-morrow ;  and  wrhere  to-day  no  ship  can 
pass,  perhaps  the  winds  and  waves  will  to-morrow  plough  a 
channel  through.  The  blockade-runners  were  guided  by  a 
perfect  system  of  shore  signals,  which  were  kindly  supplied  to 
all  needing  them,  as  is  said,  by  the  British  consul  at  Havana  ; 
while  the  vessels  were  taken  in  by  pilots  perfectly  acquainted 
with  every  mile  of  the  coast.  Add  to  this  the  fact,  that  the  mo 
ment  the  policy  of  the  two  countries  was  announced,  and  the 
blockade  was  proclaimed,  the  science,  the  wealth,  the  mechani 
cal  skill,  and  the  ingenuity  of  England  were  largely  employed 
to  devise  and  execute  the  most  promising  plans  for  violating 
the  blockade,  and  for  supplying  the  rebels  with  munitions  of 
war  and  whatever  they  might  need  beside. 


THE  WORK  REQUIRED  OF  THE  NAVY.  91 

It  is  believed  that  tlie  keen,  icy,  degrading  selfishness  of 
England,  as  shown  in  her  conduct  then,  is  without  a  parallel  in 
the  history  of  nations.  It  reached  that  pitch  of  shamelessness 
where  there  was  not  even  a  pretence  of  any  regard  for  justice, 
or  any  moral  principle  whatever ;  not  even  a  reference  to  any 
noble  impulse,  or  a  generous  sentiment ;  no  feeling  of  sympathy 
or  pity  for  a  people  of  their  own  kindred,  struggling  to  maintain 
a  lawful  government  against  a  formidable  rebellion,  to  maintain 
law,  and  order,  and  human  rights,  and  free  institutions,  against 
traitors  leagued  for  the  overthrow  of  all  these,  and  whose  suc 
cess  would  have  stopped  the  progress  of  American  civilization, 
and  have  given  a  new  lease  of  power  to  the  worst  despotisms  of 
Europe. 

The  course  of  England  was  the  most  complete  vindication  of 
her  own  writers  who  charge  her  with  having  become  insensible 
to  any  great  moral  principle,  to  every  great  idea,  and  alive  only 
to  the  one  degrading  purpose  of  heaping  up  wealth,  careless 
alike  whether  she  feeds  her  greed  upon  the  blood  and  tears  of 
her  own  children,  or  upon  the  weakness  or  misfortunes  of  other 
nations.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  this,  one  fact  is  beyond 
dispute  :  Great  Britain,  by  her  American  policy,  has  corrupted 
her  own  public  sentiment,  has  diminished  the  moral  force  of 
the  nation,  and  has  thus  inflicted  upon  herself  a  wrong  which 
she  cannot  soon  repair.  She  is  incapable,  for  the  present,  either 
of  a  great  enterprise  or  of  an  heroic  defence.  She  will  need  the 
furnace  of  affliction  to  purge  this  mammon  dross  away.  She 
will  require  the  pressure  and  the  inspiration  of  trial  before  she 
will  regain  what  was  once  noble  in  her  character.  She  cannot 
reply  to  such  statements,  that  other  nations  have  done  similar 
things. 

Doubtless  individuals  of  other  lands  have  been  guilty  of 
acts  like  hers.  But  where  else  shall  we  find  an  example  of  the 
leading  classes  of  a  whole  nation  cheering  on  the  manifest 
wrong,  casting  all  true  convictions  and  all  former  professions 
alike  away,  giving  themselves  to  the  impossible  task  of  proving 
the  truth  a  lie,  and  making  falsehood  their  watchword  ?  Where 
else  do  we  find  a  nation  becoming  hot  and  enthusiastic  in  evil 
merely  to  make  herself  richer,  and  to  gratify  a  low  jealousy  of 
her  own  offspring,  because  they  were  too  prosperous  to  suit  her 


92  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

ambition  and  her  pride  ?  America  came  forth  from  the  war  far 
nobler  and  stronger  than  ever,  because  she  fought  for  a  great 
idea;  but  when  England  finished  her  experiment  she  was 
weaker  and  more  demoralized  than  ever  before,  and  more  com 
pletely  the  slave  of  mammon,  and  low  and  selfish  aims. 

It  should  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  England  wrought 
sluggishly  because  she  was  moved  by  no  great  or  noble  idea. 
She  worked  under  an  evil  inspiration,  that  aroused  her,  so  far 
as  one  can  be,  in  the  service  of  the  wrong.  She  was  in  true 
sympathy  with  the  rebellion  ;  she  was  fired  with  the  corrupting 
enthusiasm  of  the  traitors ;  and  she  desired,  with  an  earnestness 
not  exceeded  by  that  of  Jefferson  Davis  himself,  the  humbling 
of  the  North,  and  the  separation  of  the  Union.  If  any  one 
doubts  this,  let  him  read  the  comments  of  the  British  press  upon 
the  sinking  of  the  Alabama.  With  a  few  noble  exceptions,  the 
English  treated  that  as  if  it  were  a  personal  disgrace,  a  hum 
bling  of  their  own  flag.  The  capture  of  the  Guerriere  by  the 
Constitution  scarcely  produced  a  deeper  mortification.  The 
important  fact  in  this  connection  is,  that  this  exhibition  of  in 
tense  feeling  was  natural  and  even  inevitable,  for  England  had 
made  the  Confederate  cause  her  own,  and  it  was  her  ship,  her 
men,  her  guns,  her  courage  and  skill,  her  national  honor,  that 
were  that  day  on  trial.  It  was,  by  representative  vessels,  a  bat 
tle  between  the  wooden  Navy  of  England  and  that  of  America, 
and  it  was  really  the  flag  of  Britain  which  was  lowered  to  the 
stripes  and  stars. 

Such  was  the  spirit  and  such  the  conduct  of  England,  that 
the  Navy  Department  was  called  in  the  outset  to  a  contest,  with 
abundant  capital  and  with  the  most  daring  enterprise,  with  the 
skill  and  ingenuity  of  the  English  commercial  marine.  This 
hostile  and  selfish  policy  of  Great  Britain  was  directed  toward 
a  double  purpose.  The  piratical  cruisers  fitted  out  in  her  har 
bors  were  to  destroy,  so  far  as  possible,  American  commerce, 
while  the  terror  of  their  operations  would  drive  much  of  the  re 
mainder  into  English  bottoms,  and  through  the  blockade-run 
ners  she  hoped  to  monopolize  the  commerce  of  the  South. 

These  remarks  will  show  some  of  the  main  difficulties  which 
beset  the  Navy  Department  in  the  first  weeks  of  the  rebellion. 
No  time  was  lost  by  our  eminently  neutral  friends  after  the  es- 


THE  WOKK  REQUIRED  OF  THE  NAVY.  93 

tablishment  of  the  blockade.  The  swiftest  steamers  in  the  mer 
chant  service  of  England  were  selected,  and  with  cargoes  suited 
to  the  wants  of  the  rebels  were  started  for  Southern  ports  ;  and 
the  uselessness  of  sailing  vessels  for  a  coast-guard  was  seen  at 
once,  when  the  blockade  was  to  be  tested  by  steamers  which 
could  make  fourteen  knots  per  hour. 

"Not  satisfied  with  the  injury  which  could  be  inflicted  by  the 
vessels  already  afloat,  Englishmen  prepared,  as  rapidly  as  pos 
sible,  a  fleet  of  new  steamers,  built  especially  for  this  rebel  trade, 
adapted  to  the  shallow  inlets  and  sounds  and  inner  channels  of 
the  £outh ;  and  these  new  steamers  combined  every  excellence 
suited  to  their  work  which  the  skill  and  science  and  capital  of 
England  could  command. 

These  English  steamers,  the  latest  triumph  of  British  art  and 
naval  science,  were  to  be  watched,  and  met,  and  foiled,  along  all 
the  three  thousand  miles  of  outer  coast-line,  along  the  corre 
sponding  inner  coast,  the  inlets  and  sounds  and  interior  channels 
of  the  South.  Hence  it  was  necessary,  not  only  to  have  an  out 
side  blockading  fleet,  but  also  to  command  those  inner  waters 
where  rebel  commerce  was  sheltered,  and  where  the  conspira 
tors  were  busy  in  building  a  navy  of  their  own. 

The  following  extract  from  a  letter,  dated  on  board  the 
United  States  steamer  Eoanoke,  will  illustrate  the  difficulty  of 
blockading  the  Southern  coast : 

It  is  well  known  that  the  rebels  have  had,  with  but  few  exceptions, 
full  and  undisputed  possession  of  those  countless  inland  seas  which  dot 
the  whole  range  of  the  Southern  coast,  and  which  are  only  separated 
from  the  great  ocean  by  narrow  necks  of  land.  These  places,  since  the 
commencement  of  the  rebellion,  have  been  the  rendezvous  for  the 
greater  portion  of  the  privateers  and  pirates  that  owe  their  existence  to 
the  Confederate  Government. 

Too  many  places  of  the  above  character,  it  is  feared,  have  been  too 
insecurely  blockaded,  there  being  so  many  inlets  into  them  which  are 
wholly  unknown  to  the  officers  and  men  of  our  Navy,  and  the  chances 
thus  offered  enable  the  rebels  to  cany  on  a  very  extensive  commerce, 
and  thus  supply  their  army  and  themselves  with  the  articles  essentially 
necessary  in  such  times. 

The  Hoanoke  was  powerless  to  interfere  or  stop  this  alarming  state 
of  things,  owing  to  the  reasons  above  given.  "We  could  not  go  into  the 


94:  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

inlets  and  ferret  them  out,  which  is  all  that  is  required  to  effectually  kill 
this  smuggling  business.  What  we  require  immediately  to  check  this 
great  evil  are  gunboats  of  little  draught  of  water,  which  can  dart  with 
ease  in  and  around  the  passes  alluded  to,  without  the  fear  of  getting 
aground  and  being  blown  to  atoms  by  the  merciless  storms  that  rage 
there. 

Tf  the  Government  would  place  at  the  disposal  of  able  and  efficient 
mariners  a  fleet  of  twelve  or  fifteen  such  gunboats  as  the  Resolute,  Reli 
ance,  or  Thomas  Freeborn,  drawing  not  over  six  and  a  half  feet  of  water, 
all  well  armed  with  rifle-cannon,  and  manned  by  experienced  seamen, 
we  could  at  once  take  possession  of  all  their  inland  waters,  and  suddenly 
and  satisfactorily  stop  the  smuggling  business  now  so  extensively  carried 
on  by  the  enemy.  More  than  this,  we  could  undoubtedly  also  capture 
many  of  their  privateers,  which  now  make  the  waters  boil  as  they  glide 
so  swiftly  over  them  in  perfect  security,  with  their  welcome  and  valuable 
cargoes  for  the  traitors  composing  the  rebel  army.  I  repeat  it,  such  a 
monstrosity  as  our  ship  is  valueless  to  impede  the  progress  of  these  fleet 
little  craft,  whose  crews  are  intimately  acquainted  with  every  hole,  cor 
ner,  and  hiding-place  which  that  mysterious  coast  affords.  It  seems  that 
every  new  storm  makes  a  new  inlet,  and  in  the  face  of  such  facts  how 
can  it  be  expected  that  a  few  large  steamers  should  be  able  to  guard 
them  ?  There  are  many  instances  similar  to  our  own,  where  vessels 
blockading  cannot  come  within  miles  of  these  small  inlets,  all  of  which 
are  open  to  these  little  privateers. 

This  necessity  of  controlling  the  interior  waters  will  explain 
some  of  the  earlier  naval  expeditions  of  the  war. 

But  the  closing  of  the  Southern  ports  against  this  British 
commerce  was,  by  no  means,  all  that  was  required  of  the  Navy, 
even  along  the  coast.  It  was  quite  as  important  to  seal  every 
harbor,  inlet,  and  river's  mouth  against  the  coining  out  of  the 
ships  of  the  rebels.  The  nature  and  the  peril  of  this  duty  may 
be  known  by  calling  to  mind  the  Merrimack,  the  Albemarle, 
the  Atlanta,  the  Tennessee,  the  Louisiana,  and  the  Mississippi, 
each  one  of  which  was  at  least  a  match  for  any  iron-clad  in  the 
French  or  English  navy,  armed  as  they  were  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war. 

Had  any  one  of  these  vessels  reached  the  ocean  in  safety  in 
the  earlier  part  of  the  war,  she  could  have  entered  any  North 
ern  harbor,  and  laid  under  contribution  or  destroyed  any  of  our 
seaboard  cities. 


THE  WORK  REQUIRED  OF  THE  NAVY.  95 

In  addition  to  all  that  has  been  already  stated,  it  was  expected 
of  the  Navy  Department  that  naval  expeditions,  of  a  far  more 
formidable  character  than  any  before  fitted  out  in  the  United 
States,  should  be  prepared  to  cooperate  with  land  forces  in  re 
capturing  the  forts  of  the  Southern  coast,  and  on  the  lower  Mis 
sissippi  ;  and  the  character  and  magnitude  of  this  work  will  be 
understood  from  what  was  done  at  Hilton  Head,  and  New 
Orleans,  and  Mobile,  and  Charleston,  and  Wilmington,  and  also 
from  the  lesser  countless  fights  with  batteries  on  the  Potomac, 
on  the  James,  in  the  vicinity  of  Newbern,  on  the  Ogeechee,  and 
on  Albemarle  Sound,  and  indeed  on  almost  every  mile  of  navi 
gable  water  in  the  South.  Add  to  this  the  task  of  keeping  open 
the  Potomac,  which  required  almost  daily  battle  with  the  bat 
teries  on  shore — batteries  which  were  shifted  from  point  to  point, 
and  which  our  small  wooden  ships  could  fight  only  at  great  dis 
advantage,  but  which  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  fight  and 
silence,  or  permit  Washington  and  our  army  to  be  cut  off  from 
all  communication  with  the  sea.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  a  force 
which  could  exclude  the  swift  blockade-runners  and  shut  in  the 
formidable  rebel  iron-clads,  must  combine  numbers,  speed,  and 
power  to  an  extent  before  unknown  in  naval  war.  It  is  true 
that  the  Navy  Department  was  not  called  upon  to  meet  all  these 
demands  at  once  and  at  the  very  opening  of  the  contest,  but  it 
is  known  now  that  the  rebels,  in  the  construction  of  their  new 
navy,  were  in  advance  of  our  own  Government ;  and  it  is  a 
triumphant  proof  of  the  energy,  the  promptness,  and  sagacity,  as 
well  as  of  the  boldness  of  those  who  controlled  our  naval  affairs, 
that  a  new  war  engine  was  conceived  and  made  ready,  and 
brought  to  the  spot  just  in  time  to  save  our  navy,  our  cities,  and 
our  cause,  and,  by  the  defeat  of  the  Merrimack,  render  impossible 
from  that  hour  the  construction  of  a  rebel  navy  which  we  could 
not  readily  destroy.  In  addition  to  this  service,  it  devolved  upon 
the  Navy  Department  to  transport  and  protect  the  supplies  for 
the  armies  operating  along  the  seaboard,  as  well  as  the  main 
body  that  at  length  marched  under  McClellan  to  Eichmond. 

Turning  from  this  scene  westward,  another  gigantic  task  for 
the  Navy  is  revealed.  The  rebels  had  closed  the  Mississippi  at 
Columbus,  at  Island  No.  10,  at  Memphis,  at  Yicksburg,  and 
Port  Hudson,  and  not  a  throb  of  commercial  life  beat  along  the 


96  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

great  artery  of  the  "West.  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  closed 
the  Tennessee  and  the  Cumberland,  so  that  no  troops  could  be 
sent  into  Tennessee  by  water,  nor  could  supplies  readily  reach 
them  if  they  were  marched  by  land.  No  wooden  vessel  could 
pass  these  batteries,  unless  it  might  at  such  peril  as  neither  sup 
plies  nor  men  could  be  exposed  to,  and  no  land  force  unaided 
could  capture  and  hold  these  strongholds  of  our  foe.  The  prob 
lem  presented  to  the  Department  then,  was,  how  to  prepare  a 
naval  force  which,  cooperating  with  an  army,  could  capture 
these  river  forts,  and  open  and  hold  open  the  Mississippi,  and 
by  clearing  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee,  prepare  a  highway 
by  which  our  armies  could  establish  themselves  in  the  very  cita 
del  of  the  Confederacy,  and  assault  the  whole  western  line  of  the 
rebel  defences.  In  addition  to  this,  it  was  necessary  to  patrol 
the  Ohio  for  its  whole  length  of  a  thousand  miles,  to  prevent 
raids  into  the  border  States  and  the  burning  of  the  river  cities. 
To  meet  this  problem  of  the  West,  some  new  form  of  iron-clad 
was  needed,  differing  alike  from  the  broadside  ship  and  the  tur- 
reted  Monitor ;  and  in  another  chapter  this  new  product  of 
American  ingenuity  will  be  particularly  described. 

Such  were  some  of  the  more  obvious  difficulties  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  war,  and  such  in  its  main  features  was  the  work 
which  the  Navy  was  called  upon  to  do.  It  may  be  safely  said  that 
no  such  task  was  ever  laid  on  any  other  Government.  It  would 
have  taxed  severely  all  the  power  of  the  French  or  English  navy ; 
in  fact,  we  could  not  have  fully  met  the  exigency  with  one  of 
these  great  navies  at  our  command,  because  so  few  of  the  ships 
are  adapted  to  our  peculiar  wants.  It  is  very  doubtful,  to  say 
the  least,  whether  such  a  vessel  as  the  Warrior  could  have 
stopped  the  Merrimack,  much  less  the  Tennessee,  and  such  a 
navy  would  have  supplied  almost  nothing  suited  to  our  river 
service.  It  was  well,  perhaps,  that  we  had  no  E"avy ;  but  that 
throws  into  bolder  relief  the  skill,  the  energy,  the  audacity, 
which  some  called  rashness,  that  created  the  fleets  by  which  the 
work  was  done. 

The  next  chapter  will  treat  of  the  means  at  the  disposal  of 
the  Department  in  the  beginning  of  the  war. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


THE  MEANS  AT  THE  DISPOSAL  OF  THE  NAVY  DEPARTMENT  WHEN 
THE  WAR  BEGAN. 


HAVING  presented,  in  the  last  chapter,  the  main  features  of 
the  great  and  varied  work  demanded  of  the  Navy,  it  is  proper 
to  show  also  the  resources  which  were  at  hand  for  performing 
this  task  ;  for  only  by  comparing  what  was  to  be  done  with  the 
means  which  the  Navy  Department  could,  in  the  outset,  com 
mand,  can  the  country  judge  whether  its  affairs  were  conducted 
with  energy  and  skill. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  the  line  of  battle  stretched  al 
most  at  once  from  Washington,  down  the  Potomac,  and  along 
the  whole  Southern  coast,  and  the  banks  of  our  "Western  rivers  ; 
and  the  demand  was  immediate  and  urgent  for  a  Navy  to 
watch  the  long  line  of  attack.  What  were  the  available  means  ? 
At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Navy  consisted  of  twenty-six 
steamers,  as  follows : 

Five  screw  frigates,  of  a  little  more  than  3,000  tons  each  :  the  Mer- 
rimack,  Wabasb,  Minnesota,  Roanoke,  and  Colorado. 

One  large  screw-sloop,  the  Niagara,  of  4,582  tons. 

Six  first-class  screw-sloops,  the  Richmond,  Brooklyn,  San  Jacinto, 
Hartford,  Pensacola,  and  Lancaster,  of  about  2,000  tons  each  ;  five 
second-class  sloops,  the  Pawnee,  Iroquois,  Wyoming,  Mohican,  and  Da 
kota,  of  about  1,000  tons  each  ;  and  of  the  third-class  sloops,  the  Narra 
ganset  and  Seminole,  of  about  850  tons  each. 

Four  first-class  side-wheel  sloops :  the  Susquehanna  and  Powhatan, 
of  about  2,400  tons  each,  the  Mississippi,  of  about  1,700  tons,  and  the 
Saranac,  of  about  1,450  tons;  and  of  the  small  side-wheel  steamers,  the 
Michigan,  Saginaw,  and  Water- Witch,  of  about  470  tons  each.  In  all, 
twenty-six  steamers. 
7 


98  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

As  the  Navy  Department  lias  been  most  fiercely  and  per 
sistently  attacked  in  regard  to  the  speed  of  the  vessels  which 
have  been  constructed  or  purchased  during  the  war,  the  follow 
ing  statement  is  given  of  the  speed  of  the  steamers  which,  were 
built  before  the  war ;  and  in  another  chapter  this  will  be  com 
pared  with  the  rate  of  the  vessels  which  have  been  built  since 
the  war  began. 

The  statement  of  the  speed  of  the  vessels  of  the  old  Navy  is 
quoted  from  a  letter  of  the  eminent  ship-builder  Donald  McKay, 
adopted  and  sanctioned  in  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  for  1864.  It  is  as  follows : 

The  maximum  speeds  of  those  vessels  in  smooth  water,  and  for  a 
short  time,  were  as  follows,  in  knots  per  hour,  namely:  Niagara,  10.9; 
Merrimack,  Wabash,  Minnesota,  Roanoke,  and  Colorado,  9  ;  Brooklyn, 
9.2  ;  San  Jacinto,  8.8 ;  Hartford  and  Lancaster,  9.5  ;  Richmond,  9.5  ; 
Pawnee,  8;  Iroquois,  "Wyoming,  Mohican,  and  Dakota,  11.7;  Narra- 
ganset  and  Seminole,  8;  Susquehanna  and  Powhatan,  11;  Mississippi, 
8.7;  Saranac,  9.2;  Saginaw,  9;  Water- Witch,  9;  Michigan,  10.5. 
The  Pcnsacola  proved  a  total  failure,  and  the  machinery  had  to  be  re 
moved. 

Such  was  the  steam  Navy  with  which  the  Administration  began  the 
task  of  vigorously  blockading  three  thousand  six  hundred  miles  of  the 
most  difficult  coast  in  the  world,  against  the  fastest  and  best  steamers 
that  the  shops  of  England  could  produce,  built  exclusively  for  speed  and 
blockade- running  at  the  particular  localities. /In  addition  to  which,  the 
oceans  of  the  world  were  to  be  kept  free  of  the  steamers  called  Confed 
erate  cruisers,  but  which  were  in  reality  English  pirates,  being  built  in 
England,  equipped  with  English  guns,  and  manned  by  English  crews, 
whose  purpose  was,  not  to  fight  our  cruisers  as  war-vessels,  but  to  plun 
der  our  sailing  merchant-ships,  and  to  keep  out  of  the  paths  of  our  war- 
steamers.  With  the  enormous  advantage  of  having  all  the  ports  of  the 
world,  except  those  of  the  country  they  pretended  to  belong  to,  open  to 
them  for  coaling,  repair,  refuge  when  closely  pursued,  and  sale  of  the 
most  valuable  and  less  bulky  portion  of  their  plunder;  and  with  the 
sympathy  and  active  cooperation  of  the  officials  of  those  ports,  and  with 
the  strong  incentive  of  the  free  plunder  of  a  large,  rich,  and  defenceless 
commerce,  without  the  slightest  personal  danger,  even  if  captured — it  is 
indeed  miraculous  they  should  have  been  able  to  do  us  the  little  injury 
thev  have. 


MEANS   AT   THE   DISPOSAL   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.          99 

Had  all  these  vessels  "been  in  commission,  and  at  the  com 
mand  of  the  Secretary,  they  would  have  constituted  quite  a  for 
midable  force  for  the  commencement  of  operations.  But  as 
has  already  been  stated  in  previous  chapters,  this  small  fleet 
was  so  disposed  that  but  one  efficient  vessel  was  on  our  North 
ern  coast  when  the  conflict  began.  The  natural  effect  of  such 
circumstances  would  be  to  give  the  insurgents  ample  time  to 
seize  and  establish  themselves  in  the  strongholds  of  the  coast 
before  any  naval  force  could  be  collected.  The  following 
statement  is  from  the  report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Xavy  for 
1861: 

In  order  that  the  condition  of  the  Navy  on  the  4th  of  March  may 
he  rightly  understood,  it  will  be  well  to  state  the  position  and  character 
of  each  of  the  vessels  at  that  date.  The  Home  Squadron  consisted  of 
twelve  vessels,  and  of  these  only  four  were  in  Northern  ports,  and  avail 
able  for  service,  viz. : 

Xame.  Class.  No.  of  guns.  "Where  stationed. 

Pawnee Screw-sloop 8   At  Washington. 

Crusader Steamer 8   At  Xew  York. 

Mohawk Steamer 5   

Supply Storeship 4 

Four  vessels 25 

The  remaining  vessels  of  the  squadron  were  stationed  as  follows  : 

Name.  Class.  No.  of  guns.  "Where  stationed 

Sabine Frigate 50 Ponsacola. 

St.  Louis Sloop 20  

Brooklyn Steamer 25   

Wyandot    Steamer 5   

Macedonia Sloop 22   Vera  Cruz. 

'Cumberland Sloop 24  \      Returning 

Pocahontas Steamer 5   >          from 

Powhatan Steamer 11   )    Vera   Cruz. 

Eight  vessels 162 

The  Powhatan  arrived  at,  New  York  on  the  12th  of  March,  and  sailed 
early  in  April  for  Fort  Pickens.  The  Pocahontas  reached  Hampton 
Roads  on  the  12th  of  March,  and  the  Cumberland  on  the  23d  of  the 
same  month. 

Of  vessels  on  foreign  stations,  the  following  have  returned  in  obedi 
ence  to  orders  from  the  Department : 


100  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

FROM    THE    MEDITERRANEAN. 

• 

Name.  Class.  No.  of  guns.  Date  of  arrival. 

Richmond Steam-sloop 16   July  3. 

Susquehanna Steam-sloop 15  June  6. 

Iroquois Steam-sloop 6 June  15. 

FROM    COAST    OF    AFRICA. 

Name.  Class.  No.  of  guns.  Date  of  arrival. 

Constellation Sloop 22  September  28. 

Portsmouth Sloop 22  September  23. 

Mohican Steam-sloop 6  September  27. 

Mystic Steamer 5  October  7. 

Sumter .Steamer 5  September  15. 

San  Jacinto Steam-sloop 13 November  15. 

Relief Storeship 2  October  12. 

FROM    COAST    OF   BRAZIL. 

Name.  Class.  No.  of  guns.  Date  of  arrival. 

Congress Frigate 50 August  12. 

Seminole Steam-sloop 5  July  6. 

The  following  have  not  yet  arrived : 

FROM    THE    EAST    INDIES. 

Name.  Class.  No.  of  guns.  Date  of  arrival 

John  Adams Sloop. 

Hartford Steam-sloop. 

Dakota Steam-sloop. 

The  following  are  to  remain  abroad  : 

Name.  Class.  No.  of  guns.  Where  stationed. 

Sa™toga Sloop 18   Coast  of  Africa. 

Pulaski Steamer 1   Coast  of  Brazil. 

Saginaw Steamer 3  East  Indies. 

Add  to  these  the  vessels  on  the  Pacific  coast,  the  frigate  Niagara, 
which  was  returning  from  Japan,  and  four  tenders  and  storeships,  and 
there  was  a  total,  as  stated  in  the  last  report,  of  42  vessels,  carrying  555 
guns,  and  about  7,600  men,  in  commission  on  the  4th  of  March  last. 

These  official  statements  are  a  sufficient  answer  to  all  the 
charges  of  slowness  and  inefficiency,  so  thoughtlessly  made  by 
those  totally  ignorant  of  the  facts,  and  who,  in  their  impatience, 
demanded  what  nothing  short  of  creative  power  could  possibly 
accomplish. 


MEANS   AT   THE   DISPOSAL    OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.       101 

The  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  Government  for  the  con 
struction  of  such  vessels  as  were  needed  were  so  limited  as  to 
present  a  very  serious  difficulty.  There  was  not  found  at  the 
navy-yards  any  adequate  supply  of  suitable  timber. 

It  had  generally  been  supposed  that  large  amounts  of  timber 
had  been  accumulated  at  the  several  yards,  and  that  the  stock 
was  yearly  increasing.  The  exact  contrary  was  true,  as  if  this 
insurrection  had  not  only  been  contemplated  for  years,  but  as  if 
steps  had  been  actually  taken  long  ago  to  cripple  the  naval 
power.  It  was  found  on  investigation  that  not  only  had  no  addi 
tions  been  made  to  the  stocks  of  timber  on  hand  so  as  to  increase 
the  amount,  but  that  these  stocks  had  been  diminished  by  neglect, 
and  by  omitting  to  purchase,  until  very  little  material  remained 
from  which  new  vessels  could  be  constructed. 

Obstacles  scarcely  less  formidable  were  found  in  the  condi 
tion  of  the  workshops.  These  difficulties  are  well  presented  by 
Donald  McKay  in  the  following  statement : 

The  means  at  the  command  of  the  Administration  for  building  a 
steam  navy  to  achieve  the  herculean  task  just  indicated,  were  about  two 
dozen  machine-shops,  great  and  small,  distributed  from  Maine  to  Mary 
land,  many  of  them  very  small,  and  without  the  tools,  workmen,  or  skill 
requisite  for  the  production  of  marine  machinery.  The  first-class  shops 
did  not  exceed  eight  in  number.  But  the  entire  force  of  those  shops 
could  not  be  commanded  by  the  Navy  Department  for  the  construction 
of  new  machinery.  The  War  Department  also  drew  largely  on  their 
resources  for  transport  steamers,  while  the  locomotive  and  tool-making 
shops  found  it  utterly  impossible  to  meet  the  demand  upon  them. 
Neither  was  there  sufficient  raw  material  in  the  country  for  the  large  and 
sudden  demand ;  the  iron,  copper,  tin,  and  coal  had  to  bo  mined  and 
manufactured.  Hundreds  of  steamers,  hundreds  of  locomotives,  shops 
full  of  tools,  tens  of  thousands  of  tons  of  metal  were  called  for  instantly, 
and  there  was  nothing  on  hand  to  answer  the  call. 

War-steamers  cannot  be  built  in  a  day.  Inexperienced  labor  cannot 
be  converted  into  skilled  mechanics  in  a  day.  The  prices  of  machinery 
rose  immensely,  the  pay  of  the  mechanics  and  the  cost  of  material  reached 
a  point  far  above  what  they  were  worth,  except  from  the  factitious  cause 
of  the  suddenness  of  the  demand.  The  result  was  felt  in  the  poor  mate 
rials  and  poorer  workmanship  with  which  the  machinery  was  made. 
Any  kind  of  material,  and  the  most  unskilled  labor,  had  to  be  brought 


102  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

into  use,  and  all  this  time  the  amount  of  even  that  labor  was  conse 
quently  diminishing  by  the  absorption  of  men  into  the  military 
service. 

In  view  of  these  startling  facts,  it  becomes  evident  that  our  national 
fleet  ought  to  be  immediately  and  largely  increased,  so  as  to  be  prepared 
for  any  emergency.  Such  as  our  Navy  is  at  the  present  moment,  it 
ranks  hardly  with  second-rate  European  powers,  and  it  is  entirely  insuffi 
cient  to  protect  our  trade  and  to  uphold  the  dignity  of  our  flag.  There 
is  no  reason  why  we  should  not  have  a  fleet  as  powerful  as  that  of  Eng 
land  or  France.  We  have  the  money,  the  materials  and  artisans  neces 
sary  to  build  a  first-class  fleet,  and  the  best  sailors  to  man  it. 

It  would  be  easy  for  us  to  build  in  one  year  a  fleet  of  five  hundred 
to  six  hundred  men-of-war  ships,  from  a  gunboat  up  to  the  largest  class 
of  iron-cased  frigates.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  we  built  in  one  year 
the  astonishing  number  of  two  thousand  and  thirty-four  vessels  and 
steamers  of  all  classes,  measuring  together  583,450  tons.  A  large  number 
of  these  vessels  were  as  large  as  the  biggest  class  of  frigates  hitherto 
constructed.  What  we  have  done  once,  we  may  do  over  again;  and 
working  at  the  same  rate,  we  would  be  able,  alone  in  our  merchants' 
yards,  to  turn  out  in  one  year  five  hundred  and  eighty-three  ships,  of 
one  thousand  tons  each.  In  our  six  navy-yards,  where  the  choicest 
materials  are  stocked  for  building  a  fleet  of  one  hundred  ships,  sixty 
more  men-of-war  ships  might  be  built  in  one  year,  making  a  total  of  six 
hundred  and  forty-three  men-of-war  ships  of  all  classes,  varying  in  their 
armament  from  three  to  sixty  guns.  More  than  a  hundred  of  our  great 
est  engineering  firms  would  complete  all  the  machinery  necessary  to  be 
put  in  these  ships  in  less  than  a  year.  Our  capabilities  and  facilities  of 
building  ships  have  not  in  the  least  suffered  by  the  loss  of  the  seceded 
States.  They  never  were  ship-building  States,  and  as  late  as  1860  they 
only  built  (combined)  one  full-rigged  ship,  while  the  Northern  States 
built  one  hundred  and  ten  ships  of  the  same  description.  That  is  to 
say,  in  plain  words,  all  the  seceded  States  combined  did  not  build  even 
one  per  cent,  of  the  sea-going  ships  built  in  the  United  States. 

It  is  true  on  a  very  urgent  occasion,  in  a  great  emergency,  our  coun 
try  could  largely  increase  her  Navy,  in  a  very  few  months,  with  very 
powerful  descriptions  of  vessels,  if  they  would  proceed  as  follows :  Cut 
down  all  our  line-of-battle  ships  one  or  two  decks,  case  them  with  five- 
inch  iron  plates,  put  a  battery  of  thirty  to  forty  guns  of  the  heaviest 
calibre  on  board  of  them,  and  moor  them  across  the  entrance  of  our 
harbors.  Plate  our  heavy  frigates  with  shell-proof  iron  plates,  and,  to 
make  up  for  the  additional  weight  put  into  them,  do  away  with  their 
armament  on  the  upper  deck.  Transform  one  hundred  of  our  best  sea- 


MEANS   AT  THE   DISPOSAL   OF   THE   NAVY   DEPARTMENT.      103 

going  merchant  steamers  into  so  many  frigates,  sloops,  dispatch  and 
gunboats,  of  a  speed  superior  to  any  men-of-war  ships  yet  produced. 

Among  our  large  clipper-ships  and  traders  more  than  five  hundred 
may  be  found  that  are  capable  to  be  transformed  into  so  many  efficient 
sailing  sloops  and  frigates.  Their  length  varies  from  two  hundred  to 
three  hundred  feet,  their  breadth  from  forty  to  fifty-two  feet ;  and  when 
ever  they  are  cut  one  deck,  or  their  decks  are  lowered,  will  be  found 
capable  of  carrying  an  armament  varying  from  twenty  to  fifty  heavy 
guns,  according  to  their  respective  capacity.  Twenty  or  thirty  of  our 
largest  clipper-ships  might  very  well  be  transformed  into  powerful  screw- 
frigates;  as,  for  instance,  the  Great  Republic,  which  exceeds  in  her 
dimensions  the  largest  English  50-gun  frigates,  while  her  shape  for  speed 
is  incomparably  superior.  The  scantling  of  all  these  ships  is  well  known 
to  be  larger  than  that  of  the  best  and  strongest  men-of-war  ships  of  our 
Navy. 

Among  the  barks  and  brigs  there  are  certainly  four  hundred  to  five 
hundred  capable  of  receiving  an  armament  of  from  eight  to  twenty  guns, 
and  more  than  a  thousand  of  our  large  coasting  schooners  that  have  a 
breadth  of  twenty-eight  to  thirty  feet  and  over,  and  a  form  never  sur 
passed  for  speed,  can,  in  a  few  weeks,  be  transformed  into  men-of-war 
schooners,  armed  with  one  pivot  gun  of  the  heaviest  description  in  the 
middle,  and  two  to  four  32-pounders  at  the  ends.  These  vessels  have  a 
very  large  stability,  and  the  scantling  of  their  timbers,  etc.,  is  by  twenty 
per  cent,  heavier  than  that  of  the  common  men-of-war  schooners. 

This  fleet,  of  about  two  thousand  vessels-of-war,  can  (working  with 
all  the  natural  energy  of  our  nation)  be  turned  out  in  less  time  than  four 
to  six  months,  and  it  would  be  sufficient  to  protect  our  coast  and  meet 
the  first  storm.  Time  would  so  be  gained  to  build  a  fleet  fit  to  repre 
sent  our  great  nation,  and  to  make  our  flag  once  more  respected  in  all 
seas  of  the  globe. 

But  the  time  is  pressing,  our  country  is  surrounded  by  dangers  on 
all  sides,  and  it  becomes  the  imperative  duty  of  our  Government  and 
people  to  act  with  the  greatest  energy  without  delay.  The  times  are 
gone  when  Europe  could  be  frightened  by  thundering  newspaper  articles 
and  the  hollow  brag  of  ambitious  politicians ;  we  have  to  show  now  that 
we  know  how  to  handle  engines  of  war,  and  to  stand  a  hail  of  shells 
and  balls. 

A  powerful  fleet  is  the  best  guaranty  of  peace  for  a  great  maritime 
nation  ;  of  the  truth  of  this  principle  England,  whose  motto  is  "Free  trade 
and  peace  with  all  nations,"  is  the  most  striking  example. 

Yours  trulv,  DONALD  McKAY. 


104  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

In  addition  to  all  this,  the  Department  was  still  further  per 
plexed  and  endangered  by  the  disloyalty  of  so  many  officers  of 
the  Navy,  that  it  knew  not  whom  it  could  safely  trust.  In  his 
first  report,  July  4,  1861,  the  Secretary  uses  the  following  lan 
guage  : 

Demoralization  prevailed  among  the  officers,  many  of  whom,  occu 
pying  the  most  responsible  positions,  betrayed  symptoms  of  that  infi 
delity  which  has  dishonored  the  service.  But  while  so  many  officers  were 
unfaithful,  the  crews,  to  their  honor  be  it  recorded,  were  true  and  reliable, 
and  have  maintained,  through  every  trial  and  under  all  circumstances, 
their  devotion  to  the  Union  and  the  flag.  Unfortunately,  however,  few 
comparatively  of  these  gallant  men  were  within  the  call  of  the  Depart 
ment  at  tLat  eventful  period.  They,  as  well  as  the  ships,  were  abroad. 

From  the  4th  of  March,  1861,  to  the  4th  of  July  of  the  same 
year,  the  Secretary  states  that  two  hundred  and  fifty-nine  offi 
cers  of  the  Navy  either  resigned  or  were  dismissed  from  the 
service,  and  on  this  account  many  vessels  were  sent  to  sea  with 
out  a  full  complement  of  officers.  The  spirit  of  the  Department 
on  this  subject  is  well  set  forth  in  the  following  letter,  which 
explains  itself: 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  July  15, 1861. 

SIR  :  I  duly  received  the  letter  of  Midshipman  Watson,  requesting 
an  "  order  to  some  foreign  station,  or  any  place  where  I  [he]  will  not  be 
brought  in  conflict  with  my  friends  and  relations  in  the  South  ; "  and  also 
the  letter  of  J.  L.  Harrison,  requesting  that  he  "  may  be  relieved  from 
duty  on  board  this  ship  [the  Richmond],  and  ordered  where  I  [he]  will 
not  be  called  upon  to  act  against  my  personal  feelings."  Each  of  these 
letters  is  forwarded  by  you  with  the  recommendation  that  "  the  applica 
tion  be  complied  with  for  the  reasons  assigned,  and  that  another  mid 
shipman  be  ordered."  As  I  do  not  doubt  your  own  loyalty  and  fidelity, 
I  cannot  permit  the  opportunity  to  pass  without  expressing  my  disap 
proval  of  such  recommendations  and  indorsements.  I  especially  object 
to  your  reasons  as  incompatible  with  a  profession  that  is  national,  and 
in  conflict  with  the  enduring  welfare  of  the  country.  In  the  request  of 
these  young  gentlemen  may  be  seen  the  germinating  element  of  that  de 
nationalizing  sentiment  which  has  wrought  incalculable  evil  to  our 
country. 

A  great  conspiracy  has  been  formed  against  that  Government  which 
it  is  the  duty  of  all  to  support.,  and  which  naval  officers  have  avowedly 


MEANS   AT   THE   DISPOSAL    OF    THE   NAVY    DEPARTMENT.       105 

dedicated  their  lives  to  sustain ;  but  because  some  of  their  relatives  or 
friends  are  complicated,  or  from  personal  feelings,  there  is  a  reluctance 
on  the  part  of  some  of  the  profession  to  stand  by  their  country  when 
their  services  are  most  required.  These  young  gentlemen  have  been 
inspired  with  these  sectional  and  erroneous  opinions  by  false  theories, 
and  it  is  not  perhaps  strange  when  their  commanding  officer  encourages 
them  in  the  error,  by  recommending  the  Department  to  yield  to  it,  and 
asking  the  Secretary  to  provide  a  substitute  to  execute  these  duties  which 
they  are  unwilling  to  discharge. 

Why  should  there  be  a  discrimination  between  these  young  gentle 
men  and  other  midshipmen  in  the  performance  of  a  national  and  profes 
sional  duty  ?  Those  whom  they  would  substitute  belong,  like  them 
selves,  to  a  common  country,  and  are  to  meet  and  suppress  an  insurrec 
tion  against  a  Government  to  which  every  man  of  the  profession  owes  a 
common  allegiance. 

Were  your  recommendation  to  be  a  principle  of  action,  only  the  offi 
cers  of  one  portion  of  the  Union  would  be  required  to  sustain  the  Gov 
ernment  and  country  against  a  great  conspiracy,  while  another  section 
would  be  exempted.  The  effects  of  such  a  rule  would  be  to  generate 
and  perpetuate  sectional  difficulty  and  animosity,  whereas  we  should  all 
be  united  in  suppressing  hostility  or  resistance  to  the  Government  and 
the  flag.  None  should  shrink  from  this  duty ;  none  should  be  en 
couraged  to  shrink  from  it ;  none  should  receive  recommendations  to 
evade  the  high  obligations  which  all,  and  especially  all  naval  officers, 
owe  to  that  Government  which  has  educated  and  nourished  them,  and 
to  whose  support  they  have  pledged  their  fidelity. 

It  is  the  duty  of  all  to  encourage  a  more  devoted  nationality,  and 
to  discountenance  the  prevalent  error  among  a  sectional  class,  that  there 
is  a  higher  political  allegiance  than  that  which  is  due  to  their  country. 
A  naval  officer  can  have  no  higher  duty  in  the  line  of  his  profession  than 
to  oppose  the  enemies  of  his  country,  whether  foreign  or  domestic.  He 
should  never  seek  to  avoid  or  evade  that  duty  from  sectional  or  personal 
considerations,  nor  should  he,  by  recommendations  or  example,  be  en 
couraged  to  evade  it.  The  lessons  of  history,  which  teach  that  love  of 
country  should  be  superior  to  selfish  considerations,  will  have  been  lost 
upon  young  American  officers,  if  their  superiors  recommend  that,  from 
"personal  feeling"  or  a  contingent  apprehension  of  encountering  dis 
loyal  relatives,  they  be  relieved  from  their  obligations  to  abide  by  their 
country  in  the  hour  of  peril  in  any  post  that  may  be  assigned  them. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Capt.  JOHN  POPE,  Commanding  U.  S.  ship  Richmond,  Nciv  York. 


106  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

Such,  in  general,  was  the  condition  of  affairs  in  the  Navy 
and  in  the  country  when  Secretary  "Welles  was  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  Navy  Department.  In  July,  1861,  the  office  of 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  created.  To  this  office 
Captain  G.  V.  Fox  was  soon  after  appointed.  And  now  if  the 
country  will  take  the  insignificant  force  at  command  when  the 
war  began,  and  compare  that  with  the  vast  and  various  work 
performed,  and  with  the  nearly  seven  hundred  ships  at  the  close 
of  the  war,  it  cannot  fail  to  see  that  such  a  grand  result  could 
only  have  been  reached  by  untiring  industry  and  by  a  wide 
and  clear  comprehension  of  the  whole  field  of  action,  and  by 
consummate  sagacity  and  skill.  The  work  actually  done  is  an 
impossible  achievement,  except  by  talent  and  executive  ability 
of  the  very  highest  order.  The  first  step  was  to  increase  the 
power  of  the  Navy,  and  the  measures  adopted  for  this  purpose 
will  form  the  subject  of  the  next  chapter. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  FIRST  MEASURES  ADOPTED  FOR  THE  INCREASE  OF  THE  NAVY. 

THE  facts  already  presented  in  regard  to  our  navy-yards  and 
machine-shops  show  very  clearly  that  the  Department  could 
not  depend  upon  them  to  supply  its  immediate  wants.  Even 
had  suitable  materials  and  machinery  been  at  hand,  they  would 
have  availed  nothing  for  the  first  emergency.  It  is  not  the 
work  of  a  few  weeks,  or  a  few  months  even,  to  construct  an 
efficient  war-ship,  and  the  safety  of  the  country  demanded  a 
fleet  in  the  very  first  weeks  of  the  rebellion. 

Evidently  there  was  but  one  course  even  possible  for  the  De 
partment.  It  was  necessary  either  to  purchase  vessels  wherever 
they  could  be  obtained,  or  to  fight  the  battle  without  ships. 
Nor  did  the  case  admit  of  any  delay.  Then,  for  the  first  time, 
was  clearly  seen  the  true  national  importance  of  that  great  com 
mercial  navy  which  private  enterprise  had  created.  The  fleet 
which  had  been  built  for  peace  was  found  to  be  also  efficient  for 
war.  In  that  squadron  of  commerce  were  some  of  the  fastest 
steamers  in  the  world — stanch,  sea-going  vessels,  and  capable 
of  bearing  a  formidable  armament.  Measures  were  immediately 
taken  to  purchase  such  of  these  steamers  as  were  adapted  to  the 
service  required. 

As  was  perfectly  natural,  the  Secretary  turned  first  of  all  to 
the  officers  of  the  Navy  as  the  most  suitable  persons  to  judge 
of  the  character  of  these  ships,  and  whether  they  could  be  suc 
cessfully  used  as  vessels-of-war.  The  step  was  taken  when  all 
direct  communication  was  cut  off  between  "Washington  and  the 
Northern  cities.  A  naval  officer  was  dispatched  to  New  York 
with  orders  to  make  the  needed  arrangements.  It  was  hoped 


108  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

that  lie  would  find  a  passage  through  the  enemy's  lines ;  but 
twenty-four  hours  after  his  departure  a  telegram  was  received 
from  him  dated  at  "Wheeling,  he  having  been  compelled  to  cross 
the  mountains  and  go  round  by  the  Ohio  River  and  one  of  the 
Northern  routes,  in  order  to  reach  New  York.  This  is  only  an 
example  of  the  countless  embarrassments  under  which  the  Gov 
ernment  labored  during  the  first  months  of  the  rebellion,  and 
which  should  be  duly  considered  in  judging  of  the  efficiency  of 
the  Administration. 

As  this  purchase  of  vessels  involved  the  expenditure  of  a 
very  large  amount  of  money,  justice  to  the  Navy  Department 
requires  that  these  negotiations  and  the  measures  that  were 
adopted  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  Government  should  be 
presented  somewhat  in  detail.  The  following  orders,  addressed 
to  the  officers  in  command  of  the  navy-yards  at  Boston,  New 
York,  and  Philadelphia,  will  explain  themselves,  and  show  how 
the  Secretary  proceeded  in  this  important  matter  : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  April  21, 1861. 
Commodore  SAMUEL  L.  BEEESE,  Navy-  Yard,  New  York  : 

SIR  :  By  order  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  you  will  forth 
with  procure  ten  steamers  capable  of  mounting  a  9-inch  pivot-gun,  with 
light  draught,  about  nine  or  twelve  feet,  having  particular  reference  to 
strength  and  speed.  You  will  consult  with  Commodore  Foote,  the 
naval  constructor,  and  such  other  persons  as  are  capable  of  giving  infor 
mation  and  advice.  Charter  on  the  best  terms  possible  for  three  months, 
with  the  option  of  the  Government  purchasing  them  within  that  time 
at  a  stipulated  price ;  these  vessels  to  be  immediately  removed  to  the 
navy  or  private  yards,  with  the  necessary  alterations  and  equipments  to 
render  them  efficient  for  the  service  required. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Captain  SAMUEL  F.  Du  POXT,  Navy -Yard,  Philadelphia: 

SIR  :  By  order  of  the  President  of  the  United  States  you  will  forth 
with  procure  five  steamers  capable  of  mounting  a  9-inch  pivot-gun,  with 
light  draught,  about  nine  or  twelve  feet,  having  particular  reference  to 
strength  and  speed.  You  will  consult  with  the  naval  constructor  and 
such  other  officers  and  persons  as  are  capable  of  giving  information  and 
advice.  Charter  on  the  best  terms  possible  for  three  months,  with  the 


MEASURES    ADOPTED   FOR   THE   INCREASE   OF  THE   NAVY.      109 

option  of  the  Government  purchasing  them  within  that  time  at  a  stipu 
lated  price.  These  vessels  to  be  immediately  removed  to  the  navy  or 
private  yards,  with  the  necessary  alterations  and  equipments  to  render 
them  efficient  for  the  service  required. 

I  am,  sir,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEOX  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

A  similar  order  was  addressed  to  Commander  William  L. 
Hudson,  in  charge  of  the  navy-yard  at  Boston. 

These  orders,  as  will  be  seen,  authorized  the  chartering  of 
twenty  steamers  for  three  months,  with  the  privilege  of  purchas 
ing  at  a  stipulated  price.  The  matter  was  intrusted  to  expe 
rienced  officers,  and  the  Government  was  protected  by  the 
privilege  of  purchase  at  a  price  stipulated  beforehand.  This, 
at  first,  seemed  to  be  the  best  possible  arrangement  for  the  Gov 
ernment,  because  it  was  necessary  to  submit  every  vessel  to  the 
inspection  and  judgment  of  a  naval  officer.  These  officers,  how 
ever,  soon  felt  that  such  duties  lay  without  the  sphere  of  their 
profession ;  that  however  skilful  they  might  be  in  perceiving  the 
good  or  bad  qualities  of  a  ship,  they  were  not  merchants,  and 
they  desired  that  the  purchase  of  vessels  might  be  committed  to 
men  better  acquainted  with  the  customs  and  laws  of  traffic.  It 
was  thought  that  experts  in  the  market  might  obtain  more  fa 
vorable  terms  for  the  Government  than  men  unskilled  in  trade. 

On  the  22d  of  April  it  was  thought  best  so  to  modify  the 
original  orders  for  purchase  as  to  place  no  restrictions  upon  the 
size  of  the  vessels,  and  directing  that  any  steamers  should  be 
obtained  adapted  to  the  purpose,  but  that  special  reference  must 
be  had  to  efficiency,  speed,  and  sea  qualifications,  adding,  that 
these  qualities  are  indispensable. 

Such  orders,  placed  for  execution  in  the  hands  of  naval  offi 
cers  of  experience  and  skill,  show  how  prompt  the  action  of  the 
Department  was  in  securing  the  best  and  fastest  vessels  in  our 
commercial  navy. 

Soon  after,  on  the  23d  of  April,  the  commander  of  the  navy- 
yard  at  Xew  York  was  directed  to  consult  with  "  Governor  E. 
D.  Morgan,  or,  in  his  absence,  with  Mr.  Geo.  D.  Morgan,  and 
with  Messrs  Wm.  Evarts,  E.  M.  Blatchford,  and  M.  H.  Grin- 
nell,  a  committee  of  the  citizens  of  New  York,  who  are  hereby 


110  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 


empowered  to  act  for  this  Department  in  this  crisis."  By  this 
order  the  K"avy  Department  brought  to  its  aid,  in  procuring 
ships,  some  of  the  most  eminent  and  trusted  business  men  of 
New  York. 

At  this  time  the  most  intense  anxiety  prevailed  in  the  large 
cities  in  regard  to  the  increase  of  the  Navy,  and  the  protection 
of  our  commerce.  The  following  letters  will  show  what  meas 
ures  leading  men  desired  to  adopt,  and  how  the  Department 
proposed  to  meet  the  necessities  of  the  time  : 

OFFICE  BOAKD  OF  TKADE,  BOSTON,  April  20, 1861. 
Hon.  GIDEOX  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  G.  : 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  a  copy  of  resolutions  unanimously 
passed  at  a  special  meeting  of  the  government  of  this  Board,  on  the 
18th  inst.  I  am,  sir,  with  sentiments  of  high  consideration, 

Your  obedient  servant, 

JAMES  SABIXE,  Secretary. 

Resolved,  That  this  Body  regard  this  proposition,  published  by  a 
member  of  this  Board,  Mr.  R.  B.  Forbes,  in  the  papers  of  the  day,  and 
hereunto  appended,  as  necessary  and  practicable,  and  that  this  association 
will  give  the  merchants  and  master  mariners  of  Massachusetts  every  aid 
in  its  power  in  the  contemplated  organization  ;  and  that  the  aid  and  the 
countenance  of  the  State  is  hereby  earnestly  invoked. 

Resolved,  That  this  Association  forward  herewith  a  copy  of  these 
resolutions  to  the  Executive  of  the  State,  and  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  and  the  Secretary  of  State,  at  Washington. 

BOSTON,  Api'il  25, 1861. 
Ron.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C.  : 

Whereas,  The  system  of  building  ships-of-war  by  private  contract  has 
suffered  by  being  made  subservient  to  jobbing  and  to  partisan  favorit 
ism  ;  but  under  proper  guards  is  probably  cheapest  and  most  conducive 
to  progress  in  the  course  of  naval  construction ;  and 

Whereas,  It  is  believed  that  Boston  can,  in  this  emergency,  turn  out 
just  such  steamers  as  the  Government  want,  in  half  the  time,  and  at  less 
cost,  than  those  built  in  the  navy-yards ;  and 

Whereas,  It  is  now  proposed  to  build  a  model  light-draught  sloop-of- 
war,  ready  for  her  armament,  or  one  or  two  steam  gunboats,  and  to  offer 
the  same  to  the  Government  at  actual  cost,  with  six  per  cent,  interest — 

Therefore,  The  undersigned,  a  committee  of  Boston  merchants,  em 
powered  so  to  do,  at  a  meeting  held  at  the  Boston  Merchants'  Exchange, 


MEASURES   ADOPTED  FOE  THE  DECREASE  OF  THE  NAVY.        Ill 

April  22,  1861,  do  hereby  respectfully  invite  the  attention  of  the  Hon. 
Gideon  Welles,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  to  the  above  consideration,  and 
solicit  his  sanction  to  the  undertaking  proposed. 
Your  obedient  servants, 
(Signed)  R.  B.  FORBES, 

WM.  ROPES, 

LEWIS  W.  TAPPAN,  Committee. 

THEOPHILUS  PARSONS, 


NAYY  DEPARTMENT,  April  27, 1861 . 

Captain  WM.  L.  HUDSON,  Commandant  Nmy-yard,  Boston,  Mass. : 

SIR  :  The  Department  has  not  had  the  pleasure  of  hearing  from  you 
since  it  authorized  the  procurement  of  five  steamers  for  immediate  ser 
vice,  and,  of  course,  is  uninformed  as  to  the  progress  you  have  made. 
It  is  hoped,  however,  that  there  has  been  a  vigorous  and  efficient  re 
sponse. 

The  Department  has  information  from  ex-Governor  Boutwell,  who 
has  been  deputed  by  Governor  Andrew,  of  Massachusetts,  that  there  is 
a  disposition  in  Boston  to  raise  an  auxiliary  navy  or  coast  guard,  for 
the  protection  of  commerce,  and  to  assist  in  carrying  into  effect  the 
blockade  of  the  ports  of  those  States  that  are  waging  war  on  the  Fed 
eral  Government.  Although  this  project  has  not  been  communicated  by 
his  excellency  Governor  Andrew,  nor  by  ex-Governor  Boutwell  to  this 
Department,  it  has  been  submitted  by  a  gentleman  who  has  been  au 
thorized  by  the  latter  to  communicate  it.  It  has  also  received  a  letter 
from  the  Board  of  Trade,  and  also  from  a  committee  of  Boston  gentle 
men,  of  which.  Mr.  R.  B.  Forbes  is  chairman,  having  in  view  this  object, 
and  with  it  the  construction  of  one  or  more  vessels. 

Whatever  may  be  the  capabilities  of  the  ship-yards,  and  the  efforts 
of  the  enterprising  merchants  and  builders  of  Boston,  they  will  bear  in 
mind  that  our  immediate  wants  do  not  allow  us  to  wait  for  vessels  to  be 
constructed.  If  the  gentlemen  have  confidence  that  they  can  build  vessels 
of  a  superior  class,  it  is  hoped  they  also  have  sufficient  confidence  and 
reliance  in  themselves  to  go  forward,  and  trust  to  their  being  purchased 
by  the  Government  after  they  are  built.  We  now  desire  to  obtain  and 
equip,  at  the  earliest  moment,  good  and  efficient  steamers,  having  in 
view  speed  and  strength,  to  meet  the  existing  emergency. 

I  communicate  these  views  now,  in  detail,  to  you,  in  the  pressure  of 
business,  to  save  time  and  numerous  answers.  Any  suggestions  you 
may  make,  or  propositions  receive  from  Mr.  Forbes,  you  will  please 
communicate.  Their  efforts  and  patriotic  zeal,  and  that  of  Governor 


112  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Andrew,  are  highly  appreciated,  and  it  is  gratifying  to  the  Department 
to  have  their  active  cooperation  in  this  emergency,  so  interesting  to  the 
whole  country. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 
(Signed)  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

While  the  Secretary  intimates  his  willingness  to  purchase 
vessels  -when  finished,  he  states  that  the  exigencies  of  the  Gov 
ernment  require  that  vessels  should  be  obtained  at  once,  and 
that  this  could  be  done  only  by  purchasing  ships  already  built, 
and  which  could  be  promptly  fitted  for  service. 

Time  has  shown  that  the  Department  availed  itself  prompt 
ly  of  the  only  means  by  which  the  country  could  have  been 
saved.  By  the  well-known  system  of  trade  in  the  great  mar 
kets,  negotiations  for  the  transfer  of  important  property  are  not 
carried  on  directly  between  the  holder  of  the  property  and 
those  who  wish  to  buy,  but  between  a  broker,  acting  for  the 
parties,  and  this  broker  receives  a  stipulated  commission  from 
the  seller.  It  was  found  that  the  business  of  purchasing  vessels 
for  the  United  States  was  so  managed,  that  the  Government 
sometimes  paid  two  commissions,  and  that,  in  some  cases,  these 
commissions  had  also  been  above  the  market  rates.  After  con 
sultation  with  those  qualified  to  advise,  and  with  the  express 
sanction  of  the  President,  it  was  determined  to  procure  the 
services  of  some  competent  and  reliable  man,  who  would  agree 
to  devote  his  whole  time  to  the  procuring  and  fitting  out  of 
ships,  and  who  should  receive  nothing  from  the  Government, 
and  from  the  seller  only  the  regular  commission  established  by 
the  New  York  Board  of  Trade.  This  would  bring  the  whole 
transaction  within  the  common  and  recognized  laws  of  trade, 
and  would  relieve  the  Department  from  the  liability  of  any  im 
proper  charge  for  commissions,  and  of  extravagant  prices  for 
vessels  which  might  be  bought. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan,  the  Department  applied  to  Mr. 
George  D.  Morgan,  of  New  York,  a  gentleman  of  well-known 
character  and  ability,  and  of  large  experience  as  a  merchant. 
He  acceded  to  the  wishes  of  the  Department,  and  relinquishing 
a  lucrative  business  which  would  have  yielded  him  more  profit 
than  the  amount  of  his  commissions,  entered  upon  his  work. 


MEASURES  ADOPTED  FOE  THE  INCREASE  OF  THE  NAVY.        113 

The  naval  constructor  and  an  experienced  engineer  were  then 
associated  with  Mr.  Morgan.  These  two  officers  examined  be 
forehand  every  vessel  which  it  was  proposed  to  buy.  The  naval 
constructor  could  judge  of  the  character  of  the  vessel,  the  engi 
neer  formed  an  opinion  of  the  engine,  and  together  they  made 
an  appraisal  of  the  ship,  which  was  submitted  confidentially  to 
Mr.  Morgan,  who  was  not  permitted  to  pay  more  for  any  vessel 
than  the  price  set  upon  her  by  the  examiners  and  appraisers  of 
the  Government. 

Through  this  arrangement  the  Department  was  enabled  to 
obtain  many  of  the  fastest  and  best  steamers  in  the  mercantile 
navy,  and  on  terms  rather  within  than  exceeding  the  usual  rates 
of  the  market.  From  this  source  the  Department  derived  the 
means  both  of  establishing  the  blockade  and  of  meeting  the 
vast  demand  of  the  Army  for  transportation  of  troops  and  sup 
plies.  Many  of  these  steamers,  when  armed,  were  very  formi 
dable  war-ships.  Some  of  them  could  carry  with  safety  eight 
9-inch  guns,  while  small,  swift  vessels  armed  with  a  100-pounder 
rifle,  were  the  terror  of  the  blockade-runners  of  England. 

The  efficiency  of  this  Navy,  thus  extemporized  from  mer 
chant-ships,  has  been  largely  underrated,  because  opinions  have 
been  formed  without  considering  that  the  method  of  arming  our 
ships  is  both  American  and  peculiar.  No  correct  idea  can  be 
formed  of  the  actual  force  of  an  American  ship  from  the  num 
ber  of  guns  she  mounts.  It  is  by  no  means  certain  that  a  vessel 
with  one  gun  would  be  overmatched  by  another  merely  because 
she  is  armed  with  ten.  At  the  commencement  of  the  war  a 
50-pounder  rifle  was  the  heaviest  cannon  mounted  on  any 
French  war-ship,  and  the  English  relied  upon  the  smooth 
bore  68-pounder  as  their  most  efficient  gun;  while  our  own 
small  gunboats  carried  a  100-pounder  rifle,  and  some  of  our 
second-rate  sloops  mounted  a  150-pounder  rifle  or  an  11-inch 
gun,  and  sometimes  both. 

The  character  of  the  armament  of  our  ships  is  an  original 
American  idea,  and  is  a  distinguishing  and  most  important  fea 
ture  of  the  Navy.  A  merchant- vessel  that  could  carry  one  11- 
inch  pivot-gun,  or  a  heavy  rifle,  would  not  be  a  pleasant  antag 
onist  for  a  ship  mounting  a  whole  broadside  of  the  light  cannon 
of  the  old  style  of  armament. 
8 


HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

As  to  the  discrimination  and  care  used,  and  the  efficiency  of 
the  vessels  purchased,  the  statement  is  made  on  the  direct  au 
thority  of  Admiral  Porter,  that  the  twenty-one  mortar-vessels 
under  his  command  endured  the  severe  service  with  almost 
no  apparent  injury.  The  number  of  discharges  from  these 
heavy  mortars  averaged  fifteen  hundred  to  each  vessel,  and 
yet  none  of  them  were  shaken  so  as  to  leak,  and  at  the  close 
of  the  war  they  were  sold  for  nearly  as  much  as  they  origi 
nally  cost. 

The  following  extract  from  the  Secretary's  report  for  1861 
presents  his  own  account  of  this  important  matter  : 

The  public  vessels  and  the  public  yards,  in  their  capacity  of  con 
struction  and  repair,  were,  however,  totally  inadequate  to  the  demands 
that  are  now  pressing  on  this  branch  of  the  Government,  and  the  De 
partment  was  compelled  to  resort  to  the  commercial  marine  to  make 
good  the  deficiency.  Vessels  of  every  class  and  description  were 
promptly  tendered  by  sellers  and  their  agents,  who,  in  many  instances, 
became  dissatisfied  when  their  offers  were  not  accepted. 

This  new  necessity  of  the  Government,  involving  a  large  expenditure, 
and  the  purchase  of  suitable  vessels,  imposed  an  important  responsi 
bility  ;  and  the  task  of  making  suitable  arrangements  to  insure  the 
prompt  and  systematic  purchase,  on  the  best  and  most  reasonable  terms 
for  the  Government,  of  a  large  number  of  vessels  most  suitable  for  its 
use,  was  attended  by  peculiar  difficulties,  and  received  mature  consider 
ation.  The  purchase  might  be  made  directly  by  the  Department,  or  by 
boards  of  officers  under  its  control  at  the  principal  ports  where  the  ves 
sels  were  to  be  bought,  and  especially  at  the  great  central  point  of  sup 
ply  for  such  a  demand,  the  port  of  New  York. 

But  to  both  these  methods  of  procedure  the  briefest  trial  disclosed 
serious  objections.  It  was  manifest  from  the  first  that  the  Department, 
charged  suddenly  with  the  organization  and  superintendence  of  new  and 
arduous  naval  operations  on  a  large  scale,  in  addition  to  its  current  busi 
ness,  could  not  possibly  itself  devote  to  the  numerous  details  of  each 
case  of  purchase,  the  time  and  attention  needful  fully  to  protect  the  in 
terests  of  the  Government.  It  was  equally  clear  that  boards  of  officers, 
acting  in  a  mere  mercantile  capacity,  new  to  them,  and  for  which  they 
had  neither  been  practically  trained  nor  professionally  commissioned, 
would  be  subjected  to  great  embarrassment  and  disadvantage  in  their 
dealings  with  sellers  of  ships  and  professional  ship-brokers,  in  a  market 
suddenly  pressed  by  a  heavy  and  peremptory  demand.  Yet  the  Depart- 


MEASURES  ADOPTED  FOR  THE  INCREASE  OF  THE  NAVY.        115 

ment  could  rely,  and  it  did  rely,  with  the  fullest  confidence  upon  the 
professional  judgment  and  ability  of  its  ordnance  officers,  naval  con 
structors,  and  engineers,  all  acting  under  the  responsibility  of  their  com 
missions,  to  investigate  and  determine  the  whole  question  of  the  adap 
tation,  in  all  respects,  of  each  ship  offered,  and  of  its  capacity  to  be  by 
alteration  fully  adapted  to  perform  the  particular  service  required  by  the 
Government.  This  work,  with  the  corresponding  authority  of  selection 
and  rejection  of  all  vessels,  was  therefore  exclusively  committed  to 
boards  consisting  each  of  an  experienced  naval  constructor  and  engi 
neer  and  an  ordnance  officer,  convened  and  stationed  for  the  purpose  at 
New  York,  and  the  other  principal  cities.  The  mere  mercantile  part 
of  the  business — the  making  of  the  best  bargains  possible  for  the  Gov 
ernment  in  each  case,  with  the  care  of  averting  all  intervention  of  third 
parties,  which  might  embarrass  the  attainment  of  that  result — was  con 
sidered  by  the  Government  to  be  placed  most  properly  in  the  hands  of 
a  mercantile  agency  of  a  high  and  established  character  for  integrity, 
experience,  and  capacity.  Obvious  reasons,  including  the  consideration 
that  it  is  individual  responsibility  which  is  always  felt  most  keenly,  and 
that  several  agents,  all  acting  separately  for  the  Government  at  the  same 
places,  would  necessarily  compete  with  each  other  to  its  disadvantage 
in  the  market,  indicated  that  this  agency  should  be  tendered  to  a  single, 
properly  qualified  individual,  upon  the  distinct  understanding  that  he 
should  devote  his  whole  time,  attention,  and  ability  to  the  work ;  that 
he  should  in  no  case  make  any  charge  against  the  Government  for  his 
service ;  that  he  should  deal  always  directly  and  exclusively  with  the 
owners  of  the  vessels  purchased,  thus  permitting  no  brokerage  fees,  or 
agents'  commissions,  between  himself  and  the  owners  ;  and  that,  finally, 
his  own  commission,  payable  always  by  the  seller,  should  in  no  case  ex 
ceed  the  regular  mercantile  percentage  fixed  by  the  Chamber  of  Com 
merce  of  New  York,  and  established  by  the  custom  of  merchants  in 
that  city  as  the  rightful  and  legal  rate  of  remuneration  for  such  services 
rendered  by  any  person  acting  between  the  sellers  and  purchasers  of 
vessels. 

The  experiment  thus  made  by  the  Navy  Department  was 
one  of  great  national  importance,  and  every  American  has  rea 
son  to  rejoice  at  the  result.  It  lias  shown  what  abundant  re 
sources  we  have  ever  at  hand  in  our  merchant  steamers  to  meet 
such  an  emergency  as  the  rebellion  created,  and  that  under  an 
efficient  administration  these  can  be  called  to  the  aid  of  the 
Government  almost  as  quickly  as  if  they  belonged  to  the  na- 


116  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

tional  Navy.  They  were  admirably  fitted  for  the  intended  pur 
pose  ;  they  were  more  efficient  blockaders  than  our  regular  war- 
vessels  ;  they  were  formidable  antagonists  because  of  their  heavy 
armament ;  but  notwithstanding  this,  the  nation  should  not  de 
ceive  itself  with  the  idea  that  it  would  be  equally  safe  to  depend 
upon  this  class  of  vessels  in  case  of  a  foreign  war.  This  subject 
will  be  discussed  in  another  chapter. 


CHAPTEE  X. 


THE  IDEAS  WHICH  GOVERNED  THE  DEPARTMENT  IN  THE  CONSTRUC 
TION  OF  NEW  VESSELS. 

IN  order  to  judge  aright  the  policy  of  the  Department  in  the 
construction  of  new  vessels,  it  is  necessary  not  only  to  inquire 
what  the  precise  want  of  the  country  then  was,  but  whether  this 
policy  was  shaped  by  a  definite  American  idea  concerning  ships 
and  guns,  and  naval  war.  This  subject  was  touched  upon  in 
an  opening  chapter,  with  the  intention  of  returning  to  it  again. 

It  is  an  important  thought,  and  one  which,  in  estimating  the 
value  of  the  Navy,  has  not  received  due  attention,  that  previous 
to  the  rebellion  it  was  the  best  exponent  of  our  national  power, 
the  expression  of  a  true  national  thought  and  feeling.  With 
the  exception  of  the  little  standing  Army,  that  attracted  no  at 
tention,  we  had  only  State  troops,  where  we  had  any  soldiers, 
who  expected  to  answer  any  call  from  the  General  Government 
only  through  the  State  authority  ;  but  in  the  Navy  there  were 
no  State  ships,  nor  sailors,  nor  State  flags  ;  it  was  "  the  Ameri 
can  Navy."  There  the  true  national  feeling  was  cherished  in 
its  strength,  when  it  was  weak  or  discarded  elsewhere  ;  and  par 
ticularly  was  this  true  of  the  seamen,  a  fact  to  be  remembered 
to  their  eternal  honor.  When  the  officers  of  Southern  birth 
or  proclivities,  who  had  come  under  the  influence  of  their 
leaders,  abandoned  in  large  numbers  the  cause  of  their  country, 
the  common  seamen,  with  very  few  exceptions,  were  true  to  the 
national  sentiment,  and  faithful  to  the  national  flag.  The 
Navy  not  only  centred  upon  itself  the  national  feeling,  but  it 
embodied  the  national  thought. 

When  the  American  mind  came   to  express  itself  in  the 


118  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

form  of  ships  and  guns,  it  was  seen  that  it  had  not  followed  ex 
isting  models,  but  had  thought  out  some  peculiar  and  original 
forms.  Soon,  when  men  spoke  of  an  American  ship,  it  was  un 
derstood  to  be  a  vessel  of  distinctive  character,  and  different 
from  an  English  or  any  other  ship.  It  was  regarded  as  bear 
ing  the  stamp  of  American  character. 

The  American  mind,  however,  from  the  first,  was  not  work 
ing  at  random  ;  it  was  not  making  experiments  here  and  there, 
which  tended  to  no  result,  but,  from  first  to  last,  it  was  gov 
erned  by  a  few  definite  ideas  and  well-settled  principles ;  and 
the  Department,  in  the  construction  of  the  new  Navy,  followed 
the  traditional  policy  of  the  nation,  but  made  some  novel  and 
very  startling  applications  of  leading  principles  and  ideas. 

A  very  brief  sketch  of  the  rise  and  progress  of  the  ISTavy  will 
place  the  action  of  the  Department  in  its  proper  light.  A  lead 
ing  characteristic  of  the  American  mind  is  its  impatience  of 
many  successive  operations  to  produce  a  given  effect.  It  aims 
to  reach  its  object  by  a  single  step.  It  seeks  to  concentrate 
power  upon  a  single  point,  to  combine  many  forces  in  one,  and 
by  a  single  blow  produce  the  effect  of  all.  It  brings  the 
greatest  possible  force  to  bear  on  a  single  purpose,  and  reaches 
that  purpose  in  the  shortest  possible  time.  In  every  branch  of 
our  industry  we  find  examples  of  the  manner  in  which  this  cen 
tral  idea  has  given  direction  to  American  thought.  Instead  of 
the  slow  process  of  hand-work,  the  American  will  have  a  ma 
chine  to  gin  his  cotton,  and  with  it  he  changes  the  aspect  and 
relations  of  the  world.  He  will  not  only  have  a  printing-press 
worked  by  steam,  instead  of  the  hand,  but  he  constructs  a  cyl 
inder  press  ;  and,  not  content  with  that,  he  invents  a  Hoe  press, 
a  lightning  press,  that  throws  off  its  thousands  of  sheets  per 
hour.  He  not  only  uses  the  ship  that  sails  with  the  wind  and 
tide,  but  he  will  construct  a  steamship,  that  goes  with  equal 
speed  against  the  wind  and  tide.  He  cannot  wait  for  the  slow 
processes  of  scythe  and  sickle,  but  concentrates  the  power  of 
twenty  men  into  a  single  machine.  He  cannot  endure  that  his 
message  should  travel  only  forty  miles  per  hour,  and  so  he  in 
vents  the  telegraph,  and  flashes  on  his  thought  hundreds  of  miles 
in  a  moment.  Instead  of  waiting  for  the  slow  stitching  of 
weary  hands,  he  condenses  the  power  and  speed  of  fifty  needles 


CONSTRUCTION   OF   NEW   VESSELS.  119 

into  one,  and  drives  that  one  by  steam.  When  he  builds  a  war 
ship,  he  aims  to  give  her  the  highest  speed  consistent  with  his 
purpose,  and  for  her  armament  he  concentrates  the  force  of  a 
broadside  into  one  big  gun  ;  and,  instead  of  making  fifty  small 
holes  or  indentations,  he  crushes  in  the  side  of  his  enemy  by 
one  smashing  shot,  and  compels  him  to  surrender  or  sends  him 
to  the  bottom.  The  Navy,  therefore,  is  the  creation  of  a  lead 
ing  thought  in  the  American  mind,  and  it  will  be  interesting  to 
trace  the  influence  of  this  thought  in  the  various  stages  of  con 
struction. 

At  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  we  had,  of  course,  no  Navy, 
and  the  few  small  commercial  vessels  of  the  colonies  presented 
nothing  peculiar.  The  thought  of  the  people  had  been  occupied 
with  the  grave  political  and  moral  questions  connected  with  the 
separation  from  England.  The  American  mind  had  not  yet  been 
directed  to  the  importance  of  manufactures  or  commerce.  In 
fact,  both  were  purposely  made  impossible  for  the  colonists  by 
the  restrictive  laws  of  England.  But  in  the  very  first  war-ves 
sels  built  after  the  close  of  the  war,  the  true  distinctive  Ameri 
can  idea  began  to  be  manifested.  The  idea  was,  to  bring  the 
power  of  a  line-of-battle  ship  within  the  dimensions  of  a 
frigate.  This  was  nearly  accomplished  by  slightly  increasing 
the  size  of  the  common  frigate,  and  arming  her  witli  heavier 
guns,  without  changing  her  nominal  rate.  The  manner  in 
which  this  was  carried  out  is  shown  in  the  size  and  armament 
of  the  frigates  Constitution  and  United  States.  The  frigate 
Constitution  was  launched  in  1T9T;  her  length  was  175  feet, 
her  breadth  of  beam  43.6  in.,  and  her  tonnage,  according  to  the 
old  rates,  1,530  tons.  The  United  States  was  launched  in  1797 ; 
her  length  was  175  feet,  her  breadth  of  beam  43.6  in.,  and  her 
tonnage  1,530. 

In  order  to  compare  the  American  with  the  British  ship  of 
the  same  rate,  it  is  only  necessary  to  state  the  weight  of  their 
broadsides,  which  were  as  follows : 

American  frigate  United  States 864  Ibs. 

American  frigate  Constitution 768  Ibs. 

British  frigate  Macedonian 528  Ibs. 

British  frigate  Guerriere 617  Ibs. 

It  will  be  seen  at  a  glance,  from  these  statements,  that  the 


120  HISTOET    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

registered  rates  of  our  ships  gave  no  indication  of  their  compar 
ative  force.  The  Americans  had  so  far  carried  out  their  idea 
of  the  concentration  of  power,  that  their  frigate  rated  as  a  forty- 
four  was  very  nearly  the  equal  of  a  British  line-of-battle  ship ; 
and  the  result  was,  that  when  the  Guerriere,  a  forty-four,  was 
laid  alongside  the  American  forty-four,  the  Constitution,  the 
British  ship  was  demolished  in  fifteen  minutes.  Similar  results 
followed,  as  is  well  known,  in  other  actions  ;  and  though  it  was 
conceded  that  the  rapidity  of  the  American  fire  was  generally 
greater  than  that  of  the  English,  still  our  almost  unbroken 
success  was  mainly  due  to  the  superior  weight  of  the  American 
broadside. 

The  English  historians  have  dwelt  with  great  satisfaction 
upon  the  disparity  of  force.  They  declare  that  it  removes  all 
the  sting  of  defeat.  They  insist  that  it  was  perfectly  natural, 
even  inevitable,  that,  under  such  circumstances,  the  British 
ships  should  be  captured  or  sunk.  This  was,  and  is,  precisely 
the  American  opinion.  This  was  just  the  result  they  antici 
pated,  and  they  built  their  frigates  with  this  very  object  in 
view.  There  are  two  aspects  to  this  subject,  one  of  which  all 
English  writers  seem  to  have  overlooked.  In  one  view,  it  was 
a  battle  between  ship  and  ship,  and  it  was  no  disgrace  to  the 
English  commanders  to  yield  to  superior  force.  But  it  was  also 
a  fight  between  the  two  nations,  and  certainly  it  was  a  remark 
able  fact,  and  highly  honorable  to  the  Americans,  that  their 
young  nation,  in  the  first  hours  of  its  life,  should  have  produced 
ships  that  carried  dismay  to  every  English  heart,  and  conquered, 
on  her  own  element,  the  haughty  mistress  of  the  seas.  In  the 
battle  between  the  nations,  England  was  met  by  superior 
weapons,  and  was  ingloriously  defeated. 

Should  such  a  ship  as  our  Miantonomoh  meet  an  English 
broadside  iron-clad,  and  crush  in  her  sides  with  15-inch  shot, 
as  she  easily  could,  it  would  be  quite  natural,  even  necessary, 
that  the  British  ship  should  surrender  or  sink.  There  might  be 
no  occasion  to  charge  the  English  commander  with  want  of 
courage  or  skill,  but  it  would  be  discreditable  and  humbling  to 
Great  Britain  that  her  boasted  national  ships,  to  which  she  had 
trusted  her  safety  and  honor,  should  be  easily  demolished  by  an 
American  Monitor.  It  would  not  lessen  the  national  shame  to 


CONSTEUCTION   OF   NEW  VESSELS.  121 

assert  and  prove  that  the  British  iron-clad  was  no  match  for  the 
Yankee  ship.  That  is  the  precise  result  at  which  we  are  aiming. 
To  present  more  fully  the  difference  between  the  English 
and  American  armament,  the  following  table  is  extracted  from 
James's  "  Naval  History,"  showing  the  weight  of  the  broadside 
of  the  classes  of  ships  named  : 

Gun  ship.  French.  English. 

120  1,268  1,373. 

110  1,180 1,278. 

80 996  1,079. 

74  838 907. 

64  510  552. 

The  heaviest  guns  in  these  armaments  were  36-pounders,  on 
the  main  deck. 

James's  history  was  published  in  1822.  His  rates  have  been 
quoted  by  authorities  since  as  correct,  and  yet  we  find  that  he 
states  that  the  weight  of  the  Macedonian's  broadside  was  549 
pounds  at  the  time  of  her  capture  in  1812,  and  that  the  broad 
side  of  the  Guerriere  was  517  pounds.  It  will  be  seen  that  the 
United  States  frigate,  rated  as  a  forty-four,  threw  very  nearly 
the  same  weight  of  metal  at  a  broadside  as  the  Ttt-gun  ship 
of  the  English  Navy,  if  James's  figures  are  correct. 

A  second  era  in  the  construction  of  the  American  Navy  be 
gan  after  the  War  of  1812,  when  the  Government  built  several 
line-of-battle  ships,  follpwing  in  the  main  the  European  model, 
retaining  still,  however,  the  heavy  armament ;  and  the  vessels 
thus  constructed  were  as  much  superior  to  the  British  vessels 
of  the  same  rates  as  were  our  frigates  to  those  of  the  same  rate 
in  the  English  Navy.  In  James's  history  is  the  following  com 
parison  between  the  English  80-gun  ship  and  the  American 
ship  Franklin,  rated  as  a  seventy-four,  and  also  carrying  eighty 
guns: 

ALBION.  FRANKLIN. 

Weight  Weight 

Guns.  Pounders.        per  gun.  Guns.  Pounders,  per  gun. 

First  deck 28        long       32 55  30        long       32 63 

Second" 28           "          18   42£  32           "         32  . . . .  52 

Quarter  deck  ...     6           "          12 34  2            "         32 53 

Forecastle 12  carronades  32   17f  18  carronades  32  ....  19 

Poop 6  carronadas  18 10^ 

80  82 


122  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

ALBION.  FRANKLIN. 

Weight  of  broadside. .     982  Ibs.  Weight  of  broadside. . .    1,312  Ibs. 

Crew 593  Crew 786 

Size,  tons 1,743  Size,  tons 2,124 

Length  of  the  Franklin,  as  stated  by  James 197  feet. 

Extreme  breadth 50     " 

First  deck  ports  apart. 8.6  " 

Height  of       "     from  water 4.7" 

Draught  of  water  abaft 24     " 

To  these  tables  may  properly  be  added  the  following  state 
ment  of  the  battery  of  the  Ohio.  The  Ohio  rates  as  a  74-gun 
ship.  Her  length  is  198  feet,  and  her  breadth  of  beam  54  feet, 
6  inches.  The  battery  of  this  ship  is  shown  by  the  following 
tables : 

BATTERY  OF  THE  OHIO — 1846. 


Weight  of  broadside. 

Spar  deck,  •< 

'  Twelve 

Four 
Six 

32-pounders  of 
32        "          of 
32        "         of 

42  cwt. 

57    " 
61    " 

1480  Ibs. 

Four 

8-inch 

of 

53     " 

Main  deck, 

Twenty-eight 
:  Four 

32-pounders 
8-inch 

of 
of 

61     " 
63    " 

j-576 

Ibs. 

Lower  deck  J  Twenty-eight 
(  Four 

Total.  . 

4  2-p  ounders 
8-inch 

of 
of 

71    " 
63     " 

.  |  716 

,  ,1,772. 

Ibs. 

The  armament  of  an  English  120-gun  ship  is  stated  by 
James  (volume  i.,  published  in  1822)  as  follows  : 

32  36-pounders.  ") 

34  24-pounders. 

34  12-pounders.  \  WeiSht  of  broadside  1,373  Ibs. 

20  8-pounders.  J 

120 

In  round  numbers,  then,  the  broadside  of  the  American  90- 
gun  ship  was  heavier  by  400  pounds  than  that  of  the  English 
ship  of  120  guns.  Nor  was  this  the  only  superiority.  The  lar 
gest  gun  then  mounted  on  the  English  three-decker  was  a  36- 
pounder,  while  the  Ohio  carried  28  42-pounders  and  8  8-inch 
guns,  whose  shot  weighs  65  pounds. 

In  the  form  of  the  American  line-of-battle  ship  there  was 


CONSTRUCTION   OF   NEW   VESSELS.  123 

little  or  nothing  peculiar ;  but  the  armament  was  distinctively 
American.  The  8-inch  guns,  the  42-pounders,  and  the  superior 
weight  of  the  broadside,  gave  the  Ohio  so  great  an  advantage 
as  to  make  it  almost  certain  that  a  100-gun  ship  of  the  old 
style,  in  a  combat  with  her,  would  have  been  demolished  as  the 
Guerriere  was  by  the  Constitution.  These  line-of-battle  ships, 
six  in  number,  were,  however,  upon  the  whole,  the  most  unsat 
isfactory  vessels  which  have  been  constructed.  They  followed 
very  closely  in  form  the  European  model ;  and  the  American 
mind  does  not,  in  such  matters,  work  well  in  foreign  harness. 
They  were  the  first  and  the  last  of  their  class  in  our  Navy,  and 
are  now  useful  only  as  storeships. 

The  next  distinctive  era  in  the  progress  of  our  Navy  was 
that  in  w^hich  a  new  class  of  frigates  was  produced,  which,  more 
clearly  than  any  thing  which  had  preceded  them,  presented  the 
distinctive  American  idea.  They  were  such  war-ships  as  the 
world  had  not  seen  before,  and  were  destined,  within  their 
sphere,  to  revolutionize  the  naval  architecture  of  the  world. 
Already,  indeed,  the  Americans,  in  their  endeavor  to  produce 
ships  of  greater  speed,  had  greatly  modified  the  forms  of  our 
commercial  vessels.  The  hull  was  much  longer  in  proportion 
to  breadth,  the  bow  was  sharper,  and  the  stern  was  rounded, 
while  the  length  of  spars,  and  consequently  the  spread  of 
canvas,  was  largely  increased.  With  these  modifications  our 
sailing  vessels,  as  well  as  our  steamboats,  had  become  the  fastest 
in  the  world.  These  changes,  so  far  as  they  were  available, 
were  adopted  in  the  construction  of  the  new  American  frigates. 

In  order  to  place  the  character  of  these  vessels  more  clearly 
before  the  reader,  the  dimensions,  tonnage,  and  weight  of  broad 
side,  as  stated  by  James,  of  a  French  lOtt-gun  ship,  and  an 
English  90-gun  ship,  about  the  time  of  our  Revolution,  are  here 
presented : 

Length  of  deck.  Breadth.  Weight  of  broadside. 

French  104  guns 187  ft.,  7£  in 53  ft.,  8£  in 1,170  pounds. 

English  90  guns 175  ft.  48  ft.,  7^  in. ...     842  pounds. 

The  French  ship  measured  2,347  tons. 

The  English  "  "       1,814    " 

By  referring  to  tables  previously  given,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  American  frigates  Constitution  and  United  States,  built  just 


124  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

after  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  were  as  large  as  the  English 
90-gun  ship,  and  that  the  United  States  threw  a  heavier  broad 
side. 

In  the  light  of  these  facts  the  change  wrought  in  naval  con 
struction  by  the  new  American  frigates  will  be  clearly  seen. 
They  were  the  first  built  after  the  war  of  1812-'15.  The  Minne 
sota  may  be  regarded  as  a  type  of  this  class  of  ships,  and  her 
dimensions  are  as  follows :  length  269  feet ;  breadth  51  feet,  4 
inches ;  tonnage  3,307  tons.  She  is,  then,  nearly  1,600  tons 
heavier  than  the  English  90-gun  ship  was  about  the  beginning 
of  this  century ;  she  is  94  feet  longer,  and  her  weight  of  broad 
side  is  2,406  pounds,  or  nearly  three  times  that  of  the  old 
British  90-gun  ship,  while  she  is  also  nearly  70*  feet  longer  than 
our  own  line-of-battle  ships  built  after  the  War  of  1812. 

The  important  points  to  be  noticed  here  are  the  greater 
length  of  the  ship  in  proportion  to  her  breadth,  the  increase 
of  the  weight  of  the  broadside  in  proportion  to  the  tonnage,  and 
the  greater  size  of  the  shot.  According  to  James,  the  largest 
gun  on  the  English  120-gun  ship  of  the  old  form  was  a  36- 
pounder.  Our  own  line-of-battle  ship,  the  Franklin,  carried,  as 
is  stated,  nothing  heavier  than  32-pounders.  Our  90-gun  ship, 
the  Ohio,  in  1845  was  armed  partly  with  42-pounders,  but  they 
were  carronades,  and  the  idea  of  the  heavy  armament  will  ap 
pear  very  distinctly  if,  with  these  figures  before  us,  we  look  at 
the  size  of  the  Minnesota's  guns,  as  they  were  in  1863  : 

"Weight  of  shot. 

1  150-pounder,  rifle 150  Ibs. 

4  100-pounders,  " 100    " 

111-inch  "  166    " 

42    9-inch  " ; 90    " 

These  statements  show  very  clearly  the  direction  in  which 
the  American  mind  was  working.  The  object  aimed  at  is 
plain ;  and  the  result  was,  a  class  of  frigates  more  formidable 
than  any  other  ships  afloat.  The  manner  in  which  the  heavy 
guns  of  the  Kearsarge  shattered  and  sunk  the  Alabama  shows 
how  quickly  the  Minnesota  could  crush  any  wooden  ship  armed 
only  with  32-pounder  or  42-pounder  guns,  or  even  with  a  few 
68-pounders,  in  addition  to  the  general  armament.  A  war  with 
England,  previous  to  the  rebellion,  would  necessarily  have  re- 


CONSTRUCTION    OF    NEW  VESSELS.  125 

peated,  on  a  larger  scale  and  with  more  decisive  effects,  the  tri 
umphs  of  our  first  battles  on  the  sea.  The  little  Navy  of  the 
United  States,  as  a  wrhole,  was  doubtless  no  match  for  the  im 
mense  fleets  of  England  ;  but  the  Minnesota,  or  any  other  ship 
of  her  class  and  armament,  would  have  captured  any  single 
wooden  ship  then  in  the  British  Navy.  She  would  so  far  have 
overmatched  an  English  line-of-battle  ship  as  to  have  made  the 
battle  a  useless  waste  of  life. 

This  point  had  been  reached  by  the  United  States  in  the 
construction  of  a  Navy  previous  to  the  breaking  out  of  the  re 
bellion.  Intent  only  on  the  pursuits  of  peace,  the  country  felt 
no  anxiety  in  regard  to  the  increase  of  its  naval  power.  For 
almost  fifty  years  the  Navy  had  had  no  opportunity  of  attract 
ing  attention  by  brilliant  achievements.  A  generation  had 
come  upon  the  stage  to  whom  its  former  renown  was  only  a 
matter  of  history.  Very  little  was  known  of  its  character,  or 
the  nature  of  its  service,  or  of  the  stations  of  the  ships  ;  and  it 
was  perfectly  easy,  therefore,  for  the  conspirators  who  controlled 
the  Navy  to  scatter  it  abroad,  and  disarm  the  nation  without 
exciting  remark  or  suspicion.  The  condition  of  affairs  in  this 
respect  has  been  already  described,  and  mention  has  been  made 
of  the  first  measures  adopted  by  the  Department  to  extricate 
itself  from  its  perilous  position,  through  the  extensive  pur 
chase  of  private  vessels.  This,  as  has  been  stated,  was  the  only 
possible  step  which  the  Secretary  could  take  with  any  reason 
able  hope  of  success ;  and  it  was  accomplished,  as  has  been 
shown,  with  remarkable  promptitude,  business  tact,  and  econ 
omy  for  the  Government.  A  blockade  had  been  proclaimed, 
and  a  mere  paper  blockade  would  only  have  invited  the  trad,e 
of  all  nations  to  the  rebel  ports.  These  purchased  vessels  were 
stationed,  as  rapidly  as  possible,  along  the  Southern  coast.  But 
these  purchased  ships,  well  suited  as  they  were  to  the  general 
purpose,  by  no  means  met  the  whole  want  of  the  country.  It 
was  not  alone  the  outer,  the  sea-coast  line,  which  was  to  be 
guarded,  but  the  inner  coast,  the  sounds,  the  inlets,  and  rivers. 
To  complete  and  maintain  this  blockade,  and  thus  cut  off  the 
rebel  supplies,  was  evidently  the  first  thing  to  be  done.  The 
operations  of  the  Navy  Department  cannot  be  rightly  judged 
without  holding  in  view,  not  alone  what  it  was  desirable  to  do, 


126  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

but  what,  at  the  time,  it  was  possible  to  get  done.  It  must  also 
be  remembered,  that  while  many  things  pressed  at  once  upon 
the  Secretary,  and  all  perhaps  important,  yet  from  his  stand 
point,  and  knowing  what  the  public  did  not,  he  could  see  that 
some  one  thing  should  take  precedence  of  all  the  rest,  and  the 
Department  aimed  ever  to  do  the  first  thing  first. 

Having  made  his  first  purchases  of  vessels  for  the  blocka 
ding  squadron,  the  Secretary  knew  that  the  heavy  frigates 
already  named,  and  some  steam-sloops,  might  be  used  to  re 
duce  some  of  the  less  formidable  forts'  guarding  the  inlets  and 
sounds,  so  soon  as  these  ships  could  be  collected  from  the  distant 
points  to  which  they  had  been  scattered  ;  and  the  first  wrork  of 
construction  was  the  building  of  a  fleet  of  small  gunboats,  of 
about  five  hundred  tons'  burden,  to  operate  in  the  shallow  wa 
ters  of  the  Southern  coast.  Such  was  the  necessity  for  these 
vessels,  and  such  the  foresight  and  decision  of  the  Secretary,  that 
twenty-three  of  this  class  were  ordered  in  advance  of  the  action 
of  Congress ;  and  when  that  body  met  in  December,  1861,  the 
Department  was  able  to  report  that  many  of  these  gunboats 
were  already  in  commission,  and  doing  good  service  on  the 
Southern  coast.  A  brief  statement  of  the  character  of  these 
vessels  wTill  present  once  more  very  clearly  the  American  idea 
of  ships  and  their  armament.  Their  dimensions  were  as  fol 
lows  :  length,  165  ft.,  6  in. ;  breadth,  28  feet ;  depth,  12  feet. 
They  were  schooner-rigged,  and  their  maximum  and  contract 
speed  was  nine  knots.  Their  armament  consisted  of  one  11- 
inch  pivot-gun  ;  two  24-pounder  howitzers,  and  one  20-pounder 
howitzer.  Their  measurement  was,  in  round  numbers,  five  hun 
dred  (500)  tons. 

The  first  point  worthy  of  note,  as  illustrating  the  change 
which  the  Americans  were  working  in  naval  architecture,  is 
their  length  in  proportion  to  their  tonnage  and  diminished 
breadth.  Our  first  frigates,  as  has  been  shown,  were  about  the 
length  of  the  old  80-gun  ship,  and  their  measurement  about  fif 
teen  hundred  (1,500)  tons.  The  breadth  of  the  frigates  was  a 
little  more  than  fifty  feet.  But  these  small  gunboats  of  only 
five  hundred  tons  are  only  ten  feet  shorter  than  such  frigates  as 
the  Constitution  and  the  United  States,  while  their  breadth  is 
only  twenty-eight  feet.  They  are  nearly  as  long  as  the  frigates 


CONSTRUCTION   OF   NEW  VESSELS.  127 

of  1812  with  only  one-third  their  tonnage,  while  they  have  only 
a  trine  more  than  one-half  their  breadth. 

This  shows  an  entire  change  in  the  model  of  war-ships  ;  but 
we  see  also  that  it  is  in  conformity  to  a  general  idea  that  is  a 
prevailing  one  in  the  construction  of  the  Navy,  and  indeed  of 
all  American  ships,  the  lengthening  of  the  hull  in  proportion 
to  the  breadth.  The  next  American  characteristic  is  shown  in 
the  style  of  the  armament.  These  small  gunboats  carry  one 
pivot-gun,  whose  shot  weighs  160  pounds.  A  comparison  will 
show  the  practical  effect  of  this  new  arrangement.  This  single 
11-inch  gun,  and  one  of  the  2i-pounder  howitzers,  carry  a 
weight  of  metal  equal  to  the  broadside  of  a  20-gun  ship  armed 
with  18-pounders.  Nor  is  this  all.  While  the  gunboat  might 
receive  many  broadsides  from  the  18-pounders  without  being 
sunk,  a  single  shot  from  the  11-inch  gun  would  be  very 
likely  to  disable  or  sink  a  20-gun  ship  of  the  old  construction 
and  armament.  These  little  gunboats  were  really  formidable 
vessels. 

The  country  in  its  first  alarm,  and  having  then  no  clear  con 
ceptions  of  what  was  needed,  or  of  what  could  be  done,  was  anx 
ious  for  many  things,  and  also  anxious  that  these  many  things 
should  be  immediately  provided.  The  people  demanded  pow 
erful,  swift  ocean  cruisers,  which  should  sweep  the  seas,  forgetful 
of  the  important  fact  that  such  ships  would  require  three  years 
in  the  building,  and  even  if  already  built  they  would  not  meet 
the  exact  want  which  was  pressing  the  Government  most  se 
verely  then.  Its  first  need  was  for  blockading  vessels,  which 
were  procured,  as  far  as  possible,  by  purchase ;  and  its  next,  of 
gunboats  for  the  shallow  waters  and  rivers  of  the  South,  was 
provided  for  by  the  fleet  of  twenty-three,  which  were  put  in 
commission  a  few  months  only  after  the  contracts  were  made. 

To  illustrate  the  object  which  American  builders  have  held 
steadily  in  view,  let  it  be  supposed  that  such  a  gunboat  as  has 
been  described,  with  her  speed  increased  to  fourteen  knots  (if 
that  is  possible),  should  meet  even  a  line-of-battle  ship  armed 
only  with  32-pounders  and  32-pounder  carronades — to  say 
the  very  least,  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  the  large  ship 
would  be  the  victor.  It  is  probably  not  practicable  to  give  to 
a  vessel  of  this  small  gunboat  class  the  requisite  speed ;  but  a 


128  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

small,  swift  vessel,  carrying  one  heavy  gun,  can  be  built,  and 
she  would  prove  a  very  formidable  foe  to  a  ship  much  larger 
than  herself  if  armed  only  with  lighter  guns. 

By  the  promptness  and  energy  with  which  the  Department 
moved  in  carrying  out  these  measures,  before  the  close  of  the 
first  year  of  its  administration,  it  had  placed  on  the  Southern 
coast  a  fleet  quite  sufficient  to  establish  a  blockade  which  Euro 
pean  Governments  were  compelled  to  recognize  as  valid.  Of 
course  it  was  very  difficult,  at  first,  so  to  close  that  long  and 
double  coast-line,  that  the  vigilance,  and  skill,  and  persevering 
energy  of  neutral  England  could  find  no  entrance,  stimulated 
as  she  was  by  the  hope  of  gain,  and  the  desire  to  aid  in  our 
ruin ;  but  every  new  ship  we  commissioned  lessened  somewhat 
her  chances  of  success,  and  cut  off  some  portion  of  the  resources 
of  the  rebels.  The  fleet  of  English  steamers  supplying  them 
with  arms,  clothing,  food,  and  whatever  else  was  required, 
and  other  English  vessels  floating  the  secession  flag,  destroy 
ing  our  peaceful  ships,  will  appear  in  the  future  as  the 
most  disgraceful  chapter  of  all  her  history.  Nor  do  all  the 
pleasant  speeches  which  individual  Englishmen  or  Americans 
have  made,  or  may  make,  alter  the  smallest  feature  of  the  case. 
These  pleasant-spoken  gentlemen  do  not  represent  the  real 
England  with  which  we  have  to  deal.  Lord  Palmerston  was 
the  true  exponent  of  England. 

The  next  step  was  to  produce  some  new  steamers  of  the  Iro- 
quois  class,  vessels  of  about  one  thousand  tons'  burden,  and  which 
were  efficient  ocean  cruisers.  Of  these  were  the  Kearsarge,  the 
Oneida,  the  Wachusett,  and  Tuscarora.  The  value  of  these 
ships  was  triumphantly  shown  in  the  destruction  of  the  Ala 
bama,  a  battle  which,  in  its  influence  upon  European  opinion 
and  policy,  was  second  only  to  the  Monitor  fight  with  the  Mer- 
rimack.  The  dimensions  of  this  class  were  as  follows,  omitting 
fractions,  and  taking  the  Kearsarge  as  a  type :  length,  200  feet ; 
breadth,  33  feet ;  measurement,  1,031  tons ;  battery,  two  11-inch 
guns,  one  30-pounder  rifle,  four  32-pounders  smooth  bore. 
These  vessels,  for  the  purpose  of  saving  time,  were  built  from 
drawings  and  patterns  already  in  the  hands  of  the  builders  of 
those  from  which  they  were  copied — ships  that  had  been  con 
structed  previous  to  the  war,  and  yet  they  exhibit  very  clearly 


CONSTRUCTION    OF   NEW  VESSELS.  129 

the  direction  in  which  the  American  mind  was  working. 
These  gunboats  are  a  few  feet  longer  than  our  old  Y4- 
gun  ship,  the  Franklin,  while  they  are  also  twenty-two  feet 
narrower.  The  destruction  of  the  Alabama  is  proof  positive  of 
the  terrible  efficiency  of  their  armament,  and  it  is  more  than 
probable  that  the  Kearsarge  with  her  11-inch  guns  would  de 
stroy  any  wooden  ship,  however  large,  if  armed  only  with  32- 
pounder  and  42-pounder  guns,  and  provided  her  speed  were 
only  equal  to  that  of  the  Kearsarge. 

These  vessels  were  intended,  not  only  for  the  service  of  the 
blockade,  but  for  the  pursuit  and  capture  of  the  armed  vessels 
which  neutral  England1  fitted  out  in  her  harbors,  and  manned 
with  seamen  and  gunners  from  her  own  practice-ships ;  and 
while  many  Americans  were  denouncing  the  Department  be 
cause  it  had  furnished,  as  was  said,  no  swift,  efficient  ships,  the 
English  papers  ascribed  the  capture  of  their  boasted  Alabama 
to  the  superior  speed  and  general  efficiency  of  the  Kearsarge — 
a  very  conclusive  answer  to  the  censure  at  home. 

Some  experiments  which  were  made  in  the  crooked  and 
narrow  channels  of  the  Southern  rivers  showed  conclusively 
that  the  screw-steamers  were  not  the  most  efficient  vessels  for 
such  a  service,  because  they  cannot  run  backward — they  cannot 
advance  and  retire  on  the  same  line.  They  must  turn  round  in 
order  to  withdraw;  and  to  say  nothing  of  the  difficulty  of  doing 
this  in  a  narrow  channel,  it  is  often  very  dangerous  ;  as,  for  in 
stance,  when  a  vessel  attacks  a  fort,  and  it  becomes  necessary  to 
withdraw.  In  turning,  the  entire  broadside  would  be  exposed 
to  the  enemy's  fire.  The  same  would  be  true  when  a  vessel,  in 
the  bend  of  a  stream,  comes  unexpectedly  upon  a  battery  or 
fort. 

In  the  early  part  of  the  war  one  of  our  screw-steamers  was 
lost  in  this  manner.  She  found  herself  suddenly  under  the  fire 
of  a  battery  in  the  bend  of  a  river,  and  in  endeavoring  to  turn 
she  ran  aground  and  was  lost.  If  she  could  have  backed  out, 
she  would  have  been  saved.  The  Department  next  decided 
upon  the  construction  of  some  side-wheel  steamers ;  and  the 
following  were  built :  the  Maratanza,  Mali  ask  a,  Sebago,  Octa- 
rora,  Sonoma,  Conemaugh,  Tioga,  Genesee,  Miami,  Paul  Jones, 
Port  Royal,  and  Cimarron,  twelve  in  number,  of  about  850 
9 


130  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

tons  each,  and  having  a  maximum  speed  of  eleven  knots  per 
hour. 

But  even  these  did  not  meet  all  the  requirements  of  the 
case,  and  another  style  of  vessel  was  devised,  still  better  adapted 
to  the  shallow  and  tortuous  channels  of  the  Southern  waters. 
Both  ends  of  these  vessels  were  built  alike,  and  their  wheels 
and  engines  were  so  constructed  that  they  could  move  back 
ward  or  forward  with  equal  facility.  These  were  twenty- 
seven  in  number.  They  were  of  974  tons'  burden,  and  have  a 
maximum  speed  of  14J  knots  per  hour.  Their  names  were,  the 
Eutaw,  the  Sassacus,  Wateree,  Pawtuxet,  Tallapoosa,  Winoo- 
ski,  Mackinaw,  Shamrock,  Tallahoma,  Tacony,  losco,  Aga- 
wam,  Pontoosuc,  Massasoit,  Osceola,  Mattobosett,  Chickopee, 
Ascutney,  Otsego,  Metacomet,  Chenango,  Lenapee,  Mendota, 
Mingo,  Wyalusing,  Pontiac,  and  Peoria.  These  were  the 
gunboats  known  as  "  double-enders."  To  this  class  seven  other 
larger  and  faster  were  added,  the  Winnipec,  Ashuelot,  Muscoo- 
ta,  Suwanee,  Shamokin,  Mohongo,  and  Monocacy,  all  of  1,030 
tons  each.  These  paddle-wheel  gunboats  have  the  light  draught 
of  eight  feet,  and  were  very  heavily  armed. 

These  were  followed  by  another  class,  larger  still,  and  de 
signed  for  ocean  cruisers,  and  it  was  intended  to  give  them  a 
speed  equal  to  that  of  the  neutral  blockade-runners.  The  Lack- 
awanna  may  perhaps  be  taken  as  a  representative  of  this  class, 
although  she  is  a  trine  larger  than  some  of  them.  Her  length 
is  237  feet ;  her  breadth,  38  feet ;  her  tonnage,  1,533  tons. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  change  in  model  was  still  going  on 
in  the  same  direction,  as  appears  by  an  example.  The  now  his 
toric  flag-ship  of  Admiral  Farragut,  the  Hartford,  was  of  the 
following  dimensions :  length,  229  feet  9  inches ;  breadth,  44 
feet ;  tonnage,  in  round  numbers,  2,000  tons.  With  a  tonnage 
of  only  1,533  tons,  the  Lackawanna  is  7  feet  3  inches  longer 
than  the  Hartford,  while  at  the  same  time  she  is  six  feet  nar 
rower. 

The  armament  of  this  class  of  ships  was  as  follows.  The 
list,  however,  gives  only  a  general  idea  of  their  guns,  for  they 
were  not  precisely  the  same  on  every  vessel,  and  changes  were 
made  from  time  to  time  that  were  indicated  by  experience. 
The  armament  of  the  Lackawanna  was  as  follows  : 


CONSTRUCTION   OF   NEW  VESSELS.  131 

Weight  of  shell.  Weight  of  shot. 

One  150-pounder  rifle,  pivot 146  pounds 150  pounds. 

One  50          "          "         "    40       "      50       " 

Two  11-inch  "         "    each  136      "      each  166       " 

Four  9     "    broadside  "      73      "      "       90      " 

Weight  of  broadside shell  622      "  . .  shot  712       " 


If  this  battery  is  compared  with  that  of  vessels  of  an  earlier 
date,  it  will  be  seen  to  be  a  very  formidable  one  ;  and  such  an 
American  war-ship,  armed  with  such  guns,  placed  alongside  a 
frigate  or  line-of-battle  ship  built  in  the  early  part  of  the  eigh 
teenth  century,  is  shown  to  be  a  new  creation,  the  product  of  a 
new  idea.  The  progress  of  what  may  be  called  American  ideas 
in  the  form  and  armament  of  vessels  is  very  clearly  shown  by 
a  comparison  between  the  old  frigate  Constitution  and  the 
Lackawanna.  In  two  points  they  admit  of  this  comparison,  their 
tonnage  and  the  weight  of  their  broadside.  The  Constitution 
measured  about  1,500  tons,  the  Lackawanna  1,533  tons.  The 
broadside  of  the  Constitution  weighed  Y68  pounds,  while  that 
of  the  Lackawanna  weighs  712  pounds.  In  burden  and  broad 
side,  therefore,  the  two  ships  are  nearly  the  same.  But  here 
the  resemblance  ends.  The  length  of  the  old  frigate  was  175 
feet,  that  of  the  new  steam-sloop  237  feet ;  the  breadth  of  the 
Constitution  was  43  feet,  6  inches,  that  of  the  Lackawanna  is  38 
feet.  So  that  while  the  modern  vessel  is  5  feet  narrower  than 
the  pride  of  the  old  Navy  ("  Old  Ironsides  ")  was,  she  is,  at  the 
same  time,  62  feet  longer.  These  facts  exhibit  with  great 
clearness  the  direction  in  which  American  thought  has  been 
working,  and  it  will  soon  be  shown  that  the  limit  was  not 
reached  with  the  Lackawanna  class  of  steamers. 

But  it  is  in  the  armament  that  the  American  peculiarity  is 
presented  with  greatest  boldness.  Scarcely  a  trace  remains  of  the 
old  ideas  in  the  battery  of  the  Lackawanna.  Europe  had  never 
before  seen  such  an  armament.  The  new  steam-sloop,  with 
only  eight  guns,  throws  about  the  same  weight  of  metal  that 
the  Constitution  did  with  her  fifty  guns.  The  heaviest  guns  of 
the  Constitution  were  32-pounders,  the  lightest  gun  of  the 
Lackawanna  was  in  1863  a  50-pounder;  the  broadside  guns 
were  90-pounders ;  then  there  was  one  150-pounder  rifle,  and 
last,  two  166-pounder  pivot-guns.  To  this  must  be  added  the 


132  HISTOKY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

important  fact  that  these  were  also  shell-guns.  Such  a  ship 
would  demolish  an  old  100-gun  ship  almost  at  a  broadside. 
The  speed  of  these  new  ships  was  such  as  to  vindicate  both  the 
wisdom  of  the  Department  in  deciding  upon  their  model  and 
the  skill  and  faithfulness  of  those  by  whom  the  hulls  and  the 
engines  were  built.  The  swiftest  steamers  that  England  could 
produce,  when  aiming  only  at  speed,  and  carrying  no  battery, 
could  seldom  escape  these  new  war-steamers,  if  the  blockade- 
runner  could  be  seen  early  enough  in  the  day  to  permit  a  few 
hours'  chase  before  it  was  dark. 

The  idea  so  prevalent,  that  our  war-vessels  were  slow  com 
pared  with  the  ships  of  England  and  France,  had  no  foundation 
in  fact.  The  contrary,  indeed,  was  true.  As  an  illustration  of 
this,  the  writer  was  informed  by  Admiral  Farragut  that  the 
main  difficulty  was,  not  that  the  English  steamers  were  faster 
than  our  own,  but  to  get  sight  of  a  blockade-runner  long 
enough  before  night  or  far  enough  from  a  port  to  allow  a  chase. 
In  confirmation  of  this  fact,  he  related  the  following  incident : 
A  new  blockade-runner  had  been  built  by  Englishmen  and  sent 
out,  which  was  said  to  have  uncommon  speed.  An  English 
officer  said  to  Admiral  Farragut  that  she  could  make  twenty 
miles  per  hour.  The  admiral  expressed  his  doubts  of  this,  and 
also  his  belief  that  he  would  capture  this  British  racer. 

Shortly  after,  it  was  ascertained  that  this  new  neutral  trader 
would  soon  be  on  our  coast,  and  the  captain  of  one  of  our  gun 
boats  asked  permission  of  the  admiral  to  take  two  guns  out  of 
his  ship  and  go  in  pursuit  of  her.  He  was  told  to  take  ouifour 
guns.  He  did  so,  and  stationed  himself  in  her  supposed  track. 
He  was  soon  fortunate  enough  to  get  sight  of  her  under  favor 
able  circumstances,  and  after  a  chase  of  a  few  hours  this 
pride  and  hope  of  the  English  builders  and  merchants  was  over 
hauled  and  captured  by  a  Yankee  gunboat. 

At  the  very  time  when  the  impression  was  spread  through 
the  country  that  our  Navy  consisted  only  of  slow  and  almost 
worthless  ships,  we  had  some  of  the  fastest  war-vessels  afloat. 
In  order  fully  to  present  the  main  features  of  the  policy  of  the 
Department,  it  is  necessary  so  far  to  anticipate  the  history  of  the 
iron-clads  as  to  mention  the  attempt  to  construct  a  fleet  of  light- 
draught  Monitors  for  service  on  the  Southern  rivers,  inlets,  and 


CONSTRUCTION    OF   NEW  VESSELS.  133 

sounds.  After  our  Navy  began  its  operations  in  the  bays  and 
estuaries  of  the  South,  and  in  the  narrow  and  extremely  crooked 
channels  of  its  rivers,  it  was  soon  found  that  the  light  gunboats, 
which  alone  could  navigate  those  waters,  were  unable  to  resist 
the  forts  and  even  the  heavy  field-batteries  so  easily  planted 
along  the  shores,  and  which  could  also  be  readily  transferred 
from  point  to  point.  How  to  meet  this  difficulty  was  a  very 
serious  question,  for  unless  the  Government  could  command 
these  inlets,  bays,  and  rivers,  the  rebellion  could  not  be  sub 
dued,  for  the  communications  of  the  Army  could  not  be  kept 
open,  and  the  country,  therefore,  could  not  be  occupied. 

After  much  anxious  deliberation  in  regard  to  experiments 
in  an  unknown  field,  it  was  decided  to  try  a  class  of  vessels 
which  had  never  been  used,  the  light-draught  Monitors.  It  was 
very  clearly  seen  that  if  they  should  prove  a  success,  they  would 
meet  the  exact  want  of  the  Government,  and  it  was  thought 

'  O 

wise  that  the  trial  should  be  made.  The  result  of  this  experi 
ment  will  be  stated  hereafter.  It  has  been  mentioned  here 
merely  to  show  that  the  Navy  Department  kept  a  watchful  eye 
upon  every  feature  of  the  contest,  and  was  ever  on  the  alert, 
anxiously  considering  what  means  were  best  adapted  to  meet 
the  wants  of  the  hour.  It  was  constantly  called  upon  to  meet 
exigencies  before  unknown  in  naval  war.  New  weapons  were 
employed  by  the  rebels,  and  new  methods  of  attack.  These 
novelties  of  war  the  Department  was  obliged  to  meet  with  new 
inventions  of  its  own,  and  it  would  be  passing  strange  if  no 
mistakes  had  been  made.  But  the  difficulties  and  dangers  which 
pressed  upon  the  Department  through  the  conspiracy  at  home, 
various  and  formidable  as  these  were,  were  by  no  means  the 
only  ones  against  which  it  was  necessary  to  guard.  The  un 
friendly  and  threatening  attitude  assumed  and  held  by  England, 
the  presence  of  France  in  Mexico,  and  the  intentions  avowed  by 
the  emperor,  showed  conclusively  that  our  only  security  against 
foreign  war  would  be  not  alone  the  power  to  defend  our  coast, 
but  to  make  a  successful  attack  upon  a  foe.  It  was  evident  that 
in  case  of  a  war  with  France,  or  England,  or  both,  though  we 
might  with  our  iron-clads  defend  our  coast  from  the  combined 
attack,  yet,  if  we  had  no  powerful  ocean  cruisers  with  which  to 
destroy  their  commerce  or  threaten  them  at  home,  that  our 


134  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

coast  might  be  virtually  blockaded  by  their  fleets  and  our  com 
merce  destroyed,  while  their  own  merchant-ships  would  be 
safely  employed  on  every  sea. 

In  attempting  to  provide  against  this  danger,  a  very  serious 
obstacle  presented  itself.  It  was  evident  that  such  cruisers  as 
would  be  needed  must  be  steamers  with  the  highest  possible 
rate  of  speed.  This  would  of  course  require  a  large  consump 
tion  of  coal,  so  large  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  carry  a  supply 
for  a  long  cruise.  But  the  United  States  had  not  a  single  coal 
ing  station  outside  of  their  own  home  territory.  England,  on 
the  contrary,  has  such  stations  on  almost  every  coast,  in  nearly 
every  sea.  In  extending,  perfecting,  and  securing  her  commer 
cial  system  and  a  secure  basis  for  her  naval  operations,  she  has 
shown  a  matchless  sagacity  and  statesmanship ;  and  so  far  as 
human  wisdom  could  do  it,  she  has  provided  in  this  respect 
against  every  exigency  of  the  future.  In  every  part  of  the 
world  her  steam-cruisers  are  within  proper  distance  of  the 
needed  supplies,  and,  making  .only  short  voyages,  they  can 
traverse  every  sea.  In  every  naval  contest,  therefore,  she  would 
have  facilities  which  would  give  her  immense  advantages  over 
every  other  nation,  but  especially  over  one  like  ourselves,  having 
no  depots  for  coal  except  at  home.  It  was  clear  that  in  a  war 
with  England  and  France  they  might  exclude  us  from  all  or 
nearly  all  the  coal  stations  in  the  world,  outside  of  our  own 
territory,  and  confine  us  at  home  as  effectually  as  if  we  had 
no  Navy. 

The  enterprise  and  energy  which  characterized  the  Depart 
ment  during  the  whole  war  enabled  it  to  provide  for  these  new 
dangers,  while  sorely  pressed  by  the  difficulties  and  burdens  of 
the  rebellion.  It  decided  to  lay  down  an  entirely  new  class  of 
ships,  of  which  the  Wampanoag  may  be  regarded  as  a  type. 
This  vessel  is  335  feet  long  and  45  feet  in  breadth,  and  her 
measurement  is  3,200  tons.  It  was  not  intended  that  these  ves 
sels  should  be  overloaded  with  a  battery.  Their  armament 
consists  of  a  few  heavy  guns.  They  are  full  ship-rigged,  their 
capacity  for  carrying  coal  is  great  in  proportion  to  their  size, 
and  under  either  sail  or  steam  they  were  expected  to  make  at 
least  fifteen  knots  per  hour.  Up  to  the  time  of  the  close  of  the 
war,  these  ships  were  the  latest  expression  of  American  thought 


CONSTRUCTION   OF   NEW  VESSELS.  135 

for  an  ocean  cruise,  to  meet  our  difficulties  and  our  wants  in 
case  of  a  foreign  war. 

There  are  several  features  of  these  steamers  which  are 
worthy  of  attention,  as  showing  how  the  minds  of  our  naval 
constructors  were  still  working  in  the  same  general  direction 
already  indicated,  with  only  such  variations  as  special  circum 
stances  required.  The  "YVampanoag  is  nearly  twice  the  length 
of  the  frigates  of  1812,  such  as  the  Constitution,  while  her 
breadth  is  about  the  same,  a  very  remarkable  change  in  model. 
Again,  she  is  fifteen  feet  longer  than  the  Niagara,  and  ten  feet 
narrower ;  and  although  she  is  longer  than  the  Niagara,  yet  her 
burden  is  less  by  1,380  tons,  according  to  the  old  measurement. 

The  peculiarities  of  these  ships  are  obvious ;  their  spread  of 
canvas  is  enormous,  and  this,  with  their  great  length  and  com 
parative  narrowness  of  beam,  gives  them  the  utmost  speed  at 
tainable  by  vessels  under  sail.  At  the  same  time,  instead  of 
the  weight  of  a  full  battery,  they  carry  the  most  powerful  en 
gines  that  even  their  immense  hulls  can  bear,  and  have  there 
fore  the  maximum  speed  which  any  ocean  steamer  has  yet  at 
tained.  Their  few  heavy  guns  and  the  rapidity  of  their  move 
ment  enable  them  to  cope  with  any  wooden  ship,  if  they  choose 
to  risk  a  battle,  and  they  are  fleet  enough  to  avoid  a  conflict 
when  they  do  not  desire  a  fight. 

In  case  of  a  war  with  England  it  is  quite  easy  to  see  what 
the  proper  work  of  such  cruisers  would  be.  It  would  not  be  to 
fight  the  British  Navy,  for  we  have  other  ships  better  fitted  for 
that  work.  It  would  not  be  their  province  to  defend  our  coast 
and  seaboard  cities,  for  that  can  be  done  effectually  by  our  iron 
clads.  But  let  one  of  these  enormous  sea-racers  take  in  a  full 
supply  of  coal,  and  then  using  her  engines  only  when  abso 
lutely  necessary,  cross  the  ocean  under  sail  and  place  herself  on 
one  of  the  highways  of  British  commerce,  prepared  there  to  use 
steam  or  sails  as  might  best  suit  her  purpose,  who  can  measure 
the  havoc  she  would  make.  Suppose  thirty  such  were  scattered 
over  the  seas,  how  long  would  the  merchant  marine  of  England 
remain  afloat  ?  Such  are  the  formidable  weapons  which  Great 
Britain  by  her  unfriendly  and  deceitful  course  has  prepared 
against  herself  whenever  the  occasion  comes.  Compared  with 
what  these  new  American  steamers  are  able  to  do,  her  Ala- 


136  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

bamas,  and  Floridas,  and  Shenandoahs  are  very  harmless  ships, 
and  in  a  war  with  America  now,  any  foreign  nation  would  meet 
such  powers  for  destruction  as  Europe  has  never  yet  encountered. 
Thus  in  the  midst  of  the  pressing  demands  of  the  war  at  home, 
the  nation  was  also  prepared  for  a  foreign  war,  if  that  also 
should  come. 

Leaving  the  discussion  of  the  question  of  the  iron-clads, 
whether  of  the  Monitor  class  or  those  peculiar  ones  designed  for 
the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  for  future  consideration,  it 
will  be  useful  to  review  very  briefly  the  measures  adopted  by 
the  Navy  Department  for  the  defence  of  the  country  and  the 
suppression  of  the  rebellion.  Without  ships,  or  guns,  or  seamen, 
or  even  suitable  materials,  or  workshops  for  building,  the  Secre 
tary,  in  the  first  weeks  even  of  his  administration,  was  called 
upon  to  make  effectual  a  blockade  declared  for  a  coast-line  three 
thousand  five  hundred  miles  in  extent,  besides  inner  coast-lines 
and  inlets,  a  task  which  neither  England  nor  France,  with  their 
immense  navies,  had  ever  thought  of  attempting,  which  they 
declared  impossible,  the  very  idea  of  which  was  laughed  to 
scorn  by  many  of  those  who  were  thought  to  be  the  best  judges 
of  maritime  affairs.  The  Department  was  required  to  execute 
without  means  the  boldest  conception  of  modern  warfare. 

To  accomplish  this  it  was  necessary,  first  of  all,  to  use  the 
Secretary's  own  language,  "  to  make  available  every  naval  ves 
sel,  to  recall  our  foreign  squadron,  to  increase  our  force  by  build 
ing  new  vessels  and  by  procuring  for  naval  purposes  from  the 
merchant  service  every  steamer  which  could  be  made  a  fighting 
vessel,  to  enlarge  at  once  the  capacity  of  the  navy-yards,  to  put 
in  requisition  the  founderies  and  the  workshops  of  the  country 
for  supplies  of  ordnance  and  steam  machinery,  to  augment  the 
number  of  seamen,  and  to  supply  the  deficiency  of  officers  by  se 
lecting  experienced  and  able  shipmasters  and  others  from  the 
commercial  marine."  After  providing  for  the  purchase  of  every 
available  ship,  it  was  found  that  the  peculiar  character  of  the 
Southern  coast  required  a  new  class  of  steamers :  and  accordino*- 

1  *   "U 

ly,  without  even  waiting  for  the  action  of  Congress,  such  was 
the  emergency,  that  the  twenty-three  small  vessels  were  con 
tracted  for  which  were  intended  for  service  on  the  Southern 
rivers,  inlets,  and  sounds,  to  search  out  and  break  up  the  secret 


CONSTRUCTION   OF   NEW  VESSELS.  137 

depots  of  trade  with  the  blockade-runners,  which  new  centres 
of  business  had  been  established  on  the  shallow  waters  within 
the  outer  coast-line.  To  give  the  reader  an  idea  of  these  con 
cealed  but  busy  spots,  and  to  show  the  need  of  light-draught 
gunboats  to  discover  them,  the  following  extract  from  the  letter 
of  an  Englishman  is  inserted,  giving  an  account  of  his  visit  to 
such  an  inland  post  in  the  vicinity  of  Charleston  :  "  Embarking 
with  the  mystery  of  a  conspirator  on  board  a  small  steam-tug 
laden  with  the  most  explosive  and  combustible  goods,  this  wit 
ness  for  the  press  is  carried  down  the  dreary  estuary  of  the 
Ashley  and  Cooper  Rivers,  passing  a  few  dark  and  rakish  pri 
vateers,  and  one  or  two  unfinished  ships  intended  for  the  Con 
federate  Navy.  Steaming  boldly  for  the  open  sea,  he  and  liis 
friend  glide  by  Forts  Sumter  and  Moultrie,  which,  together  with 
the  new  earthworks  and  batteries  on  shore,  appear  to  make  of 
Charleston  a  miniature  Cronstadt.  Creeping  along  the  coast 
with  their  hearts  ill  at  ease,  for  the  lights  of  the  blockading 
frigate  shine  at  no  great  distance,  and  the  breakers  are  unpleas 
antly  near,  the  adventurous  voyagers  at  length  get  into  quiet 
water  in  a  narrow  sound  between  a  low,  reedy  islet  and  the 
mainland.  They  make  but  slow  progress,  for  the  tug  has  a 
couple  of  scows  in  tow,  with  heavy  cargoes  of  cotton  and  tur 
pentine,  and  the  channel  being  of  no  great  depth,  these  are 
sticking  constantly  hard  and  fast  upon  sand-banks.  There  shoot 
forth,  however,  from  secluded  creeks  and  inlets,  lurking  boats, 
by  the  aid  of  which  the  tug  is  sent  forward  before  the  unfriend 
ly  dawn  can  reveal  her  position  to  the  Federal  man-of-war. 
The  little  expedition  thus  reaches  in  safety  the  secluded  spot 
where  the  unconquerable  genius  of  trade  has  opened  a  new  out 
let  for  the  produce  of  the  South." 

The  scene  is  thus  described  :  "  It  was  broad  daylight  when 
we  emerged  from  this  reed-fringed  creek  upon  a  space  of  open 
water,  skirted  by  broad  rice-fields,  dotted  here  and  there  with 
square,  antiquated  houses  and  contiguous  collections  of  negro 
huts.  But  rebellion  had  made  this  quiet  bay  a  busy  focus  of 
industry ;  and  as  we  panted  up  to  a  new  wharf,  along  and  near 
which  twenty-six  vessels  were  lying,  and  I  saw  the  desperate 
traffic  carried  on  in  utter  defiance  of  the  blockade,  I  gave  the 
Southerners  credit  for  greater  energy  than  I  had  believed  pos- 


138  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES    NAVY. 

sible.  Among  the  ships  I  observed  the  notorious  privateer 
Sumter,  which  had  arrived  the  day  before  with  a  prize  laden 
with  valuable  silks  and  wines,  two  other  privateers,  and  a  cap 
tured  Boston  clipper,  which  was  being  cut  down  and  pierced 
for  guns.  The  other  vessels  were  either  prizes  or  merchantmen, 
owned  in  Liverpool  or  New  York,  which,  having  brought  in 
cargoes  of  foreign  goods  and  munitions  of  war,  were  being  load 
ed  with  rice,  cotton,  and  turpentine.  Nearly  all  the  cotton,  it 
was  stated,  would  find  its  way  to  New  England.  Five  ships,  I 
was  told,  had  sailed  through  the  night.  It  was  from  this  har 
bor  that  Mr.  Slidell  and  his  friends  sailed  for  Cuba,  on  their 
way  to  Europe,  and  until  its  whereabouts  is  discovered,  and  the 
mouths  of  these  inlets  effectually  closed  with  stones  and  sunken 
lighters,  the  blockade  is  a  mere  sham,  and  the  trade  with 
Charleston  virtually  opened." 

In  the  course  of  a  tour  through  the  adjoining  States,  the 
special  correspondent  found  other  ports  where  a  thriving  import 
and  export  business  appeared  to  be  carried  on  without  the  slight 
est  concealment  or  chance  of  interruption.  At  Wilmington, 
North  Carolina,  no  hostile  squadron  had  ever  troubled  the  re 
pose  of  the  prosperous  and  contented  merchants,  the  embou 
chure  of  Cape  Fear  River  having  apparently  been  overlooked 
by  the  official  geographers  of  Washington. 

This  work  provided  for,  the  next  step  was  to  increase  the 
number  of  steamers  which  could  keep  the  open  sea  as  block- 
aders,  and  which  should  be  equal  in  speed  to  the  illicit  traders 
of  England,  and  be  able  to  follow  the  pirates  which  she  had 
fitted  out  in  her  ports.  The  wisdom  and  success  of  this  move 
ment  were  both  shown  by  the  result.  By  these  new  vessels  the 
swiftest  steamers  that  England  could  produce  were  caught,  and 
by  one  of  them  the  Alabama  was  destroyed. 

The  next  difficulty  was  the  one  encountered  by  the  screw 
gunboats  in  attacking  forts  and  batteries  in  the  narrow,  winding 
channels  of  the  inlets  and  rivers,  in  positions  where  they  could 
not  turn,  and  not  being  able  to  back,  were  sometimes  exposed, 
almost  helpless,  to  the  enemy's  fire.  To  obviate  this  the  De 
partment  contrived  the  novel  ships  called  the  "  double-enders," 
side-wheel  steamers,  built  with  both  ends  alike,  and  therefore 
capable  of  going  either  way ;  vessels  of  great  speed,  and  an- 


CONSTRUCTION   OF   NEW  VESSELS.  139 

swering  in  every  essential  particular  the  original  purpose. 
Still  it  was  found  impracticable  to  command  those  shallow 
waters  and  narrow  channels  by  wooden  vessels  only,  because 
they  were  constantly  exposed  to  the  fire  of  forts  and  batteries  at 
so  short  range  as  greatly  to  endanger  them.  For  this  exposure 
the  light-draught  Monitors  were  designed ;  and  but  for  a  mis 
take  in  the  drawings,  which  the  Department  certainly  could  not 
foresee,  and  for  which  it  is  only  indirectly  responsible,  they 
would  have  proved  a  most  valuable  addition  to  the  Navy  at 
that  time.  The  plan  devised  was  a  proper  one,  the  principal 
drawings  were  correct ;  but  in  the  details  a  mistake  was  made 
which  could  not  be  detected  until  too  late  to  be  remedied. 

Having  thus  provided  for  the  dangers  of  the  rebellion,  the 
Department,  as  has  just  been  shown,  began  the  construc 
tion  of  those  immense  and  swift  steamers  which,  in  case  of  a 
foreign  war,  could  sweep  the  commerce  of  an  enemy  from  the 
sea.  Add  to  these  statements  the  actual  increase  of  the  Navy 
as  exhibited  by  the  Secretary's  reports,  and  together  they  pre 
sent  in  the  most  convincing  manner  the  skill,  enterprise,  and 
power  with  which  this  branch  of  the  Government  was  con 
ducted.  In  no  case  was  the  honor  of  the  nation  compromised, 
and  Europe  has  not  withheld  its  praise  of  its  boldness  of  con 
ception  and  the  energy  of  its  execution. 

In  the  commencement  of  the  struggle  the  number  of  seamen 
available  at  all  our  naval  stations  was  about  two  hundred,  ac 
cording  to  the  Secretary's  report,  and  the  ships  then  in  com 
mission,  including  the  sailing  vessels,  were  42  ;  on  July  4, 1861, 
82  ;  December,  1861,  264  ;  December  1,  1862,  42T  ;  December 
7,  1863,  588  ;  December,  1864,  671. 

The  increase  of  the  number  of  seamen  was  of  course  in  pro 
portion  to  the  growth  of  the  Navy,  and  it  was  a  matter  of  no 
small  difficulty  to  procure  promptly  crews  for  so  large  a  number 
of  ships,  when  the  land  service  was  making  such  frequent 
and  sweeping  requisitions  upon  the  able-bodied  men  of  the 
country. 

In  this  short  review  only  a  single  feature  of  the  work  of 
the  Navy  Department  has  been  presented — the  increase  of  our 
wooden  ships.  These,  however,  formed  only  a  part  of  the  forces 
which  were  almost  literally  created  for  the  service  of  the  coun- 


140  HISTORY   OF   THE   UKITED   STATES   NAVY. 

try.  The  iron-clad  Navy,  both  for  the  eastern  waters  and  for 
the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries,  upon  which  the  contest 
actually  hinged,  and  the  new  heavy  guns,  without  which  even 
the  invulnerable  ship  is  comparatively  of  small  value,  these  are 
yet  to  be  considered  as  a  most  important  work  undertaken  and 
performed,  amid  difficulties  and  doubts  and  serious  opposition, 
not  from  the  ignorant  alone,  but  from  scientific  and  experienced 
men.  And  when  these  mighty  and  novel  instruments  were  all 
ready,  then  began  a  labor  still  more  difficult  than  the  purchase 
or  construction  of  ships  or  the  casting  of  cannon.  It  certainly 
required  administrative  ability  of  the  very  highest  order  so  to 
employ  the  various  enginery  of  war  on  all  the  wide  and  diver 
sified  field  of  action,  demanding  at  once  such  different  labors  as 
to  insure  success  in  each  important  movement,  and  at  the  same 
time  cause  all  to  tend  steadily  toward  the  one  important  end. 
The  history,  as  it  proceeds,  will  show  whether  this  was  done. 


CHAPTEK  XL 

THE    IRON-CLAD    NAVY. 

IN  order  to  complete,  in  one  view,  the  general  policy  and 
chief  measures  of  the  Navy  Department,  it  is  necessary  to  pre 
sent  the  important  subject  of  armored  vessels,  and  the  various 
forms  of  iron-clad  ships  prepared  or  adopted  here  and  in  Eu 
rope.  There  are  no  means  of  judging  whether  the  interests  of 
the  country  were  committed  to  proper  hands,  whether  the  De 
partment  was  prudently  bold  or  rashly  adventurous,  except  by 
studying  first  the  exigencies  of  the  case,  and  then  the  question 
of  armored  ships  as  it  was  viewed  by  men  of  science  and  nauti 
cal  skill  both  here  and  in  Europe. 

The  main  features  of  the  country's  necessity  are  easily  un 
derstood.  It  is  well  known  that  the  rebels,  by  European  credit, 
sympathy,  and  aid,  and  by  the  sale  of  large  amounts  of  cotton 
which  at  first  they  could  ship  in  spite  of  the  blockade,  were 
enabled  to  begin  very  early  in  the  contest  a  navy  on  a  formi 
dable  scale,  and  in  this  movement  they  acted  under  the  best 
advice  that  England  and  France  were  able  to  give.  They 
turned  their  attention  exclusively  to  iron-clad  ships.  They  rea 
soned  in  this  manner  :  "  There  is  no  fortification  on  the  North 
ern  seaboard  which  a  well-constructed  armored  ship  may  not 
pass  with  impunity,  and  if  we  can  got  one  such  vessel  afloat  be 
fore  the  North  can  build  one,  the  Northern  cities,  Washington 
included,  will  be  at  our  mercy ;  we  can  break  the  blockade  at 
any  point,  and  we  can  drive  oft',  or  capture,  or  destroy  the  whole 
Union  fleet.  At  the  worst,  with  the  help  of  our  English  and 
French  friends,  we  can  build  such  ships  as  rapidly  as  the  North 
can,  and  we  shall  at  least  be  upon  an  equality  with  them  even 


142  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

upon  the  sea."  Arguing  from  all  the  facts  then  known  the  rea 
soning  was  correct,  and  they  acted  upon  it  writh  promptitude 
and  energy.  They  availed  themselves  of  all  the  experience  and 
skill  of  Europe,  and  adopted  the  latest  new  suggestion,  which 
in  the  opinion  of  many  in  England  promised  important  results  ; 
which  idea  was  to  cover  the  deck  with  a  roof  of  shot-proof 
armor,  and  extend  it  downward  so  far  into  the  water  as  to  pro 
tect  the  hull  below.  Such  armor  forms  an  angle  at  or  near 
the  water-line,  so  that  a  shot  striking  above  the  angle  would 
glance  upward,  and  would  be  turned  downward  should  it  hit 
below. 

Unfortunately  for  the  Union  cause,  the  pusillanimous  burn 
ing  and  desertion  of  the  navy-yard  at  Norfolk  placed  in  the 
hands  of  the  rebel  Government  a  ship  admirably  fitted  for  the 
purpose.  Without  entering  here  into  details  which  belong 
properly  to  another  place,  it  is  sufficient  to  state  that  one  of  our 
largest  and  finest  frigates,  the  Merrimack,  a  ship  of  about  three 
thousand  two  hundred  tons'  burden,  was  so  sunk  when  the  yard 
was  abandoned  that  the  rebels  raised  her  with  very  little  dif 
ficulty,  and  found  her  almost  uninjured. 

They  immediately  began  to  prepare  her  to  receive  the  roof- 
shaped  armor,  and  supplied  by  their  English  friends  with  all 
necessary  material,  they  soon  had  the  vessel  in  such  a  state  of 
forwardness  as  rendered  it  quite  probable  that  she  would  be 
ready  for  service  before  any  thing  could  be  prepared  to  meet 
her.  It  was  well  known  that  the  Merrimack  was  one  of  the  very 
best  ships  in  the  Navy,  and  it  was  but  too  evident  that  if  she 
should  come  out  cased  in  shot-proof  mail,  when  there  would  be 
nothing  to  meet  her  but  wooden  vessels,  that  the  effect  upon 
our  cause  would  be  well  nigh,  if  not  entirely,  fatal.  No  one 
could  presume  to  measure  aright  the  havoc  which  such  an  ar 
mored  frigate  would  make  with  our  Navy  or  our  seaboard 
cities.  The  danger  was  great  and  pressing,  requiring  not  only 
prompt  and  decisive  action,  but  it  was  essential  that  no  mistake 
should  be  made,  for  failure  would  give  almost  certain  success 
to  the  rebel  cause. 

The  plan  of  the  enemy  had  been  matured  earlier  than 
our  own,  and  they  were  ready  for  action  the  moment  the  navy- 
yard  was  in  their  possession.  With  the  English  workshops  at 


THE   IKON-CLAD   NAVY.  143 

their  service,  and  with  a  power  at  their  head  that  worked  di 
rectly  when  necessary,  and  without  much  incumbrance  from 
legal  formalities,  their  preparations  were  urged  on  with  far 
greater  rapidity  than  was  possible  in  our  own  Navy  Depart 
ment,  where  every  step  was  very  properly  subjected  to  Congres 
sional  scrutiny  and  authority,  at  a  time  too  when  the  country 
could  not  know  its  peril,  and  when  little  or  no  interest  was 
generally  felt  in  armored  ships  because  so  little  was  known. 

It  was  evidently  of  vital  importance  either  to  destroy  the 
Merrimack  where  she  was,  or  capture  her  before  she  could  leave 
Hampton  Roads,  but  to  recapture  the  navy-yard  was  at  that 
time  beyond  the  power  of  the  Government ;  it  had  not  an  iron 
clad  ship,  and  to  construct  one  of  any  form  then  known,  of 
sufficient  size  and  force  to  cope  with  the  rebel  frigate,  was  the 
work  not  of  months  but  of  years.  Two  very  perplexing  ques 
tions  were  then  presented  :  Is  the  Merrimack  too  formidable  to 
be  captured  or  crippled  by  wooden  ships  ?  and  if  she  can  be 
met  only  by  an  iron- clad,  then  how  is  the  suitably  armored  ves 
sel  to  be  obtained  in  season  ?  Upon  these  points  very  little  satis 
factory  information  could  be  obtained.  England  and  France  had 
each  constructed  one  or  more  armored  ships,  and  others  were  in 
process  of  building,  but  these  were  all  broadside  vessels,  and  the 
question  whether  such  ships  were  really  available  for  naval  war 
was  still  being  warmly  discussed  in  Europe.  The  following  ex 
tracts  from  a  work  on  "  Iron  Defences,"  by  General  Sir  Howard 
Douglas,  published  in  1861,  will  show  how  the  subject  of  iron 
clad  vessels  was  viewed  by  some  distinguished  thinkers  in 
Europe :  "  A  very  able  and  distinguished  French  officer,  M. 
Richild  Grivel,  a  great  admirer  and  advocate  of  the  Emperor 
Louis  Napoleon's  floating  batteries,  constructed  for  the  attack 
of  forts  and  fortresses  and  other  special  purposes  in  inland  seas, 
condemns,  in  no  measured  terms,  the  notion  of  the  possibility 
of  using  them  in  ocean  fleets  as  substitutes  for  line-of-battle 
ships.  Admitting  fully  the  advantage  of  floating  batteries, 
gunboats,  and  other  vessels  of  light  draught  of  water  for  the 
special  service  above  stated,  he  has  well  said  that  to  dominant 
fleets  of  line-of-battle  ships,  the  true  representatives  of  naval 
power  for  service  in  the  open  sea,  will  always  belong  the  sov 
ereignty  of  the  ocean  ;  and  that  the  nation  that  would  renounce 


144  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

these  true  representatives  of  naval  power  by  constituting  their 
fleets  of  comparatively  small  ships  adapted  only  to  services 
purely  special,  would  be  infallibly  erased  from  the  category  of 
first-rate  naval  powers." 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  distinguished  French  officer  assumed  it 
as  a  conceded  fact  that  it  was  impossible  to  construct  an  armored 
battery  that  should  answer  the  double  purpose  of  a  shot-proof 
vessel  and  an  ocean  cruiser.  This  was  also  the  opinion  of  many 
in  England.  In  remarking  upon  this  opinion  of  the  French  officer, 
Sir  Howard  Douglas  goes  on  to  say:  "If  we  should  be  so  infat 
uated  as  to  commence  forthwith  the  construction  of  our  Navy  on 
such  a  principle,  England  would  surely  ere  long  be  erased  from  the 
category  of  first-rate  maritime  powers,  and  lose  the  empire  of 
the  seas.  Such  really  has  been  the  delusion  in  the  case  of  La 
Gloire ;  such  the  panic  upon  the  mere  appearance  on  the  sea 
of  that  solitary  frigate,  and  she  a  failure,  that  I  should  not  be 
surprised  when  that  delusion  shall  have  been  dispelled,  and  it  is 
passing  now,  if  it  were  spoken  of  as  in  the  days  of  the  Warner 
hoax.  I  am  quite  sure  that  as  much  nonsense,  deceit,  decep 
tion,  and  credulity  are  exhibited  in  the  one  as  there  were  in  the 
other.  But  though  I  know  that  La  Gloire  is  a  failure  in  speed, 
and  in  all  the  qualities  required  in  a  sea-going  ship,  yet  the  public 
mind  has  been  brought  to  such  a  state  of  fever  and  delusion  on 
this  subject,  that  I  will  allow  that  the  Government  is  perhaps 
right  in  laying  down  other  such  monsters  before  the  Warrior, 
the  Black  Prince,  and  the  Defiance  are  launched,  and  have  been 
tried." 

In  another  part  of  the  same  work,  Sir  Howard  Douglas 
thus  refers  to  opinions  then  prevailing  in  the  United  States : 
"  Although  the  naval  force  of  the  United  States  has  been  in 
creased  by  the  addition  of  twenty  screw-steamers,  a  still  further 
increase  in  the  Navy  has  been  recommended  in  the  report  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  ISTavy •  but  no  iron-cased  vessel  is  built  or 
being  built,  nor  even  alluded  to  in  the  very  able  report  on  the 
increase  of  the  Navy,  nor  in  the  miscellaneous  observations  and 
contemplated  changes.  The  experiments  tried  in  the  United 
States  in  endeavoring  to  render  ships  proof  against  shot  by 
covering  their  sides  with  iron  plates  of  adequate  thickness 
having  proved  that  nothing  less  than  six  inches  will  suffice,  and 


THE   IRON-CLAD   NAVY.  145 

a  commission  of  naval  officers  having  deprecated  the  proposi 
tion  to  apply  naval  resources  to  coast  defences  in  the  form  of 
floating  batteries,  the  Government  of  the  United  States  are  sat 
isfied  as  to  the  futility  of  all  such  expedients,  and  probably  con 
sider  all  these  questions  definitely  settled." 

Another  extract  from  the  same  writer  will  show  another 
opinion  then  prevailing  among  scientific  naval  officers  in  regard 
to  the  question  whether  a  wooden  vessel  of  high  speed  could 
contend  successfully  with  a  slower  iron-clad  :  "  Metallic  protec 
tion  and  power  of  speed  are  antagonistic  qualities.  One  or 
other  of  these  must  be  sacrificed.  Which  of  them  should  be 
given  up  is  a  question  which  I  propose  to  examine  hereafter. 
In  the  mean  time  it  may  be  remarked  that  it  does  not  appear, 
upon  a  careful  review  of  improvements  and  changes  in  the  art 
of  war,  that  the  best  way  of  opposing  new  modes  or  means  in 
the  practice  of  war  is  to  imitate  those  innovations.  If  this  were 
so,  the  practice  of  war  would  not  have  altered,  as  we  see  in  a 
review  of  its  history.  It  would  rather  appear  that  improved 
science  seeks  to  counteract,  rather  than  to  imitate,  and  the 
question  arises  whether  this  might  not  be  successfully  done  in 
the  case  of  iron-sided  vessels,  which  must  necessarily  lose  speed. 
It  is,  therefore,  a  question,  whether  by  superior  speed,  and  a 
judicious  mixture  of  armament,  68-pounder  guns  on  the  main- 
deck,  and  Armstrong's  long-range  40-pounders  on  the  upper 
deck,  a  vessel  like  our  Mersey  might  not  be  capable  of  contend 
ing  with  such  a  ship  as  La  Gloire  with  her  speed  reduced  to  in 
feriority  by  the  heavy  armor  under  which  she  labors." 

Another  question  of  great  importance  is  thus  discussed  by  the 
same  distinguished  officer,  the  effect  of  shells  upon  wooden  ships : 
"  Reviewing  the  effects  produced  by  shells  on  the  ships  of  the 
allied  fleet  in  the  bombardment  of  the  17th  of  October,  1854,  at 
Sevastopol,  it  does  not  appear  that  the  effect  of  shells  was  so 
fatal  or  so  destructive  as  had  been  previously  imagined,  and  I 
confess  that  I  partook  of  the  belief  that  a  shell,  and  particularly 
a  time-fuse  shell  lodged,  and  then  exploding  in  a  ship,  could 
scarcely  fail  to  set  her  on  fire,  or  destroy  her.  But  from  the 
account  given  it  appears  that  all  the  ships  of  the  allied  fleet 
were  struck  and  penetrated  by  numerous  shells,  yet  no  ship 
was  destroyed,  none  l  converted  into  lucifer  matches.'  Four  or 
10 


146  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

five  times  fuse-shells  burst  on  board  the  Albion,  and  set  her  on 
fire  several  times.  The  Sanspareil,  London,  Albion,  and  several 
other  ships  were  penetrated  by  shells,  and  suffered  considerably 
in  their  hulls  from  shells  from  the  Telegraph  and  Wasp  bat 
teries.  The  London  was  three  times  on  fire  ;  the  Queen  forced 
to  retire,  having  been  set  on  fire  by  red-hot  shot.  The  Aga 
memnon  suffered  severely  from  the  enemies'  shells.  One  shell 
burst  on  the  main-deck  of  the  Arethusa,  and  carried  off  nearly 
the  whole  of  two  guns'  crews  ;  another  committed  great  injury 
on  the  lower  deck.  The  Yille  de  Paris  received  a  shell  which 
blew  away  a  part  of  her  poop-deck,  killing  and  wounding  a 
great  number  of  men.  She  received  forty-one  shot  and  shell 
in  her  hull,  and  nearly  as  many  in  her  masts  and  rigging  ;  but 
was  not  put  hors  du  combat,  though  she  was  set  on  fire  several 
times,  the  fire  being  promptly  extinguished." 

These  extracts  serve  to  show  the  views  of  a  large  class  of  in 
fluential  men  in  Europe  upon  three  important  points :  the  value 
of  armored  ships,  the  effects  of  shells  upon  vessels,  and  the 
question  whether  a  swift  wooden  ship  might  not  capture  a  slow 
iron-clad  battery  by  using  68-pounder  smooth-bore  guns  and  40- 
pounder  rifles.  Sir  Howard  and  his  friends  evidently  thought 
it  could  be  done.  His  treatise  was  published  about  the  time  of 
the  beginning  of  the  rebellion,  and  it  is  a  remarkable  example 
of  the  tenacity  with  which  men  cling  to  opinions  which  have 
long  swayed  the  public  thought,  of  the  stubbornness  with  which 
innovation  is  resisted,  and  of  the  blindness  which  prevents  men 
from  discerning  the  signs  of  the  times.  When  a  theory  in  re 
gard  to  any  important  subject  has  become  embedded  in  the 
thought  of  the  time,  and  when  it  shapes  some  important  depart 
ment  of  public  action,  so  that  any  change  involves  the  pride  of 
opinion,  and  would  affect  the  interest  of  capital  and  industry, 
such  a  theory  will  often  long  maintain  its  authority  after  it  has 
been  proved  false  both  by  reasoning  and  by  experiment.  The 
old  rulers  of  thought  and  practice  distrust,  or  perhaps  scorn  and 
ridicule,  the  new  men  and  their  speculations,  and  truth,  how 
ever  plain,  cannot,  for  a  time,  get  herself  recognized ;  and  the 
established  opinions,  and  all  the  related  interests,  struggle  hard 
to  maintain  their  position,  and  fact  and  reason  are  often  alike 
discarded.  It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  an  institution  so  vast 


THE   IKON-CLAD   NAVY. 

as  the  British  Navy,  whose  glory  and  interest  and  wide-reach 
ing  operations  were  interwoven  with  every  fibre  of  the  national 
life,  could  be  suddenly  revolutionized  without  violent  and  pro 
tracted  opposition.  As  a  class  the  members  of  the  Government, 
committed  to  things  as  they  were,  and  following  the  footsteps  of 
"  illustrious  predecessors,"  the  designers  and  builders  of  ships, 
the  inventors  and  makers  of  guns,  the  officers  who  had  sailed  and 
fought  the  old  vessels,  and  won  renown  and  station  on  their 
decks,  all  these  would  naturally  oppose  all  changes  which 
seemed  to  throw  any  discredit  upon  a  Navy  that  had  made 
England  the  mistress  of  the  seas. 

Had  not  prejudices  and  interests,  such  as  have  been  men 
tioned,  interposed  to  prevent  a  rational  conclusion,  Sir  Howard 
Douglas  would  probably  have  seen  that  the  effects  of  shell-firing 
upon  the  French  and  British  ships  at  Sevastopol,  almost  equally 
with  the  destruction  of  the  Turkish  fleet  at  Sinope,  proved  that 
no  wooden  vessel  can  long  resist  those  fearful  weapons,  es 
pecially  in  close-range  fighting.  He  did  not  think  proper  to 
state  whether,  in  his  opinion,  those  ships  of  the  allies  could  have 
endured  another  day's  fire  from  the  Kussian  fleet.  The  fact 
was,  that  the  attack  was  not  renewed. 

The  action  between  the  Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama  was  a 
much  more  decisive  test  of  the  destructive  power  of  shells  than 
that  at  Sinope  or  Sevastopol.  The  Alabama  was  an  English 
ship,  armed  with  English  guns,  and  manned  by  British  sea 
men  ;  and  in  a  brief  battle,  not  fought  at  short-  range,  she  was 
demolished  and  sunk  by  shells  from  our  11-inch  guns. 

Had  the  Alabama  been  a  line-of-battle  ship,  firing  only  solid 
shot  from  32-pounder  or  42-pounder  guns,  she  would  have  met 
the  same  fate.  In  regard  to  the  question  whether  a  swift 
wooden  ship  could  capture  a  slower  iron-clad,  we  need  only  the 
experience  of  our  American  battles  to  settle  it  in  the  most  con 
clusive  manner.  It  would  have  required  but  a  few  minutes  for 
the  Merrimack  to  destroy  the  most  powerful  wooden  ship  in  the 
world.  She  would  have  sunk  any  other  frigate,  or  even  a  100- 
gun  ship,  as  readily  as  she  did  the  Congress  and  Cumber 
land,  and  that  without  any  aid  from  her  prow.  A  swift  wooden 
ship  might  escape  from  a  slow  iron-clad,  but  to  engage  her,  if 
armed  with  heavy  shell-guns,  would  be  only  to  court  destruc- 


148  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

tion.     How  long  could  any  wooden  ship  endure  the  explosion 
of  15-inch  shells? 

But  these  questions  will  all  be  fully  answered  in  the  discus 
sions  in  another  chapter.     They  are  introduced  here  merely  to 
show  the  state  of  the  public  mind  in  Europe  when  our  war  be 
gan,  and  the  Government  was  called  upon  to  decide  upon  its 
means  of  defence.     When  a  large  and  influential  class  both  in 
France  and  England  were  clinging  tenaciously  to  the  wooden 
ship,  and  rejecting  the  idea  of  cannon  longer  than  those  then  in 
use,  it  showed  the  boldness  and  independence  of  the  American 
mind  that  both  parties  turned  at  once  to  iron-clads  as  the  chief 
means  of  attack  and  defence.    The  rebels,  as  a  matter  of  course, 
from   their   strong    sympathy  with   England,   turned   to   and 
adopted  her  ideas  and  plans,  with  such  alterations  as  the  latest 
experiments  had  suggested.    The  Merrimack,  which  early  in  the 
war  they  were  pushing  to  a  completion,  was  really  an  English 
iron-clad,  with  the  improvement  of  the  sloping  armor.     The 
problem  presented  to  the  ISTavy  Department  was  how  to  capture 
or  destroy  an  iron-clad  frigate,  which  represented  the  skill  and 
science  of  Europe,  and  in  general  how  to  prepare  to  meet  the 
iron-clad  navy  which  the  rebels  were  rapidly  getting  ready. 
The  true  position  of  our  own  !N~avy  Department  cannot  be 
clearly  seen ;  the  merit  or  demerit  of  its  course  cannot  be  justly 
weighed  without  giving  some  account  of  the  origin  of  the  idea 
of  plating  vessels  with  iron,  and  the  progress  which  the  inven 
tion  had  made  about  the  time  of  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion, 
and  then,  also,  the  peculiar  and  original  character  of  the  new 
American  iron-clads  will  distinctly  appear.     The  following  ex 
tract  from  Sir  Howard  Douglas's  work  (page  392)  will  give  the 
English  account  of  the  origin  of  this  invention  :  "  The  project 
of  covering  ships  with  iron  plates,  in  order  to  render  them  shot- 
proof,  was  suggested  many  years  since  by  Colonel  (the  late 
General)  Paixhans.     The  Comite  Consultatif  de  la  Marine  at 
that  time  having  caused  the  weight  of  an  iron  covering,  and  the 
capability  of  ships  to  bear  the  load  to  be  calculated,  found  that 
such  armor  could  not  be  applied  to  line-of-battle  ships  of  the 
lowest  class,  to  frigates,  nor  to  smaller  vessels. ,    With  respect  to 
ships  of  three  decks,  the   Comite  stated  in  its  report  that  the 
great  displacement  of  these  would  enable  them  to  bear  the  re- 


THE    IRON-CLAD   NAVY.  149 

quisite  weight,  provided  the  quantity  of  artillery  on  the  upper 
decks  were  diminished.  This  inquiry  led  however,  to  no  at 
tempt  in  France  to  cuirass  ships-of-war,  and  the  project  was 
at  that  time  abandoned,  apparently  as  impracticable.  A  pro 
posal  for  constructing  floating  batteries,  so  thick  as  to  be  shot- 
proof,  was  entertained  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
in  or  before  the  year  1852,  and  the  feasibility  of  the  proposition 
was  made  the  object  of  an  experiment ;  the  result  of  this  being 
unfavorable,  the  project  fell  to  the  ground." 

The  subjoined  extract  from  the  Scientific  American,  Feb 
ruary  7, 1863,  presents  an  American  account  of  the  same  inven 
tion  :  "  On  the  22d  ult,  Senator  Cowan,  of  Pennsylvania,  pre 
sented  a  petition  in  the  Senate  from  A.  Stewart,  and  others, 
asking  for  a  pension  to  the  widow  of  Thomas  Gregg — it  being 
claimed  that  he  was  the  original  inventor  and  patentee  of  iron 
clad  vessels.  This  is  a  new  phase  of  this  subject,  and  a  brief 
history  of  the  invention,  according  to  the  information  we  pos 
sess,  will  therefore  be  of  some  public  interest  just  now.  It  is 
generally  admitted  by  European  engineers  that  although  iron 
clad  gunboats  were  first  brought  practically  into  use  in  the 
Crimean  War,  the  late  Kobert  L.  Stevens  and  E.  A.  Stevens,  of 
Hoboken,  ~N.  J.,  were  the  inventors  of  these  vessels  protected 
with  angulated  iron  plates,  and  were  proposed  by  them  as  early 
as  1816,  for  coast  and  harbor  defence.  A  description  of  such 
vessels  was  afterward  submitted  to  a  Government  board,  con 
sisting  of  Commodores  Stewart  and  Perry,  and  Colonels  Thair 
and  Totten,  in  1841.  It  was  stated  in  the  document  proposing 
the  construction  of  such  a  vessel  for  the  defence  of  ^N"ew  York, 
that  plates  of  iron  four  inches  in  thickness  were  equal  to  five 
feet  four  inches  of  oak  in  resisting  a  ball  at  point-blank  distance, 
and  with  the  guns  then  in  use,  it  was  supposed  that  none  of  their 
shot  could  penetrate  a  vessel  clad  with  such  an  armor.  In  1843 
a  contract  was  formed  between  our  Government  and  Messrs. 
Stevens  for  the  construction  of  such  a  floating  battery,  and 
$500,000  was  furnished  by  Government,  and  expended  on  the 
battery  now  at  Hoboken.  During  the  Crimean  War,  in  1855,  it 
was  found  that  wooden  steam-frigates  were  totally  useless  in  at 
tacking  granite  casemated  forts  defended  by  big  guns  firing 
shells.  An  application  of  Stevens's  invention  was  suggested, 


150  HISTORY    OF    THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

and  several  iron-clad  gunboats  were  then  built  for  the  French 
and  English  navies.  A  few  of  these  were  employed  at  the  siege 
of  Kinburn,  and  were  decidedly  successful.  This  led  the  Em 
peror  of  France  to  extend  the  application  of  iron  plates  to  one 
of  his  large  frigates,  La  Gloire,  which  was  completed  three 
years  ago,  and  was  the  first  regular  iron-clad  war-ship  ever 
built.  Since  then  several  have  been  constructed  for  the  French 
and  English  navies  ;  the  American  invention  having  thus  been 
first  carried  into  practical  use  in  Europe." 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  British  and  American  authorities 
differ  essentially  in  regard  to  the  effect  of  shells  upon  wooden 
vessels,  and  also  in  regard  to  the  success  of  the  iron-clad  gun 
boats  at  the  siege  of  Kinburn.  The  events  of  our  war  have 
shown  that  Sir  Howard  Douglas  had  materially  underrated 
both  the  eifect  of  shells  on  wooden  ships  and  the  measure  of  re 
sistance  which  iron  armor  oiFers  to  a  shot.  In  this,  as  in  some 
other  respects,  the  experience  of  the  United  States  has  revolu 
tionized  the  opinions  of  the  world. 

It  is  important  to  trace  here  the  progress  of  the  building  of 
iron-clad  ships  in  Europe  up  to  the  time  when  our  own  Govern 
ment  began  the  construction  of  these  new  weapons  of  war. 
Passing  by  the  small  gunboats  which  fought  at  Kinburn,  the 
first  important  trial  of  the  iron  mail  was  by  the  French  em 
peror  on  the  frigate  La  Gloire,  the  construction  of  which  was 
ordered  in  1858.  She  is  simply  a  frigate  of  the  common  model, 
cased  with  iron  plates  about  four  inches  thick.  The  plates  are 
said  to  be  three  and  a  half  inches  thick  at  the  stern  and  bow, 
and  four  and  a  half  inches  in  the  centre,  covering  the  ship's 
battery.  She  is  described  from  French  authorities  as  about  257 
feet  long,  carrying  thirty-six  50-pounder  rifles  on  a  single  pro 
tected  deck.  Her  engine  is  of  900  horse-power,  and  her  crew 
consists  of  500  men.  Her  ports  are  only  six  feet  above  water. 
Her  width  is  fifty-six  feet,  and  her  speed  is  stated  to  be  thirteen 
and  a  quarter  knots  per  hour.  This  statement,  however,  has 
been  denied  by  Sir  Howard  Douglas,  who  declares  that  on  her 
trial  trip,  without  the  full  weight  on  board  which  she  is  ex 
pected  to  carry,  she  made  only  a  trifle  more  than  eleven  knots. 
The  French  emperor  ordered  the  construction  of  ten  more  frig 
ates  of  this  class.  Besides  these,  France,  at  the  beginning  of  our 


THE   IKON-CLAD   NAVY. 


151 


war,  had  nearly  ready  the  Normandie,  the  Invincible,  the  Cou- 
ronne,  and  two  larger  iron-clad  rams,  the  Solferino  and  the  Ma 
genta.  These  last  carry  each  fifty-two  guns,  and  were  intended 
to  have  a  speed  of  thirteen  and  a  half  knots  per  hour ;  but  it  is 
by  no  means  probable  that  this  speed  can  be  maintained  at  sea. 

The  lower  ports  of  these  vessels  are  eight  feet  above  the 
water.  It  is  stated  in  the  North  British  Review  (August,  1863), 
that  these  largest  French  frigates  are  plated  in  the  centre  with 
iron  six  inches  thick.  The  Normandie  has  crossed  the  Atlantic, 
but  no  very  favorable  account  has  as  yet  been  given  of  the  sea 
going  qualities  of  any  of  these  French  ships.  They  are  said  to 
roll  very  heavily,  and  it  is  also  stated  that  their  batteries  cannot 
be  used  in  a  heavy  sea,  because  the  ports  roll  under.  So  far  as 
is  yet  known,  all  the  broadside  iron-plated  ships  roll  heavily  in 
a  rough  sea,  and  the  remedy  for  this  is  not  at  present  known. 

In  the  North  British  Review  for  August,  1863,  is  the  fol 
lowing  table,  presenting  the  French  and  English  iron-clad 
Navies  as  they  then  were,  and  as  these  vessels  were  either  fin 
ished  or  being  built  at  the  beginning  of  our  war,  it  will  show 
with  sufficient  accuracy  what  had  been  done  in  Europe  when 
the  question  of  an  iron-clad  navy  was  first  presented  by  our 
Government.  The  account,  we  are  informed  by  the  writer,  is 
copied  from  official  papers.  It  includes  vessels  afloat  and  build 
ing,  and  is  as  follows : 


•d 

g 

. 

tc 

•3 

. 

. 

o« 

g    . 

§ 

£ 

«'  > 

w"    . 

!»• 

^&? 

r^ 

-a  ^ 
%.  % 

^a 

i 

1 

I 

fc  5 

C!    O 

£^ 

1* 

0 

5 

1" 

6 

1 

1 

England  .  .  . 

21 

59 

44 

16 

30 

9 

380 

566 

102 

France        

16 

37 

29 

18 

7 

9 

244 

360 

122 

At  Kinburn  the  French  emperor  proved  that  iron-clad  batteries 
could,  without  injury,  sustain  a  fire  which  would  be  utterly  destructive 
to  wooden  vessels.  He  pursued  the  conclusions  thus  arrived  at,  and 
finally,  in  1858,  ordered  the  construction  of  four  iron-plated  frigates — 
La  Gloire,  L'lnvinciblc,  La  Normandie,  and  La  Couronne.  The  first 
three  arc  on  wood  frames;  the  latter  is  iron  throughout.  They  are 
about  two  hundred  and  thirty-one  feet  in  length,  carrying  thirty-six  50- 
pounders  on  a  single  protected  deck,  with  two  more  on  an  upper  deck, 


152 


HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 


unprotected.  Their  engines  are  of  nine  hundred  horse-power,  and  the 
crew  five  hundred  and  seventy  men.  All  these  are  at  sea,  and  have  been 
found  successful ;  but  the  ports  being  only  about  six  feet  above  the  water 
when  at  load  draught,  they  are  placed  at  a  certain  disadvantage  in  bad 
•weather.  Subsequently  two  others,  the  Solferino  and  Magenta,  were 
ordered,  which  have  been  launched,  but  are  not  yet  completed.  They 
are  armed  with  a  "  spur  "  projecting  from  the  bow,  carry  their  guns  in 
two  tiers  in  the  centre  of  the  ship,  and  the  lower  ports  are  eight  feet 
from  the  water-line.  Their  length  is  two  hundred  and  eighty-two 
feet ;  draught,  twenty-five  feet ;  and  horse-power,  one  thousand. 

In  November,  1860,  ten  more  were  ordered,  which  are  still  on  the 
stocks,  and  are  being  slowly  proceeded  with.  They  are  to  be  of  the 
Gloire  type,  and  all  of  wood  frames,  except  the  Heroine,  which  is  of 
iron ;  but  the  thickness  of  the  plates  has  been  increased  from  three  and 
a  half  to  four  inches  of  the  Gloire,  to  four  and  a  half  to  six  inches.  All 
the  other  iron-plated  vessels  under  construction  in  France  at  the  present 
moment  are  merely  floating  batteries  for  harbor  defence.  Our  own  armor 
fleet,  though  more  tardily  commenced,  now  stands  thus  : 


Hull. 

Armor- 
plated. 

Tons. 

Horse 
Power. 

Length 

Draught. 

Guns. 

Men. 

At  Sea. 
Warrior.. 

Iron 

Partially 

6  109 

1  250 

feet. 

380 

feet.      in. 
22      9 

40 

704 

Black  Prince 

6  109 

1  250 

380 

26     31 

40 

704 

Defence  .  . 

« 

« 

3  720 

600 

280 

24  11 

16 

445 

Resistance  ...             .     .  . 

« 

a 

3  710 

600 

280 

24  10 

16 

455 

Royal  Oak  

Wood 

Wholly 

4  056 

800 

273 

25  lOt 

35 

600 

Launched. 
Caledonia  

Wood 

Wholly 

4,125 

1,000 

273 

25  10* 

35 

fiOO 

Ocean 

4  047 

1  000 

273 

25  lOt 

35 

600 

Prince  Consort  

« 

« 

4,045 

1,000 

273 

25  lOt 

35 

600 

Hector 

Iron 

Partially 

4  089 

800 

280 

24    8 

32 

600 

Valiant 

« 

« 

4*063 

800 

280 

24    8 

32 

600 

To  le  Launched,  1863. 
Minotaur 

Iron 

Wholly 

6  6^1 

1  350 

400 

25     8 

37 

704 

Achilles.. 

6  079 

1  250 

380 

26     3t 

30 

704 

Roval  Alfred. 

Wood 

« 

4  045 

800 

273 

25  lOt 

35 

600 

Zealous  

Partially 

3  716 

800 

2o2 

25     3 

16 

Royal  Sovereign  

« 

Wholly 

3  963 

800 

240 

22  11 

5 

900 

Prince  Albert  

Iron 

2  529 

500 

240 

20 

5 

160 

Research  

Wood 

Partially 

*1  253 

200 

195 

14 

4 

Enterprise 

990 

160 

180 

14    4t 

4. 

80 

To  le  Launched,  1864. 
Agincourt  . 

Wholly 

6  621 

1  350 

400 

25     8 

37 

fiOO 

N  orthumberland.  . 

iC 

6  6Q1 

1  350 

400 

25     8 

37 

600 

Favorite  

Wood 

" 

2,186 

400 

225 

20     5 

8 

160 

Other  authorities   state  the  number  of  iron-elads  in  the 
French.  Navy  at  ninety-four ;  but,  as  the  English  reviewer  re- 


THE   IRON-CLAD   NAVY.  153 

marks,  all  but  those  enumerated  are  merely  swimming  batteries 
for  harbor  defence,  and  small  gunboats,  such  as  were  used  at 
Kinburn,  in  the  Crimean  War.  Of  these  swimming  batteries 
and  gunboats,  the  National  Almanac  for  1863  enumerates  sev 
enty-seven,  leaving,  of  the  ninety-four  iron-clads,  only  seventeen 
for  the  ocean-going  ships,  which  corresponds  very  nearly  to  the 
statement  of  the  Review. 

In  addition  to  these  tables  and  the  description  of  La  Gloire, 
the  following  account  of  three  of  the  most  formidable  iron-clads 
of  England  will  show  more  clearly  the  exact  form  in  which  the 
subject  was  first  presented  to  our  own  ]STavy  Department.  It 
was  necessary  to  consider  how  we  could  best  meet  the  armored 
ships  of  France  and  England,  as  well  as  those  which  the  rebels 
might  construct,  because,  in  the  early  part  of  the  contest,  it 
seemed  as  if  these  powers  needed  only  an  occasion  to  become 
active  parties  in  the  war. 

The  Warrior  and  the  Black  Prince  are  regarded  as  the  model  ships 
of  the  iron  navy  of  England,  and  they  may  be  considered  as  embodying 
the  utmost  skill  and  science  of  Great  Britain  at  the  present  time.  These 
ships  are  380  feet  long;  their  tonnage  is  6,000  tons;  their  draught  is, 
of  the  one,  22  feet  9  inches,  and  of  the  Black  Prince,  26  feet  3  inches. 
They  each  carry  forty  guns:  twenty-eight  68-pounder,  and  twelve  100- 
pounder  Armstrong  guns.  Their  crew  is  704  men.  Their  armor-plates 
are  four  and  a  half  inches  thick ;  and  the  Warrior,  on  her  trial  trip,  had 
a  speed  of  fourteen  knots,  and  the  Black  Prince  ran  from  twelve  to  thir 
teen  knots  per  hour.  Their  engines  are  of  1,250  horse-power. 

These  ships  are  only  plated  with  iron  for  two-thirds  of  their  length, 
the  bow  and  stern  being,  as  English  writers  affirm,  more  vulnerable  than 
a  common  wooden  ship.  The  battery  only  is  protected  by  the  iron 
mail,  while  about  sixty  feet  of  the  stern  and  bow  are  like  a  common 
vessel. 

The  Minotaur  is  400  feet  long;  her  tonnage  is  6,621  tons;  her  en 
gines  are  of  1,350  horse-power ;  her  draught  is  25  feet  8  inches,  and  she 
is  to  carry  thirty-seven  guns.  Her  speed  has  not  been  ascertained. 
Portions  of  the  armor  of  this  ship  arc  said  to  be  six  inches  thick.  The 
Bellerophon  is  a  newly-devised  iron-clad,  now  being  built,  whose  coming 
is  thus  heralded  by  the  London  Times  :  She  will  be  "  as  terrible  an  as 
sailant  to  iron-clads  as  an  iron-clad  would  be  to  wooden  ships.  The 
object  for  winch  this  vessel  is  designed  is,  in  case  of  another  great 
war,  to  avoid  repetition  of  the  long,  dreary  process  of  blockading  an  ene- 


154:  HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

my's  fleet,  by  wearisome  and  dangerous  cruising  off  the  mouth  of  har 
bors.  The  Bellerophon  is,  in  short,  to  a  fleet  of  iron-clads  what  a  fox- 
terrier  is  to  a  pack  of  hounds.  In  case  of  an  enemy's  iron  fleet  running 
into  port,  she  can  follow  them  with  impunity." 

But  in  the  description  which  the  Times  gives  of  what  it  calls 
"  this  monster,"  one  fails  to  discover  the  immense  superiority  which  is 
claimed. 

She  is  300  feet  long,  56  feet  beam,  has  a  draught  of  25  feet,  and 
her  tonnage  is  4,246  tons.  "It  is  hoped,"  if  certain'  improvements 
work  well,  that  she  will  make  fifteen  knots  per  hour ;  but  she  is  on  the 
stocks  as  yet,  and  her  speed  is  yet  to  be  determined.  Her  armor-plates 
are  six  inches  thick,  but  they  reach  to  the  upper  deck  for  only  ninety 
feet  of  the  ship's  length  ;  for  the  remaining  distance  of  two  hundred  and 
ten  feet,  the  plating  reaches  only  six  feet  above  the  water,  and  all  above 
this  line  and  both  ends  of  the  vessel  are  unprotected.  She  is  to  be 
armed  with  ten  broadside  guns,  of  what  size  we  are  not  informed,  and 
probably  that  is  not  yet  determined. 

Of  iron-mailed  vessels,  of  the  general  character  described — most  of 
them,  however,  somewhat  smaller — England  has  between  twenty  and 
thirty  built,  or  in  process  of  construction.  Like  those  of  France,  they 
are  all  broadside  ships,  and,  of  course,  expose  an  immense  surface  to  an 
enemy's  fire.  The  importance  of  this  will  appear,  when  they  are  com 
pared  with  the  American  Monitor  form  of  war-ship. 

The  objections  made  to  the  French  ships  are,  that  they  cannot  use 
their  batteries  except  when  the  sea  is  smooth,  and  that,  in  rough  weather, 
they  roll  so  as  to  render  them  not  only  uncomfortable,  but  dangerous. 
The  English  ships  require  from  twenty-five  to  twenty-six  feet  of  water, 
and  are,  therefore,  unable  to  enter  our  principal  harbors.  From  their 
great  size,  they  are  unwieldy  ;  the  joints  of  their  armor-plates  work  in  a 
sea,  and  leak;  they  do  not  steer  safely ;  and,  from  the  general  tone  of 
English  criticisms,  one  is  led  to  infer  that  they  are  by  no  means  satisfied 
with  the  performance  of  the  iron  fleet.  But,  as  neither  the  French  nor 
English  ships  have  been,  as  yet,  tested  in  battle,  no  very  definite  opinion 
of  their  qualities  can  be  formed. 

We  know,  however,  exactly  the  effect  which  certain  kinds  of-  artil 
lery  will  produce  upon  iron  plates,  such  as  those  which  form  their 
armor ;  and  as  the  American  ships  have  been  exposed,  at  short  range, 
to  the  heaviest  cannon  and  the  most  destructive  shot  which  England 
could  furnish  to  the  rebels,  while  at  the  same  time  our  guns  have  been 
tried  upon  armor-plates  in  action,  we  have  the  means  of  forming  a  very 
accurate  opinion  of  our  power  for  attack  or  defence,  as  compared  with 
other  nations. 


THE    IRON-CLAD   NAYY.  155 

Such  was  the  condition  of  the  question  of  iron-clad  vessels 
when  first  the  Navy  Department  was  called  to  its  serious  consid 
eration.  The  problem  of  their  usefulness  was  by  no  means  con 
sidered  as  settled  by  scientific  men  and  naval  officers ;  and  there 
was,  to  say  the  least,  a  very  strong  array  of  talent,  experience, 
and  science  that  adhered  firmly  to  the  idea  that  wooden  ships 
without  armor  were  the  only  proper  vessels-of-war.  Still, 
France  had  built  a  mailed  frigate,  and  this,  according  to  British 
testimony,  spread  such  a  panic  through  England  as  compelled 
the  admiralty  to  begin  at  once  the  construction  of  plated 
frigates,  more  formidable  as  was  thought  than  the  French  one. 
Upon  this,  the  French  emperor  took  measures  to  increase  at  once 
his  own  iron-clad  fleet ;  and  to  match  this,  England  laid  down 
still  more  enormous  monsters,  till  at  the  time  of  the  breaking 
out  of  the  rebellion  the  account  of  vessels  built  or  projected 
stood  as  quoted  in  the  tables  presented.  These,  it  should  be 
remembered,  were  all  broadside  vessels.  No  idea  of  any  dif 
ferent  form  of  ship  had  then  found  any  favor  in  Europe.  Other 
plans  had  been  suggested,  but  they  had  been  rejected  as  worth 
less,  and  no  government  had  ventured  a  departure  from  the 
obvious  and  simple  contrivance  of  covering  with  iron  plates  the 
sides  of  a  wooden  ship.  In  the  mean  time  the  rebels  were 
pushing  rapidly  to  completion  the  first  American  iron-clad,  the 
Merrimack,  with  her  sloping  sides  and  formidable  battery;  and 
the  indications  were  that  she  might  be  ready  for  sea  before  any 
thing  could  be  prepared  to  stop  her. 

It  was  evidently  a  perilous  hour  for  the  Government.  In  a 
short  time,  how  short  could  not  certainly  be  known,  the  rebel 
frigate  would  be  ready  for  the  work  of  destruction,  and  it  was 
evident  that  a  very  slight  thing  might  bring  the  French  and 
English  vessels  to  our  shores. 

This  perilous  crisis  the  Navy  Department  was  expected  to 
meet,  and  it  was  met  with  a  boldness,  and  skill,  and  decision, 
not  surpassed  by  any  of  the  other  operations  of  the  war ;  and  it 
should  not  be  forgotten  that  this  new  danger  was  in  addition  to 
the  nearly  impossible  task  of  sealing  by  blockade  three  thousand 
five  hundred  miles  of  our  most  difficult  coast,  with  almost 
nothing  with  which  to  begin  the  work.  Nor  can  the  reader 
rightly  judge  of  the  difficulties  of  the  situation  unless  he 


156  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

remembers  that  nearly  all  that  we  now  know  of  iron-clads  was 
then  unknown.  Not  one  decisive  experiment  had  been  made 
by  which  the  Department  could  be  guided.  A  few  ships,  or 
perhaps  only  one,  had  been  finished  at  the  beginning  of  Mr. 
Lincoln's  administration ;  some  others  had  been  begun,  but,  as 
has  been  already  shown,  it  was  by  no  means  settled  whether 
they  were  really  formidable  or  utterly  worthless,  for  public 
opinion  both  in  England  and  France  vibrated  to  either  extreme, 
and  each  found  earnest  supporters.  The  only  important  fact  was, 
England  and  France  were  building  huge  broadside  iron-clads, 
for  the  building  of  which  not  months  but  years  were  needed, 
with  all  the  appliances  of  their  national  workshops ;  while  the 
rebels  were  hastening  to  completion  a  similar  one,  within  a  few 
hours'  sail  of  Washington.  Early  in  May  the  subject  came  up  for 
discussion  in  the  Navy  Department,  and  so  little  was  then  known 
in  regard  to  this  novel  mode  of  warfare,  such  the  unwillingness 
suddenly  to  abandon  what  were  considered  settled  theories  and 
long-tried  practice,  that,  except  with  the  Secretary,  the  plan 
found  but  little  favor.  It  is  supposed  that  when  the  subject 
was  first  considered,  one  or  two  only  among  the  officers  of 
higher  rank  in  the  Navy  were  willing  to  give  their  counte 
nance  to  the  new  form  of  a  war-ship,  which  few  now  would 
dare  to  condemn. 

There  was  nothing  unusual  in  this ;  nor  is  it  cause  for  cen 
sure  that  naval  constructors  who  had  devoted  their  lives  to  cer 
tain  methods  of  operation,  sanctioned  by  the  science  and  expe 
rience  of  the  world,  could  not  in  a  moment  abandon  all  they 
had  learned  or  done  as  of  little  worth,  and  adopt  the  dark  con 
clusions  which  would  contradict  all  their  own  experience  and 
reverse  the  decisions  of  the  world.  Nor  was  it  to  be  expected 
that  naval  officers  should  at  once  agree  to  sanction  a  novelty  of 
which  they  could  form  no  clear  conception,  and  which  had 
never  been  tested  in  battle. 

It  was  well  that  the  Secretary  and  his  immediate  advisers 
were  somewhat  more  free  from  the  trammels  of  previous  educa 
tion  than  some  of  their  associates,  and  were  ready  to  assume  a 
responsibility  from  which  others,  and  perhaps  not  unwisely, 
were  disposed  to  shrink. 

The  convictions  of  the  Secretarv  and  the  few  who  sustained 


THE   IRON-CLAD    NAVY.  157 

him  were  so  strong,  that  it  was  decided  to  begin  the  construc 
tion  of  some  iron-plated  vessels,  provided  the  money  for  such  a 
purpose  couH  be  obtained;  for  then  the  Department  was 
entirely  destitute  of  means  for  such  a  work.  Mr.  Chase,  then 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was  consulted,  and  he  undertook  to 
provide  the  means  if  an  appropriation  could  be  obtained.  At 
the  extra  session  of  Congress,  in  July,  1861,  the  Secretary  pre 
sented  the  subject  in  the  following  guarded  language,  showing 
how  little  preparation  for  it  there  was,  either  in  Congress  or 
the  country  at  large,  and  giving  no  idea  of  the  extended  and 
earnest  discussions  which  had  long  been  going  on.  Whatever 
merit  there  was  in  first  adopting  iron-clads  in  the  Navy  belongs 
to  the  Department ;  the  Monitor  form  is  due  to  the  genius  of 
Ericsson.  The  following  is  the  Secretary's  language : 

Much  attention  has  been  given  within  the  last  few  years  to  the  sub 
ject  of  floating  batteries,  or  iron-clad  steamers.  Other  governments, 
and  particularly  France  and  England,  have  made  it  a  special  object  in 
connection  with  naval  improvements ;  and  the  ingenuity  and  inventive 
faculties  of  our  own  countrymen  have  also  been  stimulated  by  recent 
occurrences  toward  the  construction  of  this  class  of  vessels.  The 
period  is  perhaps  not  one  best  adapted  to  heavy  expenditures  by  way 
of  experiment,  and  the  time  and  attention  of  some  of  those  who  are  most 
competent  to  investigate  and  form  correct  conclusions  on  this  subject 
are  otherwise  employed.  I  would,  however,  recommend  the  appoint 
ment  of  a  proper  and  competent  board  to  inquire  into  and  report  in 
regard  to  a  measure  so  important ;  and  it  is  for  Congress  to  decide 
whether,  on  a  favorable  report,  they  will  order  one  or  more  iron-clad 
steamers,  or  floating  batteries,  to  be  constructed,  with  a  view  to  perfect 
protection  from  the  effects  of  present  ordnance  at  short  range,  and  make 
an  appropriation  for  that  purpose. 

It  is  nearly  twenty  years  since  a  gentleman  of  New  Jersey,  possess 
ing  wealth  and  talent,  projected  the  construction  of  a  floating  battery, 
and  the  Government  aided  the  work  by  a  liberal  appropriation.  The 
death  of  this  gentleman  a  few  years  since  interrupted  the  prosecution 
of  this  experiment,  and  application  has  been  recently  made  by  his  sur 
viving  brother,  the  authorities  of  New  Jersey,  and  others,  for  additional 
means  to  carry  it  forward  to  completion.  The  amount  asked  is  of  such 
magnitude  as  to  require  special  investigation  by  a  competent  board, 
who  shall  report  as  to  the  expediency  and  practicability  of  the  experi 
ment  before  so  large  an  expenditure  should  be  authorized. 


158  HISTORY    OF    THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Very  early  in  the  session  of  this  Congress  a  resolution  of  in 
quiry  was  introduced  by  Mr.  Hale,  of  New  Hampshire,  calling 
upon  the  Secretary  for  information  concerning  all  the  transac 
tions  of  his  Department,  and  especially  in  reference  to  the  pur 
chase  and  construction  of  vessels.  As  heretofore  stated,  the 
Secretary  had  felt  compelled,  in  order  to  meet  the  great  need 
and  peril  of  the  country,  to  purchase  as  many  suitable  vessels  as 
could  be  obtained,  and  contract  for  the  immediate  building  of 
a  fleet  of  light-draught  steamers  in  advance  of  the  action  of 
Congress.  It  was  understood  that  this  resolution  covered  an 
implied  censure  of  the  Department,  assuming  that  some  wrong 
had  been  done,  for  which  the  Secretary  should  give  an  account 
at  the  bar  of  the  Senate.  Mr.  Hale  was  chairman  of  the  Naval 
Committee,  and  therefore  had  been  one  whose  counsel  the  Sec 
retary  had  sought  in  the  beginning  of  his  administration,  and 
upon  whose  support  he  thought  he  could  rely  for  any  proper 
measure ;  and  the  hostility  foreshadowed  by  this  resolution  was, 
therefore,  more  keenly  felt  than  if  it  had  come  from  the  open 
opposers  of  the  Government.  The  charges  of  extravagance, 
recklessness,  and  corruption  which  followed  this  beginning  were 
exceedingly  relished  by  the  opposition  members,  who  were  very 
happy  to  agree  with  all  who  would  attack  any  Department  of 
Mr.  Lincoln's  Government.  It  added  greatly  to  the  difficulties 
with  which  the  Navy  Department  had  to  contend,  that  a  move 
ment  should  have  originated  in  a  body  so  respected  and  trusted 
as  the  Senate  of  the  United  States,  and  with  a  distinguished 
member  of  that  body,  and  one  of  the  leaders  in  the  Republican 
ranks. 

As  a  matter  of  course  it  awakened  suspicion  all  over  the 
country.  It  was  seized  upon  by  every  opposition  leader  and 
journal  as  proof  positive  of  the  incompetency  and  corruption  in 
the  Department,  and  the  public  mind  was  prepared,  far  and 
wide,  not  only  for  jealous  watchfulness,  but  for  an  unfriendly 
judgment  in  regard  to  all  that  the  Secretary  or  the  Navy  might 
do.  To  say  the  least,  it  was  an  ill-considered  and  causeless 
attack,  and  the  consequences  were  such  as  every  lover  of  his 
country,  and  of  the  right  and  true,  has  since  had  occasion 
to  regret.  Those  who  originated  and  supported  it,  found 
themselves  obliged  to  strengthen  their  position  in  order  to  jus- 


THE   IKON-CLAD   NAVY.  159 

tify  their  course;  and  so,  while  the  operations  of  the  Army 
passed  unquestioned,  or  with  such  a  generous  confidence  as  gave 
the  "War  Department  strength  and  courage,  the  Secretary  of 
the 'Navy  and  his  associates,  and  all  their  movements  were  sub 
jected  to  the  hostile  scrutiny  of  those  whom  the  people  knew 
only  as  prominent  and  influential  friends  of  the  Administration, 
and  who  were  supposed  to  speak  thus  of  the  Navy,  because,  as 
honest  men  and  guardians  of  the  public  weal  and  treasure,  they 
could  not  withhold  their  condemnation.  With  very  few  excep 
tions,  there  was  probably  little  or  no  personal  ill-will  toward 
the  Secretary  or  his  associates,  or  any  officers  of  the  Navy. 
Senators  and  Representatives,  and  conductors  of  the  press,  who 
had  not  particularly  studied  this  subject,  came  honestly  to 
wrong  conclusions.  The  country,  at  that  time,  had  no  proper 
conception  of  the  magnitude  of  the  struggle ;  and  preparations 
made  by  the  Navy  Department,  which  a  little  time  showed  to 
be  inadequate,  were  at  first  thought  extravagant  and  uncalled 
for;  and  when  an  iron-clad  navy  was  proposed,  and  particu 
larly  the  Monitor  form,  and  then  the  new  heavy  ordnance,  men 
who  by  no  previous  training  or  education  were  fitted  to  pro 
nounce  a  judgment  in  such  matters,  condemned  and  sneered  at 
the  whole  thing ;  nor  can  it  be  said  that  they  received  no  coun 
tenance  in  this  from  any  of  the  older  officers  of  the  Navy.  The 
opinions  of  some  of  these  were  quoted  in  the  House  and  in  the 
Senate ;  and  when  Senators  of  the  Administration  party,  and 
some  of  the  most  experienced  of  the  constructors  and  officers 
were  known  to  disapprove  the  new  ideas,  the  country  was  more 
than  half  inclined  to  think  that  the  Navy  Department  was 
conducted  by  those  who  were  dozing  over  the  country's  perils, 
or  wasting  time  and  money  upon  useless  novelties  and  impracti 
cable  projects.  The  consequence  was,  that  the  men  who,  above 
all  others,  at  that  time,  were  devising  and  executing  plans 
without  which  the  country  would  have  been  lost,  met  little  but 
censure  and  discouragement ;  a  distrust  of  the  whole  naval  ser 
vice  was  created,  and  every  gallant  officer  and  seaman  felt  that 
a  shadow  was  thrown  over  his  reputation  and  his  prospects. 
They  felt  keenly  the  fact,  which  was  apparent  to  all,  that  the 
people  had  been  taught  not  to  honor  or  love  the  Navy  as  they 
did  in  former  years.  There  were  those  in  the  Navy  Depart- 


1GO  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

ment  who  had  the  genius  to  devise  and  the  courage  to  adopt 
the  true  method  of  meeting  the  public  danger  ;  they  had  gone 
beyond  the  general  thinking  of  their  age,  and  met  the  usual  re 
ward,  censure  and  ridicule,  until  they  were  justified  by  success. 
Notwithstanding  all  this  opposition  and  this  attempt  to  cen 
sure  the  Department,  Congress  gave  the  authority  to  appoint  a 
special  board  to  examine  and  report  upon  the  subject  of  iron 
clads,  and  made  an  appropriation  of  $1,500,000  to  be  used  by 
the  Secretary  for  the  construction  of  one  or  more  armored  ships. 
The  following  report  of  the  board,  dated  September  16,  1861, 
shows  that  though  some  progress  had  been  made  toward  right 
opinions,  the  truth  was,  as  yet,  but  dimly  seen.  The  Depart 
ment,  with  its  novel  ships  and  new  ordnance,  was  doomed  to 
remain  under  a  shadow  until  near  the  close  of  the  war : 


EEPOET   ON   IRON-CLAD   VESSELS. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  i 

BUREAU  OF  YARDS  AND  DOCKS,  September  16, 1861.  \ 

SIR  :  The  undersigned,  constituting  a  board  appointed  by  your  or 
der  of  the  8th  ultimo,  proceeded  to  the  duty  assigned  to  them,  in  ac 
cordance  with  the  first  section  of  an  act  of  Congress,  approved  3d  of 
August,  1861,  directing  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  "to  appoint  a  board 
of  three  skilful  naval  officers  to  investigate  the  plans  and  specifications 
that  may  be  submitted  for  the  construction  or  completing  of  iron-clad 
steamships  or  steam-batteries,  and  on  their  report,  should  it  be  favora 
ble,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  will  cause  one  or  more  armored  or  iron 
or  steel  clad  steamships,  or  floating  steam-batteries  to  be  built ;  and 
there  is  hereby  appropriated,  out  of  any  money  in  the  Treasury  not 
otherwise  appropriated,  the  sum  of  one  million  five  hundred  thousand 
dollars." 

Distrustful  of  our  ability  to  discharge  this  duty,  which  the  law  re 
quires  should  be  performed  by  three  skilful  naval  officers,  we  approach 
the  subject  with  diffidence,  having  no  experience,  and  but  scanty  knowl 
edge  in  this  branch  of  naval  architecture. 

The  plans  submitted  are  so  various,  and,  in  many  respects,  so  en 
tirely  dissimilar,  that,  without  a  more  thorough  knowledge  of  this  mode 
of  construction  and  the  resisting  properties  of  iron  than  we  possess,  it  is 
very  likely  that  some  of  our  connclsions  may  prove  erroneous. 

Application  was  made  to  the  Department  for  a  naval  constructor,  to 
be  placed  under  our  orders,  with  whom  we  might  consult ;  but  it  ap- 


THE   IRON-CLAD   NAVY.     '  161 

pears,  that  they  are  all  so  employed  on  important  service  that  none 
could  be  assigned  to  this  duty.  The  construction  of  iron-clad  steam- 
ships-of-war  is  now  zealously  claiming  the  attention  of  foreign  naval 
powers.  France  led  off;  England  followed,  and  is  now  somewhat  ex 
tensively  engaged  in  the  system  ;  and  other  powers  seem  to  emulate 
their  example,  though  on  a  smaller  scale. 

Opinions  differ  amongst  naval  and  scientific  men  as  to  the  policy  of 
adopting  the  iron  armature  for  ships-of-war.  For  coast  and  harbor  de 
fence  they  are  undoubtedly  formidable  adjuncts  to  fortifications  on  land. 
As  cruising  vessels,  however,  we  are  skeptical  as  to  their  advantages 
and  ultimate  adoption.  But  whilst  other  nations  are  endeavoring  to 
perfect  them,  we  must  not  remain  idle. 

The  enormous  load  of  iron,  as  so  much  additional  weight  to  the 
vessel ;  the  great  breadth  of  beam  necessary  to  give  her  stability ;  the 
short  supply  of  coal  she  will  be  able  to  store  in  bunkers ;  the  greater 
power  required  to  propel  her,  and  the  largely  increased  cost  of  construc 
tion,  are  objections  to  this  class  of  vessels  as  cruisers  which  we  believe 
it  is  difficult  successfully  to  overcome.  For  river  and  harbor  service 
we  consider  iron-clad  vessels  of  light  draught,  or  floating  batteries  thus 
shielded,  as  very  important ;  and  we  feel,  at  this  moment,  the  necessity 
of  them  on  some  of  our  rivers  and  inlets,  to  enforce  obedience  to  the 
laws.  We,  however,  do  not  hesitate  to  express  the  opinion,  notwith 
standing  all  we  have  heard  or  seen  written  on  the  subject,  that  no  ship 
or  floating  battery,  however  heavily  she  may  be  plated,  can  cope  suc 
cessfully  with  a  properly  constructed  fortification  of  masonry.  The  one 
is  fixed  and  immovable,  and,  though  constructed  of  a  material  which 
may  be  shattered  by  shot,  can  be  covered,  if  need  be,  by  the  same,  or 
much  heavier  armor  than  a  floating  vessel  can  bear,  whilst  the  other  is 
subject  to  disturbance  by  winds  and  waves,  and  to  the  powerful  effects 
of  tides  and  currents. 

Armored  ships  or  batteries  may  be  employed  advantageously  to  pass 
fortifications  on  land  for  ulterior  objects  of  attack,  to  run  a  blockade,  or 
to  reduce  temporary  batteries  on  the  shores  of  rivers  and  the  approaches 
to  our  harbors. 

From  what  we  know  of  the  comparative  advantages  and  disadvan 
tages  of  ships  constructed  of  wood  over  those  of  iron,  we  are  clearly  of 
opinion  that  no  iron-clad  vessel  of  equal  displacement  can  be  made  to 
obtain  the  same  speed  as  one  not  thus  encumbered,  because  her  form 
would  be  better  adapted  to  speed.  Her  form  and  dimensions,  and  the 
unyielding  nature  of  the  shield,  detract  materially  in  a  heavy  sea  from 
the  life,  buoyancy,  and  spring  which  a  ship  built  of  wood  possesses. 

Wooden  ships  may  be  said  to  be  but  coffins  for  their  crews  when 
11 


162  HISTOKY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

brought  in  conflict  with  iron-clad  vessels ;  but  the  speed  of  the  former, 
we  take  for  granted,  being  greater  than  that  of  the  latter,  they  can 
readily  choose  their  position,  and  keep  out  of  harm's  way  entirely. 

Recent  improvements  in  the  form  and  preparation  of  projectiles, 
and  their  increased  capacity  for  destruction,  have  enlisted  a  large 
amount  of  ingenuity  and  skill  to  devise  means  for  resisting  them,  in 
the  construction  of  ships-of-war.  As  yet  we  know  of  nothing  superior 
to  the  large  and  heavy  spherical  shot  in  its  destructive  effects  on 
vessels,  whether  plated  or  not.  Rifle-guns  have  greater  range,  but 
the  conical  shot  does  not  produce  the  crushing  effect  of  spherical 
shot. 

It  is  assumed  that  4-J-incli  plates  are  the  heaviest  armor  a  sea-going 
vessel  can  safely  carry.  These  plates  should  be  of  tough  iron,  and  rolled 
in  large,  long  pieces.  This  thickness  of  armor,  it  is  believed,  will  resist 
all  projectiles  now  in  general  use  at  a  distance  of  five  hundred  yards, 
especially  if  the  ship's  sides  are  angular. 

Plates  hammered  in  large  masses  are  less  fibrous  and  tough  than 
when  rolled.  The  question  whether  wooden  backing,  or  any  elastic 
substance  behind  the  iron  plating,  will  tend  to  relieve  at  all  the  frame  of 
the  ships  from  the  crushing  effect  of  a  heavy  projectile,  is  not  yet  de 
cided.  Major  Barnard  says :  "  To  put  an  elastic  material  behind  the 
iron  is  to  insure  its  destruction."  With  all  deference  to  such  creditable 
authority,  we  may  suggest  that  it  is  possible  a  backing  of  some  elastic 
substance  (soft  wood,  perhaps,  is  the  best)  might  relieve  the  frame  of 
the  ship  somewhat  from  the  terrible  shock  of  a  heavy  projectile,  though 
the  plate  should  not  be  fractured. 

With  respect  to  a  comparison  between  ships  of  iron  and  those  of 
wood,  without  plating,  high  authorities  in  England  differ  as  to  which  is 
the  best.  The  tops  of  ships  built  of  iron,  we  are  told,  wear  out  three 
bottoms ;  whilst  the  bottoms  of  those  built  of  wood  will  outwear  three 
tops.  In  deciding  upon  the  relative  merits  of  iron  and  wooden  framed 
vessels,  for  each  of  which  we  have  offers,  the  board  is  of  opinion,  that  it 
would  be  well  to  try  a  specimen  of  each,  as  both  have  distinguished  ad 
vocates.  One  strong  objection  to  iron  vessels,  which,  so  far  as  we  know, 
has  not  yet  been  overcome,  is  the  oxidation  or  rust  in  salt  water,  and 
their  liability  of  becoming  foul  under  water  by  the  attachment  of  sea- 
grass  and  animalcules  to  their  bottoms.  The  best  preventive  we  know 
of  is  a  coating  of  pure  zinc  paint,  which,  so  long  as  it  lasts,  is  believed 
to  be  an  antidote  to  this  cause  of  evil. 

After  these  brief  remarks  on  the  subject  generally,  we  proceed  to  no 
tice  the  plans  and  offers  referred  to  us  for  the  construction  of  plated  ves 
sels  and  floating  batteries. 


THE   IKON-CLAD   NAVY.  163 

It  has  been  suggested  that  the  most  ready  mode  of  obtaining  an 
iron-clad  ship-of-war  would  be  to  contract  with  responsible  parties  in 
England  for  its  complete  construction  ;  and  we  are  assured  that  parties 
there  are  ready  to  engage  in  such  an  enterprise  on  terms  more  reason 
able,  perhaps,  than  such  vessels  could  be  built  in  this  country,  having 
much  greater  experience  and  facilities  than  we  possess.  Indeed,  we  .are 
informed  there  are  no  mills  and  machinery  in  this  country  capable  of 
rolling  iron  4J-  inches  thick,  though  plates  might  be  hammered  to  that 
thickness  in  many  of  our  workshops.  As  before  observed,  rolled  iron 
is  considered  much  the  best,  and  the  difficulty  of  rolling  it. increases  rap 
idly  with  the  increase  of  thickness.  It  has,  however,  occurred  to  us  that 
a  difficulty  might  arise  with  the  British  Government,  in  case  we  should 
undertake  to  construct  ships-of-war  in  that  country,  which  might  compli 
cate  their  delivery  ;  and,  moreover,  we  are  of  opinion  that  every  people 
or  nation  who  can  maintain  a  navy  should  be  capable  of  constructing  it 
themselves. 

Our  immediate  demands  seem  to  require,  first,  so  far  as  practicable, 
vessels  invulnerable  to  shot,  of  light  draught  of  water,  to  penetrate  our 
shoal  harbors,  rivers,  and  bayous.  We,  therefore,  favor  the  construction 
of  this  class  of  vessels  before  going  into  a  more  perfect  system  of  large 
iron-clad  sea-going  vessels-of-war.  We  are  here  met  with  the  difficulty 
of  encumbering  small  vessels  with  armor,  which,  from  their  size,  they 
are  unable  to  bear.  We,  nevertheless,  recommend  that  contracts  be 
made  with  responsible  parties  for  the  construction  of  one  or  more  iron 
clad  vessels  or  batteries,  of  as  light  a  draught  of  water  as  practicable 
consistent  with  their  weight  of  armor.  Meanwhile,  availing  ourselves  of 
the  experience  thus  obtained,  and  the  improvements  which  we  believe 
are  yet  to  be  made  by  other  naval  powers  in  building  iron-clad  ships, 
we  would  advise  the  construction,  in  our  own  dock-yards,  of  one  or  more 
of  these  vessels,  and  upon  a  larger  and  more  perfect  scale,  when  Con 
gress  shall  see  fit  to  authorize  it.  The  amount  now  appropriated  is  not 
sufficient  to  build  both  classes  of  vessels  to  any  great  extent. 

We  have  made  a  synopsis  of  the  propositions  and  specifications 
submitted,  which  we  annex,  and  now  proceed  to  state,  in  brief,  the  re 
sult  of  our  decisions  upon  the  offers  presented  to  us  : 

J.  ERICSSON,  New  York,  page  19. — His  plan  of  a  floating  battery  is 
novel,  but  seems  to  be  based  upon  a  plan  which  will  render  the  battery 
shot  and  shell  proof.  We  are  somewhat  apprehensive  that  her  proper 
ties  for  sea  are  not  such  as  a  sea-going  vessel  should  possess.  But  she 
may  be  moved  from  one  place  to  another  on  the  coast  in  smooth  water. 
We  recommend  that  an  experiment  be  made  with  one  battery  of  this 
description  on  the  terms  proposed,  with  a  guaranty  and  forfeiture  in 


164  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

case  of  failure  in  any  of  the  properties  and  points  of  the  vessel  as  pro 
posed.  Price,  $275,000  ;  length  of  vessel,  172  feet;  breadth  of  beam, 
41  feet;  depth  of  hold,  11-j-  feet;  time,  100  days;  draught  of  water, 
10  feet;  displacement,  1,255  tons;  speed,  per  hour,  nine  statute  miles. 

JOHN  W.  NYSTROM,  Philadelphia,  1216  Chestnut  Street,  page  1. — 
The  plan  of  (quadruple)  guns  is  not  known,  and  cannot  be  considered. 
The  dimensions  would  not  float  the  vessel  without  the  guards,  which 
we  are  not  satisfied  would  repel  shot.  We  do  not  recommend  the  plan. 
Price,  about  $175,000;  length  of  vessel,  175  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  27 
feet;  depth  of  hold,  13  feet;  time,  4  months;  draught  of  water,  10 
feet;  displacement,  875  tons;  speed,  per  hour,  12  knots. 

WILLIAM  PERINE,  New  York,  2777  post-office  box,  presents  three 
plans.  The  specifications  and  drawings  are  not  full.  The  last  proposal. 
(No.  3,  page  2),  for  the  heavy  plating  is  the  only  one  we  have  consid 
ered  ;  but  there  is  neither  drawing  nor  model,  and  the  capacity  of  the 
vessel,  we  think,  will  not  bear  the  armor  and  armament  proposed. 
Price,  $621,000;  length  of  vessel,  225  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  45J  feet; 
depth  of  hold,  15^-  feet;  time,  9  months;  draught  of  water,  13  feet; 
displacement,  2,454  tons  ;  speed,  per  hour,  10  knots. 

JOHN  C.  LE  FERRE,  Boston,  page  9. — Description  deficient.  Not 
recommended.  Sent  a  model ;  but  neither  price,  time,  nor  dimensions 
stated. 

E.  S.  RENWICK,  New  York,  335  Broadway,  presents  drawings,  spe 
cification,  and  model  of  an  iron-clad  vessel  of  large  capacity  and  power 
ful  engines,  with  great  speed,  capable  of  carrying  a  heavy  battery,  and 
stated  to  be  shot-proof  and  a  good  sea-boat.  The  form  and  manner  of 
construction  and  proportions  of  this  vessel  are  novel,  and  will  attract 
the  attention  of  scientific  and  practical  men.  She  is  of  very  light 
draught  of  water ;  and  on  the  question  whether  she  will  prove  to  be  a 
safe  and  comfortable  sea-boat  we  do  not  express  a  decided  opinion. 
Vessels  of  somewhat  similar  form,  in  that  part  of  vessels  which  is  im 
mersed,  of  light  draught  of  water,  on  our  Western  lakes,  have,  we  be 
lieve,  proved  entirely  satisfactory  in  all  weathers.  To  counteract  the 
effect  of  the  waves,  when  disturbed  by  the  winds,  by  producing  a  jerk  or 
sudden  rolling  motion  of  flat,  shoal  vessels,  it  is  proposed  to  carry  a 
sufficient  weight  above  the  centre  of  gravity  to  counterpoise  the  heavy 
weight  below,  which  is  done  in  this  ship  by  the  immense  iron  armor. 
If,  after  a  full  discussion  and  examination  by  experts  on  this  plan,  it 
should  be  decided  that  she  is  a  safe  vessel  for  sea  service,  we  would  recom 
mend  the  construction  upon  it  of  one  ship,  at  one  of  our  dock-yards. 
The  estimated  cost  of  this  ship,  $1,500,000,  precludes  action  upon  the 
plan  until  further  appropriations  shall  be  made  bv  Congress  for  such  ob- 


THE    IKON-CLAD   NAVY.  165 

jects.  Time  not  stated;  draught  of  water,  16  feet;  displacement,  6,520 
tons;  speed  per  hour,  at  least  18  miles. 

WHITNEY  &  ROWLAND,  Brooklyn,  Greenpoint,  page  13,  propose 
an  iron  gunboat,  armor  of  bars  of  iron  and  thin  plate  over  it.  JVb  price 
stated.  Dimensions  of  vessel,  we  think,  will  not  bear  the  weight  and 
possess  stability.  Time,  5  months.  Not  recommended.  Length  of 
vessel,  140  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  28  feet;  depth  of  hold,  13£  feet; 
draught  of  water,  8  feet. 

DONALD  McKAY,  Boston,  page  16. — Vessel,  in  general  dimensions 
and  armor,  approved.  The  speed  estimated  slow.  The  cost  precludes 
the  consideration  of  construction  by  the  board.  Price,  $1,000,000; 
length  of  vessel  227  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  50  feet;  depth  of  hold,  26  J 
feet;  time,  9  to  10  months;  draught  of  water,  14  feet;  displacement, 
3,200  tons  ;  speed  per  hour,  6  to  7  knots. 

WILLIAM  H.  WOOD,  Jersey  City,  N.  J.,  page  14. — Dimensions  will 
not  float  the  guns  high  enough.  Not  recommended.  Price,  $255,000  ; 
length  of  vessel,  160  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  34  feet;  depth  of  hold,  22 
feet;  time,  4  months;  draught  of  water,  13  feet;  displacement,  1,215 
tons  ;  speed  not  stated. 

MERRICK  AND  SONS,  Philadelphia,  pages  7  and  8. — Vessel  of  wood 
and  iron  combined,  This  proposition  we  consider  the  most  practicable 
for  heavy  armor.  We  recommend  that  a  contract  be  made  with  that 
party  under  a  guaranty,  with  forfeiture  in  case  of  failure  to  comply 
with  the  specifications ;  and  that  the  contract  require  the  plates  to  be 
15  feet  long  and  36  inches  wide,  with  a  reservation  of  some  modifica 
tions,  which  may  occur  as  the  work  progresses,  not  to  affect  the  cost. 
Price,  $780,000 ;  length  of  vessel,  220  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  60  feet; 
depth  of  hold,  23  feet;  time,  9  months;  draught  of  water,  13  feet;  dis 
placement,  3,296  tons ;  speed  per  hour,  9^  knots. 

BENJAMIN  RATHBURN,  page  20. — We  do  not  recommend  the  plan 
for  adoption.  Price  not  stated ;  length  of  vessel  not  stated ;  breadth 
of  beam,  80  feet ;  depth  of  hold,  74  feet ;  time  not  stated ;  draught  of 
water,  25  feet;  displacement,  15,000  tons;  speed  not  stated.  Specifi 
cations  incomplete. 

HENRY  R.  DUNHAM,  New  York,  page  11. — Vessel  too  costly  for  the 
appropriation ;  no  drawings  or  specifications ;  not  recommended. 
Price,  $1,200,000 ;  length  of  vessel,  325  feet ;  breadth  of  beam,  60  feet; 
depth  of  hold  not  stated  ;  time,  15  to  18  months  ;  draught  of  water,  16 
feet ;  displacement  not  stated  ;  speed  per  hour,  12  miles. 

C.  S.  BUSHNELL  &  Co.,  New  Haven,  Conn.,  page  121,  propose  a 
vessel  to  be  iron-clad  on  the  rail  and  plate  principle,  and  to  obtain  high 
speed.  The  objection  to  this  vessel  is  the  fear  that  she  will  not  float  her 


166  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

armor  and  load  sufficiently  high,  and  have  stability  enough  for  a  sea 
vessel.  With  a  guaranty  that  she  shall  do  these,  we  recommend  on  that 
basis  a  contract.  Price,  $235,250  ;  length  of  vessel,  180  feet ;  breadth 
of  beam,  —  feet ;  depth  of  hold,  12|  feet ;  time,  4  months  ;  draught  of 
water,  10  feet;  displacement,  — tons;  speed  per  hour,  12  knots. 

JOHN  WESTWOOD,  Cincinnati,  Ohio,  page  17. — Vessel  of  wood  with 
iron  armor ;  plan  good  enough,  but  the  breadth  not  enough  to  bear  the 
armor.  No  detailed  specifications  ;  no  price  or  time  stated  ;  only  a  gen 
eral  drawing.  Not  recommended. 

NEAFIE  &  LEVY,  Philadelphia,  page  5. — No  plans  or  drawings,  there 
fore  not  considered.  Neither  price  nor  time  stated.  Length  of  vessel, 
200  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  40  feet;  depth  of  hold,  15  feet:  draught 
of  water,  13  feet;  displacement,  1,748  tons;  speed  per  hour,  10  knots. 

WM.  NORRIS,  New  York,  26  Cedar  Street,  page  6. — Iron  boat  with 
out  armor.  Too  small,  and  not  received.  Price,  $32',000 ;  length  of 
vessel,  83  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  25  feet;  depth  of  hold,  14  feet; 
draught  of  water,  3  feet ;  displacement,  90  tons  ;  speed  not  stated. 

WM.  KINGSLEY,  Washington,  D.  C.,  page  10,  proposes  a  rubber-clad 
vessel,  which  we  cannot  recommend.  No  price  or  dimension  stated. 

A.  BEEBE,  New  York,  82  Broadway,  page  18. — Specifications  and 
sketch  defective.  Plan  not  approved.  Price,  $50,000 ;  length  of  ves 
sel,  120  feet;  breadth  of  beam,  55  feet;  depth  not  stated;  time,  100 
days;  draught  of  water,  6  feet;  displacement,  1,000  tons;  speed  per 
hour,  8  knots. 

These  three  propositions  recommended,  viz. :  Bushnell  &  Co.,  New 
Haven,  Connecticut ;  Merrick  &  Sons,  Philadelphia ;  and  J.  Ericsson, 
New  York,  will  absorb  $1,290,250,  of  the  appropriation  of  $1,500,000, 
leaving  $209,750  yet  unexpended. 

The  board  recommends  that  armor  with  heavy  guns  be  placed  on 
one  of  our  river  craft,  or,  if  none  will  bear  it,  to  construct  a  scow,  which 
will  answer  to  plate  and  shield  the  guns,  for  the  river  service  on  the 
Potomac,  to  be  constructed,  or  prepared  by  the  Government  at  the 
navy-yard  here,  for  immediate  use. 

We  would  further  recommend  that  the  Department  ask  of  Congress 
at  its  next  session,  an  appropriation,  for  experimenting  on  iron  plates  of 
different  kinds,  of  $10,000. 

All  of  which  is  respectfully  submitted, 

JOSEPH  SMITH, 
H.  PAULDING, 
C.  H.  DAVIS. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


THE   EBON-CLAD    NAVY.  167 

The  report  of  this  board  was  followed  by  contracts  for  the 
building  of  three  iron-clad  vessels.  One  was  a  small  corvette 
called  the  Galena,  another  was  the  New  Ironsides,  and  the 
third  the  first  Monitor.  The  Galena  was  plated  with  iron  about 
three  inches  thick,  and  this  armor  was  found  to  be  nearly  use 
less  as  a  defence  against  heavy  guns,  for  the  vessel  was  nearly 
ruined  in  a  single  attack  upon  Fort  Darling,  10-inch  shot  break 
ing  through  her  armor  and  shattering  her  hull  almost  beyond 
repair.  The  frigate  New  Ironsides,  built  at  Philadelphia  by 
Merrick  &  Sons,  has  proved  to  be  one  of  the  most  efficient,  if 
not  the  most  formidable  broadside  iron-clad  in  the  world  at  the 
time  she  went  into  service.  Her  superior  power,  however,  con 
sisted  not  in  the  structure  of  her  hull  or  in  any  peculiarity  of 
her  armor,  but  in  her  truly  American  battery  of  11-inch  guns. 
This  battery  was  almost  irresistible  in  an  attack  upon  a  fort  in 
this  respect ;  the  men  could  not  stand  to  their  guns  under  the 
terrible  hail  of  her  shot,  but  she  has  never  been  tested  by  such 
a  fire  as  the  Monitors  have  endured.  She  has  seldom,  if  ever, 
engaged  a  battery  at  a  less  distance  than  a  mile.  A  more  par 
ticular  description  of  this  ship  will  be  given  hereafter. 

But  by  far  the  most  important  contract,  as  events  have 
shown,  was  that  for  the  building  of  the  vessel  afterward  named 
"  The  Monitor."  In  that  curious,  insignificant  looking  craft, 
which  bore  no  resemblance  to  what  men  had  been  taught  to  call 
a  ship,  was  the  germ  of  that  American  thought  which  virtually 
annihilated  the  old  navies  of  the  world.  As  no  invention  of 
modern  times  has  created  a  greater  sensation  than  this  Monitor- 
ship  of  Ericsson,  as  no  one  is  likely  to  exert  so  wide  an  influence 
upon  the  art  of  war,  and  consequently  upon  the  relative  power 
of  nations,  and  as  no  one  has  met  with  a  severer  criticism  or 
harsher  censure,  it  is  thought  proper  to  devote  a  chapter  to  a 
discussion  of  the  peculiarities  and  the  advantages  of  this  new 
American  war-ship  before  entering  upon  the  general  narrative 
of  the  operations  of  the  Navy  during  the  war. 

If  the  country  is  called  upon  to  decide  whether  the  Navy 
Department  was  reckless  and  visionary,  or  prudent  and  far- 
seeing  in  adopting  the  Monitor-ship,  it  is  right  to  consider 
what  they  have  done  and  what  the  Monitor  now  is,  because  the 
original  and  essential  idea  of  the  invention  remains  the  same 


168  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

through  all  the  modifications  and  every  improvement  since 
made,  and  these  were  all  involved  in  the  original  conception. 
The  capabilities,  the  grand  scope  of  the  germ-thought  of  the 
Monitor  plan  induced  the  Department  to  adopt  it,  and  events 
have  justified  the  decision. 

The  original  "  cheese-box  on  a  raft,"  as  it  was  called,  the 
Dictator  and  the  Puritan,  the  Monadnock  and  the  Miantonomoh, 
the  Kalamazoo  and  her  sister  ships,  though  differing  widely 
from  each  other,  yet  all  are  Monitors,  modifications  of  the  one 
central  thought. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE  INVENTOR  OF  THE  MONITOR. 

THE  forces  employed  in  a  great  war  are  not  often  estimated 
according  to  their  real  importance  ;  and  this  is  particularly  so 
in  a  country  like  our  own,  where  the  originating  and  sustaining 
power  is  not  with  the  rulers  hut  the  people.  The  great  under 
lying  force  of  our  struggle  was  with  the  people  themselves. 
They  supplied  the  wealth,  the  mechanical  force  and  skill,  the 
thinking  power  that  created  the  instruments ;  and,  ahove  all, 
the  moral  force  that  gave  not  only  impulse  but  steadiness  to  the 
Government.  The  people  have  received  their  reward  in  the 
common  glory  of  success,  in  the  ennobling  of  the  national 
character,  and  in  the  increased  stability  and  security  of  our 
institutions. 

The  common  soldiers  and  sailors,  and  the  subordinate 
officers  form  another  great  power  of  war,  and  in  no  nation  as 
yet  have  they  obtained  their  proper  reward.  The  superior 
and  successful  officers  are  in  the  main  duly  honored,  and  this 
is  well ;  such  men  should  not  lose  the  full  reward.  The  states 
men  who,  at  the  head  of  affairs,  direct  unseen  these  national 
forces,  do  not  often  receive  from  the  men  of  their  own  times 
the  honor  really  due.  When  subsequent  history  discloses  the 
secrets  of  cabinet  councils,  then  the  statesmen  of  a  previous 
age  are  weighed  and  assigned  to  their  proper  place. 

In  this  age,  when  war  is  not  only  a  science,  but  when  bat 
tles,  especially  on  the  water,  are  decided  by  the  use  of  scientific 
machinery,  the  man  who  invents  a  weapon  which  both  for  of 
fensive  or  defensive  war  is  decidedly  superior  to  any  known 
before,  becomes  himself  a  great  war  power,  one  of  the  forces 


170  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

which,  shape  the  character  of  an  age.  And  inasmuch  as  the 
inventor  of  an  art  or  a  machine  which  revolutionizes  the  opin 
ions  and  practice  of  a  nation,  seldom  has  the  wealth  by  which 
its  value  can  be  tested  on  the  large  scale,  they  who  by  patron 
age  and  capital  supply  the  needed  means  and  share  the  risks 
and  the  odium  of  the  novelty,  deserve  also  an  honorable  place 
by  the  side  of  the  inventor  himself. 

Ericsson*  will  be  recognized  by  impartial  history  as  one  of 
the  great  powers  of  the  American  wrar ;  and  they  who,  like 
Griswold  and  his  associates,  stood  by  the  inventors  of  the  coun 
try  and  enabled  them  to  bring  their  new  weapons  to  the  prac 
tical  test  of  battle,  should  receive  the  honor  due  to  them  as 
among  the  causes  which,  lying  back  of  the  battle  and  concealed 
from  the  public,  contributed  largely  to  the  victory.  This  is 
equally  true  of  those  who  in  the  West  brought  to  the  aid  of 
their  country  their  skill,  their  capital,  and  their  genius. 

It  is  as  the  inventor  of  the  Monitor  that  Captain  Erics- 
eon  will  be  remembered  and  placed  among  those  whose  genius 
has  revolutionized  the  opinions  and  practice  of  the  world. 
Valuable  as  the  caloric  engine  may  be,  it  has  not  superseded 
Bteam  as  a  motive  power ;  and  important  as  the  screw-propeller 
undoubtedly  is,  it  is  only  one  of  the  methods  by  which  steamers 
are  driven,  and  the  side  paddle-wheel  still  maintains  its  place  ; 

*  JOHN  ERICSSON  was  born  in  the  province  of  Wermeland,  Sweden,  in  1803.  The 
son  of  a  mining  proprietor,  his  earliest  impressions  were  derived  from  the  engines 
and  machinery  of  the  mines. 

His  extraordinary  inventive  genius  developed  itself  very  early  in  life.  When 
only  twenty-three  years  old  he  obtained  leave  of  absence  from  the  Swedish  army  for 
the  purpose  of  introducing  in  England  a  flame-engine,  which  he  had  already  exhibited 
in  his  native  country.  He  was  the  inventor  and  constructor  of  the  novelty  engine, 
which  was  one  of  those  which  competed  for  the  prize  offered  for  the  best  locomotive 
by  the  directors  of  the  Liverpool  and  Manchester  Railway  in  1829.  An  artificial 
draught  was  the  distinguishing  feature  of  this  machine.  .  This  feature  is  still  retained 
in  all  locomotives.  He  next  produced  a  stearn  fire-engine,  and  then  soon  after 
brought  out  his  famous  caloric  engine,  some  2,000  of  which  are  now  in  operation. 

He  was  the  inventor  of  the  propeller,  and  of  that  new  arrangement  of  steam  ma 
chinery  in  war-vessels  which  has  revolutionized  the  navies  of  the  world.  The  first 
steamship  built  with  the  new  propelling  machinery  was  the  Princeton,  and  America 
thus  became  the  leader  in  the  great  change.  He  received  almost  countless  testimo 
nials  to  his  genius  and  the  value  of  his  inventions,  in  the  form  of  medals  and  mem 
berships  in  the  most  important  societies  in  Europe,  and  was  most  widely  and  favora 
bly  known  before  his  name  became  connected  with  our  iron-clad  navy. 


UN 


THE   INVENTOR   OF   THE   MONITOR.  171 

but  the  essential  features  of  the  Monitor  ship  seem  destined  to 
modify  or  displace  all  other  forms  of  war-vessels  intended  for 
heavy  ordnance.  Every  experiment  thus  far  made,  either  here 
or  in  Europe,  tends  toward  this  result.  It  is  conceded  that  no 
broadside  ship  now  known  can  float  armor  thick  enough  to  resist 
the  15-inch  or  20-inch  smooth-bore,  or  the  12-inch  rifle,  while 
no  effort  yet  has  succeeded  in  devising  a  casemate  which  is 
equal  to  the  circular  one.  Unless  the  progress  of  events  is  soon 
arrested  by  some  new  discovery,  the  sailing  ship  as  a  war-ship, 
the  wooden  ship,  for  fighting,  and  the  broadside  iron-clad,  will 
all  disappear  among  the  rubbish  of  the  past ;  and  the  Monitors, 
for  a  time  at  least,  will  form  the  world's  weapon  for  naval  war. 

What  new  form  of  engines  of  destruction  the  wonder-work 
ing  modern  mind  may  yet  produce  none  now  can  tell.  Monitors 
may  be  and  probably  will  be  displaced  by  some  new  weapon 
which  may  better  ward  off  or  deal  the  death-blow,  but  this 
would  not  dim  the  fame  of  Ericsson.  It  is  sufficient  to  secure 
his  renown  that  he  met  the  want  of  the  age  in  which  he  lives, 
and  gave  to  this  young  nation  in  its  hour  of  peril  an  instrument 
which  not  only  shielded  her  from  the  blow  meditated  in  Europe, 
but  annihilated  that  naval  power  with  which  France  and  Eng 
land  were  holding  the  rest  of  the  world  in  subjection. 

The  Monitor  and  her  immense  guns  have  broken  the  right 
arm  of  despotism  both  here  and  in  Europe.  They  may  be 
classed  among  the  great  levelling  and  emancipating  forces  of 
the  world.  They  have  made,  at  least  for  a  time,  the  weaker 
nations  equal  in  some  important  respects  upon  the  sea  to  the 
strongest ;  and  once  delivered  from  the  pressure  and  the  fear  of 
the  great  navies,  they  will  gain  confidence  and  moral  power. 
A  nation  owning  a  single  first-class  Monitor  is  above  being  de 
spised,  even  by  England. 

It  is  doubtless  true  that  the  powerful  and  wealthy  nation 
may  in  time  restore  the  former  inequality  by  the  number  of 
its  new  ships  and  the  power  of  its  guns ;  still  the  lesson  of  the 
Monitor  will  not  be  forgotten,  and  perhaps  the  torpedo  or 
some  still  more  terrific  agent  may  once  more  place  the  squad 
rons  of  the  strong  at  the  mercy  of  the  weak ;  and  it  seems 
unlikely  now  that  any  one  great  naval  power  will  hereafter 
dominate  the  seas  as  England  heretofore  has  done. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  MONITORS. 

THE  Monitor  form  of  a  war-ship  is  an  original  invention, 
the  embodiment  of  a  before  unknown  idea.  It  seems  to  stand 
unconnected  with  all  the  previous  thinking  of  the  world  in  re 
gard  to  naval  architecture.  Instead  of  adopting  or  imitating 
any  form  then  known,  it  rejected  them  all.  It  is  scarcely  too 
much  to  say  that  it  is  the  opposite  of  them  all.  A  ship  that 
could  fly  through  the  air  would  be  scarcely  more  removed  from 
the  general  idea  of  the  world  than  is  the  almost  submarine 
Monitor  ploughing  through  or  diving  under  the  waves.  The 
contrast  is  not  less  between  the  hundred  guns  of  the  common 
line-of-battle  ship  and  the  two  guns  of  the  revolving  battery. 
It  marks  an  era  in  the  world's  history.  It  belongs  to  the  high 
est  order  of  genius ;  and  they  were  men  of  genius,  or  in  pro 
found  sympathy  with  genius,  who  had  the  boldness  to  adopt 
the  plan. 

In  order  both  to  weigh  properly  the  objections  which  have 
been  made  against  these  new  engines  of  war,  and  to  estimate 
aright  their  advantages,  it  is  necessary  first  of  all  to  obtain  a 
clear  idea  of  what  a  Monitor  is.  "What  are  its  distinctive  and 
essential  features,  without  which  it  would  not  be  a  Monitor,  and 
retaining  which  it  still  remains  a  Monitor,  though  modified  in 
many  unessential  particulars  ?  First  and  most  important  is  the 
revolving  turret,  which  shields  the  battery ;  and  second,  the 
submerging  of  the  hull  until  the  deck  is  brought  within  a  few 
inches  of  the  surface  of  the  water,  this  distance  varying  some 
what  according  to  the  size  of  the  vessel,  but  presenting  in  all 
only  a  narrow  line  instead  of  the  lofty  broadside  to  an  enemy's 


THE   MONITORS.  173 

fire.  The  advantage  of  this  will  be  more  particularly  shown 
hereafter. 

In  mentioning  the  submerging  of  the  hull  as  a  feature  of  the 
Monitor,  it  is  not  intended  to  state  that  this  is  peculiar  to  this 
form  of  war-ship ;  but  the  true  idea  of  a  Monitor  cannot  be 
carried  out  except  where  the  deck  lies  nearly  level  with  the 
water.  A  broadside  ship  might  carry  a  revolving  turret,  and 
to  that  extent  might  be  called  a  Monitor,  but  the  true  Monitor 
has  her  hull  nearly  all  below  the  water-line,  and  therefore  be 
yond  the  reach  of  shot. 

The  Monitor  idea  then  admits  of  any  change  or  improve 
ment  wThich  leaves  the  hull  nearly  submerged  and  retains  the 
revolving  turret.  This  shows  at  once  how  entirely  irrelevant 
much  of  the  criticism  has  been  by  which  Ericsson's  invention 
has  been  condemned.  This  criticism  has  overlooked  almost 
entirely  the  essential  idea  of  the  invention,  and  attacked  the 
minor  defects  and  mistakes  which  are  unavoidable  in  carrying 
out  so  novel  a  conception.  It  was  unreasonable  to  suppose  that 
an  idea  which  set  aside  all  the  previous  thinking  of  the  world 
in  regard  to  ships,  and  rejected  all  known  forms  of  construction, 
should  assume  at  the  first  trial  a  practical  form  so  complete  as 
to  require  no  improvement ;  and  especially  when  new  ma 
chinery  was  to  be  devised  for  almost  every  operation  of  the 
ship  and  her  guns. 

Upon  the  appearance  of  the  first  Monitor  her  form  was 
ridiculed  and  condemned,  and  the  whole  Monitor  idea  cast  con 
temptuously  aside,  as  if  the  peculiarities  spoken  of  were  the  es 
sential  features  in  the  plan.  Her  armor  was  so  arranged  as  to 
project  on  all  sides,  so  as  to  protect  both  her  propeller  and  the 
hull  for  some  distance  below  the  water-line.  This  was  seized 
upon,  all  its  disadvantages  enumerated  and  exaggerated,  and 
then  the  invention  was  condemned  as  if  this  "overhang"  con 
stituted  a  Monitor.  But  this  was  not  an  essential  part  of  the 
plan,  and  has  been  dispensed  with  in  the  more  recently  con 
structed  ships.  The  criticisms  were  valid  against  the  "  over 
hang,"  but  not  against  a  Monitor.  The  Miantonomoli,  without 
the  projecting  armor-shelf,  is  a  far  better  expression  of  the 
true  Monitor  idea  than  was  the  little  craft  that  defeated  the 
Merrimack. 


HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

It  was  declared  that  the  Monitors  were  all  slow  and  un 
wieldy,  that  they  were  worthless  as  sea-boats,  and  especially  as 
cruisers.  But  the  first  Monitors  were  only  a  special  application 
of  the  general  idea.  The  want  of  the  Government  just  then 
was  some  invulnerable  floating  batteries,  and  such  these  Mon 
itors  were.  They  were  floating  revolving  forts  ;  and  they  not 
only  answered  this  special  purpose  as  no  other  form  of  ship 
could  have  done,  but  they  proved  themselves  to  be  admirable 
sea-boats,  and  their  speed  was  fully  equal  to  that  of  the  New 
Ironsides.  It  was  all  that  was  needed  for  the  service  required 
of  them.  But  the  Monitor  is  not  necessarily  a  slow  ship.  The 
Monadnock  and  the  Miantonomoh  are  among  the  fastest  vessels 
in  the  Navy,  and  are  quite  equal,  as  is  believed,  in  this  respect, 
to  the  average  speed  of  the  iron-clads  of  Europe.  They  are  also 
first-class  sea-boats,  many  officers  and  men  preferring  them  at  sea 
to  a  broadside  ship  of  any  kind.  They  were  condemned  as  un 
healthy,  but  the  latest  medical  reports  would  indicate  that  they 
are  even  more  healthy  than  other  ships.  Because  the  first  one 
was  lost,  it  was  said  they  were  good  for  nothing  except  to  go  to 
the  bottom,  as  if  no  vessel  but  a  Monitor  had  ever  foundered 
at  sea. 

When  the  fleet  of  iron-clads  failed  to  capture  Charleston, 
and  some  of  them  w^ere  temporarily  disabled,  their  worthlessness 
was  again  proclaimed  through  the  land,  and  nearly  all  seemed 
to  forget  the  fact  that  these  vessels  were  the  next  day  in  good 
fighting  trim,  after  having  endured  a  fire  that  would  have  sunk 
the  whole  broadside  fleet  of  Europe,  and  this  with  only  trifling 
injuries  to  the  ships,  and  with  no  loss  of  life.  The  first  attack  in 
Congress,  followed  by  the  censures  of  an  influential  press,  had 
unfitted  the  country  for  forming  a  candid  judgment.  In  all 
their  condemnation  of  the  Monitors,  and  censures  of  those  who 
adopted  them  as  a  part  of  our  national  defences,  men  seemed 
to  forget  that  it  was  a  Monitor,  and  a  very  imperfect  and 
hastily  constructed  one,  which  arrested  the  ruin  of  our  fleet,  and 
at  a  most  perilous  moment  decided  the  contest  in  our  favor. 

The  country  did  not  know  at  the  time,  and  perhaps  will 
never  fully  understand  how  much  it  owed  to  those  Senators  and 
members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  by  whom  this  current 
of  wrong  opinions  and  causeless  prejudice  was  first  arrested  at 


THE    MONITORS.  175 

the  capitol,  and  through  whom  the  truth,  against  determined 
opposition,  was  gradually  brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the 
people. 

Such  was  the  well-spread  distrust,  and  even  hostility  to  the 
Navy  Department  and  its  plans,  that  it  required  the  most  posi 
tive  convictions,  and  a  willingness  to  risk  personal  popularity 
for  the  country's  safety,  to  induce  any  man,  at  that  time,  to 
stand  up  and  defend  the  Navy  from  the  persistent  attack  of 
some  of  the  most  trusted  and  influential  members  of  the  Senate 
and  the  House.  Had  this  attack  succeeded,  and  success  at  one 
moment  seemed  almost  certain ;  had  the  policy  of  the  Depart 
ment  been  repudiated  ;  had  its  plans  for  iron-clads  and  ordnance 
been  rejected,  so  far  as  human  wisdom  can  judge,  looking  back 
on  the  past,  the  rebellion  must  have  succeeded. 

Fortunately  for  the  country,  God  raised  up  men  whose 
statesmanship  was  .equal  to  the  hour,  and  who  had  the  sagacity 
to  perceive  the  real  exigency  of  the  country,  and  who  saw  that 
the  plans  of  the  Department  were  the  only  available  ones  which 
promised  success.  Foremost  in  this  contest  for  the  right  and 
the  safety  of  the  country  were  Hon.  J.  W.  Grimes,  Senator  from 
Iowa,  and  Hon.  A.  II.  Rice,  member  of  the  House  from  Massa 
chusetts  ;  and  with  them,  and  perhaps  equally  entitled  to  the 
country's  grateful  remembrance,  were  Hon.  Messrs.  F.  A.  Pike, 
of  Maine,  II.  T.  Blow,  of  Missouri,  and  Hon.  J.  A.  Griswold,  of 
New  York,  who,  by  their  public  speeches  and  labors  in  Commit 
tee,  both  shielded  the  Department,  began  the  creation  of  a  true 
public  sentiment  in  regard  to  the  Navy,  and  materially  aided  in 
saving  the  country  from  disaster  in  one  of  the  most  critical  peri 
ods  of  the  war.  It  has  been  said,  that  when  Cervantes  "  smiled 
Spain's  chivalry  away,  he  broke  the  right  arm  of  his  own 
country."  Had  Mr.  Hale  and  his  associates  succeeded  in  their 
ridicule,  they  would  have  demolished  with  a  sneer  the  main  de 
fence  of  the  nation. 

Having'  shown  what  the  essential  characteristics  of  a  Moni- 

O 

tor  are,  it  is  but  just  to  state,  that  while  the  original  conception 
and  a  part  of  the  improvements  are  due  solely  to  the  genius  of 
Ericsson,  so  that  his  name  holds  the  same  relation  to  the  Moni 
tor  that  "Watt  does  to  the  steam-engine,  and  Fulton  to  the 
steamboat,  very  important  changes  were  suggested  by  men  of 


176  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

nautical  experience  in  the  Navy  Department ;  and  it  is  probable 
that,  next  to  Ericsson,  the  Assistant  Secretary  has  done  more 
than  any  other  man  in  bringing  this  class  of  ships  to  their 
present  form  and  efficiency,  while  Admiral  Smith  has  also 
contributed  to  the  same  great  national  end.  Nor  do  these  gen 
tlemen  believe  that  Ericsson's  idea  has  been  even  yet  fully  de 
veloped.  They  think  that  it  involves  more  than  as  yet  has  been 
exhibited  in  practice,  and  that  from  it  a  far  more  formidable 
war-ship  than  any  now  afloat  will  hereafter  be  produced. 

These  statements  show  that  much  of  the  hostile  criticism  of 
the  Ericsson  invention  had  no  relation  to  the  real  merits  of  the 
plan,  but  were  rather  directed  to  errors  in  construction,  after 
ward  remedied,  while  much  also  arose  from  a  misunderstanding 
of  the  facts.  The  reader  will  now  be  prepared  to  consider  the 
advantages  of  this  new  war-engine  which,  like  the  steamboat, 
the  locomotive,  and  the  telegraph,  has  come  forth  to  revolution 
ize  the  opinions  of  the  world. 

The  first  and  principal  one,  upon  which  the  rest  depend,  is 
the  revolving  turret,  containing  the  battery  by  which  the  guns 
and  their  shot-proof  shield  turn  together,  and  so  that  the  guns 
can  be  trained  to  any  point  in  the  horizon  without  regard  to  the 
position  of  the  ship. 

This  feature  alone  distinguishes  the  Ericsson  vessel  from 
every  other  known  invention.  It  has  been  claimed  that  Captain 
Coles,  of  the  British  Navy,  was  the  original  inventor  of  the  tur- 
reted  ship.  Even  if  this  were  so,  it  would  detract  nothing  from 
the  fame  of  the  American  inventor,  or  from  the  merits  or  origi 
nality  of  his  plan.  A  Monitor  is  indeed  a  turreted  ship,  but  a 
ship  with  a  stationary  turret  is  by  no  means  a  Monitor.  The 
turreted  ship  of  Captain  Coles,  of  the  British  Navy,  is  simply  a 
broadside  vessel  with  stationary  turrets  upon  the  deck,  and  these 
might  perhaps  better  be  named  circular  casements  in  order  the 
more  readily  to  distinguish  them  from  the  revolving  turrets  of 
Ericsson.  Captain  Coles's  ship  possesses  neither  of  the  chief 
characteristics  of  a  Monitor.  Neither  is  a  vessel  a  Monitor 
which  has  a  stationary  circular  shield  for  the  battery  while  the 
guns  are  mounted  upon  a  turn-table  within.  This  form  was 
proposed  to  avoid  the  danger  of  having  a  revolving  turret 
jammed  by  shot,  as  was  the  case  with  one  or  more  at  Charles- 


THE   MONITORS.  177 

ton.  But  this  difficulty  lias  been  provided  for  by  the  addition 
of  an  outer  ring  enclosing  the  base  of  the  turret,  by  which  it  is 
effectually  guarded.  Neither  in  the  stationary  turret  of  Captain 
Coles,  nor  in  the  turret  with  the  revolving  table,  can  the  guns  be 
trained  to  any  point  without  shifting  the  position  of  the  ship. 
The  gun  can  be  varied  only  to  the  extent  allowed  by  the  trav 
erse  circle,  and  the  port  must  be  enlarged  to  correspond,  so  as 
to  admit  the  different  positions  of  the  gun,  thus  increasing  the 
exposure  of  the  men  ;  while  the  Monitor  port  is  but  little  larger 
than  the  muzzle  of  the  gun.  If  the  expedient  is  adopted  of 
mounting  the  guns  so  as  to  be  fired  through  three  ports  as  in 
the  Stonewall  and  some  of  our  Western  iron-clads,  then  not  only 
is  the  exposure  increased  by  the  three  ports,  but  it  is  a  clumsy 
contrivance  compared  with  the  revolving  turret. 

In  the  Monitor,  whatever  the  position  of  the  ship,  the  guns 
revolving  with  the  turret  can  be  trained  instantly  to  any  point 
of  the  horizon,  sweeping  round  the  entire  circle.  Even  were 
the  Monitor  hard  aground,  it  would  scarcely  diminish  her  defen 
sive  power,  for  from  whatever  quarter  her  adversary  might  ap 
proach  she  would  be  equally  under  her  guns.  A  Monitor 
aground  is  a  revolving  foil  of  the  most  effective  character.  The 
advantage  of  this  feature  will  appear  in  a  subsequent  chapter, 
describing  an  attack  upon  a  Monitor  aground  by  some  land 
forces  on  Ked  Kiver.  The  importance  of  this  feature  of  the  in 
vention  cannot  be  easily  overrated.  It  distinguishes  it  as  clearly 
from  every  other  form  of  turreted  ship  as  it  does  from  a  broad 
side  vessel.  A  second  advantage  is  gained  from  mounting  the 
guns  in  the  centre  of  the  vessel.  This  alone  renders  it  possible 
to  use  at  sea  the  new  heavy  American  guns.  Guns  mounted 
on  broadside  act  with  their  weight  upon  a  lever,  the  length  of 
which  is  equal  to  the  distance  from  the  centre  of  the  ship  to  the 
line  011  which  the  guns  stand,  and  the  tendency  of  this  immense 
weight  is  either  to  roll  the  ship  under  or  wrench  her  timbers 
apart.  It  is  easy,  therefore,  to  see  that  no  vessel  yet  built  could 
bear  the  strain  of  fifteen-inch  guns  mounted  on  her  side  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  feet  outward  from  the  line  of  her  keel.  They 
would  roll  her  under,  or  tear  her  in  pieces.  But  in  a  Monitor 
the  guns  are  mounted  directly  over  the  keel,  and  therefore  the 
ship  has  only  to  bear  their  weight.  Besides,  the  Monitor,  as 
12 


178  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

will  be  more  particularly  shown  hereafter,  scarcely  pitches  at  all, 
and  rolls  but  slightly,  and  the  guns  rest  comparatively  quiet 
over  the  ship's  centre  of  gravity.  This  steadiness  of  the  Moni 
tor  at  sea  offers  another  very  great  advantage  in  the  training  of 
her  guns. 

One  of  the  objections  strenuously  urged  against  them  was 
that  because  the  gunners  are  enclosed  in  the  turret,  and  the 
port-holes  are  scarcely  larger  than  the  muzzles  of  the  guns,  that 
therefore  no  accuracy  of  aim  can  be  obtained.  But  the  exact 
contrary  of  this  is  true,  for  officers  who  have  commanded  Moni 
tors  in  action  inform  us  that,  owing  to  the  steadiness  of  the 
ship,  the  accuracy  of  fire  is  nearly  the  same  as  if  the  guns  were 
in  battery  on  shore.  Nor  is  this  all.  The  Monitor  form  of 
war-ship,  by  the  mounting  of  the  guns  over  the  keel  of  the  ves 
sel,  gives  unlimited  opportunity  to  carry  out  the  American  idea 
of  condensing  the  weight  of  a  broadside  into  a  few  heavy  shot, 
substituting  the  smashing  blow  for  greater  penetration  by  the 
swifter  and  smaller  shot. 

Another  and  essential  feature  of  a  perfect  Monitor  is  that 
the  deck  lies  so  near  the  water-line  that  a  narrow  strip  only  of 
her  hull  is  above  the  surface.  This  enables  such  a  ship  to  carry 
a  perfectly  shot-proof  armor  on  every  part  exposed  to  an  enemy's 
guns,  while  such  a  thickness  of  iron  over  the  whole  side  of  a 
broadside  ship  would  send  her  to  the  bottom  the  moment  she 
was  launched.  Again,  the  Monitor  form  presents  a  mark  so 
exceedingly  small  compared  with  the  huge  broadside,  as  to  give 
her  a  very  decided  advantage  in  battle.  These  two  features,  the 
ability  to  carry  an  invulnerable  armor  on  the  part  exposed,  and 
the  small  target  offered  to  an  enemy,  are  so  important  as  to  re 
quire  particular  consideration.  The  most  formidable  iron-clads 
of  the  British  Navy  are  in  size  and  general  construction  repre 
sented  by  the  Warrior.  England  has  more  efficient  vessels  than 
she  is,  but  the  Warrior  may  properly  be  used  to  show  the  dif 
ference  of  exposed  surface  in  a  first-class  broadside  frigate,  and 
a  Monitor  able  to  cope  with  her.  The  "Warrior  is  three  hun 
dred  and  eighty  (380)  feet  long,  and  she  floats,  according  to  the 
scale  of  an  official  drawing,  twenty  feet  out  of  the  water.  The 
area  of  her  broadside  exposed  to  shot  is,  therefore,  seven  thou 
sand  six  hundred  (7,600)  square  feet.  The  length  of  the  first 


THE   MONITOES.  179 

Monitor  was  one  hundred  and  eighty-five  (185)  feet,  of  the  sec 
ond  class  two  hundred  (200)  feet,  of  the  third  class  two  hundred 
and  twenty-five  (225)  feet,  of  the  Monadnock  class  two  hundred 
and  fifty-seven  (257)  feet,  and  of  the  Dictator  three  hundred 
and  fourteen  (314)  feet.  These  ships,  upon  the  average,  do  not 
float  much  more  than  one  foot  above  the  water  when  in  fighting 
trim ;  and  the  immense  advantage  which  they  have  over  a 
broadside  antagonist  is  readily  seen.  But  the  comparison  can 
be  made  with  perfect  accuracy  between  such  a  ship  as  the  War 
rior  and  one  of  our  double-turreted  Monitors  of  the  Monad- 
nock  class.  The  Miantonomoh  is  of  this  pattern.  She  is,  in 
round  numbers,  two  hundred  and  fifty-seven  (257)  feet  long, 
and  her  deck,  when  prepared  for  action,  rises  only  twenty-four 
inches  above  the  water.  Hence  the  surface  exposed  in  her  broad 
side  is  only  five  hundred  and  fourteen  (514)  square  feet.  Add 
to  this  the  turrets,  each  twenty-two  feet  in  diameter  and  nine 
feet  high,  equal  to  one  hundred  and  ninety  (190)  square  feet 
each  more,  and  it  is  seen  that  a  Monitor  of  this  size  presents  in  all 
only  eight  hundred  and  ninety-four  (894)  square  feet  as  a  target 
to  the  enemy's  fire,  while  the  Warrior  offers  seven  thousand  six 
hundred  square  feet.  Besides  this,  it  must  be  remembered  that 
a  surface  two  hundred  feet  long  and  only  two  feet  wide,  if  visi 
ble  at  all  at  the  distance  of  a  mile,  or  even  a  thousand  yards, 
appears  only  as  a  line  of  that  length,  while,  unless  a  shot 
strikes  a  turret  exactly  in  the  centre,  it  is  almost  certain  to  be 
turned  aside.  The  chances  then  of  hitting  a  Monitor  with  a 
damaging  shot  from  a  high  broadside  vessel  in  motion,  and 
rolling  or  pitching  with  the  sea,  are  very  few.  Nor  must  it  be 
forgotten  that  the  reason  why  our  Monitors  have  been  struck  so 
often  is,  that  they  have  fought  against  forts  and  batteries  whose 
guns  were  stationary,  and  had  been  previously  trained  with  the 
utmost  possible  precision  upon  points  where  the  vessels  were  de 
tained  by  obstructions  placed  for  this  purpose.  This  will  be 
fully  shown  in  the  description  of  the  obstructions  in  Charleston 
harbor.  It  has  been  said  that  the  greater  number  of  guns  of 
the  broadside  ship  will  more  than  compensate  for  the  inequal 
ity  of  size.  But  no  shot  from  guns  yet  mounted  in  broadside 
would  harm  either  the  turret  or  the  sides  of  the  Miantono 
moh,  though  every  one  of  a  broadside  should  strike  at  point- 


180  HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

blank  range.  Her  side  armor  is  equal  to  nearly  eleven  inches 
of  solid  iron ;  and  then,  inasmuch  as  her  deck  is  solid  wood  and 
iron  down  to  the  water-line,  the  backing  of  her  side  armor  is 
really  fifty-two  feet  thick,  or  the  whole  width  of  the  ship.  !N"o 
shot  yet  fired  from  a  broadside  ship  would  injure  her  turret, 
while  at  a  thousand  yards  such  a  Monitor,  from  her  great  stead 
iness  in  the  water,  should  strike  a  ship  like  the  "Warrior  with 
four  15-inch  shot  at  every  discharge  of  her  guns  at  the  distance 
of  fifteen  hundred  yards.  The  effect  of  these  shot  upon  any 
armor  which  a  broadside  vessel  can  float  will  be  shown  here 
after,  and  the  proof  will  be  presented  that  any  one  of  our  Moni 
tors  mounting  15-inch  guns  would  sink  any  ship  of  the  War 
rior  pattern. 

In  this  comparison  of  surfaces  exposed  in  a  broadside  ship 
and  a  Monitor,  it  should  be  stated,  that  while  it  was  assumed  in 
the  calculation  that  the  Miantonomoh  rises  two  feet  out  of  the 
water,  many  of  our  turreted  ships  have  their  decks  only  about 
twelve  inches  above  the  water-line,  and  that  the  Dictator,  the 
largest  yet  finished  (February,  1866),  is  very  little  higher  than 
this. 

To  place  this  subject  in  a  still  clearer  light,  let  it,  for  the 
sake  of  a  comparison,  be  supposed,  though  it  is  not  true,  that 
the  broadside  frigate  with  her  greater  number  of  guns  would 
strike  the  small  target  as  often  as  the  Monitor  could  the  large 
broadside  with  her  four  guns,  let  the  reader  consider  what  kind 
of  a  ship  it  must  be,  and  what  guns  she  must  carry,  in  order  to 
match  the  turreted  vessel.  The  broadside  of  the  Warrior  pre 
sents  a  surface  to  fire  eight  and  a  half  or  nine  times  as  large  as 
the  Miantonomoh.  To  equal  this  Monitor,  the  English  frigate 
should  carry  on  a  side  eight  and  a  half  times  the  number  of  15-^ 
inch  guns  which  the  Monitor  mounts.  This  would  require  thirty- 
four  on  a  side,  or  sixty-four  15-inch  guns  in  all.  In  addition  to 
this  she  must  be  covered  all  around  with  armor  eleven  inches 
thick.  It  is  not  possible  to  comply  with  either  of  these  condi 
tions,  and  hence  the  difficulty,  in  the  present  state  of  science 
and  invention,  of  constructing  a  broadside  ship  that  can  cope 
with  our  double-turreted  Monitors.  No  English  or  French  ship 
yet  launched  can  carry  our  15-inch  gun  in  broadside. 

Another  very  decided  advantage  afforded  by  Ericsson's  in- 


THE   MONITORS.  181 

vention  is  the  small  number  of  men  required  for  the  working  of 
the  ship  and  her  guns.  The  crew  of  the  Warrior  is  stated  by 
English  authorities  to  be  seven  hundred  men,  while  the  Mian- 
tonomoh  requires  but  two  hundred,  and  the  single  turrets  are 
worked  by  one  hundred  men. 

Add  to  this  the  almost  entire  safety  of  the  men,  and  it  will 
be  seen  that  this  is  not  the  least  recommendation  of  the  Ameri 
can  war-ship.  Such  are  the  chief  features  of  Ericsson's  inven 
tion,  clearly  marking  it  as  a  new  thought,  which,  by  changes  in 
the  application  of  its  principle  that  experience  has  suggested, 
is  now  embodied  in  the  most  formidable  war-vessels  of  the 
world. 

So  clear  and  decided  were  the  convictions  of  the  Secretary 
and  his  associates  that  they  persevered  through  opposition,  mis 
representation,  and  ridicule,  until  their  policy  was  triumphantly 
vindicated  by  results.  Perhaps  the  noblest  triumph  of  the  Navy 
has  been  announced  while  this  paragraph  was  being  written 
(February,  1866),  the  official  announcement  that  the  French 
emperor  is  preparing  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  Mexico.  If 
this  is  true,  then  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  this  course  beyond 
all  doubt  is  the  power  of  the  American  Navy,  and  the  well- 
known  fact  that  our  iron-clad  fleet  cannot  be  safely  attacked. 
Besides,  all  Europe  knows  that  we  have  nearly  ready  for  sea  at 
this  date  the  most  powerful  steam-cruisers  in  the  world.  May 
the  nation  learn  from  this  a  lesson  in  regard  to  the  importance 
of  the  Navy,  for  on  it  must  depend  hereafter  the  peaceful  solu 
tion  of  foreign  complications  !  If  we  maintain  a  Navy  suited 
to  the  power  and  resources  of  the  country,  no  foreign  nation 
will  dare  attack  us,  and  therefore  we  shall  have  peace. 

No  American  statesman  should  be  deluded  by  the  idea  that 
peace  can  be  long  maintained  between  this  republic  and  Europe 
except  by  a  Navy  that  is  able  to  defend  us  against  the  united 
attack  of  every  Latin  power  in  Europe,  aided  by  England. 
This  will  seem  to  many  perhaps  a  reckless  assertion,  but  it  is 
not  made  without  careful  consideration.  France  controls  every 
one  of  these  Latin  powers ;  and  the  principal  ones,  as  Spain  and 
Italy,  are  rapidly  increasing  their  navies — iron-clad  navies. 
France  will  be  able  to  combine  against  us,  whenever  she 
chooses,  Spain,  Italy,  and  England. 


182  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

"We  should  not  forget  how  recently  the  fleets  of  France, 
Spain,  and  England,  appeared  on  American  shores,  leagued  in 
a  conspiracy  against  the  United  States,  which  has  failed  only 
because  of  our  new  war  weapons,  our  sudden  development  of 
our  military  power,  and  our  success  in  putting  down  the  rebel 
lion.  The  antagonisms  between  this  republic  and  the  powers 
of  Western  Europe  are  sharp,  active,  irreconcilable,  and  endur 
ing.  There  is  a  religious  antagonism,  and  one  of  races  also. 
Louis  ]STapoleon,  in  an  unguarded  moment,  declared  these  to  be 
the  powers  that  originated  the  attack  on  Mexico.  He  went,  he 
said,  to  restore  on  this  continent  the  prestige  of  the  Latin  race, 
and,  of  course,  the  Latin  Church.  For  the  very  same  reasons 
he  produced  the  war  against  Russia,  to  restore  in  the  East  the 
prestige  of  the  Latin  race. 

This  intention  to  restore  both  in  Europe  and  here  the  old 
control  of  the  Latin  race  over  the  Anglo-Saxon,  and  of  the 
Latin  Church  over  the  Protestant,  will  not  be  abandoned  until 
a  decision  has  been  reached  either  by  a  great  war  or  by  such 
an  exhibition  of  power  on  our  part  as  would  forbid  all  hope  of 
a  successful  attack.  This  involves  also  a  political  antagonism. 
The  religious  sentiment  of  the  Latin  race  clothes  itself  in  de 
spotic  forms  in  Church  and  State  alike.  It  knows  no  other  form 
of  civilization,  it  rejects  all  else.  The  American  religious  senti 
ment  embodies  itself  in  free  institutions — political,  social,  and 
religious.  It  is  a  direct,  ever-acting  antagonism  to  the  systems 
and  sentiment  of  Western  Europe.  The  forces  on  both  sides 
therefore  are  aggressive,  and  sooner  or  later  the  conflict  must 
come,  unless  it  is  warded  off  by  the  manifest  strength  of  our 
Navy. 

Again,  the  commercial  and  manufacturing  antagonism  is 
also  very  strong  and  very  active ;  and  England,  whose  very  exist 
ence  is  wrapped  up  in  these  interests,  will  attack  us  whenever 
she  dares  to  do  so,  in  the  hope  of  crushing  a  rival.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  build  in  advance  a  thousand  ships,  but  our  home 
manufactures  should  be  cherished.  Yards  should  be  provided, 
materials  accumulated,  and  machinery  erected,  which  will  en 
able  us  to  compete  with  Europe  in  the  production  of  ships.  We 
must  become  a  great  naval  power,  or  be  at  the  mercy  of  Europe. 
Those  who  have  introduced  the  Monitors  not  only  indorse  all 


THE   MONITORS.  183 

that  has  thus  far  been  stated  here,  but  they  are  fully  prepared 
to  go  much  further.  After  having  tested  such  vessels  as  the 
Monadnock  and  Miantonomoh,  especially  after  their  perform 
ance  at  sea  has  been  watched  and  reported  by  experienced 
naval  officers,  those  in  whose  judgment  we  have  reason  to  con 
fide,  are  perfectly  willing  to  commit  themselves  to  the  opin 
ion  that  the  Monitor  idea  is  destined  to  work  a  revolution  not 
only  in  regard  to  coast  and  harbor  defences,  but  in  the  whole 
system  of  naval  architecture  in  the  world. 

Taking  this  general  view  of  the  subject,  the  submerged  or 
nearly  submerged  hull  is  the  central  thought.  In  the  severest 
gale  the  agitation  of  the  water  reaches  but  a  few  feet  below  the 
surface,  and  it  therefore  is  quite  evident  that  if  a  vessel  could 
be  moved  beneath  the  waves  instead  of  upon  them,  that  her 
path  would  be  through  calm  water,  however  rough  it  might  be 
above  her.  In  proportion  as  the  hull  of  a  vessel  is  thus  sunk 
into  the  calmer  water,  while  a  diminished  surface  is  exposed  to 
the  stroke  of  the  surface-wave,  will  be  her  steadiness  and  safety. 
This  principle  has  been  illustrated  by  reference  to  the  elephant, 
who  swims  beneath  the  surface,  sinking  his  huge  bulk  until  it 
floats  in  comparatively  calm  water,  and  communicating  through 
his  uplifted  trunk  with  the  upper  air. 

A  properly  constructed  Monitor  therefore  might  be  called, 
not  inaptly,  an  iron  sea-elephant,  communicating  with  the 
upper  air  through  its  turret  and  pilot-house,  while  the  hull  is 
mostly  beneath  the  water.  Holding  for  a  moment  the  idea  of 
the  submerged  hull  separate  from  all  others,  the  inquiry  is  sug 
gested,  why  the  merchant-ship  and  even  the  sailing  vessel  should 
not  also  be  constructed  upon  the  same  principle  ?  Sails  or  steam 
will  propel  a  vessel  whose  deck  lies  level  with  the  water,  to  say 
the  least,  as  rapidly  as  when  her  sides  rise  twenty  feet  above, 
while  her  steadiness  would  of  course  be  greatly  increased  by 
sinking  her  hull  into  the  calm  water  below.  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  it  is  well  known  that  the  Monitors  in  a  gale  are  the  stead 
iest  vessels  afloat.  The  wear  and  tear  of  a  large,  high,  broad 
side  ship,  by  the  strokes  of  the  sea  upon  her  lofty  sides,  and  by 
the  strain  of  her  pitching  and  rolling,  is  of  course  very  great. 
But  this  smiting  of  the  waves  upon  the  sides,  and  most  of  the 
injurious  motion  of  a  ship,  would  be  avoided  by  leaving  only  the 


184  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

deck  above  water.  If  the  principle  here  assumed  is  correct, 
then  perhaps  it  may  be  expected  that  the  time  will  come  when 
the  submarine  ship,  or  one  nearly  so,  will  supersede  all  other 
forms.  "What  particular  shape  the  principle  may  in  practice 
assume  cannot  now  perhaps  be  foreseen ;  but  experiments  al 
ready  made  have,  in  the  opinion  of  good  judges,  shown  con 
clusively  not  only  that  the  Monitor  can  live  in  a  heavy  sea,  but 
that  the  Monitor  principle  will  secure  the  best  sea-boat  yet  de 
vised  by  man. 

There  need  be  no  fear  in  reference  to  such  a  ship  of  the 
most  appropriate  form.  The  fact  is  already  established  that  a 
vessel  with  her  deck  at  the  surface  of  the  water  has  buoyancy 
enough  to  carry  guns  and  stores,  or  a  cargo ;  that  she  will  go 
through  the  waves  or  under  them  far  more  easily  and  steadily 
than  she  could  ride  over  them,  and  the  ingenuity  of  man  will 
soon  devise  the  means  of  giving  speed  and  comfort  to  the  novel 
ship.  Indeed,  as  has  been  already  stated,  our  latest-built  Mon 
itors  are  among  our  fastest  war-ships,  and  many  officers  and  men 
prefer  them  to  any  other  ship,  because  there  is  in  them  far  less 
of  discomfort  and  exposure. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  DIFFERENT  CLASSES  OF  MONITORS. 

THE  next  step  in  this  history  will  be  to  present  a  general 
description  of  the  different  classes  of  Monitors,  and  what  they 
have  performed  daring  the  war  will  be  set  forth  hereafter  in  the 
narrative. 

In  the  perilous  hour  which  has  been  described,  when  the 
Merrimack  was  being  hastened  on  to  completion  in  the  hope  of 
destroying  our  Navy,  laying  waste  our  cities,  and  ending  the 
war,  God  brought  the  genius  of  Ericsson  to  the  aid  of  the  na 
tion  ;  but  genius  without  money  could  avail  nothing.  The 
Government,  through  a  mistaken  trust  that  war  had  ceased, 
had  no  means  of  its  own  for  constructing  an  iron-clad.  It  had 
neither  the  proper  yards  nor  suitable  machinery.  It  was  in 
precisely  the  condition  in  which  the  next  great  war  will  find  us, 
if  a  narrow  policy  in  regard  to  the  Navy  should  rule  the  coun 
cils  of  the  nation  instead  of  a  generous  and  cordial  support.  It 
was  the  state  in  which  the  nation  will  be  ere  long  if  we  forget 
that  in  a  foreign  war  a  navy,  and  not  an  array,  must  fight  the 
battles. 

In  this  emergency  individuals  were  found  willing  to  risk 
their  capital  and  their  business  reputation  in  constructing,  at 
their  own  risk,  the  nondescript  vessel.  Such  was  the  state  of 
public  opinion  that  the  Department  felt  compelled  to  guard  the 
contract  with  some  stringent  conditions.  The  report  of  the 
board  of  officers  bound  the  Secretary  to  this  course  so  far  as  its 
authority  went.  "While  in  the  contract  for  the  New  Ironsides 
the  contractors  were  required  simply  to  comply  with  the  speci 
fications  furnished,  and  while  her  plan  was  proposed  by  the 


186  HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

board  as  "the  most  practicable  one  for  heavy  armor,"  thus 
throwing  some  distrust  at  the  outset  upon  the  turreted  battery, 
the  contractors  for  the  Monitor  were  bound  under  forfeiture  to 
guarantee  against  "  failure  in  any  of  the  properties  and  points 
of  the  vessel  as  proposed."  For  these  restrictions  the  Navy  De 
partment  has  been  censured,  and  the  Secretary  has  been  re 
proached  with  permitting  a  great  national  battle  to  be  fought 
by  a  ship  which  at  the  time  was  the  property  of  individuals. 
But  these  conditions  were  imposed  by  the  report  of  the  board, 
and  with  the,  well-known  feelings  and  opinions  in  and  out  of 
Congress  the  Secretary  perhaps  was  not  inclined  to  assume  a 
responsibility  not  properly  his.  Manifestly,  he  could  do  no  less 
than  to  require  that  the  novel  battery  should  perform  what  the 
inventor  and  contractor  promised ;  there  was  no  time  for  any 
experiments  with  her  after  she  was  ready  for  sea,  and,  in  fact, 
it  was  only  by  a  trial  in  battle  that  conclusive  proof  could  be 
given  that  the  contract  was  really  fulfilled.  As  a  matter  of 
course,  therefore,  she  was  not  fully  paid  for  until  after  her  trial 
in  the  fight  with  the  Merrimack. 

It  is  always  interesting  to  learn  how  great  inventions  have 
originated ;  under  what  circumstances,  by  what  influences,  and 
by  what  men  they  have  been  introduced  among  the  forces  of  the 
world.  The  birthplace  and  early  history  of  a  great  idea  are  at 
least  as  important  as  those  of  a  great  man.  In  order  to  present 
these  facts  in  regard  to  the  Monitor,  it  is  necessary  to  go  a  little 
back  of  some  statements  already  made.  In  September,  1861, 
C.  S.  Bushnell,  of  ISTew  Haven,  the  gentleman  who  contracted 
to  build  the  corvette  Galena,  was  conversing  with  Ericsson  in 
regard  to  iron-clad  batteries,  when  he  took  from  a  drawer  a 
plan  of  one  which  he  at  some  former  period  had  conceived  and 
sketched  for  future  reference.  It  was  substantially  the  plan  of 
the  original  Monitor.  Mr.  Bushnell  was  most  favorably  im 
pressed  with  the  novel  idea,  and  urged  Ericsson  to  go  to  "Wash 
ington  and  present  the  plan  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy.  For 
some  reason  this  proposition  was  declined,  and  at  length  Mr. 
Bushnell  asked  and  obtained  permission  to  take  the  drawing 
himself  to  the  Secretary.  Mr.  "Welles  was  pleased  with  the 
idea,  but  few  of  the  naval  officers  and  constructors  at  that  time 
regarded  the  plan  with  favor.  Naturally  enough  they  felt  un- 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  1ST 

willing  to  risk  a  reputation  honorably  earned,  and  which  was 
their  all,  upon  this  novel  weapon  entirely  untried,  and  which, 
however  perfect  it  might  be  in  theory,  they  feared  might  fail  in 
the  stern  practice  of  a  fight.  From  the  first,  however,  Admiral 
Joseph  Smith  gave  to  the  Monitor  battery  his  sanction  and 
earnest  support,  and  aided  the  Secretary  in  his  effort  to  bring 
out  the  new  invention  to  the  extent  of  his  influence.  Among 
many  that  doubted,  he  stands  conspicuous  as  the  early  and 
steadfast  friend  of  the  iron-clad  navy.  He  presents  one  of  the 
few  examples  where  men  rise  above  the  trammels  of  early  edu 
cation  and  even  of  professional  training,  and  embrace  late  in 
life  entirely  new  ideas.  A  few  facts  in  regard  to  Admiral 
Smith*  will  doubtless  be  interesting  to  the  reader,  inasmuch  as 
he  has  been  an  actor  in  both  our  great  naval  wars. 

*  Rear-Admiral  JOSEPH  SMITH  was  bora  in  1791,  in  Hanover  Old  Colony,  Massa 
chusetts.  He  entered  the  Navy  as  a  midshipman,  in  January,  1809.  He  has  served 
in  the  several  grades  of  midshipman,  master,  commandant,  captain,  commodore,  and 
rear-admiral,  in  all  of  which  grades  he  sustained  the  character  of  an  intelligent  and 
efficient  officer.  During  a  period  when  active  service  in  the  Navy  was  not  available, 
in  order  to  perfect  himself  in  the  duties  of  seamanship,  he  entered  the  merchant  ser 
vice,  and  made  several  voyages  to  Europe  and  the  East  Indies. 

During  the  War  of  1812  he  was  ordered  to  Lake  Champlain,  and  served  as  a  lieu 
tenant  under  McDonough.  In  the  battle  of  Plattsburg  he  was  second  in  command 
of  the  brig  Eagle,  which  carried  twenty  guns.  In  that  bloody  fight  he  received  a 
wound,  the  effects  of  which  he  will  carry  with  him  to  his  grave.  One  incident  of  that 
battle  which  Admiral  Smith  relates  is  worth  recording.  Among  those  on  board  the 
Eagle  was  one  who  had  his  wife  with  him.  This  man  was  killed  during  the  action, 
and  his  body  laid  down  on  the  berth-deck.  Several  of  the  powder-boys  were  soon 
killed  or  wounded,  and  this  woman  volunteered  to  take  the  place  of  one  of  them,  and 
carried  cartridges  from  the  magazine  to  the  guns,  stepping  each  time  over  the  man 
gled  corpse  of  her  husband.  The  name  of  that  woman  should  be  known. 

For  his  gallantry  on  that  occasion  Lieutenant  Smith  received  a  medal  from  the 
Government.  He  was  in  the  frigate  Constitution  in  the  war  with  Algiers,  then  in  the 
Guerriere,  as  first  lieutenant  under  McDonough,  and  subsequently  commanded  that 
ship  in  the  Pacific.  He  atone  time  commanded  the  line-of-battle -ship  Ohio  in  the 
Mediterranean,  and  afterward  the  Mediterranean  squadron  in  the  flag-ship  Cumber 
land. 

In  1846  he  was  appointed  chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Yards  and  Docks,  and  the  fact 
that  he  has  retained  that  place  up  to  this  time  (1867),  is  sufficient  evidence  of  the 
ability  with  which  his  department  of  the  service  has  been  conducted.  It  was  his  son 
who  so  gallantly  defended  the  Congress  when  attacked  by  the  Merrimack,  and  who 
was  killed  in  that  action. 

His  connection  with  the  board  appointed  to  examine  and  report  upon  the  proposed 
construction  of  iron-clad  vessels,  and  the  support  which  he  gave  to  Ericsson's  inven 


188  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Notwithstanding  the  manifest  hazards  of  an  untried  experi 
ment,  involving  so  large  an  amount  as  the  construction  of  a 
Monitor,  men  were  found  who  had  the  sagacity  to  perceive  the 
excellences  of  the  plan  of  Ericsson,  and  who  had  the  courage 
and  patriotism  to  take  all  the  risks  which  the  enterprise  re 
quired.  The  names  of  such  men  should  be  handed  down  in 
history  equally  with  those  who  fought  our  battles,  or  those  who 
distinguished  themselves  as  statesmen  and  legislators. 

The  genius  that  conceived  the  Monitor,  and  the  patriotic 
manufacturers  who  perilled  reputation  and  money  in  her  con 
struction,  were  as  truly  among  the  heroes  and  saviors  of  the 
country  as  the  President  and  his  Cabinet,  or  our  legislators,  or 
the  generals  at  the  head  of  our  armies,  or  our  naval  officers  on 
their  victorious  ships. 

Such  men  were  those  who  associated  themselves  for  the  pur 
pose  of  building  and  bringing  out  the  Monitor.  These  men 
were,  the  Hon.  John  A.  Griswold,  of  Troy,  K  Y. ;  C.  S.  Bush- 
nell,  of  New  Haven,  who  first  brought  Ericsson's  drawing  to 
the  notice  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  who,  being  also 
the  contractor  for  the  building  of  the  Galena,  was  willing  to 
take  the  additional  risk  of  the  Monitor.  "With  these  two  was 
associated  John  F.  "Winslow. 

Conspicuous  among  these  as  the  man  whose  capital,  general 
influence,  and  business  resources  were  relied  upon  to  carry  out 
the  enterprise  was  John  A.  Griswold,  whose  extensive  iron 
mills  and  acquaintance  with  manufacturers  enabled  him  to  push 
forward  the  work,  so  that  the  Monitor  was  not  too  late  in  reach 
ing  the  scene  of  her  trial  and  her  triumph.  As  Mr.  Griswold 


tion  have  already  been  mentioned.  The  New  Ironsides,  however,  was  Admiral  Smith's 
favorite  ship ;  and  he  was  in  favor  of  constructing  other  casemated  broadside  vessels. 
At  his  suggestion  the  original  dimensions  and  form  of  the  New  Ironsides  were  some 
what  changed,  so  as  to  lessen  her  draught  to  enable  her  to  enter  the  Southern  har 
bors.  This  ship  was  undoubtedly  one  of  the  finest  broadside  frigates  in  the  world, 
and  reflects  great  credit  on  the  good  judgment  of  Admiral  Smith. 

He  made  several  suggestions  to  Mr.  Webb  in  the  construction  of  the  Dunderberg, 
some  of  which  were  adopted. 

He  was  entirely  opposed  to  ignoring  wood  in  the  construction  of  iron  vessels ; 
and  neither  approved  nor  recommended  the  building  of  the  iron  vessels  Dictator  and 
Puritan.  The  man  who  was  a  friend  of  the  Monitor  and  New  Ironsides  deserves  to 
be  remembered. 


^ 


UNIVERSITY   ) 

\  OF  / 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  189 

occupies  a  prominent  position  before  the  country,  as  one  of  her 
leading  and  trusted  public  men,  in  addition  to  his  connection 
with  the  Monitor,  it  may  be  well  that  the  friends  of  the  Navy 
should  know  something  of  his  history.* 

Such  were  the  circumstances  in  which  the  Monitor  took  her 
place  in  the  American  Navy. 

Ericsson  was  the  undisputed  inventor  of  the  new  battery. 
He  had  conceived  the  idea  several  years  before  the  war.  C.  S. 

*  JOHN  A.  GRISWOLD  was  born  at  Nassau,  Rensselaer  County,  New  York.  His 
ancestors  were  among  those  who  fought  in  the  war  of  the  Eevolution,  and  one  of 
them  was  confined  in  the  Jersey  prison-ship,  suffering  as  well  as  fighting  for  his 
country.  He  was  educated  for  commercial  pursuits ;  and  when  about  seventeen 
years  of  age  he  entered  the  iron  and  hardware  house  of  Hart,  Seeley  &  Warren,  in 
Troy,  New  York.  About  one  year  after,  he  accepted  the  position  of  book-keeper  in 
the  house  of  C.  H.  &  I.  J.  Merrick,  cotton  manufacturers.  With  this  firm  he  remained 
for  some  time,  living  in  the  family  of  his  uncle,  Major-General  J.  E.  Wool.  Soon 
after  engaging  in  businesss  for  himself,  he  became  interested  in  the  iron  manufacture, 
and  that  and  banking  have  formed  his  principal  occupations.  He  entered  political 
life  as  a  member  of  the  Democratic  party,  and  in  1855  was  elected  Mayor  of  the  city 
of  Troy.  His  Democracy,  however,  never  led  him  into  opposition  to  the  Government, 
and  upon  the  breaking  out  of  the  rebellion  he  at  once  placed  himself  firmly  on 
the  side  of  the  country.  He  presided  at  a  public  meeting  in  Troy,  on  the  15th  of 
April,  and  urged  a  speedy  response  to  the  demands  of  the  Government.  The  Second 
regiment  of  New  York  volunteers  was  largely  aided  by  him  in  preparing  for  the 
field.  His  assistance  was  also  liberally  given  to  several  other  regiments,  one  of  which 
was  known  as  the  Griswold  Light  Cavalry. 

Soon  after,  in  connection  with  C.  S.  Bushnell,  of  New  Haven,  and  John  F.  Wins- 
low,  the  contract  for  building  the  Monitor  was  entered  into,  the  model  having  been 
shown  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  who  expressed  much  interest  in  the  matter.  The  building  of 
the  Monitor  was  begun  in  October,  1861,  the  contractors  advancing  for  the  work 
$275,000.  On  the  30th  of  January,  1862,  one  hundred  days  from  her  commence 
ment,  she  was  launched  at  Greenpoint.  Thus  Mr.  Griswold  and  his  associates  were 
instrumental  in  saving  the  reputation  of  the  Government  at  a  very  critical  hour,  and 
such  men  deserve  to  be  gratefully  remembered  as  public  benefactors. 

Subsequently  Mr.  Griswold  employed  his  capital  and  influence  in  the  construction 
of  the  Dictator  ;  and  when  the  Navy  Department  was  attacked  in  the  Senate  by  Mr. 
Hale,  and  in  the  House  by  Mr.  Davis,  he  made  a  very  effective  speech  in  defence  of 
its  policy,  and  especially  in  the  construction  of  the  Monitors.  As  a  politician  Mr. 
Griswold  has  enjoyed  in  a  high  degree  the  confidence  of  the  Union  party.  Elected 
for  three  successive  terms  to  Congress,  and  in  the  very  period  when  the  country  was 
passing  through  its  severest  trials,  he  proved  himself  true  to  the  great  principles  on 
which  the  war  was  fought ;  and  was,  in  consequence  of  his  faithfulness  and  high- 
toned  patriotism  reflected  for  the  Fortieth  Congress  by  the  largest  majority  ever 
given  for  a  candidate  in  his  district.  Not  only  by  his  construction  of  the  Monitors, 
but  by  long  service  as  an  efficient  member  of  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs,  he 
identified  himself  with  the  interests  of  the  Navy. 


190  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Bushnell,  by  permission  of  Ericsson,  brought  it  to  the  notice  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  while  at  Hartford.  Mr.  Welles  was 
pleased  with  it,  and  referred  it  to  the  board  which  had  been 
appointed  by  Congress  to  investigate  the  subject  of  iron-clad 
vessels.  It  met,  at  first,  with  little  support,  except  from 
Admiral  Smith.  Early  in  the  discussion,  the  plan  was  ap 
proved  by  the  Assistant  Secretary,  Captain  Fox,  who  has  since 
so  fully  identified  himself  with  the  Monitor  fleet.  The  rapid 
construction  of  the  Monitor,  so  that  she  was  ready  to  meet 
the  Merrimack,  was  mainly  due  to  the  capital,  the  energy,  and 
patriotism  of  John  A.  Griswold,  and  his  partners,  Bushnell  and 
"Winslow. 

The  iron- clad  navy  was  first  discussed  and  designed  in  ref 
erence  to  the  retaking  the  forts  and  harbors  of  the  South ;  but 
the  known  progress  which  the  rebels  were  making  with  their 
frigate  at  Norfolk  made  it  necessary  to  devise  the  means  of 
meeting  that  meditated  attack ;  and  it  may  therefore  be  said 
that  the  first  Monitor  was  extemporized  for  the  purpose  of  stop 
ping  the  Merrimack  ;  and  all  criticism  and  all  censure  are  com 
pletely  answered  by  the  one  fact  that  she  did  completely  the 
very  work  for  which  she  was  mainly  designed. 

It  has  been  said  she  was  not  a  sea-boat,  yet  she  encountered 
rough  weather  on  her  passage  to  Hampton  Roads,  and  went 
through  safely.  It  was  said  she  was  so  slow,  yet  she  was  there 
in  time  to  save  the  Minnesota  and  the  country's  honor.  But 
she  had  that  awkward  overhang :  yes,  but  in.  spite  of  that,  she 
repulsed  the  rebel  frigate  and  saved  the  Navy  and  our  cities. 
Yet  the  men  were  all  shut  up  below  water :  yes,  and  they  all 
came  out  alive  after  a  four  hours'  fight  with  the  most  formida 
ble  vessel  then  afloat,  except  her  small  antagonist. 

The  following  is  a  brief  description  of  the  original  Monitor  : 

Extreme  length  on  deck  over  the  armor 173  feet. 

Extreme  beam  on  deck  over  the  armor 41          6  inches. 

Depth 12 

Length  of  iron  hull 127 

Width  of  iron  hull 36          2  inches. 

Projection  of  armor-shelf  forward 14 

Projection  of  armor-shelf  aft 32 . 

The  thickness  of  the  side  armor  was  five  inches  above  the 


THE    DIFFERENT    CLASSES    OF   MONITOES.  191 

water-line,  diminishing,  first  to  four  inches,  and  then  to  three 
inches,  below  the  water.  The  whole  armor  above  the  water 
was  two  feet  three  inches  of  wood,  and  five  inches  of  iron. 
The  turret  was  made  of  eight  thicknesses  of  one-inch  iron 
plates.  Its  inside  diameter  was  twenty  feet,  and  its  height  nine 
feet.  Her  armament  was  two  11-inch  guns  laid  side  by  side, 
and  they  revolved  with  the  turret. 

Such  was  the  diminutive  aifair  which  repulsed  and  drove 
back  to  harbor  a  first-class  iron-clad  broadside  frigate.  Her 
success  was  manifestly  due  to  her  peculiar  structure,  the  invul 
nerable  turret  which  shielded  her  guns  and  her  crew,  the  great 
weight  of  her  shot,  and  the  extremely  small  surface  (little  more 
than  her  turret)  which  was  exposed  to  the  enemy's  fire.  She 
was  slow ;  but  the  Monitors  lately  constructed  are  fast.  She 
had  many  defects,  inseparable  from  the  hasty  carrying  out  a 
new  idea.  But,  notwithstanding  her  faults,  she  settled  the 
value  of  the  principle  of  her  construction ;  and  the  Government 
at  once  determined  to  build  nine  more  according  to  the  general 
plan,  with  such  changes  as  experience  had  suggested.  The  nine 
vessels  of  this  new  Monitor  fleet  were  modelled  alike,  and  their 
dimensions  were  as  follows : 

Length  on  deck 200  feet. 

Width  on  deck 45    " 

Depth 12    " 

Length  of  hull  proper 159    u 

Width  of  hull  proper 37    "     8  inches. 

Overhang  of  armor-shelf  forward , 16    " 

Overhang  of  armor-shelf  aft 25    " 

Tonnage 844  tons. 

Draught  of  water 10  feet. 

It  will  be  seen  by  these  dimensions  that  there  was,  even  so 
early,  a  tendency  to  diminish  the  overhang  in  proportion  to  the 
size  of  the  vessel,  and  this  idea  has  been  acted  upon  in  vessels 
lately  constructed.  The  side  armor  of  these  vessels  is  five  one- 
inch  plates ;  the  wood  backing  three  feet  three  inches ;  and 
the  deck  is  plated  with  two  thicknesses  of  half-inch  iron.  The 
turret  is  eleven  inches  thick,  made  of  eleven  one-inch  plates. 
It  is  nine  feet  highy  and  the  inside  diameter  is  twenty  feet. 
The  armament  was  originally  intended  to  be  two  15-inch  guns  ; 
but  this  varies,  some  carrying  one  15-inch  and  one  11-inch  gun, 


192  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

and  others  one  15-inch  smooth-bore  and  one  Parrott  rifle,  a  150- 
pounder  or  a  200-pounder.  These  are  the  ships  that  were 
engaged  at  Charleston. 

The  so-called  light-draught  Monitors  need  not  be  particu 
larly  described,  as  they  were  failures.  They  were  intended  for 
operations  against  Fort  Fisher,  and  for  service  on  the  Southern 
rivers ;  but  from  an  error  in  calculation,  instead  of  floating  at 
the  proper  height,  they  were,  when  launched,  BO  low  in  the 
water  as  to  be  unserviceable  without  a  change  in  plan.  Great 
complaints  were  made  against  the  Department  on  account  of 
these  vessels.  The  mistake  was  one  which  could  not  be  fore 
seen  ;  and  the  only  fault  was,  that  somebody  did  not  make  it 
certain  that  the  calculations  were  in  proper  hands,  and  also  un 
der  proper  supervision.  The  error  has  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  the  principle  of  Monitor  construction. 

The  next  class  of  Monitors  ordered  consisted  of  vessels  of 
one  thousand  tons'  burden.  They  are  about  225  feet  long  ;  the 
overhang  is  less,  and  sponsons  extend  from  its  outer  edge  to  the 
hull,  and  this  increases  their  speed  and  their  safety  as  sea-boats. 
Their  turrets  are  composed  of  eleven  one-inch  plates,  and  their 
side  armor  is  so  constructed  as  to  be  practically  equal  to  eleven 
inches  of  solid  iron,  besides  the  wooden  backing.  These  are 
more  formidable  vessels  than  any  that  preceded  them,  and  it 
is  easy  to  see  that  they  are  absolutely  invulnerable  to  any  artil 
lery  that  has  yet  been  mounted  on  board  a  ship,  except  in  our 
own  Navy ;  and  that  no  broadside  ship  now  afloat  could  main 
tain  a  close  action  with  one  of  these  with  the  slightest  prospect 
of  success,  unless  it  were  possible  for  the  large  ship  to  run  the 
small  one  down,  a  thing  which  the  Merrimack  was  by  no  means 
able  to  do  in  her  battle  in  Hampton  Roads. 

The  next  effort  of  the  Government  was  to  construct  some 
swift  ocean  cruisers  on  the  Monitor  plan,  and  the  Puritan  and 
the  Dictator  were  begun.  The  Puritan  is  a  double-turreted 
ship,  while  the  Dictator  has  but  one  turret,  and  is  some  twenty 
feet  shorter  than  the  Puritan,  and  the  armament  of  this  latter 
ship  is  by  far  the  more  formidable  one.  In  other  respects  they 
are  so  similar,  that  the  following  description  of  the  Dictator 
will  answer  very  well  for  both.  It  was  published  originally 
in  the  New  York  Tribune,  and  has  been  revised  by  Mr. 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  193 

Ericsson  himself.  Some  comments  of  the  editor  are  also 
included,  as  forming  a  part  of  the  history  of  the  opinions  of 
the  day : 

It  having  been  frequently  stated  that  the  Dictator  is  an  ocean  iron 
clad,  the  impression  prevails  that  she  resembles  the  New  Ironsides  and 
other  vessels  built  for  the  purpose  of  going  to  sea.  This  is  not  so.  The 
Dictator  has  none  of  the  paraphernalia  of  such  ocean-vessels  as  we  are 
in  the  habit  of  looking  at  in  our  harbors.  She  has  none  of  the  tall  bul 
warks,  no  masts,  no  rigging,  no  capstan  on  deck — nothing,  in  fact,  that, 
looks  like  an  ordinary  ship.  A  long-armed  man  could  dip  his  hands 
into  the  water  from  her  deck. 

The  dimensions  of  the  hull  of  the  vessel  are  as  follows :  Extreme 
length  over  all,  314  feet.  The  aft  overhang  being  thirty-one  feet,  and 
forward  overhang  thirteen,  it  leaves  270  feet  between  perpendiculars- 
extreme  breadth  fifty,  and  depth  twenty-two  and  a  half  feet.  Like  the 
original  Monitor,  and  the  Monitors  that  are  now  in  course  of  con 
struction,  the  Dictator  is  almost  exclusively  iron — her  frames,  keelsons, 
and  plating  being  of  that  metal.  A  person  looking  at  her  in  the  river 
can  form  no  idea  of  her  appearance  when  she  is  completely  out  of  the 
water.  If  an  ordinary  ship  were  lifted  up,  and  an  immense  shelf  of 
eleven  inches  of  iron  placed  on  the  top  of  her  deck,  overhanging  for  a 
space  of  some  four  feet  on  each  side,  she  would  resemble  the  Dictator. 
Taking  into  account  the  curvature  of  the  sea,  the  Dictator  could  not  be 
seen  four  miles  off. 

The  armor  of  the  original  Monitor  consisted  of  five  inches  of  iron, 
laid  on  in  single  plates,  each  one  inch  thick.  That  of  the  Warrior  con 
sisted  of  four  and  a  half  inches  of  iron,  laid  on  in  a  solid  slab  like  our 
own  iron-clad  frigate  Roanoke.  The  French  frigate  La  Gloire  had  also 
four  and  a  half  inches  of  iron  laid  on  in  a  solid  slab.  Now,  the  Dicta 
tor  has  on  her  sides  eleven  inches  of  iron,  and  five  inches  of  this  is  in 
solid  beams,  somewhat  like  the  Warrior,  the  La  Gloire,  and  the  Roa 
noke,  except  that  the  plates  of  the  latter  were  in  very  large  slabs,  while 
those  of  the  Dictator  are  in  beams  five  by  eight  inches.  Over  these 
5-inch  blocks  of  iron  are  six  1-inch  plates  of  iron ;  making  alto 
gether  an  armor  of  eleven  inches  of  iron,  the  same  dimensions  as  the 
armor  of  a  turret  of  the  Passaic,  Montauk,  etc.  The  armor  begins  at 
the  deck  and  goes  down  six  feet,  which  takes  it  about  four  feet  below 
the  water ;  so  that  the  deck  of  the  ocean  iron-clad  Dictator  will  only  be 
about  two  feet  over  water.  Below  this  armor  there  are  sixteen  feet  of 
the  ship,  composed  of  plating  13-16ths  of  an  inch  thick.  The  weight  of 
13 


194  HISTOEY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

the  armor  is  about  five  hundred  tons — the  burden  of  a  pretty  large-sized 
steamer.  There  will  be  but  one  turret,  of  an  improved  pattern.  It  was 
originally  intended  to  cover  it  with  twenty-four  inches  of  iron,  but  the 
perfection  to  which  its  construction  has  now  been  brought  will  render 
fifteen  inches  sufficient.  This  is  four  inches  more  than  the  armor  of  the 
Passaic  class  of  turret,  and  ten  inches  more  than  the  armored  sides  of 
those  vessels.  The  apparatus  for  working  the  guns  will  be  more  perfect 
than  any  yet  earned  out.  The  revolution  in  naval  artillery,  caused  by 
the  facility  with  which  four  or  five  men  can  work  the  15-inch  gun,  will 
be  made  still  more  startling  when  one  or  two  men  can  handle  such  im 
mense  pieces  of  ordnance.  The  gear  of  the  turret  is  different  from  that 
of  the  other  vessels  only  in  point  of  size.  The  turret  complete  will 
weigh  almost  five  hundred  tons,  or  thereabouts,  being  almost  as  heavy 
as  the  entire  armor  of  the  vessel. 

The  ram  is  perhaps  the  finest  piece  of  work  aboard  the  ship.  The 
ram  proper  is  twenty-two  feet  of  solid  oak  and  iron ;  unlike  the  Keokuk, 
which  protruded  from  the  bottom  of  the  hull  near  the  keel,  this  extends 
from  the  top  of  the  deck,  being,  as  it  were,  an  extension  of  the  entire 
armor  of  the  ship.  Another  advantage  in  this  ram  is,  that  it  could  be 
carried  away  without  any  material  damage  or  injury  to  the  vessel,  and 
without  her  making  water. 

The  decks  are  perfectly  clear  of  all  incumbrances  except  the  turret. 
The  same  objection  made  to  the  other  Monitors,  relative  to  their  liabil 
ity  to  be  injured  by  plunging  shot  from  forts,  is  valid  in  the  Dictator's 
case ;  but  it  is  only  just  to  say,  that,  of  the  iron-clad  vessels  engaged  in 
the  attack  on  Charleston,  none  has  suffered  any  serious  inconvenience 
from  injuries  done  to  the  deck.  It  seems  almost  impossible,  and  has 
proved  so,  that  a  projectile  fired  from  a  ship  could  enter  the  deck.  The 
armor  of  the  deck  consists  of  one  and  a  half  inches  of  iron,  laid  on  in 
two  plates,  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  other  vessels. 

The  berth-deck — that  on  which  the  crew  and  officers  are  to  live — is 
a  very  commodious  one,  the  head-room  being  equal  to  that  of  any  first- 
class  sailing  frigate  in  the  Navy.  A  man  six  feet  high,  with  his  hat  on, 
can  walk,  without  stooping,  from  end  to  end  of  it. 

The  ship  is  ventilated  by  three  immense  blowers ;  two  for  the  use  of 
the  vessel  generally,  and  one  for  the  express  purpose  of  ventilating  the 
engine-room.  These  blowers  are  of  immense  size,  about  seventy-two 
inches  by  forty-eight  inches.  An  air-trunk,  supplying  a  blower  eight 
feet  in  diameter,  is  placed  thirty-five  feet  from  the  stern.  The  air  to 
supply  the  other  blowers  is  drawn  from  the  top  of  the  turret  and  dis 
tributed  through  the  ship. 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  195 

The  machinery  of  the  Dictator  is  of  greater  power  than  that  of  any 
man-of-war  built  in  this  country  or  in  Europe.  The  cylinders  are  one 
hundred  inches  in  diameter.  Cylinders  of  these  dimensions  have  never 
been  built  in  this  city,  except  for  side-wheel  steamboats.  The  cylinders 
are  bolted  to  massive  wrought-iron  keelsons,  ten  feet  deep,  and  some 
twenty-four  inches  in  width.  They  are  both  in  line,  athwart  ships,  and 
have  large  slide  and  expansive  valves,  the  latter  working  over  the  for 
mer.  A  peculiar  feature  of  the  machinery  is  the  absence  of  guides, 
cross-heads,  and  other  cumbrous  parts.  The  piston,  four  feet  stroke, 
has  a  trunk  attached  to  it.  The  boilers  are  immense,  six  in  number, 
and  have  fifty-six  furnaces,  and  an  aggregate  grate-surface  of  1,100  feet; 
allowing  twelve  pounds  of  coal  per  square  foot  of  grate-surface,  the  ves 
sel  will  require  at  least  one  hundred  and  forty  tons  of  coal  per  day  of 
twenty-four  hours'  steaming  at  full  speed,  which  will  never  be  requisite 
excepting  when  chasing  an  enemy.  The  weight  of  these  boilers  will  be 
almost  seventy  tons  each,  that  is,  four  hundred  and  twenty  tons  alto 
gether,  without  water;  so  that  when  they  are  completed  they  will  weigh 
over  seven  hundred  tons.  The  propeller  shaft  is  a  gigantic  piece  of 
forge-work ;  it  weighs  something  like  thirty-six  tons,  the  burden  of  an 
average  sloop.  The  propeller  is  a  right-handed  true-screw,  twenty-one 
and  a  half  feet  in  diameter;  has  thirty-four  feet  pitch,  and  weighs 
39,000  pounds.  There  is  no  outboard  bearing  for  the  shaft.  What 
piston-speed  will  be  obtained  from  the  engines  remains  to  be  seen.  The 
propeller  cannot  be  injured  by  any  projectile,  as  a  shot  would  have 
to  pass  through  twenty-six  feet  of  water  to  strike  it.  The  engines  are 
calculated  to  be  something  in  the  neighborhood  of  5,000  horse-power. 

One  of  the  greatest  difficulties  in  the  way  of  making  the  iron-clads 
permanently  useful  was  that  of  protecting  the  bottoms  from  the  filth 
which  concentrated  there  and  prevented  them  from  moving.  The  ori 
ginal  Monitor  had  to  be  towed  from  Fortress  Monroe  to  Washington, 
on  account  of  her  bottom  being  so  foul.  The  English  frigate  Warrior 
also  experienced  a  similar  inconvenience.  All  sorts  of  paints  have  been 
tried,  and  all  with  want  of  success.  The  most  popular  was  a  sort  of 
English  "peacock"  paint,  which  was  used  in  some  of  the  mail-steamers; 
but  it  did  very  little  good.  On  the  bottom  of  the  Dictator,  however,  and 
on  all  of  our  iron-clads  to  be  built  henceforward,  and  most  of  the  naval- 
built  vessels,  a  successful  remedy  has  been  devised,  which  will  keep  the 
bottoms  perfectly  clear  of  all  filth.  It  is  called  "  ship-zinc"  paint,  and 
is  perfectly  white  in  color.  Some  thirty  years  since  a  vessel  was  coated 
with  it  in  England ;  she  arrived  here  a  few  weeks  ago,  and  her  bottom 
was  found  in  perfect  order.  The  Government  has  responsible  parties 


196  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

furnishing  the  paint,  and  its  purity  can  be  relied  on.  It  is  confidently 
expected  that  a  vessel  so  complete,  with  eleven  inches  of  armor  and 
such  a  heavy  battery,  will  prove  herself  the  Dictator  of  the  ocean. 

Captain  Tyler,  of  the  Royal  Engineers,  in  a  lecture  before  the 
United  Service  Institution,  January  18th,  delighted  his  hearers  by  as 
suring  them  that  "  the  turrets  of  the  Monitors  and  their  port-stoppers 
were  effective  principally  in  preventing  the  guns  from  being  worked." 
He  further  stated  that  the  report  of  Secretary  Welles  "  confirmed  the 
worst  estimate  that  we  (the  English)  had  formed  of  them."  The  un 
prejudiced  lecturer  further  told  his  hearers  that  the  only  Federal  vessel 
that  had  ventured  within  YOO  yards  of  Fort  Sumter,  the  Keokuk,  had 
to  be  withdrawn  in  a  sinking  condition,  and  afterward  sunk.  "  The 
11-inch  guns  proved  too  much  for  the  11-inch  turrets  of  the  Mon 
itors,"  added  the  lecturer,  leaving  his  hearers  to  infer  that  the  Keokuk 
was  a  Monitor  whose  turret  and  hull  had  been  riddled  by  Confederate 
balls.  Our  readers  will  bear  in  mind  that  this  statement  was  made  on 
the  18th  of  January,  1864,  on  an  occasion  of  more  than  ordinary  grav 
ity,  the  subject  under  consideration  being  the  great  national  question  of 
harbor  defence  and  the  fortifications  at  Spithead.  Captain  Tyler  pro 
duced  charts  showing  that  there  were  three  distinct  channels,  varying 
from  1,000  to  3,000  yards  in  width,  open  to  an  enemy's  vessels,  and 
which  channels  he  said  could  not  be  obstructed ;  yet,  as  the  Keokuk 
had  been  sunk  at  a  distance  of  700  yards,  these  channels  could  not  be 
entered  by  our  iron-clads. 

We  will  not  attempt  to  dispel  Captain  Tyler's  delusion,  nor  question 
the  soundness  of  his  argument  in  proof  of  England's  security.  Our  ob 
ject  is  simply  to  point  out  that  he  has  grossly  misrepresented  our  naval 
achievements.  The  fact  is,  the  Eoyal  Engineers  have  been  forced  to 
admit  the  impregnability  of  our  turrets  and  port-stoppers — hence  their 
annoyance.  The  brevity  of  the  action  with  the  Confederate  iron-clad 
Atlanta  has  shown  that  the  "  cheese-box  on  a  raft "  is  something  more 
than  a  mere  Yankee  notion.  The  English  artillerists  are  surprised  to 
find  that  while  they  require  twenty  men  to  handle  a  10-inch  gun  on 
land,  our  enormous  pieces  of  15-inch  calibre  are  handled  on  board  of 
the  Monitors  with  half  a  dozen  hands — a  single  man  only  being  required 
to  point  these  guns.  But  more  surprising  still,  the  turrets  and  the 
port-stoppers  offer  absolute  protection  to  guns  and  gunners. 

The  lecturer  of  the  18th  of  January  knew  that  the  Monitors  had 
been  repeatedly  engaged  with  the  Confederate  batteries  at  short  ranges, 
since  the  first  conflict  at  Charleston,  and  he  well  knew,  at  the  time 
when  he  addressed  his  audience,  that  upward  of  2,000  shot  had  hit  the 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITOES.  197 

Monitor  fleet.  The  Patapsco,  it  was  well  known  at  the  time,  had  been 
in  twenty-eight  engagements,  yet  nothing  had  been  destroyed  within 
her  turret,  and  not  the  slightest  derangement  caused  to  her  machinery. 
These  stubborn  facts  Captain  Tyler  cannot  grapple  with,  and  therefore 
tells  his  hearers  what  happened  during  the  first  brief  trial  of  the  new 
system,  under  fire  at  Charleston,  in  April,  1863.  A  port-stopper  which 
had  been  placed  too  near  the  turret  in  one  of  the  vessels,  stuck.  The 
application  of  hammer  and  chisel  for  half  an  hour  removed  the  diffi 
cult}7.  Not  a  single  accident  of  the  kind  occurred  during  the  whole 
siege,  not  a  pound  of  Confederate  metal  entered  through  plates  or 
port-stoppers ;  and  yet  an  officer  in  her  Majesty's  service,  before  an 
audience  composed  of  distinguished  persons,  ventures  to  state  that  ".  the 
turrets  of  the  Monitors,  and  their  port-stoppers,  were  effective  princi 
pally  in  preventing  the  guns  from  being  worked,"  and  that  the  Con 
federate  guns  "proved  too  much  for  the  11-inch  plates  which  composed 
the  turrets  of  the  Monitors." 

We  forbear  comment,  but  advise  the  English  people  not  to  be  lulled 
into  security  by  assurances  based  on  professional  conceit  and  ignorance. 
Their  neighbors  over  the  Channel  have  fully  proved  that  iron-clads, 
of  the  European  type,  are  unfit  to  fight  at  sea,  and  that  notwithstanding 
M.  Xavier  Raymond's  splendid  account  of  their  success,  written  to  order 
for  the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  just  published,  something  better  must  be 
contrived.  Accordingly,  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  through  his 
agents,  is  taking  a  very  careful  look  into  our  turrets.  England  will  do 
well  to  do  the  same ;  for  with  a  single  opponent  at  Cherbourg,  such  as 
our  large  turret  vessels,  with  their  15-inch  thick  iron  protection  to  their 
enormous  guns,  and  10|~inch  side  armor,  backed  by  four  feet  of  oak, 
the  Warriors,  Black  Princes,  and  Prince  Consorts  could  not  hold  the 
Channel  for  a  single  day.  The  experiments  at  the  Washington  Navy- 
Yard  established  the  fact  long  ago,  that  the  4J  inch  plating  of  the  Eu 
ropean  iron-clads  with  its  thin  wood  backing,  affords  no  protection 
against  the  enormous  weight  of  ordnance  which  is  part  of  the  Monitor 
system.  The  result  of  the  recent  trials  of  armor-plate  instituted  by  the 
Navy  Department,  which  we  alluded  to  a  few  days  ago,  will  amaze  our 
Transatlantic  rivals.  The  news  of  the  fate  of  the  famous  6-inch  solid 
armor-plates,  considered  by  the  French  as  impregnable,  wall  be  most 
unwelcome.  The  utter  demolition  of  Messrs.  Petin  and  Gaudit's  6-inch 
plate  at  the  first  shot  from  a  15-inch  gun  at  Washington  Navy-Yard, 
on  the  10th  of  February,  1864,  will  form  an  epoch  in  the  history  of 
iron-clads.  The  small-bore  and  high-velocity  theory  has  received  its 
quietus  by  this  last  practical  mode  adopted  by  the  Navy  Department 


198  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

for  settling  the  question.  Much  credit  is  due  to  the  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  for  his  persistent  course  in  adhering  to  the  large  smooth 
bore  principle,  the  successful  application  of  which  now  enables  us  to 
defy  all  European  iron-clads. 

It  would  appear  that  the  great  problem  is  nearer  to  solution  than 
has  been  supposed.  We  have  guns  that  can  tear  to  fragments  6-inch 
solid  armor-plates  at  a  single  shot,  and  therefore  fully  adequate  to  crush 
in  the  sides  of  any  European  iron-clad.  We  operate  these  guns  within 
impregnable  iron  cylinders  15-inches  thick,  which  at  the  will  of  the 
gunner  turn  to  any  point  of  the  compass.  These  cylinders  again  we 
place  on  vessels,  which,  while  they  present  a  very  small  target  to  the 
enemy's  fire,  are  protected  by  10-inch  side  armor,  backed  by  timber 
from  three  to  four  feet  in  thickness.  In  regard  to  speed,  those  who  are 
best  informed  expect  that  our  large  turret-ships  will  be  very  fast.  We 
abstain  from  all  speculation  on  this  point,  since  the  Dictator  will  be  un 
der  steam  by  the  end  of  April.  It  will  be  proper  to  add,  that  our  rivals 
have  frequently  asserted  that  our  small  Monitor  vessels  would  be  useless 
for  defensive  purposes,  notwithstanding  their  heavy  and  well-protected 
guns.  They  have  boasted  of  their  superior  speed,  and  told  us  that  their 
Warriors  would  run  down  the  small  Monitors,  pass  our  forts,  and  come 
up  to  our  wharves. 

It  has  just  occurred  to  them  that  their  armored  ships  draw  twenty- 
five  feet  water,  while  the  Monitors  only  draw  ten  and  a  half  feet ;  and 
that  the  gunner  in  a  Monitor  turret,  safe  on  the  shoals  along  the  main 
channels,  can  unmolested  and  at  short  range  put  his  15-inch  shot 
through  the  insufficient  armor  of  the  intruder. 

In  the  Dunderberg  the  Government  has  undertaken  to  com 
bine  some  of  the  advantages  of  a  tnrreted  ship  with  a  broadside 
vessel.  A  description  of  this  novel  ship,  as  she  was  before  launch 
ing,  is  copied  from  the  Scientific  American  for  March  14, 1863  : 

The  formidable  ram-frigate  Dunderberg,  now  building  for  the  Gov 
ernment  by  W.  H.  Webb,  at  his  yard  at  the  foot  of  Sixth  Street,  in 
this  city,  is  in  a  very  forward  state,  and  being  completed  as  fast  as  pos 
sible.  We  lately  visited  this  vessel,  and  are  able  to  furnish  a  few  de 
tails  of  her  construction,  which  we  think  will  prove  acceptable  to  our 
readers. 

The  hull  of  the  Dunderberg  is  massive,  being  solid  from  stem  to 
stern.  It  is  378  feet  long,  68  feet  wide,  and  32  feet  deep.  The  frames 
are  twelve  inches  thick,  and  are  built  of  oak,  firmly  bolted  and  fastened 
together. 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  199 

The  model  of  the  ship  is  very  peculiar.  The  floor  is  dead  flat  for 
the  whole  length,  and  the  sides  rise  from  it  at  an  angle  everywhere  savft 
forward,  where  they  are  very  nearly  vertical.  The  bow  is  as  sharp  and 
has  as  fine  lines  as  it  is  possible  to  give  it ;  and  the  stern  and  run  aft 
are  very  clean  and  handsomely  modelled.  The  hull  is  divided  by  sev 
eral  water-tight  compartments,  both  longitudinally  and  transversely — n, 
precaution  common  to  nearly  all  modern  sea-going  ships,  which  has 
been  found  indispensable.  The  frames  are  strapped  diagonally  with 
heavy  irons,  five  inches  wide  by  seven-eighths  of  an  inch  thick,  blunt 
bolted  to  them.  There  is  a  slight  sheer  on  deck,  but  it  is  almost  in 
visible  to  the  casual  observer  at  a  short  distance.  There  is  but  one 
rudder :  provision  is  made,  however,  for  steering  by  an  auxiliary  appa 
ratus  of  a  peculiar  nature,  should  the  main  steering-gear  be  shot  away. 
The  frame-timbers,  twelve  inches  thick,  are  ceiled  inside  five  inches 
thick,  planked  outside  five  inches  thick,  and  over  the  planking  two 
courses  of  heavy  oak  beams,  twelve  inches  thick,  are  again  laid,  making 
in  all  an  aggregate  amount  of  nearly  five  feet  of  solid  timber  on  the 
ram's  sides.  The  planking  is  all  caulked,  and  the  seams  payed,  before 
the  last  protection  is  applied,  and  the  entire  mass  is  as  firmly  bolted  to 
gether  as  it  is  possible  to  do  it 

The  ram  on  the  Dunderberg  is  about  as  formidable  a  looking  object 
as  one  can  conceive.  The  entire  forefoot  of  the  vessel  is  prolonged 
thirty  feet  from  the  hull  proper,  and,  rising  easily  upward  from  the  keel 
about  half  the  distance  from  the  water-line,  is  there  rounded,  presenting 
a  blunt  end  in  shape  like  the  profile  of  an  axe-edge ;  it  then  runs  back 
toward  the  stem  again.  The  mass  of  wood  which  forms  this  rain  pro 
jects  inside  the  hull  almost  as  far  as  it  does  outboard,  and  is  there  sub 
stantially  secured  to  the  main  timbers.  The  sides  and  edge  of  the  ram 
will  be  iron-plated ;  and  even  should  the  whole  of  it  be  knocked  oft*  in 
an  affray,  the  builders  say  that  the  hull  will  be  water-tight. 

The  Dunderberg  has,  on  top  of  the  main-deck,  casemated  quarters 
for  the  guns  and  crew.  This  casemate  slopes  at  an  acute  angle  from 
the  sides  to  the  top.  It  takes  up  a  large  portion  of  the  vessel  amid 
ships,  and  is  an  elongated  octagon  in  shape.  It  is  made  of  heavy  tim 
ber,  plated  with  iron  four  and  a  half  inches  thick.  It  is  pierced  on  each 
side  for  three  broadside  guns,  and  has  one  port  forward  and  another  aft, 
in  the  casemate,  for  bow  and  stern  firing.  The  hull  of  the  ship  is  built 
out  from  a  distance  below  the  water-line  to  meet  the  edge  of  the  case 
mate  above,  so  that  the  broadside  of  the  Dunderberg  will  present  an 
acute  angle  to  the  line  of  the  enemy's  fire.  We  do  not  know  what  the 
inclination  of  the  casemate  and  side  is,  but  it  cannot  be  less  than  45°. 


200  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

The  mass  of  wood  and  iron  presenting  a  resistance  to  the  enemy's  rams 
or  projectiles  at  this  point  amounts  in  all  to  seven  feet.  There  are  to 
be  two  turrets  on  the  top  of  this  casemate.  The  thickness  of  the  turret- 
walls  will  be  much  greater  than  those  of  the  Monitor  batteries,  and 
strong  enough  to  resist  the  heaviest  ordnance. 

The  armament  of  the  Dunderberg  has  been  variously  guessed  at  by 
parties.  As  it  is  not  publicly  known  what  it  will  be,  we  are  not  able  to 
inform  our  readers,  further  than  that  rumor  assigns  the  20-inch  guns 
to  the  broadside,  while  each  turret  will  also  contain  two  heavy  guns. 
The  deck  of  the  casemate,  and  also  the  main-deck,  will  be  plated  bomb 
proof ;  and  the  quarters  for  the  officers  and  crew,  being  in  the  fortress 
on  deck,  will  be  thoroughly  ventilated  and  open  to  the  light  and  air : 
there  will  then  be  none  of  that  depressing  influence  which  is  so  marked 
in  the  departments  assigned  to  the  crews  on  the  other  batteries. 

One  great  and  overwhelming  advantage  that  this  splendid  vessel 
has,  is  that  she  is  built  of  wood.  She  may  leak,  become  water-logged, 
roll,  pitch,  and  toss,  but  there  will  still  be  some  hope  for  the  crew  as 
long  as  they  stick  to  her.  Iron  batteries  fill  and  plunge  out  of  sight 
with  very  little  warning.  The  efiect  of  this  fact  upon  sailors  morally  is 
not  the  least  important  one.  Although  no  men  could  have  behaved 
better  than  the  crew  of  the  Monitor  did  in  their  peril,  yet  they  all  felt 
that  their  case  was  hopeless ;  and  if  they  were  saved,  it  would  be  more 
the  result  of  good  fortune  than  any  aid  which  their  ship  could  afford 
them.  The  Dunderberg  will  draw  about  twenty  feet  of  water.  Her 
speed  is  not  stated.  Her  engines  are  estimated  at  6,000  horse-power. 
We  are  not  able  at  present  to  give  particulars  of  them. 

The  next  class  of  Monitors  planned  by  the  Department  is 
represented  by  the  Monadnock  and  Miantonomoh.  The  inten 
tion  was  to  produce  a  double-turreted  ocean  cruiser.  These 
ships  are  of  the  usual  Monitor  type  in  general,  but  without  the 
side  projection  or  overhang  of  the  armor,  by  which  omission  it 
was  expected  that  the  speed  of  the  vessel  would  be  increased. 
In  this  there  has  been  no  disappointment. 

These  Monitors  have  a  speed  of  eleven  knots,  and  therefore 
rank  among  the  fastest  war-ships  afloat.  Doubtless  there  are 
some  swifter  ships  than  these  in  the  French  and  English  Navies, 
and  we  have  faster  wooden  vessels ;  but  it  must  be  remembered, 
that  ships  that  are  reported  to  make  fourteen  or  sixteen  knots 
on  their  trial  trip,  and  in  smooth  water,  fall  very  much  below 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  201 

this  at  sea ;  and  an  iron-clad  making  eleven  knots  at  sea,  as 
these  Monitors  have  done,  deserves  the  name  of  fast. 

They  are  two  hundred  and  fifty-seven  (257)  feet  long,  with 
two  turrets  of  the  usual  size.  The  side  armor  is  equal  to  eleven 
inches  of  solid  iron,  besides  the  wood  backing,  and  the  turrets 
are  twelve  inches  thick.  The  armament  is  four  15-inch  guns, 
and  consequently  the  weight  of  a  broadside  of  solid  shot  is 
eighteen  hundred  (1,800)  pounds. 

These  Monitors,  as  has  been  said,  float  about  two  feet  out  of 
the  water,  and  the  size  of  the  target  which  they  present  to  an 
enemy's  fire  has  been  shown  already.  No  one  can  visit  one  of 
these  wonderful  vessels  without  feeling  that  art  and  skill  have 
overcome  everyxserious  objection  which  has  been  made  against 
the  Monitor  form.  The  writer  has  visited  the  Miantonomoh  in 
weather  when  ventilation  was  needed  ;  and  found  the  air  fresh 
and  pure  throughout  the  ship,  though  lying  at  anchor;  and 
again  in  the  cold,  damp  days  of  winter,  and  then  there  was  no 
sense  of  dampness  or  chill  in  any  part  of  the  vessel.  The  per 
fection  of  the  machinery,  the  beautiful  adaptation  of  new  ma 
chinery  to  meet  the  new  wants  of  such  a  novel  war-ship,  are 
worthy  of  all  admiration.  A  sense  of  almost  perfect  security 
against  shot,  and  the  consciousness  of  wielding  a  power  that 
nothing  yet  invented  can  resist,  produce  that  frame  of  mind  in 
which  men  can  do  their  utmost.  Such  a  sense  of  security,  and 
confidence  in  weapons,  is  an  almost  certain  guaranty  of  success 
in  a  combat  where  in  other  respects  the  parties  are  equal. 

In  addition  to  these,  the  Department  had  nearly  completed, 
at  the  close  of  the  rebellion,  a  still  more  formidable  class  of 
Monitors.  Excepting,  perhaps,  only  the  Puritan,  they  surpass 
in  defensive  and  offensive  power  any  vessels  which  have  yet 
been  constructed,  whether  here  or  in  Europe. 

The  dimensions  of  this  class,  of  which  the  Kalamazoo  is  a 
representative,  are  as  follows : 

Length 342  feet. 

Breadth 66    "    8  inches. 

Depth  on  the  side 21    "    6       " 

Outside  iron  plating 6  inches.  ) 

Thickness  of  iron  stringers 8     «        j"  14  inches  of  iron. 

Whole  thickness  of  wooden  backing. 30  inches. 

Whole  thickness  of  side,  wood  and  iron 3  feet    8      " 


202  HISTOBT   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

THICKNESS  OF  DECK. 

Wood  deck-plank 6  inches. 

Iron  plating 3       " 

Wood  on  top  of  plating 3       " 

Whole  thickness 12  inches. 

Below  this  twelve  inches  of  wood  and  iron  are  the  heavy 
transverse  beams  which  support  the  deck,  and  between  these 
timbers  large  iron  braces,  so  that  practically,  the  deck,  as  before 
stated  in  regard  to  the  Miantonomoh,  is  solid  to  the  water-line, 
or  nearly  so,  and  therefore  the  whole  width  of  the  deck  is  the 
actual  backing  of  the  side  armor.  The  turrets  of  these  Moni 
tors  are  fifteen  inches  thick,  and  are  constructed  upon  a  new  prin 
ciple,  which  it  is  supposed  will  greatly  increase  their  power  of 
resistance.  The  outer  circle  of  the  turret  is  composed  of  five  one- 
inch  plates.  The  inner  circle  is  also  formed  of  five  one-inch 
plates,  while  the  space  between  these,  of  five  inches,  is  filled  in 
with  solid  iron  rings  or  bands,  five  inches  thick,  of  solid  iron. 
These  vessels  are  thirty-two  hundred  tons'  burden. 

Nothing,  perhaps,  will  show  more  impressively  the  firm  con 
victions  upon  which  the  Department  has  acted  in  the  construc 
tion  of  the  Monitors,  than  the  statement  made  by  one  high  in 
office,  who  has  a  reputation  at  stake,  and  who  knows,  as  well  as 
any  man  can,  the  merits  of  this  national  question.  He  said  he 
was  quite  willing  to  have  the  American  Navy  subjected  to  the 
following  test :  He  would  anchor  one  of  these  new  Monitors,  and 
around  her,  at  a  distance  of  fifteen  hundred  yards,  should  be 
anchored  as  many  of  the  broadside  iron-clads  of  France  and 
England  as  they  might  choose  to  place  there,  more  or  less,  with 
their  present  armament,  and  each  of  these  ships  should  be  per 
mitted  to  fire  one  broadside  at  the  Monitor;  then,  if  at  the  close 
of  this  the  Monitor  should  be  disabled,  or  unable  to  return  fire, 
America  should  be  considered  beaten.  But  if  not,  then  the 
Monitor  should  fire  her  guns,  once  at  each  ship ;  and  the  contest 
for  superiority  in  ships  and  guns  should  be  decided  by  the  -result. 

It  is  very  easy  to  throw  ridicule  upon  such  a  proposition  as 
vain  and  empty  boasting ;  but  the  result  of  such  a  trial  is  as 
easy  to  be  calculated  beforehand  as  the  effect  of  known  physi 
cal  laws.  What  effect  would  any  ordnance  yet  mounted  on 


'THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITOES.  203 

shipboard  by  France  and  England  have  on  fourteen  inches  of 
solid  iron  in  side  armor,  or  fifteen  inches  in  the  turret  at  a  dis 
tance  of  fifteen  hundred  yards  ?  How  often  would  the  best  gun 
ners  strike  the  narrow  strip  of  hull  above  the  water  ?  and  how 
often  the  centre  of  the  turret  ?  for  a  shot  aside  from  the  centre 
would  glance  aside.  And  should  the  shot  strike,  what  harm 
would  be  done  ?  None  whatever,  or,  at  most,  a  damage  not 
essential.  But  the  Monitor  can  return  that  fire  with  15-inch 
smooth  bores,  or  with  12-inch  rifles ;  and  it  requires  no  long 
thought  to  determine  the  effect  of  such  projectiles  upon  any 
broadside  iron-clads  which  are  yet  afloat.  Nothing  could  more 
completely  show  the  superiority  of  the  American  Navy  than 
such  an  experiment  as  this. 

This  superiority  may  or  may  not  be  temporary.  No  man 
will  pretend  to  set  bounds  to  the  inventive  genius  of  the  nations. 
England,  France,  all  Europe  indeed,  are  intent  upon  new  dis 
coveries  in  the  art  of  slaughter  and  defence ;  and  no  man  can 
foresee  what  new  forms  the  science  of  war  may  next  assume. 
Something  as  far  removed  from  our  present  thought  as  was  a 
Monitor  from  the  thought  of  the  past,  may  be  produced  here  or 
elsewhere.  All  that  is  now  claimed  is,  that  when  the  war 
closed  the  American  Navy  was  the  most  formidable  one  in  the 
world,  and  that  for  the  future  we  may  safely  rely  upon  the  ge 
nius  and  skill  of  our  countrymen,  if  the  Government  will  only 
give  them  suitable  means  wherewith  to  work.  It  will  be  all  in 
vain  that  we  have  inventive  power  or  skilful  mechanics,  if  we 
have  no  suitable  navy-yards,  or  docks,  or  machinery  with  which 
ships  can  be  built  or  repaired,  while  our  enemies  are  abun 
dantly  provided  with  all  that  anxious  thought  can  suggest  or 
the  wealth  of  nations  supply. 

As  a  proper  addition  to  the  arguments  and  statements  al 
ready  made,  the  following  opinions  of  eminent  men  in  regard 
to  the  Monitors  and  iron-clads  in  general  are  presented  here  : 

EXTRACT  FROM  A  LETTER  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  THE  NAVY  TO  B.  F.  WADE, 
CHAIRMAN  OF  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  THE  CONDUCT  OF  THE  WAR. 

The  necessity  of  light-draught  iron-clads  to  operate  in  the  bays, 
sounds,  and  rivers,  as  well  as  for  defensive  purposes,  was  forced  upon  the 
Department  at  an  early  period  of  the  present  struggle.  Not  only  was 


204:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

the  contest  in  Avhich  we  were  engaged  peculiar,  but  the  means  and  meas 
ures  to  meet  and  suppress  it,  particularly  those  of  the  Navy,  were  novel 
and  without  precedent.  Most  of  the  lines  of  army  communication  were 
by  water,  and  the  .  Navy  was  expected  to  protect  them  and  render 
them  secure.  A  brief  experience  and  a  few  engagements  made  it  evi 
dent  that  light-draught,  unprotected,  wooden  boats,  with  magazines,  ma 
chinery,  and  boilers  exposed,  could  be  driven  off  by  field  artillery  behind 
earthworks.  Light-draught  iron-clads  became,  therefore,  an  imperious 
necessity,  and  the  convictions  of  the  Department,  and  of  all  indeed  who 
gave  the  subject  intelligent  consideration,  wrere  irresistibly  in  favor  of 
such  vessels ;  but  we  were  without  models,  and  the  wants  of  the  country 
wTere  pressing.  Neither  of  the  maritime  powers  of  Europe  had  built,  or 
attempted  to  build,  a  light-draught  iron-clad. 

The  Navy  Department,  in  this  emergency,  was  compelled  to  feel  its 
way,  without  experience  or  precedent  in  any  quarter  to  guide  it.  Ap 
peals  had  been  made  in  vain  to  Congress  to  provide  a  proper  establish 
ment  for  the  construction  of  iron  and  armored  vessels,  where  plans  and 
models  might  have  been  developed  and  matured  with  studied  delibera 
tion  and  skill.  When  the  contracts  for  these  vessels  were  entered  into, 
delays  were  inadmissible.  Difficulties  with  foreign  powers  seemed  im 
minent,  and  in  the  absence  of  any  national  establishment  immediate  con 
tracts  for  the  construction  of  armored  vessels  were  called  for  on  every 
hand.  The  authorities  of  the  States  and  cities  on  the  seaboard  were 
appealing  to  the  Department  and  the  Government  for  iron-clad  vessels 
to  defend  their  harbors  from  the  two  or  three  rovers  that  were  then  al 
ready  abroad,  and  great  apprehensions  were  entertained  that  certain  for 
midable  ships  in  the  process  of  construction  in  Frarice  and  England  for 
the  rebels  would  soon  visit  our  coast.  Many  who  may  now  be  forward 
to  criticise  and  censure  the  enlarged  and  energetic  action  that  was  taken, 
were  at  that  time  profuse  in  censuring  the  Department  for  delays  in  not 
more  promptly  providing  whatever  vessels  were  necessary  for  the  service. 

Congress  having  omitted  to  provide  an  establishment  for  the  con 
struction  of  an  iron  navy,  where  this  class  of  armored  vessels  of  light 
draught  could  be  constructed,  the  Department  has  been  compelled  to 
rely  on  contractors  and  outside  parties  in  different  sections  of  the 
country  for  the  work. 

The  parties  contracting  have  generally  exerted  themselves  to  meet 
in  good  faith  the  requirements  of  the  Government,  and  it  is  a  subject  of 
just  congratulation  that,  in  this  great  emergency,  when  the  Department 
was  compelled  to  act  without  precedents  to  guide  it,  and  when  the 
Government  had  omitted  to  furnish  a  suitable  establishment,  private 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  205 

enterprise  and  our  skilled  mechanics  have  so  well  met  the  difficulties 
presented. 

Mr.  J.  B.  Eades,  of  St.  Louis,  furnished  the  light-draught  river-boats 
which  have  been  so  successful  on  the  Mississippi  and  also  in  the  bay  of 
Mobile.  Captain  Ericsson,  the  inventor  of  the  Monitor  class  of  vessels, 
furnished  the  idea  which  is  now  near  practical  consummation.  Although 
as  yet  untried,  these  vessels  differ  so  little  from  the  original  Monitor,  that 
there  is  every  reason  to  anticipate  their  success.  To  predict  otherwise 
would  be  presumption  ;  yet  it  has  been  the  misfortune  of  the  Depart 
ment  to  encounter  hostility  and  forebodings  of  failure  with  every  im 
provement  which  has  been  made  during  the  war,  and  often  from  those 
of  whom  encouragement  and  support  might  reasonably  have  been 
expected.  Some  of  the  best  engineers  and  constructors  in  the  service 
of  the  Government,  as  well  as  others,  expressed  their  want  of  confidence 
in  the  first  Monitor,  and  declared  it  would  prove  a  failure.  It  was 
represented  that  she  could  not  float,  that  she  would  plunge  to  the  bottom 
when  launched,  and  that  to  send  her  to  Hampton  Roads  would  be  reck 
lessness  amounting  to  crime.  A  constant  succession  of  struggles  against 
prejudices,  ignorance,  and  fixed  habits  and  opinions,  has  been  the  fate 
of  the  Department  at  every  step  which  the  extraordinary  exigencies  of 
this  war  have  compelled  it  to  take.  While  it  is  not  difficult  to  criticise 
and  point  out  mistakes  in  a  new  description  of  vessels  which  the  change 
in  naval  warfare  has  suddenly  called  into  existence,  and  to  suggest  altera 
tions  and  improvements  on  what  has  already  transpired,  it  is  a  satisfac 
tion  to  the  Department  which  was  compelled  to  encounter  this  opposition 
to  know  that  this  class  of  vessels,  subjected  at  the  beginning  to  ridicule, 
and  subsequently  to  obloquy  and  denunciation,  has  been  successfully 
tried  in  battle  and  in  storm — that  these  vessels  have  equalled  the  expec 
tations  of  the  country  in  periods  of  peril,  and  have  been  extensively 
copied  abroad.  Other  Governments  are  adopting  them,  while  many  of 
the  discontented  of  our  own  country  still  question  the  wisdom  of  build 
ing  vessels  of  the  class  which  has  at  a  critical  moment  rendered 
unequalled  service  to  the  Union,  and  saved  the  capital  of  the  nation. 

In  encouraging  contrast  with  the  illiberal  and  prejudiced  opinions 
which  have  opposed  all  improvements,  denounced  them  in  advance  as  fail 
ures,  and  been  dissatisfied  even  with  successful  results,  are  the  observations 
and  reflections  of  the  sagacious  and  sensible  author  of  the  recent  valua 
ble  work  on  "  English  and  French  Neutrality,"  who,  appreciating  the 
difficulties  of  the  Department,  remarks,  at  page  458  of  his  instructive 
volume : 

"  It  is  no  small  proof  of  ability  in  the  management  of  the  Navy,  that 


206  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

there  was  skill  enough  to  provide,  and  independence  enough  to  use,  a 
form  of  war-ship  and  a  kind  of  cannon  before  untried,  but  which  time 
and  experience  have  shown  were  alone  of  all  ships  and  weapons  then 
known  capable  of  meeting  the  emergency." 

At  the  present  time  the  call  for  light-draught  iron-clads  comes  from 
every  squadron  engaged  in  this  struggle.  Acting  Rear-Admiral  Lee 
says  that  within  the  limits  of  his  command  there  must  be  a  large  increase 
of  light-draught  iron-clads.  Vice-Admiral  Farragut,  before  he  left  the 
scene  of  his  great  exploits,  asked  for  additional  iron-clads,  especially 
those  of  lio-ht  drauo-ht,  and  declared  that  the  coast  could  not  be  held 

O  O         7 

unless  he  had  them.  In  each  of  the  blockading  and  river  squadrons 
they  are  required. 

Nearly  two  years  have  elapsed  since  any  contracts  have  been  entered 
into  for  this  class  of  vessels,  and  it  is  hoped  the  present  war  is  so  near 
its  close  that  no  further  expenditures  for  additional  ones  will  be  neces 
sary  ;  but  should  the  war  continue  a  year  longer,  more  will  be  wanted. 

My  acknowledgments  are  due  to  the  committee  for  this  opportunity 
to  express  my  views.  I  shall  feel  under  obligations  to  them  or  others, 
as  will  the  whole  country,  for  any  improvements  or  suggestions  which 
they  may  propose  in  consequence  of  their  investigations,  or  for  any  un 
detected  errors  or  mistakes  which  they  may  discover,  in  order  that  their 
conclusions  and  recommendations  in  this  great  emergency  may  be 
brought  to  the  aid  of  the  Department  on  this  most  interesting  and  im 
portant  subject. 

REPOET   OF   EEAE-ADMIEAL   J.    A.    DAIILGREN. 

FLAG-STEAMER  PHILADELPHIA,        ) 
OFF  MOEBIS  ISLAND,  January  28, 1864.  f 

SIR  :  Conformably  to  the  wishes  of  the  Department,  I  submit  the 
following  review  of  the  services  of  the  Monitors  while  under  my  com 
mand ;  and  as  some  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  under  which  they 
have  been  tested  may  afford  a  better  appreciation  of  their  qualities,  I 
shall  briefly  narrate  some  of  the  leading  events  in  which  they  have  par 
ticipated  during  the  operations  at  this  place. 

On  the  6th  July  Rear-Admiral  Du  Pont  delivered  to  me  the  com 
mand  of  the  naval  forces  occupying  the  coast  of  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  and  part  of  Florida ;  they  embraced  seventy  (70)  vessels  of  all 
classes,  and  were  distributed  at  various  points  along  an  extent  of  more 
than  three  hundred  miles.  There  was  no  concentration,  the  purpose 
being  rather  to  distribute  the  vessels  in  order  to  enforce  an  efficient 
blockade. 


THE    DIFFEKENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITOKS.  207 

Of  the  iron-clads,  the  Ironsides  was  off  Charleston  bar,  two  Monitors 
were  at  Edisto,  one  at  Stono,  three  at  Port  Royal,  and  one  at  Ossabaw. 

The  orders  of  the  Department  (June  24,  1863)  only  directed  me  to 
assume  the  command;  they  went  no  further,  nor  was  there  need  that 
they  should.  There  was  an  enemy  in  front,  and  it  was  my  duty  to 
compel  him  to  obedience,  so  far  as  my  means  permitted.  On  the  day 
that  I  arrived,  an  interview  occurred  with  General  Gillmoro,  in  which 
the  details  for  a  descent  on  Morris  Island  were  arranged  to  commence 
on  the  Wednesday  following,  but  which  were  postponed  first  to  Thurs 
day  and  then  to  Friday,  in  order  to  allow  General  Gillmore  to  perfect 
his  arrangements. 

-  In  the  absence  of  specific  instructions,  I  was  obliged  to  assume  the 
responsibility  of  action  which  the  Department  was  advised  of. 

The  naval  part  of  the  operations  consisted  of — 

1.  In  assembling  the  iron-clads  at  the  Charleston  bar,  so  as  to  cross 
at  early  daylight  on  the  day  named,  to  cover  the  attack  of  the  troops,  to 
prevent  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  during  that  attack,  and  to  engage 
the  rebel  batteries,  particularly  Fort  Wagner. 

2.  To  furnish  a  convoy  for  the  column  that  was  to  ascend  to  Stono, 
cover  its  landing,  and  shell  James's  Island. 

3.  To  guard  the  depots  of  the  army  at  Hilton  Head  and  at  Seabrook 
during  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  concentrated  on  Folly  Island. 

I  should  here  state  that  Mr.  Ericsson  had  decided  to  increase  the 
thicknesses  of  the  pilot-houses  of  all  the  Monitors,  and  add  heavy  circles 
of  metal  to  the  bases  of  the  turrets  and  pilot-houses. 

The  three  at  Port  Royal  were  already  in  hand  for  this  purpose,  and 
some  progress  had  been  made.  A  part  of  my  preparation  consisted  in 
putting  a  stop  to  the  work,  and  having  the  vessels  fitted  temporarily  for 
service. 

This  was  effected  in  season,  and  before  daylight  of  the  9th  of  July 
the  Monitors  were  off  the  bar,  ready  to  pass  in  at  the  first  sign  of  move 
ment  by  the  United  States  batteries  on  Folly  Island. 

The  plan  was  to  open  from  the  masked  batteries  on  the  north  end 
of  Folly  Island,  cross  the  bar  with  the  Monitors,  and  enfilade  the  rebel 
position  on  the  eminences  of  Morris  Island,  while  the  troops  were  to 
cross  the  narrow  inlet  which  divides  Morris  Island  from  Folly  Island 
when  the  proper  moment  arrived.  The  obscurity  of  the  night  still 
rested  on  land  and  sea  when  I  went,  on  board  the  Catskill  (July  10), 
and  not  a  symptom  of  preparation  on  shore  was  visible  to  us. 

It  was  important  that  the  Monitors  should  not  by  their  appearance 
give  any  intimation  of  what  was  meditated  by  being  seen  on  the  bar 


208  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

until  the  details  ashore  were  completed ;  so  I  waited  the  first  fire  of  the 
batteries.  This  was  not  long  coming,  and  I  led  with  my  flag  in  the 
Catsldll,  followed  by  Captains  Fairfax,  Downes,  and  Colhoun,  in  the 
Montauk,  Nahant,  and  Weehawken.  Steering  for  the  wreck  of  the 
Keokuk,  and  passing  it,  the  Monitors  were  laid  in  line  about  parallel  to 
the  land,  opposite  the  southern  eminences  of  Morris  Island,  and  poured 
in  a  steady  fire  among  the  rebel  garrison,  who  were  there  posted,  mak 
ing  a  feeble  and  ineffectual  return  to  the  storm  of  shot  and  shell  that 
came  upon  their  front  and  flank.  I  could  see  plainly  the  great  confusion 
into  which  they  were  thrown  by  this  sudden  and  overwhelming 
onslaught.  It  was  a  complete  surprise,  both  as  to  time  and  to  power 
developed. 

The  Monitors  were  run  in  as  close  as  the  shoal  waters  permitted,  so 
that  the  shells  from  our  own  batteries  on  Folly  Island  passed  close 
ahead  of  and  at  times  over  some  of  them. 

About  8  o'clock  a  body  of  men  were  seen  coming  over  the  low  sand- 
beach  of  Morris  Island,  and  while  hesitating  whether  to  treat  them  to 
some  volleys  of  grape,  the  sight  of  the  Union  flag  *  told  who  they  were. 
They  composed  the  brigade  which  had  been  brought  from  the  Folly 
River  by  ..the  boats  of  the  squadron  under  Lieutenant-Commander  Bunce, 
and  Lieutenant  Mackenzie. 

I  paused  for  a  moment  to  observe  the  gradual  accumulation  of  our 
men  in  masses,  and  their  advancing  movement ;  then  pushed  forward  to 
accelerate  with  our  enfilading  fire  the  retreat  of  the  rebels. 

The  sight  was  now  of  great  interest.  Our  own  troops  could  be  seen 
taking  possession  of  the  sand-hills  where  the  enemy  had  rested  the  sole 
defence  of  this  end  of  the  island,  while  some  battalions  were  moving  along 
the  beach.  The  defeated  rebels  were  hurriedly  making  their  way  along 
the  low,  flat  land  north  of  their  position,  and  some  two  or  three  detached 
dwellings  were  in  flames,  while  the  Monitors  skirting  the  shore  main 
tained  a  steady  fire  on  the  retreat.  Presently  they  reached  Fort  Wag 
ner,  and  here  we  were  advised  that  our  advance  was  checked,  at  least 
for  the  day,  though  it  was  but  nine  o'clock.  The  discomfited  rebels  were 
safe  in  the  work,  and  our  own  men  halted  at  a  reasonable  distance 
from  it. 

The  Monitor  with  my  flag  wras  now  anchored  as  near  the  beach  as 
the  depth  of  water  permitted  (twelve  hundred  yards),  and  the  other 
Monitors  in  line  to  the  southward.  A  steady  fire  was  begun  about  9.30 
— the  fort  replying  briskly — and  maintained  through  the  day,  except 

*  The  first  planted  on  Morris  Island  by  Lieutenant  Robeson. 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  209 

the  dinner  hour,  until  six  in  the  evening ;  then  I  retired  and  anchored 
lower  down. 

Next  morning  before  six  o'clock  the  flag-lieutenant  reported  to  me 
that  an  assault  had  been  made  at  daybreak  by  our  troops  and  failed, 
and  about  nine  o'clock  I  had  a  note  in  pencil  from  the  general,  saying : 
"  We  attempted  to  carry  Fort  Wagner  by  assault  this  morning  and 
reached  the  parapet,  but  the  men  recoiled  and  fell  back  with  slight  loss." 

It  is  known  now  that  reinforcements  had  been  hurried  to  the  island 
by  the  rebels,  and  had  entered  the  work  about  midnight. 

I  had  no  notice  whatever  of  the  general's  intent,  and  could,  there 
fore,  render  no  aid  in  time. 

Here  ended  the  first  part  of  the  enterprise  against  Morris  Island.  It 
had  been  in  all  respects  a  surprise,  and  so  complete  that  the  rebels  do  not 
seem  to  have  had  any  idea  of  it  until  the  clay  before ;  and  it  is  not  cer 
tain  they  were  then  aware  of  the  scale  on  which  it  was  to  be  conducted. 

Had  a  work  like  Wagner  crowned  the  sand-hills  of  the  south  end, 
we  could  not  have  established  our  position  on  the  island — even  a  sur 
prise  would  probably  have  been  out  of  the  question.  But  there  were  to 
be  no  more  surprises — the  undertaking  was  to  be  completed  only  by  hard 
work  patiently  endured  in  the  trenches,  and  by  batteries  ashore  and  afloat. 

The  general  now  decided  to  make  a  second  assault  in  force,  and  to 
cover  it  by  some  light  batteries  established  at  distances  varying  from 
one  thousand  to  seventeen  hundred  yards. 

While  the  preparations  for  this  design  were  going  on,  the  Monitors 
were  daily  at  work  to  occupy  the  attention  of  Wagner  and  keep  down 
its  fire — the  gunboats  assisting  at  long  range. 

On  the  18th  July,  all  being  ready,  about  noon  I  led  up  in  the  Mon- 
tauk,  followed  by  four  Monitors  and  the  Ironsides,  anchored  at  twelve 
hundred  yards,  as  near  as  the  state  of  the  tide  would  permit,  and  opened 
fire — the  gunboats  firing  at  a  greater  distance,  and  the  shore  batteries  also 
in  action. 

As  the  tide  rose  the  Montauk  gradually  closed  in,  until  at  seven 
o'clock  she  was  about  three  hundred  yards  from  Wagner,  when  I  ordered 
grape  to  be  used.  Unable  to  endure  the  fire  of  the  vessels,  the  guns 
of  the  fort  were  now  silent,  and  not  a  man  was  to  be  seen. 

About  sunset  a  note  in  pencil  from  General  Gillmore  announced  his 
intention  to  assault,  but  it  was  quite  dark  before  the  column  reached  the 
work.  The  fire  of  the  vessels  was  continued  so  long  as  it  was  safe  for 
our  own  men  ashore,  but  ceased  when  the  darkness  made  it  impossible 
to  distinguish  friend  and  foe.  The  rattle  of  musketry  soon  made 
known  the  commencement  of  the  assault,  and  continued  with  little  in- 

14 


210  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

termission  until  9.30,  when  it  ceased,  and  then  came  the  painful  tidings 
of  our  defeat. 

This  was  the  end  of  the  second  part  of  the  operation,  and  proved  that 
the  work  was  too  strong  and  too  pertinaciously  defended  to  be  taken  by 
any  off-hand  blow.  The  slow  and  laborious  operation  by  trench  and 
cannon  only  were  capable  of  reducing  it. 

And  here  I  may  remark,  that  in  this  necessity  is  to  be  found  a  prin 
cipal  cause  for  the  delay  in  reaching  Charleston  that  subsequently 
ensued.  It  was  no  doubt  unavoidable,  for  it  is  to  be  presumed  that  no 
more  troops  could  then  be  spared  from  the  main  armies.  If  there  had 
been  sufficient  to  make  such  an  assault  as  would  have  overpowered  all 
opposition,  Wagner  might  have  been  carried  at  the  first  assault,  Gregg 
would  have  yielded  immediately,  Sumter  would  soon  have  followed  as  a 
matter  of  course,  and  the  iron-clads,  untouched  by  severe  and  continued 
battering,  would  have  been  in  condition  to  come  quickly  in  contact 
with  the  then  imperfect  interior  defences. 

The  rebel  movements  clearly  indicate  that  they  admitted  the  imprac 
ticability  of  defending  Morris  Island,  and  consequently  Sumter,  after 
our  position  on  it  was  fully  established  and  covered  by  the  iron-clads. 
They  only  sought  to  hold  the  island  long  enough  to  replace  Sumter  by 
an  interior  position ;  hence,  every  day  of  defence  by  Wagner  was  vital 
to  that  of  Charleston. 

This  policy  was  successful  for  two  months  (10th  July  to  7th  Sep 
tember),  and  gave  time  to  convert  Fort  Johnson  from  a  forlorn  old  fort 
into  a  powerful  earthwork — improved  by  the  experiences  of  Wagner. 
Moultrie  received  similar  advantages,  and  most  of  the  cannon  of  Sumter 
were  divided  between  Johnson  and  Moultrie.  Batteries  were  established 
along  the  south  shore  of  the  channel  from  Johnson  toward  the  city ; 
and  thus  an  interior  defence  was  completed  which,  though  it  separated 
more  widely  the  salient  and  principal  works  of  the  defence,  by  substitu 
ting  Johnson  for  Surnter,  yet  rendered  access  to  the  upper  harbor  far 
more  difficult,  because  a  more  powerful  fire  was  concentrated  from 
additional  batteries  upon  vessels  attempting  to  enter. 

And  thus  it  was  that,  even  after  Morris  Island  was  evacuated  and 
Sumter  dismantled,  the  fleet  must  still  pass  the  fire  of  Moultrie  and  Bee 
to  find  itself  in  presence  of  a  formidable  earthwork,  supported  by  con 
tmuous  batteries,  and  commanding  obstructions  more  difficult  than  any 
between  Sumter  and  Moultrie. 

The  real  nature  of  these  obstructions  was  not  suspected  until  the 
Avinter  freshets  had  broken  away  and  floated  into  our  hands  a  fair 
specimen  of  them,  which  were  certainly  far  more  formidable  than  had 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MOKETOES.  211 

been  anticipated.  So  well  do  the  rebels  keep  their  counsel,  that  the 
best-informed  refugees, who  Lad  been  constantly  engaged  about  the  har 
bor,  appeared  to  know  as  little  about  them  as  we  did. 

During  the  progress  of  the  engineers  toward  Wagner  the  iron-clads 
played  an  important  part,  using  their  guns  whenever  an  opportunity 
offered,  as  shown  in  the  instances  quoted  on  page  213.  It  may  be 
readily  conceived  that,  all  things  being  equal,  it  was  just  as  easy  for  the 
rebels  to  have  worked  toward  our  position  as  it  was  for  our  troops  to 
work  toward  theirs.  But  there  was  a  serious  difference  in  the  fact  that 
the  cannon  of  the  iron-clads,  and  also  of  the  gunboats,  completely  enfi 
laded  the  entire  width  of  the  narrow  island,  and  absolutely  interdicted 
any  operation  of  the  kind  on  the  part  of  the  rebels.  In  addition,  when 
ever  their  fire  was  bearing  severely  on  our  own  workmen,  a  request  from 
the  general  always  drew  the  fire  of  the  vessels ;  and  I  do  not  know  that 
it  failed  to  be  effective  in  any  instance.  As  a  consequence,  the  rebels 
were  restricted  to  Wagner,  and  were  powerless  to  hinder  the  progress  of 
the  trenches  that  were  at  last  carried  into  the  very  ditch  of  the  work, 
and  decided  its  evacuation  without  assault. 

The  day  before  the  contemplated  assault,  I  led  in  the  iron-clads  in 
force,  as  agreed  on,  and  battered  the  fort  all  day,  tearing  it  into  a  sand- 
heap.  The  next  morning  it  was  to  have  been  stormed,  but  the  enemy 
had  fled  :  they  foresaw  the  inevitable  result. 

The  vessels  thus  shared  fully  with  the  army  in  the  operation  that 
led  to  the  abandonment  of  the  works  on  Morris  Island,  and  besides 
what  is  already  mentioned,  prevented  the  access  of  reenforcements  or 
their  accumulation  between  Wagner  and  Gregg.  The  boats  of  the 
squadron  were  also  engaged  on  picket  duty  by  night  along  the  sea 
shore  of  Morris  Island,  and  the  little  stream  on  its  inner  border. 

A  detachment  of  seamen  and  marines,  under  Captain  Parker,  par 
ticipated  in  the  practice  of  the  batteries  on  Fort  Sumter,  by  working  four 
navy  rifle-cannon,  landed  for  the  purpose. 

The  duties  of  the  iron-clads  were  not  performed  under  idle  batteries. 
The  guns  of  Wagner  never  failed  to  open  on  them,  and  fired  until  their 
crews  were  driven,  by  those  of  our  iron-clads,  to  take  shelter  in  the 
bomb-proofs.  One  of  these  cannon,  a  10-inch,  left  deep  dents  on  every 
turret,  that  will  not  easily  be  effaced. 

The  operations. of  the  iron-clads  against  Morris  Island  were  appro 
priately  closed  by  a  severe  contest  with  Fort  Moultrie,  Batteries  Bee, 
Beauregard,  etc.,  to  relieve  the  Weehavvken,  which  had  grounded  under 
their  fire,  and  was  finally  got  off  with  some  severe  injuries,  owing  to  the 
falling  tide  having  exposed  the  hull  under  the  overhang. 


212 


HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 


There  were  other  occasions  when  severe  conflicts  occurred  with  the 
rebel  works  on  Sullivan's  Island. 

And  besides  the  principal  attacks  in  force,  there  were  few  days  from 
the  first  attack  on  Morris  Island  (July  10th)  to  its  evacuation  (Septem 
ber  7th)  that  some  iron-clads  or  gunboats  were  not  engaged  in  firing  at 
the  enemy's  works,  so  as  to  facilitate  the  labor  of  our  troops  ashore,  as 
will  be  perceived  by  the  following  sample  from  the  record  : 


Object. 


Vessels  engaged. 


1863. 

July    18 


22 


Assault  on  Wagner. 


Wagner 


24  Wagner,  to  cover  advance. 


25  Wagner  . . . 
28 j Wagner  ... 

29  Wagner... 

30  Wagner  . . . 


"      31 
Aug.     1 


Rebel  batteries  on  Morris  Island 
Wagner 


2  Wagner 

4|  Wagner 

6  Wagner 

8j  Wagner 

11  j  Wagner  and  vicinity 

13  Rebel  batteries  on  Morris  Island. 

14  Rebel  batteries  on  Morris  Island . 


15  Wagner 

17  Rebel  batteries  on  Morris  Island, 
to  direct  fire  from  our  batteries 
which  opened  on  Sumter. 


18 


Wagner,  to  prevent  assault 


19  Wagner 

20  Rebel  batteries  on  Morris  Island. 


21  j  Sumter  and  Wagner 


22jWagner 
23  Sumter. 


Sept.    1  Sumter  and  obstructions. 


5  Between  Sumter  and  Gregg 

6  j  Wagner  and  Gregg 

^Batteries  on  Sullivan's  Island... 
S.Batteries  on  Sullivan's  Island... 


Montauk  (flag),  Ironsides,  Catskill,  Nan- 
tucket,  Weehawken,  Patapsco ;  gun 
boats  Paul  Jones,  Ottawa,  Seneca,  Chip- 
pewa,  Wissahickon. 

Nantucket,  Ottawa  (gunboat). 

Weebawken  (flag),  Ironsides,  Catskill, 
Montauk,  Patapsco,  Nantucket ;  gun 
boats  Paul  Jones,  Seneca,  Ottawa,  Dai- 
Cbing. 

Gunboats  Ottawa,  Dai-Ching,  Paul  Jones. 

Weehawken,  Catskill,  Ottawa  (gunboat). 

Ironsides,  Patapsco. 

Ironsides,  Catskill,  Patapsco,  Ottawa  (gun 
boat). 

Ottawa  (gunboat). 

Montauk,  Patapsco,  Catskill,  Weehawken, 
Passaic,  Nahant,  Marblehead  (gunboat). 

Ottawa,  Marblehead  (gunboats). 

Montauk,  Marblehead'  (gunboat). 

Marblehead  (gunboat). 

Ottawa,  Marblehead,  Mahaska  (gunboats). 

Patapsco,  Catskill. 

Gunboats  Dai-Ching,  Ottawa,  Mahaska, 
Wissahickon,  Racer. 

Gunboats  Wissahickon,  Mahaska,  Ottawa, 
Dai-Ching,  Racer,  Dan.  Smith. 

Mortar-boats  Racer,  Dan.  Smith. 

Weehawken,  Ironsides,  Montauk,  Nahant, 
Catskill,  Passaic,  Patapsco  ;  gunboats 
Canandaigua,  Mahaska,  Ottawa,  Cimar- 
ron,  Wissahickon,  Dai-Ching,  Lodona. 

Ironsides,  Passaic,  Weehawken;  gunboats 
Wissahickon,  Mahaska,  Dai-Ching,  Ot 
tawa,  Lodona. 

Ironsides. 

Ironsides ;  gunboats  Mahaska,  Ottawa, 
Dai-Ching,  Lodona. 

Ironsides,  Patapsco ;  gunboats  Mahaska, 
Dai-Ching. 

Weehawken,  Ironsides :  gunboat  Mon 
tauk. 

Weehawken,  Montauk,  Passaic,  Patapsco, 
Nahant. 

Weehawken,  Montauk,  Passaic,  Patapsco, 
Nahant,  Lehigh. 

Lehigh,  Nahant. 

Ironsides,  Weehawken,  Montauk,  Passaic, 
Patapsco,  Nahant,  Lehigh. 

Ironsides,  Patapsco,  Lehigh,  Nahant,  Mon 
tauk,  Weehawken  (ashore). 

Ironsides,  Patapsco,  Lehigh,  Nahant,  Mon 
tauk,  Weehawken  (ashore). 


THE    DUTEKENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS. 


213 


I  shall  now  briefly  comment  on  the  various  qualities  of  the  Monitors : 
1st  Capacity  for  resistance.  2d.  Power  of  ordnance.  3d.  Draught  of 
water.  4th.  Speed.  5th.  Number  of  crew. 

Endurance. — During  the  operations  against  Morris  Island  the 
nine  iron-clads  fired  eight  thousand  projectiles,  and  received  eight  hun 
dred  and  eighty-two  (882)  hits.  Including  the  service  at  Sumter  in 
April  and  the  Ogeechee,  the  total  number  was  eleven  hundred  and 
ninety-four  (1,194,)  distributed  as  follows: 

Service  of  iron-dads.    South  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron.    Shots  fired  and 
hits  received  by  them  during  operations  against  Morris  Island. 


VESSELS. 

JTo.  OF  SHOTS  FIEED. 

3 

t-T 

tg 
<co 

Exj 

HJ 

«"i 

£ 

-2 

3 

3 
g 

15-in. 

11-in. 

Catskill  

138 
301 
41 
119 
170 
178 
264 
44 

425 
478 
28 
107 
276 
230 
633 
155 
4,439 

86 
154 
36 
90 
69 
96 
134 
53 
164 

20 
14 

"35 

36 
47 
53 
51 

"4(3 

""9 
i 

106 
214 
36 
134 
105 
144 
187 
304 
164 

Montauk  

Lehio'h  

Passaic  

Nahant  

Patapsco  

\Veehawken 

Nantucket  

Ironsides 

Total... 

1,255 

6,771 

882 

256 

56 

1,194 

No.  of  shots  fired. 

Weight  of  projec 
tiles  fired,  in  tons. 

By  Ironsides 

4  439 

288i 

11-inch  by  Monitors 

2,332 

15H 

15-inch   by  Monitors 

1,255 

218* 

Total  

8,026 

653i 

Additional  list  of  actions  in  which  the  new  Ironsides  was  engaged  with  the 
rebel  latteries  in  Charleston  harbor  while  reducing  Morris  Island. 


DATE. 

Name. 

Rounds 
fired. 

Hits  by 
enemy. 

Distance. 

Object 

Eemarks. 

1863. 

July    18 
"       20 
Aug.    23 

Sept.    2 

"        2 

"         5 
"        5 

New  Ironsides. 

« 

805 
168 
90 

41 

9 
488 
32 

4 
13 
4 

7 

Yards. 
1,400 
1,300 

Fort  "Wagner 

Ship  was  under  way; 
distance  varied  from 
1,100  to  1,300  yds. 
Hits  from  Gregg  and 
Moultrie  ;     shfp    at 
anchor. 

Hit  from  Gregg. 

« 

it 

1,000 

1,500 
1,300 
1,800 

Fort  Gregg.. 

Fort  Sumter 
Fort  Wagner 
Fort  Gregg.  . 

n 

it 

1 

On  July  29th  the  Passaic  engaged  Wagner,  and  on  August  31st 


214:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Moultrie.  On  September  8th  the  Passaic  (in  a  disabled  condition), 
Patapsco,  Weehawken,  and  Nahant  engaged  Moultrie. 

Of  the  eight  Monitors,  one  was  always  absent  at  Warsaw  (Nahant  or 
Nantucket),  to  blockade  the  rebel  ram.  The  Lehigh  did  not  arrive  until 
August  30th,  therefore  was  only  able  to  participate  in  the  operations  of 
the  remaining  seven  days,  but  did  good  work. 

For  some  time  only  five  Monitors  were  available  for  general  attack, 
and  then  six,  which  was  the  greatest  number  disposable  at  any  one  time. 

The  consequences  of  the  protracted  firing  and  hard  usage  to  which 
the  Monitors  were  exposed  during  these  two  months  of  incessant  ser 
vice,  were  unavoidably  very  considerable  in  the  aggregate ;  and  the 
greater,  also,  that  all  repair  which  could  possibly  be  dispensed  with  was 
postponed  to  the  conclusion.  It  was  therefore  necessarily  extensive 
when  entered  upon.  The  battering  received  was  without  precedent. 
The  Montauk  had  been  struck  two  hundred  and  fourteen  (214)  times  ; 
the  Weehawken  one  hundred  and  eighty-seven  (187)  times,  and  almost 
entirely  by  10-inch  shot.  What  vessels  have  ever  been  subjected  to  such 
a  test  ?  It  is  not  surprising  that  they  should  need  considerable  repair  after 
sustaining  such  severe  pounding  for  so  long  a  time,  but  only  that  they 
could  be  restored  at  ah1  to  serviceable  condition.  The  force  of  the  10- 
inch  shot  must  be  experienced  to  be  appreciated.  Any  one  in  contact 
with  the  part  of  the  turret  struck  falls  senseless,  and  I  have  been  nearly 
shaken  oft*  my  feet  in  the  pilot-house  when  engaging  Moultrie. 

All  the  little  defects  of  detail  were  marked  by  such  a  searching  pro 
cess.  Decks  were  cut  through ;  cannon  were  worn  out ;  side  armor 
shaken  ;  tops  of  pilot-houses  crushed,  etc.  But  all  these  were  reparable, 
and  no  vital  principle  was  seriously  touched. 

With  such  workshops  and  means  as  a  Northern  navy-yard  includes, 
the  repair  of  all  Monitors  would  have  been  speedily  executed ;  but 
when  machinery,  tools,  labor,  and  material  have  all  to  be  obtained,  as 
they  were  here,  from  a  great  distance,  there  was  of  necessity  consid 
erable  delay ;  and,  moreover,  it  was  not  admissible  to  withdraw  but  a 
portion  of  the  Monitors  at  a  time  from  the  blockade. 

The  additions  that  were  deemed  advisable  for  strengthening  the 
pilot-houses  and  turrets  were  also  put  on  at  this  time,  and  the  bottoms 
cleaned,  for  they  had  now^  became  so  foul  with  oysters  and  grass  that 
the  speed  was  reduced  to  three  or  three  and  a  half  knots,  and,  with  the 
strong  tide  of  this  harbor,  added  considerably  to  the  difficulties  of  work 
ing  the  vessels  properly  under  fire. 

On  one  night  I  was  caught  by  heavy  weather  from  the  southeast 
while  close  up  to  Sumter,  when  I  had  gone  to  attack  it ;  and  it  was  well 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  215 

that  the  darkness  of  the  night  prevented  the  slowness  of  our  motion 
from  being  perceived  while  extricating  the  Monitors  from  their  position. 

Power  of  Ordnance. — Each  turret  contains  two  guns,  and  from  the 
peculiar  facility  which  it  has  for  giving  direction  to  the  heaviest  ord 
nance,  no  doubt,  arises  the  desire  to  make  these  of  the  heaviest  descrip 
tion.  How  far  other  considerations  should  control  the  character  of  the 
ordnance  is  necessarily  an  unsettled  question. 

To  strike  an  armored  ship,  it  may  be  best  to  use  a  gun  capable  of 
the  greatest  power ;  but  whether  this  shall  be  derived  from  a  projectile 
of  great  weight,  driven  by  low  velocity,  or  of  less  weight,  and  high  ve 
locity  ;  whether  it  shall  be  a  15-inch  gun,  fired  with  thirty-five  or  forty 
pounds,  or  a  13-inch,  fired  with  fifty  pounds  of  powder,  is  not  here  ma 
terial  :  the  weight  of  the  gun  for  either  purpose  will  not  vary  to  any 
important  degree.  But  in  operations  against  earthworks,  whose  mate 
rial  cannot  be  damaged  permanently,  but  only  disturbed,  and  which  are 
only  to  be  dealt  with  by  keeping  down  their  fire,  a  much  lighter  projec 
tile  would  be  preferable,  in  order  that  the  practice  may  be  as  rapid  as 
possible.  Hence  a  piece  of  sixteen  thousand  pounds  for  10-inch  or  11- 
inch  shot  and  shell. 

When  a  number  of  Monitors  are  brought  together  it  would  be  better 
also  to  have  guns  of  like  kind  in  each  turret,  and  bring  into  action 
whichever  might  be  preferable.  Each  of  the  Monitors  of  this  squadron 
had  a  15-inch  and  a  smaller  gun  (11-inch  or  8-inch  rifle),  and  hence 
the  rapidity  of  fire,  which  was  most  desirable,  was  not  attained.  That 
this  was  due  to  the  calibre  of  the  gun,  and  not  to  its  being  located  in  a 
turret,  may  be  shown  by  one  notable  instance. 

November  9,  1863,  the  Montauk,  Captain  Davis,  was  engaged  in 
battering  Sumter.  In  so  doing,  the  1 1-inch  gun  fired  twenty-five  shells 
successively  in  one  hour,  of  which  twenty-one  hit  the  wall  of  the  fort 
aimed  at — distance  sixteen  hundred  yards.  This  is  at  the  rate  of  one 
shell  in  2.4  minutes,  which  is  not  only  rapid  but  also  exceedingly  accu 
rate  practice.  There  is  no  reason  why  another  11-inch,  if  placed  in  the 
adjoining  carriage  (instead  of  the  15-inch),  could  not  have  been  fired  in 
the  same  time,  at  which  rate  that  Monitor  would  have  delivered  an  11- 
inch  shell  every  1.2  minute.  The  rates  of  fire  reported  for  the  Iron 
sides,  by  Captain  Rowan,  are — 


Time. 

No.  fired. 

Time  for  each  fire. 

Most  rapid     

h.  m. 

0  50 

25 

m. 

I  74 

Continuous  

2  55 

490 

2  86 

1  00 

360 

1  33 

1  00 

25 

2  40 

216  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

It  will  be  perceived,  that  for  a  short  space  of  time  the  frigate  deliv 
ered  a  shell  from  each  gun  in  1.74  minute,  for  three  hours  in  2.86  min 
utes,  and  it  is  believed  that  a  fire  could  be  sustained  at  the  rate  of  1.33 
minute.  The  last  rate  is  therefore  possible,  but  I  am  sure  it  would  be 
difficult  to  sustain  it  long  with  much  regard  to  good  aim  and  consider 
able  distances ;  and  I  believe,  on  the  whole,  that  for  every  practicable 
purpose  there  would  be  all  desirable  rapidity  of  fire  from  the  11-inch  in 
turret.  Thus  it  is  not  to  be  presumed  that  there  will  be  equality  of 
ordnance  power  in  the  same  number  of  11-inch  guns  as  to  rapidity  of 
fire,  whether  in  a  turret  or  broadside. 

Draught  of  Water. — The  Monitors  of  the  Passaic  class  draw  about 
eleven  and  a  half  (llj)  feet  of  water  when  properly  trimmed.  On  this 
coast  ten  and  eleven  feet  is  the  most  convenient  draught  of  water  for 
penetrating  all  the  principal  sounds  and  rivers  and  navigating  them  to 
any  extent.  A  greater  draught  restricts  a  vessel  in  movement,  and  in 
many  instances  excludes  her  from  several  ports,  except  under  very  fa 
vorable  circumstances. 

Speed. — The  speed  of  the  Monitors  is  not  great  (seven  knots),  but 
it  is  quite  respectable  with  a  clean  bottom,  and  is  fully  equal  to  that  of 
the  Ironsides.  Their  steerage  is  peculiar,  but  when  understood  and 
rightfully  managed,  not  difficult  to  control.  They  pivot  with  celerity 
and  in  less  space  than  almost  any  other  class  of  vessel. 

Number  of  Men.- — The  number  of  men  required  to  work  them  and 
the  guns  is  only  eighty,  which  is  very  moderate. 

In  common  with  all  iron-clads,  the  scope  of  vision  is  much  restricted, 
for  the  plain  reason  that  in  such  vessels  apertures  of  any  size  must  be 
avoided.  There  are  some  other  defects,  but  they  are  not  inherent,  and 
it  is  believed  are  susceptible  of  being  remedied  wholly  or  in  part.  So 
much  for  the  Monitors. 

The  Ironsides  is  a  fine,  powerful  ship.  Her  armor  has  stood  heavy 
battering  very  well,  and  her  broadside  of  seven  11-inch  guns  and  one 
8-inch  rifle  has  always  told  with  signal  effect  when  opened  on  the 
enemy.  Draught  of  water  about  15%  to  16  feet.  Speed  six  to  seven 
knots,  and  crew  about  four  hundred  and  forty  men. 

The  defects  of  the  vessel  are  the  unplated  ends,  which  are  conse 
quently  easily  damaged  by  a  raking  fire,  and  involve  the  rudder  and 
screw  more  or  less,  while  she  can  return  no  fire  in  either  direction. 
This  was  particularly  and  frequently  inconvenient  in  attacking  the  works 
on  Morris  Island,  for  at  certain  stages  of  the  tide  vessels  tail  nearly 
across  the  channel,  and  present  bow  and  stern  to  the  beach  of  Morris 
Island,  so  that  sometimes  it  was  necessary  to  delay  placing  the  vessel  in 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  217 

position,  and  at  others  she  would  swing  around  very  awkwardly  when 
engaged. 

The  Monitors,  on  the  other  hand,  were  almost  equally  well  defended 
on  all  sides,  and  could  fire  in  any  direction.  The  Ironsides  was  also 
open  to  descending  shot,  and  her  scope  of  fire  too  much  restricted  by 
badly-placed  ports. 

The  desire  for  comparison  which  rages  just  now  can  easily  be  satis 
fied  by  bringing  the  above  data  into  juxtaposition. 

Just  as  they  are,  the  Ironsides  is  capable  of  a  more  rapid  and  con 
centrated  fire,  which,  under  the  circumstances,  made  her  guns  more 
effective  than  the  15-inch  of  the  Monitors.  On  the  other  hand,  she  was 
restricted  by  draught  to  the  mid-channel,  was  very  vulnerable  to  a  ra 
king  fire,  and  the  direction  of  her  own  guns  was  very  limited  laterally. 

The  Monitors  could  operate  in  most  of  the  channels — could  direct 
their  fire  around  the  whole  circle — and  were  almost  equally  well  de 
fended  on  all  sides. 

The  defects  in  both  classes  of  vessels  are  susceptible  of  being  reme 
died  partially  or  entirely.  The  defence  of  the  Ironsides  could  be  made 
complete,  and  that  of  the  Monitors  equally  so.  The  armament  of 
the  Monitors  could  be  perfected  so  as  to  give  all  desirable  rapidity  of 
fire,  but  by  no  contrivance  could  the  Ironsides  be  enabled  to  use  much 
heavier  guns  than  those  mounted.  Yet  when  such  changes  were  made 
as  experience  has  suggested,  there  still  would  remain  to  the  Monitors 
the  lighter  draught,  choice  of  guns  from  the  heaviest  to  the  lightest,  de- 
fensibility,  and  direction  of  fire  around  the  whole  circle ;  consequently 
the  ability  to  carry  a  heavy  battery  into  the  least  depth  of  water,  with 
equal  power  of  offence  and  defence  in  any  direction,  and  that  with  half 
the  number  of  guns  carried  in  broadside  by  another  vessel. 

The  comparison  now  made  is  to  be  understood  as  having  relation  to 
existing  circumstances,  and  not  at  all  intended  as  conclusive  in  regard 
to  the  general  merits  of  iron-clads. 

It  is  in  this  sense  that  the  action  of  the  Navy  Department  is  to  be 
considered  with  reference  to  the  selection  of  one  class  of  vessels  over 
another. 

It  is  evident  that  it  was  not  designed  to  adopt  any  one  style  exclu 
sively,  for  of  the  three  vessels  first  ordered  two  were  of  the  ordinary 
broadside  class — the  Ironsides  and  the  Galena.  The  latter  was  quickly 
proved  to  be  absolutely  inefficient,  and  so  must  any  armored  steamer  of 
that  size.  It  is  universally  admitted  that  plates  of  less  than  four  and  a 
half  (4|-)  inches  cannot  stand  the  shock  of  heavy  projectiles,  and  vessels 
so  armored  must  be  of  considerable  tonnage. 


218  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

I  presume  the  Department  only  intended  to  build  such  vessels  as 
were  best  adapted  to  the  service  at  the  scene  of  war. 

Keeping  in  view  the  peculiar  exigencies  of  the  case,  which  required 
light  draught  and  great  ordnance  power,  it  appears  that  the  selection  of 
the  Department  could  not  have  been  more  judicious  in  preferring  a 
number  of  Monitors  to  operate  from  a  heavy  frigate  as  a  base ;  and  if 
the  intent  of  the  Department  could  have  been  carried  out  in  regard  to 
numbers,  we  should  now  have  been  in  entire  possession  of  the  coast 
from  the  capes  of  Virginia  to  New  Orleans,  including  Wilmington, 
Charleston,  Mobile,  etc. 

Many  defects  of  both  classes  are  easily  remediable,  but  some  of  those 
in  the  Monitors  could  only  be  determined  by  the  test  of  battle ;  before 
that,  approximation  only  was  possible. 

What  other  style  of  vessel  could  the  Department  have  chosen  ? 
Certainly  none  that  has  been  built  by  English  or  French  naval  authori 
ties.  The  Warrior  and  her  class  are  exceedingly  powerful,  but  could 
not  get  within  gunshot  here.* 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  very  little  navigable  water  on  this  coast 
which  is  not  accessible  to  the  Monitors.  They  command  supremely  all 
that  is  near  the  shore,  and  cannot  themselves  be  reached  by  vessels  of 
heavier  draught.  So  that,  when  there  was  some  reason  to  apprehend  the 
appearance  of  certain  rams  in  this  quarter,  I  assured  the  Department 
that  the  iron-clads  could  maintain  position  so  long  as  coal  and  provi 
sions  lasted. 

It  may  appear  that  I  speak  too  positively  on  the  subject,  but  some 
experience  with  them  certainly  gives  a  right  to  do  so.  With  a  single 
exception,  I  have  been  on  board  a  Monitor  in  all  the  principal  actions, 
and  the  recurrence  of  casualties  to  the  fleet-captains  f  near  me  shows 
that  I  was  in  a  situation  to  judge.  I  was  once  in  the  Ironsides  in  an 
attack  on  Moultrie  and  Sumter.  I  have  also  watched  the  behavior  of  the 
Monitors  at  anchor  through  all  the  phases  of  winter  weather  in  this  ex 
posed  situation. 

The  completeness  with  which  four  little  Monitors,  supported  by  an 
iron-clad  frigate,  have  closed  this  port,  is  well  worth  noting. 

*  According  to  Rear-Admiral  Paris,  the  French  Gloire  draws  28  feet ;  the  British 
Warrior  26  feet ;  the  Black  Prince  23£  feet ;  even  those  of  inferior  class,  Defence 
and  Resistance,  draw  24  feet.  Not  one  of  these  vessels  could  cross  the  Charleston 
bar,  and  would  be  perfectly  impotent  to  render  the  least  service  in  any  of  the  opera 
tions  now  being  carried  on. 

f  Captain  George  W.  Rodgers  was  next  ahead  when  killed  off  Wagner,  and  his 
successor,  Captain  Badger,  had  his  leg  broken  by  an  iron  splinter  in  the  attack  on 
Sumter. 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  219 

Very  soon  after  entering  the  roads  I  advanced  one  Monitor  well  up 
toward  the  inner  debouches  of  the  northern  channels,  supported  by 
another.  On  the  night  of  the  19th  of  July  an  English  steamer  at 
tempted  to  run  in,  and  having  eluded  the  hot  pursuit  of  the  outside 
blockade,  no  doubt  indulged  in  the  belief  that  all  danger  was  past.  But 
the  gallant  Captain  Rodgers  was  in  advance  that  night  with  the  Cat- 
skill,  and  a  shell  sent  suddenly  by  him  ahead  of  the  culprit  steamer  sig 
nified  no  escape.  In  despair  or  alarm  the  latter  grounded  on  a  shoal, 
and  her  wreck  has  since  served  as  a  warning  to  like  evil-doers.  Two  or 
three  steamers  that  were  in,  managed  to  get  out  immediately  after,  and 
one  or  two  may  have  gotten  in,  for  the  crews  of  the  Monitors  were  often 
too  fatigued  then  with  a  day's  battle  to  keep  watch  at  night ;  but  there 
ended  the  business  as  such,  and  for  several  months  not  a  vessel  has 
passed  in  or  out. 

These  four  Monitors,  who  thus  keep  watch  and  ward,  muster  eight 
(8)  guns  and  three  hundred  and  twenty  (320)  men,  which  is  almost  in 
significant  in  contrast  with  the  work  done. 

I  have  thus  put  on  paper  the  general  impressions  now  uppermost, 
but  very  hastily  and  under  great  pressure  of  business,  which  will,  I  hope, 
excuse  such  imperfections  as  may  have  inadvertently  occurred.  With 
more  leisure  I  could  do  full  justice  to  this  interesting  subject. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  A.  DAHLGREN, 

Rear- Admiral,  Commanding  S.  A.  B.  Squadron. 
Hon.  GIDEOX  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 

REAR-ADMIRAL   PORTER?S   VIEWS   UPON   IRON-CLADS. 

FLAG-SHIP  BLACK  HAWK,  MISSISSIPPI  SQUADRON,  1 
CAIRO,  February  16, 1864.     f 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  have  made  a  visit  to  Cincin 
nati  to  examine  the  iron-clads  there,  and  see  what  prospect  there  was 
of  getting  some  of  these  vessels  into  immediate  service 

It  is  much  to  be  regretted  that  the  boats  at  Cincinnati  are  not 
finished,  as  I  am  certain  they  would  accomplish  all  that  can  be  done  by 
Monitors.  No  complaint,  however,  can  be  justly  made  against  the  con 
tractors  for  want  of  activity  in  the  performance  of  the  work  on  these  boats. 

When  I  visited  Cincinnati  a  little  over  a  year  ago,  no  preparations 
were  then  made  to  commence  these  vessels.  Now  they  are  in  a  fair 
way  of  being  completed,  and  I  think  can  all  be  put  in  the  water  and 
ready  to  operate  against  an  enemy  by  the  first  of  June. 

When  the  Government  do  get  these  boats,  they  may  rest  assured  of 


220  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

receiving  as  good  Monitor-built  vessels  as  have  yet  been  contracted  for ; 
for  though  I  have  not  seen  many  to  which  I  can  compare  them,  I  am 
glad  to  say  that  in  workmanship,  model,  and  probably  in  speed,  these 
vessels  will  be  equal,  if  not  superior,  to  any  Monitors  yet  built,  at  least 
of  those  that  I  have  seen.  I  can  only  draw  comparison  between  these 
and  the  first  Ericsson  Monitor,  which  I  was  sent  by  order  of  the  De 
partment  to  examine.  I  remember  pronouncing  that  vessel  "  a  perfect 
success,"  "  and  capable  of  defeating  any  thing  that  then  floated."  I 
was  looked  upon  at  that  time  as  something  of  an  enthusiast,  as  my 
opinions  were  widely  at  variance  with  those  of  some  scientific  gentle 
men.  The  results  have  justified  me  in  forming  a  high  estimate  of  the 
Monitor  principle,  and  I  was  pleased  to  see  that  on  our  Western  waters 
we  can  build  them  as  well,  if  not  better,  than  in  the  workshops  of  the 
North.  No  better  proof  is  wanted  of  the  ability  of  the  West  to  supply 
all  demands  of  the  Government  for  iron-clad  vessels  than  is  given  in 
those  building  at  Cincinnati.  The  work  is  perfect  in  every  respect,  and 
put  together  so  well  that  it  may  be  compared  to  joiner's  work.  The 
hulls  are  as  strong  as  can  possibly  be  desired,  the  speed  will  be  good, 
and  the  only  fault  in  the  vessels,  if  they  have  any,  is  the  "  overhang  " 
aft,  which  is  of  no  consequence  in  a  smooth  sea,  but  must  be  injurious 
when  the  Monitors  have  to  go  from  port  to  port. 

The  nearest  to  completion  of  these  Monitors  is  one  of  those  in  the 
Greenwood  building ;  she  can  be  launched  in  a  month,  and  I  am  of 
opinion,  when  finished,  could  commence  at  Cairo,  and,  going  down  the 
river,  could  destroy  every  vessel  we  have  on  these  waters,  unless  they 
took  advantage  of  their  greater  speed  and  run  away.  The  heaviest  and 
best  vessel  we  have,  the  Benton,  would  stand  a  poor  chance  against  the 
Monitor  alluded  to.  If  she  failed  to  sink  the  Benton  with  shot,  she 
could  surely  do  it  with  her  beak  or  ram,  which  is  not  the  least  formi 
dable  thing  about  her ;  this  is  saying  a  great  deal,  for  the  Benton  is  a 
very  formidable  vessel,  and  since  she  has  been  under  my  command  has 
been  struck  130  times  in  the  hull,  without  any  apparent  damage.  Three 
of  the  Monitors  at  Cincinnati  are  on  the  improved  Ericsson  plan,  while 
the  two  light-draughts  building  at  the  Hamilton  Works  are  to  be  sub 
merged  when  going  into  action.  I  do  not  like  that  as  well  as  the 
Ericsson  model,  as  there  is  more  machinery  about  them  than  is  desir 
able  ;  simplicity  of  arrangement  being  the  object  to  be  aimed  at  in  ves- 
sels-of-war.  The  plan  of  these  latter-mentioned  vessels  is  a  good  one, 
provided  their  armor  and  backing  is  strong  enough  to  stand  heavy  shot, 
which  I  think  will  be  the  case  if  they  only  encounter  the  ordinary  rifle 
projectile. 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  221 

From  the  information  received  from  the  different  officers  I  have  sent 
on  duty  at  various  times  to  the  points  where  these  iron  vessels  are  build 
ing,  the  same  favorable  report  is  made  of  their  efficiency,  and  the  good 
work  that  is  being  put  on  them  ;  and  in  six  months  we  will  have  a  fleet 
of  vessels  that  will  keep  this  river  against  the  fleets  of  the  world,  and  be 
enabled  to  carry  the  war  into  the  enemy's  quarters,  where  there  is  any 
thing  like  an  equality  in  guns.  I  think  too  much  has  been  expected  of 
Monitors  heretofore,  and  the  fact  that  two  or  three  of  them  were  not 
able  to  overcome  obstacles  formidable  enough  to  keep  out  a  large  fleet 
of  three-deckers  has,  in  a  measure,  weakened  the  confidence  of  the  pub 
lic  (who  generally  know  little  or  nothing  about  such  matters)  in  them. 

But  the  Monitors,  for  harbor  defence,  are  just  as  valuable  as  they 
were  on  the  day  when  the  first  one  drove  the  leviathan  "Merrimack" 
back  to  her  hole,  and  saved  the  honor  of  the  nation.  I  am  sure  that 
Monitors  would  have  done  much  better  on  this  river  than  the  old  Pook 
gunboats  did,  which  were  built  for  temporary  purposes  only,  or  until 
Monitors  could  take  their  places.  Earthworks  on  elevated  positions  are 
difficult  to  silence,  it  is  true,  except  by  a  concentrated  fire  of  many  guns, 
and  Monitors  are  not  well  provided  in  numbers.  No  vessels  have  been 
more  successful  than  the  Mississippi  gunboats,  whenever  they  have  been 
called  on  to  attack  such  works.  Still  they  were  very  deficient  in  one 
respect,  as  they  were  very  vulnerable,  suffered  a  good  deal,  and  proved 
that  in  the  end  the  Monitor  principle,  from  its  invulnerability,  was  the 
only  thing  that  could  be  safely  depended  on.  For  this  reason  I  often 
wished  that  I  had  been  provided  with  one  good  Monitor,  with  which,  at 
certain  times,  I  could  have  accomplished  more  than  with  a  fleet  of  such 
boats  as  we  have  here. 

A  new  boat,  the  Ozark,  has  just  arrived  here.  •  As  far  as  her  turret 
is  concerned  she  is  all  right,  but  her  hull  is  too  high  out  of  water,  and 
she  lacks  more  than  three  inches  of  iron  on  fifteen  inches  of  oak.  I 
have,  moreover,  noticed  that  where  there  is  a  backing  of  wood  covered 
with  3-inch  iron,  and  that  iron  with  wood  again,  the  resistance  of  the 
latter  will  prevent  balls  of  heavy  size  from  entering  the  iron.  In  fact,  it 
is  hardly  indented.  This  was  particularly  demonstrated  in  the  passage 
of  the  fleet  past  Yicksburg,  when  it  was  necessary  to  take  every  precau 
tion  to  insure  success  and  prevent  injury  to  the  steamers.  Heavy  logs, 
twenty  inches  in  diameter,  were  hung  perpendicularly  on  the  sides  of 
the  vessel,  close  together,  and  so  secured  that  no  shot  could  strike  the 
side  without  passing  through  the  logs.  Bales  of  hay  were  also  packed 
over  the  decks  and  sterns  in  sufficient  thickness  (it  was  supposed)  to 
prevent  the  passage  of  any  shot.  Suffice  it  to  say,  the  pressed  hay  was 


222  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

no  protection  whatever  against  shot  or  shell.  They  passed  through  four 
or  five  bales,  and  very  much  endangered  the  vessels  by  setting  the  hay 
on  fire.  Wherever  the  projectiles  of  the  enemy  struck  the  logs,  they 
did  no  further  damage ;  they  would  pass  through  the  logs,  strike  the 
iron  without  leaving  more  than  an  indentation,  and  glance  oft*.  Many 
instances  of  narrow  escapes  could  be  mentioned,  where  the  vessels  were 
saved  by  the  intervention  of  the  wood,  and  in  no  instance  were  the  ves 
sels  damaged  where  the  logs  were  properly  placed.  The  incidents  of 
that  night — the  passing  of  the  Vicksburg  batteries — suggested  to  me 
the  idea  of  first  having  a  heavy  backing  of  wood,  then  a  layer  of  iron, 
and  then  a  covering  of  wood  over  the  iron,  which  will,  I  am  convinced, 
make  a  vessel  perfectly  shot-proof.  I  notice  that  the  idea  is  not  an  ori 
ginal  one,  but  has  been  discovered  and  recommended  by  several  persons. 
There  are  two  vessels  in  this  squadron,  the  Lafayette  and  Choctaw, 
which  give  proof  of  the  value  of  heavy  backing  to  iron.  These  vessels 
were  built  with  heavy  frames,  covered  on  the  outside  with  gutta-percha, 
and  then  with  a  light  thickness  of  iron.  "Whenever  these  vessels  have 
been  struck  on  the  iron  where  the  wood  backing  was  heavy,  they  re 
sisted  the  shot  of  heaviest  calibre ;  but  where  the  backing  was  light,  shot 
went  in  at  one  side  and  out  at  the  other.  The  defence  of  gutta-percha 
was  not  of  the  slightest  use ;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  a  detriment  and 
aided  very  much  in  destroying  the  vessels  by  rot.  It  is  so  much  extra 
weight  that  the  vessels  have  to  carry,  without  deriving  the  slightest 
benefit  from  it.  The  money  that  built  the  Lafayette  and  Choctaw 
would  have  built  three  Monitors  of  such  a  model ;  that  one  Monitor 
would  have  destroyed  both  of  the  first.  I  would  here  state  that  these 
two  vessels  will  only  be  serviceable  for  a  short  time,  as  they  are  already 
showing  signs  of  weakness.  They  are  not  very  serviceable,  have  not 
speed  enough,  and  are  too  unwieldy  for  rams,  and  in  some  pails  are 
very  vulnerable.  They  have,  however,  fine  machinery,  and  when  they 
wear  out  it  can  be  fitted  to  better  hulls.  I  consider  these  vessels  only 
as  temporary  expedients,  to  give  way  to  the  Monitor  class,  when  there 
is  a  sufficient  number  built. 

Another  class  of  vessels  in  this  squadron  deserves  mention,  as  show 
ing  the  different  expedients  resorted  to  to  open  and  defend  the  Missis 
sippi  River.  I  allude  to  the  Tuscumbia,  Chillicothe,  and  Indianola. 
Two  of  these  have  been  tried  under  batteries,  and  the  Indianola  in 
battle  against  vessels,  and  have  shown  that  the  Monitor  principle  only 
was  the  right  one.  Their  turrets  were  in  no  instance  found  impenetra 
ble  to  the  heavy  rifled  shot,  and  besides  they  were  soon  damaged  in 
their  wheels,  which  afforded  fine  targets  for  the  enemy  to  fire  at.  Still, 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  223 

two  of  these  vessels  remained  under  fire  as  long  as  any  Monitors  have 
been  known  to  remain  at  one  time,  and  if  they  did  not  come  up  to  the 
Monitors  in  invulnerability,  they  accomplished  all  that  was  required  at 
the  time,  viz.,  the  capture  of  the  enemy's  stronghold.  The  builders 
never  claimed  that  they  should  be  considered  more  than  temporary  ex 
pedients  with  which  to  harass  the  enemy ;  and,  taken  in  that  sense, 
they  certainly  may  be  considered  very  good  vessels,  and  have  fairly  re 
paid  all  the  money  spent  on  them,  taking  into  consideration  the  work 
they  have  done. 

As  to  approving  of  any  of  the  above-mentioned  styles  of  gunboat, 
as  part  of  a  permanent  system  of  national  defence  to  be  adopted  in  this 
country,  that  I  cannot  do.  Any  professional  man  who  will  lay  aside 
his  prejudices  caused  by  the  discomforts  incident  to  the  Monitors,  must 
admit  that,  as  a  harbor  defence,  they  are  the  best  and  only  vessels  to  be 
built ;  and  I  hope  we  shall  see  every  harbor  in  the  United  States,  where 
there  is  a  chance  of  an  enemy  penetrating,  supplied  with  two  or  three 
of  these  floating  batteries.  If  they  have  not  been  able  to  penetrate  the 
harbor  of  Charleston,  where  fifty  guns  to  one  was  opposed  to  them, 
and  where  they  had  to  contend  with  obstructions  placed  in  their  way 
impossible  to  be  removed,  it  in  no  way  detracts  from  their  well-earned 
reputation  for  efficiency.  They  have  done  at  Charleston  what  no  other 
vessels  ever  built  could  possibly  have  accomplished ;  and  though  the 
Army,  as  usual  when  combined  operations  are  carried  on,  has  monopo 
lized  all  the  honors,  it  is  a  very  certain  fact  that  the  Monitors  held  their 
own  as  no  other  vessels  could  have  done,  and  under  their  shelter  the 
Army  was  enabled  to  perform  its  work  successfully. 

I  hope,  sir,  you  will  excuse  the  unreasonable  length  of  this  commu 
nication  on  the  subject  of  the  Monitors  ;  but  I  know  their  value  when 
properly  used,  have  felt  the  want  of  them  so  much  at  times,  that  I  would 
have  exchanged  several  even  of  the  best  of  my  vessels  for  one  of  them, 
properly  fitted.  I  have  seen  a  whole  army  kept  at  bay  for  the  want  of 
one  of  these  little  "  shot-proofs,"  and  have,  now  and  then,  been  tempted 
to  do  foolish  things,  in  hopes  of  accomplishing  what  I  deemed  imprac 
ticable.  The  Cincinnati  was  sunk  when  my  own  judgment  told  me  it 
was  wrong  to  place  her  where  I  was  called  upon  to  order  her.  With  a 
single  Monitor  results  would  have  been  very  different ;  and  on  that  day, 
instead  of  having  a  vessel  sunk,  the  right  wing  of  our  army  would  have 
gained  a  position  commanding  the  most  important  works  in  and  about 
Vicksburg.  Vulnerable  as  this  vessel  was,  it  would  not  have  done  for 
the  Navy  to  hesitate,  when  the  Army  thought  there  was  a  prospect  of 
success. 


224:  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

In  conclusion,  sir,  permit  me  to  express  the  hope  that  the  West  may 
be  converted  into  a  large  workshop  for  the  building  of  future  Monitors 
of  all  sizes.  I  know  of  no  part  of  the  Union  where  the  work  can  be 
done  better  or  quicker. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

DAVID  D.  PORTER,  Rear- Admiral. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 


ARCHITECTUEE. 

Mr.  Kussell  says  of  "the  modern  American  fleet:"  It  is  a  creation 
altogether  original,  peculiarly  American,  and  admirably  adapted  to  the 
special  purpose  which  gave  it  birth.  Like  most  American  inventions, 
use  has  been  allowed  to  dictate  terms  of  construction;  and  purpose, 
not  prejudice,  has  been  allowed  to  rule  invention. 

The  ruling  conditions  of  construction  for  the  inventors  of  the  Ameri 
can  fleet  were  these:  the  vessels  must  be  perfectly  shot-proof — they 
must  fight  in  shallow  water — they  must  be  able  to  endure  a  heavy  sea, 
and  pass  through  it,  if  not  fight  in  it. 

The  American  iron-clad  Navy  is  a  child  of  these  conditions.  Mini 
mum  draft  of  water  means  minimum  extent  of  surface,  protected  by 
armor;  perfect  protection  means  thickness  to  resist  the  heaviest  shot, 
and  protection  for  the  whole  length  of  the  ship  ;  it  also  means  perfect 
protection  to  guns  and  gunners.  Had  they  added  what  our  legislators 
exact,  that  the  ports  shall  lie  in  the  ship's  side,  nine  feet  above  the 
water,  the  problem  might  at  once  have  become  impossible  and  absurd; 
but  they  wanted  the  work  done  as  it  could  be  done,  and  allowed  the 
conditions  of  success  to  rule  the  methods  of  construction. 

The  conditions  of  success  in  the  given  circumstances  were  these : 
that  you  should  not  require  the  sides  of  the  ship  to  rise  much  above  the 
water's  edge  ;  that  you  should  not  require  more  protection  to  the  guns 
than  would  contain  guns  and  gunners  ;  that  you  should  be  content  with 
as  many  guns  as  the  ship  could  carry,  and  no  more. 

To  do  the  work,  therefore,  the  full  thickness  of  armor  required  to 
keep  out  the  enemy's  shot  was  taken,  but  the  ship  was  made  to  rise  a 
few  inches  above  water,  and  no  more ;  and  so  a  narrow  strip  of  thick 
armor,  all  along  the  upper  edge  of  the  ship's  side,  gave  her  complete 
protection.  Thus  the  least  quantity  of  thickest  armor  did  most  work  in 
protecting  the  ship,  engines,  boilers,  and  magazine.  Next,  to  protect  the 
guns,  a  small  circular  fortress,  shield,  or  tower,  encircled  a  couple  of 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  225 

guns  ;  and  if  four  guns  were  to  be  carried,  two  such  turrets  earned  the 
armament  and  contained  the  gunners.  Thus,  again,  weight  of  armor 
was  spared  to  the  utmost,  and  so  both  ship  and  armament  were  com 
pletely  protected. 

But  the  consequences  of  these  conditions  are  such  as  we,  at  least  for 
sea-going  ships,  would  reluctantly  accept.  The  low  ship's  side  will,  in 
a  sea-way,  allow  the  sea  to  sweep  over  the  ship,  and  the  waves,  not  the 
sailors,  will  have  possession  of  the  deck.  The  American  accepts  the 
conditions,  removes  the  sailors  from  the  deck,  allows  the  sea  to  have  its 
way,  and  drives  his  vessel  through,  not  over  the  sea,  to  her  fighting  des 
tination  by  steam,  abandoning  sails.  The  American  also  cheerfully 
accepts  the  small  round  turret  as  protection  for  guns  and  men;  and 
pivots  them  on  a  central  turn-table  in  the  middle  of  his  ship,  raising  his 
port  high  enough  to  be  out  of  the  water,  and  then  fighting  his  gun 
through  an  aperture  little  larger  than  its  muzzle. 

By  thus  frankly  accepting  the  conditions  he  could  not  control,  the 
American  did  his  work  and  built  his  fleet.  It  is  beyond  doubt  that  the 
American  Monitor  class,  with  two  turrets  in  each  ship,  and  two  guns  in 
each  turret,  is  a  kind  of  vessel  that  can  be  made  fast,  shot-proof,  and  sea- 
proof.  It  may  be  uncomfortable,  but  it  can  be  made  secure.  The  sea 
may  possess  its  deck,  but  in  the  air,  above  the  sea,  the  American  raises  a 
platform  on  the  level  of  the  top  of  his  turrets,  which  he  calls  his  hurricane 
deck,  whence  he  can  look  down  with  in  difference  at  the  waves  fruitless 
ly  foaming  and  breaking  themselves  on  the  abandoned  deck  below.  His 
vessel,  too,  has  the  advantage,  as  he  thinks  it,  of  not  rolling  with  the 
waves  ;  so  that  he  can  take  his  aim  steadily  and  throw  his  shot  surely. 
Thus,  if  he  abandons  much  that  we  value,  he  secures  what  he  values 
more. 

I  think  I  have  reason  to  know  that  the  American  turret-ships,  of  the 
larger  class,  with  two  turrets  and  four  guns,  are  successful  vessels — suc 
cessful  beyond  the  measure  of  our  English  estimate  of  their  success. 
Like  so  many  American  inventions,  they  are  severely  subject  to  the 
conditions  of  use,  and  successful  by  the  rigidity  and  precision  with 
which  they  fit  the  end  and  fulfil  the  purpose  which  was  their  aim. 

Plate  138  contains  longitudinal  section,  deck  plans,  and  cross  section 
of  the  original  American  Monitor  of  Captain  Ericsson — the  first  turret- 
ship  that  distinguished  herself  in  action,  having  to  engage  with  her 
single  turret  and  pair  of  guns  a  large  broadside  ship  of  much  heavier 
tonnage  and  armament,  which  she  thoroughly  defeated. 

Captain  Ericsson,  the  builder  of  the  Monitor,  has  long  been  distin 
guished  equally  in  England  and  America.  He  was  known  as  the  builder 

15 


226  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

and  designer  of  one  of  the  most  remarkable  engines,  in  the  original 
competition,  preliminary  to  the  opening  of  the  Liverpool  and  Manches 
ter  Railroad ;  he  was  afterward  distinguished  in  the  introduction  of  the 
screw  propeller  in  steam  navigation,  and  lie  Las  crowned  his  career  by 
the  successful  construction  of  the  class  of  turret-ships,  which  appear  to 
have  been  taken  up  with  avidity  and  prosecuted  with  energy  by  the  Amer 
ican  Government;  and  during  the  course  of  their  sad  civil  war,  the 
Monitors  appear  to  have  rendered  to  the  Federal  side  very  important 
services.     The  design  of  these  vessels  has  about  it  all  the  characteristics 
of  American  audacity.     Every  conventionality  of  the  ship  has  been  de 
spised  and  discarded ;  in  the  sailor's  sense  of  the  word  there  is  nothing 
"  ship-shape  "  about  this  original  Monitor ;  every  thing  is  unusual.    She 
has  neither  keel,  nor  bilges,  nor  bulwarks.     She  is  very  nearly  a  London 
bridge,  covered  by  a  great  horizontal  platform  of  timber,  projecting 
beyond  her  deck,  and  descending  below  the  water-line.      This  great 
upper  platform  in  no  way  conforms  to  the  shape  of  the  under-ship  which 
carries  it ;  it  is  obviously  meant  to  shelter  the  rudder  and  the  stern  from 
every  attempt  to  damage  them  by  collision.     At  the  bow  the  entire 
hull  is  equally  protected   by  the  overhanging  platform  of  the  deck,  and 
the  whole  upper  works  of  the  ship  are  covered  with  thick  iron  armor  on 
both  sides,  and  the  wooden  deck  is  protected  by  iron  plates.     The  rud 
der  is  a  balanced  rudder,  and  the  ship  is  propelled  by  a  single  screw  ; 
the  boilers  are  the  double-tier  boilers,  of  the  ordinary  construction,  with 
four  sets  of  flues.     It  will  be  noticed  that  the  arrangements  of  the  turret 
are  very  different  from  Captain  Coles's  arrangements.     The  whole  turret 
is  on  the  upper  deck,  exposed  to  shot ;  it  is  not  carried  on  a  revolving 
set  of  rollers,  but  is  pivoted  on  the  centre,  which  seems  to  carry  most  of 
its  weight  by  means  of  an  iron  trussing,  from  which  it  is,  as  it  were,  sus 
pended,  and  it  slides  on  a  smooth  metal  plate  lying  on  the  deck.     The 
turret  is  worked  by  a  small  pair  of  donkey-engines,  working  on  tooth- 
gear,  and  the  ports  are  covered  by  hanging  blocks.     Like  our  turret, 
the  Monitor  shield  has  two  guns  worked  parallel  to  each  other  on  slides. 
The   manner   in   which  these   turrets   were  afterward    improved    and 
matured  by  experience,  is  shown  in  plate  139,  and  it  is  certain  that 
Captain  Ericsson  rendered  great  service  to  his  country  by  inventing  at 
once,  and  successfully  introducing,  a  class  of  vessels  peculiarly  suited  to 
action  in  their  inland  waters  and  shallow  navigations ;  and  when  we 
consider  the  extreme  rapidity  which  attended  the  execution  of  the  pro 
ject,  we  must  say  that  the  original  Monitor  was  a  remarkable  success, 
and  that  she  was  a  type  of  an  entirely  new  class  of  war-ship.     It  is  curi 
ous   and  instructive  to  observe  how  differently  the  system  has  been 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  227 

developed  in  America  and  in  England:  in  the  one  case  the  sudden 
abandonment  of  all  the  conventionalities  of  a  ship,  and  in  the  other 
the  studious  retention  of  old  forms  and  ways,  admitting  the  innovation 
with  the  greatest  possible  amount  of  reluctance  and  seeming  aversion. 
But  it  is  almost  always  so  with  the  Americans,  who  love  a  thing  because 
it  is  new,  even  without  any  other  recommendation ;  and  with  the  English, 
who  begin  by  hating  a  novelty,  whatever  be  its  merits. 


LETTER   OF   DONALD   MACKAY. 

CURTIS  GUILD,  Esq.,  Editor  Commercial  Bulletin,  Boston,  Mass.  : 

DEAR  SIR  :  According  to  my  promise,  I  herewith  furnish  you  with 
a  few  facts  relating  to  the  English  and  French  iron-clad  fleets,  which  I 
have  recently  inspected,  and  find  many  vessels  completed  which  during 
previous  visits  were  in  process  of  construction,  the  names  and  particu 
lars  of  which  I  gave  you  in  former  letters  several  years  ago.  I  also  saw 
several  new  iron-clads  in  progress,  differing  materially  in  construction 
and  armor  from  the  first.  I  am  more  convinced  than  ever  that  those 
iron-clad  fleets  fully  meet  my  views  as  to  efficiency  and  sea  service,  as 
stated  in  my  previous  communications  to  you. 

While  viewing  these,  their  style  of  construction,  equipment,  etc.,  I 
felt  proud  that  our  Navy  Department,  since  1861,  have  constructed, 
built,  and  equipped  an  iron-clad  fleet,  both  for  home  defence  and  sea 
going  service,  more  powerful  than  all  the  iron-clad  navies  of  the  world ; 
and  I  strongly  recommend  to  the  Government,  as  a  profitable  and  judi 
cious  expenditure,  and  one  which  will  prove  to  be  the  strongest  guar 
anty  of  peace  and  just  neutrality,  a  continuance  of  building  and  adding 
to  our  iron-clad  sea-going  fleet,  thus  keeping  pace  with  other  nations. 

I  can  allude  with  pride  to  that  wonderful  production  of  human  ge 
nius,  the  Dunderberg,  now  in  the  process  of  construction  by  Mr.  William 
H.  Webb,  of  New  York.  I  have  personally  inspected  all  the  iron-clads 
of  England  and  France,  but  I  have  not  seen  one  of  them  which  in  origi 
nality  of  design,  power,  and  completeness  of  detail,  begins  to  compare 
with  her.  She  combines  the  impregnability  of  the  turret  system  with 
the  advantages  of  the  broadsides  and  ends.  In  short,  she  can  bring 
guns  to  bear  from  every  point  of  the  compass  without  changing  her  po 
sition.  From  the  appearance  of  her  model  it  is  evident  to  me  that  she 
must  be  an  excellent  sea-boat,  of  superior  speed,  and,  notwithstanding 
her  great  size,  easily  managed.  It  is  said  she  will  cost  over  $2,000,000  ; 
but  this  is  not  high  when  compared  with  the  sums  lavished  upon  the 
large  iron-clads  of  the  Old  World,  which  are  far  inferior  to  her  as  a  ves- 


228  HISTOET    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

sel-of-war.     I  consider  her  a  match  for  a  fleet  of  such  vessels  as  some  of 
the  best  produced  in  France. 

I  am  pleased  to  find  that  the  Honorable  Secretary,  in  his  report,  has 
recommended  the  enlargement  of  our  navy-yards,  work-shops,  dry-docks, 
etc. ;  also  a  building-yard  of  proper  size  for  the  construction  and  fitting 
complete  of  the  largest  iron-clad  ships  ;  for  the  machinery  and  furnaces, 
for  forging  and  rolling  plates  equal  in  size  and  thickness  to  those  used 
by  the  English  Navy.  In  this  way  we  would  get  the  finest  qualities  of 
iron,  so  essential  for  armored  ships.  A  plate  of  the  best  quality  of  lami 
nated  iron,  four  inches  thick,  will  protect  a  ship's  side,  and  resist  solid 
shot  equal  to  the  common  manufactured  plates  of  six  inches  in  thick 
ness.  This  test  was  made  in  England.  Large  quantities  of  iron  for 
both  hull  and  armor,  made  by  different  contractors,  which  did  not  come 
up  to  the  standard  quality,  I  have  seen  condemned  in  England.  I  be 
lieve  that  the  means  and  facilities  for  the  manufacturing  of  iron  plates 
and  armor  should  be  owned  by  and  under  the  control  of  the  Govern 
ment. 

Over  forty  large  wooden  screw-ships  without  armor  are  under  con 
struction  now  in  the  Government  yards,  and  many  are  well  advanced 
toward  completion.  The  hulls  were  designed  by  Mr.  John  Lenthall, 
chief  of  the  bureau  of  construction  and  repairs,  on  the  Alabama  principle 
for  speed,  and  the  motive  power  by  Mr.  B.  F.  Isherwood,  chief  of 
bureau  of  steam  engineering.  Having  inspected  those  ships  and  their 
machinery,  I  have  no  hesitation  in  saying  they  will  be  the  fastest  war 
ships  in  the  world.  The  class  carrying  the  two  100-inch  cylinders  will 
attain  a  regular  sea-going  speed  of  upward  of  fifteen  knots. 

With  all  that  we  have  done  and  are  doing  in  the  increasing  of  our 
Navy,  I  see,  with  our  Honorable  Secretary,  one  fearful  deficiency  in  basins 
or  dry-docks.  Supposing  that  we  had  a  hard  naval  engagement,  resulting 
in  the  damaging  of  many  vessels,  we  have  only  dry-docks  enough  to  re 
pair  a  few  ships,  and  for  this  reason  we  would  at  once  become  compara 
tively  weak  at  sea ;  and  this  is  a  matter  which  should  receive  our  early 
attention.  Both  France  and  England,  while  adding  to  the  strength  and 
number  of  their  ships,  keep  pace  with  the  increase  of  their  dry-docks 
and  basins.  Unless  we  adopt  this  system,  the  additions  to  our  Navy  so 
liberally  appropriated  for  by  Congress  will  avail  but  little.  The  French 
diy-docks  contain  space  sufficient  for  fifty  of  the  largest  class  ships  at 
one  time,  and  England  is  fast  approaching  this  also. 

On  Mr.  E.  J.  Reed's  accession  to  the  chief  constructorship  of  the 
British  Navy,  the  Board  of  Admiralty  authorized  him  to  alter  some  of 
the  small  classes  of  wooden  ships  (partially  built,  still  on  the  stocks) 


THE   DIFFEBENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  229 

for  armor  plating,  on  a  plan  proposed  by  himself  for  new  vessels  of  2,000 
tons.  The  conversion  of  these  into  iron-clads  by  the  new  constructor 
was  rather  a  difficult  task,  and  should  not  be  -expected  to  equal  new 
designs,  yet  they  proved  to  be  very  successful  sea-going  ships.  The 
Enterpiise  was  the  first  taken  in  hand.  She  carries  her  armament  and 
armor  at  somewhat  less  than  the  contemplated  draught  (sixteen  feet), 
and  steaming  only  one-fourth  of  a  knot  less  than  other  vessels  of  her 
class  carrying  no  armor  at  all.  Her  armor  is  four  and  a  half  inches 
thick,  and  extends  over  the  whole  length  of  the  hull  at  the  water-line, 
and  over  a  battery  of  four  heavy  guns  carried  amidships.  A  year  ago 
she  was  ordered  on  general  service  to  the  Mediterranean,  and  was  the 
first  British  man-of-war  that  passed  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  with  the 
new  broadside  six  and  a  half  ton  naval  guns,  firing  100-pound  round 
shot  with  twenty-five  pounds  of  powder,  having  previously  been  pro 
nounced  by  Admiral  Sidney  Dacres,  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Channel  squadron,  after  many  sea  trials,  the  best  iron-clad  in  the  navy, 
as  regarded  sea-going  qualities,  accommodation,  ventilation,  etc. 

The  conversion  of  the  Research  followed  the  Enterprise,  and  differing 
from  the  latter  chiefly  in  the  fact  that  the  upper  deck  was  lowered  in 
the  former,  and  the  armor  continued  up  to  it  instead  of  the  armor  at 
the  ends  being  a  mere  narrow  belt.  This  would  no  doubt  make  the  Re 
search  a  stronger,  more  enduring  ship  in  action,  but  it  has  made  her  a 
comparatively  wet  vesssel  in  a  sea-way,  although  many  officers  of  our  own 
Navy  who  have  had  experience  in  our  Monitors,  would  perhaps  consider 
her  efficient  when  they  learn  that  her  upper  deck  is  four  and  a  half  feet 
above  the  water  at  its  lowest  point ;  that  the  whole  length  of  the  deck 
is  protected  by  bulwarks  six  feet  high,  and  that  in  the  central  thirty-six 
feet  of  the  ship's  length  she  carries  a  fixed  solid  battery  up  to  a  height 
of  eleven  and  a  half  feet,  at  which  height  it  is  decked  over  with  sheet 
iron,  covered  with  four-inch  planking. 

The  Favorite,  a  ship  of  2,000  tons,  and  the  Zealous,  of  nearly  4,000, 
were  next  taken  in  hand  and  converted  by  plans  of  the  chief  con 
structor,  both  being  wooden  ships  and  answering  well  so  far  as  they 
have  yet  been  tried  ;  although  in  the  case  of  the  Zealous,  as  in  that  of 
the  French  ships  Magenta  and  Solferino,  there  is  a  large  exposed  portion 
of  the  wooden  hull  before  and  abaft  the  battery  which  would  no  doubt 
be  speedily  set  on  fire  in  action.  Still,  there  is  no  comparison  between 
the  offensive  and  defensive  powers  of  these  vessels  as  at  present  con 
structed,  and  what  they  would  have  been  if  completed  on  their  original 
designs  as  mere  unprotected  wooden  hulls. 

A  great  improvement  over  the  first  iron-clads  was  a  plan  of  Rear- 


230  HISTORY   OF  THE  UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

Admiral  R.  S.  Robinson,  Comptroller  of  the  British  Navy,  in  securing 
the  rudder-head  and  steering  apparatus  from  the  direct  impact  of  shot. 
The  confidence  which  Admiral  Robinson  had  in  the  soundness  of  the 
views  of  the  new  constructor  led  the  Admiralty  to  call  upon  him  to  de 
sign  two  powerful  frigates,  Lord  Warden  and  Lord  Clyde,  of  a  new 
class,  and  of  4,000  tons.  These  ships  are  each  pierced  with  gun-ports 
on  the  main  deck  from  stern  to  stern,  and  are  armor-plated  throughout, 
the  plates  being  carried  up  over  a  topgallant  forecastle,  to  protect  two 
guns  firing  ahead  on  the  upper  deck,  in  addition  to  others  firing  forward 
and  aft  on  the  main  deck.  Unlike  all  the  other  armor-clad  ships  of  the 
British  Navy,  therefore,  these  two  carry  four  powerful  guns  firing  ahead 
in  the  line  of  their  keel,  which  would  no  doubt  render  them  most  for 
midable  examples  of  what  is  known  in  England  as  the  "  end-on"  sys 
tem.  The  armor  of  these  ships  is  five  and  a  half  inches  thick  at  the 
water-line,  and  six  inches  (in  two  thicknesses  of  four  and  a  half  and  one 
and  a  half  inches)  over  the  battery  deck.  These  ships,  however,  being 
of  wood,  and  armed  with  a  large  number  of  guns,  not  of  the  largest 
class,  did  not  fully  represent  the  views  of  the  chief  constructor,  and  ac 
cordingly  he  handed  in  at  the  same  time  the  design  of  another  ship,  to 
be  built  of  iron  and  to  carry  a  less  number  of  very  powerful  guns  under 
the  protection  of  armor  of  unusual  thickness.  This  design  was  also 
adopted  by  the  Admiralty,  and  the  ship  to  be  built  called  the  Beller- 
ophon — a  name  which  has  already  become  identified  with  the  finest 
specimen  of  an  iron-clad  frigate  yet  produced  in  Great  Britain. 

So  great  was  the.  simplification  introduced  into  the  design  of  this 
ship,  that  she  was  floated  out  of  dock  within  twelve  months  from  the 
laying  of  the  keel,  with  several  hundreds  of  tons  of  armor  already  upon 
her  sides,  and  in  five  or  six  months  after  she  was  taken  down  the  Med- 
way  to  the  Nore,  for  a  preliminary  trial  of  her  engines  and  screw,  with 
her  armor  plating  entirely  completed,  and  many  of  her  fittings  well  in 
hand.  In  addition  to  6-inch  armor,  this  ship  is  formed  with  a  double 
iron  skin,  which  has  been  found  to  add  very  much  to  the  resisting 
power  of  her  hull.  She  is  armed  with  12-ton  guns,  is  to  steam  14  knots, 
and  turns  under  the  action  of  her  balanced  rudder,  which  is  of  the 
American  plan,  more  handily  than  any  other  ship  in  the  navy.  Next, 
the  Pallas  was  commenced  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  British  com 
merce  from  the  American  "  Alabamas  "  and  "  Floridas."  She  was  built 
of  wood,  at  Woolwich,  and  is  a  short,  fast,  handy  ship,  and,  like  the 
Bellerophon,  is  full  rigged  for  sea-going  purposes.  The  armor  plating 
is,  of  course,  much  inferior  in  strength  to  the  Bellerophon,  and  her  guns 
much  fewer  in  number.  The  whole  of  these  ships  (Lord  Clyde,  Lord 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  231 

Warden,  Bellerophon,  and  Pallas)  are  rapidly  approaching  completion, 
and  will  speedily  proceed  on  their  sea  trials. 

Soon  after  the  commencement  of  these  ships,  Mr.  E.  J.  Reed  received 
his  official  appointment  of  chief  constructor  of  the  Navy — he  being  at 
the  time  about  thirty-three  years  of  age — attaining  this  position  solely 
by  the  merit  of  the  plans  submitted  by  him  to  the  Admiralty,  and 
highly  approved  by  them.  After  his  official  appointment,  his  first  ves 
sels  were  the  two  iron-clad  gunboats,  Viper  and  Vixen,  which  being  of 
a  very  light  draught  of  water,  afforded  but  little  scope  for  obtaining 
superior  qualities.  The  water-line  and  the  engines  of  these  vessels  are 
protected,  but  the  only  cover  given  to  the  guns  is  a  transverse  bulkhead, 
through  which  the  guns  fire  over  a  forecastle  deck.  Each  vessel  is  fitted 
with  two  screw  propellers,  supported  by  separate  dead  woods,  so  that 
the  stern  is  double.  The  Viper  is  built  wholly  of  iron,  and  the  Vixen 
with  iron  frames  and  wood  planking  outside,  to  enable  the  bottom  to  be 
coppered. 

The  Penelope  is  also  a  double-screw  ship  of  iron,  but  of  much  larger 
dimensions,  being  nearly  3,000  tons.  Her  armor  will  be  similar  to  the 
Bellerophon' s,  but  of  less  extent,  and  she  is  to  draw  but  16  feet  of  water. 
Her  cabins  are  to  accommodate  an  admiral  and  his  staff,  and  she  is  in 
tended  for  service  in  any  part  of  the  world.  This  ship  is  but  just  begun 
at  the  Pembroke  Dock-Yard,  South  Wales. 

The  Hercules  will  succeed  the  Bellerophon  at  Chatham,  differing 
from  her  but  little,  except  that  her  armor  is  to  be  of  a  more  ponderous 
character.  The  outside  armor  plates  are  9  inches  thick  ;  then  come 
12-inch  teak-logs,  then  a  double  iron  skin  1J  inches  thick,  then  10-inch 
iron  frames,  filled  in  solid  with  teak,  then  18  inches  of  teak-logs;  next 
to  these  and  supporting  them,  another  iron  skin,  three-quarters  inch 
thick,  this  skin  being  finally  supported  by  iron  frames  8  inches  deep. 
A  target,  constructed  in  this  manner,  has  been  fired  at  with  the  most 
powerful  12-ton  guns,  with  extreme  charges  of  powder  and  steel  pro 
jectiles,  but  even  the  first  iron  skin  was  not  penetrated.  It  is  thought 
that  even  the  20-ton^  600-pounder  gun,  will  not  penetrate  it;  but  this 
is  about  to  be  tried. 

A  very  powerful  iron-clad,  designed  by  Mr.  Reed,  for  the  Sultan  of 
Turkey,  with  the  sanction  of  the  British  Government,  to  be  named  the 
"Turkestan,"  completed  the  list  of  iron-clad  ships  designed  by  him 
during  two  and  a  half  years  that  he  has  been  associated  with  the  Admi 
ralty. 

In  addition  to  the  iron-clads,  however,  a  fleet  of  1,000-ton  wooden 
ships,  to  steam  thirteen  knots  and  cany  a  couple  of  heavy  and  a  couple 


232 


HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 


of  light  guns,  have  been  designed  by  the  chief  constructor  and  built  by 
the  Admiralty,  the  remarkable  feature  about  them  being  that  they  are 
only  about  one  half  of  the  length  of  fleet  wooden  sloops  now  build 
ing  by  the  United  States  Government.  These  sloops,  known  as  the 
"  Amazon  "  class,  are  single  screw-vessels ;  and  in  addition  to  them  a 
small  double-screw  vessel,  named  the  Plover,  of  only  660  tons,  and 
without  armor,  has  been  laid  down  at  Deptford.  A  paddle  steamer, 
called  the  Helicon,  has  also  been  built  from  plans  of  the  constructor, 
and  has  given  good  results — steaming  a  knot  an  hour  faster  in  smooth 
water  than  a  similar  ship  constructed  by  private  parties,  and  nearly  a 
knot  and  a  half  faster  in  a  sea-way. 

The  latest  work  of  the  chief  constructor  of  the  British  Navy  has 
been  to  design  a  fleet  of  iron  transports  for  conveying  troops.  These 
will  be  noble  ships,  360  feet  long,  49  broad,  drawing  20  feet  of  water, 
and  to  steam  at  14  knots,  carry  1,250  troops,  women,  and  children,  and 
200  officers  and  seamen  on  board.  These  ships  will  cost  about  £200,- 
000  each,  or  one  million  pounds  sterling  for  the  five.  They  are  build 
ing  in  private  yards,  and  will  be  completed  in  the  coming  year.  The 
following  table  will  show  the  progress  of  the  British  Navy  within  two 
and  a  half  years : 

ENGLISH  AEMOE-PLATED   SHIPS. 


SHIP'S  NAME. 

Tons. 

H.  P. 

DRAUGHT  OF  WATER. 

LENGTH. 

BESADTH. 

Forward. 

Aft. 

Between 
Perpen 
diculars. 

of 

Keel. 

Extreme. 

For 
Tonnage. 

Enterprise  
Research.  . 

933 
1,253 
2,094 
2,126 
3,716 
4,067 
4,080 
4,270 
737 
754 
2,947 
4,813 
5,938 

160 
200 
400 
600 
800 
1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
160 
160 
600 
1,100 
1,150 

ft.   'in. 
12    4 

12    3 
19    3 
18    3 
24    6 
24    0 
24   0 
21    0 
9    6 
9    9 
15    9 
22    0 
24    6 

ft.    in. 

15  10 
15    3 
22    3 
24    3 
26    0 
26    6 
26    6 
26    0 
10    6 
10    9 
16    9 
26    0 
26    6 

ft.    in. 

180    0 
195    0 
225    0 
225    0 
252    0 
280    0 
280    0 
300    0 
160    0 
160    0 
260  .0 
305    0 
35510 

ft.    in. 

15211 
168    3 
195    6 
187    8 
213    9 
233  11 
233    9 
255    3 
135    4 
13410 
221    7 
55911 
310    1 

ft.   in. 

36    0 
38    6 
46    9 
50    0 
58    7 
58  11 
59    0 
56    1 
32    0 
32    5 
50    0 
59    0 
60    0 

ft.    in. 

35    0 

37    5 
4410 
48    9 
57    2 
57    2 
57    3 
56    1 
32    0 
32    5 
50    0 
59    0 
60    0 

Favorite  

Pallas..    . 

Zealous  

Lord  Clyde.  . 

Lord  Warden  
Bellerophon 

Viper  

Vixen.  . 

Penelope  

Hercules 

Turkestan  

ENTERPRISE. — Wooden  hull;  plating  4£  inches  thick ;  195  tons  used.  Nature  of 
backing — a  wooden  ship  with  side  19|  inches  thick ;  has  4  6^-ton  guns  on  main 
deck.  No.  of  crew,  129  ;  measured  mile,  trial  speed,  in  smooth  sea,  9.9  knots. 

RESEARCH. — Plating  4^  inches  thick  ;  352  tons  used.  Wooden  ship,  with  side  19 
inches  thick  ;  4  6^-ton  guns  on  main  deck.  Number  of  crew,  135.  10.4  knots 
measured  trial  speed  in  a  smooth  sea. 

FAVORITE. — Plating  4|  inches  thick  ;  560  tons  used.     Wooden  ship,  with  side  26 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS. 


233 


inches  thick;  8  6^-ton  rifled  guns,  and  2  110-pounder  Armstrongs  on  main  deck. 
Number  of  crew,  200.     Trial  speed,  measured  mile  in  smooth  sea,  11.7  knots. 

PALLAS. — Plating  4^  inches  thick ;  560  tons  used.  Wooden  ship,  with  side  22 
inches  thick.  Armed  with  4  6^-ton  rifled,  and  2  110-pounder  Armstrongs.  Number 
of  crew,  225.  In  smooth  sea,  trial  speed,  per  measured  mile,  13^  knots. 

ZEALOUS. — Plating  4£  inches  thick;  791  tons  used.  Wooden  ship,  with  side  30£ 
inches  thick.  Armament,  16  6^-ton  rifled  guns  on  main  deck,  and  4  110-pounder 
Armstrongs  on  upper  deck.  Number  of  crew,  455.  Trial  speed,  per  measured  mile, 
in  smooth  sea,  12  knots. 

LORD  CLYDE. — Plating,  part  4^,  part  5£,  inches  thick ;  1,379  tons  used.  A  wooden 
ship,  with  side  31|-  inches  thick.  Armed  with  20  6^-ton  rifled  guns  on  main  deck, 
and  4  110-pounder  Armstrongs  on  upper  deck.  Number  of  crew,  605.  Trial  speed, 
per  measured  mile,  in  smooth  sea,  13.7  knots. 

LORD  WARDEN. — Plating,  and  the  other  particulars,  same  as  the  "Lord  Clyde." 

BELLEROPHON. — Iron  hull ;  plating  6  inches  thick ;  1,089  tons  used  ;  backing  of 
10-inch  teak.  Armament,  10  300-pounders,  12  tons;  2  110-pounders,  bow;  3  do. 
aft — making  15  guns  on  main  deck,  and  in  addition,  1  40-pounder  Armstrong  on 
upper  deck.  Number  of  crew,  525.  In  smooth  sea,  trial  speed  per  measured  mile, 
14.2  knots. 

YIPER. — Iron  hull;  4^  inch  plating;  180  tons  used;  backing  10-inch  teak.  Arm 
ament,  2  100-pounders,  6J  tons,  and  2  howitzers,  all  on  main  deck.  Number  of  crew, 
80.  Trial  speed  in  smooth  sea,  9.2  knots. 

VIXEN. — Hull  both  of  wood  and  iron ;  thickness  of  plating,  etc.,  all  same  as  the  Viper. 

PENELOPE. — Iron  hull ;  plating  part  5  and  part  6  inches  thick.  Number  of  tons, 
680.  Backing,  part  10  and  part  11  inches  thick,  of  teak.  Armament,  on  main  deck, 
2  100-pounders,  6J  tons,  and  2  howitzers ;  on  upper  deck,  1  40-pounder  Armstrong. 
Number  of  crew,  350.  Trial  speed,  per  measured  mile,  in  smooth  sea,  13.2  knots. 

HERCULES. — Iron  hull;  plating  of  6,  8,  and  9  inches  thickness ;  1,425  tons  of  do. 
used;  teak  backing,  both  10  and  12  inches'  thickness.  Armament,  10  300-pounders, 
12  tons,  on  main  deck,  and  2  64-pounders  on  upper  deck.  Number  of  crew,  550. 
Trial  speed  in  smooth  sea,  by  measured  mile,  16.2  knots. 

TURKESTAN. — For  the  Turkish  Government.  Iron  hull ;  plating  8  inches  thick, 
with  both  10  and  11-inch  teak  backing;  2,095  tons  of  plating  used.  Main  deck 
armament,  29  7-ton  guns ;  upper  deck  do.,  4  7-ton  guns.  Number  of  crew,  650. 
Trial  speed  in  smooth  sea,  15  knots. 

WOODEN  SHIPS,  NOT  PLATED. 


SHIP'S  NAME. 

Tons. 

H.  P. 

DRAUGHT  OF  WATEB. 

LENGTH. 

BREADTH. 

Forward. 

Aft. 

Between 
Perpen 
diculars. 

of 
KeeL 

Extreme. 

For 
Tonnage. 

Helicon  

835 

1,081 
« 
n 
u 
it 
u 
u 

663 

21 

;;< 

1 

JO 
)0 

50 

ft 

10 
13 

9 

to. 
0 

6 
0 

ft. 

10 
16 

i 
9 

in. 
0 
9 

( 

6 

fe 

2 

1! 
I1 

et. 

20 
J7 

ro 

ft. 
20( 
15! 

151 

in. 
)   0 

J  3 

L  7 

ft. 
28 

36 

29 

in. 

2 
0 

0 

ft. 

28 
35 

t 

28 

in. 

0 
10 

i 

8 

Niobe  

Vestal  

Nymphe  

Dryad 

Daphne  

Plover  

234: 


H1STOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 


The  Helicon  has  2  20-pounder  Armstrong  guns  on  main  deck.  Number  of  crew, 
65.  Speed,  144;  knots. 

The  Plover  has  1  100-pounder  64-ton  gun,  and  2  40-pounder  Armstrongs  on  the 
upper  deck.  Number  of  crew,  80.  Speed,  11  knots. 

The  others  have  for  armament  2  100-pounder  6J  tons,  and  2  64-pounders,  all  on 

main  deck. 

IEON  TEANSPOETS. 


SHIP'S  NAME. 

Tons. 

H.  P. 

700 

u 
11 

li 

DRAUGHT  OF  WATER. 

LENGTH 

BREADTH 

Forward. 

Aft. 

Between 
Perpen 
diculars. 

ft.     in. 

360  0 

u 
(( 

a 
(( 

of 
Keel. 

Extreme. 

for 
Tonnage. 

Crocodile 

4,173 

a 

a 
u 

ft.    in. 

19  0 

u 
u 
u 
(( 

ft.  in. 

21    0 

« 

« 

tt 

ft.     in. 

326   9 

a 
u 
a 
(( 

ft.    in. 

49  0 

tt 
a 
u 
it 

ft.     in. 

49  0 

(( 

a 
a 

Serapis  

Euphrates 

Jumna.  .            .... 

Malabar.  . 

Their  armament  consists  each  of  2  40-pounder  Armstrong  guns  on  upper  deck. 
Number  of  crew  to  each,  200.  Speed,  14  knots. 

In  the  foregoing  tables  the  speed  is  per  measured  mile  in  smooth 
sea,  without  armament  or  stores  on  board.  The  following  is  a  table  of 
the  French  Iron-clad  Navy  at  the  present  time : 

IEON-CASED    SHIPS    OF   FEANCE. 


SHIP'S  NAME. 

Displace 
ment. 

Horse- 
Power. 

Mean 
Draught. 

Length 
on  Load 
Line. 

Breadth. 

Kind 
Hull 

Armor 
Plating. 

Weight 
of 
Armor. 

Speed  in 
Smooth 
Water. 

Magenta  
Solferino  
Couronne.  .  .  . 
Gloire  

Tons. 

6,750 
6,700 
6,000 
5,650 

1,000 
1,000 
900 
900 

Feet. 

26 
26 
25 

254- 

Feet. 
280 
280 

260 
255 

Feet. 
57 

57 
55 
56 

Wood. 

tt 

Iron. 
Wood. 

Inches. 

4* 

a 

44;  &  3 
44- 

Tons. 

900 

900 
700 
800 

Knots. 
134; 

14 
13 
134- 

Invincible  
Normandie  .  .  . 
Flandre  . 

5,525 
5,650 
5  700 

900 
900 
1  000 

254; 
26 
25 

255 
255 
260 

56 
56 
56 

u 
It 

11 

a 
« 
6 

800 
800 
1  000 

134- 
13* 

Gauloise  

5,700 

1  000 

25 

260 

56 

tt 

u 

Guyenne  
Heroine  

5,700 
5  700 

1,000 
1  000 

25 
25 

260 
260 

56 
56 

tt 

Iron. 

(( 

a 

— 

Magnanime.  .  . 
Provence  .... 
Eevanche.  
Savoie  . 

5,700 
5,700 
5,700 
5  700 

1,000 
1,000 
1,000 
1  000 

25 
25 
25 
25 

260 
260 
260 
260 

56 
56 
56 
56 

Wood. 

a 
n 
n 

<( 
u 
a 
a 

14 

Surveillante  .  . 
Valeureuse.  .  . 
Belliqueuse  .  . 
Taureau  
Paixhans  .... 
Palestro  
Peiho  

5,700 
5,700 
3,350 
2,450 
1,540 
1,540 
1  500 

1,000 
1,000 
900 
900 
150 
150 
150 

25 
25 
19* 
16 
8* 
8i 

io| 

260 
260 
230 
200 
156' 
156 
150 

56 
56 
46 
47i 
46 
46 
45 

it 
it 
n 
n 
u 

a 
(( 

u 

v( 
it 
« 

4| 
« 

a 

800 

275 

a 
it 

7 
tt 

« 

Saigon 

1  500 

150 

10 

156 

46 

tt 

« 

a 

« 

Embuscade.  .  . 
Impregnable.  . 
Protectrice.  .  . 
Refuge  

1,225 
1,225 
1,225 
1  225 

150 
150 
150 
150 

9* 
H 

94- 

01 

130 
130 
130 
130 

51 
51 
51 
51 

Iron, 
u 

(( 
tl 

Bi 

t< 

a 
u 

— 

E 

Arrogante...  . 
Implacable.  .  . 
Opiniatre  .... 

1,340 
1,340 
1,340 

150 
150 
150 

8f 
8f 
84 

145 
145 
145 

48 
48 
48 

It 
tt 

it 

ti 
a 
« 

~~ 

n 

8 

!   '\-\'~  — 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  235 


OPINION   OF   THE   RUSSIAN   ADMIRAL. 

Rejecting  the  high  sides  of  vessels,  to  cover  which  thousands  of 
pounds  of  iron  would  be  required,  the  inventor  of  the  Monitor  has 
gained,  in  comparison  with  other  armored  vessels,  the  following  advan 
tages  : 

First.  A  comparative  cheapness  in  construction. 
Second.  The  insignificance  of  target  presented  to  the  enemy's  fire. 
Third.  The  safety  of  the  submerged  part  of  the  vessel  from  shots. 
Fourth.  The  possibility  of  using  guns  of  the  heaviest  calibres,  and 
capability  to  give  great  thickness  to  the  turrets  and  side  armor  easier 
than  it  could  be  done  on  armored  vessels  of  other  systems. 

The  system  of  Captain  Ericsson  must  not  be  confounded  with  the 
turreted  system  of  Captain  Coles.  The  latter  places  his  turret  on  a  com 
mon  vessel  with  pretty  high  sides,  for  the  protection  of  which  by  armor, 
as  was  mentioned  before,  an  enormous  weight  of  iron  is  required. 
Those  are  the  advantages  presented  by  Captain  Ericsson's  system.  In 
relation  to  the  execution  of  details,  the  first  Monitor  presented  an  exten 
sive  field  for  improvement.  The  famous  action  in  Hampton  Roads  at 
the  beginning  of  1862  compelled  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
to  choose  this  system  of  vessels  for  coast  defence  in  preference  to  others. 
Five  large  vessels-of-war  very  nearly  became  victims  to  the  Merri- 
mack,  but  were  rescued  by  the  timely  arrival  of  the  small  Monitor, 
which  forced  the  Merrimack  to  leave  the  field  of  battle. 

In  reference  to  artillery,  the  choice  of  the  American  Government  fell 
on  the  15-inch  Rodman  gun.  Up  to  that  time  the  largest  guns  used  in 
the  Navy  were  11 -inch  Dahlgren  guns,  but  the  Monitor  system  is  able  to 
use  the  largest  guns,  the  defeating  force  of  which  is  more  effectual  than 
that  of  the  11-inch  guns. 

From  that  time  it  may  be  said  that  this  class  of  vessels  is  sufficiently 
tried  in  America.  We  will  briefly  bring  forth  some  of  the  most  noted 
occasions  in  which  their  merits  were  exhibited.  In  order  of  time  the 
following  favorable  news  concerning  Monitors  transpired  :  First  was  the 
report  by  Commodore  Rodgers  of  the  storm  encountered  by  him  on  the 
Atlantic  Ocean  on  board  the  Monitor  Weehawken.  This  renowned 
naval  officer  went  to  sea  in  tow  of  a  steamer  in  the  same  way  as  all 
Monitors  generally  make  their  sea  voyages.  Near  the  capes  of  the  Del 
aware,  perceiving  the  approach  of  a  storm,  Commodore  Rodgers  sent 
his  companion  to  the  nearest  port,  determined  to  remain  at  sea  himself 
to  test  the  Monitor  under  these  circumstances. 

In  his  report  he  praises  the  qualities  of  the  Weehawken  observed  by 


236  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

him  during  the  storm.  The  other  Monitors  have  repeatedly  made  sea 
passages  during  the  tempestuous  winter  time.  Out  of  their  number  only 
the  first  Monitor  was  lost,  and  that  from  causes  more  or  less  accessory. 

After  this  we  have  the  intelligence  of  the  action  on  the  Ogeechee 
against  sand-batteries ;  the  distance  was  from  400  to  600  fathoms,  im 
pediments  preventing  a  nearer  approach;  several  other  vessels  armed 
partly  with  mortars  participated  in  the  action.  The  fortifications  were 
completely  demolished,  though  repaired  during  the  night.  The  absence 
of  land  forces  prevented  the  driving  of  the  enemy  out  of  the  forts,  as 
the  execution  of  the  artillery  alone  at  a  distance  of  400  fathoms  was 
insufficient  for  that  purpose.  One  of  the  enemy's  cruisers,  the  Nashville, 
attempted  to  break  through  the  Monitors,  but  a  15-inch  shell  decided 
her  fate. 

Thereupon  follows  the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter.  A  careful  study  of 
this  affair  shows  that  the  injuries  sustained  by  the  Monitors  were  more 
or  less  of  a  light  character.  Many  weak  points  were  discovered,  also 
many  defects  requiring  alterations  on  the  vessels  already  built,  and  some 
changes  in  those  that  were  in  process  of  building ;  but  the  main  princi 
ple  on  which  the  system  of  building  these  vessels  was  founded  came  out 
of  this  effective  trial  with  a  complete  triumph. 

The  next  trial  was  of  a  real  naval  character — a  combat  between  two 
iron-clads,  the  Monitor  Weehawken  against  the  Atlanta.  On  both  sides 
much  was  expected  from  the  issue  of  this  battle,  but  almost  the  first 
shot  from  the  15-inch  gun  of  the  Weehawken  decided  the  affair  in  her 
favor. 

The  Monitors  continue  to  play,  if  not  the  principal,  still,  however,  an 
important  part  at  the  siege  of  Charleston.  Continually  exposed  to  the 
fire  of  the  enemy  for  several  months,  they  obstinately  occupy  their  posi 
tion  in  an  almost  open  roadstead,  maintaining  a  successful  blockade  ot 
Charleston.  All  these  circumstances  certainly  speak  a  great  deal  more 
for  the  usefulness  of  the  Monitors  than  against  them.  The  last  accident 
to  the  Weehawken,  which  unexpectedly  foundered  in  the  midst  of  a 
whole  squadron  of  similar  vessels,  while  at  an  anchorage  at  which  those 
vessels  have  remained  so  long  a  time  with  impunity,  is  not  investigated, 
and  it  may  be  will  only  show  that  these  vessels  require  particular 
precautions  and  care,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  treat  them  as  common 
vessels. 

Such,  in  short,  is  the  substance  of  the  knowledge  we  have  of  the 
Monitors. 

In  Russia,  the  Navy  Department,  in  the  person  of  his  highness  the 
General  Admiral  and  his  nearest  assistants,  did  not  cease  to  follow  from 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS.  237 

the  beginning  the  trials  of  armored  ship-building  in  other  States,  but 
with  prudent  caution  it  was  decided  not  to  do  any  thing  until  the  new 
vessels  had  been  sufficiently  tested.  In  consequence,  after  the  first 
battle  between  iron-clad  vessels  in  America,  the  Navy  Department  im 
mediately  sent  out  there  several  officers  belonging  to  different  branches 
of  the  naval  service  to  study  those  new  vessels  on  the  spot.  Those  per 
sons  fulfilled  the  commission  with  which  they  were  charged  in  the  most 
successful  manner.  Their  reports  confirmed  the  Navy  Department  in 
its  conclusions  that  out  of  all  known  systems  of  iron-clads  the  Monitor 
was  preferred  for  our  coast  defences,  especially  in  our  shallow  waters. 
The  protection  of  Cronstadt,  our  principal  naval  port,  an  object  of  con 
stant  and  particular  solicitude  of  our  Navy  Department,  presents  besides 
such  local  conveniences  for  the  use  of  those  vessels  as  cannot  be  found 
everywhere.  In  consequence  of  all  this,  several  vessels  were  commenced 
on  the  exact  model  of  the  American  Monitors.  These  vessels,  destined 
exclusively  for  the  protection  of  Cronstadt,  rapidly  and  successfully 
move  to  completion.  All  the  improvements,  the  necessity  of  which  has 
been  proved  by  experience  in  America,  will  be  introduced  on  our  vessels, 
and  it  is  expected  that  those  vessels  will  be  a  very  effective  and  neces 
sary  addition  to  our  land  defences  of  Cronstadt. 

At  the  same  time  the  Navy  Department  did  not  neglect  to  adopt  all 
measures  to  provide  the  new  vessels  with  the  most  perfect  artillery ;  and 
we  hope  that  our  single-turreted  vessels,  representing  the  exact  copy  of 
the  American  Monitors,  will  be  armored  with  formidable  artillery,  com 
bine  all  the  new  improvements,  and  give  satisfaction  to  all  the  demands 
of  contemporary  military  science. 

In  addition  to  this,  we  did  not  stop  on  one  system  exclusively. 
"With  prudent  calculation,  concentrating  all  our  efforts  on  means  exclu 
sively  defensive,  we  shall  have  at  the  same  time,  besides  the  Monitors,  a 
few  iron-clad  vessels  representing  models  of  all  the  principal  systems 
now  in  use,  and  which  could  be  adapted  to  our  exclusive  and  local  con 
dition. 

In  conclusion,  we  may  say  we  have  before  us  an  extensive  and  vast 
road  for  the  further  study  of  this  question,  and  investigation  of  those 
improvements  which  are  called  forth  by  numerous  imperfections  of  all 
the  systems  of  iron- clad  vessels  known  at  the  present  time. 

In  examining  the  reports  of  the  captains  of  the  Monitors  which  partici 
pated  in  the  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter,  knowing  exactly  the  kind  of 
battle  the  Monitors  were  engaged  in,  the  injuries  received  by  them,  and 
remembering  that,  notwithstanding  a  severe  concentrated  fire  from  the 
numerous  Southern  forts,  the  Federal  fleet  had  only  one  man  killed  and 


238  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

two  wounded,  we  come  inevitably  to  the  conclusion  that  the  attack  on 
Charleston  positively  proves  the  Monitors  capable  to  compete,  and  prob 
ably  with  chances  of  success,  with  the  best  iron-clad  vessels  of  the 
French  and  English  Navies. 

It  is  true  that,  from  injuries  received  in  this  battle,  the  Keokuk  was 
sunk ;  but  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  having  been  constructed  on  a 
different  system,  she  was  fastened  imperfectly  in  comparison  with  her 
companions,  the  injuries  to  which,  though  important,  were  for  the  most 
part  of  such  a  character  as  will  be  easily  provided  against  on  the  Moni 
tors  that  are  now  being  built  in  our  yards  and  factories. 

For  instance,  on  board  the  vessels  that  participated  in  the  action  of 
the  7th  April,  1863,  a  great  many  bolts  that  fastened  the  turret-plates 
were  broken.  In  the  pilot-houses  and  turrets,  where  there  was  no  inside 
iron  sheathing,  the  captains  and  the  men  at  the  guns  were  exposed  to 
great  danger  from  the  nuts  and  ends  of  bolts  rebounding  inside.  Those 
nuts  and  pieces  of  bolts,  falling  between  the  foundations  of  turrets  and 
decks,  prevented  the  turret  from  revolving.  The  fire  of  the  Monitors  also 
was  not  so  very  effective,  from  continual  stoppages  of  the  guns.  Finally, 
there  were  some  few  more  or  less  important  defects  and  errors. 

A  well-considered  new  system  of  fastening  iron  plates  in  turrets, 
taken  from  experience,  a  large  iron  ring  covering  the  space  between  the 
lower  part  of  the  turret  and  the  deck,  and  the  9-inch  cast-steel  gun,  are 
the  means  from  which  we  expect  a  great  deal. 

Notwithstanding  the  defects  of  the  American  Monitors,  the  strength 
shown  by  them  during  the  bombardment  is  truly  astonishing.  The 
Southerners  were  firing  from  guns  of  the  heaviest  calibres  at  distances 
which  probably  were  carefully  measured  before  the  commencement  of 
the  action — these  distances  being  smaller  than  half  the  distance  of  an 
ordinary  pointing  fire — and  yet  not  one  of  the  monster  charges  penetra 
ted  the  turrets.  The  strongest  experience  of  this  kind  was  sustained 
by  the  Passaic,  and  what  was  the  result  ?  A  shot  from  a  gun  of  a  heavy 
calibre  struck  the  upper  edge  of  the  turret,  broke  eleven  plates,  but  did 
not  penetrate  the  turret,  though  the  strength  of  the  shock  was  such  that 
the  projectile,  rebounding  upward,  made  an  indentation  of  2|-  inches  in 
the  pilot-house  and  bent  it  on  one  side;  and  notwithstanding  all  this,  in 
the  turret  proper  of  the  Passaic,  as  well  as  in  the  turrets  of  the  other 
Monitors,  there  was  no  one  killed  or  wounded ;  a  result  certainly  very 
important,  and  which  confirms  the  great  superiority  of  the  Monitor 
system  over  all  other  systems  of  armor-plated  vessels. 

The  fighting  test  through  which  the  Monitors  have  passed  is  cer 
tainly  more  effectual  and  decisive  than  the  experiments  made  on  plates 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  239 

representing  the  sides  of  a  "  Warrior "  or  a  "  La  Gloire ; "  4J  inch 
plates  of  those  were  fractured  by  occasional  shots. 

We  may  well  ask  what  would  have  become  of  the  vessels  covered 
by  such  plates,  and  their  sides  presenting  a  large  target,  and  if  (as  it 
happened  with  the  Nahant)  they  would  be  exposed  for  some  time  to  a 
concentrated  fire  of  100  guns  at  a  distance  less  than  1,500  feet?  It  is 
not  difficult  to  answer.  Not  only  the  "  Warrior,"  with  the  "  La  Gloire," 
but  all  those  Minotaurs,  Northumberlands,  Magentas,  and  Solferinos, 
constructed  on  improved  models,  would  be  sunk  in  such  circumstances ; 
while  the  Nahant  got  out  of  the  action  with  injuries  comparatively  not 
very  important. 

In  examining  the  reports  of  the  captains,  we  find  several  other  places 
confirming  the  solidity  of  the  Monitors.  With  the  exception  of  the 
Keokuk  and  Passaic,  all  the  vessels  of  the  squadron  were  in  a  condition 
to  continue  the  fight,  and  it  was  only  the  signal  of  the  admiral  (to  stop 
the  battle)  that  made  them  stop  the  attack.  The  Monitors  Weehawken, 
Montauk,  Patapsco,  and  Catskill,  after  a  hot  action  of  40  minutes,  had 
no  serious  injuries,  not  only  in  their  turrets,  but  in  any  other  parts  of  the 
vessels.  In"  one  word,  from  whatever  side  you  look  upon  the  results  of 
the  battle,  they  are  positively  favorable  to  the  Monitor  system  of  con 
structing  vessels,  inasmuch  as  the  same  is  subject  to  improvements  which 
can  be  partly  adopted  on  the  Monitors  building  at  the  present  time,  and 
unconditionally  on  those  that  are  to  be  built.  Passing  to  the  reproach 
of  slowness  of  fire  from  the  Monitors,  it  is  easy  to  prove  that,  taking 
into  consideration  the  present  state  of  artillery,  the  number  of  projectiles 
fired  within  a  certain  specified  time  is  not  so  very  important  as  is  the 
degree  of  destruction  they  produce.  Five  shots  from  the  Weehawken 
were  quite  sufficient  to  force  the  Atlanta,  a  beautiful  iron-clad  corvette 
which  cost  the  Southerners  a  million  of  dollars,  to  strike  her  flag. 

And  it  is  certain  that  nine  shots  from  a  15-inch  gun  fired  by  the  Pas 
saic  in  forty-five  minutes  would  do  a  great  deal  of  harm  to  the  Warrior 
or  Black  Prince.  In  three-quarters  of  an  hour  the  Federal  squadron  let 
out  139  projectiles,  excluding  3  shots  that  the  Keokuk  made;  and 
remembering  that  the  admiral's  ship,  the  new  Ironsides,  scarcely  partici 
pated  in  the  fight,  it  appears  that  the  mean  number  of  shots  fired  from 
the  14  guns  of  the  remaining  seven  Monitors  during  the  action  was  nine, 
or  one  shot  for  every  five  minntes  ;  a  result,  if  not  particularly  brilliant, 
still  very  satisfactory,  if  we  remember  that  the  continual  stoppages  in 
firing  are  partly  explained  by  inevitable  accidents  in  first  experiments, 
and  for  the  most  part  are  set  aside  by  another  system  of  artillery,  possi 
ble  improvements  in  loading  guns,  and  port-stoppers. 


240 


HISTOKY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 


To  these  statements  would  be  added  parts  of  a  very  impor 
tant  report  made  by  the  Committee  on  Naval  Affairs  in  the 
House  of  Representatives,  January  30,  1865,  which  presents 
facts  that  are  perfectly  conclusive  in  regard  to  the  speed  of  our 
ships-of-war,  facts  which  completely  vindicate  the  Department 
from  the  attacks  which  have  been  made  in  reference  to  this 
particular  subject.  The  first  of  these  extracts  will  show  the 
average  speed  of  vessels  constructed  before  the  war  : 


Names,  tonnage,  maximum  and  average  speed  of  the  Screw  Vessels  of  the 
Navy  T)uilt  ~before  the  War. 


NAME. 

Tons1  burden. 

Maximum  speed 
in  knots  per 
hour  under 
steam  alone  in 
smooth  water. 

Average  speed  at 
sea  in  knots  per 
hour  with  steam 
and  sail. 

4,582 

10.9 

8.5 

Minnesota,  Merrirnack,  Wabash,  Roa- 

3,774 

9.0 

6.5 

Brooklyn                   ...            

2,070 

9.2 

8.1 

San  Jacinto  

1,446 

8.8 

7.2 

Hartford                           

1,990 

9.5 

7.3 

2,362 

9.5 

7.3 

1,929 

7.5 

6.5 

1,289 

8.0 

6.5 

Iroquois,  Wyoming,  Dakota,  and  Mo- 

1,016 

11.7 

8.0 

Narragansett  and  Seminole  

809 

8.0 

6.5 

Names,  tonnage,  maximum  and  average  speed  of  the  Side  or  Paddle-wheel 
Vessels  of  the  Navy  "built  before  the  War. 


NAME. 

Tons'  burden. 

Maximum  speed 
under  steam 
alone  in  knots 
per  hour  in 
smooth  water. 

Average  speed  at 
sea  in  knots  per 
hour  with  steam 
and  sail. 

2,450 

11.0 

9.0 

2415 

11.0 

9.0 

1,692 

8.7 

7.5 

Saranac                

1,446 

9.2 

8.0 

Saginaw  

453 

9.0 

The  following  statements  and  tables  from  the  same  report 
will  enable  the  reader  to  compare  the  ships  built  since  the 
war  began  with  those  constructed  before,  and  also  with  other 


THE   DIFFERENT   CLASSES   OF   MONITORS. 


NAME  OF  VESSEL. 

S-8 

>£ 

55  N 
£^  E, 

WJ 

Number  of  voyages 
from  Liverpool  to 
New  York. 

Mean  length  of  all 
the  voyages  in  days 
and  hours. 

Average  speed  of  all 
the  voyages  in  knots 
per  hour. 

Paddle-wheel  steamers  —  Cunard  line  : 
Asia      ..   .    .       

4 

3 

12.15f 

10  04 

2 

2 

14.7i 

8  88 

Africa        ..         .        

3 

2 

13.0 

9  »78 

5 

6 

11.3 

11  42 

Scotia       .                        

5 

6 

10.184, 

11  80 

Mean  of  all  five  

10  39 

Screw  steamers  —  Cunard  line  : 
China     .                

I 

3 

12.2 

10.52 

4 

4 

ll.Oi 

11.54 

Mean  of  the  two  

11.03 

Screw  steamers  —  Liverpool,  New  York,  and  Phil 
adelphia  Steamship  Company  : 
^Etna         ....         .... 

6 

5 

12  4*- 

1043 

4 

3 

14.1  If 

8.78 

Edinburgh                 ..    .. 

6 

5 

13  5 

9  62 

City  of  Washington  

8 

8 

11.21 

10.70 

City  of  Baltimore  .    . 

8 

8 

12  8 

1030 

5 

4 

12  23 

9.81 

9.94 

SPEED   OF   THE   FASTEST    MERCHANT   TRANSATLANTIC    STEAMERS. 

As  a  very  exaggerated  idea  is  generally  had  of  the  speed  of  the 
ocean  merchant  steamers,  the  following  table  is  given  with  a  view  to 
correct  erroneous  impressions.  It  shows  the  average  speed  made  dur 
ing  the  year  1862  by  the  screw  and  side- wheel  steamers  of  the  Cunard 
line,  and  of  the  screw  steamers  of  the  Liverpool,  New  York,  and  Phil 
adelphia  line,  plying  between  the  cities  of  New  York  and  Liverpool. 
In  computing  the  speed  per  hour,  the  distance  is  taken  at  3,050  geo 
graphical  miles. 

These  vessels  run  at  their  best  speed ;  they  burn  all  the  coal  they 
can  from  their  departure  to  their  arrival,  and  use  their  canvas  (with 
which  they  are  well  provided)  whenever  it  can  be  advantageously  set. 
The  average  of  so  many  voyages  in  both  directions  must  be  very  nearly 
the  correct  speed  that  can  be  permanently  sustained  under  steam  alone 
at  sea,  uninfluenced  by  weather,  which  is  neutralized  during  so  long  a 
course  of  steaming,  and  in  opposite  directions ;  nor  should  it  be  over- 

16 


24:2  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

looked  that  this  speed  corresponds  to  the  vessel's  draught  of  water  when 
her  coal  and  stores  are  half  expended,  and  not  to  the  deep-load  draught 
of  water.  The  maximum  and  minimum  passages  are  due  purely  to  fa 
vorable  or  unfavorable  weather. 

The  average  speed  of  the  Collins  steamers  was  13f  knots  per  hour; 
that  of  the  Peninsular  and  Oriental  Steamship  Company  is  llf  knots 
per  hour.  All  of  these  vessels,  it  will  be  remembered,  are  of  large  ton 
nage,  and  have  models  as  sharp  as  it  is  possible  to  construct  them.  On 
the  whole,  it  may  be  considered  that  a  medium-sized  screw  vessel,  of 
the  best  model,  which  can  permanently  sustain  10-|-  knots  per  hour  at 
sea,  uninfluenced  by  weather,  is  a  fast  merchant  steamer. 


Principal  Screw  War-steamers  of  the  United  States  Navy. 


*"•»  of  Vessel. 

Lackawanna  ...............................................  12  .  00 

Ticonderoga  ...............................................  12.00 

Sacramento  ................................................  12.00 

Shenandoah  ...............................................  12.00 

Monongahela  ...............................................  12.00 

Adirondack  and  Juniata  .....................................  12  .00 

Ossipee  and  Housatonic  ......................................  12  .  00 

Canandaigua  ...............................................  12.00 

Nipsic,  Shawmut,  and  Nyack.  .  .  .  ,  ............................  12  .  50 

Sagamore,  Huron,  Cayuga,  Chippewa,  Aroostook,  Chocura,  Itasca, 
Kanawha,  Katahdin,  Kennebec,  Kineo,  Marblehead,  Owasco,  Pe- 

nobscot,  Pinola,  Scioto,  Tahoma,  Wissahickon,  Winona  ........  10.00 

Iroquois  ...................................................  11.70 

Wyoming  .................................................  11.20 

Mohican  ..................................................  11.80 

Kearsarge  .................................................  11.20 

Oneida  ....................  .  ...............................  11.70 

Wachusett  .................................................  11.20 

Dakota  ....................................................  12  .  00 

Tuscarora  .................................................  11.20 

Lancaster  .................................................  9.50 

Hartford  ..................................................  9.50 

Richmond  .................................................  7.50 

San  Jacinto  ...........  ,  ....................................  8  .  50 

Wabash  ...................................................  9.11 

Minnesota  .................................................  8.87 

Roanoke  ..................................................  8.83 

Colorado  ..................................................  8.83 

Brooklyn  ........................             ....................  9.19 


THE    DIFFERENT   CLASSES    OF   MONITORS.  243 

Principal  Paddle-wheel  Steamers  of  the  United  States  Naxy. 

Name  of  Vessel.  Speed  per  hour  in 

nautical  miles. 

Conemaugh 11 . 30 

Cimarrou 11.60 

Haratanza 10.00 

Mahaska 11 .00 

Port  Royal 11.10 

PaulJones 11.11 

Genesee 10.90  « 

Sonoma 11.30 

Tioga 10.90 

Sebago 11.00 

Octorora 11.30 

Ascutney,  Agawam,  Chenango,  Chicopee,  Eutaw,  lasco,  Lenapee, 
Pontiac,  Patuxet,  Mattabeset,  Mingoe,  Massasoit,  Metacomet, 
Mendota,  Mackinaw,  Otsego,  Pontoosuc,  Tacony,  Sassacus,  Sham 
rock,  Tallapoosa,  Wateree,  Wyalusing,  Osceola 13 .07 

Powhatan 1 1 . 00 

Mississippi 8.70 

Saranac 9 . 20 

Susquehanna 11.00 


CHAPTER  XV. 


THE    RELIEF    OF    FORT    SUMTER. 

ONE  of  the  most  important  of  all  the  early  enterprises  of 
the  war  has  devoted  to  it  only  the  two  following  sentences  in 
one  of  the  trusted  and  widely  circulated  histories  of  the  rebel 
lion  :  "  The  fleet  from  New  York  laden  with  provisions  for 
the  garrison  had  appeared  off  the  bar  by  noon  of  the  day  on 
which  fire  was  opened,  but  made  no  effort  to  fulfil  its  errand  ; 
to  have  attempted  to  supply  the  fort  would  have  at  best  in- 
yolved  a  heavy  cost  of  life,  probably  to  no  purpose.  Its  com 
mander  communicated  by  signal  with  Major  Anderson,  but  re 
mained  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's  fire  till  after  the  surrender, 
when  he  returned  as  he  came."  * 

History  is  supposed  by  many  to  be  a  revealer  as  well  as  a 
•recorder  of  truth  ;  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  any  paragraph  so 
small  as  the  above  has  ever  before  concealed  as  many  important 
facts.  Of  course,  no  intention  of  concealment  is  charged  upon 
the  writer ;  but  the  fact  shows  that  often  when  the  historian 
thinks  he  has  searched  the  whole  field  many  very  important 
things  may  still  lie  beyond  the  range  of  his  vision.  How  much 
lay  hidden  in  the  shadow  of  these  few  lines  will  appear  by  a 
relation  of  facts. 

The  most  perplexing,  and  probably  the  most  dangerous  of 
the  questions  first  presented  to  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  advisers, 
was  in  regard  to  the  relief  of  Fort  Sumter.  Either  through 
the  weakness  or  the  complicity,  or  both,  of  the  preceding  ad 
ministration,  an  armed  insurrection  against  the  Government 
was  treated  as  if  it  required  no  serious  intervention,  and  the 

*  Greeley,  "  The  American  Conflict,"  vol.  i.,  page  447 


THE   BELIEF   OF   FORT   SUMTEE.  245 

seizure  of  forts,  arsenals,  mints,  and  custom-houses,  was  passed 
over  as  if  it  were  merely  an  innocent  amusement.  Mr.  Bu 
chanan  and  his  counsellors  had  constrained  the  little  garrison 
of  Fort  Sumter  to  remain  without  supplies  or  reinforcements, 
and  to  permit  the  rebels  to  encircle  them  with  batteries,  not 
only  without  resistance  but  without  even  a  protest,  while  the 
guns  of  the  fort  bore  on  every  point  which  the  conspirators 
were  fortifying  ;  and  when  Mr.  Lincoln  came  into  power  Sum 
ter  was  surrounded  by  a  line  of  guns  to  which  the  little  garrison 
could  offer  no  effectual  resistance. 

At  the  time  when  Mr.  Lincoln  was  inaugurated,  the  mere 
relief  of  the  garrison  by  provisions  or  troops,  difficult  as  that 
was,  by  no  means  formed  the  most  perplexing  part  of  the  prob 
lem.  The  new  Government  began  its  contest  at  almost  fatal 
disadvantage.  The  plan  of  the  rebel  leaders  was  clearly  de 
fined  and  settled.  All  understood  the  common  purpose,  and 
all  were  perfectly  united.  They  were  fully  determined  from 
the  beginning  upon  separation  and  independence,  and  nothing 
less  than  this  ;  and  were  ready  to  try  the  issue  by  war,  if  that 
should  be  needed.  At  the  same  time,  while  making  every  pos 
sible  preparation  for  an  armed  conflict,  they  strengthened  their 
accomplices  in  the  North  and  in  Europe  by  declaring  that  they 
desired  only  peace,  only  to  be  left  in  quiet  to  manage  their  own 
concerns.  By  adding  to  this  the  deceitful  doctrine  that  the  citi 
zen  owes  primary  allegiance  to  his  State,  and  pressing  loudly 
the  sovereignty  of  the  States  and  the  sacredness  of  their  soil  as 
against  any  "  invasion  "  by  the  General  Government,  they  be 
wildered  a  portion  even  of  the  loyal  JSTorth  and  caused  it  to  be 
widely  assumed  as  a  conceded  fact,  that  they  were  already  in 
fact  and  by  right  an  independent  people,  and  were  seeking  only 
the  things  that  belong  to  peace  ;  and  should  the  Federal  Gov 
ernment  attack  them,  it  would  be  a  causeless  assault  upon  an 
unoffending  party.  They  had  thus  secured  beforehand  the 
sympathies  of  England  and  France,  who  welcomed  and  made 
use  of  the  argument  without  being  deceived  by  the  reasoning. 
The  "  peace  Democrats  "  of  the  North  made  these  statements  the 
staple  of  their  warfare  against  the  Government,  and  a  multitude 
of  loyal  men  for  a  time  were  puzzled. 

While  the  peaceable  intentions  and  the  sacred  State  rights 


246  HISTOET   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

of  the  conspirators  were  tlius  widely  proclaimed  and  echoed  by 
every  friend  of  their  cause  at  home  and  abroad,  they  worked 
with  boldness  and  untiring  energy  to  possess  themselves  of 
every  strategic  point  and  every  fortification  both  on  the  coast 
and  inland,  and  with  almost  complete  success.  They  were  ex 
ceedingly  anxious  to  obtain  possession  of  Fort  Sumter,  either  by 
inducing  the  Government  to  evacuate  it  or  to  attack  them,  in 
order  that  they  might  appear  to  capture  it  in  self-defence.  They 
were,  however,  as  the  result  proved,  fully  determined  to  attack 
and  reduce  the  fort  at  all  hazards,  provided  other  methods 
should  fail. 

Some  of  the  chief  perils  which  beset  the  new  Administration 
in  that  dark  hour  are  therefore  easily  seen.  Southern  commis 
sioners  were  in  "Washington  ostensibly  seeking  terms  of  peace 
able  separation,  and  though  not  officially  received  they  were 
nevertheless  in  communication  with  one  department  of  the 
Government ;  and  as  the  result  has  shown,  they  managed,  by 
busy  and  ingenious  friends,  of  whom  they  had  so  many,  to  pos 
sess  themselves  of  secrets  which  it  was  supposed  none  but  the 
chief  officers  of  the  Government  knew.  If  they  could  obtain  a 
peaceable  evacuation  of  Fort  Sumter,  they  could  properly  claim 
it  as  an  acknowledgment  of  their  rights,  and  virtually  of  their 
independence  ;  and  they  urged  this  step  with  so  much  power  as 
to  obtain,  as  they  affirm,  an  assurance  which  they  received  as 
from  due  authority,  that  within  a  certain  number  of  days  Fort 
Sumter  should  be  evacuated.  Of  course,  Southern  evidence 
must  be  received  only  for  what  it  is  worth.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  could  provoke  the  Government  to  attack  them  at 
Charleston,  they  would,  in  self-defence,  capture  the  fort  in  a 
few  hours,  and  Europe  could  thus  cry  out,  Shame  on  a  Govern 
ment  that  attempts  to  crush  a  weaker  and  independent  people 
merely  wishing  peaceably  to  govern  themselves ;  and  they  could 
glorify  the  skill  and  courage  of  the  Southern  army  in  reducing 
so  quickly  a  strong  casemated  fort.  Every  sympathizer  in  the 
North  would  be  ready  to  echo  the  cry,  and  use  it  for  the  over 
throw  of  the  party  in  power. 

It  would  seem  that  these  two  horns  of  a  dilemma  were  quite 
enough  to  present  to  Mr.  Lincoln  and  his  advisers,  but  there 
was  a  third  which  also  demanded  serious  attention.  The 


THE  EELIEF  OF  FOKT  SUMTEK.  247 

cowardly  or  treacherous  yielding  of  the  preceding  Adminis 
tration,  and  the  prospect  of  what  many  thought  would  be  a 
tame  submission  by  the  new  one,  had  so  far  destroyed  the  con 
fidence  of  the  North  that  the  credit  of  the  Government  was 
seriously  injured.  The  loyal  people  were  fast  losing  confidence 
in  the  courage  of  their  leaders,  and  consequently  in  the  success 
of  their  cause,  and  money  therefore  was  not  to  be  obtained. 

These  statements  will  serve  perhaps  to  throw  some  light 
upon  that  mysterious  and  silent  pause  which  occurred  between 
the  4th  of  March,  1861,  and  the  early  days  of  April. 

Surrounded  on  all  sides  by  perils,  each  of  which  seemed 
almost  equally  formidable,  pressed  by  questions  for  the  decision 
of  which  there  were  no  precedents,  and  which  involved  the  life 
of  the  nation,  time  for  mature  deliberation  was  absolutely  ne 
cessary — time  to  consult  the  wisest  in  the  land  before  a  step  was 
taken  which  could  not  be  retraced.  At  the  same  time  the  situa 
tion  was  becoming  more  dangerous  with  every  hour  of  delay. 

The  truly  loyal  portion  of  the  North  was,  being  weakened 
both  by  impatience  and  inaction,  and  by  loss  of  confidence  in 
the  Administration ;  public  credit  was  sinking,  and  there  was  a 
growing  disposition  to  concede  the  right  of  secession,  and  to  say 
to  the  conspirators,  Go  in  peace.  It  is  in  the  light  of  these  facts 
only  that  the  true  history  of  the  attempt  to  relieve  Fort  Sum- 
ter  can  be  made  to  appear. 

As  has  been  stated  in  a  previous  chapter,  an  armistice  had 
been  secretly  entered  into  between  the  former  Administration 
and  the  secessionists,  and  Commodore  Barron  had  been  sent  out 
to  Pensacola  on  the  20th  of  January  to  prevent  any  government 
vessel  from  entering  the  harbor,  by  which  order  not  only  were 
the  conspirators  left  in  quiet  possession  of  Pensacola,  but  Fort 
Pickens  was  cut  off  from  receiving  any  supplies,  and  would,  as 
a  consequence,  in  due  time  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  secession 
ists.  Troops  sent  out  by  General  Scott  had  already  been  pre 
vented  from  landing,  in  obedience  to  Toucey's  orders,  and  in  ac 
cordance  with  Mr.  Buchanan's  armistice,  of  whose  existence  Mr. 
Lincoln  and  his  Cabinet  at  the  time  knew  nothing. 

It  is  quite  evident,  therefore,  that  the  discussion  in  regard  to 
the  relief  of  Fort  Sumter  began  in  Mr.  Lincoln's  Cabinet  under 
exceedingly  embarrassing  circumstances.  To  add  to  the  com- 


24:8  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

plication  of  affairs,  John  Forsyth,  Martin  J.  Crawford,  and  A. 
B.  Roman,  styling  themselves  "  Commissioners  from  the  Con 
federate  States,"  were  in  "Washington  to  negotiate,  according  to 
their  own  statement,  the  terms  of  a  peaceable  separation ;  and 
though  not  officially  received,  they  were,  nevertheless,  through 
Judge  Campbell,  in  official  communication  with  the  Govern 
ment  through  the  State  Department.  Conversations  were  there 
held  in  the  presence  of  Judge  Nelson,  of  the  Supreme  Court, 
who,  on  the  15th  of  March,  1861,  sanctioned  the  following  note 
from  Judge  Campbell  to  Judge  Crawford  as  the  proper  infer 
ence  to  be  drawn  from  the  assurances  which  were  given  :  "  / 
feel  entire  confidence  that  Fort  Sumter  will  ~be  evacuated  in  the 
next  five  days" 

Judge  Campbell  subsequently  declared  that  he  felt  author 
ized  to  make  the  following  statement  in  a  letter  to  Jefferson 
Davis  :  "  Before  this  letter  reaches  you,  Sumter  will  have  been 
evacuated." 

In  addition  to  this,  Mr.  Buchanan's  policy  was  sustained  by 
a  large  party  in  the  North,  constituting  a  power  which  could 
not  be  wholly  disregarded.  Not  only  had  his  Administration 
decided  that  a  State  could  not  be  compelled  by  force  to  obey 
the  G-eneral  Government,  but,  after  much  consultation,  had 
determined  that  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  relieve  the  gar 
rison  of  Sumter.  Captain  "Ward,  a  brave  officer  of  the  Navy, 
who  was  killed  early  in  the  war,  on  the  Potomac,  proposed  a 
plan  to  Mr.  Buchanan  for  relieving  the  fort,  which  plan  was 
then  deemed  practicable  by  both  naval  and  military  men  ;  but 
it  was  rejected,  and  Major  Anderson  and  his  men  abandoned. 

In  spite  of  this  dangerous  and  complicated  condition  of 
affairs,  the  majority  of  Mr.  Lincoln's  Cabinet  were,  at  first,  in 
favor  of  holding  and  reenforcing  the  fort.  Those  who  from  the 
first  desired  to  evacuate  it,  urged  that  the  Government  could 
make  its  stand  at  Fort  Pickensf  with  far  greater  probability  of 
success,  and  with  equal  moral  effect ;  and  when  to  this  was 
added  afterward  the  influence  of  the  opinion  of  General  Scott, 
General  Totten,  and  other  distinguished  military  men,  that  the 
completion  of  the  rebel  batteries  had  rendered  an  approach  to 
the  fort  impossible,  except  by  an  unwarrantable  loss  of  life,  it  is 
not  strange  that  the  Cabinet  should  have  wavered,  or  that  they 


THE  BELIEF  OF  FOKT  SUMTEK.  249 

should,  at  one  time,  have  deemed  it  wise  to  evacuate  the  fort. 
But  it  was  soon  seen  that  the  eyes  and  hearts  of  the  whole 
country  were  so  fixed  upon  Fort  Sumter  and  its  beleaguered 
garrison,  that  it  would  be  dangerous  for  the  Administration  to 
appear  indifferent  to  its  fate.  There,  in  the  opinion  of  the  peo 
ple,  the  honor  of  the  country  was  at  stake.  There  the  rebels 
had  made  their  first  hostile  demonstration.  Charleston  was 
regarded  as  the  head  and  heart  of  the  conspiracy.  There  the 
Government  was  defied  and  scorned.  And  the  loyal  people  felt 
that  if  the  fort  was  tamely  surrendered,  it  would  be  a  disgrace 
to  the  national  name.  Some  in  high  places  declared  that  the 
evacuation  of  Sumter  would  be  treason,  and  advised  the  Presi 
dent  to  make  the  attempt  to  relieve  it,  even  if  he  believed  that 
every  ship  and  man  of  the  expedition  would  be  lost. 

Under  this  pressure  from  without,  the  President  decided, 
late  in  March,  1861,  to  attempt  to  succor  the  fort.  Previous  to 
this,  Captain  G-.  Y.  Fox,  who  was  soon  afterward  appointed  As 
sistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  a  gallant  officer,  of  great  nautical 
skill  and  experience,  had  laid  before  the  President  and  Cabinet  a 
plan  for  the  relief  of  the  fort,  and  offered  to  lead  the  expedition 
himself.  The  spirit  and  determination  of  this  officer  were 
shown  by  the  fact  that  he  proposed  this,  though  General  Scott, 
having  now  declared  the  scheme  impracticable,  threw  his  influ 
ence  against  it ;  while  some  tried  and  loyal  officers  felt  unwilling 
to  risk  their  reputation  in  an  enterprise  which  seemed  to  them 
to  promise  little  but  failure.  It  was  thought,  however,  by  Mr. 
Lincoln,  that  an  earnest  and  gallant  attempt  to  relieve  that 
starving  garrison,  even  though  a  failure,  would  maintain  the 
honor  of  our  flag,  and  raise  the  spirits  of  the  people. 

The  determination  of  the  President,  and  the  precise  plan 
of  Captain  Fox  were,  of  course,  known  to  each  member  of  the 
Cabinet,  and  to  any  others,  if  such  they  were,  who  were  in  their 
confidence.  If,  therefore,  a  disposition  existed  anywhere  to  de 
feat  the  expedition,  a  fair  opportunity  was  presented.  JSTo  in 
tention  of  this  kind  is  charged  upon  any  one ;  but  by  one  of 
those  curious  coincidences  which  sometimes  occur,  the  only 
thing  which  could  have  prevented  the  success  of  the  plan  was 
actually  done. 

The  method  of  relief  proposed  by  Captain  Fox  required  one 


250  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

steam-frigate  for  carrying  three  hundred  (300)  sailors,  to  be 
landed,  if  necessary,  in  boats,  and  a  full  complement  of  armed 
launches,  two  smaller  steamers,  and  three  tugs.  "Without  the 
frigate,  and  the  sailors  and  launches  she  was  to  carry,  the  exe 
cution  of  the  plan  was  impossible.  It  was  well  known  to  the 
Cabinet  that  only  a  single  frigate  suitable  for  this  service  was 
then  on  the  Atlantic  coast — the  Powhatan,  at  New  York. 

On  the  28th  of  March  the  President  wrote  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  directing  him  to  fit  out  an  expedition  as  soon  as 
practicable,  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Sumter.  The  expedition  was 
under  the  orders  of  the  War  Department,  and  the  Navy  was  to 
cooperate.  Of  course,  this  order  covered  the  use  of  all  vessels 
and  means  at  the  Secretary's  disposal,  which  the  execution  of 
the  order  required.  It  included,  from  necessity,  the  Powhatan, 
because  without  that  frigate  nothing  could  be  done.  Moreover, 
the  Powhatan  was  actually  included  in  formal  orders,  as  will 
appear  from  the  following  telegrams.  The  first  orders  the 
Powhatan  to  be  held  in  readiness  for  sea,  and  is  as  follows : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April  1, 1861— Received  at  Brooklyn  4.10  P.  M. 
To  Commodore  S.  L.  BEEESE,  Navy- Yard: 

The  Department  revokes  its  orders  for  the  detachment  of  the  officers 
of  the  Powhatan,  and  the  transfer  and  discharge  of  her  crew.  Hold 
her  in  readiness  for  sea  service. 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  second  is  from  Mr.  Lincoln  himself,  and  is  as  follows  : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April  1, 1861— Received  at  Brooklyn,  6.50  P.  M. 
To  the  Commandant  of  the  Navy-Yard: 

Fit  out  the  Powhatan  to  go  to  sea  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
under  sealed  orders.  Orders  by  a  confidential  messenger  go  forward  to 
morrow.  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

The  third  is  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and,  as  it  ap 
pears,  was  sent  at  the  same  time  with  the  one  from  the  Presi 
dent,  for  both  were  received  at  Brooklyn  at  the  same  time,  6.50 
p.  M.  It  is  as  follows : 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  April  1, 1861— Received  at  Brooklyn  6.50  P.  M. 
To  Commandant  of  Navy-Yard : 

Fit  out  Powhatan  to  go  to  sea  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


THE    BELIEF   OF   FORT   SUHTEE.  251 

These  telegrams  show,  either  that  the  President  was  acting 
in  concert  with  the  Secretary  in  regard  to  the  Powhatan,  and 
that  he  gave  the  order  for  detaching  her  without  knowing  its 
import,  or,  if  he  knew  that  the  order  which  he  signed  related  to 
the  Powhatan,  he  did  not  know  that  to  take  her  would  interfere 
with  the  expedition  to  Sumter,  for  he  afterward  expressly  disa 
vowed  any  intention  to  do  so,  and  ordered,  when  too  late,  that 
the  frigate  should  proceed  to  Sumter,  and  that  the  Secretary's 
orders  should  be  carried  out.  Whatever,  then,  may  have  been 
the  design,  if  any,  in  interfering  with  the  expedition,  the  Presi 
dent  was  not  a  party  to  the  plan. 

The  Secretary  acted  with  the  utmost  promptness.  Orders 
were  immediately  issued  to  have  the  sailors  ready,  and  to  pre 
pare  the  Pawnee,  the  Harriet  Lane,  the  Pocahontas,  and  the 
Powhatan  for  the  expedition. 

On  the  30th  of  March  the  President  sent  Captain  Fox  to 
New  York  with  verbal  instructions  to  prepare  for  the  execution 
of  his  plan.  These  preparations  were  duly  made.  The  Pow 
hatan,  the  Pawnee,  the  Pocahontas,  and  the  Harriet  Lane  were 
got  ready  for  sea,  and  on  the  6th  of  April  the  Powhatan  sailed. 
On  that  day  her  commander,  Captain  Mercer,  received  an  order, 
signed  by  the  President,  detaching  the  Powhatan  from  the  ser 
vice  to  which  she  had  been  assigned,  and  placing  her  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant  D.  D.  Porter.  The  President  after 
ward  declared  that  he  signed  this  order  without  the  least  idea 
that  it  was  to  deprive  Captain  Fox  of  one  of  his  ships,  and  he 
probably  did  not  remember  the  names  of  the  vessels  which  had 
been  designated  for  Fort  Sumter.  Captain  Fox  did  not  sail  un 
til  two  days  after  the  Powhatan,  but  he  received  no  intimation 
that  her  destination  had  been  changed,  and  supposed  she  had 
gone  on  to  Charleston  in  obedience  to  orders.  There  was  a 
very  good  reason  for  this.  The  order  to  change  her  course  did 
not  pass  through  the  Navy  Department  at  all.  Secretary 
Welles  knew  nothing  of  the  matter  until  it  was  too  late  to  in 
terfere.  The  manner  in  which  it  came  to  his  knowledge  is  also 
worthy  of  being  recorded.  When  the  officers  who  were  sent  to 
take  the  Powhatan  out  of  the  hands  of  her  commander  found 
that  their  orders  conflicted  with  those  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  they  telegraphed  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  by  whom 


252  HISTOET   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES    NAVY. 

their  order  had  been  procured  from  the  President.  Mr.  Seward 
called  upon  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  at  Willard's,  at  about 
eleven  o'clock  p.  M.  on  the  day  that  the  Powhatan  sailed  from 
NQW  York,  and  said  there  was  some  trouble  in  New  York  about 
the  Powhatan.  Mr.  Welles,  upon  learning  the  facts,  informed  the 
Secretary  of  State  that  the  Powhatan  had  been  ordered  by  the 
ISTavy  Department,  and  by  direction  of  the  President,  to  the  re 
lief  of  Fort  Sumter.  It  was  proposed  that  they  should  call  on 
the  President  in  order  that  the  question  might  be  settled.  Mr. 
Lincoln  had  forgotten  that  the  Powhatan  had  been  ordered  to 
go  on  the  Fort  Sumter  expedition ;  and,  although  it  was  then 
midnight,  Secretary  "Welles  went  to  the  Navy  Department,  and 
procured  and  showed  him  the  original  order. 

The  President  then  declared  that  the  orders  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  must  not  be  interfered  with,  and  ordered  the  Pow 
hatan  to  be  restored  to  her  original  destination.  A  telegram 
was  sent  by  the  Secretary  of  State  to  New  York,  but  because  it 
was  too  late,  or  for  some  other  reason,  the  Powhatan  was  not 
stopped,  and  in  consequence  the  expedition  to  Fort  Sumter 
failed.  At  about  the  same  time  an  operator  in  a  telegraph 
office  brought  to  Secretary  Welles  a  telegram  which  had  been 
forwarded  to  Charleston,  and  which  he  deemed  of  too  much 
public  importance  to  remain  unknown.  It  informed  the  Con 
federates  that  an  attempt  was  being  made  to  relieve  Fort  Sum 
ter,  and  on  the  receipt  of  this  message  at  Charleston,  the  Con 
federates  opened  their  fire,  and  the  fort  was  soon  surrendered. 

The  details  of  the  expedition,  and  the  failure  in  consequence 
of  the  absence  of  the  Powhatan,  are  fully  set  forth  in  the  fol 
lowing  statement  of  Captain  Fox,  which  is  an  important  part 
of  the  history : 

MEMORANDUM   OF   FACTS    CONCERNING   THE   ATTEMPT   TO    SEND 
SUPPLIES   TO   FOKT   SUMTEE   IN   1861. 

January  5,  1861,  whilst  in  New  York,  I  heard  that  a  steamer,  be 
longing  to  M.  O.  Roberts,  was  about  to  leave,  to  earn7  supplies  to  the 
garrison  of  Fort  Sumter.  When  an  officer  in  the  Navy,  I  had  com 
manded  one  of  the  United  States  mail  steamers  belonging  to  the  line  of 
which  Mr.  -Roberts  was  president,  and  therefore  I  believed  it  possible 
for  me  to  obtain  command  of  the  vessel  designated  to  take  supplies  and 


THE   BELIEF   OF   FOET   SUMTEE.  253 

troops  to  that  fort.  Upon  visiting  the  office  of  the  company,  in  West 
Street,  I  found  that  Captain  McGowan  had  been  appointed  to  the  com 
mand,  and  that  this  steamer,  named  the  Star  of  the  West,  had  returned 
from  her  voyage,  having  been  turned  back  by  the  rebel  batteries  of  Morris 
Island.  On  the  9th  of  January,  I  called  upon  my  friend  George  W.  Blunt, 
Esq.,  of  New  York,  and  expressed  to  him  my  views  as  to  the  possibility 
of  relieving  the  garrison,  and  the  dishonor  which  would  be  justly  merited 
by  the  Government,  unless  immediate  measures  were  taken  to  fulfil  this 
sacred  duty. 

Mr.  Blunt  asked  me  to  explain  my  plan  to  him,  which  I  did,  as  fol 
lows  : 

From  the  outer  edge  of  the  Charleston  bar,  in  a  straight  line  to 
Sumter,  through  the  Swash  Channel,  the  distance  is  four  miles,  with  no 
shoal  spots  having  less  than  nine  feet  at  high  water.  The  batteries  on 
Morris  and  Sullivan's  Islands  are  about  two  thousand  six  hundred  yards 
apart,  and  between  these  troops  and  supplies  must  pass.  I  proposed  to 
anchor  three  small  men-of-war  off  the  entrance  to  the  Swash  Channel, 
as  a  safe  base  of  operations  against  any  naval  attack  from  the  enemy. 

The  soldiers  and  provisions  to  be  carried  to  the  Charleston  bar  in 
the  Collins  steamer  Baltic ;  all  the  provisions  and  munitions  to  be  put 
up  in  portable  packages,  easily  handled  by  one  man.  The  Baltic  to 
carry  three  hundred  extra  sailors,  and  a  sufficient  number  of  armed 
launches,  to  land  all  the  troops  at  Fort  Sumter  in  one  night. 

Three  steam-tugs,  of  not  more  than  six  feet  draught  of  water,  such  as 
are  employed  for  towing  purposes,  were  to  form  part  of  the  expedition, 
to  be  used  for  carrying  in  the  troops  and  provisions,  in  case  the  weather 
should  be  too  rough  for  boats. 

With  the  exception  of  the  men-of-war  and  tugs,  the  whole  expedi 
tion  was  to  be  complete  on  board  the  steamer  Baltic,  and  its  success  de 
pended  upon  the  possibility  of  running  past  batteries  at  night,  which 
were  distant  from  the  centre  of  the  channel  one  thousand  three  hundred 
yards.  I  depended  upon  the  barbette  guns  of  Sumter  to  keep  the 
channel  between  Morris  and  Sullivan's  Islands  clear  of  rebel  vessels  at 
the  time  of  entering. 

Mr.  Blunt  and  myself  discussed  the  plan  over  a  chart,  and  he  com 
municated  it  to  Charles  H.  Marshall  and  Russell  Sturges,  and  they  all 
approved  it,  and  Mr.  Marshall  agreed  to  furnish  and  provision  the  ves 
sels  without  exciting  suspicion. 

February  4th,  Mr.  Blunt  came  to  my  hotel  with  a  telegram  from 
Lieutenant-General  Scott,  requesting  my  attendance  at  Washington.  I 
left  the  next  day,  and  breakfasted  with  the  General  on  the  J3th  instant 


254:  HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

At  1 1  A.  M.  I  met  at  his  office,  by  arrangement,  Lieutenant  Hall,  who 
had  been  sent  from  Surnter  by  Major  Anderson.  In  the  General's  pres 
ence  we  discussed  the  question  of  relieving  Fort  Surnter.  Lieutenant 
Hall's  plan  was  to  go  in  with  a  steamer,  protected  by  a  vessel  on  each 
side  loaded  with  hay.  I  objected  to  it  for  the  following  reasons :  first, 
a  steamer  could  not  carry  vessels  lashed  alongside  in  rough  water ;  and 
second,  in  running  up  the  channel,  she  would  be  bows  on  to  Fort  Moul- 
trie,  and,  presenting  a  large  fixed  mark  without  protection  ahead,  would 
certainly  be  disabled. 

Lieutenant-General  Scott  approved  my  plan,  and,  on  the  7th  of  Feb 
ruary,  introduced  me  to  Mr.  Holt,  the  Secretary  of  War,  to  whom  I 
explained  the  project,  and  offered  my  services  to  conduct  the  party  to 
the  fort.  Mr.  Holt  agreed  to  present  the  matter  to  President  Buchanan 
that  evening. 

The  next  day,  the  8th  of  February,  news  was  received  of  the  election 
of  Jefferson  Davis  by  the  Montgomery  Convention.  I  called  upon  Gen 
eral  Scott,  and  he  intimated  to  me  that  probably  no  effort  would  be 
made  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter.  He  seemed  much  disappointed  and  as 
tonished  ;  I  therefore  returned  to  New  York  on  the  9th  of  February. 

On  the  12th  of  March  I  received  a  telegram  from  Postmaster-Gen 
eral  Blair  to  come  to  Washington,  and  I  arrived  there  on  the  13th. 
Mr.  Blair  having  been  acquainted  with  the  proposition  I  presented  to 
General  Scott  under  Mr.  Buchanan's  administration,  sent  for  me  to  ten 
der  the  same  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  informing  me  that  Lieuten ant-General 
Scott  had  advised  the  President  that  the  fort  could  not  be  relieved,  and 
must  be  given  up.  Mr.  Blair  took  me  at  once  to  the  White  House, 
and  I  explained  the  plan  to  the  President;  thence  we  adjourned  to 
Lieutenant-General  Scott's  office,  where  a  renewed  discussion  of  the  sub 
ject  took  place. 

The  General  informed  the  President  that  my  plan  was  practicable  in 
February,  but  that  the  increased  number  of  batteries  erected  at  the 
mouth  of  the  harbor  since  that  time,  rendered  it  impossible  in  March. 

Finding  there  was  great  opposition  to  any  attempt  at  relieving  Fort 
Sumter,  and  that  Mr.  Blair  alone  sustained  the  President  in  his  policy 
of  refusing  to  yield,  I  judged  that  my  arguments  in  favor  of  the  practi 
cability  of  sending  in  supplies  would  be  strengthened  by  a  visit  to 
Charleston  and  the  fort. 

The  President  readily  agreed  to  my  visit,  if  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  General  Scott  raised  no  objections.  Both  of  these  gentlemen  con 
senting,  I  left  Washington  on  the  19th  of  March,  and  passing  through 
Richmond  and  Wilmington,  reached  Charleston  the  21st.  I  travelled 


THE   BELIEF   OF   FOKT    SUMTEE.  255 

the  latter  part  of  the  way  with  Mr.  Holmes,  of  California,  formerly  a 
member  of  Congress  from  South  Carolina,  in  the  days  of  Calhoun.  At 
Florence  Station  we  met  Mr.  Keitt,  a  member  of  Congress  from  South 
Carolina  when  that  State  attempted  to  secede.  He  welcomed  Mr. 
Holmes  very  warmly,  and  inquired,  with  great  anxiety,  whether  Sumter 
was  to  be  given  up.  Mr.  Holmes  said,  "  Yes,  I  know  it ; "  which  seemed 
to  give  Mr.  Keitt  much  satisfaction,  but  he  insisted  upon  knowing  his 
authority.  Mr.  Holmes  said,  "  I  have  the  highest  authority  for  what  I 
say ; "  and  upon  Mr.  Keitt  again  asking  who,  he  leaned  toward  him,  and 
at  that  moment  the  engine-whistle  gave  a  screech  for  starting,  so  that 
the  conversation  closed,  and  I  lost  the  name. 

At  a  station  near  Charleston,  Mr.  Huger,  formerly  postmaster  under 
President  Buchanan,  got  into  the  cars,  and  had  an  interview  with  Mr. 
Holmes,  during  which  the  same  assurances  were  repeated,  relative  to 
the  certainty  of  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Surater.  Mr.  Huger  seemed 
much  depressed  with  the  condition  of  affairs.  At  Charleston,  I  sought 
an  interview  with  Captain  Hartstein,  formerly  of  the  United  States 
Navy,  and  to  him  I  stated  my  desire  to  visit  Major  Anderson  ;  not  find 
ing  General  Beauregard,  he  introduced  me  to  Governor  Pickens,  to 
whom  I  showed  the  order  under  which  I  acted.  After  considerable 
delay,  he  directed  Captain  Hartstein  to  take  me  to  Fort  Sumter ;  and 
whilst  the  boat  was  preparing,  I  had  an  interview  with  General  Beaure 
gard.  We  reached  Fort  Sumter  after  dark,  and  remained  about  two 
hours. 

Major  Anderson  seemed  to  think  it  was  too  late  to  relieve  the  fort 
by  any  other  means  than  by  landing  an  army  on  Morris  Island.  He 
agreed  with  General  Scott  that  an  entrance  from  the  sea  was  impossible ; 
but  as  we  looked  out  upon  the  water  from  the  parapet,  it  seemed  very 
feasible,  more  especially  as  we  heard  the  oars  of  a  boat  near  the  fort, 
which  the  sentry  hailed,  but  we  could  not  see  her  through  the  darkness 
until  she  almost  touched  the  landing. 

I  found  the  garrison  getting  short  of  supplies,  and  it  was  agreed  that 
I  might  report  that  the  15th  of  April,  at  noon,  would  be  the  period  be 
yond  which  he  could  not  hold  the  fort  unless  supplies  were  furnished. 

I  made  no  arrangements  with  Major  Anderson  for  reenforcing  or 
supplying  the  fort,  nor  did  I  inform  him  of  my  plan. 

Upon  my  return,  I  had  the  honor  to  be  called  frequently  before  the 
President,  and,  in  the  presence  of  different  members  of  his  Cabinet,  to 
answer  the  objections  presented  by  Lieutenant-General  Scott  and  the 
military  authorities ;  but  as  my  project  simply  involved  passing  batteries, 
with  steamers  or  boats,  at  night,  at  right-angles  to  their  line  of  fire,  and 


256  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

one  thousand  three  hundred  yards  distant,  a  feat  of  which  the  Crimean 
War  furnished  many  safe  examples,  I  maintained  the  proposition,  and 
suggested  that  it  was  a  naval  plan,  and  should  be  decided  by  naval 
officers. 

The  President  asked  me  if  there  was  any  naval  officer  of  high  au 
thority  in  Washington  who  would  sustain  me,  and  if  so  to  bring  him  to 
the  White  House.  I  knew  that  Commodore  Stringham  was  at  that 
time  filling  the  position  of  detailing  officer  in  the  Navy  Department, 
and  I  took  him  to  the  President,  where,  in  the  presence  of  Lieutenant- 
General  Scott,  he  not  only  confirmed  my  views,  but  said  that  he  had 
that  morning  held  a  conversation  with  Commodore  Stewart,  who  de 
clared  that  Fort  Sumter  could  easily  be  reenforced  and  provisioned  with 
boats  at  night. 

As  valuable  time  was  being  lost  by  discussions,  which  form  no  part 
of  this  narrative,  I  represented  that  so  important  an  expedition  required 
time  for  its  preparation,  and  that  I  ought  to  be  allowed  to  take  the  pre 
paratory  steps,  if  there  was  any  possibility  of  sending  it  out. 

On  the  13th  of  March,  the  President  sent  me  to  New  York  with 
verbal  instructions  to  prepare  for  the  voyage,  but  to  make  no  binding- 
engagements. 

After  consultation  with  George  W.  Blunt,  Esq.,  who  throughout  had 
been  of  great  assistance  to  me  with  his  advice  and  active  cooperation,  I 
met,  by  previous  arrangement,  Messrs.  William  H.  Aspinwall  and  Charles 
H.  Marshall,  for  the  purpose  of  making  with  them  preliminary  arrange 
ments  for  the  voyage. 

Mr.  Marshall  declined  to  aid  me,  upon  the  ground  that  the  attempt 
to  relieve  Fort  Sumter  would  kill  the  proposed  loan  and  bring  on  civil 
war,  and  that  the  people  had  made  up  their  minds  to  abandon  Sumter, 
and  make  the  stand  upon  Fort  Pickens. 

On  the  2d  of  April  I  had  not  received  the  written  authority 
which  I  expected  from  the  Government,  therefore  I  returned  to  Wash 
ington. 

Delays,  which  belong  to  the  secret  history  of  this  period,  prevented 
a  decision  until  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  of  April,  when  the  President 
sent  for  me,  and  said  that  he  had  decided  to  let  the  expedition  go,  and 
that  a  messenger  from  himself  would  be  sent  to  the  authorities  of 
Charleston,  before  I  could  possibly  get  there,  to  notify  them  that  no 
troops  would  be  thrown  into  Sumter  if  provisions  were  allowed  peace 
fully  to  be  sent  to  the  garrison.  I  mentioned  to  the  President  that,  by 
the  time  I  should  arrive  at  New  York,  I  would  have  but  nine  days  in 
which  to  charter  and  provision  the  vessels,  and  reach  the  destined 


THE  BELIEF  OF  FOET  SUMTEE.  257 

point,  six  hundred  and  thirty-two  miles  distant.  He  answered,  I 
should  best  fulfil  uiy  duty  to  my  country  to  make  the  attempt.  The 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  had  in  commission,  in  the  Atlantic  waters  of  the 
United  States,  only  the  Powhatan,  the  Pocahontas,  and  the  Pawnee  ;  all 
these  he  placed  at  my  disposal,  as  well  as  the  revenue  steamer  Harriet 
Lane,  and  directed  me  to  give  all  the  necessary  orders.  The  Powhatan, 
which  had  recently  returned  and  gone  out  of  commission,  was  added  to 
the  force  I  designated,  to  enable  me  to  have  her  fine  boats  and  crew  for 
landing  the  supplies. 

I  suggested  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  place  Commodore 
Stringham  in  command  of  the  naval  force ;  but  upon  consulting  with  that 
distinguished  officer,  he  considered  it  to  be  too  late  to  be  successful,  and 
likely  to  ruin  the  reputation  of  the  officer  who  undertook  it  then. 

I  arrived  at  New  York  on  the  5th  of  April,  engaged  the  steamer 
Baltic  of  Mr.  Aspinwall,  who  used  every  possible  exertion  to  get  her 
ready  for  sea,  and  delivered  confidential  orders,  embracing  all  my  wants, 
to  Colonel  H.  L.  Scott,  aide  to  the  General-in-chief,  and  Colonel  D.  D. 
Tompkins,  quartermaster. 

Colonel  Scott  ridiculed  the  idea  of  Government  relieving  Fort  Sum- 
ter,  and,  by  his  indifference  and  delay,  half  a  day  of  precious  time  was 
lost.  The  recruits  that  he  finally  furnished  to  me  were  totally  unfit  to 
be  thrown  into  a  fort  likely  to  be  attacked  by  the  rebels. 

I  placed  the  hiring  of  three  tugs  in  the  hands  of  Russell  Sturges, 
who  labored  very  energetically,  but  he  found  great  difficulty  in  obtain 
ing  from  the  owners,  tugs  to  go  to  sea.  Finally,  three  were  promised  at 
exorbitant  rates — namely,  the  Yankee,  which  I  fitted  to  throw  hot 
water,  the  Uncle  Ben,  and  the  Freeborn.  The  question  of  supplies  in 
troduced  me  to  Major  Eaton,  of  the  Commissary  Department,  who 
thanked  God  that  an  attempt  was  to  be  made  to  relieve  Major  Ander 
son's  command,  and,  from  the  energetic  and  enthusiastic  cooperation 
of  this  officer,  the  expedition  was  immediately  provisioned  for  all  con 
tingencies. 

The  frigate  Powhatan,  Captain  Mercer,  sailed  on  the  6th  of  April, 
1861 ;  the  Pawnee,  Commander  Rowan,  on  the  9th;  the  Pocahontas, 
Captain  Gillis,  on  the  10th ;  the  Harriet  Lane,  Captain  Faunce,  on  the 
8th ;  the  tug  Uncle  Ben  on  the  7th  ;  the  tug  Yankee  on  the  8th ;  and 
the  Baltic,  Captain  Fletcher,  dropped  down  to  Sandy  Hook  on  the 
evening  of  the  8th,  and  went  to  sea  at  8  A.  M.  of  the  9th. 

The  officers  of  the  army  who  accompanied  the  military  force  were, 
First-Lieutenant  Edward  McK.  Hudson,  First-Lieutenant  Robert  0.  Ty 
ler,  and  First-Lieutenant  C.  "W.  Thomas. 

17 


258  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Soon  after  leaving  Sandy  Hook,  a  heavy  gale  of  wind  set  in,  which 
continued  during  the  whole  passage.  At  3  A.  M.  of  the  12th,  we 
reached  the  rendezvous  off  Charleston,  and  communicated  with  the  Har 
riet  Lane,  the  only  vessel  which  had  arrived.  At  6  A.  M.  the  Pawnee 
was  seen  standing  in.  I  boarded  her,  and  informed  her  commander  of 
my  orders  to  offer  to  send  in  provisions,  and  asked  him  to  stand  in  to 
the  bar  with  me.  He  replied  that  his  orders  required  him  to  remain 
ten  miles  east  of  the  light,  and  await  the  Powhatan,  and  that  he  was  not 
going  in  there  to  inaugurate  civil  war.  I  then  stood  in  toward  the  bar, 
followed  by  the  Harriet  Lane,  Captain  Faunce,  who  cheerfully  accompa 
nied  me. 

As  we  neared  the  land,  heavy  guns  were  heard,  and  the  smoke  and 
shells  from  the  batteries,  which  had  just  opened  fire  upon  Sumter,  were 
distinctly  visible. 

I  immediately  stood  out  to  inform  Captain  Eowan,  of  the  Pawnee, 
but  met  him  coming  in.  He  hailed  me,  and  asked  for  a  pilot,  declaring 
his  intention  of  standing  into  the  harbor,  and  sharing  the  fate  of  his 
brethren  of  the  army.  I  went  on  board,  and  informed  him  that  I  would 
answer  for  it ;  that  the  Government  did  not  expect  any  such  gallant  sac 
rifice,  having  settled  maturely  upon  the  policy  indicated  in  the  instruc 
tions  to  Captain  Mercer  and  myself.  No  other  naval  vessels  arrived 
during  this  day ;  but  the  steamer  Nashville,  from  New  York,  and  a 
number  of  merchant  vessels,  reached  the  bar,  and  awaited  the  result  of 
the  bombardment,  giving  indications  to  those  inside  of  a  large  naval 
fleet  off  the  harbor.  The  weather  continued  very  bad,  with  a  heavy  sea; 
neither  the  Pawnee  nor  Harriet  Lane  had  boats  or  men  to  carry  in  sup 
plies.  Feeling  sure  that  the  Powhatan  would  arrive  during  the  night,  as 
she  had  sailed  from  New  York  two  days  before  us,  I  stood  out  to  the 
appointed  rendezvous,  and  made  signals  all  night.  *  The  morning  of  the 
13 tli  was  thick  and  foggy,  with  a  very  heavy  ground-swell.  The  Baltic, 
feeling  her  way  in,  ran  ashore  on  Rattlesnake  Shoal,  but  soon  got  off 
without  damage.  On  account  of  the  very  heavy  swell,  she  was  obliged 
to  anchor  in  deep  water,  several  miles  outside  of  the  Pawnee  and  Harriet 
Lane. 

Lieutenant  Robert  0.  Tyler,  an  officer  of  very  great  zeal  and  fidelity, 
though  suffering  from  sea-sickness,  as  were  most  of  the  recruits,  organ 
ized  a  boat's  crew,  and  exercised  them,  notwithstanding  the  heavy  sea, 
for  the  purpose  of  having  at  least  one  boat,  in  the  absence  of  the  Pow- 
hatan's,  to  reach  Fort  Sumter.  At  8  A.  M.  I  took  this  boat,  and  in 
company  with  Lieutenant  Hudson  pulled  in  to  the  Pawnee.  As  we 
approached  that  vessel,  a  great  volume  of  black  smoke  issued  from  Fort 


THE   RELIEF   OF   FOKT   SUMTEK.  259 

Sumter,  through  which  the  flash  of  Major  Anderson's  guns  still  re 
plied  to  the  rebel  fire.  The  quarters  of  the  fort  were  on  fire,  and  most 
of  our  military  and  naval  officers  believed  the  smoke  to  proceed  from  an 
attempt  to  smote  out  the  garrison  with  fire-rafts. 

As  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  officers  that  no  boats  with  any  load  in 
them  could  have  reached  Sumter  in  this  heavy  sea,  and  no  tug-boats 
had  arrived,  it  was  proposed  to  capture  a  schooner  near  us,  loaded  with 
ice,  which  was  done,  and  preparations  were  at  once  commenced  to  fit  her 
out,  and  load  her  for  entering  the  harbor  the  following  night.  I  now 
learned,  for  the  first  time,  that  Captain  Rowan  had  received  a  note  from 
Captain  Mercer,  of  the  Powhatan,  dated  at  New  York,  the  6th,  the  day 
he  sailed,  stating  that  the  Powhatan  was  detached,  by  order  of  superior 
authority,  from  the  duty  to  which  she  was  assigned  off  Charleston,  and 
had  sailed  for  another  destination.  I  left  New  York  two  days  afterward, 
without  any  intimation  of  this  change. 

At  2  p.  M.  the  Pocahontas  arrived,  and  at  half-past  two  the  flag  of 
Sumter  was  shot  away,  and  not  again  raised.  A  flag  of  truce  was  sent 
in  by  Captain  Gillis,  and  arrangements  made  to  place  Major  Anderson 
and  his  command  on  board  the  Baltic  to  return  North. 

The  fort  was  evacuated  Sunday,  the  14th  of  April.  Monday,  the 
15th,  the  steamer  Isabel  took  the  garrison  outside  to  the  steamer  Baltic, 
which  left  that  evening  direct  for  New  York,  where  she  arrived  the  fore 
noon  of  the  18th  instant. 

My  plan  for  supplying  Fort  Sumter  required  three  hundred  sailors,  a 
full  supply  of  armed  launches,  and  three  tugs. 

The  Powhatan  carried  the  sailors  and  launches,  and  when  this  vessel 
was  about  to  leave,  in  obedience  to  the  orders  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  two  officers,  Lieutenant  D.  D.  Porter,  United  States  Navy,  and 
Captain  M.  C.  Meigs,  TJnited  States  Engineers,  presented  themselves  on 
board  with  an  order  from  the  President  of  the  United  States,  authorizing 
the  former  to  take  any  vessel  whatever  in  commission,  and  proceed  imme 
diately  to  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  This  order  did  not  pass  through  the 
Navy  Department,  and  was  unknown  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and, 
when  signed  by  the  President,  he  was  not  conscious  that  his  signature 
would  deprive  me  of  the  means  to  accomplish  -an  object  which  he  held 
to  be  of  vital  importance. 

In  a  letter  from  him,  which  is  annexed,  he  hastened  to  affirm  that 
"the  attempt"  to  provision  Fort  Sumter  had  advanced  the  cause  of  the 
country. 

The  tug  Freeborn  was  not  permitted  to  leave  New  York.  The  tug 
Uncle  Ben  was  driven  into  Wilmington  by  the  violence  of  the  gale,  and 


260  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

subsequently  captured  by  the  rebels.  The  tug  Yankee  reached  Charles 
ton  bar  a  few  hours  after  the  Baltic  had  left  with  Major  Anderson's  com 
mand  on  board. 

The  communications  between  New  York  and  Washington  having 
been  severed,  I  applied  to  Mr.  Aspinwall  to  obtain  for  me  a  small 
steamer  with  arms  and  ammunition  to  enable  me  to  reach  the  Chesa 
peake  Bay,  where  I  judged  that  armed  steamers  were  very  essential. 
This  gentleman  applied  to  Mr.  William  B.  Astor,  who  very  generously 
gave  him  a  check  for  five  thousand  dollars.  With  this  he  procured  the 
tug  Yankee,  and  persuaded  Commodore  Breese,  commandant  of  the 
New  York  Navy- Yard,  to  arm  and  fit  her  out ;  and  having  received  from 
that  officer  an  appointment  as  acting  lieutenant  in  the  Navy,  I  left  on 
the  26th  for  Hampton  Roads,  where  I  reported  to  Commodore  Pender- 
grast,  of  the  Cumberland. 

The  services  of  the  Yankee  not  being  required  at  this  point,  I  pro 
ceeded  to  Annapolis,  and  offered  my  vessel  to  General  Butler,  who  was 
about  opening  communications  with  Washington.  The  General  grate 
fully  received  the  steamer,  and  sent  me  through  to  the  capital  to  report 
to  the  President,  and  immediately  afterward  I  received  an  appointment 
in  the  Navy  Department. 

Annexed  are  copies  of  orders  and  letters  relating  to  the  narrative 
which  I  have  submitted.  Very  respectfully  yours, 

G.  V.  Fox,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

February  8, 1861. 
Lieutenant-  General  "WINFIELD  SCOTT,  United  States  Army : 

SIR, — The  proposition  which  I  had  the  honor  to  submit  to  you  fully, 
in  person,  is  herewith  presented  in  writing.  Lieutenant  Hall  and  myself 
have  had  several  free  conferences,  and  if  he  is  permitted  by  the  South 
Carolina  authorities  to  reenter  Fort  Sumter,  Major  Anderson  will 
comprehend  the  plan  for  his  relief.  I  consider  myself  very  fortunate  in 
having  proposed  a  project  which  meets  the  approval  of  the  General-in- 
chief,  and  I  ask  no  reward  but  the  entire  conduct  of  the  plan,  exclusive 
of  the  armed  vessels.  The  commander  of  these  should  be  ordered  to 
cooperate  with  me  by  affording  protection  and  destroying  their  naval 
preparations  near  the  bar,  leaving  to  me,  as  the  author  of  the  plan,  the 
actual  operations  of  relief. 

I  suggest  that  the  Pawnee  be  immediately  sent  to  the  Delaware 
breakwater  to  await  orders,  the  Harriet  Lane  to  be  ready  for  sea,  and 
some  arrangement  entered  into  by  which  the  requisite  steamer  and  tugs 
should  be  engaged,  at  least  so  far  as  not  to  excite  suspicion.  I  should 
prefer  one  of  the  Collins  steamers.  They  are  now  being  prepared  for 


THE   EELIEF    OF   FOKT   SUMTEE.  261 

sea,  and  are  of  such  a  size  and  power  as  to  be  able  fearlessly  to  run 
down  any  vessels  which  might  attempt  to  capture  us  outside  by  coup  de 
main.  I  could  quietly  engage  one,  and  have  her  ready  to  start  on 
twenty-four  hours'  notice,  without  exciting  suspicion.  I  shall  leave  for 
New  York  at  3  p.  M.,  and  any  communications  previous  will  find  me  at 
Judge  Blair's.  Tf  the  Pawnee's  pivot-gun  is  landed,  it  should  certainly 
be  remounted.  Very  respectfully,  etc.,  G.  V.  Fox. 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  WASHINGTON,  March  19, 18G1. 
DEAR  SIR  :  In  accordance  with  the  request  contained  in  a  note  from 
the  Secretary  of  War  to  me,  of  which  I  annex  a  copy,  I  request  that 
you  will  have  the  goodness  to  proceed  to  Charleston,  S.  C.,  and  obtain 
permission,  "  if  necessary,"  to  \isit  Fort  Sumter,  in  order  to  enable  you 
to  comply  with  the  wish  expressed  in  the  Secretary's  note.  Please,  on 
your  return,  to  report  accordingly.  I  remain  yours,  etc., 

G.  Y.  Fox,  Esq.  WINFIELD  SCOTT. 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  WASHINGTON,  April  1, 1861. 

Lieutenant  D.  D.  Porter  will  take  command  of  the  steamer  Pow- 
hatan,  or  any  other  United  States  steamer  ready  for  sea  which  he  may 
deem  most  fit  for  the  service  to  which  he  has  been  assigned  by  confiden 
tial  instructions  of  this  date. 

All  officers  are  commanded  to  afford  him  all  such  facilities  as  he 
may  deem  necessary  for  getting  to  sea  as  soon  as  possible. 

He  will  select  the  officers  to  accompany  him. 

Recommended :  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD. 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  April  1, 1SG1. 

Lieutenant  D.  D.  PORTER,  United  States  Navy  : 

SIR, — You  will  proceed  to  New  York,  and,  with  the  least  possible 
delay,  assuming  command  of  any  naval  steamer  available,  proceed  to 
Pensacola  harbor,  and  at  any  cost  or  risk  prevent  any  expedition  from 
the  mainland  reaching  Fort  Pickens  or  Santa  Rosa  Island. 

You  will  exhibit  this  order  to  any  naval  officer  at  Pensacola,  if  you 
deem  it  necessary,  after  you  have  established  yourself  within  the  harbor, 
and  will  request  cooperation  by  the  entrance  of  at  least  one  other 
steamer. 

This  order,  its  object,  and  your  destination  will  be  communicated  to 
no  person  whatever  until  you  reach  the  harbor  of  Peusacola, 
Recommended :  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

WILLIAM  H.  SEWARD. 


262  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

WASHINGTON,  EXECUTIVE  MANSION,  April  1, 1861. 

All  officers  of  the  Army  and  Navy  to  whom  this  order  may  be  ex 
hibited  will  aid  by  every  means  in  their  power  the  expedition  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Harvey  Brown,  supplying  him  with  men  and  ma 
terial,  and  cooperating  with  him  as  he  may  desire. 
A  true  copy :  ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 

M.  C.  MEIGS,  Captain  of  Engineers, 

Chief  Engineer  of  said  Expedition. 

[CONFIDENTIAL.] 

WASHINGTON  CITY,  April  2, 1861. 

SIR:  Circumstances  render  it  necessary  to  place  in  command  of 
your  ship  (and  for  a  special  purpose)  an  officer  who  is  fully  informed 
and  instructed  in  relation  to  the  wishes  of  the  Government,  and  you 
will  therefore  consider  yourself  detached.  But  in  taking  this  step,  the 
Government  does  not  in  the  least  reflect  upon  your  efficiency  or  patriot 
ism  ;  on  the  contrary,  have  the  fullest  confidence  in  your  ability  to  per 
form  any  duty  required  of  you.  Hoping  soon  to  be  able  to  give  you  a 
better  command  than  the  one  you  now  enjoy,  and  trusting  that  you  will 
have  full  confidence  in  the  disposition  of  the  Government  toward  you, 

I  remain,  etc.,         ABRAHAM  LINCOLN. 
Captain  S.  MERCER,  United  States  Navy. 
A  true  copy : 

M.  C.  MEIGS,  Captain  of  Engineers, 

Chief  Engineer  of  Expedition  of  Colonel  Brown. 

WAE  DEPARTMENT,  ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S  OFFICE,    ) 
Wednesday,  April  4,  1861.  J 

SIR  :  By  direction  of  the  War  Department,  you  will  charter  such 
vessels  as  Captain  G.  V.  Fox,  the  bearer  of  this,  may  designate,  for  such 
times  and  with  such  supplies  as  he  may  indicate. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

L.  THOMAS,  Adjutant-General. 
Colonel  D.  D.  TOMPKINS, 

Assistant  Quartermaster- General,  New  York,  N.  Y. 

[CONFIDENTIAL.] 
HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY,  WASHINGTON.  April  4,  1861. 

SIR  :  This  letter  will  be  handed  to  you  by  Captain  G.  V.  Fox,  ex- 
officer  of  the  Navy,  and  a  gentleman  of  high  standing,  as  well  as  possessed 
of  extraordinary  nautical  ability.  He  is  charged  by  high  authority 
here  with  the  command  of  an  expedition  (undei  cover  of  certain  ships- 


THE   RELIEF   OF   FOET   SUMTEE.  263 

of-war)  whose  object  is  to  reenforce  Fort  Sumter.  To  embark  with 
Captain  Fox,  you  will  cause  a  detachment  of  recruits,  say  about  two 
hundred,  to  be  immediately  organized  at  Fort  Columbus,  with  a  compe 
tent  number  of  officers,  army  ammunition,  and  subsistence  ;  a  large  sur 
plus  of  the  latter,  indeed,  as  great  as  the  vessels  of  the  expedition  will 
take,  with  other  necessaries,  will  be  needed  for  the  augmented  garrison 
of  Fort  Sumter.  The  subsistence  and  other  supplies  should  be  assorted 
like  those  which  were  provided  by  you  and  Captain  Ward,  of  the  Navy, 
for  a  former  expedition.  Consult  Captain  Fox  and  Major  Eaton  on  the 
subject,  and  give  all  necessary  orders,  in  my  name,  to  fit  out  the  expe 
dition,  except  that  the  hiring  the  vessels  will  be  left  to  others. 

Some  fuel  must  be  shipped.  Oil,  artillery  implements,  fuses,  cor 
dage,  slow  match,  mechanical  levers,  and  guns,  etc.,  etc.,  should  also  be 
put  on  board.  Consult  also,  if  necessary  (confidentially),  Colonel 
Tompkins  and  Major  Thornton.  Respectfully  yours, 

WINFIELD  SCOTT. 
Lieutenant- Colonel  H.  L.  SCOTT,  Aide-de-Camp,  etc.,  etc. 


WAR  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  April  4,  1861. 

SIR  :  It  having  been  decided  to  succor  Fort  Sumter,  you  have  been 
selected  for  this  important  duty.  Accordingly,  you  will  take  charge  of 
the  transports  in  New  York  having  the  troops  and  supplies  on  board  to 
the  entrance  of  Charleston  harbor,  and  endeavor,  in  the  first  instance,  to 
deliver  the  subsistence.  If  you  are  opposed  in  this,  you  are  directed  to 
report  the  fact  to  the  senior  naval  officer  off  the  harbor,  who  will  be  in 
structed  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  use  his  entire  force  to  open  a 
passage,  when  you  will,  if  possible,  effect  an  entrance  and  place  both  the 
troops  and  supplies  in  Fort  Sumter. 

I  am  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

SIMON  CAMERON,  Secretary  of  War. 
Captain  G.  V.  Fox,  Washington,  D.  C. 

NAVT  DEPARTMENT,  April  5, 1361. 
Captain  SAMUEL  MEECER,  commanding  U.  8.  Steamer  Powhatan,  N".  Y. : 

The  United  States  steamers  Powhatan,  Pawnee,  Pocahontas,  and 
Harriet  Lane  will  compose  a  naval  force  under  your  command,  to  be 
sent  to  the  vicinity  of  Charleston,  S.  C.,  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  in 
carrying  out  the  objects  of  an  expedition  of  which  the  War  Department 
has  charge. 

The  primary  object  of  the  expedition  is  to  provision  Fort  Sumter, 
for  which  purpose  the  War  Department  will  furnish  the  necessary  trans- 


264:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

ports.  Should  the  authorities  of  Charleston  permit  the  fort  to  be  sup 
plied,  no  farther  particular  service  will  be  required  of  the  force  under 
your  command;  and  after  being  satisfied  that  supplies  have  been  re 
ceived  at  the  fort,  the  Powhatan,  Pocahontas,  and  Harriet  Lane  will 
return  to  New  York,  and  the  Pawnee  to  Washington. 

Should  the  authorities  at  Charleston,  however,  refuse  to  permit,  or 
attempt  to  prevent  the  vessel  or  vessels  having  supplies  on  board  from 
entering  the  harbor,  or  from  peaceably  proceeding  to  Fort  Sumter,  you 
will  protect  the  transports  or  boats  of  the  expedition  in  the  object  of 
their  mission,  disposing  of  your  force  in  such  manner  as  to  open  the  way 
for  their  ingress,  and  afford,  so  far  as  practicable,  security  to  the  men 
and  boats,  and  repelling  by  force,  if  necessary,  all  obstructions  toward 
provisioning  the  fort  and  reenforcing  it ;  for  in  case  of  a  resistance  to 
the  peaceable  primary  object  of  the  expedition,  a  reenforcement  of  the 
garrison  will  also  be  attempted.  These  purposes  will  be  under  the 
supervision  of  the  War  Department,  which  has  charge  of  the  expedition. 
The  expedition  has  been  intrusted  to  Captain  G.  V.  Fox,  with  whom  you 
will  put  yourself  in  communication,  and  cooperate  with  him  to  accom 
plish  and  carry  into  effect  its  object. 

You  will  leave  New  York  with  the  Powhatan  in  time  to  be  off 
Charleston  bar,  ten  miles  distant  from  and  due  east  of  the  light-house,  on 
the  morning  of  the  llth  instant,  there  to  await  the  arrival  of  the 
transport  or  transports  with  troops  and  stores.  The  Pawnee  and  Poca 
hontas  will  be  ordered  to  join  you  there  at  the  time  mentioned,  and  also 
the  Harriet  Lane,  which  latter  vessel  has  been  placed  under  the  control 
of  this  Department  for  this  service. 

On  the  termination  of  the  expedition,  whether  it  be  peaceable  or 
otherwise,  the  several  vessels  under  your  command  will  return  to  the 
respective  ports,  as  above  directed,  unless  some  unforeseen  circumstance 
should  prevent.  I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  April  5,  1S6L 
Commander  J.  P.  GILLIS,  commanding  U.  S.  Steamer  Pocahontas,  Norfolk,  Va. : 

SIR, — You  will  proceed  to  sea  with  the  Pocahontas,  and  on  the  morn 
ing  of  the  llth  instant  appear  off  Charleston  bar,  ten  miles  distant 
from  and  due  east  of  the  light-house,  where  you  will  report  to  Captain 
Samuel  Mercer,  of  the  Powhatan,  for  special  service.  Should  he  not  be 
there,  you  will  await  his  arrival. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


THE   BELIEF   OF   FORT   BrMTEE.  265 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  April  5,  1861. 

Commander  S.  C.  KOWAN,  commanding  U.  8.  Steamer  Pawnee,  Norfolk,  Va.  : 
SIR, — After  the  Pawnee  shall  have  been  provisioned  at  Norfolk,  you 
will  proceed  with  her  to  sea,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  llth  instant 
appear  off  Charleston  bar,  ten  miles  distant  from  and  due  east  of  the 
light-house,  where  you  will  report  to  Captain  Samuel  Mercer,  of  the  Pow- 
hatan,  for  special  service.  Should  he  not  be  there,  you  will  await  his 
arrival. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  April  5,  1S61. 
Captain  FAUXCE,  Commander  of  U.  S.  Revenue  Steamer  Harriet  Lane,  N.  T. : 

SIR, — The  revenue  steamer  Harriet  Lane  having  been  temporarily 
placed  under  the  orders  of  this  Department,  you  will  proceed  with  her 
from  New  York  in  time  to  appear  off  Charleston  bar,  ten  miles  distant 
from  and  due  east  of  the  light-house,  on  the  morning  of  the  llth 
instant,  where  you  will  report  to  Captain  Samuel  Mercer,  of  the  Pow- 
hatan,  for  special  service.  Should  he  not  be  there,  you  will  await  his 
arrival.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  April  5, 1861. 

Captain  JOHN  FAUNCE.  Commander  of  Steamer  Harriet  Lane : 

SIR, — The  Harriet  Lane,  under  your  command,  having  been  detached 
from  the  collection  district  of  New  York,  and  assigned  to  duty  under 
the  Navy  Department,  you  are  hereby  instructed  to  proceed  to  within 
ten  miles  due  east  from  and  off  Charleston  light-house,  where  you  will 
report  to  Captain  Mercer,  of  the  Powhatan,  for  duty,  on  the  morning  of 
the  llth  instant;  and  should  he  not  be  there,  you  will  wait  a  rea 
sonable  time  for  his  arrival. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  May  1, 1861. 

Captain  Gr.  Y.  Fox : 

MY  DEAR  SIR, — I  sincerely  regret  that  the  failure  of  the  late  attempt 
to  provision  Fort  Sumter  should  be  the  source  of  any  annoyance  to  you. 
The  practicability  of  your  plan  was  not,  in  fact,  brought  to  a  test. 

By  reason  of  a  gale  well  known  in  advance  to  be  possible,  and  not 
improbable,  the  tugs,  an  essential  part  of  the  plan,  never  reached  the 


266  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

ground ;  while,  by  an  accident,  for  which  you  were  in  no  wise  responsi 
ble,  and  possibly  /,  to  some  extent,  was,  you  were  deprived  of  a  war- 
vessel,  with  her  men,  which  you  deemed  of  great  importance  to  the  en 
terprise. 

I  most  cheerfully  and  truly  declare  that  the  failure  of  the  underta 
king  has  not  lowered  you  a  particle,  while  the  qualities  you  developed  in 
the  effort  have  greatly  heightened  you  in  my  estimation. 

For  a  daring  and  dangerous  enterprise  of  a  similar  character,  you 
would,  to-day,  be  the  man,  of  all  my  acquaintances,  whom  I  would 
select.  You  and  I  both  anticipated  that  the  cause  of  the  country  would 
be  advanced  by  making  the  attempt  to  provision  Fort  Sumter,  even  if 
it  should  fail;  and  it  is  no  small  consolation  now  to  feel  that  our  antici 
pation  is  justified  by  the  result. 

Very  truly  your  friend,  A.  LINCOLN. 


These  statements  and  facts  place  in  the  clearest  light  the  in 
justice  of  the  complaints  made  against  the  Government  during 
the  apparent  inaction  between  the  4th  of  March  and  April, 
1861.  Any  movement  would  have  been  rash  then,  before  a  de 
liberate  survey  of  all  the  perils  by  which  the  new  Administra 
tion  was  beset.  Particularly  do  these  facts  show  how  ill-con 
sidered  and  ungenerous  were  the  charges  of  inefficiency  brought 
by  some  against  the  Navy  Department  and  the  spirited  and 
skilful  officer  who  conducted  the  enterprise,  because  Sumter 
was  not  relieved.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy  acted  with  the 
utmost  promptitude.  The  letter  of  the  President  directing  the 
expedition  to  be  got  ready  was  dated  March  28th,  and  before 
the  first  of  April  every  vessel  needed  was  being  prepared,  and 
every  one  was  ready  in  season  to  reach  the  appointed  rendezvous 
on  the  llth  of  April,  four  days  before  the  time  up  to  which 
Major  Anderson  had  informed  the  Government  that  he  could 
hold  the  fort. 

Certainly  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  could  not  foresee  that 
the  most  important  ship  of  the  little  squadron,  the  one  without 
which  failure  was  inevitable,  would  be  detached  without  any 
consultation  with  him,  and  sent  contrary  to  his  orders  in  another 
direction ;  and  to  hold  Captain  Fox  responsible  for  the  failure 
after  the  vessel  upon  which  he  mainly  relied,  and  which  carried 
the  three  hundred  sailors  and  the  launches,  had  been  sent  to 


THE  BELIEF  OF  FORT  SDMTEE.  267 

Fort  Pickens  by  a  secret  order,  was  such  glaring  injustice  that 
President  Lincoln  would  not  suffer  it  to  pass :  but  with  the 
characteristic  manliness  of  his  nature,  in  a  letter  to  Captain 
Fox,  took  the  responsibility  upon  himself,  through  what  he  calls 
the  "  accident "  of  sending  away  the  Powhatan.  The  expedi 
tion  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Pickens,  for  which  the  Powhatan,  not 
only  without  orders  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  but  con 
trary  to  his  orders,  was  secretly  withdrawn  from  Captain  Fox, 
proved  to  be  a  useless  one,  for  the  Navy  Department  and  the 
Secretary  of  War  had  abundantly  provided  for  its  safety,  and  it 
was  in  fact  reenforced  before  the  Powhatan  arrived. 

Fort  Sumter  was  not  relieved,  not  because  the  President  did 
not  decide  to  do  it,  nor  because  there  was  any  remissness  in  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  or  any  defect  in  the  plan  of  Captain  Fox, 
but  because  both  orders  and  plan  were  secretly  interfered  with 
in  a  manner  that  could  neither  be  foreseen  nor  avoided.  Presi 
dent  Lincoln  was  doubtless  right  in  expressing  to  Captain  Fox 
the  following  sentiment  in  the  letter  already  quoted :  "  You 
and  I  both  anticipated  that  the  cause  of  the  country  would  be 
advanced  by  making  the  attempt  to  provision  Fort  Sumter, 
even  if  it  should  fail,  and  it  is  no  small  consolation  now  to  feel 
that  our  anticipation  is  justified  by  the  result."  In  a  very  im 
portant  sense  the  expedition  was  no  failure,  even  though  it  did 
not  reach  the  fort.  It  was  the  decision  to  do  it,  the  moral 
courage  and  patriotism  exhibited  in  the  bold  and  perilous  at 
tempt  which  reinspired  the  country.  The  spirit  of  the  North 
was  drooping,  it  had  reached  well  nigh  the  point  of  fatal  col 
lapse  ;  and  the  noble  determination  that  the  country's  honor 
should  not  be  stained  by  a  timid  surrender,  that  our  flag  should 
not  be  lowered  without  one  brave  blow  struck  in  its  defence, 
this  reinspired  the  fainting  heart  of  the  people  ;  it  imparted  to 
them  a  fresh  moral  power  that  rendered  them  capable  of  that 
magnificent  outburst  of  patriotism  and  holy  wrath  which  fol 
lowed  the  capture  of  the  fort.  It  was  one  among  the  many 
severe  trials  which  the  Secretary  endured  in  silence,  that  after 
every  needed  preparation  had  "been  promptly  made  to  execute 
this  most  important  order  of  the  President ;  when  a  trusted  and 
skilful  officer  had  volunteered  to  hazard  both  life  and  reputa 
tion,  dearer  than  life ;  when  the  Department  had  done  its  whole 


268  HISTOEY   OF   THE  UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

duty,  and  failure  was  due  alone  to  secret  interference  from  with 
out,  that  its  whole  action  should  be  made  the  subject  of  reproach 
and  sneers  by  those  who  might  easily  have  known  the  facts. 
But  time,  the  avenger  of  injured  reputation  as  well  as  other 
wrongs,  has  fully  vindicated  both  the  Secretary  and  the  officer 
who  commanded  the  expedition. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

AMERICAN    ORDNANCE. 

THE  facts  already  stated  present  but  one  part  of  that  com 
prehensive  plan  devised  and  executed  by  the  Navy  Department, 
by  which,  in  the  short  space  of  four  years,  and  under  the  pres 
sure  of  a  great  war,  the  United  States  was  raised  to  a  first-class 
naval  power,  and  a  force  created  which  more  effectually  than 
our  armies  shielded  us  from  foreign  intervention.  Our  soldiers 
were  a  perfect  protection  on  the  land — an  equally  powerful  one 
was  needed  on  the  sea. 

The  other  part  of  the  general  plan  was  to  increase  the  power 
of  our  guns.  The  fitting  out  of  ships  purchased,  the  construc 
tion  of  new  ones,  in  short,  every  step  in  the  creation  of  the 
Navy  had  more  or  less  reference  to  changes  already  made  or 
contemplated  in  the  character  of  our  naval  ordnance.  The  idea 
of  the  heavy,  smashing  shot,  instead  of  the  smaller,  swifter  one, 
has,  from  the  beginning  of  our  national  career,  been  a  control 
ling  one  in  the  American  mind. 

Although  referred  to  more  than  once  already,  it  is  necessary 
to  present  it  once  more  in  this  discussion  of  the  character  and 
efficiency  of  the  heavy  American  guns  which  were  first  used 
during  the  rebellion,  and  which  have  already  greatly  modified 
both  the  theories  and  the  practice  of  all  naval  powers.  It  is 
not  supposed  by  any  that  the  perfect  gun  has  as  yet  been 
reached.  The  whole  question  in  regard  to  ordnance  is  yet  in 
an  unsettled  state.  ISTo  scientific  professional  man  would  under 
take  to  say  what  may  be  done  or  what  cannot  be  done.  Results 
already  reached  are  in  such  startling  contradiction  to  most  pre 
vious  theories  and  expectations,  that  the  boldest  are  disposed  to 
wait  for  additional  facts  before  forming  a  decided  opinion. 


270  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

England  and  France  are  very  unwilling  to  admit  that  the 
American  experiments  have  shown  that  their  science,  skill,  and 
experience  are  all  at  fault.  They  are  naturally  enough  quite 
slow  to  believe  that  a  young  nation  which  through  all  its  life 
had  made  peace  and  not  war  a  study,  has,  in  a  sudden  emer 
gency,  discovered  a  principle  in  gunnery  which  proves  all  their 
wisdom  to  be  folly  in  comparison.  It  will  be  only  by  the  strong 
compulsion  of  facts  that  they  will  be  convinced  that  they  must 
abandon  the  present  armament  for  their  ships,  and  adopt  the 
*  plans  of  a  nation  which  they  have  held  as  so  far  inferior  to 
themselves  in  all  the  arts  of  war.  ]Sror  is  it  surprising  that 
there  are  many  here,  as  well  as  in  Europe,  who  are  not  yet  pre 
pared  to  think  that  American  thought  in  regard  to  guns  is  so 
far  in  advance  of  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  ordnance  problem 
then  is  by  no  means  considered  to  be  solved,  but  England  and 
France  were  probably  ready  to  admit,  at  the  close  of  our  war, 
that  it  would  be  wise  to  pause  and  reconsider  their  theories ; 
while  here  and  in  Russia,  to  say  the  least,  the  facts  are  believed 
to  be  very  decidedly,  if  not  conclusively,  in  favor  of  the  large 
gun  and  the  smashing  shot.  The  Navy  Department  has 
adopted  and  acted  upon  this  idea,  and  its  success  has  more  than 
justified  its  early  expectations ;  and  the  opposition  and  ridicule 
with  which  the  new  guns  were  met  at  first  has  been  silenced  by 
the  results.  The  introduction  of  larger  cannon  for  our  ships 
was  not  only  a  part  of  the  plan,  but  it  was  an  essential  part, 
and  especially  when  iron-clad  vessels  were  to  be  attacked.  A 
single  illustration,  which  will  be  brought  forward  hereafter, 
may  be  glanced  at  here.  In  the  action  between  the  Monitor 
and  Merrimack  the  two  vessels  fought  for  four  'hours  at  short 
range,  sometimes  at  a  distance  of  only  a  few  yards,  and  yet 
neither  was  sunk,  captured,  nor  essentially  injured.  Yet  they 
used  the  most  powerful  guns  then  known,  except  in  theory,  to 
England  or  America.  It  was  evident  then  that  different  can 
non  were  needed,  and  how  this  thought  was  worked  out  will  be 
explained  hereafter. 

In  order  that  the  reader  may  understand  the  progress  which 
has  been  made  in  American  gunnery,  and  the  direction  that 
the  American  mind  has  taken  in  this  department  of  war,  it  is 
necessary  to  dwell  more  at  length  upon  a  subject  already 


AMERICAN   OKDNANCE.  271 

touched  upon  in  a  previous  chapter,  the  batteries  of  French 
and  English  ships.  No  proper  comparison  can  be  made  be 
tween  the  guns  in  use  on  American  ships  at  the  close  of  the 
war  and  the  previous  armaments  of  war-vessels,  without  going 
back  as  far  at  least  as  Lord  Nelson's  time,  and  showing  the 
character  of  the  batteries  of  those  world-renowned  ships  with 
which  England  made  herself  the  mistress  of  the  seas ;  while  the 
progress  in  English  gunnery  must  also  be  noted,  from  a  time 
still  more  remote.  The  following  statements,  collected  from 
English  authorities,  will  show  the  main  changes  which  have 
been  made  in  naval  guns  for  more  than  two  hundred  years  : 

The  first  frigate  built  in  England,  according  to  Mr.  James, 
was  the  Constant  "Warwick,  constructed  in  1646.  She  was  a 
ship  of  about  400  tons'  burden  and  mounted  26  guns.  Eighteen 
of  these  were  short  9-pounders,  six  were  short  6-pounders,  and 
two  minions  on  the  roof  of  the  officers'  cabin.  Such  a  frigate 
would  not  be  considered  a  very  formidable  adversary  for  any 
thing  which  now  we  would  dignify  with  the  name  of  vessel-of- 
war. 

In  1740  two  new  classes  were  added  to  the  British  Navy, 
one  a  44-gun  ship  of  about  700  tons.  The  heaviest  guns  of 
this  class  were  18-pounders,  the  lighter  were  9-pounders  and 
6-pounders.  The  other  class  was  a  24-gun  ship,  of  about  450 
tons,  armed  mainly  with  9-pounders.  Up  to  1779  it  appears 
that  the  18-pounder  was  the  largest  gun  in  use  either  in  the 
English  or  French  Navies.  In  one  hundred  and  thirty-three 
years  from  the  building  of  the  Constant  Warwick,  England  had 
advanced  from  a  9-pounder  to  an  18-pounder  gun  for  the  arma 
ment  of  her  largest  vessels.  In  1779  the  gun  now  called  a 
carronade  was  cast  for  the  first  time  at  the  works  of  the  Carron 
Company,  on  the  banks  of  the  river  Carron,  in  Scotland — a  short, 
light  gun  with  a  large  calibre  in  proportion  to  other  cannon. 
One  of  those  first  cast  was  an  8-inch  gun,  and  the  shot  weighed 
about  68  pounds.  In  December,  1781,  it  was  recommended 
that  68-pounder  carronades  should  be  used  on  the  forecastle  of 
large  ships,  and  42-pounders  and  32-pounders  011  the  same  deck 
of  smaller  rates.  In  1793  we  find  the  following  statement  of 
the  batteries  of  a  French  and  an  English  frigate,  the  Semillonte 
and  the  Yenus,  that  fought  with  no  decisive  result : 


272  HISTOET   OF   THE   IGNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

VENUS.  SEMILLONTE. 

24  long  12-pounders  ,  26  long  12-pounders. 

8  long  6-pounders  10  long  6-pounders. 

6  carronades,  18-pounders  4  carronades,  36-pounders. 

38  40 

Lord  Howe's  squadron,  in  1794,  was  armed  with  32-pound- 
ers,  24-pounders,  18-pounders,  12-pounders,  and  9-pounders,  and 
in  the  wThole  fleet  were  only  two  68-pounder  carronades.  These 
statements  are  sufficient  to  show  the  character  of  the  guns  used 
in  the  French  and  English  Navies  down  to  the  time  of  Lord 
Nelson. 

The  carronade,  after  having  been  received  for  a  time  with 
great  favor,  gradually  fell  into  disuse  as  science  was  more  and 
more  applied  to  the  art  of  gunnery,  and  it  disappeared  from 
the  service  both  in  England,  France,  and  America  upon  the 
introduction  of  shell-guns.  Two  ideas  were  connected  with  the 
first  use  of  shell-guns — one,  the  firing  of  hollow  shot  of  larger 
calibre  than  a  solid  shot  of  the  same  weight,  on  the  supposition 
that  the  smashing  power  would  be  greater  ;  and  the  other  was, 
to  employ  a  shell  with  a  bursting  charge.  Through  a  long 
course  of  experiments,  both  in  England  and  America,  conclu 
sions  were  reached  unfavorable  to  the  use  of  hollow  shot,  and 
shell-guns  were  more  and  more  restricted  to  their  appropriate 
use,  with  shells  designed  to  explode.  The  changes  which  were 
made  in  the  guns  of  Europe  between  the  close  of  the  wars  with 
Bonaparte  and  1860,  will  appear  from  the  following  tables 
quoted  from  Sir  Howard  Douglas's  work  on  "  Naval  Gunnery." 
These,  of  course,  will  exhibit  the  armaments  of  European  navies 
in  general  at  the  commencement  of  the  rebellion,  and  in  this 
light  the  position  of  the  American  mind  upon  the  subject  of 
naval  guns  will  clearly  appear,  as  will  also  the  distinction  be 
tween  the  American  and  European  theories.  In  studying  these 
tables  the  reader  will  perceive  that  two  kinds  of  8-inch  guns 
are  mentioned,  one  weighing  65  cwt.,  and  9  feet  long,  and  the 
other  weighing  95  cwt.,  and  10  feet  long.  The  lighter  and 
shorter  gun  is  a  shell-gun,  and  the  larger  for  firing  solid  68- 
pound  shot ;  and  up  to  the  time  of  the  commencement  of  our 
rebellion,  to  say  the  least,  it  was  considered  by  the  English  to 
be  the  most  powerful  and  reliable  gun  in  the  world. 


AMERICAN   ORDNANCE.  273 

AEMAMENT  OF   THE  BRITISH  NAVY. 

SCEEW  STEAM  SHIPS. 
First  Rates — "  Victoria"  Class,  1,000  horse-power. 

Lower  Deck 32  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 

Middle  Deck 30  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 

Main  Deck 32  32-pounders,  58  or  56  cwt,  9  feet  6  inches. 

Upper  Deck  \    26  32-Pounders>  42  cwt>  8  feet- 

'  (      1  68-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 

121  guns.     Total  complement,  1,150  men. 

First  Rates — '•'•Duke  of  Wellington''''  Class,  700  horse-power. 

(    10  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 
'  |    26  32-pounders,  58  or  56  cwt,  9  feet  6  inches. 

Middle  Deck  \      6  8'inch  guns>  65  cwt'  9  feet 

(    30  32-pounders,  58  or  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 

Main  Deck 38  32-pounders,  42  cwt.,  8  feet. 

TJ         T)    k  (20  32-pounders,  25  cwt,  6  feet. 

' '  \      I  68-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt,  10  feet. 

131  guns.     Total  complement,  1,120  men 

First  Rates— "Royal  Albert"  Class,  500  horse-power. 

Lower  Deck 32  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt,  9  feet. 

Middle  Deck 32  32-pounders,  58  or  56  cwt,  9  feet  6  inches. 

Main  Deck 32  32-pounders,  42  cwt,  8  feet. 

Upper  Deck. .  \    24  32-Pounder8>  42  cwt'>  8  feet' 

"1      1  68-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 

121  guns.     Total  complement,  1,070  men. 

Second  Rates — "  Conqueror  "  Class,  800  horse-power. 

Lower  Deck 36  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt,  9  feet. 

Main  Deck 36  32-pounders,  58  or  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 

Upper  Deck  \    28  32-P°unders>  42  cwt>  8  feet- 

"  (      1  68-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 

101  gnns.     Total  complement,  950  men. 
Third  Rates — "  Colossus  "  Class,  200  horse-power. 

Lower  Deck  I    10  8'inch  gun8'  65  CWt'  9  feet 

' '  (    18  32-pounders,  58  or  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 

j      4  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 

* ]    24  32-pounders,  50  cwt.,  9  feet. 

Upper  Deck 24  32-pounders,  42  cwt,  8  feet 

80  guns.     Total  complement,  770  men. 
18 


274  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

SCREW   STEAM   FRIGATES. 

Fourth  Rates — "  Emerald  "  Class,  600  horse-power. 

Main  Deck 30  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 

(    20  32-pounders,  58  or  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 
GC    (      1  68-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 

51  guns.     Total  complement,  570  men. 

fifth  Rates — "  Tribune  "  Class,  300  horse-power. 
Main  Deck 20  32-pounders,  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 

UDner  Deck  \    10  32-Pounders>  42  cwt>  8  feet- 

'  )      1  10-inch  pivot,  84  cwt.,  9  feet  4  inches. 

31  guns.     Total  complement,  350  men. 

SCREW   STEAM   CORVETTES. 

Sixth  Rates — "  Pearl "  Class,  400  horse-power. 

Upper  Deck  $    2°  8'inch  guns'  60  cwt'  8  feet'  10  inche8' 

"(      I  68-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt,  10  feet. 

21  guns.     Total  complement,  350  men. 

MORTAR   FRIGATES. 

Sixth  Rates. — "JEurotas  "  Class,  200  horse-power. 

(      2  13-inch  mortars,  100  cwt. 
Mam  Deck  . .  -< 

(      8  32-pounders,  42  cwt,  8  feet. 

Upper  Deck 2  68-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 

12  guns.     Total  complement,  200  men. 

FLOATING    BATTERIES. 

Sixth  Rates — "^Etna  "  Class,  200  horse-power. 

Main  Deck 16  68-pounders,  95  cwt,  10  feet. 

16  guns.     Total  complement,  210  men. 

SCREW   STEAM   SLOOPS. 

"  Chameleon  "  Class,  200  horse-power. 

16  32-pounders,  32  cwt.,  6  feet  6  inches  (on    rear 


Mam  Deck ^  chock  carriages). 

1  32-pounder  pivot,  58  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 

17  guns.     Total  complement,  70  men. 


AMERICAN   ORDNANCE.  275 

SCREW    STEAM   GUN-VESSELS. 

"  Arrow  "  Class,  160  horse-power. 

(      2  68-pounder  pivots,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 
Main  Deck j      2  12_poun(jer  howitzers,  10  cwt. 

4  guns.     Total  complement,  65  men. 


SCREW    STEAM    GUNBOATS FIRST   CLASS. 

"  Charon  "  Class,  60  horse-power. 

3-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 

Main  Deck \      1  32-pounder  pivot,  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches,  on 

slides  available  for  the  95-cwt.  gun. 


t      1  68- 
: •!       1  32- 


2  guns.     Total  complement,  36  men. 

"  Cheerful "  Class,  20  horse-power. 
Main  Deck. . . .- 2  32-pounder  pivots,  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 

2  guns.     Total  complement,  30  men. 

SCREW   STEAM-VESSELS. 

"  Rifleman  "  Class,  100  horse-power. 

(      2  32-pounders,  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 
Main  Deck j      6  32.pounders,  25  cwt.,  6  feet. 

8  guns.     Total  complement,  90  men. 

SAILING   SHIPS. 

First  Rates — "  Caledonia  "  Class. 

(  8  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 

Lower  Deck j  24  32_p0unders,  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 

(  4  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 

Middle  Deck |  3Q  32.pOUnders,  50  cwt.,  9  feet. 

Main  Deck 34  32-pounders,  42  cwt.,  8  feet. 

<  6  32-pounders,  42  cwt.,  8  feet. 

Quarter  Deck  and  Forecastle,  -j  ^  32_pounder  carronades,  17  cwt.,  4  feet. 

120  guns.     Total  complement,  970  men. 


276  H1STOKY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Second  Rates— "  Princess  Charlotte  "  Class. 

C      4  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 
Lower  Deck |    24  32.pouI1(jerS)  55  cwt^  9  feet  6  inches. 

(      2  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 
Mlddle  Deck ]    28  32-pounders,  48  cwt.,  8  feet. 

(    30  32-pounders,  rear  chock  carriage,  32  cwt.,  6  feet 

Mam  Deck. < 

(  6  uiches. 

(      6  32-pounders,  45  cwt.,  8  feet  6  inches. 

Quarter  Deck  and  Forecastle.  <  .  c    . 

(    10  32-pounder  carronades,  17  cwt.,  4  feet. 

104  guns.     Total  complement,  850  men. 

Third  Rates— "  Bellerophon  "  Class. 

(      4  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 
"\    22  32-pounders,  56  cwt.,  9  feet,  6  inches. 

Main  Deck  J      2  8-inch  guns>  65  Cwt>  9  feet 

/    26  32-pounders,  50  cwt.,  9  feet. 

Quarter  Deck  and  Forecastle.       16  32-pounders,  42  cwt.,  8  feet. 

70  guns.     Total  complement,  650  men. 


Fourth  Rates—"  Indefatigable  " 

Main  Deck 28  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  3  feet. 

Quarter  Deck  and  Forecastle.       22  32-pounders,  45  cwt.,  8  feet  6  inches. 

50  guns.     Total  complement,  500  men. 

Fifth  Rates—"  Pique  "  Class. 

j      6  8-inch  guns,  60  cwt.,  8  feet  10  inches. 
5    " \    18  32-pounders,  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 

(    14  32-pounders,  25  cwt.,  6  feet. 
Quarter  Deck  and  Forecastle.  -< 

(      2  32-pounders,  50  cwt.,  9  feet. 

40  guns.    Total  complement,  375  men. 


Main  Deck •< 


Sixth  Rates — "  Trincomalee  "  Class. 

8  32-pounders,  56  cwt.,  9  feet  6  inches. 
10  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 

(      6  32-pounders,  40  cwt.,  7  feet  6  inches. 
Quarter  Deck  and  Forecastle.  -J  ... 

(      1  10-inch  gun,  84  cwt.,  9  feet  4  inches. 

25  guns.     Total  complement,  275  men. 

SLOOPS. 

"Arachne"  Class. 

2  32-pounders,  39  cwt.,  7  feet  6  inches. 
16  32-pounders,  25  cwt.,  6  feet. 

18  guns.     Total  complement,  145  men. 


AMERICAN    ORDNANCE.  277 

PADDLE   STEAM-FRIGATES. 

Fifth  Pates — "  Terrible  "  Class,  800  horse-power. 

(    10  8-inch  guns,  65  cwt.,  9  feet. 
Mam  Deck < 

/      4  68-pounders,  95  cwt,  10  feet 

Upper  Deck  \      4  10-inch  guns,  84  cwt,  9  feet  4  inches. 

"  (      3  68-pounder  pivots,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 

21  guns.     Total  complement,  310  men. 

Sixth  Rates — "Furious"  Class,  400  horse-power. 
Main  Deck 10  32-pounders,  50  cwt.,  9  feet. 

TJppe  Deck  $      2  10-incl1  Pivots»  84  cwi>  9  feefc  4  hlches- 

"\      4  32-pounders,  50  cwt,  9  feet. 

16  guns.    Total  complement,  230  men. 


PADDLE    STEAM-SLOOPS. 

"  Bulldog  "  Class,  500  horse-power. 

1  68-pounder  pivot,  95  cwt.,  10  feet. 

Upper  Deck ^      1  10-inch  pivot,  94  cwt.,  9  feet  4  inches. 

4  32-pounders,  80  cwt.,  8  feet. 

6  guns.     Total  complement,  170  men. 


PADDLE     STEAM-VESSELS. 

"Medina"  Class,  312  horse-power. 

Upper  Deck 4  32-pounders,  50  cwt.,  9  feet. 

4  guns.     Total  complement,  65  men. 

These  tables  and  statements  present  a  general  view  of  the 
batteries  of  the  English  ISTavy  from  the  building  of  the  first 
frigate  down  to  the  time  of  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion. 
They  do  not  exhibit  the  exact  armament  of  every  ship,  nor  do 
they  notice  the  experimental  guns  which  were  continually 
brought  to  the  notice  of  the  British  Government,  but  they  show 
what  was  deemed  sufficiently  trustworthy  to  enter  into  the  per- 
mament  armament  of  these  ships.  It  is  seen  that  at  the  time 
when  Sir  Howard  Douglas  published  his  work  (1860),  the  8-inch 
shell-gun  was  the  main  reliance,  while  the  8-inch  68-pounder 
for  solid  shot  was  considered  the  heaviest  and  most  powerful 
gun  that  could  be  safely  used  even  as  a  pivot-gun  on  board  a 


278  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

ship.  It  was  not  thought  that  such  guns  could  be  carried  in 
broadside.  Up  to  that  date  the  English  and  French  adhered 
to  the  idea  of  long  range  and  penetration,  rather  than  the 
smashing  power  and  lower  velocity  of  the  larger  shot.  The 
latter  idea  was  entertained  for  a  short  time  when  the  carronade 
was  first  introduced,  but  it  was  gradually  abandoned  when  it 
was  found  that  a  ship  was  liable  to  be  disabled  by  the  long 
guns  of  an  adversary  before  the  shot  from  a  carronade  would 
reach  her,  and  it  remained  for  the  Americans  to  increase  the 
calibre  of  the  gun  without  diminishing  its  range. 

Leaving  the  English  Navy  at  the  point  reached  in  1860 
with  the  8-inch  shell-gun  for  the  broadside,  and  the  68-pounder 
8-inch  gun  as  a  pivot-gun,  the  reader  will  be  ready  to  compare 
with  this  the  progress  of  the  American  idea.  Going  back  to 
the  true  starting-point  of  the  American  Navy,  just  before  the 
War  of  1812,  we  find  a  point  of  comparison  between  British  and 
American  batteries  in  the  following  note  in  Admiral  Dahlgren's 
"  Shells  and  Shell-Guns:" 

"  It  may  be  noted  here  that,  as  a  means  of  comparison  with 
ships  of  a  past  date,  that  the  Britannia,  three-decker,  on  being 
laid  up  in  1806,  after  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  in  which  she  bore 
a  part,  returned  102  guns  to  store  at  Davenport ;  showing  a 
broadside  weight  of  metal  equal  to  1,160  pounds."  *  Referring 
once  more  to  what  was  stated  in  a  previous  chapter,  it  will  be 
seen  that  the  weight  of  metal  thrown  at  a  broadside  by  one 
of  the  new  American  frigates  of  that  period  was  864  pounds, 
while  she  mounted  only  fifty-four  guns.  Considering  the  greater 
weight  of  the  frigate's  shot,  and  the  longer  range  of  her  guns, 
it  may  be  safely  presumed  that,  under  favorable  circumstances, 
she  would  have  been  an  equal  match  for  this  English  three- 
decker,  the  pride  of  the  British  Navy. 

The  victories  won  by  the  Americans  in  the  War  of  1812, 
which  so  astonished  the  world,  and  humbled  the  pride  of  Eng 
land,  and  dealt  a  blow  to  her  naval  supremacy,  from  which  she 
will  never  recover,  were  due  in  great  degree  to  the  manner  in 
which  the  national  idea  of  heavy  guns  had  been  carried  out  in 
the  armament  of  our  ships,  especially  our  frigates. 

While  the  main  batteries  of  the  English  44-gun  ship  con- 

*  Official  Report  to  Committee  of  Parliament. 


AMERICAN    ORDNANCE.  279 

sisted  of  long  18-pounders,  our  frigates  of  the  same  rate  carried 
long  24-pounders ;  and  where  the  British  ship  mounted  32- 
pound  er  carronades,  ours  in  many  instances  were  armed  with 
42-pounder  guns  of  this  description,  so  that  there  was  an  impor 
tant  preponderance  in  our  favor  in  the  weight  of  the  broadside, 
and  this  told  with  such  fearful  effect  upon  the  more  lightly 
armed  adversary,  that  only  one  of  the  three  frigates  captured 
by  us  could  be  brought  into  port. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  this  was  not  entirely  due  to  the  supe 
riority  of  our  guns,  and  the  greater  weight  of  our  shot.  Our 
gunners  were  undoubtedly  superior  to  the  English  in  the  rapid 
ity  and  accuracy  of  their  fire,  and  hence  the  deadly  effect 
of  their  broadside.  Misrepresentation,  spiteful  abuse  of  the 
American  people,  improper,  personal  attacks  upon  our  officers, 
and  downright  inaccuracy,  were  all  persistently  employed  to 
break  the  force  of  the  blow  thus  given  to  British  pride  and 
boastfulness,  but  it  was  all  in  vain.  Even  James's  labored  effort, 
which  is  beneath  the  name  of  history  so  far  as  America  is  con 
cerned,  and  which  can  scarcely  be  said  to  be  founded  on  fact, 
could  not  conceal  the  real  state  of  the  case.  Through  the 
thick  veil  of  his  misrepresentations  the  main  truths  still  ap 
pear.  The  British  were  met  with  better  ships,  a  more  powerful 
armament,  with  better  gunners  and  more  skilful  seamen  than 
their  own,  and  therefore  they  were  beaten ;  and  the  fate  of  the 
Alabama,  that  English  pet,  under  the  fire  of  the  Kearsarge, 
is  prophetic  of  results  when  next  these  two  nations  meet. 

After  the  close  of  the  "War  of  1812,  our  new  line-of-battle 
ships,  such  as  the  Ohio,  were  armed  with  still  larger  guns. 
They  carried  long  42-pounders  on  the  main  deck,  and  were  as 
much  superior  to  the  English  vessels  of  the  same  class  as  our 
frigates  of  1812  had  been.  The  results  of  experiments,  which 
were  continually  made  under  the  direction  of  Government, 
tended  constantly  to  the  adoption  of  heavier  ordnance.  -The 
gun  called  the  columbiad  was  introduced,  and  then  the  gun 
which  bears  the  name  of  the  distinguished  inventor,  Dahlgren, 
who  has  contributed  so  largely  to  give  to  American  ordnance 
its  present  superiority.  The  experiments  made  under  the  di 
rection  of  Admiral  Dahlgren  were  so  decisive  that  the  six  new 
frigates  fitted  out  in  1856  were  armed  with  much  heavier  guns 


280  HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED  STATES   NAVY. 

than  had  been  before  used  on  board  a  ship  as  composing  a  regu 
lar  battery.  They  were  9-inch,  10-inch,  and  11-inch  shell-guns. 
The  following  comparison  between  one  of  these  frigates,  the 
Merrimack,  since  become  so  famous,  and  two  of  the  finest  Eng 
lish  frigates  of  that  date,  will  show  the  reader  the  character  of 
the  armaments  of  the  two  nations  at  the  beginning  of  the  re 
bellion,  by  which  it  will  also  appear  that  the  American  frigates 
still  retained  their  former  superiority  in  guns  and  weight  both 
of  the  single  shot  and  the  broadside.  The  statement  is  copied 
from  Admiral  Dahlgren's  "  Shells  and  Shell-Guns,"  published 
in  1856 : 

The  remarks  that  have  been  made  in  relation  to  the  comparative 
force  of  the  United  States  ship  Merrimack,  and  the  British  ships  Shan 
non  and  Euryalus,  induce  me  to  offer  a  few  words  on  the  subject : 

The  batteries  of  these  ships  may  be  stated  thus  from  the  best  sources 
that  are  accessible  to  us : 

GUN-DECK.  SPAR-DECK. 

Euryalus,  28  of  8-inch,  of  65  cwt  22  32-pdrs.,  of  45  cwt. 

Shannon,  30  of  8-inch,  of  65  cwt.  20  32-pdrs,  of  56  cwt,  and  1  68  pdr.,  of  95  cwt. 

Merrimack,  24  of  9-inch.  14  8-inch,  of  63  cwt.,  and  2  10-inch,  of  107  cwt 

Taking  the  main  weight  of  iron  that  goes  out  of  the  guns  to  any 
one  point,  the  ships  will  discharge — Euryalus,  1,066  pounds;  Shannon, 
1,167  pounds  ;  Merrimack,  1,424  pounds  ;  so  that  even  by  this  standard, 
the  Merrimack  would  have  the  superiority  in  offensive  capacity  by  a 
ratio  of  100  to  82. 

But  such  a  mode  of  estimating  the  power  of  ordnance  is  only  ad 
missible  when  the  description  of  gun  is  the  same  in  both  ships,  or  if  dif 
ferent,  when  the  distances  are  so  short  that  the  hastiest  shot  will  neither 
miss  the  mark  nor  fail  to  perforate.  "When,  as  now,  it  is  expected  to 
use  the  advantages  of  heavy  calibres  for  superior  accuracy  and  force  be 
yond  mere  point  blanks,  the  amount  of  metal  that  issues  from  the 
broadside  does  not  supply  the  criterion  of  power,  but  that  which  strikes 
the  object  and  with  due  force. 

Relative  accuracy  and  penetration  are,  therefore,  to  be  considered  in 
estimating  the  value  of  ships'  batteries  like  those  now  spoken  of.  There 
is  no  difficulty  in  deciding  between  the  Shannon  and  the  Euryalus,  be 
cause  both  have  similar  calibres,  8-inch  on  the  gun-deck  and  32-pounders 
above.  But  the  Shannon  has  more  of  the  8-inch  shell-guns  and  heavier 
32-pounders  than  the  Euryalus,  and  hence  has  unquestionably  the  more 
powerful  armament,  whether  far  or  near,  in  a  ratio  somewhat  greater 


I    UN1VEK 

\  OF 

AMERICAN   ORDNANCE.  281 

than  the  absolute  weight  of  broadside.     Besides  which,  she  has  a  68- 
pounder  on  the  forecastle. 

Now,  as  regards  the  Shannon  and  Merrimaek,  the  772  pounds  of 
8-inch  shells  from  the  gun-deck  of  the  former  are  inferior,  not  only  in 
mere  weight  to  the  864  pounds  of  9-inch  from  the  gun-deck  of  the  latter, 
but  also  in  accuracy  and  power,  so  that  a  distant  object  will  be  struck 
by  less  of  that  weight  and  with  less  force.  The  accuracy  of  the  8-inch 
to  9-inch  being  about  as  5  to  7,  the  penetration  as  9  to  10,  and  the 
content  of  powder  as  5  to  6,  with  the  further  advantage  to  the  9-inch 
of  greater  effect  by  reason  of  the  superior  content  of  the  individual 
shells — larger  orifice  and  greater  shock  of  impact. 

Then,  on  the  spar-deck,  we  have  for  the  Merrimack  360  pounds  of 
8-inch  shells  to  oppose  the  325  pounds  of  shot  from  the  Shannon  ;  the 
accuracy  of  the  8-inch  shells  to  the  32-pounder  shot  being  as  5  to  3 — 
the  shock  and  orifice  greater,  with  the  addition  of  the  explosive  force 
of  14  pounds  of  powder. 

The  Merrimack  has  also  2  pivot  10-inch  to  meet  the  one  68-pounder ; 
that  is,  200  pounds  in  heavy  shells  to  meet  the  one  68-pounder  shot,  or 
one  8-inch  shell. 

It  is  of  course  impossible,  nor  is  it  necessary,  to  deduce  the  exact 
value  of  the  combined  results,  but  we  think  that  a  glance  at  the  facts 
will  convince  that  the  Merrimack,  not  only  has  the  advantage  in  abso 
lute  weight  of  projectile,  supposing  all  strike,  but  that  the  greater  accu 
racy  and  power  beyond  point  blank  will  increase  this  difference  very 
much  in  favor  of  the  Merrimack. 

The  United  States  ship  has  also  the  capacity  to  bear  more  battery 
than  now  carried.  Her  tonnage  is  one-fifth  greater  than  that  of  the 
Shannon,  and  according  to  the  ratio  of  armament  to  burden  in  the  latter 
ship  (1  :  16J),  the  Merrimack  should  (other  things  being  equal)  bear 
with  equal  ease  about  196  tons  of  ordnance,  while  in  reality  she  only 
carries  153  tons,  which  is  absolutely  7  tons  less  than  the  weight  of  the 
Shannon's  guns.  The  addition  would  give  10  more  9-inch  guns,  for 
which  the  Merrimack  has  at  this  time  unoccupied  ports  on  the  gun-deck, 
and  would  raise  the  power  of  the  Merrimack's  broadside  to  1,780 
pounds — placing  it,  not  only  overpoweringly  above  that  of  the  Shannon, 
but  also  on  an  equality  with  the  broadside  of  the  heaviest  two-decker 
line-of-battle  ship  in  the  British  or  any  other  navy. 

It  appears  by  this  that  the  ordinary  battery  of  the  Merri 
mack  bore  nearly  the  same  ratio  of  superiority  to  that  of  the 
Shannon  that  the  armament  of  the  Constitution  did  to  that  of 


282  HISTOEY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVY. 

the  Guerriere,  while  the  full  battery  of  the  American  frigate 
was,  at  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion,  overwhelmingly  superior 
to  the  first-class  British  frigates  as  they  were  then  armed. 
These  facts  and  statements  exhibit  the  comparative  state  of 
English  and  American  ordnance  at  about  the  period  when  our 
war  of  the  rebellion  began.  Our  vessels  were  then  using,  as 
their  heaviest  guns,  the  10-inch  Dahlgren,  a  shell-gun,  and  9- 
inch,  10-inch,  and  11-inch  shell-guns  of  the  same  pattern.  This 
last-named  gun  varies  from  the  columbiad  mainly  in  its  shape, 
which  is  more  nearly  in  conformity  with  scientific  principles, 
and  experience  has  shown  it  to  be  more  reliable  and  stronger 
than  the  columbiad.  Soon  after  the  commencement  of  the  war, 
two  new  guns  were  introduced  into  the  service,  one  bearing  the 
name  of  its  inventor,  Parrott,  a  rifled  gun,  and  the  other  a 
smooth-bore,  called  also  after  its  inventor,  the  Rodman  gun.  The 
Parrott  gun  consists  of  a  solid  casting,  which  is  bored  out  and 
rifled,  and  then  strengthened  by  a  band  of  wrought  iron  around 
the  breech,  which  band  is  shrunk  on.  These  guns  are  very 
highly  esteemed  both  for  land  service  and  the  Navy,  and  the 
inventor  has  succeeded  in  producing  a  300-pounder  rifle  of  this 
pattern,  which  was  found  very  serviceable  at  Charleston. 

The  peculiar  character  of  the  Rodman  gun  consists  in  the 
method  by  which  it  is  cast.  This  method  is  thus  described 
by  Commander  Henry  A.  Wise,  United  States  Navy,  and 
chief  of  the  Ordnance  Bureau,  in  his  testimony  before  the 
Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  "War  (1865) :  « The  Eod 
man  gun,  as  it  is  termed,  is  cast  upon  a  peculiar  princi 
ple.  There  is  a  core  of  iron  in  the  centre  of  the  mould,  and 
a  stream  of  water  is  introduced  from  a  hydrant  into  that 
core.  The  metal  is  poured  into  the  mould  around  that  core, 
and  it  is  cooled  interiorly  and  exteriorly  at  the  same  time.  It 
is  assumed  that  very  great  strength  is  obtained  for  the  gun  so 
cast.  The  water  is  introduced  at  the  bore  of  the  core,  and  the 
head  of  water  from  the  hydrant  causes  it  to  rise  in  the  core  to 
the  top,  whence  it  is  carried  off  by  a  pipe.  This  process  goes 
on  during  the  process  of  pouring  in  and  cooling  the  metal. 
The  guns  made  by  that  method  are  much  stronger  than  if 
made  by  the  method  of  solid  casting.  The  casting  in  a  cylin 
drical  form  is  generally  supposed  to  give  more  uniform  strength. 


AMERICAN   ORDNANCE.  283 

This  method  has  gained  ground  only  within  the  last  three 
years.  One  15-inch  smooth-bore  gun  and  one  12-inch  rifle  had 
been  cast  on  the  Rodman  plan  before  the  beginning  of  the  re 
bellion,  but  no  use  had  been  made  of  them  beyond  a  partial 
test,  and  they  lay  dismounted  and  forgotten  at  Fortress  Monroe. 
The  terrible  accident  occasioned  by  the  bursting  of  a  wrought- 
iron  gun  on  board  of  one  of  our  steamships  had  brought  big 
guns  into  discredit,  and  the  Rodman  experimental  guns  were 
cast  aside  as  so  much  useless  rubbish.  These  two  large  guns, 
lying  thus  neglected  in  the  sand  at  Fortress  Monroe,  were 
brought  into  notice  again  by  one  of  those  apparently  trivial 
things  on  which  great  events  so  often  depend,  one  of  the  so- 
called  chance  occurrences  which  the  Christian  regards  as  taking 
place  under  the  direction  of  Him  who  notices  the  sparrow's  fall. 
The  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Captain  Fox,  and  the 
head  of  the  Ordnance  Bureau,  Captain  Wise,  were  at  Fortress 
Monroe  at  the  time  of  the  fight  between  the  Monitor  and  the 
Merrimack,  and  in  a  small  tug  were  near  spectators  of  that  now 
famous  battle.  As  the  reputation  of  the  Department,  as  well 
as  the  country's  safety,  depended  very  much  upon  the  success 
of  the  novel  ship,  the  contest  was  watched  with  intense  anxiety 
as  well  as  interest.  For  four  hours  these  two  vessels  used 
against  each  other,  at  short  range,  the  most  powerful  artillery 
then  adopted  by  England  and  America ;  and  at  its  close,  though 
the  Merrimack  was  compelled  to  withdraw,  partially  disabled, 
yet  the  armor  had  not  been  penetrated.  On  both  sides  the 
armor  had  been  victorious  over  the  guns.  The  Assistant  Secre 
tary,  in  describing  his  own  reflections,  while  yet  upon  the  spot, 
said :  "  The  first  thing  to  suggest  itself  was  the  necessity  of 
larger  guns."  It  seemed  to  be  demonstrated  that,  while  the 
Merrimack  had  inflicted  no  important  injury  upon  the  Monitor, 
neither  had  the  rebel  frigate  received  a  fatal  blow  from  the  11- 
inch  guns.  To  insure  the  destruction  of  such  a  ship,  it  was 
necessary  to  have  guns  of  greater  smashing  power. 

While  these  thoughts  were  in  his  mind,  the  party  landed  at 
Fortress  Monroe,  at  the  very  spot  where  the  neglected  and  for 
gotten  Rodman  guns  were  lying.  They  at  once  attracted  his 
attention,  and  the  question  arose,  Why  is  not  this  15-inch  gun 
the  very  thing  we  want  ?  The  question  led  to  inquiries,  and 


284:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

these  to  the  adoption  of  such  measures  as  secured  a  trial  of  this 
formidable  weapon.  Upon  a  fact  which  seemed  at  the  moment 
to  have  no  importance,  the  issue  of  the  national  conflict  was,  as 
we  now  see,  depending ;  for  success,  to  say  the  least,  would  have 
been  very  doubtful,  if  not  impossible,  without  the  Monitors  and 
the  15-inch  guns,  which  alone  gave  them  sufficient  offensive 
power. 

The  15-inch  gun  was  destined  to  meet  with  nearly  the  same 
opposition  as  the  Monitor  itself.  Those  who  had  won  a  reputa 
tion  in  the  Department  of  Ordnance  were  naturally  unwilling  to 
risk  it  upon  an  untried  experiment,  and  when  experience  seemed 
not  to  promise  success.  The  necessity  was  urgent,  and  would 
not  admit  of  such  experimental  test  of  the  gun  as  would  demon 
strate  both  its  safety  and  efficiency.  Admiral  Dahlgren,  whose 
opinions  were  entitled  to  great  weight,  and  who  was  the  direct 
ing  head  of  the  Ordnance  Department,  was  willing  to  proceed 
to  manufacture  such  a  gun  under  directions  from  the  Depart 
ment,  and  prepared  the  plan,  but  expressed  doubts  of  its  success, 
and  preferred  a  13-inch  gun,  believing  that  it  would  bear  a 
larger  charge  of  powder,  that  the  shot  driven  with  greater  force 
would  be  more  effective ;  and  thus  the  Secretary  was  constrained 
to  adopt  the  new  gun  without  the  express  sanction  of  those  to 
whom  he  would  most  naturally  go  for  an  opinion.  As  in  the 
case  of  the  Monitors,  the  newspapers  were  drawn  into  discus 
sion  of  the  question,  and  many  articles  appeared  condemning 
the  guns  and  censuring  the  Naval  Ordnance  Bureau  for  intro 
ducing  them  into  the  service.  In  order  to  relieve  that  bureau 
from  charges  to  which  it  was  not  amenable,  and  to  assume  his 
own  proper  share  of  responsibility,  the  Assistant  Secretary  ad 
dressed  the  following  note  to  The  New  York  Times : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  Thursday,  May  28, 1862. 

Several  days  since  an  article  appeared  in  your  paper  (and  similar 
articles  have  appeared  in  other  papers),  censuring  the  Naval  Ordnance 
Bureau  for  introducing  the  15-inch  calibre  into  the  Navy.  I  cannot 
say  what  influenced  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  to  adopt  this  heavy 
calibre,  but  I  know  that  the  distinguished  chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ord 
nance,  Rear-Admiral  Dahlgren,  did  not  advise  it.  Whatever  respon 
sibility  attaches  to  those  who  strenuously  urged  it  belongs  to  me  and 
not  to  the  admiral.  Very  respectfully, 

G.  V.  Fox,  Assistant  Secretary. 


AMERICAN   ORDNANCE.  285 

The  following  letter  from  Captain  Ericsson  will  help  the 
public  to  determine  to  whom  belongs  the  responsibility,  and  as 
is  now  seen  the  honor  of  bringing  into  the  service  the  15-inch 
guns : 

NETV  YOEK,  April  20, 1864. 

To  Hon.  G.  V.  Fox,  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy : 

SIR  :  I  enclose  copy  of  the  plan  of  a  twenty-feet  diameter  turret, 
with  two  15-inch  guns,  which  I  forwarded  to  you  on  the  22d  March, 
1862.  With  reference  to  these  guns  I  have  to  state  that  the  calibre 
was  determined  by  yourself,  and  that  the  outline  and  proportions  were 
made  to  correspond  as  nearly  as  possible  with  the  11-inch  Dahlgren 
gun.  I  am,  sir,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  ERICSSON. 


The  15-inch  gun  was  a  Hodman  gun,  so  far  as  the  method 
of  casting  was  concerned ;  externally  it  was  shaped  after  the 
Dahlgren  pattern,  and  it  therefore  combined  the  excellences  of 
the  plan  of  both  these  distinguished  inventors,  while  the  calibre 
of  the  gun,  and  the  weight  of  the  shot,  the  essential  points,  were 
determined  by  the  Department,  and  by  the  advice  of  the  Assist 
ant  Secretary.  The  first  trial  of  the  new  ordnance  against  an 
armored  vessel,  the  Atlanta,  ended  all  doubt  in  the  minds  of  all 
candid  persons  in  regard  to  its  efficiency ;  and  in  Europe,  even 
more  quickly  than  at  home,  it  was  conceded  that  the  American 
guns  had  introduced  a  new  era  in  naval  war — a  concession  not 
made  so  much  in  words  as  in  the  experiments  for  the  manufac 
ture  of  heavier  ordnance  for  their  own  ships. 

From  these  statements  it  will  be  seen  that  from  the  time  of 
the  building  of  our  first  frigates,  after  the  War  of  the  Revolu 
tion  to  the  close  of  the  "War  of  the  Rebellion,  the  Americans 
steadily  maintained  a  superiority  in  the  weight  of  the  battery 
and  of  the  single  shot,  and  that  these  have  been  the  main  causes 
by  which  success  and  renown  have  been  won.  True,  they  are 
not  the  only  causes.  In  general,  the  scantling  of  our  ships  has 
been  larger  than  that  of  other  nations,  and  therefore  they  were 
not  so  easily  cut  up  by  shot ;  and,  in  addition,  our  vessels  have 
been  handled  with  more  skill,  our  firing  has  been  more  rapid, 
and  the  aim  of  our  gunners  more  accurate.  All  these  points 
were  made  clear  in  the  fight  with  the  Alabama.  The  Ameri- 


286  HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

can  ship  was  more  stoutly  built  than  the  English  ship,  she  was 
managed  with  superior  skill,  her  heavy  shells  tore  the  Alabama 
in  pieces,  and  converted  her  deck  into  a  slaughter-house,  while 
the  greater  accuracy  of  the  aim  of  the  Americans  was  apparent 
to  all  who  saw  the  battle ;  and  yet  the  Alabama's  guns  were 
served  by  picked  gunners  trained  on  the  practice-ship  of  the 
British  ISTavy.  It  was  probably  the  most  conclusive  answer  yet 
given  to  the  false  and  foolish  statement  so  persistently  made  in 
England,  that  our  naval  victories  have  been  won  by  English 
seamen.  Still,  with  all  other  advantages,  it  would  be  unreason 
able  to  suppose  that  the  same  results  would  have  been  reached 
in  all  cases  in  the  "War  of  1812  had  our  ships  mounted  no 
heavier  batteries  than  those  of  the  English  frigates ;  and  it  is 
quite  clear  that  the  Alabama  was  demolished  by  our  11-inch 
shells,  and  equally  so  that  the  Atlanta  would  not  have  been 
captured,  as  she  was,  except  by  the  15-inch  guns.  Other  na 
tions  will  doubtless  manufacture  guns  equal  to  those  we  now 
have,  but  we  may  safely  trust  for  the  future  to  that  inventive 
genius  and  thinking  power  which  have  given  us  our  past  tri 
umphs  and  our  present  superiority. 

The  country  will  not  be  prepared  to  give  proper  credit  to 
the  Navy  Department,  and  especially  to  the  energy  ot  the  Chief 
of  the  Ordnance  Bureau,  unless  it  understands  how  deficient  the 
country  was  in  guns,  as  well  as  in  ships,  at  the  commencement 
of  the  rebellion. 

That  scientific  and  accomplished  officer,  Admiral  Dahlgren, 
had  rendered  a  great  service  to  his  country,  and  had  attracted 
the  attention  of  Europe  by  his  investigations  and  experiments  in 
gunnery  previous  to  the  beginning  of  the  war.  lie  wrought 
out  the  American  idea,  and  produced  an  American  gun.  His 
influence  upon  our  ordnance  will  be  more  fully  set  forth  in  a 
future  chapter.  The  gun  which  bears  his  name  is  justly  ad 
mired  as  a  truly  scientific  weapon,  more  reliable  than  any  so- 
called  "  built-up  "  guns  yet  produced.  Even  the  15-inch  guns 
were  shaped  after  the  Dahlgren  pattern  ;  and  yet,  at  the  break 
ing  out  of  the  rebellion,  but  few  of  these  excellent  guns  of  large 
calibre  had  been  manufactured.  Most  readers  will  be  surprised 
to  learn  how  few  efficient  cannon  the  Government  had  at  com 
mand  when  the  rebels  attacked  Fort  Sumter.  A  few  facts  will 


AMERICAN   OEDNANCE.  287 

present  the  actual  state  of  things,  and  show  the  great  difficul 
ties  against  which  the  Ordnance  Department  had  to  contend  in 
the  first  year  of  the  conflict.  There  were  on  hand  in  March, 
1861,  2,468  heavy  guns.  Of  this  number  1,872  pieces  were  32- 
pounders,  of  an  obsolete  pattern,  and  557  of  the  remainder  were 
light  8-inch  shell-guns,  also  of  the  old  pattern.  There  were 
305  9-inch  Dahlgren  guns,  and  32  11-inch  guns,  of  the  same 
pattern.  But  many  of  these  9-inch  and  11-inch  pieces  were  at 
the  Norfolk  Navy- Yard,  and  were  seized  by  the  rebels,  while 
most  of  the  remainder  were  on  board  of  our  cruisers,  which  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  (Toucey)  had  scattered  in  distant  seas, 
so  that  actually  the  Navy  Department  had  at  its  disposal  little 
more  than  fifty  really  efficient  guns  when  the  great  battle  be 
gan.  The  condition  of  our  ordnance  then  may  be  also  inferred 
from  the  fact  that  only  two  classes  of  guns  then  on  hand — the 
9-inch  and  the  11-inch  Dahlgren — were  the  only  pieces  which 
were  duplicated  after  the  beginning  of  the  war.  It  is  seen, 
then,  that  the  Department  was  called  upon'  to  create  not  only 
its  ships,  but  their  armaments  also.  "  Not  a  gun  belonging  to 
the  Navy  was  to  be  found  upon  the  Mississippi  or  its  tribu 
taries,"  where,  before  the  close  of  the  war,  were  a  hundred 
steamers  armed  with  the  new  American  guns. 

The  difficulties  were  increased  by  the  desertion  of  many, 
who,  by  their  knowledge  and  long  experience,  were  well  fitted 
to  conduct  the  affairs  of  the  Ordnance  Bureau,  and  this  laid  a 
double  burden  upon  Commander  H.  A.  Wise,  the  new  chief 
of  this  department  of  the  Navy,  whose  efficiency  has  been  abun 
dantly  proved  by  the  whole  history  of  the  struggle. 

The  efficiency  of  this  bureau,  and  the  immense  resources  of 
our  country,  are  very  forcibly  exhibited  by  the  fact  that,  in  No 
vember,  1863,  it  had  procured  2,811  guns,  of  the  most  approved 
modern  patterns,  about  eight  hundred  of  which  were  9-inch  and 
11-inch  Dahlgrens;  about  seven  hundred  were  heavy  rifles, 
and  thirty-six  15-inch  guns  had  already  been  finished. 

The  extensive  Tredegar  works  in  Richmond  were  from  the 
first  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels,  and,  with  the  exception  of  the 
works  at  Pittsburg,  few  founderies  in  the  country  were  at  all 
prepared  for  the  making  of  cannon ;  and  from  these  facts 
may  be  seen,  not  only  the  difficulties  whicli  beset  the  Govern- 


288  HISTORY   OF   THE   HOTTED   STATES   NAVY. 

ment,  but  the  astonishing  facility  and  skill  of  our  countrymen 
in  changing  so  suddenly  these  workshops  of  peace  into  factories 
that  produced  the  most  formidable  weapons  of  modern  war 
with  a  rapidity  equal  to  the  enormous  demand,  and  of  a  quality 
that  stood  the  ordeal  of  battle. 

The  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Ordnance  pays  the  following 
well-merited  tribute  to  the  manufacturers  who  came  so  promptly 
to  the  aid  of  the  Government : 

In  the  report  which  I  have  now  the  honor  to  present,  I  shall  en 
deavor  to  show  briefly,  yet  as  clearly  as  possible,  how  much  this  branch 
of  the  public  service  was  unprepared  for  the  great  crisis  of  1861,  and  in 
what  manner  and  to  what  extent  the  existing  difficulties  have  been 
overcome,  and  our  ordnance  of  the  Navy  increased  in  numbers  and  im 
proved  in  character.  In  doing  so  I  shall  not  fail  to  give  full  credit  to 
those  of  our  citizens  who  have  so  ably  and  unhesitatingly  assisted  the 
bureau  in  all  its  efforts  to  meet  the  urgent  necessities  of  the  country, 
and  who  still  continue  to  answer  promptly  and  well  the  heavy  requisi 
tions  made  upon  them.  For,  although  the  very  best  energies  of  the  offi 
cers  on  ordnance  duty  everywhere,  and  the  zealous  cooperation  of 
its  employes  at  the  several  navy-yards  have  always  been  exerted  to  the 
utmost  in  carrying  out  the  bureau's  instructions,  the  great  results  which 
are  shown  by  the  records  could  never  have  been  obtained  without  the 
assistance  and  support  derived  from  the  manufacturers,  founders,  and  me 
chanics  of  the  private  establishments  throughout  the  loyal  States. 

Thus  it  is  a  matter  of  no  little  importance,  especially  in  view  of 
future  contingencies,  to  know  that,  independent  of  the  resources  imme 
diately  within  the  control  of  the  Government,  the  Navy  can  safely  rely 
upon  the  patriotism,  zeal,  and  ability  of  the  loyal  citizens  of  our  coun 
try  at  all  times  and  under  all  emergencies. 

Not  only  has  this  been  the  case  among  the  people  of  our  great  cities 
on  the  Atlantic  border,  but  whenever  and  wherever  a  demand  was  made 
for  ordnance  supplies  of  a  kind  which  could  not  be  conveniently  and 
promptly  furnished  from  the  ordinary  depots  at  the  East  and  North,  the 
manufacturers  of  the  interior  and  the  West  have  been  found  ready  and 
competent  to  do  the  work  in  the  most  efficient  manner. 

These  facts  are  most  clearly  demonstrated  by  the  history  of  all  the 
operations  of  our  Navy  since  the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion.  Not  a 
single  ship  or  squadron  has  ever  been  delayed  in  its  movements  for  the 
want  of  ordnance  or  ordnance  supplies 

The  only  establishments  in  the  country  which  were  prepared  for  the 


AMERICAN   ORDNANCE.  289 

work  of  founding  heavy  cannon  when  the  rebellion  took  place  were  the 
South  Boston,  Fort  Pitt,  and  the  West  Point  founderies ;  the  Tredegar 
Works,  at  Richmond,  Va.,  having  passed  into  the  hands  of  the  rebels. 
No  government  establishment  of  the  kind  existed,  and  consequently  the 
sole  reliance  of  both  Army  aud  Navy  at  the  commencement  of  our  diffi 
culties  was  upon  these  three  founderies.  Eight  nobly,  however,  did  they 
come  to  the  rescue  in  the  hour  of  need,  and  thus  afforded  time  for  the 
bureau  to  seek  other  manufacturers  who  might  be  willing  to  undertake 
the  work  of  supplying  the  Navy  with  cannon.  Although  such  opera 
tions  are  always  attended  with  great  risk  to  those  who  are  unaccustomed 
to  the  casting  of  heavy  guns,  it  was  not  long  before  several  other  estab 
lishments  were  ready  to  cooperate,  and  the  work  of  producing  the  guns 
of  various  calibres  required  was  commenced,  and,  I  am  happy  to  say, 
has  been  most  successfully  prosecuted.  In  addition  to  the  above-named 
founderies,  the  bureau  has  now,  as  sources  of  supply,  the  establishment 
at  Providence,  Rhode  Island,  known  as  the  Builders'  Iron  Foundery ; 
the  founderies  of  Messrs.  Hinkley,  Williams  &  Co.,  of  Boston  ;  and  the 
Portland  Company,  of  Portland,  Maine  ;  and  at  Reading,  Pennsylvania, 
the  Scott  Foundery  of  Messrs.  Seyfert,  McManus  &  Co.  From  all  these 
establishments,  except  the  West  Point  Foundery,  the  Navy  is  furnished 
with  9-inch,  10-inch,  and  11-inch  guns,  none  of  the  old  system  being 
now  manufactured. 

From  the  Fort  Pitt  Foundery,  in  addition  to  the  above  classes  of 
guns,  it  obtains  the  heavy  15-inch  ;  and  from  the  West  Point  Foundery 
it  receives  the  Parrott  rifles,  of  all  calibres,  which  now  constitute  a  part 
of  the  battery  of  nearly  every  vessel  afloat,  and  the  great  effectiveness 
of  which  has  been  so  strikingly  manifest  during  the  recent  battles  at 
Charleston.  In  procuring  cannon  for  the  Navy  the  same  conditions 
have  been  exacted  from  all  these  founderies,  as  regards  the  character  of 
metal  and  every  other  element  necessary  to  constitute  good  and  reliable 
guns.  No  gun  has  been  accepted,  as  a  standard,  which  has  not  been 
subjected  to  the  ordeal  of  1,000  rounds  of  service  charges.  With  this 
standard  thus  established,  all  the  guns  of  a  contract  must  coincide  in 
their  composite  elements. 

The  only  exception  to  this  rule  has  been  in  the  case  of  the  15-inch 
guns  cast  upon  the  plan  of  Major  Rodman,  of  the  United  States  Army. 
Time  did  not  permit  of  this  proof  being  applied,  and  the  guns  were 
necessarily  accepted  and  put  into  service,  after  having  endured,  however, 
somewhat  more  than  the  tests  prescribed  by  the  army  regulations. 

It  is  most  gratifying  to  know  that  the  judgment  of  the  Navy  De 
partment  has  been  sustained  by  the  result  of  the  further  test  which  has 

19 


290  IIISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

been  applied  to  the  first  gun  of  this  class  made  for  the  Navy,  and  which 
is  still  undergoing  a  series  of  experimental  firing  after  being  modified  in 
form.  All  doubt  is  thus  removed  of  the  ability  of  the  Fort  Pitt  Foundery 
to  produce  guns  of  this  great  size  which  can  safely  be  relied  upon,  and 
the  power  thereby  added  to  the  fire  of  our  Monitors  has  been  most  fully 
exemplified  in  the  capture  of  the  Atlanta. 

Before  dismissing  this  branch  of  its  report,  it  is  just  that  the  bureau 
should  bear  special  testimony  to  the  prompt  and  efficient  manner  in 
which  the  West  Point  Foundery  has  also  done  its  share  in  supplying  the 
need  of  the  service  for  a  new  style  of  ordnance.  The  introduction  of  a 
few  rifled  guns  of  heavy  calibre  into  the  batteries  of  ships  had  al 
ready  taken  place  in  foreign  navies  prior  to  the  date  of  our  present  re 
bellion  ;  and  in  our  own  service  experiments  were  being  conducted  at  the 
Washington  Navy- Yard,  under  the  direction  of  Rear-Admiral  Dahlgren, 
for  the  purpose  of  devising  a  system  of  rifled  ordnance.  Nothing  de 
cisive,  however,  had  been  accomplished,  except  with  the  rifled  howitzer, 
and  the  experiments  were  rudely  interrupted  in  the  spring  of  1861.  At 
the  same  time  Mr.  Parrott  was  engaged  in  perfecting  his  present  system, 
and  the  results  obtained  by  him  were  so  satisfactory,  that  in  the  summer 
of  1862  the  bureau,  in  conjunction  with  the  army  ordnance,  directed  a 
100-pounder  to  be  subjected  to  a  series  of  1,000  service  rounds.  The 
gun  stood  the  test  without  bursting,  and  its  accuracy  and  range  were 
considered  sufficiently  good  to  warrant  the  adoption  of  these  rifled  guns 
as  a  permament  part  of  our  naval  armament.  Since  then  the  demand 
for  the  several  calibres  has  been  unceasing ;  and,  as  before  stated,  they 
are  to  be  found  on  board  nearly  every  vessel  now  in  service,  and  will 
continue  to  be  supplied  until  some  better  system  is  established. 

Finally,  from  personal  inspection,  and  witnessing  the  firing  of  over 
one  hundred  rounds  from  these  guns  at  the  West  Point  Foundery  re 
cently,  the  bureau  is  satisfied  that  whenever  attention  is  paid  to  details, 
and  even  moderate  skill  in  the  manner  of  loading  and  firing  is  attained, 
they  will  prove  the  most  serviceable  rifled  guns  that  have  ever  been  in 
troduced  into  any  service.  It  should  be  remarked  also  that  the  average 
cost  of  these  guns  is  much  below  that  of  any  others  which  have  been 
offered  to  the  Government. 

The  following  extract  from  Commander  Wise's  Report  for 
1864  will  snow  in  general  the  new  armament  of  the  American 
Navy,  and  affords  the  basis  of  a  comparison  between  this  and 
that  of  the  snips  of  Europe,  and  exhibits  the  manner  in  which 
the  American  idea  was  wrought  out  in  practice : 


AMERICAN    ORDNANCE.  291 

The  governing  rule,  in  arming  our  ships-of-war,  lias  been  to  place  on 
board  of  them  the  very  heaviest  and  most  effective  guns  they  can  bear 
with  safety.  In  general,  it  may  be  stated  that  the  9-inch  are  used  for 
broadside,  the  10-inch  and  11-inch  and  the  Parrott  rifles  in  pivot,  the 
15-inch  for  the  Monitor  turrets,  and  the  bronze  howitzers  and  rifles  for 
boat  and  deck  service  inshore.  A  few  of  our  ships  continue  to  be 
armed  with  the  32-pounder  and  8-inch  guns  of  the  old  system ;  but 
these  will  probably  give  way  to  the  modified  guns  of  similar  classes 
above  alluded  to. 

As  no  special  changes  have  been  made  in  the  general  arrangement 
of  batteries  since  my  last  report,  the  same  vessels  mentioned  therein,  as 
types  of  their  rate,  may  be  again  taken  to  illustrate  the  system  of  arma 
ment  still  in  vogue. 

Thus,  the  battery  of  a  first  rate  is  presented  by  the  Minnesota,  car 
rying: 

1  150-pounder  rifled  . .  , .  )   T 

>  In  pivot. 

1  11-inch  smooth f 

42  9-inch  smooth )    T 

.       .  _   ,  >  In  broadside,  and 

4  100-pounder  rifled \ 

4  howitzers. 

Of  a  second  rate,  by  the  Brooklyn,  carrying : 

2  100-pounders  rifled In  pivot. 

20  9-inch  smooth )   T 

_  ..  }•  In  broadside,  and 

2  60-pounders  rifled ) 

2  howitzers. 

Of  a  third  rate,  by  the  Eutaw,  carrying : 

2  100-pounders  ruled In  pivot. 

4  9-inch  smooth ^ 

2  24-pounders  smooth (.  In  broadside. 

2  24-pounders  rifled ) 

Of  the  fourth  rates,  by  the  Owasco,  carrying : 

1  11-inch  smooth )   , 

1  20-pounder  rifled J 

2  24-pounders  howitzers In  broadside. 

And  by  the  Nipsic,  carrying : 

1  150-pounder  rifled )    T 

1  30-pounder  rifled [  In 

2  9-inch  smooth •. . .      In  broadside,  and 

4  howitzers. 


292  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Of  the  Monitors,  by 

The  Tonawanda,  carrying 4  15-inch. 

The  Onondaga,  carrying 2  15-indh. 

2  150-pounders. 
The  Montauk  carrying 1  15-inch. 

1  150-pounder. 

Of  the  iron-plated  gunboats  of  the  Western  rivers,  by  the  Carondelet, 

carrying : 

3  9-inch. 

4  8-inch. 

2  100-pounder  rifles. 
1  50-pounder      " 
1  30-pounder      " 

The  development  of  the  power  of  each  individual  ship  named  as 
representatives  of  the  several  rates,  is : 

In  shot.  In  shells. 

Ibs.  Ibs. 

First  rate 2,606  2,123 

Second  rate 1,220  990 

Third  rate 424  343 

Fourth  rate 210  183 

and 294  255 

In  the  Monitors : 

Tonawanda 1,764  1,320 

Onondaga 1,180  930 

Montauk 606  465 

In  the  Western  gunboat : 

Carondelet. .  588  480 


These  figures  express  the  weight  of  metal  thrown  for  breaching  pur 
poses  by  the  guns  at  a  single  broadside  in  solid  shot  or  shells.  Con 
joined  with  these,  however,  are  the  destructive  and  terrible  agencies  of 
grape,  canister,  and  shrapnel,  available  at  all  times  in  the  general  course 
of  naval  warfare,  but  most  especially  and  signally  so  when  used  against 
uncovered  masses  of  men.  The  effective  power  of  a  ship  is  therefore 
increased  in  a  very  great  degree  by  these  auxiliaries,  which  are  common 
to  both  rifled  and  smooth-bores,  excepting  grape,  which  is  not  used  in 
the  rifles. 

It  will  be  noticed  that  in  each  of  the  four  rates  of  vessels  above 
mentioned,  pivot-guns  are  associated  with  those  of  broadside,  so  as  to 
meet  more  fully  the  necessity  for  long  range  at  high  elevations  in  chasing 


AMERICAN   ORDNANCE.  293 

or  bombardment,  and  at  the  same  time  to  maintain  a  direct  fire  -without 
materially  altering  the  course  of  the  vessel.  The  mechanical  arrange 
ment  of  the  pivot-carriage  also  enables  the  mounting  and  working  with 
ease  a  much  heavier  gun  than  could  possibly  be  handled  in  an  ordinary 
broadside  carriage. 

These  pivot-guns  are  always  placed  near  the  ends  of  the  vessel,  and, 
therefore,  do  not  interfere  in  the  least  with  the  working  of  the  broad 
side.*  The  rapidity  of  fire  from  them  is  of  course  not  so  great  as  from 
an  individual  gun  of  broadside,  but  it  is  fully  sufficient  for  the  purpose 
of  accuracy  at  ranges  beyond  the  reach  of  the  lesser  calibres.  No  ship 
can,  therefore,  be  considered  properly  armed  that  has  not  a  pivot-gun 
of  greater  power  and  range  than  the  guns  of  broadside.  But  whether 
a  battery  consisting  entirely  of  heavy  pivot-guns  would  be  more  formi 
dable  than  one  of  broadside  alone,  the  aggregate  weights  being  equal, 
has  not  yet  been  tried,  the  only  effort  of  the  kind  being  that  of  the 
Niagara,  which  has  a  battery  of  twelve  150-pounder  rifles  mounted  in 
pivot,  and  no  regular  broadside  guns.  It  is  not  worth  while,  however, 
to  speculate  on  the  probable  results  of  a  battery  so  constituted.  No 
doubt  under  certain  circumstances  the  peculiar  merits  of  the  plan  would 
be  fully  developed ;  but  whether  its  excellence  would  ever  be  made  so 
manifest  as  to  cause  its  adoption  in  lieu  of  tho  present  mixed  system  of 
pivot  and  broadside,  is  a  question  which  cottld  only  be  decided  under 
all  the  varying  conditions  of  an  engagement  «t  sea. 

The  decisive  power  of  the  heavy  gun  in  pivot  is,  however,  most 
strikingly  exemplified  in  the  recent  fight  between  the  Kearsarge  and 
the  Alabama,  although  the  distance  at  which  the  action  was  fought  was 
fully  within  the  scope  of  the  broadside  32-pounders  of  either  vessel,  be 
ing  only  about  700  yards.  The  water  also  was  smooth,  and  both  ships 
moved  steadily  under  steam  in  a  continuous  circle  around  a  common 
centre.  Every  condition  was  therefore  most  favorable  for  the  full  exer 
cise  of  the  offensive  power  of  each  class  and  description  of  gun  used ; 
but  it  does  not  appear  from  the  official  reports,  or  the  published  state 
ments  of  the  affair,  that  much  damage  was  inflicted  on  either  vessel  by 
the  guns  of  broadside,  the  decisive  work  having  been  performed  only 
by  the  pivot-guns  of  the  Kearsarge.  These  were  the  two  11-inch  guns 
mounted  at  either  end  of  the  ship,  the  light  30-pounder  being  too  feeble 
to  have  had  any  bearing  whatever  upon  the  results. 

There  does  not  appear  to  have  been  the  slightest  difficulty  in  ma 
noeuvring  these  pivots,  and  although  their  fire  was  much  slower  than  that 
of  the  broadside,  yet  the  weight  and  explosive  power  of  their  shells  fully 

*  An  exception  to  this  rule  is  found  in  the  New  Ironsides  and  Niagara. 


294:  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

compensated  for  any  want  of  rapidity.  For  it  is  stated  in  the  official 
reports  that  the  total  number  of  rounds  fired  by  the  Kearsarge  in  this 
action  of  one  hour  and  two  minutes,  was,  exclusive  of  those  from  the 
12-pounder  bronze  rifle,  one  hundred  and  sixty- three.  That  is,  from 
the  11-inch,  55  ;  from  the  30-pounder,  48  ;  and  from  the  broadside  32- 
pounders,  60=163. 

Throwing  out  the  rounds  fired  from  the  30-pounder,  we  have  nearly 
an  equal  number  from  the  pivot  and  broadside  guns ;  but  the  prepon 
derance  of  power  is  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  55  11-inch  shells,  weighing 
in  the  aggregate  7,425  pounds  of  iron,  with  an  explosive  charge  in  each 
shell  of  six  pounds  of  powder,  while  the  total  weight  of  metal  thrown 
from  the  32-pounders  of  broadside  in  the  60  rounds  is  in  solid  shot 
1,920  pounds  and  in  shells  only  832  pounds  of  iron,  with  an  explosive 
charge  of  not  quite  one  pound  in  each  shell. 

We  gather  from  the  official  report  of  Captain  Semmes  of  the  Ala 
bama  that  the  effect  of  the  11 -inch  shells  of  the  Kearsarge  was  most  dis 
astrous.  For  he  states  that  "  after  the  lapse  of  about  one  hour  and  ten 
minutes  our  [his]  ship  was  ascertained  to  be  in  a  sinking  condition, 
the  enemy's  shell  having  exploded  in  our  sides  and  between  decks,  open 
ing  large  apertures,  through  which  the  water  rushed  with  great  rapid 
ity."  This  part  of  his  report  is  most  certainly  true,  if  all  the  rest  is 
questionable. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Alabama  opposed  to  this  fire  one  Blakely 
Y-inch,  or  120-pounder  rifle,  one  68-pounder — both  in  pivot,  and  the 
especial  favorites  of  the  English  Navy — and  six  32-pounders,  in  broad 
side.  The  weight  of  metal  thrown  from  these  guns,  assuming  that  all 
were  used,  is  about  equal  to  that  from  the  Kearsarge ;  but  it  is  also 
stated  that  the  tiring  of  the  Alabama  was  much  more  rapid  than  that  of 
the  Kearsarge.  This,  however,  together  with  great  precision  and  concen 
tration  of  blows,  was  to  have  been  expected  from  a  crew  trained  in  the 
gunnery  exercises  of  a  navy  whose  boasted  superiority  over  all  others 
was  never  before  so  signally  disproved.  It  does  not  appear  that  cor 
rectness  of  aim  was  much  attended  to  by  the  crew  of  the  .Alabama, 
whilst  thus  delivering  their  rapid  fire ;  for  the  Kearsarge  wras  only  hit 
twenty-eight  times  in  all,  and  in  no  instance  was  she  badly  injured. 
Singularly  enough,  not  a  man  was  killed  outright  on  board  of  her,  and 
only  three  were  wounded. 

There  can  be  no  question  with  regard  to  the  superiority  of  the  11- 
inch  guns  over  the  Blakely  120-pounder,  and  the  68-pounder  of  the 
English  pivot  system,  either  in  penetration,  smashing  effect  of  the  shot, 
or  explosive  power  of  the  shells.  Hence,  although  the  vessels  were 


AMERICAN    ORDNANCE.  295 

nearly  equally  matched  as  to  tonnage,  motive  power,  and  number  of 
men  and  guns,  yet  the  preponderating  influence  of  calibre,  properly  dis 
posed  in  pivot,  and  coolly  and  deliberately  handled  by  American  sea 
men,  was  sufficient  to  settle  the  question  briefly,  and  most  conclusively. 

In  addition  to  the  improvements  in  heavy  ordnance  referred 
to,  a  corresponding  advance  was  made  in  the  construction  of 
carriages  for  mounting  and  manoeuvring  them  in  broadsides 
and  in  pivot.  This  question  was  one  of  very  grave  importance, 
and  not  easily  disposed  of,  as  will  appear,  when  we  reflect  upon 
the  violent  rolling  and  pitching  motion  of  a  ship  at  sea,  even  in 
the  ordinary  weather,  when  the  batteries  may  be  cast  adrift  for 
fighting  with  safety. 

A  series  of  well-conducted  experiments  at  the  experimental 
battery  of  the  Washington  Navy- Yard  and  on  board  the  ordnance 
practice-ship  Plymouth,  under  the  command  of  Rear- Admiral 
(then  Captain)  Dahlgren,  resulted  in  the  complete  solution  of 
the  difficulties  so  far  as  the  9  and  11  inch  guns  were  concerned : 
that  is  to  say,  a  broadside  carriage  for  the  9-inch,  and  a  pivot 
carriage  for  the  11-inch,  both  of  wood,  were  designed  and  con 
structed  for  our  frigates  of  the  Merrimack  class,  and  were  found 
to  be  as  perfect  in  their  operation  as  could  be  expected. 

The  difficulty,  however,  of  obtaining  seasoned  timber  dur 
ing  the  war  led  the  attention  of  the  present  Chief  of  the  Bureau 
of  Ordnance  to  the  question  of  substituting  iron  for  wood  in  the 
construction  of  these  carriages,  and  the  first  trial  of  iron  was 
made  in  the  carriages  of  the  New  Ironsides.  These  were  found 
to  be  better  than  those  made  of  wood,  and  it  is  believed  by 
many  that  the  days  of  wooden  carriages  are  numbered. 

Iron  was  an  indispensable  necessity  in  the  carriages  of  the 
Monitors,  and  the  genius  of  Ericsson  soon  overcame  all  me 
chanical  difficulties  in  the  methods  of  movement  and  compres 
sion.  Since  then  he  has  also  designed  and  successfully  tried  in 
practice  a  carriage  upon  which  the  15-inch  guns  can  be  mounted 
and  worked  in  broadside  without  difficulty  or  danger — the  mo 
mentum  of  these  heavy  guns  being  easily  controlled  by  means 
of  a  rotary  compressor.  The  advance  herein  made  over  the 
slow  and  expensive  trials  of  the  English  may  be  inferred  from 
the  fact  that  they  have  hitherto  failed  in  controlling  even  a  12- 
ton  gun  in  a  sea-way. 


CHAPTEE  XVII. 

THE  RELIEF  OF  FORT  PICKENS. 

IT  lias  been  truly  said  that  the  determination  to  relieve  Fort 
Sumter  was  the  turning-point,  and  the  decisive  one,  in  Mr.  Lin 
coln's  administration.  The  doctrine  of  State  rights  as  held  and 
acted  upon  by  the  Southern  leaders,  and  as  enunciated  in  an 
other  form  by  Mr.  Buchanan,  that  the  General  Government  has 
no  power  to  coerce  a  State,  had  so  far  influenced  public  thought 
as  nearly  to  paralyze  the  sovereign  power  by  which  the  whole 
nation  was  represented.  General  Scott,  then  in  command  of 
the  Army,  and  whose  influence  at  that  time  was  very  great, 
almost  controlling,  hesitated  in  regard  to  the  policy,  and  the 
right  even,  of  invading,  as  the  term  then  was,  the  soil  of  a 
"  sovereign  State,"  and  wavered  in  reference  to  the  question  of 
relieving  Sumter  on  that  account. 

On  this  question,  as  on  that  of  slavery,  there  was  a  direct 
antagonism  between  the  North  and  the  South.  From  the  ear 
liest  period  of  our  history  the  Northern  idea  of  liberty  was  of 
freedom  for  each  individual  to  act  within  his  sphere  as  a  part  of 
the  political  body,  under  the  due  restraints  of  government  and 
law.  Thus  the  citizen,  the  township,  the  county,  the  State  were 
all  regarded  as  free  and  independent,  each  in  the  proper  sphere, 
but  each  also  subordinate  to  the  higher  authority ;  and  when  the 
State  was  reached,  it  too  was  regarded  as  an  integral  and  insep 
arable  portion  of  the  supreme  body,  the  nation,  "  The  United 
States."  However  individuals  may  at  times  have  declared, 
under  local  and  temporary  excitements,  another  theory,  it  can 
not  be  denied  that  the  "ore vailing  sentiment  of  the  North  has 


THE   RELIEF    OF    FOKT    PICKEXS.  297 

been  and  still  is  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  sovereignty  for  the 
States. 

On  the  other  hand,  that  impatience  of  all  control  which  has 
been  and  is  the  characteristic  of  those  who  have  been  moulded 
by  the  influences  of  the  slave  system,  that  disregard  of  all  law 
and  authority  which  interferes  with  the  individual  will,  mani 
fested  itself  even  in  political  institutions ;  and  stimulated  as  these 
feelings  were,  by  a  jealousy  of  the  growing  power  of  the  North, 
they  exhibited  themselves,  first  in  the  assertion  of  sovereign  in 
dependence  of  the  central  Government,  and  then,  when  they 
saw  that  this  Government  must,  from  necessity,  be  controlled 
by  the  JSTorth,  they  endeavored  to  secure  this  asserted  indepen 
dence  by  force  of  arms.  It  was  virtually  the  old  question  be 
tween  a  loose,  uncertain  confederacy  of  independent  States,  allied 
during  pleasure,  as  States,  and  the  better  and  more  perfect 
union,  not  of  States  but  of  the  people,  which  was  contemplated 
by  the  Constitution.  When  Mr.  Lincoln,  therefore,  decided  to 
relieve  Fort  Sumter  and  send  troops  into  Virginia,  he  determined 
that,  so  far  as  in  him  lay,  the  United  States  should  be  a  nation, 
and  not  a  mere  confederacy. 

This  State  sovereignty  and  no  coercion  policy,  was  the  con 
trolling  one  of  Mr.  Buchanan's  administration,  on  which  he 
seems  to  have  been  guided  entirely  by  members  of  his  Cabinet 
and  their  outside  sympathizers.  As  the  result  of  this,  after 
long  apparent  halting  between  two  opinions,  Mr.  Buchanan 
refused  to  reenforce  Fort  Sumter,  and  on  the  29th  of  January, 
1861,  the  following  telegram  was  forwarded  to  Fort  Pickens : 

WASHINGTON,  January  29, 1861.     ) 
Eeceived  at  PENSACOLA,  January  29, 1861,  at  9  P.  M.  \ 

To  Captain  JAMES  GLTXN,  commanding  the  Macedonian;  Captain  W.  S. 
WALKER,  commanding  the  Brooklyn;  or  other  naval  officers  in  com 
mand;  and  Lieutenant  ADAM  j.  SLEMMER,  First  Regiment  Artillery, 
U.  8.  A,  commanding  Fort  Pickens: 

In  consequence  of  the  assurances  received  from  Mr.  Mallory,  in  a  tele 
gram  of  yesterday  to  Messrs.  Bigler,  Hunter,  and  Slidell,  with  a  request 
that  it  should  be  laid  before  the  President,  that  Fort  Pickens  would  not 
be  assaulted ;  and  an  offer  of  such  an  assurance  to  the  same  effect  from 
Colonel  Chase,  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  a  hostile  collision,  upon  re 
ceiving  satisfactory  assurances  from  Mr.  Mallory  and  Colonel  Chase  that 


298  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Fort  Pickens  will  not  be  attacked ;  yon  are  instructed  not  to  land  the 
company  on  board  the  Brooklyn,  unless  said  fort  shall  be  attacked,  or 
preparations  shall  be  made  for  its  attack.  The  provisions  necessary  for 
the  supply  of  the  fort  you  will  land.  The  Brooklyn  and  the  other  ves- 
sels-of-war  on  the  station  will  remain,  and  you  will  exercise  the  utmost 
vigilance,  and  be  prepared  at  a  moment's  warning  to  land  the  company 
at  Fort  Pickens ;  and  you  and  they  will  instantly  repel  any  attack  on 
the  fort. 

The  President  yesterday  sent  a  special  message  to  Congress  commend 
ing  the  Virginia  resolutions  of  compromise.  The  commissioners  of 
different  States  are  to  meet  here  on  Monday,  fourth  (4th)  of  February, 
and  it  is  important  that,  during  their  session,  a  collision  of  arms  should 
be  avoided,  unless  an  attack  should  be  made,  or  there  should  be  prep 
arations  for  such  an  attack.  In  either  event,  the  Brooklyn  and  the 
other  vessels  will  act  promptly.  Your  right,  and  that  of  other  offi 
cers  in  command  at  Pensacola,  freely  to  communicate  with  the  Govern 
ment,  by  special  messenger,  and  its  right,  in  the  same  manner,  to 
communicate  with  yourselves  and  them,  will  remain  intact,  as  the 
basis  of  the  present  instructions. 

J.  HOLT,  Secretary  of  War. 

I.  TOUCEY,  Secretary  of  Navy. 

This  message  explains  itself.  Its  object  was  to  leave  the 
rebels  at  Pensacola,  as  they  were  also  at  Charleston,  to  complete, 
at  their  leisure  and  without  interruption,  the  batteries  by  which 
they  could  not  only  defend  themselves,  but  could  batter  down 
Sumter  and  Pickens  so  soon  as  they  were  prepared.  "When 
afterward,  subsequent  to  Mr.  Lincoln's  inauguration,  General 
Scott  sent  an  order  to  land  the  troops  in  the  Brooklyn,  knowing 
nothing  of  the  secret  compact,  Captain  Adams,  commanding 
the  squadron  there,  refused  to  obey,  and  justified  himself  by 
stating  that  it  would  violate  the  armistice  which  had  been  en 
tered  into  with  the  rebel  leaders. 

At  this  point  in  the  history,  Fort  Sumter  becomes  connected 
with  Fort  Pickens  in  the  movements  of  the  Government ;  and 
in  order  to  set  in  a  clear  light  the  relief  of  Fort  Pickens,  it  is 
necessary  to  refer  to  some  facts,  related  in  another  chapter,  con 
cerning  Sumter.  The  policy  of  Mr.  Buchanan  and  his  Cabinet 
in  reference  to  the  Southern  forts  very  naturally  had  some  in 
fluence  at  first  upon  Mr.  Lincoln's  administration.  For  some 


THE   BELIEF   OF   FOKT   PICKETS.  299 

weeks  there  was  apparent  hesitancy,  and  some  real  division  of 
opinion  in  his  Cabinet  as  to  sending  troops  and  provisions  to 
Major  Anderson  and  his  beleaguered  garrison.  The  Secretary 
of  State  was  understood  to  have  been  decidedly  in  favor  of 
leaving  Sumter  without  assistance,  and  even  of  giving  it  up  into 
the  hands  of  the  rebels.  His  earnest  wishes,  and  the  well- 
known  opinions  of  General  Scott  and  most  of  the  Cabinet,  may 
have  induced  Mr.  Seward  to  suppose  that  it  was  perfectly 
safe  to  make  the  promise  that  the  fort  should  be  evacuated, 
which  promise  Judge  Campbell  declares  was  made.  Mr. 
Seward  may  have  considered  it  already  decided  upon,  and  as 
lacking  only  the  formal  action.  Unexpectedly,  however,  Mr. 
Lincoln,  in  the  latter  part  of  March,  decided  to  assume  the  re 
sponsibility  himself,  and  to  send  an  expedition  to  Sumter.  This 
decision  was  promptly  acted  upon ;  and  selecting  Captain  IJox, 
then  in  private  life,  to  command  the  relieving  squadron,  he 
was  sent  to  New  York  to  get  it  ready  for  sea. 

At  this  time  it  seemed  as  if  nothing  could  be  concealed 
from  the  conspirators.  In  some  manner  they  often  penetrated 
even  Cabinet  secrets,  and  a  knowledge  or  a  suspicion  of  what 
was  being  done  having  reached  the  self-styled  rebel  commis 
sioners,  they  asked  from  the  State  Department,  indirectly  and 
unofficially,  of  course,  an  explanation.  "What  was  meant  by  the 
reply, " Faith  Jcept  in  regard  to  Sumter,  wait  and  see" each  one 
must  judge  for  himself  and  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events. 
It  was  charged  at  the  time,  or  as  soon  as  the  facts  were  known, 
that  the  Secretary  of  State,  having'committed  himself,  unoffici 
ally ,  to  the  rebel  commissioners,  determined  to  thwart  the 
purpose  of  the  President,  and  prevent  the  relief  of  the  fort.  To 
decide  such  questions  is  not  the  province  of  the  historian,  but 
he  has  no  right  to  conceal  the  facts,  and  upon  them  the  country 
will  make  up  its  verdict. 

It  was  well  known,  of  course,  to  the  members  of  the  Cabinet 
that  the  expedition  under  Captain  Fox  was  being  rapidly  fitted 
out  in  ]STew  York,  and  it  was  also  known  that  the  Government 
had  at  command  but  a  single  vessel  whose  size  and  battery 
were  sufficient  for  the  main  force  of  the  proposed  squadron,  the 
Powhatan,  commanded  by  Captain  Samuel  Mercer.  This  ship 
and  other  smaller  ones  and  a  few  transports  were  placed  by  the 


300  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Secretary  of  the  Navy  at  the  control  of  Captain  Fox,  to  carry 
out  the  intentions  of  the  President.  All  who  knew  any  thing 
of  the  matter  also  knew  that  without  the  Powhatan  the  expedi 
tion  must  necessarily  fail. 

The  following  facts  will  show  what  was  actually  done.  An 
order  was  procured  from  the  President,  without  his  understand 
ing  its  real  import,  as  he  afterward  declared,  which  order 
authorized  the  employment  of  the  Powhatan  for  another  service. 
The  existence  of  this  order  and  its  object  were  carefully  con 
cealed  from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  and  from  Captain  Fox, 
under  whose  eye  the  Powhatan  was  being  fitted  out  for  Sumter. 
The  Secretary,  and  Captain  Mercer,  who  commanded  the  Pow 
hatan,  supposed  all  was  going  smoothly  on. 

"When  the  Powhatan  was  ready  she  started  down  the  bay 
under  orders  for  Sumter.  "When  off  Staten  Island  the  ship  was 
boarded,  and  an  order  produced  from  the  President  transferring 
the  ship  from  the  command  of  Captain  Mercer  to  Lieutenant 
D.  D.  Porter,  who  took  charge  of  her,  and  she  went  on  her  way, 
not  to  Sumter,  but  to  Fort  Pickens,  neither  Captain  Fox  nor  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  having  been  notified  of  any  change. 
Captain  Mercer  left  the  vessel  and  went  ashore.  Thus,  as  is 
detailed  more  at  length  in  another  chapter,  the  expedition  to 
Fort  Sumter  was  defeated,  while  the  Harvey  telegram,  giving 
information  to  the  rebels  that  an  attempt  would  be  made  to  re 
lieve  Sumter,  induced  them  to  order  an  immediate  attack,  and 
the  fort  was  captured. 

When  these  facts  became  known,  it  was  seen  that  they  bore 
somewhat  heavily  upon  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  an  explana 
tory  statement  was  made  by  General  (then  Captain)  Meigs. 
He  states  in  substance  that  he  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
planned  an  expedition  for  the  relief  of  Fort  Pickens,  so  impor 
tant  that  it  was  necessary  to  keep  it  entirely  secret  even  from  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  himself,  although  his  ships  were  abso 
lutely  necessary  in  carrying  out  their  plan.  The  manner  in 
which  the  Powhatan  was  obtained  is  thus  very  frankly  stated 
by  General  Meigs :  "  An  order,"  he  says,  "  was  extracted  "  (per 
haps  a  well-chosen  word)  "on  the  recommendation  of  Sec 
retary  Seward,  detaching  the  Powhatan  from  the  Sumter  ex 
pedition  and  sending  her  to  Fort  Pickens."  At  the  close  of  his 


THE    RELIEF    OF   FOET   PICKETS.  301 

statement  General  Meigs  says :  "  In  conclusion,  permit  me  to 
remark  that  this,  the  first  successful  military  expedition  of  the 
war,  originated  with  Mr.  Seward.  Until  it  sailed,  the  United 
States  had  declined  everywhere." 

The  brilliancy  of  this  exploit  will  be  tested  by  the  following 
facts.  In  January,  1861,  the  Brooklyn  had  been  sent  out  to 
Fort  Pickens  with  troops  to  reenforce  the  garrison.  On  the 
29th  January  the  telegram  quoted  before  was  sent,  forbidding 
the  landing  of  the  troops.  General  Scott  sent  out  an  order,  dated 
March.  12th,  directing  that  the  troops  should  be  landed  from  the 
Brooklyn.  This  Captain  Adams,  commanding  the  squadron, 
declined  to  do,  justifying  himself  by  the  armistice  which  had 
been  entered  into  between  Secretary  Holt  and  Secretary  Toucey 
and  the  rebel  leaders.  The  following  is  the  letter  of  Captain 
Adams  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  to  which  is  added  the  re 
ply  of  Mr.  Welles : 

U.  S.  FRIGATE  SABINE,  OFF  PENSACOLA,  April  1, 1861. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  a  copy  of  a  letter  addressed  to  me 
by  Captain  Vodges,  U.  S.  A.,  who  is  here  in  command  of  some  troops 
sent  out  in  January  last,  to  reenforce  the  garrison  of  Fort  Pickens.  I 
have  declined  to  land  the  men  as  Captain  Vodges  requests,  as  it  would 
be  in  direct  violation  of  the  orders  of  the  Navy  Department  under  which 
I  am  acting.  The  instructions  from  General  Scott  to  Captain  Vodges 
are  of  old  date  (March  12th),  and  may  have  been  given  without  a  full 
knowledge  of  the  condition  of  affairs  here — they  would  be  no  justifica 
tion.  Such  a  step  is  too  important  to  be  taken  without  the  clearest 
orders  from  proper  authority.  It  would  certainly  be  viewed  as  a  hos 
tile  act,  and  would  be  resisted  to  the  utmost.  No  one  acquainted 
with  the  feelings  of  the  military  assembled  under  General  Bragg  can 
doubt  that  it  would  be  considered  not  only  a  declaration  but  an  act  of  war. 
It  would  be  a  serious  thing  to  bring  on  by  any  precipitation  a  collision 
which  may  be  entirely  against  the  wishes  of  the  Administration.  At 
present  both  sides  are  faithfully  observing  the  agreement  entered  into  by 
the  United  States  Government  with  Mr.  Mallory  and  Colonel  Chase. 
This  agreement  binds  us  not  to  reenforce  Fort  Pickens  unless  it  shall  be 
attacked  or  threatened.  It  binds  them  not  to  attack  it  unless  we  should 
attempt  to  reenforce  it.  I  saw  General  Bragg  on  the  30th  ult.,  who  re 
assured  me  the  conditions  on  their  part  should  not  be  violated.  While 
I  cannot  take  on  myself,  under  such  insufficient  authority  as  General 
Scott's  order,  the  fearful  responsibility  of  an  act  which  seems  to  render 


302  HISTORY   OF  THE  UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

civil  war  inevitable,  I  am  ready   at  all  times  to  carry  out  whatever 
orders  I  may  receive  from  the  Honorable  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

In  conclusion,  I  beg  you  will  please  to  send  me  instructions  as  soon 
as  possible,  that  I  may  be  relieved  from  a  painful  embarrassment. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  A.  ADAMS,  Captain,  Senior  Officer  present. 
To  the  Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  April  6, 1861. 
Captain  HENRY  A.  ADAMS,  commanding  Naval  Force  off  Pemacola : 

SIR  :  Your  dispatch  of  April  1st  is  received.  The  Department  re 
grets  that  you  did  not  comply  with  the  request  of  Captain  Vodges  to 
carry  into  effect  the  orders  of  General  Scott,  sent  out  by  the  Crusader 
under  the  orders  of  this  Department. 

You  will  immediately,  on  the  first  favorable  opportunity  after  the 
receipt  of  this  order,  afford  every  facility  to  Captain  Vodges,  by  boats 
and  other  means,  to  enable  him  to  land  the  troops  under  his  command, 
it  being  the  wish  and  intention  of  the  Navy  Department  to  cooperate 
with  the  War  Department  in  that  object. 

I  am,  sir,  respectfully,  etc., 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

In  order  to  a  full  understanding  of  this  whole  matter,  it  is 
well  that  the  reader  should  also  have  before  him  the  following 
letters : 

HEADQUARTERS  or  THE  ARMY,  WASHINGTON,  March  12, 1861. 
SIR  :  At  the  first  favorable  moment  you  will  land  with  your  com 
pany,  reenforce  Fort  Pickens,  and  hold  the  same  until  further  notice. 

Eeport  frequently,  if  opportunities  present  themselves,  on  the  condi 
tion  of  the  fort  and  the  circumstances  around  you.  I  write  by  com 
mand  of  Lieutenant-General  Scott. 

I  am.  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

E.  D.  TOWNSEND,  Assistant  Adjutant- General. 
Captain  I.  VODGES,  U.  S.  A.,  on  board  U.  S.  Sloop-of-War 

the  Brooklyn,  off  Fort  Piclcens,  Pensacola  Harbor,  Fla. 

U.  S.  FRIGATE  SABINE,  OFF  PENSACOLA,  FLA.,  April  1, 1861. 
To  Captain  H.  A.  ADAMS,  commanding  Naval  Forces  off  Pensacola: 

SIR  :  Herewith  I  send  you  a  copy  of  an  order  received  by  me  last 
night  You  will  see  by  it  that  I  am  directed  to  land  my  command  at 


THE   BELIEF   OF   FOET   PICKETS.  303 

the  earliest  opportunity.  I  have,  therefore,  to  request  that  you  will 
place  at  my  disposal  such  boats  and  other  means  as  will  enable  me  to 
carry  into  effect  the  enclosed  order.  Yours,  etc., 

I.  VODGES,  Captain  First  Artillery,  commanding. 

So  soon  as  Captain  Adams's  letter,  which  was  sent  by  a  spe 
cial  messenger  through  the  insurgent  States,  was  received  at 
the  Navy  Department  on  the  afternoon  of  the  6th  of  April,  and 
on  the  evening  of  that  day  Lieutenant  Worden,  who  after 
ward  commanded  the  Monitor  in  her  fight  with  the  Merri- 
mack,  was  sent,  under  orders  from  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  across  the  country  with  an  order  directing  Captain 
Adams  to  land  at  once  the  troops  from  the  Brooklyn.  Lieu 
tenant  Worden  committed  this  to  memory  on  his  way  and  de 
stroyed  the  paper,  lest  he  might  be  arrested  and  the  order  be 
found  upon  him.  Not  without  difficulty  Worden  made  his  way 
to  Pensacola  and  proceeded  to  the  fort  on  the  12th  of  April. 
That  evening  the  fort  was  reenforced  and  made  secure  by  the 
landing  of  the  troops  from  the  Brooklyn. 

Lieutenant  Worden  returned  to  Pensacola  and  commenced 
his  homeward  journey,  but  the  news  of  the  reinforcement  of  the 
fort  preceded  him  through  the  telegraph,  and  it  was  also  sug 
gested  that  he  had  undoubtedly  borne  the  order  for  landing  the 
troops.  He  had  carried  it  in  his  memory,  and  reproducing  it 
from  memory  and  certifying,  as  a  naval  officer,  to  its  correctness, 
it  became  a  valid  order  to  Captain  Adams.  The  result  was, 
that  Worden  was  arrested  as  a  spy  at  Montgomery  and  kept 
there,  in  close  confinement,  for  six  months,  and  was,  as  is  be 
lieved,  the  first  person  seized  as  a  prisoner  in  the  war ;  and  it 
was  a  fitting  retribution  that  afterward  in  the  Monitor  he 
struck  the  fatal  blow  at  the  rebel  navy. 

Thus,  on  the  12th  of  April,  Fort  Pickens  was  relieved  and 
made  secure  by  the  promptness  and  energy  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy,  and  at  the  great  and  personal  risk  and  suffering  of 
one  of  its  officers.  After  all  had  been  accomplished,  so  that  the 
fort  for  the  present  was  secure,  the  Powhatan,  on  the  17th  of 
April,  appeared  off  the  harbor.  The  Atlantic,  one  of  the  trans 
ports,  arrived  on  the  16th  of  April,  and  landed  her  troops  before 
the  Powhatan  came,  and  consequently  without  her  help.  Some 
days  afterward  the  Illinois,  another  transport,  reached  the  harbor. 


304  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

Let  it  now  be  borne  in  mind  that  there  were  already  four 
vessels-of-war  at  Fort  Pickens  or  off  the  harbor — the  Sabine, 
the  Brooklyn,  and  two  others.  The  Powhatan  was  not  needed 
to  cover  the  landing  of  troops.  The  vessels  already  there 
were  not  only  able  to  do  it,  but  did  do  it,  with  no  assistance 
from  the  Powhatan.  Nor  was  the  Powhatan  needed  to  con 
voy  the  transports,  for  she  did  not  sail  in  company  with  them ; 
and,  moreover,  the  Navy  Department  had  provided  for  the 
relief  of  the  fort  independently  of  the  new  expedition,  and  it 
had  already  been  done.  What,  then,  was  the  mission  of  the 
Powhatan  to  Pensacola  ?  If  the  object  was  simply  to  relieve  the 
fort,  was  it  not  quite  sufficient  to  send  the  transports  on,  and  let 
the  vessels  already  there  receive  them  and  protect  their  landing, 
as  they  actually  did  ?  The  Powhatan  was  not  needed  either  to 
convoy  the  transports  or  to  land  the  troops,  and  she  did  neither 
of  these  things.  Besides,  if  there  was  so  great  an  anxiety  in  re 
gard  to  Fort  Pickens,  what  more  natural  than  to  have  stepped 
into  the  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the  ]STavy  to  ascertain  the 
actual  condition  of  things  ?  A  single  inquiry  would  have  dis 
closed  the  fact  that  all  needed  measures  had  already  been 
taken,  and  no  second  expedition  was  required. 

These  facts  seem  to  indicate  that — however  necessary  it 
might  have  been  to  detach  the  Powhatan  from  Captain  Fox's 
squadron  and  secure  the  failure  of  his  expedition,  in  order  to 
"  keep  faith  in  regard  to  Sumter,"  in  spite  of  the  President — 
there  was  no  exigency  in  the  public  service  that  required  that 
she  should  be  sent  to  Pickens.  Whatever  was  intended,  the  re 
sult  was  that  Sumter  was  delivered  into  the  hands  of  the  rebels. 


CHAPTEE 


THE  BEGINNING  OF   THE   CONFLICT—  RESCUE  OF  THE  FRIGATE 
CONSTITUTION. 

SHOULD  the  history  of  the  "  Great  Rebellion"  be  written 
from  the  same  stand-point  which  was  occupied  by  the  historian 
of  the  Jews,  the  interpositions  of  God,  except  those  by  miracle, 
would  perhaps  be  as  frequent  and  as  manifest  as  those  which 
marked  the  exodus  of  the  Hebrews  and  their  settlement  in 
Canaan. 

Every  believer  in  the  Christian's  God  —  a  God  who  has  not 
only  created,  but  who  superintends  and  directs  the  affairs  of  His 
universe,  so  that  not  a  sparrow  falls  without  His  knowledge  —  will 
not  fail  to  perceive  a  guiding  and  protecting  power  controlling 
the  great  conflict  throughout  all  its  course,  saving  the  North 
from  the  natural  consequences  of  mistakes  and  folly  ;  turning 
apparent  disaster  into  actual  triumph  ;  educating  the  public 
mind,  alike  by  defeat  and  victory,  until  the  real  nature  of  the 
conflict  was  clearly  seen  and  the  country  was  prepared  to  adopt 
the  only  means  through  which  God  would  grant  us  success. 

The  grand  battle  in  all  its  essential  features,  its  duration,  its 
range,  its  magnitude,  the  forces  and  weapons  on  either  side,  the 
influence  abroad  and  at  home,  all  lay  without  the  field  of  ordi 
nary  human  calculation. 

Some,  then  regarded  as  among  the  most  sagacious  statesmen, 
predicted  that  the  course  of  the  rebellion  would  be  limited  to 
ninety  days  ;  the  President  thought  it  quite  sufficient  to  ask  for 
seventy-five  thousand  men  ;  shrewd  men,  as  they  were  thought 
to  be,  talked  of  the  necessity  of  thirty  or  forty  sailing  vessels  for 
the  blockade  ;  most  were  fully  determined  that  slavery  should 
20 


306  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

by  no  means  have  any  place  in  the  struggle,  and  statesmen  and 
politicians  in  Europe  viewed  the  cause  of  the  North  as  abso 
lutely  hopeless ;  they  even  regarded  the  whole  question  as  settled 
before  the  battle  began. 

The  events  of  the  war,  as  it  went  on,  baffled  all  human  fore 
sight.  That  which  all  men  expected  did  not  come  to  pass,  that 
which  all  declared  could  never  be  accomplished  was  actually 
done ;  and  our  leaders  were  compelled  to  adopt  measures  which 
they  had  rejected  not  only  as  unwise  but  impossible. 

Both  parties  triumphed  where  they  expected  defeat,  and 
were  defeated  where  they  counted  upon  certain  and  easy  vic 
tory.  Both  were  borne  on  by  a  force  which  they  could  not 
resist,  the  one  to  ultimate  success,  and  the  other  to  ruin ;  and 
that  force  was  the  directing  power  of  God. 

In  the  latter  part  of  April,  1861,  and  soon  after  the  firing 
upon  Fort  Sumter,  the  rebels  were  rapidly  completing  a  battle- 
line  that  stretched  across  the  territory  of  the  United  States,  from 
Southwestern  Missouri  to  Chesapeake  Bay.  It  is  not  intended 
to  state  that  this  was  one  unbroken  chain  of  military  posts  within 
supporting  distance  of  each  other,  but  that  main  positions  were 
occupied,  and  there  was  a  general  movement  to  establish  and 
maintain  this  as  the  chief  line  of  defence. 

This  line  was  stretched  far  to  the  north  of  the  city  of  "Wash 
ington;  and  as  Maryland  was  expected  to  hold  securely  the 
northeastern  point,  and  so  cut  off  all  direct  communication  with 
the  North,  it  was  thought  by  the  rebels  that  the  capital  would 
be  speedily  and  easily  captured,  and  as  easily  held,  because  it 
would  be  at  least  forty  miles  within  their  lines.  On  the  evening 
of  April  19,  1861,  a  mob  from  Baltimore  lay  in  w^ait  for  the 
train  from  Philadelphia  at  Canton,  fired  at  the  engineer,  who 
stopped  the  train,  when  the  ruffians  drove  the  passengers  from 
the  cars  and  took  the  train  back  to  Gunpowder  Creek,  where 
they  burned  the  draw  of  the  bridge ;  then  came  back  to  Bush 
River,  and  burned  the  draw  of  the  bridge  at  that  point,  thus 
cutting  off  all  railroad  communication  between  Baltimore  and 
the  North,  and  preventing  the  sending  of  troops  by  rail.  At 
the  same  time  the  Government  was  informed  that  no  more 
troops  from  the  North  could  pass  through  Baltimore  unless  they 
could  fight  their  way  through. 


THE    BEGINNING    OF   THE    CONFLICT.  307 

Thus,  as  was  thought,  Washington  was  effectually  cut  off 
from  the  North  in  that  direction.  At  the  same  time  the  shores 
of  the  Potomac  were  occupied  with  rebel  batteries,  which,  as 
was  supposed,  would  prevent  troops  or  provisions  from  reaching 
the  capital  by  wrater.  The  boast  that  the  rebel  flag  would 
float  from  the  dome  of  the  capitol  before  the  end  of  May 
seemed  not  entirely  unreasonable,  when  Washington  was  thus 
hemmed  in  on  both  sides,  when  a  formidable  army  was  being 
rapidly  organized  in  Virginia  for  its  capture,  and  when,  as  it 
would  seem,  the  one  thought  of  the  rebels  was  to  rush  upon  the 
city  while  thus  isolated  and  comparatively  defenceless. 

Why  it  was  not  done  is  one  of  those  mysteries  of  human 
conduct  which  are  not  to  be  explained  by  any  of  the  ordinary 
motives  that  govern  men,  and  must  probably  be  referred  to  in 
fluences  exerted  upon  the  mind  by  a  superior  power.  That 
Washington  might  have  been  captured  in  the  early  days  of  the 
contest,  with  the  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  rebel  chief,  no  one 
now  probably  doubts.  Why  it  was  not  done  it  may  be  impossi 
ble  to  say.  It  was  one  of  the  great  opportunities  which,  once 
lost,  never  return.  While  Washington  was  in  this  condition,  and 
Baltimore  and  its  railroads  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Potomac 
on  the  other  were  held  by  the  rebels,  a  plan  was  conceived  for 
capturing  the  frigate  Constitution,  then  lying  in  the  harbor  of 
Annapolis  as  a  school-ship  connected  with  the  United  States 
Naval  Academy. 

The  conspirators  were  inspired  with  the  thought  that  this 
historic  ship,  the  pride  and  favorite  of  the  country,  and  so  well 
known  in  Europe,  might  be  the  first  to  bear  their  traitor  flag, 
and  thus  a  rebel  navy  would  be  born  in  a  manner  that  would 
kindle  enthusiasm  at  the  South  in  proportion  as  it  would  hum 
ble  and  depress  the  North.  Immediately  after  the  secession  of 
Virginia,  the  intentions  of  the  rebels  were  so  plainly  manifested 
that  it  was  thought  to  be  of  the  utmost  importance  to  get  the 
frigate  over  the  bar.  She  was  nearly  defenceless  where  she  lay, 
having  only  a  crew  of  twenty-five  men,  and  a  class  of  seventy-six 
midshipmen  from  the  academy,  who  slept  at  their  quarters,  and 
she  was  therefore  liable  at  any  time  to  be  attacked  by  board 
ing.  Troops  were  constantly  drilling  on  shore  and  exchanging 
signals,  while  large  parties  were  around  the  ship,  apparently 


308  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

seeking  the  most  assailable  point.  She  had  four  anchors  out 
when  the  order  came  to  get  her  over  the  bar.  One  anchor  was 
raised,  and  the  other  cables  were  slipped.  By  one  of  those 
curious  coincidences  which  impart  great  interest  to  what  would 
otherwise  be  unimportant  facts,  the  Eighth  Massachusetts  regi 
ment,  under  the  command  of  General  Butler,  had  just  reached 
Annapolis.  They  were  hastening  to  the  relief  of  Washington, 
and  when  they  arrived  at  Havre  de  Grace  found  that  the  rail 
road  bridges  between  that  point  and  Baltimore  had  been  burned, 
and  their  further  progress  by  rail  was  stopped.  General  Butler 
was  not  a  man  to  be  easily  thwarted,  and  the  soldiers  shared 
his  spirit.  He  procured  a  steamboat  and  proceeded  with  his 
regiment  to  Annapolis,  with  the  intention  of  marching  from 
that  point  to  "Washington.  He  reached  Annapolis  in  season  to 
render  the  country  an  important  service,  in  connection  with  the 
United  States  officers  who  had  the  old  frigate  in  charge.  At 
the  request  of  the  superintendent  of  the  Naval  Academy,  he 
placed  a  detachment  of  his  troops,  who  had  been  seamen,  on 
board  the  ship,  to  assist  the  crew,  and  then  the  steamer  Mary 
land,  which  the  general  had  seized,  was  brought  alongside  for 
the  purpose  of  towing  her  out,  having  first  received  the  frigate's 
guns  in  order  to  lighten  her.  The  officers  and  engineer  of  the 
Maryland  w^ere  so  averse  to  the  duty,  that  it  was  necessary  to 
put  them  under  a  guard  with  revolvers,  to  compel  them  to  work 
and  proceed  with  the  vessel.  The  frigate,  by  great  exertions, 
was  at  length  dragged  over  the  bar,  but  grounded  on  the  outer 
spit.  She  was  still  in  a  perilous  position.  At  10  p.  M.  word 
was  brought  that  an  attempt  was  about  to  be  made  to  obstruct 
the  channel  outside  of  the  ship. 

It  was  seen  that  what  was  to  be  done  must  be  done  quickly. 
Kedges  were  laid  out,  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  warp  the 
frigate  over  the  spit,  while  a  part  of  the  crew  stood  by  the  guns 
which  had  been  replaced  after  passing  the  bar.  The  ship  was 
started,  but  the  traitor  officers  of  the  Maryland  took  advantage 
of  the  occasion  to  run  the  steamer  aground,  and,  a  squall  com 
ing  up,  the  Constitution  was  driven  ashore  again.  Not  knowing 
how  soon  they  might  be  attacked,  nor  by  what  numbers,  or 
whether  escape  might  not  be  effectually  prevented  by  the  ob 
structing  of  the  channel,  the  officers  and  crew  passed  the  re- 


THE   BEGINNING   OF   THE    CONFLICT.  309 

maining  hours  of  the  night  in  great  anxiety.  Greatly  to  their 
relief,  at  daylight  a  steam-tug  from  Havre  de  Grace  was  seen 
approaching,  and  by  its  aid  the  noble  old  frigate  was  towed 
out.  The  Constitution  wras  originally  manned  by  men  from 
Massachusetts  when  she  was  being  prepared  to  win  the  first 
great  triumph  of  the  American  Navy,  and  it  was  a  fitting  coin 
cidence  that  Massachusetts  men,  long  after,  should  be  permitted 
to  aid  in  saving  her  from  the  dishonor  of  carrying  at  her  mast 
head  the  flag  of  the  traitors.  She  was  immediately  taken 
round  to  New  York  by  the  steamer  R.  R.  Cuyler.  Next  to 
the  occupation  of  Washington,  few  things  could  have  given  the 
rebels  greater  satisfaction,  or  obtained  for  them  more  eclat  in 
England,  than  the  capture  of  Old  Ironsides.  Thanks  to  Com 
modore  Blake  and  his  assistant  officers,  and  to  General  Butler 
and  his  boys  from  the  Old  Bay  State,  they  missed  the  coveted 
prize. 

It  is,  perhaps,  impossible  to  say  where  a  proper,  authorized 
faith  in  the  Providence  of  God  ends,  and  what  we  call  super 
stition  begins ;  but  it  doubtless  had  some  influence  upon  both  par 
ties  that  the  attack  upon  this  historic  frigate,  the  representa 
tive  of  the  days  of  our  naval  renown,  should  have  utterly  failed, 
and  that  she  came  unscathed  to  the  North,  bringing  her  na 
tional  honors  and  national  name,  and  bearing  that  same  national 
flag  which  long  ago  she  had  so  nobly  defended. 

It  is  probably  the  last  peril  that  Old  Ironsides  will  ever  en 
counter.  She  has  far  outlived  her  age,  and,  comparatively  use 
less  in  our  modern  war,  like  a  worn-out  veteran,  she  is  honored 
and  loved  for  what  she  has  been,  and  the  glorious  achievements 
of  her  youth,  when  not  merely  from  her  actual  power,  but  from 
enthusiastic  faith  in  her  invincibility,  she  was  the  most  formi 
dable  frigate  of  the  world.  She  has  fitly  bequeathed  her  pet 
name  to  one  far  more  powerful  than  herself;  for  a  whole  squad 
ron  of  frigates,  such  as  the  Constitution  was  in  the  day  of  her 
pride,  would  be  no  match  for  the  terrible  battery  of  our  New 
Ironsides,  which  was  the  queen  of  broadside  iron-clads. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 

OPERATIONS  ON  THE  POTOMAC. 

IF  we  may  judge  of  the  designs  of  the  rebels  by  their  opera 
tions,  we  may  believe  that  the  plan  of  their  first  campaign  was 
to  isolate  Washington  on  the  north  by  stretching  their  battle- 
line  to  Baltimore,  and  holding  all  the  railroads  leading  from 
that  city  north,  west,  and  south,  so  as  to  shut  off  from  the 
capital  both  reinforcements  and  supplies,  and  then  so  to  block 
ade  the  Potomac  that  nothing  could  reach  it  from  the  south. 
In  this  way,  as  they  thought,  it  would  fall  an  easy  prey  to  the 
army  which  they  were  then  massing  in  Yirginia.  "When  this  was 
partially  unfolded,  and  in  part  successfully  executed,  when  sym 
pathizers  controlled  Baltimore,  when  her  railroads  were  seized, 
when  Northern  troops  were  forbidden  to  march  across  the  soil 
of  Maryland,  and  batteries  were  established  on  the  Potomac,  and 
the  rebel  flag  was  flying  so  near  as  Alexandria,  in  sight  of  the 
capitol,  it  was  thought  by  men  of  good  military  judgment  that 
the  success  of  the  conspirators  was  nearly  certain.  They  and 
all  their  friends  believed  it,  and  throughout  the  South  the  occu 
pation  of  "Washington  was  regarded  as  a  thing  already  accom 
plished,  and  this  unbounded  confidence  was,  in  all  probability, 
one  chief  cause  of  their  failure. 

When  troops  from  the  North,  overcoming  all  obstacles,  be 
gan  to  pour  into  Washington,  and  it  became  apparent  that  the 
North  would  keep  its  highways  across  Maryland  open  at  all 
hazards,  then,  as  there  was  but  one  line  of  railroad  between  the 
capital  and  Baltimore,  it  was  believed  that  this  would  prove 
insufficient  to  transport  both  troops  and  supplies,  and  therefore 
more  strenuous  efforts  were  made  by  the  conspirators  to  close 
the  Potomac. 


OPERATIONS   ON   THE    POTOMAC.  311 

From  Alexandria  southward  the  commanding  points  were 
occupied,  and  batteries  were  established  and  mounted  with 
guns,  which,  as  was  soon  seen,  were  of  longer  range  than  most 
on  board  our  vessels.  After  the  burning  and  seizure  of  the 
navy-yard  at  Norfolk,  batteries  were  also  planted  at  all  the 
strategic  points  in  the  neighboring  waters. 

It  is  easily  seen  that  "Washington  would  be  in  constant  peril, 
if  it  could  be  shut  up  to  the  single  line  of  railroad ;  and,  as 
these  batteries  could  not  be  approached  by  land  by  any  force 
then  at  command,  the  Government  was  compelled  to  turn  to 
the  JSravy  Department  for  the  needed  assistance.  Indeed,  with 
out  a  naval  force  to  engage  these  batteries,  and  keep  the  Poto 
mac  open,  our  cause  would,  at  the  first,  have  been  nearly  hope 
less.  Could  the  insurgents  have  succeeded  in  closing  the  Poto 
mac,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  collect  at  Washington 
an  army  sufficient  for  the  defence  of  the  city,  and  even  if  the 
troops  could  have  been  brought  on,  they  could  not  have  been 
supplied  with  provisions  and  munitions  of  war  without  the  aid 
of  the  river. 

The  very  first  operations  of  the  Navy  were  vital  to  the  suc 
cess  of  the  cause,  and  yet  from  their  very  nature  were  almost 
unknown  to  the  public.  Every  movement  of  the  Army  was 
made  known  in  all  quarters  of  the  land,  and  it  was  right  that  it 
should  be  so ;  but  if  the  people  could  have  known  what  another 
class  of  men  on  the  ships  were  doing  and  suffering  for  the 
common  cause,  and  what  sleepless  vigilance  and  untiring  activ 
ity  were  necessary  both  for  seamen  and  officers  to  render  success 
possible  for  the  Army,  then  the  Navy  would  have  also  received 
from  the  first  its  due  proportion  of  honor. 

The  first  business  of  the  Navy  on  the  Potomac  was  to  pa 
trol  the  river  from  Washington  to  its  mouth,  to  inspect  both 
shores  daily  so  far  as  possible,  and  to  observe  whether  any  prep 
arations  for  batteries  were  being  made  at  any  point,  and  watch 
for  any  transports  with  troops  or  provisions,  and  convoy  them 
to  Washington. 

Every  effort  was  made  by  the  rebels  to  keep  up  a  constant 
and  active  communication  between  the  two  shores  of  the  Poto 
mac  ;  mails  from  Washington  and  from  Northern  sympathizers 
and  their  friends  generally,  and  supplies  of  all  kinds,  were  con- 


312  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

veyed  across  the  river  by  night,  and  a  night-patrol  or  picket- 
guard,  composed  of  the  boats  of  the  ships,  was  among  the  ardu 
ous  duties  which  were  constantly  performed.  They  destroyed  all 
the  row-boats  they  could  find,  and  all  visible  means  of  crossing 
the  river ;  they  intercepted  a  large  number  of  rebel  mails  and 
smugglers ;  but  with  all  their  watchfulness,  many  an  enterpris 
ing  rebel  escaped  their  scrutiny,  and  quite  a  regular  interchange 
of  letters  was  kept  up  between  the  conspirators  and  their  North 
ern  accomplices. 

The  Potomac  flotilla  was  composed  of  small  vessels,  which 
at  first  carried  only  a  light  armament,  and  were  therefore  not 
very  formidable  antagonists  of  land  batteries  armed  with  heav 
ier  guns  than  their  own,  and  this  must  be  considered  when  esti 
mating  the  work  they  performed.  The  Pawnee  was  the  largest 
among  them,  and  she  was  a  sloop  of  less  than  1,300  tons,  with 
a  battery  of  fifteen  guns,  none  of  which,  at  first,  were  of  large 
calibre  or  long  range.  The  following  quotation  from  Sir  How 
ard  Douglas  is  applicable  to  the  circumstances  under  which 
these  small  wooden  vessels  fought  the  shore  batteries  on  the 
Potomac :  "  The  attack  of  fortresses  and  powerful  land  batteries 
with  a  naval  force  only,  must  ever  be  a  hazardous,  anS  perhaps 
desperate  undertaking." 

The  first  report  of  the  establishment  of  any  batteries  on  the 
upper  Potomac  was  from  the  commander  of  the  steamer  Poca- 
hontas,  May  14,  1861.  He  states,  from  information  derived 
from  another,  that  a  battery,  an  earthwork,  with  four  embra 
sures,  had  been  erected  at  the  railroad  terminus  at  Aquia 
Creek,  about  forty-five  miles  from  Washington.  The  Govern 
ment  at  that  moment  seemed  indisposed  to  precipitate  hostili 
ties  ;  and  for  some  days  our  vessels,  not  being  attacked,  confined 
themselves  to  watching,  and  reporting  the  progress  of  the  works. 

In  the  mean  time  it  had  been  determined  that  Alexandria 
should  be  occupied,  preparatory  to  a  general  movement  into  Vir 
ginia.  On  the  23d  of  May  the  Pawnee  was  lying  off  the  town, 
commanding  it  completely  with  her  batteries.  She  remained  in 
this  position  until  the  24th,  having  it  in  her  power  at  any  time 
to  capture  or  destroy  the  city,  but  there  was  no  cooperating 
land  force  by  which  it  could  be  held.  On  the  morning  of  the 
24th  two  steamers  were  seen  coming  down  from  the  navy-yard, 


OPERATIONS    ON    THE   POTOMAC.  313 

with  troops  on  board ;  and,  as  they  approached  the  town,  the 
commander  of  the  Pawnee,  seeing  that  the  men  necessary  to 
hold  the  place  were  at  hand,  sent  a  boat  with  a  lieutenant  on 
shore  to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  city.  The  lieutenant 
held  a  consultation  with  the  insurgent  officer  commanding  the 
rebel  force,  who  refused  to  surrender,  but  agreed  to  evacuate 
the  place  by  8  o'clock  A.  M.  Lieutenant  Lowry,  in  returning 
to  his  ship,  reached  the  wharf  just  in  season  to  meet  Colonel  Ells 
worth  landing  with  his  regiment  of  Zouaves.  He  informed  him 
of  the  arrangement  made  for  the  evacuation  of  the  city.  After 
reaching  the  Pawnee,  Lieutenant  Lowry  was  again  sent  on 
shore  to  cooperate  with  the  troops.  Not  finding  Colonel  Ells 
worth  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  for  he  was  shot  about 
that  time,  Lieutenant  Lowry  hoisted  the  American  flag  over 
the  custom-house  and  upon  a  flag-staff  in  the  street.  He  also 
took  possession  of  a  train  of  freight-cars  just  starting,  but  the  lo 
comotive  escaped.  At  this  time  a  detachment  of  troops  arrived, 
that  had  marched  from  Washington  by  land,  under  Colonel 
Wilcox,  and  the  commander  of  the  Pawnee,  S.  C.  Rowan,  sur 
rendered  his  jurisdiction  to  the  Army.  As  the  work  of  the 
Navy  in  this  early  movement  has  been  little  known,  if  at  all, 
the  official  reports  of  Commander  S.  C.  Rowan  and  Lieutenant 
Lowry  are  subjoined : 

U.  S.  STEAMER  PAWNEE,  OFF  ALEXANDRIA,  May  29, 1861. 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  your  order  of  yesterday's  date,  to  "  furnish  the 
Department  with  a  minute  report  of  your  [my]  proceedings  during  the 
night  and  morning  of  the  23d  and  24th  instant,  communicating  any 
thing  of  interest  or  importance  that  came  under  your  [my]  observation" 
— in  reply,  I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  during  the  night  of  the  23d 
nothing  of  interest  or  importance  occurred.  On  the  morning  of  the 
24th,  about  daylight,  two  steamers  containing  the  Zouave  regiment 
approached  Alexandria  from  the  navy-yard,  for  the  purpose  of  landing 
and  occupying  that  city.  As  soon  as  the  steamer  came  in  full  view  of 
the  city,  and  so  near  as  not  to  expose  the  secresy  of  the  expedition,  I 
sent  Lieutenant  Lowry  on  shore  to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  town. 
Lieutenant  Lowry  returned  to  the  wharf  in  time  to  meet  Colonel  Ells 
worth  as  he  landed,  and  informed  him  that  no  resistance  would  be  made 
— that  the  town  would  be  evacuated.  Shortly  after  Lieutenant  Lowry 
left  the  ship,  I  sent  Lieutenant  Chaplin  in  the  first  cutter  to  lie  off  the 


314  HISTORY    OF    THE   UNTIED   STATES    NAVY. 

starting-point  of  the  railroad  cars,  and  to  jump  on  shore  immediately 
tlie  steamers  touched  the  wharf,  and  cut  oft'  the  departure  of  the  early 
morning  train  then  at  that  point.  The  engine  escaped,  but  the  burden- 
cars  laden  with  railroad  iron  were  captured. 

I  sent  a  cutter,  in  charge  of  the  master,  to  bring  out  two  steamers, 
the  Collyer  and  Gypsy,  that  had  been  seized  by  the  secessionists;  the 
former  belonged  to  parties  in  Washington,  and  the  latter  to  parties  in 
Maryland.  Both  these  vessels  have  been  turned  over  to  their  respec 
tive  commanders  by  the  authority  of  the  Department,  and  are  now  on 
their  routes — the  first  between  Washington  and  Alexandria,  and  the 
other  between  Alexandria  and  Fort  Washington.  I  directed  Lieuten 
ant  Lowry  to  return  to  the  town  and  cooperate  with  the  troops,  under 
the  impression  that  Colonel  Ellsworth's  command  was  the  only  force  then 
moving  on  Alexandria,  and  that  his  knowledge  of  the  localities,  together 
with  this  additional  force,  would,  in  case  of  resistance,  be  valuable. 

In  demanding  the  surrender  of  Alexandria  I  was  actuated  solely  by 
motives  of  humanity.  I  knew  the  town  to  be  full  of  helpless  women 
and  children,  mostly  of  the  middle  and  poorer  classes,  whom  I  saw  run 
ning  frantically  through  the  streets  in  search  of  protection  as  the  troops 
landed. 

A  detailed  account  of  what  took  place  on  shore,  connected  with  this 
ship,  will  be  found  in  the  accompanying  report  made  by  Lieutenant 
Lowry. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  C.  ROWAN,  Commander. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

U.  S.  STEAMEB  PAWNEE,  OFF  ALEXANDRIA,  VA.,  May  24, 1861, 10.30  A.  M. 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  your  verbal  order,  given  this  morning  about 
4.20  A.  M.,  I  proceeded  on  shore  at  this  place  and  communicated  with 
Major  Jewett,  commanding  the  Virginian  secession  forces  at  Alexandria. 
In  your  name  I  demanded  the  surrender  of  the  place,  stating  that,  as  we 
were  prepared  to  seize  the  place,  it  would  be  useless  to  resist,  and  that 
you  were  actuated  simply  by  a  desire  to  spare  the  shedding  the  blood 
of  women  and  children. 

The  interview  was  held  in  the  open  street,  surrounded  by  excited 
soldiers.  Major  Jewett  said  he  would  not  surrender,  that  he  would 
evacuate,  or  was  about  evacuating ;  that  if  hostilities  were  not  opened 
upon  him,  he  would  not  use  any.  He  wanted  to  know  how  much  time 
he  could  have ;  I  told  him  I  did  not  know ;  I  would  return  to  the 
Pawnee ;  that  no  time  was  to  be  lost.  He  said  he  would  require  till 


OPERATIONS   ON   THE   POTOMAC.  315 

8  A.  M.  to  get  such  women,  children,  and  property  out  as  he  would  re 
quire. 

I  said:  "Very  well;  I  will  go  at  once  to  the  Pawnee.  Should  the 
troops  land  and  you  make  no  resistance  I  have  no  doubt  that  no  harm 
will  be  done  to  the  town  and  its  inhabitants;  should  the  Pawnee  be 
obliged  to  open  her  batteries,  no  one  knows  better  than  yourself  what 
would  be  the  result." 

I  hastened  to  the  river-side,  and  reached  the  wharf  just  in  time  to 
witness  the  first  approach  of  the  Zouaves  under  Colonel  Ellsworth  ;  the 
sentries  on  the  wharf  fired  their  muskets,  which  was  returned  by  a  scat 
tering  fire  from  the  troops  on  board  the  transports. 

As  the  troops  commenced  to  land  I  sought  out  Colonel  Ellsworth ; 
told  him  in  these  words :  "  Sir,  I  am  an  officer  of  the  Pawnee ;  I  have 
been  on  shore  with  a  flag  of  truce,  demanding  the  surrender  of  the 
town ;  the  commanding  officer  is  already  evacuating ;  he  promises  to 
make  no  resistance ;  the  town  is  full  of  women  and  children."  Colonel 
Ellsworth  replied:  "All  right,  sir;  I  will  harm  no  one."  I  then  pro 
ceeded  with  a  detachment  of  men  from  the  Pawnee  under  Lieutenant 
Chaplin,  and  took  possession  of  the  railroad  and  some  burden-cars. 

I  informed  Colonel  Ellsworth  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  telegraph 
and  other  places.  He  landed  his  regiment  with  great  rapidity.  I  pro 
ceeded  to  the  Pawnee  and  reported  to  you,  when  you  sent  me  back  at 
once  to  cooperate  with  the  troops,  and  to  say  that,  as  they  had  landed, 
you  had  no  further  jurisdiction,  and  that  I  should  accompany  the  troops 
with  the  Pawnee's  force,  and  take  part  in  what  should  occur.  I  did  so ; 
found  that  Colonel  Ellsworth  was  not  at  the  head  of  his  regiment,  which 
had  marched  some  distance  up  the  street.  After  waiting  some  time,  I 
advanced  through  the  upper  part  of  the  town,  hoisted  the  American 
ensign  on  a  street  flag-staff  and  also  upon  the  custom-house,  where  I  left 
a  small  guard,  and  after  a  rapid  march  through  the  town  reached  the  depot, 
where  I  found  troops  of  the  United  States  in  possession  ;  these  troops  had 
advanced  by  land  from  Washington,  and  were  under  command  of 
Colonel  Wilcox.  I  stated  to  him  the  substance  of  the  above  report 
subsequently,  as  Colonel  Wilcox  called  on  board  this  ship  for  a  better 
explanation  of  our  position.  It  is  proper  to  state  that  your  order  to  me 
was  simply  "  to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  town." 

Any  misunderstanding  which  the  rebels  may  have  had  was  owing 
to  their  excited  condition,  and  exhibited  by  the  rapidity  in  which  they 
evacuated,  not  even  waiting  for  the  time  for  which  they  stipulated.  The 
spirit  of  my  language  was  intended  to  apply  only  for  the  "protection  of 
helpless  women  and  children,"  and  I  so  distinctly  stated  to  Major  Jewett. 


316  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

In  passing  to  and  from  the  interview  with  Major  Je wett,  I  observed 
small  bodies  of  men  in  marchino*  order  hastening  out  of  the  town. 

O  O 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant; 

K.  B.  LOWRY,  Lieutenant  U.  S.  Navy. 
To  Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN, 

commanding  U.  S.  Steam  Sloop  Pawnee. 

These  reports  present,  it  is  true,  no  very  important  achieve 
ment  ;  they  only  show  what  accurate  history  should  record, 
that  the  officers  of  the  Potomac  flotilla  were  with  their  ships 
where  they  should  have  been,  at  the  past  of  duty,  and  even  took 
the  initiative  in  a  work  which,  though  small  in  itself,  created 
at  the  time  a  profound  sensation  on  account  of  the  death  of  the 
lamented  Ellsworth,  and  because  it  was  the  advance  of  the 
movement  into  Virginia. 

It  has  been  said,  that  if  Commander  Rowan  had  not  sent 
his  boat  on  shore,  the  rebel  troops  in  Alexandria  would  have 
been  captured ;  but  it  appears  by  these  letters,  that  when  Lieu 
tenant  Lowry  returned  to  his  boat,  the  troops  were  landing, 
and  that  they  were  in  full  view  of  the  city  before  the  boat  left 
the  Pawnee. 

As  this  was  an  Army  expedition  in  which  the  Navy  was 
expected  to  cooperate,  the  commander  of  the  Pawnee  had 
probably  no  authority  to  demand  the  surrender;  but,  as  has 
been  stated,  the  Pawnee  had  been  lying  off  Alexandria  for 
some  time,  and  what  orders  he  had  received,  or  what  relation 
he  sustained  to  the  expedition  from  the  navy-yard,  the  records 
do  not  show. 

As  a  matter  of  course,  the  few  vessels  which  at  first  could  be 
spared  for  service  on  the  Potomac,  and  mounting  as  they  did 
in  the  beginning  of  the  contest,  no  guns  heavier  than  32-pound- 
ers,  and  with  no  cooperating  land  force,  could  do  no  more  than 
hold  in  check  such  batteries  as  the  rebels  constructed  on  shore, 
so  as  to  prevent  transports  with  troops  and  stores  from  being 
destroyed.  If  they  engaged  and  silenced  a  battery  in  the  day 
time,  it  might  be  repaired  again  during  the  night,  and  therefore 
the  river  service  was  one  of  endless  activity,  watchfulness,  and 
fatigue,  while  there  was  almost  no  possibility  of  any  such  re 
sult  as  excites  and  cheers  brave  men  in  the  performance  of  duty. 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE   POTOMAC.  317 

The  danger,  the  weariness,  and  the  apparent  fruitlessness  of  the 
work,  were  like  that  of  the  picket  and  skirmish  line  on  land, 
in  which  the  glory  and  the  reward  by  no  means  equal  the  labor 
and  the  peril. 

The  Navy  Department  constantly  urged  the  importance  of 
a  cooperating  land  force,  by  whose  aid  the  Potomac  batteries 
could  at  any  time  have  been  destroyed ;  the  Secretary  of  War 
and  the  President  wrere  anxious  to  have  this  national  disgrace 
of  the  Potomac  blockade  wiped  away ;  but  General  McClellan, 
on  one  pretence  and  another,  refused  to  furnish  any  men,  and 
could  not  be  induced  to  consent  that  even  four  thousand  troops 
should  be  spared  for  this  purpose  from  the  magnificent  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  which  he  persistently,  and  against  all  remon 
strances  of  the  President,  kept  month  after  month  in  disgrace 
ful  inaction,  instead  of  aiding  the  Navy  with  a  small  body  for 
which  he  had  no  use  except  to  exhibit  them  in  reviews. 

Under  such  circumstances,  the  service  of  the  Potomac  flotilla 
was  probably  among  the  most  fatiguing  and  discouraging  of 
the  war.  The  crews  of  the  vessels  spent  a  great  portion  of  their 
nights  in  rowing  up  and  down  the  river  on  picket  duty,  watch 
ing  for  rebel  mail-carriers  and  smugglers,  and  spies  of  all  kinds ; 
and  in  the  daytime  the  ships  were  often  aground  on  the  bars 
and  shoals  in  spite  of  all  precaution.  They  were  in  hourly 
danger  of  being  opened  upon  by  masked  batteries,  which  could 
be  constructed  unseen  in  the  thick  undergrowth  of  the  shores ; 
their  quarters  in  the  little  steamers  were  exceedingly  uncom 
fortable  ;  their  prizes  were  row-boats,  and  small,  worthless  river 
craft  used  by  the  rebels  in  smuggling,  in  carrying  the  traitors' 
mails,  and  ferrying  over  the  spies  which  were  constantly  pass 
ing  between  the  rebel  capital  and  armies  and  their  Northern 
abetters.  For  their  reward,  these  hard-working,  much-endur 
ing  men  received  too  often  only  the  complaints  of  the  country 
that  nothing  was  done,  and  sneers  at  the  inefficiency  of  the 
Navy  Department,  and  especially  of  the  Potomac  flotilla. 

By  the  last  of  May,  1861,  the  rebels  had  completed  three 
batteries  at  the  railroad  terminus  at  Aquia  Creek,  and  some 
other  batteries  had  also  been  placed  on  the  heights  back  of  the 
landing.  Up  to  this  time,  the  Government  had  refrained  from 
any  hostile  act  except  the  occupation  of  Alexandria  on  the  24th 


318  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

of  May.  These  batteries,  as  the  reports  state,  were  mounted 
with  rifled  guns,  and  the  rebels  consequently  had  a  great  advan 
tage  in  range  over  the  guns  of  the  ships.  On  the  29th  of  May 
Commander  J.  H.  Ward,  in  command  of  the  flotilla,  engaged 
these  batteries  with  the  Thomas  Freeborn,  a  paddle-wheel 
steamer  of  about  250  tons  and  three  guns;  the  Anacostia,  a 
small  screw  steamer  of  about  200  tons ;  and  the  Resolute,  a  lit 
tle  craft  of  90  tons  and  two  guns.  The  largest  gun  on  board 
this  not  very  formidable  squadron  was  a  32-pounder;  the 
smaller  ones  were  howitzers.  On  this  day  the  tide  was  out,  and 
no  harm  was  apparently  done  on  either  side. 

The  reader  will  readily  perceive  wrhat  probability  there  was 
of  any  important  result  from  these  little  vessels,  armed  with 
32-pounders  and  howitzers,  in  a  fight  with  land  batteries 
armed  with  rifled  cannon.  After  a  fight  of  two  hours,  the 
lower  batteries  were  silenced  by  the  ships,  but  the  men  with 
drew  to  the  earthworks  on  the  hill  and  recommenced  their  fire. 
These  proved  to  be  too  high  for  the  elevation  of  the  guns  of  the 
flotilla,  while  the  shot  from  the  batteries  fell  all  around  the 
little  steamers,  and  they  were  hauled  out  of  range.  Little 
damage  was  done.  On  the  1st  of  June  a  second  engagement 
was  had  with  the  same  batteries,  with  somewhat  more  serious 
results.  The  following  is  the  account  of  the  action  given  by 
Captain  J.  H.  Ward : 

FLOTILLA  STEAMER  FREEBOKN,  POTOMAC  RIVER,  June  1, 1861. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  a  renewal  of  the  bombardment  at 
Aquia  Creek,  commencing  at  11.30  A.  M.,  this  day,  and  terminating, 
from  fatigue  of  the  men,  the  day  being  very  warm  and  the  firing  on  our 
side  incessant,  at  4.30  p.  M.,  making  a  duration  of  five  hours. 

The  firing  on  shore  was  scarcely  as  spirited  at  any  time  as  yesterday. 
The  heights  were  abandoned,  the  guns  having  been  transferred  ap 
parently  to  the  earthworks  at  the  railroad  terminus,  in  replacement  of 
the  battery  silenced  there  by  us  yesterday. 

During  the  last  hour  of  the  engagement  only  two  or  three  shots 
were  thrown  from  the  shore  by  a  few  individuals,  seen  stealthily  now 
and  then  to  emerge  from  concealment,  and  hastily  load  and  fire  a  single 
gun.  The  bulk  of  the  party  had  left  a  half  hour  before,  and  squads 
were  seen  from  time  to  time  taking  to  their  heels,  along  the  beach,  with 
a  speed  and  bottom  truly  commendable  for  its  prudence,  and  highly 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE   POTOMAC.  319 

amusing  to  the  seamen.  It  did  not  seem  advisable  to  permit  so  feeble 
a  fire  to  wear  out  my  men  ;  I  therefore  discontinued  the  engagement. 

Several  shots  came  on  board  of  us,  causing  the  vessel  to  leak  badly, 
and,  besides  other  injuries,  crippling  the  port-wheel,  the  wrought-iron 
shaft  being  gouged  by  a  shot  which  would  have  shattered  it  if  of  cast 
iron — a  point  considered  by  me  in  selecting  this  vessel  for  purchase. 

Fortunately,  I  have  again  neither  killed  nor  wounded,  though  the  shot 
at  times  fell  thick  about  us,  testing  the  gallantry  and  steadiness  of  my 
people,  which  I  consider  of  standard  proof  for  any  emergency. 

I  proceed  to  Washington  to  repair  damages  and  refill  my  exhausted 
magazines.  The  Pawnee  remains  below  in  the  mean  time,  to  supply  my 
place  in  the  blockade.  Captain  Rowan,  of  that  ship,  joined  me  last 
night,  replenishing  my  exhausted  stores,  and  most  gallantly  opened  the 
fire  this  morning,  having  followed  my  lead  inshore  toward  the  batter 
ies.  His  ship  received  numerous  wounds,  both  below  and  aloft,  inflicted' 
by  the  enemy's  shot,  appearing  from  her  size,  therefore,  most  easily  hit, 
to  be  their  favorite  mark,  and  was  herself  often  a  sheet  of  flame,  owing 
to  the  rapidity  of  her  discharges.  I  have  instructed  Captain  Rowan  to 
report  circumstances  direct  to  the  Department. 

The  enemy  set  fire  to  the  large  passenger  and  freight  depot  on  the 
end  of  the  long  pier  as  we  were  approaching,  probably  to  remove  it  as 
an  obstruction  to  their  aim,  but  were  not  permitted  to  extinguish  the 
flames  during  the  whole  five  hours'  cannonade  ;  consequently  nearly  the 
whole  pier  was  destroyed,  only  the  charred  piles  remaining  above  the 
water  to  mark  its  former  position. 

My  gun-carriage  endures  its  continued  test  admirably.  The  pivot 
ing  arrangement  of  the  after  one  gave  out  in  the  last  hour  of  the  action, 
when  the  gun  was  fought  on  its  trucks,  which  had  neither  been  removed 
nor  in  any  manner  interfered  with  in  the  construction.  The  recoil, 
however,  became  severely  racking  to  the  vessel;  the  gun  was  served 
slower  and  with  less  accuracy,  and  with  greatly  increased  awkwardness, 
as  well  as  fatigue  to  the  men. 

Though  not  assuming  to  be  the  proper  judge  of  my  own  invention,  it 
is  possible  the  officers  and  men,  especially  the  guns'  crews,  are  competent 
to  speak  after  the  severe  cannonade  in  which  we  have  been  engaged, 
amounting  altogether,  in  the  two  weeks  we  are  commissioned,  to  ten 
hours,  nine  of  it  under  fire  returned  upon  us  with  more  or  less  vigor  and 
eft'ect. 

More  than  one  hundred  shots  have  fallen  aboard  and  around  us,  any 
one  of  which  would  have  struck  a  frigate.  We  had  more  than  o 
thousand  shots  discharged  at  us  within  range,  and  we  have  ourselves 


320  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

fired  upward  of  three  hundred  shots  and  shells,  with  seventeen  hundred 
pounds  of  powder.  What  damage  we  inflicted  remains  to  be  seen. 
That  we  have  received  none  not  easily  repaired  is  truly  remarkable. 

The  Anacostia  and  Reliance  were  not  permitted  to  come  under 
damaging  fire,  their  support  having  been  necessary  to  embolden  those 
engaged  by  given  them  confidence  that,  if  disabled  in  the  machinery 
.assistance  was  at  hand  to  drag  them  out. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  H.  WARD, 

Commander,  Senior  Officer  on  the  Potomac. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  next  day  the  Pawnee,  Commander  S.  C.  Rowan,  was 
brought  to  Aquia  Creek,  and  the  batteries  were  once  more 
attacked,  and  the  results  are  set  forth  in  the  following  report  of 
Commander  Ho  wan : 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  PAWNEE,  OFF  AQXTIA  CEEEK,  VA.,  June  2,  1861. 

SIR:  In  obedience  to  an  order  received  on  the  evening  of  the  31st 
ultimo,  I  proceeded  immediately  to  join  Captain  Ward. 

In  passing  down  the  river,  I  was  informed  by  Lieutenant  Mygatt,  of 
the  steamer  Reliance,  that  Captain  Ward  had  gone  ten  miles  below 
Aquia  Creek  for  the  night.  I  continued  down  the  river,  passing  the 
creek  about  3  o'clock  A.  M.  of  the  1st  of  June.  At  6  o'clock  I  joined 
Commodore  Ward.  At  9  I  stood  for  Aquia  Creek,  in  company  with  the 
Freeborn,  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  the  batteries.  We  arrived  oft'  the 
creek  at  11  o'clock,  and  at  half-past  11  we  ran  in,  the  Freeborn  leading, 
being  of  a  lighter  draught  than  the  Pawnee,  while  this  ship  kept  just 
outside  on  her  starboard  quarter  to  avoid  grounding. 

As  we  ranged  up,  the  enemy  set  fire  to  the  buildings  on  the  end  of 
the  railroad  wharf,  and  then  opened  his  fire,  which  was  promptly  re 
turned  by  us. 

Finding  my  15-second  shell  fell  short,  with  all  the  elevation  the  ports 
admitted  of,  I  ranged  ahead  of  the  Freeborn,  and  edged  in  as  near  as  I 
could,  feeling  the  way  with  the  lead  till  I  got  within  range  of  the  forts 
with  the  15-second  shell,  when  we  opened  a  heavy  fire.  I  held  this 
position  as  long  as  possible,  when  the  ship  fell  off  against  our  exertions 
to  keep  her  steady,  and  it  became  necessary  to  round  out  into  the 
river,  and  approach  a  second  time  on  the  same  tack.  Having  got  the 
ship  nearer  than  the  first  position,  and  as  near  as  was  safe,  with  but  two 
feet  of  water  to  spare,  and  to  the  northward  and  westward  of  the  Free- 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE    POTOMAC.  321 

born,  we  opened  a  terrible  fire  from  five  9-inch  guns.  The  batteries 
were  twice  silenced  under  the  weight  of  our  fire,  but  resumed  again 
when  our  fire  had  ceased.  The  houses  near  the  tort  were  destroyed,  and 
the  southern  end  of  the  bridge  set  on  fire  by  the  shells. 

The  wind  being  from  the  southward,  the  bridge  was  destroyed.  The 
enemy's  fire  was  almost  exclusively  directed  at  this  ship,  his  rifled  shot 
passing  constantly  over  and  around  us.  This  ship  was  struck  nine  times 
during  the  bombardment,  four  of  the  shot  in  the  hull ;  one  of  them,  pass 
ing  through  the  bulwarks,  tore  up  the  deck,  and  was  glanced  overboard 
by  one  of  the  iron  straps.  Of  the  shots  that  hit  the  ship  above  the  hull, 
one  passed  through  the  main  topsail  yard ;  another  shattered  the  mizzen 
masthead  and  topmast,  and  another  passed  through  the  smoke-stack. 

The  cool  and  gallant  bearing  of  the  officers  and  crew  excited  my 
warmest  admiration.  Every  man  of  the  divisions  performed  his  duties 
coolly,  and  promptly,  and  intelligently,  showing  the  ship  in  a  high  state 
of  training  to  attain  this  end.  I  have  been  ably  seconded  by  the  divi 
sional  officers,  Lieutenant  Chaplin  and  Master  Blue ;  but,  above  all,  by 
my  able  executive  officer,  Lieutenant  R.  B.  Lowry,  whose  fine  bearing 
on  the  occasion  was  every  thing  I  could  wish. 

I  am  happy  to  inform  you  that  I  have  no  casualties  to  report.  The 
only  scratch  was  one  shot  I  received  on  the  face  from  a  small  splinter. 

At  4J  p.  M.,  having  expended  all  my  10-second  and  15-second  shell, 
and  the  thirty-eight  rounds  of  ammunition  for  the  rifle d-cann on,  and  one 
hundred  and  fifty-five  hollow  shot,  I  hauled  off  out  of  range. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  C.  ROWAN,  Commander. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

Three  days  after  this  tlie  Harriet  Lane,  Captain  John 
Faunce,  attacked  the  batteries  at  Pig's  Point,  in  the  vicinity  of 
Hampton  Roads.  The  following  is  his  account  of  the  action  : 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  HARRIET  LANE,  HAMPTON  KOADS,  June  5, 1861. 

SIR:  In  obedience  to  orders  from  General  Butler  to  make  "a  recon- 

noissance  of  Pig's  Point  and  vicinity,"  etc.,  I  this  morning  at  4.50  got 

underway  with  my  ship  from    off  Newport  News,  and  stood  toward 

Craney  Island,  steaming  close  in  and  along  the  shore.     When  off  Pig's 

Point  I  observed,  near  the  beach,  a  number  of  men,  apparently  engaged 

in  transporting  guns  by  means  of  ox-teams  and  wheel-carriages,  while 

others  were  seen  near  the  embrasures  of  the  battery  with  the  secession 

flag  flyiog  over  them.     At  8.30  A.  M.  approached  as  close  to  the  battery 

21 


322  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

as  the  flats  would  allow,  a  distance  of  about  eight  hundred  yards,  and 
opened  fire,  which  was  promptly  returned  by  the  rebels  from,  I  judge, 
seven  guns,  four  of  which  were  either  42  or  32-pounders,  and  the  others 
appeared  to  be  24-pound  howitzers.  Two  of  the  shot  took  effect  on  the 
vessel — one  passing  through  the  plank-sheer,  forward  of  the  fore  rigging, 
on  port  side,  and  out  through  the  starboard  bulwarks ;  the  other,  through 
the  fore  rigging,  grazing  the  foremast.  Several  of  their  heavy  shot 
passed  over  the  vessel  and  struck  some  distance  beyond.  The  shell 
from  their  howitzers  all  fell  short.  Thirty  rounds  of  shot  and  shell 
were  thrown  by  us,  nearly  all  of  which  fell  short ;  some  few,  however, 
were  observed  to  strike  within  the  embrasures.  The  rebels  fired  about 
fifty  shot  and  shell. 

Having  accomplished  my  object  of  drawing  the  fire  of  the  enemy, 
and  thereby  discovering  the  strength  of  their  battery,  and  finding  the 
range  of  my  guns  less  than  theirs,  after  an  engagement  oi  lorry-five 
minutes  I  drew  off  out  of  range. 

From  the  enclosed  report  of  the  surgeon  you  will  perceive  that  five 
of  our  men  were  wounded.  It  affords  me  much  pleasure  to  bear  testi 
mony  to  the  gallant  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  under  my  com 
mand.  Respectfully  submitted, 

JOHST  FAUNCE,  Captain. 
Flag-Officer  G-.  J.  PENDERGRAST, 

commanding  West  India  Squadron, 

Flag-Ship  Cumberland,  off  Fortress  Monroe,  Virginia. 


On  the  27th  of  June  that  unfortunate  affair  occurred  at 
Matthias  Point  in  which  the  much-lamented  Commander  "Ward 
lost  his  life,  of  which  the  following  are  the  official  reports : 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  PAWNEE,  POTOMAC  RIVER,  June  27, 1861. 
SIR  :  About  sundown,  the  evening  of  the  26th  instant,  while  at  an 
chor  off  Aquia  creek,  I  received  an  order  from  Commander  Ward  (a 
copy  of  which  is  herewith  enclosed)  to  send  him  two  boats  armed  and 
equipped,  in  command  of  Lieutenant  Chaplin.  This  order  was  immedi 
ately  complied  with  in  all  its  details,  and  the  party  left  the  ship  in  tow 
of  the  Resolute  at  9  o'clock  A.  M.  To-day,  about  noon,  the  Resolute  re 
turned,  with  a  request  from  Captain  Ward  that  I  should  send  her  back 
if  I  had  no  more  important  service  for  her.  I  immediately  dispatched 
the  Reliance  to  Captain  Ward,  knowing  the  danger  to  which  our  people 
would  be  exposed  if  he  contemplated  a  landing  at  Matthias  Point,  as  I 
feared  was  his  intention,  judging  from  the  nature  of  the  order  he  gave 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE    POTOMAC.  323 

me,  to  furnish  him  with  such  equipments  as  were  necessary  to  cut  down 
the  trees  on  the  point  and  burn  them. 

At  9  o'clock  this  morning  the  Freeborn  and  Reliance  came  up,  hav 
ing  been  repulsed  by  the  rebels  at  Matthias  Point,  in  which  Lieutenant 
Chaplain  and  his  command  escaped  utter  destruction  by  a  miracle. 

It  becomes  my  painful  duty  to  announce  to  the  Department  the 
death  of  Commander  J.  H.  Ward,  of  the  Freeborn.  He  was  shot  in  the 
abdomen  while  in  the  act  of  sighting  his  bow  gun. 

I  beg  leave  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Department  to  the  gallantry, 
coolness,  and  presence  of  mind  of  Lieutenant  Chaplin,  of  the  Pawnee, 
commanding  the  party  on  shore.  He  remained  steady  and  cool  amongst 
a  perfect  hail  of  musketry  from  hundreds  of  men,  while  he  collected  his 
own  people  and  made  good  his  retreat  without  leaving  the  enemy  a 
trophy  beyond  a  few  sand-bags  and  some  axes,  and,  so  far  as  I  can  ascer 
tain,  the  muskets  of  the  wounded  men.  The  last  man  left  the  shore 
with  him,  and,  not  being  able  to  swim  to  the  boat  with  his  musket, 
Lieutenant  Chaplain  took  him  on  his  shoulders,  musket  and  all,  and 
safely  reached  the  boat  without  a  scratch,  save  a  musket-hole  through 
the  top  of  his  cap. 

In  consequence  of  the  want  of  ordinary  comforts  in  the  Freeborn 
for  wounded  men,  I  brought  the  two  wounded  men  belonging  to  that 
vessel  with  those  two  of  this  ship,  with  the  remains  of  the  late  Com 
mander  J.  H.  Ward,  to  the  navy-yard,  Washington,  where  now  I  await 
orders. 

I  must  also  call  the  attention  of  the  Department  to  the  bravery  of 
John  Williams,  captain  maintop,  of  the  Pawnee,  who  told  his  men, 
while  lying  oft'  in  the  boat,  that  every  man  must  die  on  his  thwart  sooner 
than  leave  a  man  behind ;  and  when  the  flag-staff  of  his  boat  was  shot 
away,  and  the  ensign  fell,  he  (although  suffering  from  a  gunshot  wound 
in  the  thigh)  seized  it  in  his  hand  and  bravely  waved  it  over  his  head. 

A  copy  of  the  surgeon's  report  of  casualties  is  herewith  enclosed. 
The  wounded  have  been  removed  to  the  hospital.  I  also  enclose  copies 
of  orders  addressed  to  Lieutenant  Lowry. 

Lieutenant  Chaplin's  report  of  the  affair  is  not  yet  ready.  When  it 
is  presented,  I  shall  forward  a  copy  for  the  information  of  the  Departr 
ment. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  C.  ROWAN, 

Commander  and  Senior  Officer  of  the  Potomac. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES, 

Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 


324  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

The  following  order  from  the  lamented  Ward,  probably  the 
last  he  ever  wrote,  will  explain,  in  part,  the  nature  of  the  expe 
dition  : 

FLOTILLA  STEAMER  FREEBORN,  LOWER  POTOMAC,  June  26, 1861. 

SIR  :  On  receipt  of  this  order  you  will  be  pleased  to  send  your 
second  launch,  by  which  I  mean  your  second-sized  boat,  also  your 
smallest  boat,  not  estimating  your  gig,  which  need  not  be  sent,  with 
their  crews  armed  with  muskets  having  bayonets,  or,  if  without  bayonets, 
their  cutlass  with  each  musket,  and  a  suitable  amount  of  ammunition, 
also  provisions  for  three  or  four  days,  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Chaplin, 
down  to  Nanjemoy,  alongside  the  schooner  Dana  there,  and  await  my 
arrival  in  the  Freeborn,  when  Lieutenant  Chaplin  will  report  to  me  with 
the  boats  so  armed  and  provisioned. 

You  will  further  be  pleased  to  send  in  the  boats  all  the  tar  you  have 
on  board  the  Pawnee,  a  gallon  of  spirits  of  turpentine  in  a  can,  all  the 
shovels,  and  all  the  coal-bags  you  have  except  twelve  retained  to  handle 
coal  with  ;  all  the  oakum  you  have,  not  exceeding  one  bale  in  quantity  ; 
a  quantity  of  old  canvas,  all  you  can  possibly  spare,  and  your  gunner's 
dark-lantern.  Send  also  every  axe  and  hatchet  you  have,  except  the 
corks.  The  launch  and  boat  you  will  see  are  provided  with  their 
kedges,  and  all  other  expeditionary  outfits  as  prescribed  in  the  Ordinance 
Regulations,  including  howitzer  for  the  large  boat,  if  you  have  two,  and 
one  is  fitted  to  sail-boat. 

You  will,  whilst  your  boat  expedition  ordered  down  to  Nanjemoy  is 
serving  as  I  intended  at  Matthias  Point,  let  the  Reliance  visit  me  at  least 
once  every  day  or  oftener,  if  convenient  with  other  duties  you  may  need 
her  for.  I  am,  sir,  respectfully, 

J.  H.  WARD,  Commander  U.  S.  N., 
commanding  Flotilla  of  the  Potomac  River. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  U.  S.  Navy, 

commanding  U.  S.  Steamer  Pawnee,  Potomac  River. 

The  object  was  to  cut  the  undergrowth  and  trees  from  Mat 
thias  Point  and  burn  the  brush,  in  order  to  destroy  the  cover 
from  which  the  rebels  fired  into  passing  vessels,  while  they  were 
themselves  unseen. 

As  the  event  proved,  it  was  an  unfortunate  undertaking; 
but  all  criticism  is  disarmed  by  the  fact  that  he  who  planned  it 
sacrificed  his  own  life  with  that  of  others,  and  that  lie  was  a 
brave  and  enterprising  officer.  It  shows  also  in  a  very  clear 
light  the  harassing  and  very  perilous  nature  of  the  work  which 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE   POTOMAC.  325 

these  brave  men  were  called  upon  to  perform.  The  shores  of 
the  Potomac  were  almost  one  continuous  ambush,  from  whence 
fire  was  opened  upon  every  vessel  which  came  within  gunshot ; 
and  as  Matthias  Point  was  one  of  the  principal  lurking-places 
for  these  river  highwaymen,  and  it  was  daily  expected  that  the 
secessionists  would  erect  powerful  batteries  under  cover  of  the 
thickets,  by  which  the  river  might  be  closed,  Commander 
Ward  thought  to  prevent  this  by  stripping  the  point  of  its 
trees  and  undergrowth.  The  result  was  a  surprise  and  a  bloody 
repulse. 

On  the  16th  of  August  this  point  was  the  scene  of  a  very 
similar  sacrifice  of  life,  as  will  be  seen  by  the  following  reports : 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  YANKEE,  OFF  AQUIA  CREEK,  August  15. 1861. 
SIR:  This  morning  at  about  11  o'clock  I  dispatched  the  steamers 
Resolute  and  Reliance  to  make  a  reconnoissance  of  Matthias  Point.     At 
about  3  P.  M.  the  Resolute,  Acting  Master  Budcl,  returned  to  this  anchor 
age,  and  made  this  report,  which  is  herewith  enclosed. 

I  have  ordered  Mr.  Budd  to  proceed  with  his  dead  and  wounded  to 
the  navy-yard.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

THOMAS  T.  CRAVEN,  Commander, 

commanding  Potomac  Flotilla. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  EESOLUTE,  August  16, 1861. 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  your  order,  I  proceeded  down  the  river  to  make 
an  examination  of  Matthias  Point  and  the  immediate  vicinity.  Nothing 
indicating  a  hostile  movement  could  be  discovered  at  or  about  the 
point.  Hearing  that  a  schooner  was  ashore  at  Lower  Cedar  Point,  I 
thought  it  advisable  to  go  down  to  her  and  get  her  off  if  possible.  A 
boat  was  seen  on  the  Virginia  shore,  a  short  distance  this  side  of  Per 
simmon  Point,  and  I  dispatched  an  officer  and  five  men  in  a  boat  to 
capture  her.  They  had  just  reached  her  and  were  in  the  act  of  making 
fast,  when  a  volley  of  musketry  was  fired  from  the  adjoining  bushes,  not 
more  than  five  or  six  yards  distant,  instantly  killing  three  of  the  boat's 
crew  and  wounding  another. 

I  immediately  opened  fire,  throwing  shell  into  the  cover  that  shel 
tered  the  enemy.  After  four  or  five  rounds  they  were  driven  out,  run 
ning  in  parties  of  three  and  four  in  different  directions,  some  of  them 
running  into  some  dwelling-houses  on  the  right.  The  survivors  of  the 


326  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

boat's  crew  succeeded  in  getting  her  off  from  the  shore  while  I  was 
firing.  The  Reliance  coming  up  at  this  moment,  commenced  firing 
shell  at  the  flying  enemy,  and  also  sent  a  boat  to  assist  in  getting  my 
boat  off.  Nothing  was  left  behind.  My  boat  is  completely  riddled, 
particularly  in  the  after  part.  The  attacking  party  numbered  about 
thirty,  Lieutenant  Mygatt  remained  with  his  vessel  in  the  vicinity  until 
I  could  report  to  you. 

The  following  persons  were  killed  and  wounded :  Killed — John 
Fuller,  master's  mate ;  George  Seymour,  seaman ;  Thomas  Tally,  sea 
man.  Wounded — Ernest  Walton,  seaman. 

The  men  that  escaped  state  that  the  boat  on  shore  had  two  casks  in 
in  her ;  we  were  unable  to  secure  her.  Very  respectfully, 

WILLIAM  BUDD,  commanding  Resolute. 
Captain  CRAVEN,  commanding  Potomac  Flotilla. 

Dangerous,  and  apparently  fruitless  for  good  as  these  little 
expeditions  were,  they  were,  nevertheless,  necessary  parts  of  the 
service.  Such  insignificant  boats  as  these  men  endeavored  to 
capture  were  actively  employed  in  every  work  of  mischief  of 
which  they  were  capable,  and  it  was  important  that  every  one, 
if  possible,  should  be  destroyed.  !Nbt  one  of  them  but  was  en 
gaged  in  carrying  intelligence  or  supplies,  or  both. 

On  the  llth  of  October  the  commander  of  the  steamer 
Union,  Lieutenant  A.  D.  Harrill,  was  informed  that  a  large 
schooner  was  lying  in  Quantico  Creek,  and  that  a  large  number 
of  troops  were  collected  there  for  the  purpose  of  crossing  the 
Potomac,  and  he  determined  to  make  an  attempt  to  destroy 
her.  Accordingly,  he  manned  three  boats  at  half-past  two  in 
the  morning,  and,  under  cover  of  the  darkness,  proceeded 
silently  toward  the  mouth  of  the  creek.  The  entrance  to  the 
creek  is  quite  narrow,  and  some  difficulty  was  experienced  in 
finding  it.  Once  in  the  creek,  they  pulled  quietly  along  within 
pistol-shot  of  the  shore,  until  they  discovered  the  schooner.  She 
was  guarded  by  a  single  sentry,  who  fled  as  they  drew  near, 
and  spread  the  alarm  in  the  neighboring  camp.  They  sprang 
on  board  and  hastily  collected  whatever  combustible  matter 
they  could  find,  including  a  new  set  of  sails  and  furniture  in 
the  cabin,  and  set  her  on  fire.  The  conflagration  spread  rapidly, 
and  it  soon  lighted  up  the  creek  and  shores,  revealing  the  posi 
tion  and  course  of  the  retreating  boats,  and  a  rapid  fire  was 


OPEKATIONS    ON   THE   POTOMAC.  327 

opened  on  them  from  both  banks.  The  glare  of  the  burning 
schooner,  the  reflection  on  the  water,  the  flash  of  musketry  from 
the  shores  and  the  boats,  and  the  occasional  flash  and  boom 
of  a  big  gun  from  the  steamers,  made  a  wild,  exciting  night 
scene,  attended  with  no  casualties  to  mar  the  success,  although 
the  garments  of  the  men  and  the  boats  showed  many  a  shot- 
hole.  The  schooner  was  entirely  consumed,  and  soon  darkness 
and  silence  succeeded  to  the  glare  and  flash  and  shoutings  of 
the  fight.  Another  secessionist  channel  of  communication  had 
been  cut  off. 

On  the  Potomac  the  secessionists  made  their  first  experi 
ments  with  the  torpedo,  a  weapon  which  they  afterward  used 
so  extensively,  and  sometimes  with  fatal  effect.  Considering 
the  vast  amount  of  labor  which  they  expended  on  these  ma 
chines,  the  variety  and  number  of  them,  the  untiring  zeal  and 
ingenuity  displayed,  it  is  almost  miraculous  that  so  few  of  our 
vessels  were  injured.  They  may  be  considered  as  pioneers  in 
a  method  of  warfare  which  will  hereafter  be  studied  by  all,  and 
which,  in  the  opinion  of  many,  is  likely  to  prove  more  effective 
than  all  others  for  the  defence  of  rivers  and  harbors. 

On  the  8th  of  July,  1861,  as  the  Pawnee  was  lying  not  far 
from  Aquia  Creek,  two  large  casks  were  discovered  floating 
down  the  river,  and  passing  about  two  hundred  yards  from  the 
ship.  A  boat  was  sent  out  to  secure  and  examine  it.  Holes 
had  been  bored  in  the  tops  of  the  casks,  suggesting  the  idea  of 
supplying  air  to  the  fuse  within.  Water  was  immediately 
poured  into  these  holes,  and  then  the  machine  was  towed  where 
it  could  be  examined.  It  was  formed  by  connecting  two  eighty- 
gallon  oil-casks  with  about  twenty-five  fathoms  of  manila-rope, 
the  line  being  buoyed  up  by  cork  floats.  Underneath  each 
cask,  and  about  six  feet  below,  was  slung  a  torpedo  made  of 
boiler-iron,  four  feet  six  inches  long  and  about  eighteen  inches 
in  diameter,  and  filled  with  powder.  On  the  top  of  each  cask 
was  a  wooden  box  prepared  to  secure  a  fuse  leading  into  the 
cask.  Through  the  centre  of  this  cask,  horizontally,  ran  a 
platform  on  which  the  fuse  was  coiled,  and  then  it  passed  down 
ward  through  water-tight  tubes  to  the  torpedo  below.  The  in 
tention  evidently  was  to  start  the  machine  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  connecting  rope  would  strike  the  cable  of  a  ship,  and 


328  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

thus  swing  the  corks  around  under  her  bows,  where,  the  fuses 
having  been  lighted  at  starting,  in  due  time  the  torpedoes  would 
explode.  It  was  found  on  examination  that  the  fuses  had  been 
on  fire ;  but  whether  they  had  gone  out  of  themselves,  or  had 
been  extinguished  by  the  water  poured  into  the  casks,  is  not 
known.  Could  the  torpedoes  have  been  exploded  at  the  suit 
able  time  and  place,  doubtless  they  would  have  destroyed  a 
vessel ;  but  considering  how  few  the  chances  were  that  this 
would  take  place,  it  appeared  like  the  bungling  experiment  of 
men  little  acquainted  with  mechanical  contrivances. 

In  all  this  river- work  there  was  abundance  of  toil  by  night 
and  day,  of  all  forms  of  exposure  to  death  by  disease  and  by 
shot,  of  discomfort  and  hard  fare,  but  very  little  of  profit  or 
glory.  The  public  saw  no  result,  and  therefore  bestowed  no 
praises.  The  value  of  this  service,  however,  will  appear,  if  we 
remember  that  the  Potomac  and  the  connected  waters  formed 
the  great  channel  of  communication  between  the  secessionists 
and  their  Northern  supporters ;  that  in  every  creek  and  little 
bay,  and  in  all  possible  places  of  concealment,  spies  and  smug 
glers  were  watching  night  and  day  for  their  opportunity,  and 
that  these  people  were  carrying  to  the  traitors  exactly  that 
which  they  needed  most — goods,  medicines,  percussion  caps, 
and  other  light  munitions  of  war  which  females  could  conceal 
in  their  dresses,  or  which  could  be  transported  in  small  row- 
boats  ;  and  that  well-filled  mails  of  the  secessionists  and  North 
ern  accomplices  were  constantly  crossing,  or  spies  were  attempt 
ing  to  cross  with  them.  In  spite  of  all  vigilance,  this  intercourse 
could  not  be  entirely  prevented,  but  it  was  so  far  interrupted 
that  Virginia  felt  very  severely  the  pressure  of  this  river  block 
ade.  The  amount  of  supplies  through  this  source  was  largely 
diminished,  spies  were  arrested,  smugglers  with  their  vessels 
were  seized,  boats  were  destroyed,  letters  and  entire  mails  were 
interrupted.  Finally,  the  secessionists,  notwithstanding  the  suc 
cess  of  their  efforts  hitherto,  finding  that  they  could  neither 
close  the  river  against  the  Government  nor  keep  it  open  for 
their  friends,  abandoned  their  batteries  and  retired  from  the 
line  of  the  river.  This,  however,  was  not  done  until  1862. 
The  giving  up  of  the  batteries,  although  it  diminished  the  peril 
somewhat  of  this  service,  did  not  lessen  the  fatigue  or  the  gen- 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE   POTOMAC.  329 

eral  exposure.  The  necessity  of  patrolling  the  river  day  and 
night  by  constant  watchfulness  continued  during  the  most  of 
the  war. 

Nearly  all  that  the  public  in  general  knows  of  war  are  the 
accounts  of  the  principal  battles.  These  are  the  luminous 
points  which  conceal  all  else ;  and  generally  in  the  bright  pic 
ture  of  victory  one  figure  only,  that  of  the  successful  chief,  oc 
cupies  the  foreground ;  and  little  is  known  or  thought  of  the 
workers  and  sufferers  in  such  a  fight  except  of  a  confused  mass 
of  men,  so  many  killed,  so  many  wounded,  so  many  yet  alive. 
Few  indeed  think  of  all  the  wearying  preparations  for  such  a 
battle ;  the  exhausting  march,  the  comfortless  bivouac,  the  peril 
ous  picket  and  skirmish  lines,  the  wasting  toil  and  watchings  in 
the  trenches,  in  the  camp  and  field,  without  which  a  successful 
battle  is  not  even  possible :  nor,  while  the  glare  of  victory  dazzles 
and  blinds  to  all  else,  do  they  dwell  much  on  the  thousands  who, 
to  secure  this  glory,  yielded  to  the  deadly  miasma  or  exposure, 
and  gave  up  their  young  lives  in  hospitals — their  last  thought 
on  the  homes  of  their  childhood. 

For  similar  reasons  the  country  will  never  fully  know,  and 
therefore  will  never  properly  appreciate  the  labors  of  the  sub 
ordinate  officers  and  seamen,  who,  by  constant  toil,  suffering, 
and  exposure,  made  possible  the  great  successes  whose  brilliancy 
blinds  the  eye  to  all  lesser  achievements.  The  officers  and 
seamen,  whose  names  have  seldom  if  ever  been  heard  of,  who 
passed  sleepless  nights  and  vigilant  days  on  the  long  line  of  the 
blockade,  preventing  the  secessionists  from  obtaining  those  sup 
plies,  by  the  want  of  which  they  were  finally  exhausted,  these 
men  and  their  labors  made  victory  certain  in  the  end.  Let  our 
successful  leaders  enjoy  their  well-earned  renown  and  rewards  ; 
but  the  country  should  not  forget  those  who,  without  fame  or 
any  adequate  reward,  bore  cheerfully  the  hardships  of  the  hum 
bler  but  necessary  service. 

So  it  is  also  with  the  officers  and  men  to  whom  was  intrust 
ed  the  very  important  but  by  no  means  brilliant  task  of  guard 
ing  and  searching  the  Potomac  and  other  Southern  rivers.  The 
little  steamers  which  alone  were  suited  to  the  work  were  too 
contracted  to  admit  of  any  comfort  even  for  the  well,  while  the 
sick  and  wounded  absolutely  suffered  from  the  lack  of  proper 


330  HISTOKY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

accommodation,  and  they  were  so  slightly  built  as  to  afford 
almost  no  protection  against  shot.  Every  day  brought  nearly 
the  same  monotonous  scene  and  task,  and  the  only  new  thing 
which  they  might  expect  a  day  would  bring  was,  that  they  might 
be  fired  into  from  an  ambush,  or  blown  up  by  a  torpedo.  How- 
ing  guard  at  night  amid  swarms  of  millions  of  insects ;  breath 
ing  miasma  almost  certain  to  bring  on  disease ;  ploughing  over 
or  sticking  fast  upon  the  soft  bars  and  flats ;  creeping  up  and 
down  the  tortuous  channels  of  muddy  creeks,  with  ever  and 
anon  rifle-balls  whizzing  out  from  the  tall  grass  or  thickets ; 
rounding  a  point  to  find  themselves  close  upon  a  battery  just 
unmasked,  the  channel  too  narrow  to  turn  in,  and  the  propeller 
forbidding  all  sternway — at  the  same  time  men  half  hidden  on 
shore  evidently  trying  to  explode  a  torpedo — these  were  the 
common  incidents,  the  every  day  and  night  work  of  a  service 
of  which  the  country  has  known  but  little. 

Insignificant  as  it  seemed  to  the  casual  observer,  it  was  a 
work  which  the  Government  could  by  no  means  dispense  with. 
It  interfered  continually  with  the  secession  operations,  prevented 
the  execution  of  many  a  well-laid  plot,  aided  in  exhausting  the 
enemy  by  cutting  off  supplies,  prevented  the  disclosure  of  the 
plans  of  the  Government,  convoyed  troops  and  supplies;  and 
when  the  operations  against  Richmond  by  way  of  the  Peninsula 
were  begun,  the  work  of  this  little  flotilla  became  more  im 
portant  and  more  arduous  still,  as  will  appear  as  the  story  of 
the  war  goes  on. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


FIRST  IMPORTANT  NAVAL  EXPEDITION— CAPTURE  OF  THE  HAT- 
TERAS  FORTS. 


IN  the  latter  part  of  August,  1861,  the  secessionists  held  one 
unbroken  line  of  defence  from  just  beloAV  Alexandria  on  the 
Potomac,  down  that  river  to  its  mouth,  thence  to  Norfolk,  then 
southward  to  Florida,  thence  along  the  Gulf  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Mississippi,  then  up  that  river  to  Columbus,  a  few  miles 
below  Cairo.  The  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  were  also  guarded 
by  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  so  as  to  prevent  any  advance 
into  Kentucky  and  Tennessee.  Strong  positions  in  Kentucky 
were  fortified,  East  Tennessee  was  occupied,  while  the  main 
army  of  the  secessionists  confronted  the  North  in  Virginia  and 
menaced  the  capital.  At  the  same  time  the  spirit  and  courage 
of  the  country  began  to  call  for  action  on  the  part  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  which  originally  consisting  of  raw  volunteers, 
had  been  disciplined  and  equipped  to  a  condition  of  veterans, 
and  subsequently  proved  itself  to  be  in  every  way  worthy  to  be 
intrusted  with  the  preservation  of  its  country's  honor. 

It  was  thought  quite  time  for  the  Government  to  begin  to 
execute  the  purpose  which  Mr.  Lincoln  boldly  avowed  at  his 
inauguration — to  repossess  himself,  in  the  name  of  the  country, 
of  the  forts  and  harbors  which  the  secessionists  had  seized.  In 
order  to  observe  all  due  precaution,  and  to  secure  success,  a 
board  had  been  convened  under  the  auspices  of  the  Navy  De 
partment  as  early  as  June,  consisting  of  Captain  Samuel  F.  Du 
Pont  and  Charles  H.  Davis  of  the  Navy,  Major  John  G.  Bar 
nard  of  the  Army,  and  Professor  Alexander  Bache  of  the  Coast 
Survey,  who  were  instructed  to  make  a  thorough  investigation 


332  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

of  the  coast  and  harbors,  their  defences,  and  the  means  by 
which  they  could  be  approached,  The  Department  could 
not  well  have  chosen  a  measure  which  would  have  shown 
more  clearly  its  caution  and  the  careful  preparation  of  its 
measures. 

These  officers  had  at  command  all  the  charts,  plans,  and 
statements  of  the  "  Coast  Survey,"  and,  guided  by  these,  they 
presented  several  elaborate  and  valuable  reports,  which  enabled 
the  Department  to  decide  upon  a  definite  plan  of  operations  for 
obtaining  possession  of  the  Southern  ports  and  coast.  The 
officers  composing  this  board  were  eminently  qualified  for  the 
work  committed  to  them.  None  knew  better  than  they  the  pe 
culiar  topography  and  hydrography  of  the  Southern  coast  line, 
and,  therefore,  they  were  qualified  to  judge  of  the  points  toward 
which  an  attack  should  be  directed.  The  secessionists  had  indi 
cated  their  own  opinions  of  the  strategic  points  by  the  location 
of  their  forts.  Two  of  the  most  important  of  these  were 
established  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  and  against  these  the  first  im 
portant  naval  expedition  was  directed. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  war  very  few  had  any  partic 
ular  and  accurate  knowledge  of  the  hydrography  and  topogra 
phy  of  the  Southern  coast.  Most  had  only  such  a  general  idea 
of  it  as  they  had  of  the  coast  of  France,  or  Spain,  or  Africa ; 
and  when  the  country  read  the  account  of  the  bombardment  of 
the  forts  on  the  barren,  shifting  sands  of  Hatteras,  it  is  not  sur 
prising  that  many  should  have  thought  it  an  uncalled-for  and 
fruitless  expedition,  and  that  the  Department  had  undertaken 
to  make  much  out  of  little  in  its  published  reports  of  the  battle* 
Had  they  known  the  character  of  the  men  under  whose  advice 
the  attack  was  planned,  and  the  reasons  which  induced  the  De 
partment  to  undertake  the  work,  very  different  opinions  would 
have  been  formed  of  the  plan,  and  its  execution  would  have 
received  the  proper  praise.  The  case  may  be  illustrated  by  a 
supposition  easily  understood.  If  the  position  of  the  two 
parties  in  the  war  had  been  reversed,  and  a  Southern  navy  had 
attempted  to  blockade  the  coast  of  the  North,  and  the  North 
had  held  possession  of  Long  Island  Sound,  the  Hudson  Biver, 
the  bays  of  New  Jersey,  and  the  bays  at  the  east  end  of 
the  sound,  and  the  entrances  to  the  ocean  from  these  were 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTERAS  FORTS.  333 

guarded  by  suitable  forts,  all  can  see  that  it  would  liave  been 
very  difficult  to  cut  us  off  from  obtaining  sufficient  supplies, 
while  our  internal  trade  would  not  have  been  in  any  manner 
interrupted.  If,  then,  an  expedition  had  been  fitted  out  to 
capture  the  forts,  either  at  the  Narrows  or  at  the  eastern  end  of 
the  sound  (supposing  that  could  be  fortified),  all  can  easily  see 
that  such  an  expedition  would  have  been  a  very  important  one. 
To  apply  this  illustration,  let  any  one  turn  to  the  map  of  North 
Carolina  and  observe  the  network  of  sounds,  bays,  and  navi 
gable  rivers  which  cover  the  eastern  part  of  that  State,  and  also 
the  connecting  railroads  leading  into  the  interior  and  joining 
the  great  trunk  lines  of  the  South. 

It  will  be  seen  that  there  are  in  Pamlico  and  Albemarle 
Sounds,  and  the  connected  waters,  more  internal  navigation 
than  is  afforded  by  Long  Island  Sound  and  its  rivers.  The 
Neuse,  the  Chowan,  and  the  Eoanoke  supply  channels  leading 
far  into  the  country,  and,  at  suitable  points,  railroads  branch  off 
to  the  main  routes,  while  the  Dismal  Swamp  Canal  afforded  a 
communication  with  Norfolk.  There  were  numerous  channels 
between  these  sounds  and  the  ocean,  inlets  running  across  the 
narrow  coast-line,  and  through  which  small  vessels  could  pass 
without  much  fear  of  discovery,  where  a  blockader  could  not 
follow,  because  of  shallow  water;  while  the  main  channel, 
through  which  our  vessels  might  enter  the  sounds,  was  guarded 
by  the  Hatteras  forts.  Once  safe  within  the  sounds,  the  rebel 
traders  had  the  whole  country  open  to  their  operations. 

There  are  many  facts  which  indicate  but  too  plainly  that 
Europe,  and  especially  England,  was  fully  instructed  before 
hand  in  regard  to  the  coming  rebellion,  and  that  the  question 
how  she  could  most  effectually  aid  the  secessionists,  in  order  to 
cripple  the  Republic  and  enrich  herself,  had  been  carefully 
studied  in  all  its  aspects.  Her  plans  were  precisely  such  as 
secret  hostility  would  naturally  devise,  with  too  little  regard 
for  justice  or  national  comity.  She  declared  the  conspirators 
belligerents,  and  the  ink  of  the  proclamation  was  not  dry  before 
privateers  were  being  fitted  out  in  her  yards,  by  which  our 
commerce  was  to  be  driven  into  British  bottoms  or  our  ships 
destroyed. 

The  nature  of  the  Southern  coast  seems  to  have  been  fully 


334:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

explained  in  England,  and  she  had  almost  at  once  a  fleet  of 
blockade-runners  exactly  fitted  to  hover  in  the  shallow  waters, 
and  thread  the  small  inlets,  where  our  heavy  ships  could  not 
follow ;  and  by  them  she  expected  to  supply  the  enemy  with 
whatever  was  needed,  and  receive  their  cotton  in  return.  Her 
success  at  first  was  gratifying.  The  main  inlets,  as  has  been 
stated,  were  guarded  by  forts,  and  through  these  and  every 
smaller  one  —  through  which  only  the  light  blockade-runner 
could  pass — these  English  smugglers  glided,  laden  one  way  with 
the  produce  of  the  British  workshops,  and  the  other  with  cotton. 

In  this  manner  they  supplied  the  enemy  with  thousands  of 
rifled  muskets,  with  the  best  rifled  cannon  which  England  could 
produce,  with  sabres  and  every  description  of  equipments  for 
cavalry,  with  gunpowder,  with  cartridges,  with  percussion  caps, 
with  plates  for  iron-clad  ships,  with  army  hats,  blankets,  boots 
and  shoes,  and  with  every  description  of  goods  for  common 
family  use,  so  that  the  South  was  virtually  a  province  hired  by 
England  and  furnished  by  her  to  carry  on  war  against  the 
United  States.  They  were  in  the  employ  of  the  British  Govern 
ment  as  practically,  except  in  name,  as  were  the  Hessians  which 
she  sent  here  during  the  war  of  the  Eevolution. 

There  were  two  points  on  the  coast  of  North  Carolina 
toward  which  this  hostile  traffic  was  directed.  One  was  Wil 
mington,  and  the  other  the  various  entrances  to  Pamlico  and 
Albemarle  Sounds.  Upon  these  points  the  rebels  depended 
more  than  upon  Charleston,  Savannah,  and  Mobile  for  their 
supplies  for  the  Army  of  Virginia.  Supplies  entering  at  these 
points  were  easily  distributed  by  the  various  railroads  and  along 
the  rivers,  which  were  navigable  for  small  craft  far  into  the 
interior.  At  first,  the  importance  of  this  traffic  was  not  fully 
understood.  Naturally  the  mind  turned  toward  Charleston, 
Savannah,  and  Mobile,  as  the  main  points  where  the  smugglers 
would  attempt  to  enter,  and  the  topography  of  the  more  north 
ern  coast  was  not  particularly  known.  Wilmington  had  been 
an  unimportant  city,  and  not  many  Northern  vessels  were  in 
the  habit  of  visiting  the  sounds. 

It  was  not,  therefore,  until  the  board  of  officers  already 
mentioned  had  made  their  report  that  the  Department  was 
made  fully  acquainted  with  the  great  importance  of  the  forts  at 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTEEAS  FOETS.  335 

Hatteras  Inlet.  In  consequence  of  this  report,  and  under  the 
advice  of  these  officers,  a  squadron  was  fitted  out  and  placed 
under  the  command  of  Commodore  Stringham.  On  the  26th 
August,  1861,  this  first  important  fleet  of  the  war  sailed  from 
Hampton  Roads.  The  following  ships  composed  this  squadron : 

Guns. 

Minnesota,  Captain  G.  J.  Van  Brunt  (flag-ship) 46 

Wabash,  Captain  Samuel  Mercer 45 

Monticello,  Commander  J.  P.  Gillis 6 

Susquehanna,  Captain  J.  Chauncey 17 

Pawnee,  Commander  S.  C.  Rowan  15 

Harriet  Lane,  Captain  John  Faunce 5 

Cumberland,  Captain  Marston  24 

158 

United  States  chartered  steamers  Adelaide,  Commander  H. 
S.  Stellwagen ;  George  Peabody,  Lieutenant  K.  K.  Lowry ; 
tug  Fanny,  Lieutenant  Pierce  Crosby.  In  addition  to  these, 
some  schooners  and  surf-boats  were  towed  by  the  steamers. 

On  board  the  transports  was  a  body  of  troops  (about  900) 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  Butler.  The  forts  against 
which  the  squadron  was  sent  are  situated  upon  Hatteras  Island 
and  command  the  main  inlet  to  the  sounds.  A  brief  de 
scription  of  the  island  and  the  forts  is  necessary  to  a  proper  un 
derstanding  of  the  conflict  of  which  they  were  the  theatre. 

Beginning  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  the  island  runs  in  a  northeast 
erly  direction  about  thirteen  miles  to  Hatteras  light-house. 
Here  it  turns  almost  at  a  right  angle  northward,  and  extends 
twenty-seven  miles  farther  to  Loggerhead  Inlet,  making  its 
whole  length  about  forty  miles.  At  this  northern  point  of  the 
island  is  Chicamacomico,  a  spot  which  became  somewhat  im 
portant  in  the  operations  of  our  forces.  The  average  width  of 
this  island  is  about  one  mile.  At  some  points  it  is  probably 
two  miles  wide,  while  at  other  places  it  is  not  more  than  one- 
third  of  a  mile  in  breadth.  It  is  mostly  a  strip  of  barren  sand. 
Here  and  there  are  scattered  clumps  of  dwarf  oaks,  and  then  a 
few  little  marshes  covered  with  coarse  marsh-grass.  The  rest  is 
composed  of  bare  sand-heaps,  at  one  time  wet  with  the  waves 
and  the  spray,  at  others  glaring  in  the  sun  and  drifting  with 
the  winds.  Besides  the  dwarf  oaks  and  patches  of  marsh-grass 


336  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

there  is  nothing  green,  nothing  that  indicates  cultivation,  or  the 
presence  of  civilized  life.  The  population  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war  was  said  to  be  about  five  hundred.  Fishing,  oystering, 
piloting,  wrecking,  make  the  sum  of  their  industrial  pursuits,  a 
race  of  beings  mostly  born  on  the  island,  and  knowing  very 
little  of  the  world  beyond  their  sand-spit  home.  A  portion  of 
these  people,  to  their  honor  be  it  remembered,  were  loyal  to 
their  Government,  and  were  driven  from  their  homes  in  conse 
quence  by  the  rebel  troops. 

Forts  Clark  and  Hatteras  are  situated  on  the  extreme  south 
western  point  of  Hatteras  Island,  with  a  shallow  bay  of  water 
about  half  a  mile  wide  between  them.  Fort  Clark,  the  smaller 
work,  was  merely  a  square  redoubt,  or  water  battery,  with  its 
guns  bearing  upon  the  northern  approach  to  the  inlet  from  the 
ocean ;  while  the  larger  fort,  Hatteras,  defended  the  inlet  itself, 
and  at  the  same  time  covered  the  smaller  water  battery  with  a 
part  of  its  guns.  These  works  were  constructed  by  the  rebels  in 
the  summer  of  1861,  and  were  laid  out  and  finished  with  much 
skill  and  at  considerable  expense,  under  the  direction  of  Colonel 
William  B.  Thompson,  of  Yirginia.  The  works  were  not  en 
tirely  completed  when  attacked,  some  of  the  heavy  guns  in 
Fort  Hatteras  not  having  been  mounted.  Fort  Hatteras  cov 
ered  an  area  of  between  one  and  two  acres,  and  was  provided 
with  a  bomb-proof,  which,  however,  was  not  sufficient  protec 
tion  against  our  heavy  shells.  The  forts  were  so  situated  that 
the  attack  was  to  be  made,  not  from  the  inlet,  but  from  the 
open  sea  to  the  southeast,  and  the  direction  of  the  fire  of  the 
ships  was  to  the  north  and  northwest,  both  forts  being  in  the 
line  of  fire,  but  the  battery  Clark  being  half  a  mile  nearer  than 
the  larger  work. 

It  was  to  be  the  first  important  experiment  of  the  war  in 
engaging  earthworks  with  ships,  and  the  result  was  awaited 
with  no  small  anxiety  by  those  who  had  planned  the  expedition. 
In  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  the  squadron  passed  Cape  Henry, 
and  the  pilot  of  the  flag-ship  Minnesota  was  discharged.  On 
the  morning  of  the  27th,  at  9.30  A.  M.,  Cape  Hatteras  light 
was  in  sight,  the  ships  encountering  a  heavy  ground-swell.  The 
squadron  rounded  the  shoals  off  Hatteras,  and  at  5  p.  M.  an 
chored  at  the  southward  of  the  cape.  During  the  evening  the 


CAPTURE    OF   THE    IIATTERAS   FORTS.  337 

surf-boats  were  hoisted,  and  all  preparations  were  made  for 
landing  troops  in  the  morning. 

On  Wednesday  morning  the  wind  was  blowing  fresh  from 
the  south,  and  the  long  lines  of  foam  showed  that  a  heavy  surf 
was  rolling  011  the  beach,  which  might  make  the  landing  of  the 
troops  a  somewhat  difficult  and  perilous  operation.  The  men. 
however,  were  called  at  4  A.  M.,  and  they  partook  of  an  early 
breakfast.  The  marines  of  the  Minnesota,  under  the  command 
of  Captain  William  L.  Shuttle  worth,  were  sent  on  board  the 
Harriet  Lane,  accompanied  by  Major-General  Butler.  At  6.40 
A.  M.,  all  being  ready,  the  signal  was  made  to  disembark  the 
troops,  and  the  Pawnee,  Harriet  Lane,  and  Monticello  were  or 
dered  to  cover  and  assist  in  landing  them. 

From  the  inlet  to  Hatteras  light-house,  a  distance  of  about 
thirteen  miles,  the  surf  rolls  in  continually,  and  in  almost  un 
broken  lines  of  foam,  varying  only  as  it  is  more  or  less  fearful 
according  to  the  state  of  the  weather,  and  to  land  through  this 
is  at  all  times  a  difficult  and  dangerous  work — a  task  which  it 
was  necessary  for  the  troops  to  undertake.  The  point  selected 
for  the  attempt  was  about  three  miles  from  the  inlet.  The  surf 
at  the  time  was  very  high,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  landing 
would  be  attended  with  extreme  danger.  Iron  surf-boats  had 
been  provided  for  this  work,  each  of  which  was  intended  to 
carry  about  one  company  of  soldiers.  Two  dismasted  schooners 
which  had  been  brought  down  for  the  purpose  were  filled  with 
men,  towed  as  near  as  possible  to  the  shore,  and  there  an 
chored.  From  these  they  were  embarked  011  the  iron  surf-boats 
and  the  boats  of  the  squadron,  to  the  number  of  three  hundred. 
When  they  entered  the  surf  it  was  only  with  the  utmost  diffi 
culty  that  they  were  kept  from  capsizing,  and  they  were  hurled 
on  the  beach,  the  wraves  sweeping  over  them,  and  the  men  strug 
gling  through  the  water  waist-deep  to  shore.  One  boat,  a  cut 
ter  from  the  Pawnee,  landed  safely,  and  returned  for  another 
load  of  soldiers,  but  on  entering  the  surf  a  second  time  it  was 
swamped,  and  all  on  board  very  narrowly  escaped  drowning. 
It  was  found  impossible  to  get  the  surf-boats  out  again,  and  they 
were  swamped  and  crushed  by  the  surf.  !Nb  further  attempts 
were  made  at  landing  the  troops,  and  this  left  about  three  hun 
dred  of  our  men  on  shore  in  a  most  uncomfortable  and  perilous 
22 


338  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

condition.  They  had  taken  with  them  two  howitzers,  but  the 
carriage  of  one  had  been  damaged  in  landing  so  as  to  render 
the  gun  useless,  and  one  rifled  howitzer  was  all  they  had  left 
for  their  protection.  Much  of  the  ammunition  had  been  wet, 
and  they  had  brought  neither  provisions  nor  water,  as  it  was 
the  intention  to  send  these  later  in  the  day.  But  the  sea  mo 
mentarily  became  rougher,  and  ere  long,  not  only  had  commu 
nication  with  the  fleet  been  cut  off,  but  the  ships  were  com 
pelled  to  haul  off  and  get  an  offing  in  order  to  pass  the  night 
safely.  The  manner  in  which  the  three  hundred  passed  the 
night  will  be  described  hereafter.  At  8.45  the  Wabash  got 
under  way,  and,  with  the  Cumberland  in  tow,  led  in  toward 
Fort  Clark,  the  Minnesota  following  them.  The  heavy  frigates 
were  watched  with  intense  interest  as  they  steamed  on  toward 
positions  within  range  of  the  forts,  and  at  10  A.  M.  the  jets  of 
smoke  leaping  from  every  port  of  the  broadside,  and  the  deep 
roar  that  came  rolling  over  the  waves  announced  that  the  fight 
had  begun.  Ten  minutes  later  the  Minnesota,  having  passed  in 
side  the  Wabash,  took  a  position  nearer  to  the  forts,  and  opened 
upon  them  her  mighty  battery.  The  Susquehanna  also  gained 
her  allotted  place,  and  added  the  weight  of  her  broadside. 

These  vessels  passed  and  repassed  Fort  Clark,  pouring  upon 
it  a  continuous  storm  of  shot  and  shell ;  while  the  firing  of  the 
rebel  gunners  was  wild  and  irregular,  the  shot  sometimes  falling 
short  and  again  passing  quite  over  the  ships.  It  has  been  often 
asked  how  it  was  possible  that  the  twenty-five  guns  of  these 
forts,  described  as  being  of  heavy  calibre,  could  have  been  used 
upon  the  large  ships  engaged  in  this  battle  for  many  hours  with 
out  producing  greater  effect ;  and  from  the  little  damage  done 
the  inference  has  been  that  it  was  really  an  insignificant  affair, 
magnified  in  order  to  glorify  the  Navy  and  encourage  the  coun 
try.  Especially  does  it  seem  remarkable  that  these  huge  frigates 
were  not  injured,  when  it  is  stated  that  the  shot  from  the  forts 
either  fell  short  or  passed  over  the  ships.  But  the  whole  is 
easily  explained  when  the  facts  are  known.  Commodore 
Stringham  fought  his  ships  under  the  peculiar  advantages 
which  steam  affords,  and  on  the  same  plan  for  which  such 
warm  praise  was  bestowed  soon  after  upon  Commodore  Du  Pont 
at  Hilton  Head,  when  he  used  it  on  a  somewhat  larger  scale. 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTEEAS  FOETS.  339 

Instead  of  anchoring  his  ships,  in  which  case  the  gunners  of  the 
forts  would  soon  have  obtained  their  range,  he  steamed  past 
the  enemy's  batteries,  delivering  his  fire  as  he  came  in  range. 
Of  course  the  motion  of  the  steamers  made  it  more  difficult  to 
strike  them,  but  this  was  not  all.  The  ships  did  not  follow  in 
each  other's  wake,  nor  pursue  the  same  path  a  second  time,  so 
that  even  if  the  range  were  right  for  the  headward  vessel,  it 
was  wrong  for  the  next,  because  she  did  not  pass  at  the  same 
distance  ;  and  when  the  fleet  passed  the  second  time,  all  the  dis 
tances  were  different  from  what  they  were  at  first,  and  so  every 
shot  from  the  fort  was  really  an  experimental  one,  a  mere  trial- 
shot,  and  this  accounts  for  the  fact,  stated  in  the  report,  that  the 
shot  from  the  fort  either  fell  short  or  passed  over  the  ships. 

So  far  as  is  known,  this  was  the  first  trial  in  our  Navy  of 
this  movement,  and  the  honor  of  introducing  it  belongs  to 
Commodore  Stringham.  The  little  that  was  known  of  the  real 
character  of  the  Hatteras  expedition  prevented  the  public  from 
paying  any  attention  to  the  commodore's  strategy,  but  when  it 
was  repeated  soon  after  by  Commodore  Du  Pont  in  a  more  bril 
liant  affair,  its  merit  was  duly  recognized.  This  scientific 
officer  saw  its  advantages,  and  for  the  splendid  use  which  he 
made  of  it  deserved  the  praise  which  he  received. 

Nine-inch,  10-inch,  and  11-inch  shells  burst  over,  around,  and 
in  the  fort  so  thickly  that  the  gunners  could  take  no  steady  aim, 
and  were  often  driven  from  their  guns.  At  12.25  p.  M.  the 
flags  were  down  on  both  forts,  and  the  rebels  were  evidently 
abandoning  Fort  Clark.  Some  were  seen  running  toward  Fort 
Hatteras,  and  others  were  leaving  the  shore  in  boats.  As  Fort 
Clark  was  evidently  abandoned,  the  signal  was  made  to  cease 
firing  at  12.30  P.  M.  At  1.10  p.  M.  the  troops  began  to  move  up 
the  beach  toward  the  fort,  and  at  2  p.  M.  the  pickets  took  pos 
session  of  the  deserted  battery  and  hoisted  over  it  the  American 
flag.  At  4  o'clock  Captain  Gillis,  of  the  Monticello,  was  or 
dered  to  feel  his  way  into  the  inlet  and  take  possession  of  the 
fort;  but  he  had  advanced  only  a  short  distance  when  Fort 
Hatteras  opened  upon  him  a  heavy  fire,  and  at  the  same  time  a 
steam-tug,  towing  a  schooner  filled  with  men  for  the  relief  of 
the  forts,  were  seen  approaching  from  the  south.  It  was  found 
that  this  was  quite  a  large  body  of  reinforcements,  but  they 


340  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

were  soon  driven  back,  and  the  Minnesota,  Susquehanna,  and 
Pawnee  at  once  reopened  fire  upon  Fort  Hatteras ;  the  Wabash 
having  gone  to  tow  the  Cumberland  into  the  offing,  where, 
being  only  a  sailing  vessel,  she  could  be  safe,  as  the  weather 
was  looking  squally. 

The  Monticello,  for  a  short  time,  was  in  an  exposed  and 
even  dangerous  position.  She  had  scarcely  entered  the  inlet 
when  she  grounded  frequently,  striking  both  bow  and  stern.  It 
was  found  that  the  water  was  shoaling,  the  ship  could  not  be 
worked  on  account  of  the  narrowness  of  the  channel,  and  she 
was  likely  to  get  hard  aground. 

The  following  report,  from  Commander  John  P.  Gillis,  will 
show  the  severity  of  this  portion  of  the  fight : 

U.  S.  STEAMER  MONTICELLO,  OFF  HATTERAS  INLET,  N.  C.,  August  31,  1861. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  to  you  that,  in  obedience  to  the 
order  of  Flag-Officer  S.  H.  Stringham,  the  transport  steamers,  with 
troops  on  board,  were  conveyed  safely  to  the  position  off  this  inlet  indi 
cated  by  him. 

I  communicated  with  the  United  States  ship  Cumberland  ;  the  Har 
riet  Lane  took  her  in  tow.  Boarded  schooner  Equator,  from  Nassau, 
with  fruit  for  New  York. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  frigates  Minnesota  and  Wabash  (27th),  received 
further  instructions  from  the  flag-officer,  and  proceeded  to  carry  them 
out.  Stood  in  and  made  a  reconnoissance  of  the  shore,  discovering  two 
forts  on  north  side  of  Hatteras  Inlet,  and  a  suitable  place  for  landing 
troops  on  the  beach  about  two  and  a  half  miles  to  the  north. 

On  the  28th  received  the  marines  from  the  Minnesota  and  Wabash; 
also  a  lighter  or  scow  with  two  howitzers,  which  we  landed,  and  assisted 
in  landing  some  of  the  other  troops,  about  300  in  all,  I  believe. 

The  Minnesota,  Wabash,  and  Cumberland  took  positions  and  com 
menced  shelling  the  forts  on  the  point,  which  promptly  returned  the 
fire,  and  the  Harriet  Lane,  Pawnee,  and  Monticello  covered  our  troops 
on  shore  with  their  shell.  Wind  freshening  and  surf  increasing,  could 
not  land  more  troops.  Steamed  down  along  the  beach,  extending  our 
firing  to  the  forts,  one  of  which  ceased  to  fire,  and  hauled  down  the  Con 
federate  flag.  We  were  feeling  our  way  in  through  the  inlet,  when 
signalled  to  come  alongside  of  flag-ship ;  received  a  pilot  for  the  inlet 
from  flag-ship,  and  proceeded  to  attempt  the  passage,  no  rebel  flag  fly 
ing  on  shore ;  entered  between  the  breakers,  feeling  our  way  carefully 
with  the  lead  for  the  deepest  water.  The  vessel  struck  heavily  fre- 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTERAS  FORTS.  3il 

quently.  Continued  on,  in  hopes  of  getting  into  deeper  water,  and  be 
enabled  to  enter  the  sound ;  the  large  fort,  of  fifteen  guns,  still  showing  no 
colors,  and  our  own  troops  in  possession  of  the  other,  of  five  guns.  As 
we  turned  the  point  or  spithead,  finding  so  little  water  that  we  would  be 
compelled  to  turn  and  work  the  vessel  out  again,  if  possible,  the  large  fort 
opened  a  brisk  fire  upon  us,  which  we  promptly  returned  with  our  pivot- 
gun  and  port  battery  (two  32-pounders  abaft),  ship  striking  often  as  we 
backed  and  filled  to  turn  her  head  seaward.  By  keeping  the  engine  in 
motion  we  succeeded,  with  the  aid  of  the  swell,  in  getting  out  of  the 
inlet,  firing  five-second  shell  rapidly  and  with  precision  at  the  battery. 
We  were  about  fifteen  minutes  in  this  "  tight  place"  during  which  time 
we  fired  thirty  shell.  The  fort  fired  slow  as  we  came  out,  and  did  not  re 
turn  our  last  three  shot,  owing,  no  doubt,  to  the  promptness  with  which 
the  flag-officer  and  the  other  vessels  opened  upon  them  for  our  relief. 

We  were  struck  by  eight-inch  shot  and  shell ;  once  amidships,  on 
port  side,  shot  lodged  in  knee  ;  another  amidships,  on  port  side,  which  car 
ried  away  boat-davit,  and  drove  the  fragments  of  shell  and  davit  through 
the  armory,  pantry,  and  galley;  another  shot  carried  away  part  of  fore- 
topsail  yard  and  sail  on  the  port  yard-arm ;  another  on  the  starboard 
bow.  This  shot  lodged  in  the  knee,  at  forward  end  of  shell-locker. 
Another  shot  amidships,  on  the  starboard  side,  passed  through,  across 
berth-deck,  paint-locker,  and  bulkhead,  across  fire-room,  and  lodged  in 
the  port  coal-bunker,  ripping  up  the  deck  in  the  gangway  over  it; 
whale-boat's  bottom  shot  away  and  gig  injured.  Received  carpenters 
from  the  flag-ship  to  make  temporary  repairs,  plug  shot-holes,  etc.,  and 
stood  in  toward  the  batteries,  firing  several  guns. 

Expended  the  following  ammunition  : 

17  five-second  10-inch' shell.  9  five-second  32-pound  shell. 

18  ten-second  10-inch  shell.  20  ten-second  32-pound  shell. 

11  fifteen-second  10-inch  shell.  11  fifteen-second  32-pound  shell. 

46  ten-inch  shell.  40  32-pound  shell. 

46 

86 
ShrapneU 3 

Total 89 

Powder. — 46  ten-pound  charges,  28  six-pound  charges,  15  four- 
pound  charges  ;  total,  89  charges. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  P.  GILLIS,  Commander. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington. 


342  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

At  6.15  the  signal  was  made  to  cease  firing,  and  the  squad 
ron  hauled  off  for  the  night,  with  the  exception  of  the  Monti- 
cello,  Pawnee,  and  Harriet  Lane ;  which  were  ordered  to  go 
inshore  and  protect  the  troops  during  the  night.  The  roar  of 
the  battle  died  away  as  one  after  another  of  the  ships  drew  out 
of  range,  the  fire  of  Fort  liatteras  ceased,  and  those  not  par 
tially  deafened  by  the  guns  heard  again  the  dash  of  the  surf  on 
the  sandy  beach  and  a  seaward  murmur  as  from  a  coming 
storm;  while  the  blows  of  the  carpenters  repairing  damages 
on  board  the  Monticello  rang  out  sharply  over  the  waters.  The 
main  body  of  troops  remained  during  the  night  near  where  they 
were  landed,  with  no  very  pleasant  prospects  of  comfort  on 
that  bare  sand-spit,  with  the  promise  of  a  squally  night. 

About  three  hundred  men  had  been  landed  in  the  manner 
already  stated,  and  were  left  without  food  or  shelter,  or  fresh 
water,  or  support  from  the  fleet,  on  a  hostile  shore,  but  a  short 
distance  from  the  forts  whose  garrisons  outnumbered  them,  and 
with  a  fleet  of  light  steamers  near  that  could  bring  other  troops 
for  a  night  attack.  In  this  state  of  things  scouts  were  sent  out  to 
reconnoitre.  They  brought  back  the  report  that  Fort  Clark  was 
evacuated,  the  troops  having  been  withdrawn  to  Fort  liatteras. 
A  small  body  of  the  troops  thereupon  marched  up  and  took  pos 
session,  hoisting  on  the  ramparts  the  Union  flag.  For  some 
unexplained  reason  the  fire  from  the  ships  was  kept  up  after 
the  little  band  had  entered  Fort  Clark,  and,  as  a  consequence, 
they  were  speedily  shelled  out  again,  and  that  before  they  could 
take  possession  of  some  commissary  stores  that  the  enemy  had 
abandoned,  and  which  the  soldiers  greatly  needed,  for  they  had 
eaten  nothing  since  5  o'clock  in  the  morning,  and  their  labors 
during  the  day  had  been  severe.  They  had  also  been  thorough 
ly  drenched,  and  had  marched  to  the  fort  in  their  wet  clothing, 
and  were  not  yet  accustomed  to  the  hardships  which  veteran 
soldiers  are  so  often  called  upon  to  endure.  Under  such  circum 
stances  they  were  compelled  to  march  back  to  the  place  where 
they  had  landed,  nearly  three  miles.  On  their  retreat  they 
captured  some  stragglers  from  the  forts,  and  from  them  and 
some  negroes  they  learned  that  the  rebel  forces  outnumbered 
ours,  and  that  they  were  expecting  reinforcements  during  the 
night.  The  prospect  was  certainly  not  very  encouraging. 


CAPTUEE  OF  THE  HATTEEAS  FOETS.  343 

The  soldiers,  however,  were  disposed  to  put  upon  the  matter 
as  cheerful  a  face  as  possible.  They  discovered  a  few  sheep 
and  some  geese,  which,  in  army  phrase,  were  "appropriated" 
or  "  acquired."  Camp-fires  were  lighted,  and  a  process,  which 
they  were  obliged  to  regard  as  cooking,  was  gone  through  with. 
Bayonets  and  cutlasses  made  very  serviceable  spits,  and  this 
meat  alone,  thus  cooked,  made  the  only  supper,  and  breakfast 
also,  of  men  who  had  been  used  to  the  comforts  of  Northern 
homes  and  the  luxuries  of  cities. 

They  had  no  tents  or  shelter  of  any  kind,  and  the  night  was 
rainy.  Their  garments  were  yet  wet  from  the  drenching  of  the 
landing,  and  so  with  the  wet  sand  for  a  bed,  with  wet  clothing 
for  a  covering,  the  rain  falling  upon  them,  and  the  surge  lashed 
by  the  rising  gale  howling  in  their  very  ears,  these  weary  de 
fenders  of  our  flag  tried  hard  to  sleep.  During  the  night,  as 
was  afterward  known,  the  enemy  were  busy  throwing  troops 
into  Hatteras,  and  organizing  to  attack  the  little  band,  but  their 
own  pickets  made  a  false  report  that  the  Union  troops  in  large 
numbers  were  advancing  to  attack  the  forts,  and  thus  they  were 
held  back  from  an  assault  in  which  our  troops  would  probably 
have  been  captured.  Thus  the  three  hundred  passed  a  safe  but 
watchful  and  anxious  night. 

On  Thursday  morning,  the  29th,  the  weather  was  pleasant, 
and  the  sea  not  so  rough.  At  5.30  A.  M.  the  general  signal  was 
made,  "  Prepare  to  engage  batteries."  All  weighed  anchor,  stood 
in  toward  the  shore,  and  "  discovered,"  says  Commodore  String- 
ham,  "  the  main  body  of  our  troops  near  where  they  landed." 
A  small  guard  had  taken  possession  of  Fort  Clark  after  it  had 
been  deserted  under  the  fire  of  the  fleet.  The  commander  of 
the  Monticello  was  instructed  to  bring  off  the  troops  if  they 
wished  to  reembark,  or  to  supply  them  with  provisions  if  they 
desired  to  remain.  At  Y.30  the  signal  to  attack  was  given,  with 
a  precaution  against  firing  too  near  the  battery  already  won. 
At  8  A.  M.  the  side-wheel  steamer  Susquehanna  being  ahead 
opened  her  broadside  upon  Fort  Hatteras,  the  "VVabash.  followed, 
and  then  the  Minnesota,  with  their  enormous  batteries,  and  soon 
after  the  Cumberland  came  in  under  sail  from  the  offing,  and 
joined  again  in  the  fight.  The  enemy  had  now  five  guns  less 
than  yesterday,  and  they  used  the  remainder  with  very  little 


HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

effect.  Commodore  Stringham,  observing  that  some  of  our  shot 
fell  short,  signalled  to  use  15-second  fuses  only  and  with  10-inch 
guns.  This  change  made  the  tiring  much  more  effectual,  shot 
and  shell  fell  thick  in  and  around  the  fort,  and  it  was  enveloped 
with  smoke  and  clouds  of  dust.  The  Harriet  Lane  also  came 
up  and  joined  in  the  firing  with  her  rifled  guns. 

During  the  last  day's  fight  the  fire  of  the  ships  was  very  accu 
rate.  The  range  was  two  miles,  and  the  15-second  fuses  explod 
ed  the  shells  at  exactly  that  distance.  Considering  the  heavy 
batteries  of  the  ships  engaged,  and  the  number  of  their  guns,  it 
is  not  surprising  that  sometimes  three  shells  would  burst  at  once 
in  the  fort.  It  was  almost  a  matter  of  co  urse  that  the  garrison 
became  demoralized.  They  could  not  stand  to  their  guns,  every 
thing  which  shot  and  shells  could  destroy  in  the  fort  was  being 
smashed  in  pieces,  and,  in  spite  of  remonstrance  or  commands, 
they  took  refuge  in  the  bomb-proof,  leaving  their  stations  at  the 
puff  of  smoke  from  the  guns  of  the  ships.  For  the  last  hour 
and  a  half  of  the  bombardment,  as  stated  by  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  fort,  the  shells  fell  mostly  in  the  centre  of  his 
works,  and  so  thickly  as  to  force  his  men  to  shelter.  At  length 
a  shell  struck  a  ventilator  in  the  top  of  the  bomb-proof,  and 
went  through,  and,  though  it  did  not  explodej  it  spread  conster 
nation  among  the  three  hundred  men  that  were  packed  within. 
The  shell  filled  the  bomb-proof  with  dust  and  smoke,  and  the 
men  supposing  that  the  magazine  was  on  fire,  a  great  panic  en 
sued,  and  they  were  beyond  control.  Not  long  after,  another  ex 
ploded  on  the  bomb-proof,  and  it  was  quite  evident  that,  not 
only  would  it  soon  be  destroyed,  but  the  magazine  would  itself 
be  exploded.  It  was  deemed  folly  to  protract  the  defence,  and 
a  white  flag  was  run  up  over  the  fort,  and  the  victory  was  won. 
Prolonged  cheers  from  the  fleet  rose  louder 'than  the  roar  of 
the  surge,  and  the  firing  ceased. 

Commodore  Barron  refused  to  surrender  the  forts  to  the 
troops  who  had  now  come  up,  the  number  being  so  small,  and 
they  having  taken  no  part  in  the  battle.  He  was  therefore 
taken  on  board  the  flag-ship,  and  there  he  gave  up  his  sword  to 
his  former  friend,  Commodore  Stringham.  The  second  day's 
bombardment  continued  a  little  more  than  three  hours. 

"When  the  white  flag   was  raised  on  the  fort    the   troops 


CAPTUEE  OF  THE  HATTEKAS  FORTS.  345 

marched  up,  and  at  11.30  Major-General  Butler,  in  the  tug 
Fanny,  went  into  the  inlet  to  the  rear  of  the  forts  to  take  pos 
session.  Three  steamers  and  several  schooners  with  rebel  troops 
on  board  were  in  the  sound  watching  the  engagement,  but  they 
left  after  the  surrender  of  the  fort,  the  Fanny  sending  some  shot 
after  them  from  her  rifled  gun.  The  chartered  steamers,  with 
the  remainder  of  the  troops  on  board,  then  went  into  the  inlet 
to  land  them,  and  thus  ended  the  first  important  naval  engage 
ment  of  the  war.  As  the  result,  possession  was  obtained  of  the 
key  to  the  inland  waters  of  North  Carolina,  and  six  hundred 
and  fifteen  prisoners  were  captured,  at  the  head  of  whom  was 
that  Samuel  Barron  who,  a  short  time  before,  by  an  order  ob 
tained  from  President  Lincoln,  in  some  unexplained  manner, 
was  to  have  taken  the  charge  of  a  most  important  office  in  the 
Navy  Department,  which  order  was  revoked  upon  the  firm  re 
monstrance  of  Secretary  Welles.  The  presence  of  this  person 
at  these  forts  is  a  very  instructive  commentary  upon  the  wisdom 
of  those  who  procured  from  Mr.  Lincoln  his  appointment  to  a 
position  where  he  would  have  known  all  the  intended  operations 
of  the  Navy,  the  location  of  every  ship,  and  the  station  of  every 
officer,  and  could  therefore  have  frustrated  every  movement  of 
the  Department.  The  following  are  the  articles  of  capitulation 
as  signed  oif  Hatteras  Inlet : 

OFF  HATTEKAS  INLET,  | 

UNITED  STATES  FLAG-SHIP  MINNESOTA,  August  29,  A.  D.  1861.  f 

Articles  of  capitulation  between  Flag-Officer  Stringham,  commanding  the  "Atlantic 
Blockading  Squadron"  and  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  United  States  Army,  command 
ing  on  behalf  of  the  United  States  Government,  and  Samuel  Barron,  command 
ing  the  naval  force  for  the  defence  of  North  Carolina  and  Virginia,  and  Colonel 
Martin,  commanding  the  forces,  and  Major  Andrews,  commanding  the  same 
forces,  at  Fort  Hatteras. 

It  is  stipulated  and  agreed  between  the  contracting  parties  that  the 
forces  under  the  command  of  the  said  Barron,  Martin,  and  Andrews, 
and  all  munitions  of  war,  arms,  men,  and  property,  under  the  command 
of  said  BaiTon,  Martin,  and  Andrews,  be  unconditionally  surrendered  to 
the  Government  of  the  United  States  in  terms  of  full  capitulation. 

And  it  is  stipulated  and  agreed  by  the  contracting  parties  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  Government  that  the  officers  and  men  shall 
receive  the  treatment  due  to  prisoners  of  war. 

In  witness  whereof,  we,  the  said  Stringham  and  Butler,  on  behalf  of 
the  United  States,  and  the  said  Barron,  Martin,  and  Andrews,  repre- 


34:6  HISTORY   OP  THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

senting  the  forces  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  hereunto  interchangeably  set  our 
hands  this  twenty-ninth  day  of  August,  A.  D.  1861,  and  of  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  United  States  the  eighty-fifth  year. 

S.  H.  STRINGHAM, 
Flay- Officer  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 

BENJAMIN  F.  BUTLER, 
Major-General  United  States  Army,  commanding. 

S.  BARRON, 

Flag- Officer  Confederate  States  Navy, 
Commanding  Naval  Defences  South  and  North  Carolina. 

WILLIAM  F.  MARTIN, 
Colonel  *lth  Regiment  Infantry  North  Carolina  Volunteers. 

W.  S.  G.  ANDREWS, 
Major,  commanding  Forts  Hatteras  and  Clark. 

The  following  papers  will  show  the  opinion  of  Commodore 
Stringham  and  of  Secretary  "Welles  in  regard  to  the  importance 
of  the  enterprise : 

U.  S.  FLAG-SHIP  MINNESOTA,  NEW  YORK  HARBOR,  September  2, 1861. 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  to  the  Department  a  correct  list 
of  the  prisoners  captured  by  the  Navy  at  Forts  Hatteras  and  Clark  on 
the  29th  day  of  August,  A.  D.  1861,  amounting  to  a  few  more  than  the 
number  I  gave  in  rny  dispatch  No.  133. 

The  three  senior  officers  of  the  enemy  surrendered  their  swords  to 
me  on  board  the  Minnesota.  Will  the  Department  please  inform  me 
what  disposition  I  can  make  of  them  ? 

I  am  not  able  to  get  a  correct  list  of  the  killed  and  wounded  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy. 

I  wish  in  this  official  manner  to  renew  the  opinion  which  I  have  here 
tofore  given  as  to  the  very  great  importance  to  the  Government  of  re 
taining  in  our  possession  the  forts  at  Hatteras.  This  inlet  I  consider  the 
key  to  all  the  ports  south  of  Hatteras,  and  only  second  in  importance  to 
Fortress  Monroe  and  Hampton  Roads.  From  all  I  can  learn,  it  was  the 
intention  of  the  enemy  to  fortify  this  point  as  strongly  as  possible. 

It  will  be  of  great  service  to  our  fleet  in  their  blockading  opera 
tions,  and  most  effectually,  I  trust,  put  an  end  to  the  pirating  which 
has  been  so  successfully  carried  on  there  for  some  time  past. 
Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  H.  STRINGHAM, 

Flag- Officer  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


CAPTURE   OF   THE    HATTERAS    FORTS.  347 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  September  2, 1861. 

SIR:  The  Department  congratulates  you  and  those  of  your  com 
mand,  and  also  the  officers  and  soldiers  of  the  army  who  cooperated 
with  you  on  the  reduction  of  Forts  Hatteras  and  Clark,  and  the  capture 
of  the  forces  employed  in  their  defence. 

The  successful  result,  thus  far,  of  an  expedition  projected  with  great 
care,  and  the  occupation  of  the  position  commanding  the  most  impor 
tant  inlet  on  the  coast  of  North  Carolina  will  be  attended  with  conse 
quences  that  can  scarcely  be  overestimated. 

This  brilliant  achievement,  accomplished  without  the  loss  of  a  man 
on  your  part,  or  injury  to  any  one  in  the  Federal  service,  has  carried 
joy  and  gladness  to  the  bosom  of  every  friend  of  the  Union. 

It  is,  I  trust,  but  the  beginning  of  results  that  will  soon  eventuate  in 
suppressing  the  insurrection,  and  confirming  more  strongly  than  ever 
the  integrity  of  the  Union. 

Convey  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  respective  vessels  under  your 
command  the  thanks  of  the  Department  for  their  gallant  conduct,  and 
the  assurance  that  is  thus  afforded  that,  in  the  great  emergency  now 
upon  us,  the  country  may  rely,  as  of  old,  upon  the  vigor  the  courage, 
and  the  enthusiasm  of  its  brave  officers  and  sailors. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GIDEON  WELLES. 
Flag-Officer  S.  H.  STRINGHAM, 

Commanding  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 


This  was  really  the  first  important  success  of  the  war,  the 
first  event  which  revived  the  drooping  spirits  of  the  country 
after  the  capture  of  Sumter  and  the  disgrace  of  Bull  Run.  It 
was  not  remarkable  for  the  character  of  the  fighting,  though 
our  ships  and  their  batteries  were  skilfully  handled,  and  officers 
and  men  performed  their  duties  nobly.  The  rebel  forts,  though 
mounting  twenty-five  guns,  effected  little,  except  wrhen  the 
Monticello  was  for  a  short  time  aground  and  unmanageable  in 
the  inlet,  because  of  the  manner  in  which  the  ships  were  man 
aged,  and  because  they  were  overwhelmed  by  the  shot  and  shell 
from  the  ships.  The  important  feature  of  the  victory  was,  that 
a  foothold  was  gained  upon  the  Southern  coast  which  afforded 
a  point  of  support  for  our  blockading  squadrons ;  that  it  gave  us 
command  of  the  most  important  passage  to  the  sounds  on  the 
coast  of  North  Carolina,  and  prevented  the  entrance  of  English 


348  HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  NAVY. 

smugglers,  while  it  also  stopped  to  a  great  extent  the  fitting  out 
of  piratical  expeditions  on  those  interior  waters. 

The  capture  of  the  Hatteras  forts  was  soon  followed  by 
other  operations  along  the  coast  and  sounds,  which  were  in 
tended  both  to  weaken  the  defences  of  the  enemy,  and  to  extend 
and  secure  our  control  of  the  adjacent  coast  and  waters.  The 
first  of  these  was  directed  against  Fort  Ocracoke.  Ocracoke 
Inlet  is  some  twenty  miles  south  of  Hatteras.  Just  inside  of  the 
inlet  is  a  small  island  called  Beacon  Island.  On  the  seaward 
face  of  this  island,  and  so  placed  as  to  command  the  inlet,  the 
rebels  had  constructed  a  fort  intended  to  mount  twenty  guns. 
At  Portsmouth,  a  small  village  on  a  point  near  by,  four  8-inch 
guns  had  also  been  placed,  with  the  intention  of  constructing  a 
battery  which  would  also  command  the  channel  of  the  inlet.  The 
capture  of  the  Hatteras  forts  interrupted  the  rebel  plans,  and 
they  were  compelled  to  evacuate  both  these  points,  and  it  was 
thought  important  to  fit  out  an  expedition  to  destroy  the  guns 
and  other  material,  in  order  to  prevent  these  points  from  being 
reoccupied.  The  following  is  the  official  report  of  this  opera 
tion: 

U.  S.  STEAMER  PAWNEE,  HATTERAS  INLET,  September  18,  1861. 

SIR  :  On  Saturday,  the  14th  instant,  I  gave  a  pass  to  one  of  the  peo 
ple  on  Hatteras  Island  to  go  to  Ocracoke  Inlet  for  the  purpose  of  bring 
ing  his  family  from  Portsmouth.  I  directed  this  person  to  examine  the 
forts  on  Beacon  Island  and  Portsmouth  Island,  and  bring  me  a  true 
report  of  the  condition  of  things  ;  the  number  of  guns  mounted,  if  any , 
and  the  number  dismounted ;  whether  any  troops  were  there,  and 
whether  the  gun-carriages  had  all  been  burnt  or  not,  and  to  report  the 
result  to  me  on  his  return. 

On  Sunday  morning,  the  15th  instant,  the  boat  came  alongside  with 
the  man  and  his  wife  and  children  in  a  destitute  state.  We  gave  them 
food,  and  the  surgeon  prescribed  and  furnished  medicine  for  the  sick  of 
the  family. 

The  man  reported  that  there  were  twenty  guns  in  Fort  Beacon  and 
four  8-inch  shell  guns  at  Portsmouth ;  that  the  guns  were  spiked  and 
the  carriages  burnt  on  the  1st  instant,  as  already  reported  to  you. 

He  also  stated  that  a  steamer  came  to  Beacon  Island,  before  he  left 
Portsmouth,  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  .off  the  guns. 

I  immediately  determined  to  use  all  the  means  at  my  command  to 
prevent  the  removal  of  the  guns,  and  forthwith  got  the  steamer  Fanny 


CAPTURE   OF   THE   HATTER  AS   FORTS.  349 

alongside  to  prepare  her  for  this  service,  and  had  the  launch  armed  and 
equipped.  I  sent  a  request  to  Colonel  Hawkins  to  give  me  as  many  of 
the  naval  brigade  as  could  be  spared,  which  he  cheerfully  complied  with. 
When  the  Fanny  was  brought  alongside,  her  iron  rudder-perch  was 
found  so  much  injured  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  send  her  without 
repairs,  and  so  the  forge  was  gotten  up,  and  the  clink  of  the  hammers 
soon  succeeded  the  voices  of  the  crew  in  their  responses  to  oar  usual 
Sunday  morning  service. 

I  dispatched  the  information  to  Captain  Chauncey,  in  the  offing,  who 
promptly  informed  me  that  he  would  send  in  four  boats  and  all  his 
marines.  I  sent  him  word  that  I  would  have  great  pleasure  in  cooperat 
ing  with  him  as  senior  officer,  and  would  send  him  the  Tempest  to  tow 
his  boats  over  Ocracoke  bar. 

At  daylight  on  Monday  morning  the  Fanny  was  towed  alongside,  and 
her  rudder  temporarily  fitted ;  the  naval  brigade  were  taken  on  board 
with  four  days'  provision  and  water,  and  the  launch  similarly  provided 
for. 

The  expedition  being  carefully  organized  and  provided  with  sledge 
hammers  to  break  off  the  trunnions,  and  32-pounder  shot  and  twenty 
7-pound  cartridges  to  be  used  in  firing  one  gun  against  the  trunnion  of 
another,  left  this  ship  at  half-past  seven  o'clock.  The  launch  com 
manded  by  Lieutenant  Eastman,  in  tow  of  the  Fanny ;  the  expedition 
under  command  of  Lieutenant  Maxwell,  the  executive  officer  of  this 
ship. 

I  dispatched  the  tug  Tempest  to  Captain  Chauncey,  she  drawing  too 
much  water  to  enter  the  sound.  At  10  o'clock  the  Susquehanna  and 
tug  started  for  the  inlet ;  on  the  evening  of  the  same  day  the  tug  and 
Susquehanna  returned  and  anchored  off  Fort  Clark.  The  tug  came  the 
next  morning,  and  the  pilot  informed  me  that  the  force  from  the  Sus 
quehanna  did  not  enter  Ocracoke  in  consequence  of  the  surf. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  17th  instant  I  felt  much  anxiety  for  our  ex 
pedition. 

The  Susquehanna  remained  at  anchor  in  the  offing,  and  our  force 
was  left  to  take  care  of  itself. 

Early  this  morning  the  look-out  at  the  masthead  gave  us  the  gratify 
ing  intelligence  that  our  expedition  was  in  sight,  and  it  reached  the  ship 
about  11  o'clock. 

Lieutenants  Maxwell  and  Eastman  performed  the  service  with  ability 
and  energy,  and  bore  my  thanks. 

The  destruction  of  the  fort  is  complete,  and  twenty-two  guns  dis 
abled  ;  these  were  all  the  guns  that  were  there,  with  the  exception  of 


350  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

two  taken  off  in  the  steamboat  Albemarle  on  Sunday.  The  destruction 
of  the  guns  was  with  me  a  necessity.  I  had  no  means  of  transporting 
them  nor  of  defending  them  in  their  position.  I  therefore  hope  my 
course  will  meet  with  your  approval. 

I  enclose  a  copy  of  Lieutenant  Maxwell's  report,  giving  all  the  de 
tails  of  this  important  service,  which  was  performed  without  an  accident 
of  any  kind. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  C.  ROWAN,  Commander. 
Flag-Officer  S.  H.  STRINGHAM,  commanding  Atlantic  Squadron. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  PAWNEE,  HATTERAS  INLET,  September  18,  1861. 

SIR  :  I  have  to  report  that,  in  compliance  with  your  orders  of  the 
16th,  I  started  for  Ocracoke  on.  that  day  in  the  steamer  Fanny,  towing 
the  Pawnee's  launch.  Lieutenant  Eastman  had  charge  of  the  latter  with 
twenty-two  men  and  six  marines  from  the  ship,  and  the  12-pound 
howitzer,  and  I  had  on  board  six  men  and  sixty-one  soldiers  of  the  naval 
brigade,  under  Lieutenants  Tillotson  and  Rowe. 

We  arrived  within  two  miles  of  the  fort  on  Beacon  Island  at  11  A.  M., 
when  the  Fanny  grounded.  I  sent  Lieutenant  Eastman  in  the  launch  to 
sound  for  the  channel.  While  he  was  so  occupied,  a  sail-boat  with  two 
men  put  off  from  Portsmouth  to  cross  the  sound.  A  shot  from  the 
Fanny  brought  them  alongside,  and  they  piloted  us  to  within  a  hun 
dred  yards  of  the  fort.  It  is  called  Fort  Ocracoke,  and  is  situated  on 
the  seaward  face  of  Beacon  Island ;  it  was  entirely  deserted  ;  it  is  octag 
onal  in  shape,  contains  four  shell-rooms  about  twenty -five  feet  square, 
and  in  the  centre  a  large  bomb-proof  one  hundred  feet  square,  with 
the  magazine  within  it.  Directly  above  the  magazine,  on  each  side, 
were  four  large  tanks  containing  water. 

The  fort  has  been  constructed  with  great  care  of  sand  in  barrels  cov 
ered  with  earth  and  turf ;  the  inner  framing  of  the  bomb-proof  was  built 
of  heavy  pine  timber.  There  were  platforms  for  twenty  guns,  which 
had  been  partially  destroyed  by  fire ;  the  gun-carriages  had  been  all 
burned.  There  were  eighteen  guns  in  the  fort,  viz. :  four  8-inch  navy 
shell-guns  and  fourteen  long  32-pounders. 

The  steamer  Alberaarle  left  on  Sunday  afternoon,  carrying  off  two 
guns.  I  found  150  barrels  also,  many  of  them  filled  with  water  ;  there 
being  no  water  in  the  fort,  they  had  brought  it  from  Washington  and 
Newbern. 

I  landed  the  men  at  half-past  one  o'clock,  and  commenced  breaking 
off  the  trunnions  of  the  guns.  While  a  portion  of  our  men  and-  the 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTERAS  FORTS.  351 

naval  brigade  were  so  employed,  I  sent  Lieutenant  Eastman  in  the 
launch  to  Portsmouth,  where  he  found  three  8-inch  navy  shell-guns 
lying  on  the  beach,  and  one  mounted  on  a  carriage  ;  they  had  all  been 
spiked.  There  was  no  battery  erected  there,  although  we  were  informed 
that  one  would  have  been  built  but  for  our  coming.  There  had  been  a 
camp  at  Portsmouth  called  Camp  Washington,  but  a  portion  of  the 
troops  were  sent  to  Fort  Hatteras  when  it  was  attacked  on  August  28, 
and  the  remainder  retired  to  the  main-land. 

Portsmouth,  which  formerly  contained  450  inhabitants,  was  nearly 
deserted,  but  the  people  are  expected  to  return ;  those  remaining  seem 
to  be  Union  men,  and  expressed  satisfaction  at  our  coming.  Lieutenant 
Eastman  assured  them  that  they  would  not  be  molested  by  the  Govern 
ment,  and  that  they  might  return  to  their  usual  occupations. 

There  are  no  intrenchments  nor  guns  at  Ocracoke.  The  fishermen 
and  pilots  who  fled  after  our  attack  have  generally  returned.  I  tried  to 
destroy  the  guns  by  breaking  the  trunnions  off  with  sledges,  and  by 
dropping  solid  shot  upon  them  from  an  elevation,  with  little  success.  I 
then  fired  solid  shot  from  a  64-pounder  at  them,  and  in  this  manner 
disabled  them. 

Lieutenant  Eastman  disabled  the  guns  at  Portsmouth  by  knocking 
off  the  cascables  and  leaving  them  in  the  salt  water  on  the  beach.  After 
destroying  the  guns  I  collected  all  the  lumber,  barrels,  and  wheelbarrows, 
and  placed  them  in  and  about  the  bomb  proof,  set  fire  to  the  pile,  and 
entirely  destroyed  it.  A  light-ship,  which  had  been  used  as  a  store-ship, 
and  which  was  run  upon  the  shore  some  distance  from  the  fort,  with  the 
intention  of  subsequently  towing  off  and  arming,  I  also  set  fire  to. 

At  half-past  six  o'clock  this  morning  I  started  on  our  return ;  we 
met  with  no  detention,  and  arrived  safely  with  all  hands  at  half-past 
eleven  o'clock. 

I  am  happy  to  report  that  the  conduct  of  our  men  and  the  naval 
brigade  was  excellent.     Lieutenant  Eastman  and  Lieutenants  Tillotson 
and  Rowe,  of  the  naval  brigade,  rendered  me  most  efficient  assistance. 
I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JAMES  G.  MAXWELL,  Lieutenant,  U.  S.  N. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  United  States  Steamer  Pawnee. 

This  secured  the  entire  possession  of  the  coast  from  Hatteras 
Inlet  southward  to  Cape  Lookout,  and  virtually  to  Cape  Fear 
River;  because  the  inlets  between  Cape  Lookout  and  Cape 
Fear  are  small  and  shallow.  Northward,  the  possession  of 
Hatteras  gave  control  of  the  coast  to  Hampton  Eoads. 


352  I1ISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Viewed  simply  as  the  bombardment  and  capture  of  two 
small  forts,  and  the  spiking  or  destroying  the  guns  of  another 
deserted  one  on  the  bare  sands  of  that  desolate  coast,  these 
things  appeared  very  insignificant,  and  as  such  were  ridiculed 
by  some ;  but  their  real  importance  is  seen  when  they  are  re 
garded  as  the  first  step,  and  that  a  necessary  one,  in  the  re 
covery  of  the  coast  and  harbors  of  the  South,  when  it  is  known 
that  this  was  the  first  check  put  upon  the  illicit  traffic  by  which 
the  rebels  were  supplied ;  that  it  introduced  our  vessels  into 
those  important  interior  waters,  which  the  forts  at  the  inlet 
guarded,  and  prepared  the  way  for  the  capture  of  the  works  on 
Roanoke  Island,  and  the  destruction  of  the  rebel  fleet  and  com 
merce.  It  is  true  that  the  blockade-runners  sought  other  en 
trances  ;  but,  as  channel  after  channel  was  closed,  their  chances 
of  escape  were  diminished  and  the  task  of  our  blockading 
squadron,  in  watching  the  remainder,  was  easier.  The  subse 
quent  operations  upon  Pamlico  and  Albemarle  Sounds  and 
their  rivers,  show  how  important  a  base  these  formed  for  the 
rebels,  and  how  difficult  it  would  have  been  to  crush  the  re 
bellion  had  they  remained  in  their  possession.  A  garrison  was 
left  at  Fort  Hatteras,  which  found  it  both  a  dangerous  and 
uncomfortable  spot.  In  some  of  the  severe  storms  they  wrere 
driven  from  their  quarters  by  the  waves,  subjecting  them  to 
annoying  privations  and  dangerous  exposure ;  while  the  rebels 
gathered  about  them,  watching  an  opportunity  to  attack,  and 
they  succeeded  in  capturing  a  part  of  an  Indiana  regiment.  To 
watch  and  repel  such  attacks  was  a  part  of  the  duty  of  the  Navy. 

One  of  these  fights,  in  which  the  steamer  Monticello  was 
engaged,  had  some  quite  peculiar  features.  Colonel  Hawkins, 
who  was  placed  in  command  of  Fort  Hatteras  after  its  capture — 
having  heard  that  the  rebels  had  occupied  Roanoke  Island,  with 
the  intention  of  fortifying  it  so  as  to  protect  both  Albemarle 
Sound  and  an  inlet  near  the  island — thought  it  to  be  his  duty 
to  send  a  body  of  men  to  seize  and  fortify  Chicamacomico,  the 
extreme  northern  point  of  Hatteras  Island,  and  about  forty 
miles  from  the  forts.  Accordingly,  the  small  steamers  Ceres 
and  Pallas  were  sent,  with  the  Twentieth  Indiana  regiment,  to 
take  possession  of  the  place.  They  started  on  the  29th  of  .Sep 
tember,  and  reached  the  designated  point  the  same  day ;  but 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTEKAS  FORTS.  353 

the  water  was  so  shallow  that  even  these  light-draught  boats 
were  obliged  to  anchor  three  miles  from  shore,  and  from  that 
point  the  troops  were  landed  in  small  boats.  They  were,  how 
ever,  but  partially  equipped  and  very  scantily  provided  with 
provisions,  as  these  were  to  be  forwarded  the  next  day  by  the 
steamer  Fanny,  an  army  transport  not  connected  with  the  Navy 
nor  under  its  orders.  The  Fanny  did  not  leave  until  the  first  of 
October.  She  reached  her  destination  the  same  afternoon. 
Just  as  she  arrived  three  rebel  steamers  made  their  appearance, 
but  their  true  character  was  not  known  until  they  opened  fire 
upon  the  Fanny.  Had  they  been  recognized  when  first  seen  all 
on  board  the  tug  might  have  escaped,  for  one  barge  had  already 
been  loaded  with  camp-equipage  and  some  other  articles,  and 
this  barge  with  ten  persons  had  time  to  leave  and  get  out  of 
reach  after  the  rebel  gunboats  came  in  sight ;  as  it  was,  twenty- 
eight  were  captured  with  the  Fanny.  The  rebels  found  the 
Union  steamer  quite  a  valuable  prize.  She  had  on  board  sixty 
barrels  of  flour,  one  thousand  new  overcoats,  nine  thousand 
pounds  of  beef,  the  goods  of  the  sutler  of  the  regiment,  and 
two  rifled  cannon.  The  capture  was  not  made  without  resist 
ance.  A  gun-squad  from  Colonel  Hawkins's  regiment  was  on 
board,  and  they  used  a  gun  of  the  Fanny  with  such  effect  as  to 
seriously  injure  two  of  the  enemy's  boats.  But  the  Fanny  was 
aground  before  the  battle  began,  and  besides  she  had  to  contend 
with  twelve  guns  on  the  rebel  boats.  Her  capture  was  seen  to 
be  inevitable  and  the  men  on  board  destroyed  what  they  could, 
before  she  was  surrendered. 

So  soon  as  the  rebels  learned  the  true  condition  of  affairs, 
they  conceived  the  bold  design  not  only  of  capturing  the  six 
hundred  men  of  the  Indiana  regiment,  but  of  retaking  the  forts 
at  Hatteras.  The  plan  was  to  land  a  large  body  of  men  above 
the  Union  regiment  and  another  below,  between  them  and 
Hatteras,  and  thus  render  retreat  impossible  and  their  capture 
certain.  Then,  with  a  fleet  of  light  steamers,  they  intended  to 
pass  rapidly  down  the  sound  and  make  a  sudden  attack  upon 
the  forts  at  the  inlet.  But  for  unforeseen  events  they  might  per 
haps  have  succeeded.  The  rebel  movement  was  attempted  on  the 
4th  of  October.  They  had  collected  ten  transports,  six  steamers, 
besides  the  steamer  Fanny,  one  cotton-barge,  and  two  flatboats ; 
23 


354:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

carrying  in  all  about  three  thousand  men.  This  force  the 
rebels  divided,  intending  to  land  a  part  above  and  a  part  below 
the  Indiana  encampment.  Colonel  Brown,  commanding  the 
Union  troops,  divided  his  forces  also,  intending  to  fight  the 
enemy  at  the  two  points  indicated.  At  this  juncture  Colonel 
Brown  received  peremptory  orders  to  retreat.  Being  at  some 
distance  from  his  camp,  he  had  no  time  to  return  for  supplies, 
and  the  regiment  was  compelled  to  begin  a  homeward  march 
of  some  forty  miles,  destitute  of  nearly  every  thing  which  could 
sustain  them  on  their  journey. 

The  movement  of  the  enemy's  fleet  revealed  their  intention, 
which  was  to  land  one  body  of  their  troops  about  eighteen 
miles  below,  and  thus  cut  off  the  retreat ;  and  it  seemed  to  be 
reduced  to  a  question  of  speed  between  steamers  and  men 
wading  through  the  loose  and  scorching  sand.  The  rebel  flo 
tilla,  however,  was  delayed  by  some  of  the  boats  getting 
aground,  and  their  troops  were  not  landed  until  after  dark; 
and  Colonel  Brown  passing  the  point  where  the  rebel  fleet  lay 
without  being  perceived,  reached,  after  a  day  of  intense  suffer 
ing  and  fatigue,  Hatteras  light-house ;  where,  early  the  next 
morning,  they  were  reenforced  by  Colonel  Hawkins's  regiment 
sent  up  from  the  forts  to  relieve  them.  From  them  and  the 
Susquehanna  the  half-famished  six  hundred  obtained  a  supply 
of  food  and  water. 

Upon  learning  that  the  Indiana  regiment  had  been  reen 
forced,  the  rebels  began  a  retreat  up  the  island,  which  proved 
far  more  disastrous  to  them  than  that  of  the  Union  troops  had 
been ;  for  they  were  at  once  pursued  not  by  marching  troops  but 
by  a  steamer,  following  them  on  the  outside  of  the  island.  This 
steamer  was  the  Monticello,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  D.  L. 
Braine.  As  has  been  stated,  the  island  is  a  narrow  and  almost 
bare  sand-spit,  not  too  wide  to  be  swept  by  the  shells  of  a  light- 
draught  steamer  at  nearly  every  point.  A  more  perilous  position 
could  therefore  scarcely  be  imagined  for  a  body  of  troops  than 
to  be  placed  under  the  guns  of  such  a  steamer  on  this  almost 
level  sand-beach  with  no  possibility  of  escape  or  shelter.  Such 
was  precisely  the  situation  of  the  rebel  regiments  that  had 
marched  down  toward  Hatteras  light-house,  expecting  to  make 
an  easy  prey  of  the  retreating  Indianians. 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTEKAS  FORTS.  355 

The  Monticello  overtook  them  at  Kinekeet  Inlet,  some  fifteen 
miles  above  Hatteras  light-house,  and  running  in  to  within 
three-fourths  of  a  mile  of  the  beach,  opened  upon  the  shelterless 
mass  with  shells  from  her  heavy  guns.  The  precision  of  her 
fire  was  so  great  that  the  shells  burst  in  the  midst  of  them, 
causing  both  destruction  and  panic.  Each  shell,  and  they  fol 
lowed  each  other  very  rapidly,  left  great  blanks  in  the  masses 
where  they  fell,  and  in  the*  utmost  terror  they  scattered  and  ran. 
But  they  could  not  fly  beyond  the  range  of  the  Monticello's 
guns,  for  she  easily  kept  them  abreast  of  her,  and  fired  into 
groups  of  them  as  rapidly  as  the  excited  and  exulting  gunners 
could  load  and  point  their  pieces.  Some  of  the  rebels  ran  for 
shelter  to  a  little  grove  of  dwarfed  trees,  where  the  shells 
quickly  followed  making  havoc  among  them  again.  As  soon 
as  possible  the  rebel  flotilla  drew  inshore,  but  they  could  not 
get  within  range  of  the  Monticello  on  the  other  side  of  the 
island,  and,  therefore,  devoted  themselves  to  the  rescue  of  the 
regiments  that  were  suffering  so  terribly  from  the  Monticello's 
fire.  The  soldiers  rushed  into  the  water  as  the  boats  ap 
proached,  and  many  were  killed  and  wounded  thus.  Two 
heavily  loaded  barges  were  struck  by  shell  and  sunk  or  blown 
in  pieces,  thus  adding  terribly  to  the  slaughter.  It  was  one 
of  the  most  horrible  scenes  of  the  wTar.  For  more  than  three 
hours  the  Monticello  kept  up  this  destructive  fire  until  her  am 
munition  was  nearly  expended;  she  having  fired  nearly  two 
hundred  shells,  and  night  drawing  on  she  hauled  off  leaving  the 
rebels  scattered  for  four  miles  along  the  beach,  and  the  dead 
and  wounded,  and  arms  and  accoutrements  lying  thick  along  a 
still  more  extended  line.  It  was  a  one-sided  fight,  and  one  of 
the  most  deadly  for  the  rebels  in  which  they  were  engaged. 
The  following  is  the  official  report  of  the  commander  of  the 
Monticello,  which  will  show  that  the  preceding  account  is  not 
too  highly  colored : 

U.  S.  STEAMER  MONTICELLO,  OFF  HATTEBAS  INLET,  N.  C.,  October  5,  1861. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that,  in  obedience  to  your 

order  of  this  morning,  I  stood  through  the  inner  channel  of  Hatteras 

Shoals  at  12.30  p.  M.,  and  stood  close  along-shore  to  the  northward, 

keeping   a  bright  look-out  from  aloft.      At  1.30  p.  M.  we  discovered 


356  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

several  vessels  over  the  woodland  Kinekeet,  and  at  the  same  time  a  regi 
ment  marching  to  the  northward,  carrying  a  rebel  flag  in  their  midst, 
with  many  stragglers  in  the  rear ;  also  two  tugs  inside  flying  the  same 
flag.  As  they  came  out  of  the  woods  Kinekeet  we  ran  close  inshore 
and  opened  a  deliberate  fire  upon  them  at  the  distance  of  three-quarters 
of  a  mile.  At  our  first  shell,  which  fell  apparently  in  their  midst,  they 
rolled  up  their  flag  and  scattered,  moving  rapidly  up  the  beach  to  the 
northward.  We  followed  upon  them,  firing  rapidly  from  three  guns, 
driving  them  up  to  a  clump  of  woods,  in  which  they  took  refuge,  and 
abreast  of  which  their  steamers  lay.  We  now  shelled  the  woods  and 
could  see  them  embarking  in  small  boats  for  their  vessels,  evidently  in 
great  confusion  and  suffering  greatly  from  our  fire. 

Their  steamers  now  opened  upon  us,  firing,  however,  but  three  shots, 
which  fell  short.  Two  boats,  filled  with  men,  were  struck  by  our  shells 
and  destroyed.  Three  more  steamers  came  down  the  sound  and  took 
position  opposite  the  woods  we  were  shelling ;  also  two  sloops.  We 
continued  firing  deliberately  upon  them  from  one  and  a  half  p.  M.  until 
three  and  a  half  p.  M.,  when  two  men  were  discovered  on  the  sea-beach 
making  signals  to  us.  Supposing  them  to  be  two  of  the  Indiana  regi 
ment,  we  sent  an  armed  boat  and  crew  to  bring  them  off,  covering  them 
at  the  same  time  with  our  fire.  Upon  the  boat  nearing  the  beach  they 
took  to  the  water,  and  one  of  them  was  successful  in  reaching  the  boat 
— Private  W.  0.  Haver,  company  II,  Twentieth  regiment  Indiana 
troops.  The  other  man,  Private  Charles  White,  company  H,  Twentieth 
Indiana  troops,  was,  unfortunately,  drowned  in  the  surf.  Private  Haver 
informs  me  that  he  was  taken  prisoner  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  ;  that 
he  witnessed  our  fire,  which  was  very  destructive  ;  he  states  that  two  of 
our  shells  fell  into  two  sloops  loaded  with  men,  blowing  the  vessels  to 
pieces  and  sinking  them ;  also  that  several  of  the  officers  were  killed ; 
their  horses  were  seen  running  about  the  track.  He  had  just  escaped 
from  his  captors  after  shooting  the  captain  of  one  of  the  rebel  companies. 
He  states  that  the  enemy  were  in  the  greatest  confusion,  rushing  wildly 
into  the  water,  striving  to  get  oft*  to  their  vessels.  Private  H.  now 
directed  me  to  the  point  where  the  rebels  were  congregated,  waiting  an 
opportunity  to  get  off".  I  opened  fire  again  with  success,  scattering 
them.  We  were  now  very  close,  in  three  fathoms  water,  and  five-second 
shells  told  with  effect.  Six  steamers  were  now  off  the  point,  one  of 
which  I  recognized  as  the  Fanny.  At  5.25  p.  M.  we  ceased  firing,  leav 
ing  the  enemy  scattered  along  the  beach  for  upward  of  four  miles. 

I  fired  repeatedly  at  the  enemy's  steamers  with  our  rifled  cannon,  a 
Parrott  30-pounder,  and  struck  the  Fanny,  I  think,  once.  I  found  the 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  HATTEKAS  FORTS.  357 

range  of  this  piece  much  short  of  what  I  had  anticipated,  many  of  the 
shot  turning  end  over  end,  and  not  exceeding  much  the  range  of  the 
smooth-bore  32-pounders.  *  * 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

D.  L.  BRAINE, 

Lieutenant,  commanding  U.  S.  Steamship  Monticello. 
Captain  J.  L.  LARDNER, 

commanding  U.  S.  Steamship  Susquehanna, 

off  Cape  Hatteras,  N.  C. 


CHAPTER  XXL 

THE  MONITOR  AND  THE  MERRIMACK. 

As  already  stated,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  took  the 
earliest  opportunity  of  calling  the  attention  of  Congress  to 
the  construction  of  iron-clad  vessels,  having  primary  reference 
to  their  use  in  reducing  the  forts  which  the  rebels  had  seized 
upon  the  Southern  coast,  but  with  the  ultimate  purpose  of  em 
ploying  them  in  any  service  to  which  they  might  be  adapted. 
In  answer  to  this  request,  Congress  authorized  him  to  build  one 
or  more  iron-clads,  according  to  the  recommendation  of  a  board 
of  naval  officers  to  be  appointed  by  him  to  examine  and  report 
in  what  manner-  an  appropriation  made  should  in  their  opinion 
be  expended.  That  report  is  inserted  in  its  proper  place.  It 
recommended  the  contracts  which  resulted  in  the  construction 
of  the  Monitor,  the  New  Ironsides,  and  the  Galena.  There 
was  nothing  peculiar'  or  original  in  the  plan  of  the  last-named 
vessels.  The  one  was  intended  to  be  an  iron-clad  corvette,  and 
the  other  a  mailed  frigate,  both  essentially  after  the  English  and 
French  pattern,  and  consequently  the  contractors  ran  no  special 
risk.  They  were  simply  required  to  follow  the  specifications, 
and  to  construct  a  ship  which  would  float  the  requisite  weight 
of  armor  and  of  battery.  The  risk  of  their  being  shot-proof  lay 
upon  the  Government  itself.  It  was  a  very  plain  business,  and 
the  builders  had  for  their  guide  the  experience  of  England  and 
France. 

Here  an  important  fact  should  be  presented  and  considered 
by  all  who  have  been  led  to  suppose  that  the  Department  de 
voted  itself  exclusively  to  the  untried  experiment  of  the  Mon 
itor  plan,  overlooking  the  experience  of  the  world  beside.  So 


THE    MONITOR   AND   THE    MERRIMACK.  359 

far  from  this  being  true,  the  Secretary  contracted  almost  at  the 
same  time  for  every  principal  form  of  iron-clad  then  known,  in 
addition  to  the  untried  Monitor.  The  JSTew  Ironsides  and  the 
Galena  represented  the  European  broadside  ship.  The  St. 
Louis,  the  first  iron-clad  which  went  into  actual  service  in 
America,  represented  the  class  with  roof-shaped  or  sloping  armor 
sides,  adopted  afterward  uniformly  by  the  rebels,  and  the  Mon 
itor,  an  original  creation ;  these  present  every  form  of  mailed 
vessel  which  was  brought  into  use  at  home  or  abroad  during 
the  period  of  the  war. 

The  Secretary  and  his  advisers,  then,  must  receive  credit,  not 
only  for  taking  measures  at  once  to  try  all  forms  of  iron-clads 
known,  but  for  the  boldness  and  courage  to  try  a  battery  then 
unknown,  and  which  has  more  than  verified  since  the  most 
sanguine  expectations  wrhich  its  projectors  and  friends  had 
formed. 

For  the  encouragement  of  those  wTho  may  hereafter  be  called 
upon  to  perform  similar  service,  it  is  important  that  history 
should  give  due  credit  to  the  men  who  came  forward  cheer 
fully  to  the  aid  of  the  Government  in  the  construction  of  the 
original  Monitor.  It  has  been  said,  and  truly,  that  there  was 
nothing  unusual  in  the  form  of  the  contract  into  which  they 
entered,  nor  in  its  forfeitures  and  guaranties,  and  that  the  Gov 
ernment  retained  in  its  hands  merely  the  usual  amount,  and 
upon  terms  common  to  all  its  contracts.  But  these  statements, 
though  true,  do  not  exhibit  the  real  points  of  difference  between 
undertaking  to  build  a  Monitor  at  that  time,  and  an  agreement 
to  construct  a  common  broadside  iron-clad,  or  even  one  with 
sloping  side-armor.  It  was  not  the  technical  form  of  the  con 
tract,  but  what  the  parties  contracted  to  do,  which  shows  the 
risk  that  patriotism  was  willing  to  take  for  the  sake  of  the 
country.  They  contracted  to  furnish  in  a  given  time,  and  that 
a  short  time,  a  shot-proof  battery  such  as  had  never  before  been 
known,  original  not  only  in  general  design,  but  in  the  arrange 
ment  of  parts,  with  new  methods  of  mounting  guns — heavier 
guns  than  had  before  been  used  on  shipboard — and  they  bound 
themselves  to  cause  this  novel  vessel,  with  all  her  untried  ma 
chinery,  to  work  in  all  respects  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  De 
partment,  or  forfeit  the  money  advanced,  and  that  twenty-five 


360  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

per  cent,  of  the  whole  amount  they  were  to  receive  should  re 
main  unpaid  until  the  Secretary  should  be  satisfied  with  the 
performance  of  the  vessel.  As  a  necessary  consequence  of  the 
contract,  the  vessel  was  not  accepted  by  the  Government  until 
after  the  fight  at  Hampton  Roads.  This  fact  has  been  fre 
quently  urged  as  if  it  were  good  ground  for  an  accusation 
against  the  Department  for  illiberal  dealing  with  the  contract 
ors.  Had  the  Secretary  taken  the  responsibility  of  this  untried 
experiment,  beyond  the  proper  encouragement  which  he  gave 
for  the  construction  of  the  battery,  he  would  have  exceeded  in 
the  judgment  of  most  the  bounds  of  prudence,  but  this  throws 
into  stronger  relief  the  bold  patriotic  enterprise  of  the  men 
who  were  willing  to  stake  capital  and  reputation  upon  an  un 
tried  experiment.  The  Secretary  took  upon  himself  the  share 
of  the  burden  which  belonged  to  him,  and  the  inventor  and 
contractors  cheerfully  accepted  the  rest ;  and  thus  it  came  to 
pass  that,  with  no  fault  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  the 
naval  battle,  upon  which  more  depended  than  upon  any 
single  combat  of  modern  times,  was  fought  by  a  ship  not  yet 
accepted  by  the  Navy  Department,  and  the  acceptance  or  re 
jection  of  which  depended  upon  the  issue  of  the  battle,  for 
there  had  been  no  opportunity  for  a  trial-trip. 

While  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  urging  forward  the 
construction  of  the  first  iron-clads,  it  was  known  that  the  rebel 
government  was  making  great  exertions  in  the  same  direction. 
Iron -clad  vessels  were  under  way  at  New  Orleans,  Charleston, 
and  at  some  other  points,  while  at  Norfolk  the  Merrimack  was 
very  near  completion  in  the  winter  of  1861-'62. 

The  formidable  character  of  this  mailed  frigate  constrained 
the  Government  to  make  every  effort  to  complete  the  Monitor 
in  season  to  meet  her  whenever  she  should  come  out ;  and  it  is 
stated  that  information  obtained  by  a  rebel  spy  of  the  state  of 
forwardness  in  which  the  Monitor  was,  induced  the  rebels  to 
put  a  double  force  upon  their  frigate,  so  that  she  might  be  able 
to  attack  our  fleet  in  Hampton  Roads  before  the  Monitor's  ar 
rival,  and,  if  possible,  also  to  make  a  raid  upon  Washington  or 
the  Northern  cities.  This  extra  labor,  it  is  said,  gained  the  one 
day  in  which  the  Merrimack  destroyed  the  Cumberland  and 
Congress.  At  the  beginning  of  the  rebellion  it  seemed  impos- 


THE   MONITOR   AND   THE   MERKIMACK.  361 

sible  to  withhold  from  the  rebels  any  thing  that  they  desired  to 
know,  while  it  was  by  no  means  easy  at  all  times  for  the  Gov 
ernment  to  penetrate  their  plans. 

The  Monitor,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  John  L.  "Worden, 
reached  the  scene  of  late  disaster  to  our  cause,  and  of  her  com 
ing  triumph,  on  the  8th  of  March,  at  9  o'clock  p.  M.,  and  Lieu 
tenant  "Worden  reported  for  orders  to  Captain  Marston,  the 
commander  of  the  Roanoke.  The  Minnesota,  one  of  our  noblest 
frigates,  the  Roanoke  of  the  same  class,  but  partially  disabled, 
the  frigate  Congress,  and  the  sloop  Cumberland,  had  been  sta 
tioned  at  the  mouth  of  the  James  River  to  watch  for,  to  engage, 
and,  if  possible,  destroy,  capture,  or  stop  the  expected  rebel 
iron-clad  frigate  then  ready  for  sea  at  Norfolk.  These  vessels 
carried  very  heavy  batteries,  and  it  was  hoped  that  they  would 
be  able  to  cope  with  the  Merrimack.  How  vain  snch  an  ex 
pectation  was,  her  first  day's  operations  fully  and  sadly  demon 
strated.  It  is  probably  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  she  would 
have  destroyed  easily,  and  without  any  material  damage  to  her 
self,  every  wooden  ship  then  in  our  Navy,  had  they  been  within 
her  reach,  and  with  none  but  themselves  to  oppose  her.  The 
heaviest  shot  from  the  guns  of  our  first-rate  frigates  produced 
no  serious  impression  upon  her,  and  the  futility  of  ramming 
an  iron-clad  with  wooden  vessels  was  afterward  shown  at 
Mobile. 

The  8th  of  March,  1862,  was  probably  the  darkest  day  of 
the  war  for  the  cause  of  the  Union.  The  new  and  really  splen 
did  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  done  nothing  whatever  to  wipe 
away  the  disgrace  and  disaster  of  Bull  Run.  The  country  had 
sent  forward  its  young  men  in  almost  uncounted  thousands,  it 
almost  idolized  its  new  commander-in- chief,  it  placed  all  its 
hopes  for  the  future  upon  it,  and  the  Government  expressed  a 
purpose  to  spare  nothing  which  could  contribute  to  its  comfort, 
its  safety,  and  its  success.  An  impatience  for  immediate  op 
erations  soon  manifested  itself,  and  clamors  were  loud  for  the 
Potomac  army  to  move  against  the  enemy.  At  length  Mr. 
Lincoln's  patience  was  exhausted,  and  a  positive  order  was 
issued  for  a  general  movement  of  all  the  forces  of  the  Govern 
ment  on  or  before  a  certain  day  named,  in  February,  and  the 
nature  of  the  movement  was  prescribed  for  the  Army  of  the 


362  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Potomac.  McClellan  strenuously  opposed  the  plan  of  the 
Government,  and  urged  one  of  his  own ;  and  the  President 
yielded  to  a  council  of  generals,  against  his  own  judgment, 
when  it  was  found  that  the  rebels,  by  a  movement  of  their 
own,  had  rendered  his  contemplated  scheme  impracticable, 
and,  as  a  consequence,  a  movement  by  the  peninsula  was  deter 
mined  upon  early  in  March,  with  Fortress  Monroe  as  the  base 
of  operations. 

But  the  success  of  the  new  movement  depended  upon  the 
question  whether  our  Navy  could  command  Hampton  Roads, 
and  the  Potomac,  Rappahannock,  York,  and  James  Rivers ;  for 
if  this  could  not  be  done,  then  clearly  an  advance  upon  Rich 
mond  by  way  of  Fortress  Monroe  was  entirely  out  of  the  ques 
tion.  Even  had  it  been  possible  to  land  the  army  on  the  pen 
insula,  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  supply  them  without 
the  entire  control  of  the  adjacent  waters ;  and  in  case  of  the 
necessity  of  a  retreat,  such  as  actually  occurred,  if  the  rebels 
had  held  those  rivers,  the  Union  army  would  have  been  anni 
hilated.  The  Government  knew  well  the  formidable  character 
of  the  armed  frigate  which  was  nearly  ready  for  sea  at  Norfolk, 
and  it  had  nothing  wherewith  to  meet  her  except  the  untried 
nondescript  of  Ericsson,  and  even  that  was  not  quite  ready  for 
use.  When  the  sun  went  down  on  the  8th  of  March,  it  ap 
peared  to  those  who  were  acquainted  with  the  appalling  facts 
that  the  cause  of  the  Union  was  wrell-nigh,  if  not  utterly,  lost. 
No  victory  with  such  decided  results  for  tho  present,  or  with 
such  bright  hopes  for  the  future,  was  gained  by  the  rebels  either 
before  or  after.  That  night  was  one  of  exultation  among  the 
conspirators  wherever  the  telegraph  could  convey  the  news. 
The  easy  and  entire  destruction  of  the  Union  Navy,  the  defeat 
of  the  projected  movement  on  Richmond,  or  the  capture  of  the 
army  if  it  should  move,  the  capture  of  Washington,  the  laying 
of  the  Northern  cities  under  contribution,  the  raising  of  the 
blockade,  recognition  in  Europe,  in  short,  the  complete  triumph 
of  the  rebel  cause,  seemed  the  natural  consequence  of  that  day's 
work  and  triumph.  The  rebels  knew  of  nothing  between  them 
and  entire  success, -and  our  own  Government  had  no  means  of 
arresting  this  impending  ruin,  except  an  experimental  and  most 
diminutive  war-ship,  in  which  experienced  naval  officers  and 


THE    MONITOR   AND   THE   MEEEIMACK.  363 

scientific  naval  constructors  had  little  or  no  confidence,  and 
even  that  had  not  reached  the  scene  of  action. 

The  attention  of  the  public  has  been  drawn  so  exclusively 
to  one  feature  of  this  battle  at  Hampton  Roads,  the  fight  be 
tween  the  iron-clads,  that  the  havoc  wThich  the  Merrimack  made 
with  what  was  really  a  very  formidable  wooden  squadron,  has 
not  been  duly  considered ;  and  the  real  importance  of  the  con 
flict  will  not  appear,  until  some  facts  which  have  been  partially 
lost  sight  of  are  set  in  their  proper  light.  On  the  morning  of 
the  8th  of  March  the  following  naval  force  was  stationed  at  or 
near  Fortress  Monroe  and  Newport  News : 

The  Minnesota,  50  guns ;  the  Roanoke,  50  guns ;  the  Con 
gress,  50  guns  ;  the  St.  Lawrence  sailing  frigate,  12  guns  ;  the 
Cumberland  sloop,  24  guns. 

These  vessels  were  armed  mainly  with  8-inch  and  9-inch 
guns,  wkile  some  had,  in  addition  to  the  broadside  battery,  a 
10-inch  pivot-gun.  Outside  of  the  American  Navy  there  could 
not  have  been  found  five  ships  of  similar  rate  whose  batteries 
would  compare  with  theirs.  In  the  early  part  of  that  disas 
trous  day  the  Congress  and  Cumberland  were  anchored  oft? 
Newport  News,  the  Minnesota  and  the  Roanoke  were  some  six 
or  eight  miles  distant,  near  Fortress  Monroe,  while  the  St.  Law 
rence  was  also  near. 

At  9  A.  M.  two  steamers  were  discovered  from  the  Cumber 
land  at  anchor  in  the  James  River,  about  twelve  miles  distant. 
As  was  afterward  shown,  they  were  intended  to  join  those 
which  were  expected  to  come  out  that  morning  from  Norfolk. 
Ere  long,  lines  of  black  smoke,  lying  along  the  horizon  over 
Elizabeth  River,  indicated  the  approach  of  steamers  from  that 
direction.  At  12  M.  three  steamers  were  visible  from  the 
Cumberland.  They  were  standing  down  the  Elizabeth  River 
.and  toward  Sewall's  Point.  At  12.45  these  steamers  rounded 
Sewall's  Point,  so  as  to  be  visible  from  the  decks  of  the  Minne 
sota,  when  it  was  at  once  seen  that  one  was  the  expected  Merri 
mack,  and  that  the  other  two  were  gunboats. 

Preparations  were  instantly  made  on  all  sides  to  receive 
this  formidable  attack.  The  Minnesota  slipped  her  cable  and 
got  under  wray,  and  the  Roanoke,  whose  machinery  was  dis 
abled,  was  taken  in  tow  by  two  steam-tugs,  and  proceeded  as 


364  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

rapidly  as  possible  toward  Newport  News,  where  the  Cumber 
land  and  Congress  were,  the  vessels  at  which  the  rebel  steamers 
were  aiming.  A  tug  was  also  dispatched  to  bring  up  as  speed 
ily  as  possible  the  frigate  St.  Lawrence.  The  channel  between 
Fortress  Monroe  and  Newport  News  runs  within  cannon-shot 
of  Sewall's  Point,  and  on  that  the  rebels  had  established  a 
battery  of  rifled  cannon.  This  battery  the  Minnesota,  the 
Roanoke,  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  towed  by  tugs,  had  to  pass  in 
going  to  Newport  News,  and  they  suffered  somewhat  from  its 
fire,  as  will  hereafter  appear.  In  order  to  present  more  clearly 
the  events  of  this  unequal  battle,  a  brief  description  will  be  at 
tempted  of  the  scene  on  board  each  separate  ship,  although  no 
narrative  can  convey  any  adequate  idea  of  the  terrible  reality. 
The  following  facts  are  gathered  in  regard  to  the  Cumberland : 
she  was  a  sloop,  carrying  twenty-four  heavy  guns,  and  was 
nearly  the  size  of  the  frigate  Constitution,  of  some  1,700  tons 
burden.  As  soon  as  the  Merrimack,  with  her  two  consorts,  was 
discovered  coming  from  Norfolk,  at  12  M.,  the  crew  were  sum 
moned  to  quarters,  the  ship  was  cleared  for  action,  and  the  guns 
on  the  main-deck  were  double  breeched.  All  the  stern  and  sad 
preparations  for  battle  were  duly  made — the  guns  all  shotted, 
the  men  in  position,  the  magazines  opened ;  shot,  shell,  car 
tridges,  all  in  place ;  the  powder-boys  at  their  stations ;  swords, 
pistols,  boarding-pikes  in  the  racks ;  the  surgeons'  tables  gleam 
ing  with  the  instruments  which  made  brave  men  shudder  with 
the  thought  of  what  a  few  moments  would  bring. 

Three  hundred  and  seventy-six  men  on  the  Cumberland, 
and  four  hundred  and  thirty-four  on  the  Congress,  stood  there, 
one-third  of  them,  as  the  event  showed,  within  a  step  of  eternity. 
Never  were  brave  men  called  upon  to  make  a  more  hopeless 
battle.  It  was  martyrdom  in  the  cause  of  country — the  sad 
privilege  of  dying  for  their  flag.  For  a  few  moments,  it  is  true,, 
this  was  not  apparent.  Yet  there  was  a  solemnity  over  all  the 
ships'  companies  that  no  ordinary  circumstances  could  inspire, 
for  they  knew  not  what  they  were  to  meet.  They  could  not 
measure  in  any  manner  the  power  of  their  enemy,  nor  what  en 
gines  of  death  he  was  about  to  wield.  They  knew  they  had  to 
face  a  terrible  foe — more  fearful,  because  they  knew  not  with 
what  weapons  he  would  attack,  nor  what  were  his  means  of  de- 


THE    MONITOR   AND   THE    MERKEMACK.  365 

fence.  At  a  little  past  2  P.  M.  the  huge  mailed  frigate  had 
approached  the  Congress  within  grape-shot  distance ;  and  then, 
every  man  in  his  place,  the  guns  trained  to  the  proper  eleva 
tion,  the  lanyards  in  the  gunner's  hand,  scarcely  a  sound  was 
heard  throughout  the  devoted  ship  while  they  awaited  the  at 
tack  of  their  dreaded  foe.  A  puff  of  smoke  from  one  of  her 
bow-guns,  and  every  breath  stopped  an  instant  till  a  storm  of 
grape  swept  over  the  deck  and  rattled  on  her  sides.  A  long 
breath  of  relief  that  it  was  no  worse.  Keeping  on  her  course, 
she  was  passing  the  Congress  at  less  than  one-fourth  of  a  mile 
distant,  heading  for  the  Cumberland.  At  that  distance  the 
Congress  delivered  her  broadside.  Her  heaviest  shot  glanced 
harmless  from  the  side  of  the  mailed  monster,  and  all  felt  that 
the  battle  was  already. decided,  and  that  nothing  remained  but 
to  surrender  or  be  destroyed  with  their  ship.  The  return  fire 
of  the  Merrimack  only  confirmed  their  worst  fears.  Her  shells 
came  crashing  through  the  sides  of  their  ship,  spreading  death 
and  ruin  on  every  side.  They  knew  that  success  was  hopeless, 
escape  impossible,  and  resistance  vain.  Yet  an  American  fifty- 
gun  ship  could  not  be  surrendered  thus,  and  so  the  strong-hearted 
martyrs  stood  by  their  flag  and  to  their  guns.  But  it  was  not 
the  intention  of  the  rebel  commander  to  finish  his  work  then. 
Passing  the  Congress  at  the  distance  of  about  three  hundred 
yards,  he  ran  direct  for  the  Cumberland.  She,  like  her  consort 
a  sailing  ship,  lay  perfectly  helpless  so  far  as  motion  was  con 
cerned,  and  all  awaited  with  silent  dread  the  approach  of  the 
rebel  frigate,  double  her  own  size.  With  a  desperate  hope  that 
she  might  not  prove  invulnerable,  they  opened  upon  her  wrhen 
at  short  range  with  their  heaviest  guns.  Breathlessly  officers 
and  men  watched  the  effect  of  their  shot,  and,  as  they  glanced 
away  from  her  sloping  sides,  or  fell  smitten  back  into  the  water, 
they  turned  on  each  other  looks  of  mingled  wonder  and  hope 
lessness. 

Still  no  one  thought  of  surrender  to  that  rebel  flag.  The 
fire  of  the  Cumberland  was  received  silently  by  the  Merrimack 
as  if  with  contempt,  and  she  came  straight  on,  and  in  a  moment 
more  her  iron  prow  smashed  through  the  sides  of  the  Cumber 
land  as  easily  it  seemed,  as  an  egg-shell  could  be  crushed  in  the 
hand,  and  at  the  same  time  a  shell  from  every  gun  which  could 


366  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

bear  crashed  through  her  timbers  and  exploded  upon  her  decks, 
piling  splinters,  gun-carriages,  guns,  and  men  in  one  confused 
wreck.  The  slaughter  was  sickening.  As  if  satisfied  that  her 
work  was  done,  the  Merrimack  hauled  off  and  steered  for  the 
Congress.  The  scene  on  the  Cumberland  was  an  awful  one. 
The  dead  and  wounded  strewed  her  decks  and  crowded  the 
cockpit ;  while  the  roar  of  the  water,  as  it  rushed  through  her 
shattered  side,  and  the  rapid  settling  of  the  ship,  told  that  she 
would  float  but  a  few  minutes  longer.  But  the  guns  were 
loaded  once  more,  and  when  the  water  had  already  reached  the 
gun -deck,  the  guns  just  above  the  water,  the  brave  remainder 
of  the  crew  fired  a  last  broadside,  and  as  the  ship  settled  to  the 
water's  edge  leaped  into  the  waves.  She  heeled  heavily  to  port 
and  went  down,  and  when  she  touched  bottom  her  flag  was  still 
flying  above  the  water,  but  it  was  over  the  grave  of  more  than 
one  hundred  men.  There  was  time  for  the  wounded  in  the 
cockpit  who  were  able  to  walk  to  go  on  deck ;  but  the  berth- 
deck  and  sick-bay  were  full  of  poor  fellows  so  mangled  by  shells 
and  splinters  that  they  could  not  be  moved,  and  they  went 
down  with  the  ship. 

So  soon  as  the  fate  of  the  Cumberland  was  seen  from  the 
Congress,  the  jib  and  topsails  were  set,  and  with  the  aid  of  a 
tug  the  frigate  was  run  ashore  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the 
smaller  steamers  which  were  enabled  to  fire  with  great  pre 
cision  at  so  large  and  stationary  a  mark.  Their  guns  were 
rifles,  and,  as  nearly  every  shell  reached  its  object,  the  vessel 
was  rapidly  cut  up,  and  the  men  were  swept  away  from  their 
guns  with  a  fearful  slaughter.  The  Merrimack  then  took  a  po 
sition  astern,  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  yards,  and  raked  the 
helpless  frigate  fore  and  aft  with  shells  which  crushed  through 
her  sides  and  exploded  on  her  decks,  setting  her  on  fire  in  sev 
eral  places. 

The  two  steamers  from  the  James  now  joined  in  the  fight, 
and  soon  the  Congress  had  not  a  single  broadside  gun  which 
could  be  used,  and  in  a  few  minutes  more  one  of  her  stern-guns 
was  dismounted,  and  the  muzzle  of  the  other  was  knocked  off. 
The  ship  was  now  perfectly  defenceless,  her  commander  was 
killed,  and,  as  all  further  resistance  was  impossible,  the  flag  of 
the  frigate  was  struck — not  disgraced,  but  borne  down  by  an 


THE   MONITOR   AND   THE    MEEREMACK.  367 

overwhelming  superiority  of  force.  A  tug  from  the  enemy 
came  alongside,  and  the  commander  ordered  the  crew  out  of 
the  Congress  as  he  intended  to  burn  the  ship.  This  tug  was 
driven  off  by  the  artillery  and  musketry  of  the  troops  011  shore, 
when  the  Merrimack  again  opened  fire,  and  threw  several  shells 
into  the  burning  frigate,  though  a  white  flag  was  flying  at  the 
peak.  The  ship  had  been  set  on  fire  in  several  places  by  hot 
shot  from  the  Merrimack,  and  as  no  hopes  were  entertained  of 
saving  her,  and  as  their  enemy  had  hauled  off  to  engage  the 
Minnesota,  the  boats  were  manned,  and  the  wounded  and  crew 
were  removed.  The  fire  soon  after  reached  the  magazine,  and 
the  fragments  of  the  mangled  and  bloody  ship  were  scattered 
over  the  waves.  Thus,  in  a  little  more  than  two  hours,  the 
rebel  iron-clad  had  destroyed  a  heavy  frigate  and  a  large  sloop, 
mounting  together  seventy-four  guns,  and  had  slaughtered  in 
battle  and  drowned  two  hundred  and  fifty  of  their  crews,  a  de 
struction  scarcely  matched  elsewhere  in  naval  war,  and  settling 
forever  the  question  whether  wooden  vessels  could  contend  suc 
cessfully  with  an  armored  ship. 

But  the  work  of  this  new  terror  of  the  sea  was  not  yet  finished. 
Leaving  the  sunken  sloop  with  the  remnant  of  her  crew  strug 
gling  in  the  water,  and  the  burning  frigate  and  her  men  to 
their  fate,  the  Merrimack  headed  once  more  for  the  Minnesota, 
accompanied  by  the  Jamestown  and  Patrick  Henry.  The 
Minnesota  was  at  this  time  hard  aground,  and  incapable  of 
changing  her  position  to  meet  or  avoid  an  attack.  Fortunately, 
the  shallow  water  prevented  the  iron-clad  from  approaching  the 
Minnesota  nearer  than  a  mile,  and  this  alone  prevented  her  in 
stant  destruction.  She  did  not  fire  with  accuracy,  and  only  a 
single  shot  from  her  battery  at  that  time  struck  the  Minnesota, 
and  that  passed  through  her  bow.  Much  greater  damage,  how 
ever,  was  done  by  the  small  rebel  steamers  which  were  armed 
with  rifled  guns.  As  the  frigate  was  aground,  they  could  choose 
both  position  and  distance.  Their  fire  for  a  time  was  very  de 
structive  ;  but  the  one  heavy  gun  which  the  Minnesota  could 
bring  to  bear  finally  drove  them  off.  The  10-inch  pivot-gun  of 
the  frigate  was  used  against  the  Merrimack,  but  officers  and 
men  were  not  merely  mortified  to  see  the  shot  fall  harmlessly 
from  her  sicfes,  but  they  were  convinced  that  their  own  noble 


368  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

| 

ship  was  as  helpless  before  such  an  enemy  as  the  Cumberland 
and  Congress  had  been.  It  was  evident  that  the  moment  the 
Merrimack  could  reach  them  their  frigate  would  be  destroyed. 
After  a  three  hours'  trial,  the  Minnesota  keeping  the  small 
steamers  at  a  distance  with  her  one  large  gun,  and  the  Merri 
mack  vainly  endeavoring  to  reach  her,  the  rebel  steamers 
hauled  off  at  7  P.  M.,  and  all  three  steamed  toward  Norfolk. 

Thus  was  closed  up  an  era  of  naval  war — an  era  which 
had  been  made  memorable  by  the  great  sea-fights  of  more 
than  a  hundred  years,  and  in  which  the  great  navies  of  modern 
Europe  had  been  created.  In  a  single  day  the  foundations  of 
the  great  maritime  powers  had  been  shaken,  the  nations  stood 
in  new  relations  to  each  other,  and  wooden  navies,  except  for 
certain  specific  purposes,  were  to  pass  away  among  the  rubbish 
of  the  past  as  the  bow  and  the  catapult  and  the  mailed  warrior 
vanished  at  the  introduction  of  fire-arms.  It  was  the  beginning 
of  a  revolution  in  war  whose  ultimate  results  cannot  even  now 
be  calculated. 

In  the  opinion  of  the  rebel  chiefs,  nothing  lay  between  them 
that  night  and  the  ruin  of  the  Republic  and  the  establishment 
of  a  slave  empire  that  would  control  the  continent.  So  far  as 
human  wisdom  could  see,  there  was  even  in  the  view  of  the 
most  sanguine  friends  of  the  Union  nothing  to  prevent  the  tri 
umph  of  treason  but  an  untried  experiment,  whose  issue  none 
could  tell.  There  was,  however,  one  other  obstacle  to  their  suc 
cess  not  then  duly  considered,  and  that  was,  the  decision  of  God. 
God  was  against  the  rebels,  and  He  had  decided  that  slavery 
and  the  rebellion  should  go  down  together.  He  had  provided 
an  instrument  for  their  ruin  at  which,  could  the  flushed  and 
confident  traitors  have  seen  it  that  night,  they  would  only  have 
laughed.  They  little  thought  that,  in  two  hours  from  the  time 
when  they  left  Hampton  Roads  so  exultingly,  an  avenger  would 
be  there  that  would  spoil  the  spoiler,  and  bring  all  their  expec 
tations  to  nothing. 

At  9  P.  M.  the  now  famous  little  Monitor  arrived  from  New 
York,  and  about  2  o'clock  the  next  morning  anchored  alongside 
the  Minnesota.  It  certainly  was  a  great  relief  to  the  officers 
and  crew  of  the  frigate  to  know  that  an  iron-clad  of  any  kind 
Was  ready  to  help ;  but  after  having  seen  how  formidable  the 


THE    MONITOR   AND   THE    MERRIMACK.  369 

rebel  frigate  was,  invulnerable  herself,  but  armed  with,  a  power 
of  destruction  really  terrific,  they  could  not  have  been  very  con 
fident  of  their  safety. 

The  Sabbath  morning  came  clear  and  bright,  and  all  on 
land  and  water  was  so  calm  and  peaceful  that  it  seemed  like  a 
preparation  for  the  funeral  of  the  two  hundred  and  fifty  brave 
men  who  had  just  given  up  their  lives  in  a  vain  defence  of  their 
flag,  and  in  a  contest  perfectly  hopeless  from  the  beginning. 
The  flag  of  the  Cumberland  was  waving  yet  just  above  the 
water,  sadly  marking  the  spot  where  the  shattered  wreck  and 
the  dead  were  lying,  and  here  and  there  the  sea-birds  were  hov 
ering  over  a  floating  corpse,  or  where  some  one  had  drifted  to 
the  beach.  The  remainder  of  the  crews  of  the  lost  ships  w^ere 
gathered  in  sad  groups  at  Newport  News.  The  straightened, 
motionless  forms  among  the  wounded  showed  that  some  of  the 
wounded  had  died  during  the  night,  and  the  men  of  the  Cum 
berland  missed  the  attention  and  consolations  of  their  chaplain, 
for  he  had  gone  down  with  the  ship.  All  was  gloom  on  the 
ships  and  on  shore.  Sorrow  for  the  past  and  dread  of  the  fu 
ture  had  laid  a  cloud  on  every  brow  and  a  weight  on  every 
heart.  The  Minnesota,  badly  cut  up  already,  was  still  hard 
aground,  immovable ;  the  Roanoke  was  unmanageable  from  the 
breaking  of  her  machinery  ;  and  the  St.  Lawrence  was  a  sailing 
vessel :  and  it  was  evident  that  nothing  but  the  Monitor  lay  be 
tween  them  all  and  destruction,  and  certainly  the  queer-looking, 
diminutive  thing  appeared  to  be  a  most  ineffectual  shield.  The 
old  sailors  looked  at  her  with  curiosity,  but  they  shook  their 
heads.  It  was  evident  that  they  considered  the  case  a  hopeless 
one.  The  Merrimack  was  not  tardy  in  beginning  her  morning 
work.  At  6  A.  M.  she  again  appeared  coming  down  from 
Craney  Island.  The  drums  beat  to  quarters,  on  board  the  Min 
nesota,  breaking  the  morning  stillness  with  less  of  hope  than 
that  call  ever  occasioned  before  on  the  deck  of  an  American 
ship.  It  sounded  in  all  ears  more  like  a  funeral  knell  than  a 
summons  to  triumphant  battle.  Contrary  to  expectation,  the 
rebel  iron-clad  passed  the  frigate  and  the  Monitor,  and  headed 
for  Fortress  Monroe,  keeping  out  of  range.  The  retreat  was 
beat  on  board  the  Minnesota  for  the  purpose  of  giving  the 
crew  their  breakfast,  that  they  might  be  better  prepared  for  the 
24 


370  HISTORY   OF   THE   TOOTED    STATES   NAVY. 

battle.  After  steaming  down  near  the  Kip  Raps,  the  Merri- 
mack  turned  into  the  channel  by  which  the  Minnesota  had 
come  up,  and  was  once  more  rapidly  approaching.  Again  the 
frigate's  crew  were  hurried  to  their  quarters.  When  within  the 
distance  of  a  mile  the  Minnesota  opened  upon  her  with  her 
stern-guns,  and  at  the  same  time  signalled  the  Monitor  to  at 
tack  her.  The  confidence  which  Lieutenant  Worden  felt  in  the 
Ericsson  battery  was  then  immediately  shown.  He  placed  the 
Monitor  exactly  between  the  Minnesota  and  her  enemy,  cover 
ing  her  so  far  as  such  a  diminutive  craft  could  do,  and  steered 
directly  for  the  rebel  frigate. 

The  Merrimack  slowed  her  engines,  and  paused  as  if  to  sur 
vey  her  nondescript  adversary,  and  ascertain  if  possible  its  char 
acter.  She  was  evidently  startled  by  the  audacity  as  well  as 
the  strange  appearance  of  this  new  Yankee  creation.  There  was 
no  means  of  measuring  its  power,  or  of  knowing  what  weapons 
of  destruction  it  carried.  Evidently,  however,  those  on  board 
of  it  had  something  at  their  disposal  in  which  they  trusted,  for 
it  came  right  on  as  if  there  was  no  thought  of  danger.  Some 
uneasy  glances  were  exchanged  among  the  older  officers,  but 
with  most  on  board  the  iron-clad,  the  insignificant-looking 
thing  was  a  subject  of  merriment.  Something,  however,  must 
be  speedily  done,  for  it  was  seen  that  in  a  very  few  minutes 
it  would  be  directly  alongside  their  frigate. 

The  Merrimack  trained  her  forward  guns  upon  what  seemed 
more  like  a  large  buoy  floating  toward  her  than  a  man-of-war, 
but  her  gunners  had  not  now  a  frigate's  broadside  to  aim  at. 
Almost  nothing  rose  above  the  water  but  the  turret,  presenting 
to  her  fire  a  cross-section  of  not  more  than  twenty  feet  by  nine 
feet,  and  from  that  a  ball  was  certain  to  glance  unless  striking 
exactly  in  the  centre.  It  was  not  surprising  that  she  missed 
the  mark,  and  the  Monitor  still  went  on  untouched.  Her  an 
swering  gun  was  an  admonition  indeed.  The  solid  11-inch 
shot  smote  the  huge  frigate  with  a  blow  that  made  her  shudder 
through  every  timber.  Startled  and  maddened,  the  rebels  de 
livered  a  full  broadside.  Most  of  the  shot  went  over  the  sub 
merged  little  battery,  but  some  struck  the  turret  and  fell  back 
or  glanced  off  as  harmlessly  as,  says  an  eye-witness,  "pebbles 
thrown  from  the  hand  of  a  child."  It  was  now  the  turn  of  the 


THE   MONITOR   ASTD   TIIE    MERRTMACK.  371 

rebels  to  be  astonished.  In  vexation  of  spirit  at  the  unexpected 
rebuff,  they  fired  still  more  rapidly  broadside  after  broadside, 
pausing  till  the  smoke  cleared  off  to  see  whether  their  little 
enemy  had  not  gone  to  the  bottom ;  but  ever  finding  her  still 
afloat,  unharmed  and  active  as  ever,  bending  and  starting  with 
her  immense  shot  the  frigate's  armor,  and  shaking  her  huge 
frame  in  a  manner  that  they  knew  must  in  due  time  be  fatal  to 
their  ship.  The  excitement  was  scarcely  less  on  board  of  our 
own  ships  and  on  the  shore.  The  combat  seemed  so  unequal 
when  the  great  frigate  was  compared  with  her  little  adversary, 
and  the  Memmack  had  shown  the  day  before  such  power  both 
of  resistance  and  attack,  that  every  movement  was  watched 
with  breathless  interest,  for  they  knew  if  the  Monitor  was  de 
stroyed  or  beaten  all  was  lost.  No  wonder  that  the  captain  of 
the  Minnesota  wrote  in  his  official  report  that  he  was  aston 
ished  to  see  Lieutenant  Worden  lay  the  Monitor  right  alongside 
the  Merrimack.  It  seemed  not  boldness,  but  recklessness.  It 
appeared  impossible  that  she  should  not  be  destroyed  at  a  blow, 
scattered  into  fragments  by  a  broadside,  or  run  down  and  sunk 
by  the  rebel  ram. 

Among  the  deeply  interested  spectators  of  the  fight  were 
Captain  Fox,  the  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  Lieu 
tenant  Henry  A.  Wise,  afterward  Chief  of  the  Ordnance  Bu 
reau.  They  had  gone  down  from  Washington  in  a  tug  with 
ammunition  for  the  Monitor,  and  they  went  out  to  view  the  re 
sult  of  the  experiment  on  which  the  war  at  that  moment  hinged, 
and  in  which  the  reputation  of  the  Department  was  so  deeply 
involved.  When  they  landed,  after  the  fight,  the  attention  of 
Captain  Fox  was  drawn,  providentially  the  Christian  thinks,  to 
the  15-inch  gun  lying  there,  which  circumstance  led  to  discus 
sion  and  finally  to  the  adoption  of  that  formidable  weapon  in 
the  armament  of  the  Monitors. 

After  some  time  spent  in  close-range  fighting,  the  Merrimack 
firing  broadsides  with  great  rapidity,  and  the  Monitor  remaining 
still  uninjured,  both  vessels  began  to  manoeuvre  to  obtain  if  pos 
sible  some  advantage.  Like  two  trained  pugilists,  they  watched 
each  other's  motions,  prepared  alike  to  strike  or  ward  off  a  blow. 
Now  the  Monitor  was  seen  to  dash  straight  at  the  frigate  as  if  to 
send  a  shot  through  a  port,  since  she  could  not  penetrate  her  ar- 


372  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

mor ;  and  then  shooting  past,  would  aim  a  blow  at  her  stern,  and 
then  the  two  would  close  broadside  to  broadside  as  if  in  a  death- 
wrestle.  All  effort  on  both  sides  seemed  in  vain.  The  little 
battery  was  not  harmed ;  and,  though  the  armor  of  the  Mem- 
mack  appeared  bent  and  loosened,  her  fighting  power  appeared 
to  be  undiminished.  Finding  that  she  could  make  no  impres 
sion,  she  suddenly  turned  and  headed  for  the  Minnesota,  hoping 
to  crush  her  before  the  Monitor  could  interfere.  In  the  morn 
ing,  when  she  passed  up,  she  had  struck  the  frigate  with  a 
heavy  shot  just  above  the  water-line  ;  and  she  had  good  reason 
to  believe  that,  if  she  could  first  give  her  a  broadside  of  shells, 
and  then  strike  her  with  her  beak,  she  would  be  destroyed.  As 
she  came  within  point-blank  range,  the  Minnesota  gave  her  a 
full  broadside,  including  the  10-inch  pivot-gun — a  broadside, 
says  Captain  Yan  Brunt,  "  which  would  have  blown  out  of  the 
water  any  timber-built  ship  in  the  world."  But  it  produced  no 
effect  upon  the  Merrimack.  She  returned  the  fire  with  her 
rifled  bow-gun,  with  a  shell  that  spread  havoc  through  the  ship, 
tearing  four  rooms  into  one,  and  exploding  two  charges  of  pow 
der  that  set  the  ship  on  fire.  Her  second  shell  blew  up  the 
tug-boat  Dragon,  lying  alongside,  causing  for  a  few  minutes 
consternation  aboard  the  frigate. 

In  the  mean  time  the  Monitor  had  not  been  idle ;  and  by  the 
time  the  rebel  frigate  had  fired  her  third  shell,  the  little  craft 
was  down  upon  her,  and  threw  herself  between  the  two,  com 
pelling  the  Merrimack  to  change  her  position.  The  Minnesota 
had  concentrated  a  fire  upon  her  from  the  gun-deck,  the  spar- 
deck,  and  forecastle  pivot-guns,  but  the  shot  all  glanced  off  harm 
less  from  her  sloping  sides.  After  the  Monitor  came  between, 
the  Merrimack,  in  changing  her  position,  grounded.  While  in 
this  position,  the  Minnesota  again  attacked  her  with  every  gun 
she  could  bring  to  bear,  but  with  no  more  effect  than  before. 

When  the  Merrimack  again  floated  clear,  she  steamed  down 
the  bay  pursued  by  the  Monitor,  the  iron  stripling  chasing  the 
iron  giant.  It  seemed  as  if  the  officers  of  the  rebel  craft  felt 
that  this  was  beyond  endurance,  for  the  Merrimack  suddenly 
turned  and  ran  full  speed  into  the  Monitor,  as  if  determined  to 
crush  her  or  force  her  under.  She  struck  a  glancing  blow,  and 
the  little  battery  glided  out  from  beneath  her,  and  then  fired 


THE   MONITOR   AND   THE   MERRIMACK.  373 

while  the  vessels  were  almost  in  contact.  The  shot  seemed  to 
crush  in  her  armor,  but  exactly  the  extent  of  damage  done  was 
never  known.  At  this  short  range  the  frigate  once  more  con 
centrated  her  fire  upon  the  Monitor's  turret  with  a  fury  that 
indicated  a  last,  desperate  effort.  But  it  was  all  in  vain.  De 
termined  not  to  be  defeated,  the  rebels  started  once  more  for 
the  Minnesota,  the  Monitor  having  hauled  off  a  little,  as  was  sup 
posed,  to  cool  her  guns.  The  situation  of  the  noble  frigate  was 
for  a  few  moments  more  perilous  than  ever.  She  was  immov 
ably  aground,  and  the  Merrimack  and  her  two  consorts  could 
choose  both  distance  and  position ;  officers  and  crew  were  worn 
out  with  fatigue,  but  still  these  noble  men  determined  that  they 
would  never  give  up  their  ship,  terribly  crippled  though  she 
was,  and  nearly  out  of  ammunition,  and  every  preparation  was 
made  to  destroy  her  if  the  last  extremity  should  come.  Sud 
denly,  however,  the  rebel  ships  all  changed  their  course  once 
more,  and  headed  for  Norfolk,  the  Merrimack  appearing  to  be 
in  some  manner  disabled  or  severely  injured.  The  rebels  have 
since  declared  that,  in  attempting  to  sink  the  Monitor,  her  iron 
prow  was  broken,  and  she  sprung  a  leak,  so  as  to  compel  her  to 
put  back  into  Norfolk.  As  she  never  ventured  out  again,  ex 
cept  to  be  blown  up,  the  more  rational  conclusion  is  that  her 
armor  and  frame  were  so  much  sliaken  by  the  heavy  shot  de 
livered,  many  of  them  at  a  distance  of  only  a  few  yards,  that 
she  was  deemed  not  seaworthy,  and  was  consequently  de 
stroyed. 

Had  the  rebel  authorities  believed  her  capable  of  meeting 
the  Monitor  again,  she  certainly  would  not  have  been  destroyed. 
The  last  shell  fired  by  the  rebel  frigate  exploded  exactly  oppo 
site  the  eyehole  in  the  pilot-house,  where  Lieutenant  Worden 
was  at  the  moment  looking  out.  His  eyes  were  severely  in 
jured,  his  face  filled  with  powder,  and  there  was  also  a  slight 
concussion  of  the  brain.  The  moment  this  brave  officer  recov 
ered  his  consciousness,  his  first  question  was,  "  Have  we  saved 
the  Minnesota  ? "  When  told  she  was  safe,  he  answered,  "  I 
am  satisfied."  He  was  taken  at  once  to  Washington,  and  an 
incident  connected  with  him  there,  illustrates  the  character  of 
Abraham  Lincoln.  A  cabinet  meeting  was  being  held,  when 
it  was  told  the  President  that  the  wounded  commander  of  the 


374  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Monitor  was  in  the  city.  He  instantly  rose,  took  his  hat,  say 
ing  :  "  Excuse  me,  gentlemen,  I  must  see  this  fellow  • "  went 
immediately  to  his  room.  "Worden  was  on  the  sofa,  his  eyes 
bandaged,  his  face  swollen  and  bloody.  The  President  was 
announced,  and  he  took  his  hand  in  silence.  "  Mr.  President," 
said  the  wounded  officer,  "  you  do  me  great  honor  by  this  visit." 
"  Sir,"  replied  Mr.  Lincoln,  while  the  tears  ran  down  his  cheeks, 
"  I  am  the  one  who  is  honored  in  this  interview." 

Thus  ended  what  was,  at  the  time  it  was  fought,  undoubt 
edly  the  most  remarkable  naval  action  of  modern  times,  per 
haps  of  any  time,  if  regarded  in  connection  with  all  its  impor 
tant  consequences.  Considered  as  a  battle  between  an  iron-clad 
and  wooden  vessels  the  result  was,  one  frigate  and  one  sloop-of- 
war  and  one  steam-tug  destroyed  ;  two  hundred  and  fifty  men 
slaughtered  in  the  fight  or  drowned ;  another  of  our  finest  frig 
ates  nearly  dismantled,  with  not  one-fourth  of  her  battery  in  a 
condition  to  be  used  when  she  reached  Fortress  Monroe ;  another 
frigate  still,  injured,  and  the  iron-clad  apparently  unharmed. 

As  between  wooden  ships  contending  with  a  broadside  iron 
clad  frigate,  and  a  Monitor  fighting  the  same  frigate  for  nearly 
twice  the  time,  the  account  stood  thus :  the  killed,  wounded, 
and  destruction  of  ships  as  just  stated  ;  while  the  iron-clad  frig 
ate  was  completely  victorious,-  and  herself  uninjured,  when  fight 
ing  the  wooden  vessels.  But  in  her  four  hours'  fight  with  the 
same  iron-clad,  not  a  man  was  killed  on  board  the  Monitor,  she 
herself  was  unharmed,  and  the  broadside  iron-clad  was  defeated, 
driven  off,  and  so  far  injured,  that  soon  after  the  rebels  de 
stroyed  her.  It  would  be  impossible  probably  to  set  the  ad 
vantages  of  the  Monitor  battery  in  a  clearer  light  than  this  by 
any  other  experiment,  and  yet  the  public  was  slow  to  perceive 
all  the  inevitable  results  which  that  experiment  involved,  espe 
cially  as  the  Monitors  which  were  tried  at  Charleston  did  not 
perform  impossible  things,  and  only  endured  with  trifling  in 
jury  a  fire  which  would  have  sunk  any  other  vessels  in  America 
or  Europe. 

It  wTas  generally  conceded  that  the  great  wooden  navies  of 
the  w^orld  were  useless  in  contending  with  iron-clads.  It  was 
evident  that  such  a  frigate  as  the  Merrimack  could  easily  de 
stroy  a  whole  squadron  of  wooden  first-rates  should  they  dare 


THE    MONITOR   AND    THE   MEKETMACK.  375 

to  meet  her,  and  that  no  fleet  of  such,  however  powerful,  could 
blockade  a  port,  or  occupy  a  harbor,  against  one  such  mail-clad 
frigate.  This  of  itself  was  an  amazing  revolution  in  naval  war, 
and  in  the  relative  power  of  nations.  The  supremacy  of  the 
great  naval  powers  was  stricken  down,  for  a  small  nation  that 
could  obtain  one  first-class  iron-clad  could  protect  itself  against 
the  wooden  navies  of  the  most  powerful.  But  there  was  anoth 
er  fact  whose  significance  at  first  was  not  so  clearly  seen.  A 
broadside  iron-clad  frigate  which,  to  say  the  least,  was  as  formi 
dable  as  any  other  broadside  vessel  then  afloat,  was  beaten  and 
seriously  injured  in  a  battle  with  a  Monitor  of  scarcely  one-fourth 
her  size  and  mounting  only  two  guns.  The  country  was  some 
what  slow  in  drawing  the  proper  inference  from  this.  Nor 
could  it  well  be  otherwise.  Few  understood  the  essential  and 
distinctive  principles  of  the  invention  of  Ericsson.  Some  leading 
men  in  Congress  unfortunately  felt  called  upon  to  make  an  at 
tack  upon  the  Navy  Department,  and  selected  the  Monitors,  as, 
in  their  opinion,  the  most  vulnerable  point.  Some  leading 
papers  united  with  them  in  the  assault,  and  the  public  mind 
was  for  a  time  confused  and  misled.  The  truth  was,  as  events 
have  subsequently  shown,  that  the  fight  at  Hampton  Roads  de 
cided  the  case  as  completely  against  broadside  iron-clads,  as  it 
did  against  wooden  ships.  Not  only  the  wooden  navies  of  Eu 
rope,  but  also  their  iron-clads,  such  as  they  were  then,  were  vir 
tually  set  aside  as  things  of  the  past.  Before  our  Avar  was  over, 
it  would  have  been  as  useless  to  have  sent  the  finest  broadside 
armored  vessel  of  Europe  to  attack  our  best  Monitors  as  to  have 
ordered  a  wooden  vessel  on  the  same  errand.  One  would  have 
been  destroyed  as  quickly  as  the  other. 

When  the  Monadnock  made  the  voyage  to  San  Francisco  in 
safety,  and  almost  at  the  same  time  the  Miantonomoh  reached 
a  European  harbor,  having  met  no  difficulty  in  crossing  the 
Atlantic  ;  when  it  was  seen  that  there  is  scarcely  a  limit  to  the 
size  of  the  gun  which  a  Monitor  ship  can  carry ;  that  those  al 
ready  built  could  mount  and  work  20-inch  cannon,  while  even 
15-inch  guns  could  not  be  carried  by  any  broadside  ship  then 
known,  it  was  then  perceived  that  what  was  really  settled  at 
Hampton  Roads  was  this :  that  the  navies  of  the  world,  both 
wooden  and  iron-clad,  must  be  laid  aside,  and  the  nations  must 


376  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

begin  anew.  The  time  lias  already  gone  by  when  Europe  will 
expend  millions  in  constructing  such  iron-clads  as  she  has  built 
already.  Home  questions  of  the  greatest  importance  were  also 
decided  there.  It  was  settled  that  the  rebels  could  not  create  a 
navy  which  we  could  not  destroy.  They  had  formed  all  their 
plans  upon  the  idea  of  the  broadside  vessel  with  sloping  ar 
mored  sides,  and  even  had  they  desired,  they  could  not  change 
them  in  season  to  meet  the  fleet  of  Monitors  which  were  ready 
so  soon.  But  they  had  confidence  in  their  method  of  construc 
tion,  and  made  no  account  of  the  fact  that  the  Monitor  ship 
could  carry  safely  a  much  heavier  gun  than  those  used  against 
the  Merrimack.  Owing  to  this  mistake,  when  the  Atlanta  was 
ready  they  did  not  hesitate  to  send  her  against  two  Monitors, 
when  her  case  was  settled  by  the  first  15-inch  shot  which  struck 
her.  The  fate  of  the  whole  rebel  navy  was  sealed  at  Hampton 
Roads.  The  fight  with  the  Merrimack  rendered  it  possible  to 
undertake  the  expedition  to  Richmond  by  the  peninsula ;  and 
when  McClellan's  army  was  once  near  Richmond,  its  destruction 
would  have  been  certain  if  the  rebels  could  have  commanded 
James  River  and  the  adjacent  waters ;  and  although  the  Merri 
mack  continued  at  Norfolk  until  near  the  middle  of  May,  and 
though  the  rebels  well  knew  the  vital  importance  of  holding 
James  River,  they  did  not  venture  to  encounter  the  Monitor 
again. 

There  were  many  critical  points  in  the  progress  of  the  war 
which  seemed  so -clearly  marked  by  the  special  interposition  of 
God  as  to  impress  the  popular  mind,  and  one  of  the  important 
results  of  the  rebellion  was  to  strengthen  the  belief  that  God,  as 
King  of  nations,  watches  over  and  directs  their  affairs,  and  con 
trols  even  the  issue  of  battle.  The  Christian  cannot  but  believe 
that  the  eye  of  God  followed  the  little  Monitor  during  the  peril 
ous  passage  from  New  York ;  that  He  preserved  her  for  the 
purpose  He  had  in  view ;  and  we  can  see  now  that,  if  the  Mer 
rimack  had  not  been  permitted  to  destroy  the  Congress  and 
Cumberland,  one  important  part  of  the  problem  would  have 
remained  unsettled,  and  the  battle  of  the  iron-clads  only  would 
have  produced  far  less  impression  both  at  home  and  abroad. 
It  was  that  which  was  needed  to  produce  the  effect.  That 
startled  Europe,  and  settled  the  question  of  intervention. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


CAPTURE    OF   ROANOKE    ISLAND— OPERATIONS    IN   PAMLICO   AND 
ALBEMARLE    SOUNDS. 


ALTHOUGH  the  capture  of  the  forts  at  Hatteras  Inlet  in 
August,  1861,  had  secured  the  principal  entrance  to  the  sounds 
of  North  Carolina,  the  rebels  had  still  the  means  of  annoying 
our  coastwise  commerce  by  sending  out  through  the  lesser  in 
lets,  small  craft,  armed  often  with  only  a  single  gun,  by  which 
they  seized  some  vessels  that  were  passing  near  the  shore. 
They  had  quite  a  fleet  of  light-draught  steamers,  many  of  which 
were  swift,  and  armed  with  rifled  guns,  with  which  they  not 
only  commanded  the  sounds,  but  were  also  ready  for  any  little 
piratical  expedition  that  promised  either  plunder  or  damage  to 
the  Union  cause. 

Besides,  these  interior  waters  offered  at  several  points  facili 
ties  for  constructing  vessels  for  the  rebel  navy,  and  it  was 
known  that  some  formidable  iron-clads  were  under  way.  It 
became,  therefore,  important  for  the  Government,  not  only  to 
clear  these  sounds  and  their  tributary  waters  of  enemies,  but  to 
hold  possession  of  them  by  a  suitable  force  of  our  owrn.  Early 
in  January  a  joint  expedition  of  the  Army  and  Navy  was 
fitted  out  for  operation  against  the  rebel  works  and  steamers  in 
these  inner  waters  of  North  Carolina.  About  seventeen  thou 
sand  troops  were  placed  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  A.  E.  Burnside,  while  the  naval  force  was  under  the  direc 
tion  of  Flag-Officer  L.  M.  Goldsborough.  The  following  table 
shows  the  character  of  the  naval  squadron  that  was  prepared 
for  this  service.  They  were  all  vessels  of  light  draught,  because 
there  is  not,  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  more  than 


378 


HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 


seven  and  a  half  feet  of  water  in  the  channel- way  of  the  bulk 
head,  and  this  passage  is  also  narrow  and  tortuous.  In  order, 
however,  that  these  small  vessels  might  successfully  contend 
with  the  forts  and  rebel  gunboats,  they  were  armed  with  guns 
of  heavy  calibre : 


Names  of  Vessels. 


Names  of  Commanders. 


Armament. 


Stars  and  Stripes  Lieut.  Com'g  Reed  Werden. 
Louisiana j  Lieut.  Com'g  Murray 


Hetzel | Lieut.  Com'g  Davenport. . . . 

Underwriter. . .  .Lieut.  Com'g  Jeffers  . . 


Delaware 


Lieut.  Com'g  Quackenbush.  1 


Valley  City Lieut.  Com'g  Chaplin 

Southfield A.  V.  Lt.  Com'g  Behm 

Hunchback  ....  'A.  V.  Lt.  Com'g  Colhoun  . . 

Morse  ........  !Act'g  Master  Hayes 

Whitehead ! Act'g  Master  French 

Seymour Act'g  Master  Wells 

Shawsheen I  Act'g  Master  Woodward. . . 

Lock  wood 'Act'g  Master  Graves 


Ceres  . . . 
Putnam  . 
Brincker 
Granite. . 


Act'g  Master  McDia,rmid  . . . 
Act'g  Master  Hotchkiss. . . . 

Act'g  Master  Giddings 1 

Act'g  Master's  Mate  Boomer!  1 


8-in.  of  55  cwt. ;  1  20-pdr.  Parrott. 

8-in.  of  63  cwt.;    1  32-pdr.  of  57 

cwt;  2  32-pdrs.  of  33  cwt. ;  1  12- 

pdr.  rifled  Dahlgren. 

9-in.  of  —  cwt. ;  1  80-pdr.  rifled. 

8-in.  of  63  cwt. ;  1  80-pdr.  rifled ;  1 

12-pdr.    rifled ;    1    12-pdr.  smooth 

bore. 

9.in.  of  —  cwt. ;    1   32-pdr.  of  57 

cwt. ;  1  12-pdr.  rifled. 

32-pdrs.  of  42  cwt.  ;  1  12-pdr.  rifled. 

9-in.  of —  cwt.;  1  100-pdr.  rifled. 

do.  do. 

9-in.  of  —  cwt. 
9-in.  of  —  cwt. 

30-pdr.  rifled  ;  1  12-pdr.  rifled. 
20-pdrs.  rifled. 

80-pdr.  rifled;  1   12-pdr.  rifled;    1 
12-pdr.  smooth  bore. 
30-pdr.  rifled  ;  1  32-pdr.  of  33  cwt. 
20-pdr.  rifled. 
30-pdr.  rifled. 
32-pdr.  of  57  cwt. 


These  armaments,  as  is  seen,  are  very  heavy  for  vessels 
drawing  only  eight  feet  of  water,  several  of  them  carrying 
9-inch  guns,  larger  than  the  68-pounder,  which,  at  the  beginning 
of  our  war,  was  the  heaviest  broadside  gun  in  the  English  Navy. 
SoDie  of  these  light  steamers  carried  a  100-pounder  rifle,  and 
several  had  SO-pounder  rifles  on  board.  This  armament  for 
such  small  craft  marked  one  of  the  many  changes  which  were 
so  rapidly  made  in  naval  war.  If  only  the  size  and  tonnage 
of  the  vessels  of  this  squadron  were  stated,  no  indication  would 
be  given  of  its  actual  force.  Few  would  be  led  even  to  suspect 
that  it  could  make  a  successful  attack  upon  a  heavily-armed 
fort. 

In  addition  to  the  armed  vessels  belonging  to  the  Navy,  and 
the  coal  schooners,  a  large  number  of  army  transports  belonged 
to  the  expedition ;  and  the  whole  number  of  the  various  kinds 
of  craft  finally  assembled  at  Hatteras  Inlet,  was  stated'  in  the 


OPERATIONS    IN   PAMLICO    AND   ALBEMARLE    SOUNDS.          379 

accounts  of  the  day  at  one  hundred  and  twenty.  This  hetero 
geneous  squadron  of  Navy  steamers,  tugs,  sailing  vessels,  and 
steam  transports,  was  sent  on  a  winter  voyage  to  one  of  the 
stormiest  and  most  dangerous  points  upon  our  coast.  It 
reached  Hatteras  Inlet  at  the  commencement  of  a  furious 
northeaster,  during  which  great  damage  was  done,  and  the 
whole  squadron  was  in  imminent  peril.  Outside  of  the  bar 
there  was  no  safe  anchorage  in  such  a  gale,  and  an  attempt  to 
enter  the  narrow,  shallow,  crooked  Channel  of  the  inlet  would 
only  have  invited  destruction. 

Some  of  the  disasters,  occasioned  by  the  several  storms 
which  the  expedition  encountered,  are  worthy  of  record,  as 
showing  the  perilous  nature  of  the  service.  One  of  the  craft 
which,  in  derision,  were  named  "floating  batteries" — large 
barges  or  canal  boats,  loaded  with  hay,  oats,  and  other  stores — 
pitched  and  sheered  so  much  in  the  heavy  sea  that  she  could 
not  be  towed,  and  it  was  found  necessary  to  rescue  her  crew 
before  she  should  go  down.  The  boat  which  took  these  off 
was  swamped  under  the  guards  of  the  steamer,  and  all  on 
board  were  pitched  into  the  sea,  and  with  the  greatest  difficulty 
were  saved.  The  tow-line  was  then  cut,  and  the  Grapeshot 
left  to  her  fate.  She -went  ashore  some  fourteen  miles  above 
Hatteras,  and  her  cargo  of  hay  and  oats  served  to  keep  alive 
some  horses  which  got  ashore  there  from  the  wreck  of  the  Poca- 
hontas. 

For  some  reason  the  "War  Department  was  not  always  as 
fortunate  in  procuring  vessels  as  the  Navy  Department.  It 
was  sometimes  impossible  to  obtain  ships  or  steamers  suited  to 
the  service  required,  and  too  many  were  quite  willing  to  deceive 
the  Government  and  to  take  advantage  of  its  necessities.  The 
embarrassments  and  losses  of  the  Government  were  very  annoy 
ing  and  expensive  in  this  expedition ;  men  who  had  vessels  for 
rent  or  sale,  in  too  many  instances,  seeming  to  care  nothing 
for  the  exposure  of  lives  and  property  which  must  necessarily 
occur  on  board  their  tmseawortliy  boats. 

The  old  steamer  Pocahontas,  which  was  chartered  as  a 
horse-transport,  was  an  illustration  of  some  of  these  remarks. 
She  had  011  board  one  hundred  and  thirteen  valuable  horses. 
During  the  gale  her  boilers  first  gave  way,  and  they  were 


380  HISTOET   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

patched  up ;  then  the  grates  fell  down ;  then  the  steering-gear 
was  broken ;  then  the  smoke-pipe  came  down ;  and,  finally,  she 
sprang  a  leak  and  was  run  ashore.  By  this  shipwreck  ninety 
valuable  horses  were  lost;  some  of  them  being  thrown  over 
board  ten  miles  from  land,  and  others  were  left,  as  was  said,  to 
perish  because  no  one  would  go  down  to  the  lower  deck  and 
untie  them,  that  they  might  swim  ashore.  The  gunboat  Zouave 
was  driven  in  the  shallow  water  upon  her  own  anchor,  staved, 
and  sunk.  Her  cargo  was  saved.  A  transport  schooner  went 
ashore  on  the  outer  bar.  Each  day  during  the  storm  more  or 
less  vessels  of  the  fleet  grounded,  and  every  lull  of  the  wind  was 
improved  by  the  tugs  in  dragging  them  oif ;  though  often  while 
one  set  were  being  released  others  were  driven  into  the  mud,  and 
thus  there  was  constant  labor,  anxiety,  and  peril.  The  City  of 
New  York,  a  large  transport  screw  steamer,  with  a  cargo  worth, 
as  was  said,  two  hundred  thousand  dollars,  mostly  ordnance 
stores,  went  ashore  near  the  entrance  to  the  inlet.  Those  on 
board  were  in  the  greatest  peril.  She  struck  on  Monday 
afternoon,  and  swung  around  almost  at  once  so  as  to  lie  nearly 
broadside  to  the  sea  among  the  breakers;  the  waves  making 
a  breach  over  her  decks,  and  her  officers  and  crew  were 
obliged  to  cling  to  her  rigging  to  prevent  being  swept  overboard. 
Such  was  the  violence  of  winds  and  waves  that  no  assistance 
could  be  given  her.  On  Tuesday  her  foremast  was  cut  away, 
and  when  it  fell  it  carried  her  pipes  with  it,  and  she  became  a 
perfect  wreck.  Those  on  board  now  lashed  themselves  to  bul 
warks  and  rigging,  to  prevent  being  washed  away ;  and  thus, 
without  food  or  aid,  in  this  awful  peril,  and  yet  in  sight  of  so 
many  friends,  they  passed  another  night.  On  Wednesday  they 
were  rescued,  but  the  steamer  and  cargo  were  lost.  The  cargo 
consisted  in  part  of  some  four  hundred  barrels  of  gunpowder, 
fifteen  hundred  rifles,  eight  hundred  shells,  Sibley  tents,  and 
hand-grenades.  Communication  between  the  ship  and  shore, 
and  even  between  ship  and  ship,  was  much  of  the  time  very 
dangerous,  and  often  impossible.  A  boat  from  the  transport 
Ann  E.  Thompson,  containing  twelve  persons,  was  swamped 
among  the  breakers,  and  Colonel  Allen  and  Surgeon  Weller,  of 
the  Ninth  New  Jersey,  were  drowned.  The  death  of  these 
much-esteemed  officers  cast  a  gloom  over  the  whole  fleet. 


OPERATIONS   IN    PAMLICO    AND   ALBEMARLE   SOUNDS.          381 

The  harbor,  as  it  was  called,  is  nothing  but  the  entrance  to 
the  inlet  between  the  seaward  bar  and  the  inner  "  bulkhead," 
with  only  a  narrow  channel ;  and  when  this  became  crowded 
with  vessels,  as  they  came  in  from  sea,  it  became  a  dangerous 
position  for  all.  Notwithstanding  they  were  anchored  with  two 
anchors,  the  violence  of  the  tempest  was  such  that  they  were 
often  dashed  against  each  other ;  and,  although  no  vessel  was 
entirely  disabled,  yet  bulwarks,  and  guards,  and  wheel-houses, 
and  light  spars,  were  pretty  generally  smashed  or  injured. 
Some  of  the  transports  drew  more  water  than  their  owners  had 
represented,  and  this  occasioned  a  fresh  perplexity.  How  to 
get  them  over  the  "  bulkhead  "  was  a  very  serious  question.  All 
expedients  of  dragging,  pushing,  and  lightening  by  throwing 
ballast  overboard,  were  resorted  to  day  after  day,  and  yet  the 
work  went  on  very,  very  slowly  indeed ;  and,  though  a  part  of 
the  squadron  reached  the  inlet  by  the  middle  of  January,  it  was 
not  till  the  5th  of  February  that  all  the  army  transports  were 
safe  across  the  "  bulkhead  "  and  ready  to  proceed  up  the  sound. 
This  exhausting  and  perilous  labor  was  performed  in  mid-winter 
on  a  coast  lashed,  at  that  season,  by  continual  storms ;  and  it 
places  in  a  most  favorable  light  the  courage  and  endurance  of 
the  soldiers  and  sailors  of  the  expedition,  as  well  as  the  skill  and 
perseverance  of  the  officers. 

To  understand  the  operations  of  the  squadron  and  the  diffi 
culty  of  the  work,  something  should  be  known  of  Roanoke 
Island,  and  its  defences  and  strategic  value.  By  the  capture  of 
the  Hatteras  forts,  the  Government  obtained  virtual  control  of 
Pamlico  Sound ;  though  some  important  points,  such  as  New- 
bern,  were  still  held  by  the  rebels.  The  first  object  of  this  ex 
pedition,  however,  was  to  gain  possession  of  Albemarle  Sound 
and  the  connected  waters,  for  then  the  rebels  were  carrying  on 
an  active  trade,  and  through  the  shallow  inlets  on  the  north  of 
Hatteras  the  small  piratical  craft  already  mentioned  went  out 
to  prey  upon  our  coastwise  commerce.  The  rebels,  therefore, 
had  guarded  the  entrance  to  this  sound  by  works  of  considerable 
strength.  Between  Albemarle  and  Pamlico  Sounds  there  is  a 
shallow  connecting  strait  in  which  lies  Roanoke  Island.  The 
sheet  of  water  on  the  west  of  the  island,  between  it  and  the 
main-land  of  North  Carolina,  is  called  Croatan  Sound ;  that  OIL 


382  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

the  east,  between  the  island  and  the  Atlantic,  has  the  name  of 
Roanoke  Sound.  Croatan  Sound  alone  is  navigable  for  large 
vessels.  Roanoke  Island,  then,  is  the  key  to  Albemarle  and  its 
connecting  waters,  to  all  coming  from  the  south,  and  with  that 
still  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels,  the  victory  at  Hatteras  would 
have  been  but  a  partial  triumph.  Holding  this  island,  the 
rebels  could  prevent  Norfolk  from  being  attacked  from  the  rear ; 
they  could  cover  "Weldon  and  the  North  Carolina  railroads, 
and  protect  the  communications  of  the  army  of  Lee.  All  this 
is  true,  although  the  final  movement  into  the  interior  of  North 
Carolina  was  made  from  another  point  toward  the  close  of  the 
war. 

Soon  after  the  capture  of  the  Hatteras  forts,  the  rebels  occu 
pied  Roanoke  Island  with  a  large  body  of  troops,  and  strength 
ened,  as  much  as  possible,  its  defences ;  the  works  on  land  being 
assisted  by  a  fleet  of  small  sound-steamers  armed  with  long- 
range  guns. 

The  defences  of  this  point  consisted  of  six  distinct  works.  Five 
of  these  guarded  the  water  approaches  and  channel,  and  the  sixth 
— a  masked  battery — was  intended  to  prevent  a  land  force  from 
attacking  the  main  works  in  the  rear.  This  battery  of  three  guns 
was  planted  on  the  only  road  leading  up  the  island  and  toward 
Fort  Bartow,  the  principal  fort  on  the  water  at  Pork  Point. 
This  battery  was  flanked  on  either  side  by  a  dense  cedar-swamp, 
deemed  impassable ;  and,  as  the  rebels  supposed  that  the  only 
approach  was  over  the  narrow  causeway  in  the  face  of  the  guns, 
they  thought  their  position  impregnable.  To  render  it  quite 
secure,  they  had  felled  the  trees  on  either  side  of  the  road  in  a 
manner  that  would  compel  an  enemy,  as  they  believed,  to  march 
along  the  road,  and  under  the  short-range  fire  of  the  battery. 
It  was  a  formidable  work,  but  the  rebels  underrated  the  re 
source  and  pluck  of  Northern  soldiers  when  they  relied  upon  a 
cedar-swamp  and  fallen  trees  as  their  sole  flank  defences.  This 
battery  -was  stormed  and  taken  by  the  Ninth  and  Fifty-first 
New  York  and  Twenty-first  Massachusetts,  assisted  by  a  six- 
gun  howitzer  battery  from  the  fleet.  By  the  time  this  battery 
was  captured,  the  water  forts  and  batteries  had  suffered  so 
severely  from  the  fire  of  the  vessels  that  they  were  surrendered 
without  much  further  resistance.  In  the  assault  upon  this  bat- 


OPEEATIONS    IN   PAMLICO   AND    ALBEMAELE   SOUNDS.          383 

tery  young  Stearns,  son  of  the  president  of  Amherst  College, 
was  killed ;  and  O.  Jennings  Wise,  son  of  him  who  hung  John 
Brown,  was  mortally  wounded. 

Going  northward,  Fort  Bartow,  on  Pork  Point,  came  next  in 
order.  It  was  a  heptagonal  work  with  five  sides  armed,  mount 
ing  eight  32-pounder  smooth-bores  and  one  68-pounder  rifled 
gun.  Fort  Blanchard  was  situated  a  mile  and  a  half  farther 
north,  a  smaller  work,  mounting  only  four  32-pounder  smooth 
bore  guns.  About  a  mile  beyond  was  Fort  Hnger,  on  Weir's 
Point.  It  mounted  twelve  guns,  two  68-pounder  rifles  and  ten 
32-pounder  smooth-bores.  It  was  quite  a  formidable  work,  and 
constructed  with  very  creditable  engineering  skill.  Fort  Ellis 
was  a  four-gun  battery  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  island,  and  in 
tended  to  prevent  the  landing  of  small  boats  on  that  side.  On 
the  main-land,  on  the  west  side  of  Croatan  Sound,  and  nearly 
opposite  Fort  Bartow,  the  fort  on  Pork  Point,  was  Fort  Forrest. 
It  was  composed  of  old  hulks  sunk  in  the  sand,  and  merely  in 
tended  as  a  flank  defence  to  the  line  of  obstructions  which 
stretched  across  Croatan  Sound,  made  of  a  double  row  of  piles 
and  sunken  wrecks.  A  post-return  found  in  Fort  Bartow, 
dated  January  29,  1862,  states  the  condition  of  the  armament 
as  follows  :  "  Forty  long  32-pounders  ready  for  action,  and  seven 
rifled  guns,  and  ammunition  for  five  days'  action." 

Behind  the  obstructions  mentioned  lay  the  rebel  fleet  of 
eight  gunboats,  mounting  some  seventeen  guns,  under  the  rebel 
Commander  Lynch,  who,  like  so  many  other  Southern  officers, 
had  deserted  his  Government  and  the  flag  which  had  given  him 
protection  and  honors.  It  will  be  seen  that  the  number  of  guns 
of  the  Union  forces  was  less  than  that  of  the  enemy ;  while  the 
advantage  of  position  was  altogether  on  the  side  of  the  rebels. 
Perhaps  three-fifths  of  their  cannon  were  in  battery  on  shore, 
placed  so  as  not  only  to  enfilade  the  barricade  across  the  chan 
nel,  but  accurately  trained  by  measurement  and  experimental 
shots  on  the  very  points  where  the  Union  vessels  were  compelled 
to  pass,  and  also  where  they  must  lie,  at  least  for  a  time,  arrested 
by  the  obstructions.  Under  the  most  favorable  circumstances, 
it  was  necessary  for  our  vessels  to  proceed  very  slowly,  owing 
to  the  narrow  channels  and  shallow  waters.  In  addition  to  this, 
the  vessels  of  the  expedition  were  merchant  steamers,  slightly 


384  II1STOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

built,  compared  with  those  of  the  Navy,  and  instead  of  being 
able  to  withstand  the  stroke  of  heavy  shot,  could  not  endure  un 
injured  the  firing  of  their  own  heavy  guns.  Yet  this  heavy 
armament  was  absolutely  necessary  to  enable  them  to  contend 
with  the  forts.  The  perils  of  the  expedition  were  of  course  in 
creased  by  the  frail  character  of  the  ships,  exposed  as  they  were 
to  the  storm,  the  strain  of  frequent  grounding  in  the  shallow 
water,  and  the  effect  of  their  own  guns. 

These  circumstances  must  all  be  considered  in  order  to 
estimate  aright  the  skill  and  persistent  courage  by  which  the 
obstacles  were  overcome,  and  victory  in  spite  of  them  secured. 

"When,  after  weeks  of  incessant  toil  and  exposure  to  winter 
storms  on  that  most  inclement  coast,-  the  vessels  had  been 
pushed  or  dragged  through  the  crooked,  narrow  channels,  or 
buoyed  up  and  so  floated  over  the  shallows,  and  when  such 
repairs  as  could  be  made  on  the  spot,  were  finished  on  the  boats 
shattered  by  the  storms  and  collisions  with  each  other,  prepara 
tions  were  made  to  seek  out  and  attack  the  enemy.  Early  on 
the  morning  of  the  5th  of  February  the  signals  for  a  general 
movement  were  displayed  on  board  the  flag-ship,  the  Philadel 
phia,  and  as  soon  as  possible  the  whole  fleet  was  under  way. 
Two  more  boats,  the  Commodore  Barney  and  Commodore 
Perry,  had  joined  the  squadron  of  naval  vessels,  making  nine 
teen  in  all ;  and  these,  with  the  army  transports,  made  quite  an 
imposing  appearance,  as  led  by  the  naval  division  in  three  col 
umns  ;  they  wrere  headed  toward  Roanoke  Island.  Owing  to  the 
character  of  the  navigation  in  these  shallow  waters,  great  caution 
was  observed,  and  the  progress  of  the  squadron  was  necessarily 
slow.  The  columns  were  commanded  respectively  by  Lieu 
tenants  Werden,  Murray,  and  Davenport.  It  was  found  need 
ful  to  send  picket-boats  ahead,  not  only  to  search  out  the  chan 
nel,  but  to  ascertain  whether  buoys  had  been  removed,  and 
where  batteries  had  been  erected. 

The  squadron  might  be  said  to  grope  its  way  through 
the  sound,  and  especially  through  what  is  called  the  marshes, 
where  the  channel-way  was  so  narrow  as  to  admit  only  two  ves 
sels  abreast.  At  sundown,  on  the  5th,  they  had  only  reached 
Stumpy  Point,  ten  miles  from  the  marshes;  and  there,  like 
travellers  on  the  land,  they  anchored  and  rested  for  the  night. 


OPERATIONS    IN    PAMLICO   AND   ALBEMAKLE    SOUNDS.          385 

k  Here  a  family,  residing  on  the  main-land,  found  itself  sub 
jected  to  temporary  inconvenience  and  alarm  by  one  of  those  in 
cidents  which  belong  to  a  state  of  war.  They  had  watched  the 
progress  of  the  Yankee  fleet  during  the  day  without  feeling 
that  they  had  any  special  personal  interest  in  the  matter  beyond 
what  every  Southern  felt  in  the  success  of  their  cause,  and  re 
tired  to  rest  thankful  that  so  much  water  lay  between  them  and 
the  nearest  of  the  squadron — a  distance  which  they  thought 
every  hour  of  the  night  was  increasing.  Toward  midnight  the 
man  was  aroused,  as  he  thought,  by  the  call  of  some  neighbor 
or  a  passing  traveller  ;  and,  upon  answering  the  summons,  was 
greatly  astonished  to  find  himself  in  the  midst  of  armed  men 
who  wore  not  the  rebel  gray,  but  the  blue  of  the  United  States 
]S"avy,  and  whose  weapons  silently  informed  him  that  remon 
strance  or  resistance  would  alike  be  in  vain.  The  officer  com 
manding  the  party  politely  informed  him  that  the  flag-oificer  of 
the  fleet  was  very  anxious  to  have  the  honor  of  his  company  on 
board  his  ship  as  soon  as  possible.  This  invitation,  so  strongly 
supported  as  it  was  by  men  and  arms,  could  not  well  be  resisted, 
and  about  midnight  this  guest  was  received  on  board  the  flag 
ship,  where  he  was  given  to  understand  that  his  knowledge  of 
the  sound  and  the  adjacent  country  would  be  very  serviceable 
to  the  fleet,  and  that  it  would  be  wise  in  him  to  communicate 
wrhat  he  knew,  and  aid  in  conducting  the  squadron  to  its  desti 
nation. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  6th  of  February  the  fleet  was 
once  more  under  way.  Two  light-draught  steamers  were  kept 
about  one  mile  in  advance,  in  order  to  give  timely  notice  either 
of  the  approach  of  the  enemy's  gunboats,  or  to  discover  con 
cealed  batteries  or  obstructions,  if  any  existed.  As  the  morn 
ing  advanced,  clouds  and  haze  obscured  both  land  and  water, 
hiding  all  but  objects  near  at  hand,  and  rendering  the  advance 
of  the  fleet  both  difficult  and  dangerous.  At  about  10.30  A.  M. 
the  weather  became  so  thick,  and  the  wind  was  so  fresh  and 
accompanied  with  rain,  that  it  was  deemed  imprudent  to  pro 
ceed,  and  the  whole  squadron  was  again  anchored  when  about 
two  miles  from  the  narrow  channel  of  the  marshes.  On  Friday 
morning  the  weather  was  more  favorable,  and  at  9  o'clock  the 
fleet  wTas  once  more  under  way,  and  headed  for  the  marshes. 
25 


386  HISTORY   OF   THE   TJHITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Three  steamers,  the  Ceres,  the  Putnam,  and  the  Underwriter, 
were  sent  ahead  to  reconnoitre,  and  particularly  to  ascertain 
whether  there  was  a  battery  on  Sandy  Point,  near  Ashby 
Harbor,  where  it  was  intended  to  land  the  troops.  At  10.30 
A.  M.  the  rebel  fleet  was  in  sight,  drawn  up  behind  the  barri 
cade  already  mentioned,  formed  of  sunken  vessels  and  a  double 
row  of  piles.  This  barricade  was  flanked  on  one  side  by  a 
fort  on  Pork  Point,  and  on  the  other  by  a  battery  on  Weir's 
Point.  The  rebel  fleet  numbered  eight  vessels,  and  they  were 
supported  by  two  other  batteries.  A  signal-gun  from  one  of 
these  gunboats  announced  to  the  rebels  the  impending  attack. 
The  Underwriter,  which  was  in  the  advance,  signalled,  "  ~No 
battery  on  Sandy  Point,"  and,  as  nothing  appeared  to  hinder 
the  carrying  out  the  plan  of  battle  already  agreed  upon,  the 
squadron  moved  on.  This  plan  was  to  land  the  troops  at  Ash- 
by  Harbor,  on  Roanoke  Island,  and  assault  the  fort  and  batter 
ies  in  the  rear,  while  the  fleet  attacked  the  water-front  and  the 
rebel  gunboats.  The  land  approach  to  the  fort  was  through 
wide  marshes,  through  which  the  troops  were  obliged  to  wade 
sometimes  nearly  waist-deep  in  mud  and  water  on  a  winter 
day,  and  exposed  meanwhile  to  a  sweeping  fire  of  musketry 
and  artillery  served  with  both  shells  and  grape. 

The  rebels  had  about  five  thousand  troops  on  the  island, 
enough  not  only  fully  to  man  the  forts  and  batteries,  but  also 
to  supply  formidable  bodies  for  operations  in  the  field,  where 
their  knowledge  of  the  country  gave  them  decided  advantages. 
Soon  after  the  announcement  that  there  was  no  battery  on 
Sandy  Point,  the  vessels  of  the  navy,  commanded  as  stated  be 
fore,  and  accompanied  by  the  Picket,  Captain  Thomas  P.  Ives ; 
Hussar,  Captain  Frederick  Crocker;  Pioneer,  Captain  Charles 
E.  Baker ;  Yidette,  Captain  John  L.  Foster ;  Ranger,  Captain 
Samuel  Emerson  ;  Lancer,  Captain  M.  B.  Morley ;  and  Chasseur, 
Captain  John  "West,  of  the  army  division,  and  keeping  in  close 
order,  had  approached  the  enemy  near  enough  to  begin  the  at 
tack.  The  following  is  an  extract  from  the  official  report  of  the 
battle : 

By  noon,  our  vessels  having  approached  still  nearer,  the  action  be 
came  general  on  their  part  and  that  of  tlie  enemy.  At  1.30  p.  M.  the 
effect  of  our  firing  caused  the  barracks  behind  the  fort  at  Pork  Point  to 


OPERATIONS   IN   PAMLICO   AND   ALBEMARLE    SOUNDS.          387 

burst  into  flames,  and  at  2.15  p.  M.  they  were  burning  furiously,  entirely 
beyond  redemption.  About  this  time  our  vessels  being  placed  by  their 
respective  commanders  as  advantageously  as  circumstances  would  per 
mit,  the  firing  was  the  hottest.  Throughout  the  sound  lying  between 
Roanoke  Island  and  the  main-land  the  depth  of  water  at  best  is  but 
little,  and  the  bottom  everywhere  is  essentially  lumpy  and  irregular. 
Even  at  the  distance  of  a  mile  and  more  from  the  shore  where 
we  had  to  approach,  scarcely  a  general  depth  at  low  water  .of  more 
than  seven  feet  is  to  be  found.  With  one  or  two  exceptions,  none 
of  our  vessels  drew  less  than  seven  feet,  and  some  of  them  drew 
rather  more  than  eight.  In  placing  them,  therefore,  so  as  to  make  their 
various  guns  to  tell  effectually,  their  several  commanders  had  to  exercise 
a  sound  discretion,  and  to  keep  in  view  the  consideration  due  to  the 
use  of  shells  with  fuses  fixed  in  value  as  to  time.  To  have  used,  for  in 
stance,  a  five-second  fuse  in  shelling  uncovered  works  at  a  less  distance 
than  about  1,400  yards,  would  not  have  secured  the  best  results.  Tow 
ard  3  p.  M.  the  troops,  embarked  on  board  of  light-draught  steamers 
and  boats,  started  to  land  at  Ashby  Harbor.  The  place  was  guarded 
by  a  large  body  of  the  enemy,  with  a  field  battery,  but  the  Delaware, 
with  Commander  Rowan  on  board,  and  his  division  flag  at  her  mast 
head,  having  very  judiciously  taken  up  a  flanking  position  to  the  south 
ward  of  Pork  Point,  and  thus,  most  opportunely,  being  near  at  hand, 
immediately  turned  her  guns  toward  the  harbor,  and  with  some  9-inch 
shrapnels  soon  cleared  the  way.  At  4.30  P.  M.  Pork  Point  battery,  and 
the  one  next  to  the  northward  of  it,  ceased  for  a  while  to  reply  to  our 
fire ;  five  of  the  enemy's  steamers,  apparently  injured,  went  back  behind 
Weir's  Point,  and  the  first  landing  of  our  troops  took  place.  At  5  p.  M. 
those  batteries  again  opened  upon  our  vessels,  and  the  enemy's  steamers 
once  more  put  forth  and  opened  upon  us.  In  about  forty  minutes, 
however,  the  latter  were  compelled  a  second  time  to  retire.  One  of 
them,  the  Curlew,  in  a  disabled  condition,  had  taken  refuge  under  the 
battery  on  Redstone  Point.  At  6  P.  M.,  the  firing  of  the  enemy  being 
only  from  Pork  Point,  and  at  long  intervals,  darkness  coming  on,  and, 
not  wishing  to  waste  ammunition,  I  ordered  the  signal  "Cease  firing" 
to  be  made.  In  the  course  of  the  afternoon,  our  six  launches,  under 
the  command  of  Midshipman  Benjamin  H.  Porter,  landed  their  howit 
zers  and  joined  the  army,  for  the  purpose  of  commanding  the  main  road 
and  its  two  forks  during  the  night,  and  assisting  in  more  active  opera 
tions  the  following  morning.  By  midnight  some  10,000  of  our  troops 
had  been  safely  landed  at  Ashby  Harbor,  the  Delaware  having  taken 
on  board  from  the  Cossack  some  800,  and  put  them  on  shore  at  10  p.  M. 


388  HISTOKY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

February  8. — As  it  was  arranged  by  General  Burnside  that  his 
forces  should  move,  at  a  veiy  early  hour  this  morning,  from  where  they 
had  been  landed,  and  begin  their  attack  upon  the  enemy ;  and,  as  the 
direction  they  were  required  to  take  would,  in  all  probability,  soon  bring 
them  in  the  line  of  fire  occupied  by  the  Navy,  it  was  agreed  between 
us  last  night  that  to-day  the  vessels  should  not  renew  operations  until  I 
could  receive  word  from  him  that  their  missiles  would  not  be  destruc 
tive  to  both  friends  and  foes.  At  daylight  none  of  the  enemy's  vessels, 
except  the  Curlew,  could  be  discovered. 

At  9  A.  M.  a  continuous  firing  in  the  interior  of  the  island  told  us 
that  our  forces  were  hotly  engaged  about  midway  between  Ashby  Har 
bor  and  Pork  Point  battery,  and,  as  this  intelligence  also  assured  us 
that  our  forces  were  not  then  in  the  range  of  our  line  of  fire,  our  vessels, 
without  waiting  to  hear  from  General  Burnside,  at  once  moved  up  to 
reengage  the  forts.  At  this  work  they  continued  until  the  firing  in  the 
interior  evidently  slackened.  Then  taking  it  for  granted  that  our  troops 
were  carrying  every  thing  before  them,  and  thus  fast  approaching  the 
rear  of  the  batteries,  I  again  ordered  the  signal  "  Cease  firing  "  to  be 
made.  At  the  time,  however,  the  work  on  Pork  Point  was  so  reduced 
that  it  did  not  use  but  one  gun  against  us.  Shortly  afterward,  on  being 
informed  by  one  of  General  Burnside's  aides  of  the  actual  state  of  things 
on  shore,  I  was  induced  to  order  another  demonstration  on  the  part  of 
our  vessels ;  but  before  firing  had  generally  commenced,  Commander 
Rowan  came  on  board  the  Southfield  just  from  General  Burnside,  with 
the  suggestion  that  it  would  be  better  to  desist,  and  accordingly  they 
were  recalled. 

At  1  P.  M.,  judging  that  the  time  had  arrived  for  clearing  a  passage 
way  through  the  obstructions  alluded  to  above,  by  the  accomplishment 
of  which  both  the  battery  on  Redstone  Point  and  the  Curlew  might  be 
destroyed,  and  our  advance  up  Albemarle  Sound  would  be  secured,  the 
Underwriter,  Valley  City,  Seymour,  Lockwood,  Ceres,  Shawsheen, 
Putnam,  Whitehead,  and  Brincker  were  ordered  to  perform  the  service. 
By  4  p.  M.  one  of  them  had  overcome  the  difficulty  for  herself,  and 
reached  the  other  side,  and  in  less  than  an  hour  more  a  sufficient  way 
for  all  the  rest  was  opened.  This  important  duty  could  not  have  been 
undertaken  one  moment  earlier  than  it  was  without  exposing  our  ves 
sels,  huddled  together,  to  the  converging  and  cross  fire  of  the  four  bat 
teries  at  Pork,  Weir's,  and  Redstone  Points,  and  another  one  situated 
between  the  former  two.  About  the  same  time  that  our  vessels  suc 
ceeded  in  bursting  through  the  barricades  the  American  flag  was  hoisted 
over  the  battery  at  Pork  Point,  and  in  a  few  minutes  afterward  the 


OPERATIONS   IN   PAMLICO    AND   ALBEMAKLE    SOUNDS.          389 

enemy  himself  fired  the  works  at  Redstone  Point,  and  also  the  steamer 
Curlew.  Both  blew  up  in  the  early  part  of  the  evening.  These  events 
close  the  struggle,  which  had  now  lasted  throughout  two  days,  and 
were  essentially  the  last  scenes  enacted  in  securing  to  us  complete  pos 
session  of  the  island  of  Roanoke. 

A  statement  of  the  casualties  that  occurred  will  accompany  this 
communication.  They  amount  in  all  to  six  killed,  seventeen  wounded, 
and  two  missing.  Considering  how  frequently  our  vessels  were  struck, 
it  is  remarkable  that  more  did  not  take  place ;  and  considering  the 
character  of  our  vessels,  it  is  also  remarkable  that  none  of  them  were 
even  put  hors  de  combat,  except  temporarily. 

It  now  remains  for  me  to  discharge  the  gratifying  duty  of  speaking 
of  the  officers  and  men  under  my  command  on  the  occasion  in  view. 
This,  obviously,  I  can  only  do,  as  it  were,  in  a  collective  way ;  but  the 
reports  of  the  commanding  officers  herewith  submitted,  upon  which, 
necessarily,  I  have  to  rely,  and  in  which  I  place  every  confidence,  will  be 
found  more  circumstantial.  I  beg  to  commend  to  your  consideration  the 
commanding  officers  themselves,  who  did  their  part  entirely  to  my  satis 
faction,  and,  in  fact,  in  a  most  admirable  manner.  The  general  order  I 
issued  the  day  after  the  surrender,  a  copy  of  which  accompanies  my 
preliminary  report,  was  intended  to  convey  applause  and  my  profound 
gratitude  to  all  to  whom  it  relates,  and  I  therefore  beg  that  it  may  be 
so  regarded  by  the  Navy  Department.  I  pray,  too,  that  to  the  be 
reaved  individuals  whose  support  and  comfort  depended  upon  those 
who  are  now  among  the  honored  dead  may  be  extended  the  earliest 
fostering  care  that  circumstances  will  permit. 

It  is  really  difficult  for  me  to  state  in  adequate  terms  how  largely  I 
feel  myself  indebted  to  Commanders  Rowan  and  Case  for  their  con 
stant  and  signal  services  throughout,  from  the  very  inception  of  the  ex 
pedition  to  the  consummation  of  the  achievement  in  view.  They,  hand 
in  hand,  with  their  marked  ability  and  sound  sense,  and  in  the  absence 
of  all  ordinary  facilities,  brought  about,  at  Hampton  Roads,  the  arming, 
manning,  and  equipment  of  the  many  vessels  sent  to  us,  from  necessity, 
in  an  unprepared  condition ;  and  subsequently  they  both  labored  most 
conspicuously  and  faithfully,  in  their  respective  spheres  of  action,  to 
vanquish  difficulties  at  the  inlet  and  the  enemy  at  Roanoke.  In  short, 
their  assistance  to  me  has  been  invaluable. 

I  am  promised  a  report  by  General  Burnside  with  regard  to  Mid 
shipman  Porter's  association  with  his  forces,  and  as  soon  as  it  comes  to 
hand  I  will  with  pleasure  forward  it  to  the  Department. 

Although  the  Philadelphia  did  not  participate  in  the  action,  because 


390  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

of  her  unfitness  for  the  purpose,  still  she  was  ever  near  at  hand,  in  read 
iness,  if  necessary,  to  tow  the  disabled,  receive  some  of  the  wounded, 
and  furnish  supplies.  Her  commander,  Acting  Master  Silas  Reynolds, 
is  every  way  worthy  of  his  trust. 

Mr.  Fisher  performed  the  important  duties  of  signal-officer  in  the 
most  commendable  manner.  Not  only  were  all  the  signals  ordered 
promptly  made,  but  no  mistake  whatever  occurred. 

Lieutenants  Robeson  and  Barstow,  of  the  Army,  were  ever  in  place, 
and  ready,  by  means  of  Myers's  system  of  signals,  to  make  known  to 
those  not  accustomed  to  our  own  code  whatever  I  wished. 

It  will  afford  me  peculiar  pleasure,  sir,  to  communicate  to  you  in 
due  season  more  particular  information  with  regard  to  the  cases  of  indi 
viduals  which  appear  to  me  to  merit  a  distinct  consideration  on  the 
part  of  the  Government. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

L.     M.    GOLDSBOROUGH, 

Flag-Officer  commanding  North  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 

Great  praise  was  due  to  General  Burnside  and  the  officers 
and  men  of  his  command  for  the  promptness,  energy,  and  per 
severing  courage  with  which  they  performed  their  part  of  the 
work  that  led  to  this  decisive  victory,  and  it  is  pleasant  to 
think  that  this  praise  was  freely  given  by  the  country.  The 
Army  and  the  Navy  labored  together  in  harmony — each  was 
necessary  to  the  other,  and  to  the  success  of  the  expedition. 
Without  the  Navy,  the  Army  could  not  have  even  reached  the 
forts,  much  less  could  they  have  captured  them ;  and  any  attack 
of  the  squadron  would  have  been  useless  without  the  coopera 
tion  of  the  troops  and  garrisons  to  hold  the  works  after  the 
victory.  By  the  capture  of  these  forts,  and  the  troops  stationed 
upon  the  island,  free  access  to  all  the  North  Carolina  sounds 
was  gained  for  our  squadron,  so  that  in  a  short  time  the  rebel 
power  was  swept  from  all  these  waters. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 

CAPTURE    OF   NEWBERN   AND   FORT    MACON. 

THE  capture  of  Roanoke  Island,  and  the  destruction  of  the 
rebel  squadron  at  Elizabeth  City,  were  followed  soon  after  by 
a  combined  attack  of  the  Army  and  E"avy  upon  Newbern,  and 
the  siege  and  capture  of  Fort  Macon.  Newbern  is  situated  at 
the  junction  of  the  Neuse  and  Trent  Rivers.  The  Neuse  flows 
into  Pamlico  Sound.  The  city  is  eighty-four  miles  northeast 
of  Wilmington,  about  the  same  distance  south  of  Weldon,  and 
one  hundred  and  twenty  miles  from  Raleigh,  the  capital  of 
North  Carolina.  It  is  connected  by  railroad  with  Beaufort, 
and  also  with  the  main  interior  lines  of  the  State  leading  south 
to  Charleston  and  north  through  Weldon  to  Richmond.  It  is, 
therefore,  a  point  of  considerable  importance,  and  in  size  is 
the  second  city  of  the  State,  its  population  having  been  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war  about  six  thousand.  The  Neuse 
River  at  Newbern  is  about  one  mile  and  a  half  wide,  and  the 
Trent  about  half  a  mile.  The  importance  of  this  city  did  not 
escape  the  attention  of  the  rebel  chiefs,  and  it  was  fortified  with 
an  expense  and  skill  proportioned  to  its  strategic  value.  The 
city  could  only  be  approached  by  an  enemy  from  the  south, 
and  the  south  bank  of  the  Neuse  was  protected  by  formidable 
earthworks,  while  obstructions  were  placed  in  the  channel  of 
the  river,  formed  of  sunken  hulks,  and  an  iron-pointed  line  of 
piles  or  cJievaux  de  frise,  which  offered  a  dangerous  resistance 
.to  our  vessels.  Torpedoes  of  an  ingenious  and  elaborate  con 
struction  were  also  planted  in  the  channel.  These  obstructions 
were  all  commanded  by  heavy  batteries.  These  works  were: 
first,  Fort  Dixie,  mounting  four  heavy  guns,  and  about  six  miles 


392  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

from  Newbern.  Next  was  Fort  Thompson,  a  really  formidable 
work,  constructed  upon  scientific  principles,  and  mounting 
thirteen  heavy  guns,  two  of  them  being  rifled  32-pounders. 
Then  came  Fort  Ellis,  three  miles  from  Newbern,  mounting 
eight  guns ;  then  Fort  Lane,  two  miles  from  Newbern,  mount 
ing  also  eight  guns;  and  Union  Point  battery  was  one  mile 
from  the  city,  and  mounted  two  guns. 

If  to  this  is  added  a  description  of  the  obstructions  in  the 
river,  a  general  idea  will  be  obtained  of  the  defences  of  New- 
bern.  These  obstructions  were  placed  a  few  miles  only  below 
the  city.  To  form  one  of  these,  twenty-four  vessels  were  sunk  in  a 
direct  line.  These  varied  in  size  from  fifty  to  two  hundred  tons 
burden,  two  brigs,  three  barks,  and  nineteen  schooners.  They 
were  locked  together  as  perfectly  as  human  ingenuity  could  do 
it,  with  their  spars  and  rigging  still  standing  and  intertwisted  in' 
every  conceivable  direction  and  manner.  It  seemed  impossible 
that  such  a  barricade  could  be  sailed  over  or  broken  through. 
This  line  of  defence  was  the  one  nearest  the  city.  The  other, 
lower  down,  and  first  encountered  by  our  gunboats,  was  a  much 
more  dangerous  affair.  It  was  constructed  by  first  driving  a 
row  of  piles  firmly  across  the  channel,  and  these  were  cut  off 
beneath  the  surface  of  the  water.  Another  row  of  piles  was 
added  to  these,  but  this  second  set  were  all  pointed  and  capped 
with  iron.  They  were  also  inclined  at  an  angle  of  about  45 
degrees  down  the  stream,  so  as  to  pierce  the  hull  of  an  ascend 
ing  vessel.  Near  these  was  placed  a  row  of  thirty  torpedoes, 
containing  each  about  two  hundred  pounds  of  powder,  quite 
sufficient  to  destroy  any  ship  beneath  which  it  should  be  ex 
ploded. 

These  dangerous  machines  were  fitted  with  metal  fuses, 
and  trigger-lines  attached  to  the  pointed  piles,  so  as  to  fire  the 
torpedo  by  the  striking  of  the  vessel  upon  the  timber.  In  ad 
dition  to  this  a  fire-raft,  filled  with  cotton,  which  had  been  satu 
rated  with  turpentine,  had  been  prepared  in  the  Trent  Eiver  to 
send  down  against  the  fleet. 

The  elaborate  and  costly  character  of  these  various  defences, 
shows  how  great  the  importance  of  Newbern  was  in  the  estima 
tion  of  the  rebels ;  and  when  one  considers  the  position  and  the 
strength  of  the  six  forts  and  batteries  along  the  river,  with  their 


CAPTURE    OF    NEWBERN    A^D    FORT   MACOX.  393 

well-constructed  rifle-pits  to  protect  them  from  a  land  assault, 
the  dangerous  obstructions  in  the  river,  the  cotton-bale  batter 
ies  on  the  wharf,  and  a  movable  battery  on  the  railway  track, 
it  is  astonishing  that  so  little  effectual  resistance  was  made  to 
the  passage  of  the  fleet  and  the  approach  of  the  Army.  It  was 
one  of  the  many  events  of  the  war  tending  to  reverse  all  former 
opinions  in  regard  to  the  comparative  power  of  ships  and  forts, 
where  the  ships  are  moved  by  steam,  and  are  armed  with  shell- 
guns. 

The  expense  incurred  and  the  pains  taken  in  fortifying,  not 
Xewbern  only,  but  all  the  strategic  points  on  these  sounds  and 
rivers  of  the  South,  show  very  clearly  that  the  rebels  deemed 
their  security  to  be  essential  to  the  success  of  their  cause,  and 
just  as  clearly  reveal  the  wisdom  of  the  Government  in  its  de 
termination  to  capture  them.  It  was  reported  that  the  obstruc 
tions  at  Roanoke  cost  four  hundred  thousand  dollars,  and  those  at 
Kewbern  were,  in  proportion  to  their  extent,  quite  as  expensive. 
Whatever  the  exact  sum  may  have  been,  it  is  quite  certain  that 
a  great  amount  of  money  and  labor  was  expended  upon  the 
various  works  by  which  these  waters  were  defended ;  and  the 
persistent  and  costly  efforts  made  to  recover  them  after  they 
had  been  captured  by  our  forces  prove  how  severely  their  loss 
was  felt.  The  rebels  evidently  thought  they  had  made  them  se 
cure.  They  knew  that  none  but  vessels  of  light  draught  could 
be  brought  into  the  sounds,  and  they  also  knew  that  we  had  at 
first  no  small,  strongly-built  gunboats  suitable  for  operations  in 
these  shallow  waters,  and  that  the  light  merchant  steamers 
would  soon  be  disabled  by  the  fire  of  heavy  artillery.  Al 
though  they  were  sorely  disappointed  at  the  success  so  quickly 
gained  by  our  flotilla  of  frail  ships,  they  could  not  but  expect 
that  they  would  be  rapidly  disabled  by  successive  battles ;  and 
this  expectation  was  so  far  realized  as  to  increase  the  difficul 
ties  and  perils  of  our  fleet  with  every  fight  in  which  they  were 
engaged,  having  no  means  at  command  of  making  any  perma 
nent  repairs.  In  each  new  battle,  therefore,  even  though  the 
rebel  force  was  no  greater  than  had  been  met  before,  the 
chances  of  success  on  our  part  were  somewhat  diminished,  be 
cause  our  vessels  were  less  stanch  and  reliable  than  at  the 
beginning — not  only  injured,  as  most  of  them  were  by  shot,  but 


394  HISTOEY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

strained  by  the  discharge  of  their  own  guns.  Under  such  dis 
advantages,  our  Navy  and  the  land  forces  were  obliged  to  fight 
the  many  battles  of  the  sounds — battles  in  which  skill  and 
daring  were  most  signally  displayed,  though  they  have  been 
overshadowed  by  the  more  important  and  better  known  engage 
ments  of  the  war. 

The  general  plan  for  the  attack  upon  these  works  was  for 
the  troops  to  land  at  Slocum's  Creek,  about  ten  miles  from 
Newbern,  and  inarch  from  that  point  to  attack  the  batteries  in 
the  rear,  if  that  were  possible,  while  the  fleet  should  precede 
the  Army  and  bombard  the  forts  and  batteries  as  they  should 
be  successively  reached.  The  manner  in  which  this  plan  was 
carried  out  shows  what  courage  and  skill  can  do,  and  is  one  of 
many  exploits  of  the  Navy  and  Army  on  the  coast  of  North 
Carolina  which  have  received  too  little  attention,  overshadowed 
by  the  splendor  of  still  more  important  victories. 

On  the  morning  of  the  12th  of  March,  1862,  the  joint  expe 
dition  left  Hatteras  Inlet,  the  naval  division  of  the  squadron  as 
usual  taking  the  lead.  At  about  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the 
advance  division  of  the  gunboats  entered  the  Neuse  River,  hav 
ing  had  delightful  weather  in  passing  up  the  sound.  Here  the 
advance  was  stopped,  and  a  steamer,  the  Lockwood,  was  sent 
to  lie  off  the  mouth  of  Pamlico  River,  as  it  was  said  that  two 
steamers  were  up  that  river  which  might  attempt  to  cut  off  any 
transports  that  should  fall  in  the  rear  of  the  fleet.  At  about 
4  o'clock,  the  fleet  having  been  concentrated,  it  moved  on  cau 
tiously,  taking  soundings  in  the  unknown  channel.  At  5  p.  M. 
they  came  in  sight  of  the  first  line  of  obstructions,  and  a  small 
steamer  was  discovered  a  few  miles  up  the  river.  The  Dela 
ware  was  sent  in  pursuit  of  her,  but  she  failed  to  overtake  the 
chase,  though  she  was  driven  under  the  guns  of  the  batteries. 

Soon  after,  the  naval  squadron  came  to  anchor  in  three  col 
umns  off  Slocum's  Creek,  the  point  selected  for  the  landing  of 
the  troops.  In  the  morning  four  gunboats  wTere  stationed,  two 
on  each  side  of  the  mouth  of  the  creek,  to  cover  the  landing, 
and  keep  up  a  fire  with  grape  and  shell  upon  the  shore  until 
the  first  brigade  had  landed.  The  landing  was  an  unpleasant 
and  difficult  work,  but  bravely  done.  The  men  seemed  regardless 
of  fatigue  and  exposure.  Such  was  the  nature  of  the  shore,  that 


CAPTURE   OF   NEWBERN   AND   FORT   MACON.  395 

they  were  obliged  to  flounder  on  from  the  boats  as  they  could, 
through  mud  and  water,  sometimes  waist-deep,  and  when  all 
were  fairly  on  solid  ground  they  were  already  partly  exhausted 
and  ill  prepared  for  the  march  before  them.  Six  naval  boat- 
howitzers  were  landed  with  the  troops,  and  the  manner  in 
which  the  gunners  suffered  in  the  subsequent  battle  shows  that 
they  were  in  the  hottest  of  the  fight.  After  this  fatigue  and 
exposure  of  the  landing,  the  troops  marched  twelve  miles  over 
roads  deep  with  mud,  then  lay  down  in  a  rain-storm  on  low  and 
marshy  ground,  to  be  waked  for  battle  at  daylight  on  the  fol 
lowing  morning.  The  boat-howitzer  battery  did  not  reach  the 
point  until  3  o'clock  in  the  morning.  Such  was  the  almost  in 
superable  difficulty  of  dragging  forward  the  guns. 

So  soon  as  the  last  brigade  was  embarked  for  landing,  the 
flag-ship  went  up  the  river  to  reconnoitre  Fort  Dixie,  the  near 
est  work,  and  mounting  four  heavy  guns.  The  fort  opened  fire 
upon  the  gunboat  so  soon  as  she  came  within  range,  which  was 
quickly  returned.  General  Burnside  having  desired  to  com 
municate  with  Commodore  Rowan,  the  Perry  took  the  place  of 
the  Delaware,  and  engaged  the  fort  with  a  very  effective  fire 
until  night,  when  a  heavy  fog  set  in.  The  plan  of  the  assault 
was,  that  the  fleet  should  attack  the  forts  and  shell  the  road  in 
advance  of  the  troops,  and  this  was  fully  carried  out  in  regard 
to  the  first  battery,  when  night  put  an  end  to  the  operations. 
A  part  of  the  fleet  was  anchored  for  the  night  nearly  abreast  of 
the  head  of  the  army  column.  At  daylight  the  fleet  was  again 
under  way,  and,  upon  opening  fire  upon  Fort  Dixie,  it  was 
found  that  the  works  had  been  abandoned ;  and  a  boat  was 
sent  on  shore,  and  the  American  flag  planted  on  the  ramparts. 
The  squadron  then  passed  on  and  attacked  Fort  Ellis ;  but  its 
magazine  w^as  soon  blown  up,  and  it,  too,  was  abandoned.  At 
this  time  the  troops  were  engaged  with  the  rifle-pits  and  field 
batteries  in  the  rear  of  Fort  Thompson.  The  squadron  passed 
on  and  opened  fire  upon  that  fortification,  and  continued  the 
fire  until  it  was  no  longer  returned  by  the  fort,  and  then  the 
flag-ship,  having  displayed  the  signal  "  Follow  me,"  dashed  at 
the  first  row  of  obstructions.  It  was  a  moment  of  intense  anx 
iety,  as  she  struck  the  line  of  piles,  for  the  explosion  of  a  tor 
pedo  was  the  thing  expected,  and  for  a  moment  few  breathed  as 


396  HISTOEY   OF    THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

they  watched  her.  She  glided  safely  through,  however,  and 
the  rest  pressed  on.  Several  were  injured  by  striking  the  iron- 
capped  timbers,  but  for  some  reason  not  a  torpedo  was  ex 
ploded.  Just  as  the  fleet  was  passing  the  line  of  piles,  the 
troops  rushed  into  Fort  Thompson,  having  carried  the  works 
in  the  rear.  The  ships  next  attacked  Fort  Lane,  but  there  was 
no  response  from  her  guns.  The  work  had  been  deserted.  The 
Valley  City  raised  on  it  the  Union  flag,  and  all  passed  rapidly 
up  the  river.  At  the  mouth  of  the  Trent  it  was  seen  that  two 
batteries  were  planted  on  the  wharf,  but  they,  too,  were  aban 
doned.  They  then  steamed  up  the  Neuse  River  to  the  city, 
and  discovering  three  steamboats  and  one  schooner  endeavoring 
to  escape  up  the  river,  the  Delaware  pursued  and  captured  two 
and  the  schooner,  but  the  other  was  run  on  shore  and  burned. 
At  12  M.  the  flag-ship  was  run  alongside  the  wharf,  and  New- 
bem  was  taken  possession  of  by  Commodore  Rowan. 

The  rebel  officers  had  fired  the  city  in  several  places,  and 
the  fire-raft  having  also  been  set  on  fire  floated  against  the  rail 
road  bridge  over  the  Trent,  and  that  also  was  burned.  At  2 
p.  M.  the  troops  appeared  on  the  south  side  of  the  Trent,  and  so 
soon  as  they  could  be  transported  across,  they  entered  and  held 
the  town. 

The  following  are  some  of  the  more  important  official  re 
ports  of  this  successful  expedition.  The  defence  made  by  the 
water  batteries  of  the  rebels  was  a  very  slight  one  compared 
with  their  force,  and  the  preparations  which  had  been  made. 
The  fire  from  their  rifle-pits  and  field  batteries  upon  the  troops 
was  much  more  destructive ;  and,  had  not  the  garrisons  been 
demoralized  by  the  shells  of  the  fleet,  there  might  have  been  a 
different  result,  for  the  enemy  had  a  large  body  of  troops ;  they 
fought  under  cover,  and  were  reenforced  during  the  fight. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  PHILADELPHIA,      | 
OFF  NEWBERN,  NORTH  CAROLINA,  March  20, 1862.  j 

SIR:  I  beg  leave  to  submit  the  following  detailed  report  of  the 
attack  upon  Newbern  and  its  approaches. 

I  left  Hatteras  Inlet  on  Wednesday,  March  12,  at  7.30  A.  M.,  with 
the  following  naval  force  under  my  command :  Philadelphia,  my  flag 
ship,  Acting  Master  S.  Reynolds  commanding;  Stars  and  Stripes,  Lieu 
tenant  Commanding  R.  Worden  ;  Louisiana,  Lieutenant  Commanding 


CAPTUEE   OF   NEWBERN    AND   FORT   MACON.  397 

A.  Murray ;  Hctzel,  Lieutenant  Commanding  H.  K.  Davenport ;  Dela 
ware,  Lieutenant  Commanding  L.  P.  Quackenbush  ;  Commodore  Perry, 
Lieutenant  Commanding  C.  W.  Flusser;  Valley  City,  Lieutenant  Com 
manding  J.  C.  Chaplin ;  Underwriter,  Lieutenant  Commanding  A.  Hop 
kins  ;  Commodore  Barney,  Acting  Lieutenant  Commanding  R.  T.  Ren- 
sliaw ;  Hunchback,  Acting  Lieutenant  Commanding  E.  R.  Colhoun ; 
Soutlifield,  Acting  Volunteer  Lieutenant  Commanding  C.  F.  W.  Behm; 
Morse,  Acting  Master  Commanding  Peter  Hayes;  Brincker,  Acting 
Master  Commanding  J.  E.  Giddings;  and  Lockwood,  Acting  Master 
Commanding  G.  W.  Graves.  By  8  A.  M.  the  naval  fleet,  together  with 
the  army  transports,  were  steaming  rapidly  up  the  sound. 

At  1  P.  M.  we  made  Brant  Island,  distant  about  twelve  miles.  At 
2.10  P.  M.  the  advance  divisions  of  the  gunboats  having  entered  the 
mouth  of  the  Neuse  River,  and  being  some  miles  in  advance  of  the  flag 
ship,  I  made  signal  to  stop,  that  the  fleet  might  be  concentrated.  At 
this  time  General  Burnside  came  alongside  the  flag-ship,  and  requested 
that  one  of  our  gunboats  might  be  sent  to  the  mouth  of  Pamlico  River, 
intelligence  having  been  received  that  two  steamers  were  in  that  river. 
To  guard  against  the  possibility  of  an  attempt  by  the  enemy  to  cut  off 
any  of  our  transport  vessels  which  might  remain  unprotected  in  the  rear 
of  the  fleet,  I  dispatched  the  Lockwood  to  lie  oft*  the  mouth  of  that 
river  during  the  night. 

At  3.40  p.  M.,  having  come  up  with  the  advance,  signal  was  made. to 
"  Form  line  ahead,"  and  the  fleet  again  moved  on,  having  now  fairly 
entered  Neuse  River.  At  5  P.  M.,  the  gunboats  being  now  far  in  ad 
vance  of  the  Army  transports  and  in  sight  of  the  obstructions  placed  by 
the  enemy  in  the  river  opposite  to  their  batteries,  a  small  steamer  was 
discovered  about  six  miles  ahead,  apparently  reconnoitring.  The  Dela 
ware  was  dispatched  in  pursuit.  Failing  to  overtake  the  chase,  but 
having  driven  her  under  the  guns  of  the  batteries,  she  returned.  At 
6.10  p.  M.  the  naval  fleet  came  to  anchor  in  three  columns  off  Slocum's 
Creek,  the  point  decided  upon  for  the  debarkation  of  troops,  and  about 
fifteen  miles  distant  from  Newbern.  Early  the  following  morning 
(13th)  I  hoisted  my  pennant  on  board  the  Delaware.  The  Stars  and 
Stripes  and  Louisiana  were  placed  on  the  west  side  of  the  creek,  and  the 
Hetzel  and  Valley  City  on  the  east.  At  about  8  A.  M.  the  troops  started 
from  the  transports,  and  at  the  same  time  the  gunboats,  stationed  as 
above,  opened  with  grape  and  shell  on  the  point  selected  for  landing, 
the  fire  ceasing  as  the  first  brigade  landed.  At  9  A.  M.  six  naval  boat- 
howitzers,  commanded,  respectively,  by  Acting  Master  C.  H.  Daniels, 
United  States  steamer  Hetzel ;  Mr.  E.  P.  Meeker,  United  States  steamer 


398  HISTOEY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

Philadelphia ;  Acting  Master  J.  B.  Hammond,  United  States  Steamer 
Hetzel ;  Mr.  E.  C.  Gabandan,  United  States  steamer  Delaware ;  Lieu 
tenant  Tillotson,  Union  Coast  Guard,  and  Lieutenant  J.  W.  B.  Hughes, 
Union  Coast  Guard — all  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  li.  S.  Mc- 
Cook,  of  the  Stars  and  Stripes — were  landed  to  assist  in  the  attack. 

The  Perry  was  moved  up  opposite  the  position  of  the  battery  in  the 
interior  near  the  railroad,  with  directions  to  open  fire  and  unmask  it. 
The  Southfield  was  ordered  to  follow  and  take  a  position  near  the 
Perry.  The  Underwriter  was  soon  directed  to  join  them  and  use  her 
rifle  gun  only.  The  Morse  was  stationed  a  mile  below  these  vessels,  and 
the  Commodore  Perry  and  Hunchback  below  the  Morse. 

As  soon  as  the  last  brigade  was  embarked  for  landing,  I  went  up 
the  river  with  the  Delaware,  to  make  a  reconnoissance  of  Fort  Dixie. 
As  I  approached,  the  battery  opened  fire,  which  was  returned,  and  the 
Perry  coining  up,  a  spirited  and  very  effective  fire  was  kept  up  by  that 
vessel  until  dark,  I  having  returned,  at  the  request  of  General  Burnside, 
to  communicate  with  him. 

Having  dispatched  the  Delaware  on  special  service,  I  returned  to 
the  Southfield,  after  having  communicated  with  the  general,  and  pro 
ceeded  in  that  vessel  to  the  Perry,  which  vessel  was  ordered  to  cease 
firing,  as  the  night  had  set  in  with  a  heavy  fog.  The  Southfield  and 
Lockwood  were  anchored  two  miles  below  Fort  Dixie,  and,  as  near  as  I 
could  judge,  abreast  of  the  advanced  position  of  our  forces,  the  Dela 
ware  joining  me  during  the  night. 

At  daylight  on  the  morning  of  the  14th  the  report  of  a  gun,  sup 
posed  to  be  a  field-piece,  was  heard.  The  Delaware,  Hunchback,  and 
Lockwood  were  immediately  ordered  to  get  under  way.  The  fog  being 
too  dense  to  signalize,  the  Lockwood  was  directed  to  trace  the  land 
down  and  order  up  the  vessels  that  had  been  stationed  along  the  shore 
from  our  position  to  the  point  of  debarkation.  The  Delaware  and 
Southfield  were  ordered  to  move  up  and  open  fire  on  Fort  Dixie.  They 
were  soon  joined  by  the  heavy  ships  from  below,  followed  by  the  more 
distant  vessels  that  had  been  guarding  Slocum's  Creek.  Receiving  no 
response  from  Fort  Dixie,  a  boat  was  sent  ashore,  and  the  American 
flag  raised  on  the  ramparts.  I  then  passed  on  up  and  opened  fire  on 
Fort  Ellis,  which  was  returned  until  the  fort  blew  up.  At  this  time  our 
troops  were  pressing  on  the  enemy's  intrenchments  in  the  rear  of  Fort 
Thompson.  I  made  signal  "  Advance  in  line  abreast,"  closed  up  toward 
the  barriers,  and  opened  fire  on  Fort  Thompson  and  in  direction  of  the 
sound  of  the  enemy's  fire  in  the  interior.  At  this  juncture  an  officer 
from  General  Burnside  came  down  to  the  beach  and  informed  me  that 


CAPTURE   OF   NEWBEKN   AXD   FORT   MACOX.  399 

our  shells  were  falling  to  the  left  and  near  our  own  troops.  Changed 
direction  and  continued  to  fire,  and  advanced  close  to  the  barriers. 

Fort  Thompson  having  ceased  to  return  our  fire,  I  made  signal 
"  Follow  my  motions,"  and  advanced  through  the  first  row  of  obstruc 
tions  in  "  line  ahead."  As  we  passed  the  obstructions  our  troops  ap 
peared  on  the  ramparts  of  the  fort,  waving  the  American  flag.  We 
threw  a  few  shells  into  Fort  Lane,  but  receiving  no  response,  ordered 
the  Valley  City  to  raise  the  American  flag  on  the  remaining  forts,  and 
passed  rapidly  up  the  river  in  "line  ahead."  As  we  passed  up,  and  on 
opening  Trent  River,  two  batteries  were  discovered,  mounting  two  guns 
each,  on  the  wharves  in  front  of  the  city ;  both,  however,  were  deserted. 
Passed  up  the  Neuse  River,  and  opened  fire  from  the  Delaware  on  some 
steamboats  that  were  attempting  to  escape  up  the  river,  one  of  them 
having  in  tow  a  schooner  loaded  with  commissary  stores.  One  of  the 
steamers  was  run  in  shore  and  burned ;  the  other  two,  together  with 
the  schooner,  were  captured. 

At  about  12  M.  I  ran  the  Delaware  alongside  the  wharf,  and  in 
formed  the  inhabitants  that  we  intended  no  injury  to  the  town.  At 
this  time  fires  broke  out  in  several  portions  of  the  city,  it  apparently 
being  the  intention  on  the  part  of  the  enemy  to  destroy  it.  Fire  was 
also  communicated  to  a  floating  raft  in  Trent  River  filled  with  bales  of 
cotton,  saturated  with  turpentine,  which  had  been  prepared  to  send 
down  to  the  fleet.  This  drifting  against  the  railroad  bridge,  set  fire  to 
and  burned  it. 

The  Louisiana  and  Barney  were  sent  to  the  Trent  side  of  the  town 
in  order  to  secure  any  public  property  that  might  be  found  there.  Sev 
eral  hundred  stand  of  arms  and  other  munitions  of  war,  and  a  large 
amount  of  naval  stores,  together  with  a  large  three-masted  schooner, 
fell  into  our  hands.  At  2  p.  M.  our  victorious  troops  appearing  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  Trent,  the  work  of  transportation  commenced,  and 
at  sundown  the  Army  was  in  full  occupancy  of  the  city. 

The  obstructions  in  the  river  were  very  formidable,  and  had  evi 
dently  been  prepared  with  great  care.  The  lower  barrier  was  composed 
of  a  series  of  piling  driven  securely  into  the  bottom  and  cut  off  below 
the  water ;  added  to  this  was  another  row  of  iron-capped  and  pointed 
piles,  inclined  at  an  angle  of  about  forty-five  degrees  down  the  stream. 
Near  these  was  a  row  of  thirty  torpedoes,  containing  about  two  hundred 
pounds  of  powder  each,  and  fitted  with  metal  fuses  connected  with 
spring  percussion  locks,  with  trigger-lines  attached  to  the  pointed  piles. 
The  second  barrier  was  quite  as  formidable  as  the  first,  although  not  so 
dangerous.  This  was  about  a  mile  above  and  abreast  of  Fort  Thomp- 


400  HISTORY   OF    THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

son,  and  consisted  of  a  line  of  sunken  vessels,  closely  massed,  and 
chevaux  defrise,  leaving  a  very  narrow  passage  under  the  battery.  In 
passing  through  these  obstructions  the  Perry  struck  one  of  the  iron 
stakes  and  carried  the  head  of  it  off,  sticking  in  her  bottom.  The 
Barney  had  a  hole  six  inches  long  cut  in  her,  and  the  Stars  and  Stripes 
was  also  injured ;  but  fortunately  the  torpedoes  failed  to  serve  the  ene 
my's  purpose. 

The  forts,  six  in  number  (exclusive  of  those  on  the  Trent),  were  well- 
constructed  earthworks,  varying  in  distance  apart  from  one-half  mile  to 
one  mile  and  a  half,  and  mounting,  in  all,  thirty-two  guns,  ranging  from 
32-pounclers  to  80-pounders,  rifled,  all  en  barbette,  with  the  exception 
of  one  casemated  fort,  mounting  two  guns. 

I  forward  herewith  the  report  of  Lieutenant  McCook,  commanding 
the  naval  battery  in  the  battle  of  Newbern.  The  conduct  of  this  officer, 
as  also  of  the  officers  in  command  of  the  guns  and  their  crews,  is  worthy 
of  all  praise.  The  list  of  killed  and  wounded  in  this  little  command, 
amounting  to  less  than  fifty  all  told,  will  show  that  where  the  hottest 
of  the  fire  was  there  they  were.  It  again  becomes  my  pleasing  duty  to 
bear  testimony  to  the  gallant  bearing  of  the  commanders  of  the  different 
vessels,  their  officers  and  crews.  I  must  beg  leave  to  express  my  grate 
ful  thanks  for  the  able  manner  in  which  I  have  been  supported  by  them. 
I  am  happy  to  add  that  no  casualties  occurred  on  board  the  vessels 
under  my  command  during  the  engagement. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  etc., 

S.  C.  ROWAN, 

Commanding  U.  S.  Naval  Forces,  Sounds  of  North  Carolina. 
Flag-Officer  L.  M.  GOLDSBOROUGH, 

Commanding  North  Atlantic  Squadron,  Hampton  Roads,  Va. 


UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  PHILADELPHIA,     ) 
OFF  NEWBERN,  NORTH  CAROLINA,  March  19,  1862.  ) 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  detailed  report  of 
the  operations  of  the  battery  under  my  command  during  the  action  near 
this  place  on  the  14th  instant. 

In  obedience  to  your  order  of  the  13th,  I  took  command  of  the 
naval  battery  of  six  howitzers,  and  on  the  morning  of  that  day  landed 
with  the  advance  of  the  Army  at  Slocum's  Creek.  I  was  placed  in  the 
brigade  and  under  the  orders  of  General  Foster,  and  at  once  moved 
forward  to  join  him.  The  roads  were  very  heavy,  and  in  some  places 
almost  impassable,  and  had  it  not  been  for  the  assistance  which  was 
cheerfully  rendered  me  by  the  Army,  the  pieces  could  never  have  gone 


CAPTURE   OF   NEWBERN   AND   FORT   MACON.  401 

forward.  We  marched  steadily  forward  till  9  o'clock  at  night,  and  then 
halted  to  rest.  At  1  A.  M.  of  the  14th  we  again  moved  forward,  and 
at  3  A.  M.  reported  to  General  Burnside,  who  ordered  us  to  halt. 

At  daylight  we  resumed  our  march.  At  about  7  A.  M.  General  Burn- 
side  ordered  me  to  take  a  position  in  front  of  the  left  of  the  enemy's 
works.  I  moved  the  battery  forward  to  the  edge  of  the  cleared  space  and 
deployed  it  to  the  left  of  the  county  road,  opening  fire  at  once  with  shell 
and  shrapnel  at  a  distance  of  about  six  hundred  yards.  Opposed  to  us 
and  behind  the  breastworks  was  a  battery  of  eleven  field -pieces  (six  of 
which  paid  particular  attention  to  us)  and  a  number  of  riflemen,  who 
annoyed  us  excessively  whenever  the  smoke  would  lift  clear  of  our  guns. 
In  attempting  to  drive  these  latter  from  the  breastwork  I  advanced  the 
battery  some  distance,  firing  canister,  but  was  compelled  to  fall  back  to 
my  original  position,  after  having  one  gun  disabled,  an  officer  and  sev 
eral  men  wounded,  and  one  killed. 

For  an  hour  and  a  half  we  maintained  our  position  under  a  heavy 
fire  of  shell,  grape,  and  musketry,  when  a  gallant  charge  by  our  troops 
cleared  the  enemy  from  the  breastwork.  I  at  once  moved  forward  into 
the  work  with  three  of  my  pieces  and  all  my  remaining  ammunition. 
General  Foster  then  ordered  me  forward  with  a  portion  of  his  brigade. 
"When  we  had  arrived  within  two  hundred  yards  of  the  railroad  a  de 
tached  body  of  the  enemy  appeared  in  sight ;  the  guns  were  at  once 
prepared  for  action,  and  pointed  toward  a  cleared  spot  on  the  opposite 
side  of  the  railroad,  that  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  making  for.  As  they 
came  into  this  open  space  I  gave  the  order  to  fire,  but,  before  the  order 
could  be  executed,  Acting  Master  Hammond  rashly  dashed  forward  in 
front  of  the  guns  and  demanded  their  surrender.  This  demand  they 
complied  with,  by  throwing  down  their  arras  and  holding  up  their 
hands  in  token  of  submission.  The  prisoners  proved  to  be  Colonel 
Avery  and  a  portion  of  his  command,  the  Twenty-fifth  North  Carolina 
regiment ;  they  had  been  driven  from  the  rifle-pits  by  our  troops,  and 
were  endeavoring  to  make  their  escape.  From  this  point  I  was  ordered 
down  the  railroad  to  Newbern.  Obtaining  two  cars,  I  placed  my  guns 
upon  them,  and  reached  the  burning  bridge  to  find  our  Navy  in  posses 
sion  of  the  city,  and  the  gunboats  transporting  the  troops  across  the 
river. 

The  cheerfulness  with  which  the  brave  men  under  my  command 
dragged  their  guns  through  the  heavy  roads,  part  of  the  time  exposed 
to  a  drenching  rain,  and  the  gallant  manner  in  which  they  sustained 
the  heavy  fire  of  the  enemy,  is  worthy  of  all  praise.  I  would  especially 
call  your  attention  to  the  gallant  conduct  of  Orderly  Sergeant  J.  Men- 

26 


402  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

denhall,  company  B,  Union  Coast  Guard;  Seamen  James  Judge, 
George  H.  Mansell,  John  Williams,  Charles  Patterson,  and  Ordinary 
Seaman  Duncan  Douglass.  These  men,  with  the  exception  of  Menden- 
hall,  acted  as  captains  of  guns,  and,  from  their  intimate  acquaintance 
with  the  howitzers,  were  of  great  service.  The  conduct  of  my  officers 
was  all  that  I  could  wish.  Acting  Masters  Daniels  and  Hammond,  of 
the  Iletzel,  rendered  me  most  valuable  aid ;  one  gun  in  each  of  their 
sections  was  in  charge  of  E.  P.  Meeker,  of  the  flag-ship,  and  E.  C.  Ga- 
bandan,  of  the  Delaware.  To  their  coolness  and  courage  all  can  testify. 
The  gun  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Hughes,  of  company  B,  Union  Coast 
Guard,  suffered  severely,  and  was  finally  disabled.  During  a  portion  of 
the  engagement  he  loaded  the  gun  himself,  until  carried  away  wounded. 
Mr.  Daniels  made  an  attempt  to  carry  forward  two  of  the  captured 
pieces,  but,  after  dragging  •  them  some  distance,  they  stuck  fast  in  the 
mud.  Lieutenant  Tillotson,  of  the  Coast  Guard,  after  firing  away  all 
his  ammunition,  left  his  section,  and,  I  have  since  learned,  was  picked 
up  by  the  retreating  enemy. 

On  going  into  action  I  discovered  that  some  of  the  men  had  strag 
gled  off,  leaving  me  about  fifty  men  to  fight  the  guns.  Among  these,  I 
regret  to  report  the  following  casualties  : 

Killed. — Privates  Arthur  McGinnis  and  John  Sheeny,  company  B, 
Union  Coast  Guard. 

Wounded. — Second  Lieutenant  T.  W.  B.  Hughes,  Orderly  Sergeant 
J.  Mendenhall,  Sergeant  James  C.  Freeman,  Corporal  Thomas  Kiley, 
and  Privates  J.  McDougal,  S.  T.  Fonda,  and  Nicholas  Mertz  (yet  miss 
ing),  company  B,  Union  Coast  Guard ;  Seaman  John  Williams,  Ordi 
nary  Seamen  Jeremiah  Sullivan,  George  Bushee,  and  Thomas  Simmons. 
Total:  killed,  2;  wounded,  11. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

R.  SHELDON  McCooK,  Lieutenant,  U.  S.  Navy. 
Commander  S.  C.  KOWAN, 

Commanding  If.  S.  Naval  Forces  in  the  Sounds  of  N.  Carolina. 


The  next  step  of  the  Government,  in  repossessing  itself  of 
the  harbors  and  fortifications  of  the  Southern  coast,  was  the 
capture  of  Fort  Macon,  a  casemated  work  at  the  entrance  of 
Beaufort  Harbor.  This  work  had  mounted  about  fifty  guns, 
some  of  them  of  long  range  and  heavy  calibre.  In  the  reduc 
tion  of  this  fortification  the  Navy  bore  only  a  subordinate  part, 
as  the  strength  of  the  fort  rendered  it  necessary  to  prepare  for  a 


CAPTURE   OF   NEWBERN   AND   FORT   MACON.  4:03 

regular  bombardment  by  batteries  established  on  shore.  These 
batteries  were  planted  about  one  mile  from  the  fort,  and 
were  three  in  number,  one  mounting  three  30-pounder  Parrott 
rifles,  one  four  10-inch  mortars,  and  a  third  four  8-inch  mortars. 
These  works  were  by  no  means  completed  without  serious  an 
noyance  from  the  guns  of  the  fort,  but  they  were  so  far  masked 
as  to  render  uncertain  the  rebel  fire,  and  they  were  finished 
without  important  loss.  Fire  was  opened  from  these  batteries 
on  the  25th  of  April.  The  shore  attack  was  seconded  by  the 
steamers  Daylight,  Commander  Samuel  Lockwood;  the  State 
of  Georgia,  Commander  James  F.  Armstrong ;  the  gunboat 
Chippewa,  Lieutenant  Commanding  A.  Bryson ;  and  the  bark 
Gemsbok,  Lieutenant  Edward  Covendy. 

The  bark  w^as  of  course  obliged  to  anchor,  but  the  steamers 
kept  under  way  in  a  circle,  delivering  their  fire  in  passing  the 
fort  at  a  distance  of  about  one  mile  and  a  quarter.  The  sea 
was  so  rough  that  the  vessels  were  compelled  to  cease  firing 
after  having  been  in  action  only  about  an  hour.  The  Gemsbok, 
at  anchor,  had  some  of  her  rigging  cut  up,  and  the  Daylight 
was  struck  by  an  8-inch  solid  shot,  which  shattered  some  of  her 
timbers,  and  wounded  one  man  by  a  splinter.  These  were  the 
only  injuries  received  by  the  fleet,  and  yet  the  rebel  fire  was, 
under  the  circumstances,  quite  accurate,  shot  and  shell  falling 
all  around  and  near  the  vessels,  notwithstanding  all  but  the 
bark  were  continually  in  motion.  Toward  evening  a  flag  of 
truce  was  hoisted  on  the  ramparts  of  the  fort,  and  soon  after  it 
was  formally  surrendered  and  taken  possession  of  by  the  troops 
under  General  Burnside.  The  articles  of  capitulation  were 
signed  jointly  by  General  Burnside,  and  Commander  Samuel 
Lockwood,  the  senior  officer  of  the  naval  force  at  that  point. 
The  fall  of  Fort  Macon  nearly  completed  for  the  time  the  occu 
pation  of  the  sounds  and  coast  of  North  Carolina,  a  work  which 
was  begun  with  the  attack  upon  the  forts  of  Hatteras  Inlet  by 
Commodore  Stringham,  and  which  went  steadily  forward  with 
no  serious  reverse  until  the  capture  of  Fort  Macon.  Still,  after 
so  much  had  been  bravely  done,  the  naval  service  upon  these 
waters  was  one  of  continual  toil  and  peril  which  the  country 
will  never  properly  appreciate,  because  not  connected  with 
great  and  brilliant  battles.  The  statements  made  in  regard 


404:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   KAVY. 

to  the  service  upon  the  Potomac  and  adjacent  rivers  will 
apply  with  even  more  force  to  the  work  of  the  Navy  on  those  of 
the  coast  and  sounds  of  North  Carolina.  Both  banks  of  these 
streams  were  occupied  by  a  hostile  population,  and  in  many 
places  they  were  so  narrow  that  the  channel  was  within  rifle 
shot  from  either  shore,  so  that  our  vessels  were  exposed  to  every 
species  of  attack. 

At  every  suitable  point  earthworks  or  batteries  mounting 
heavy  guns  were  established,  field-batteries  were  transported 
from  point  to  point,  torpedoes  were  placed  in  the  narrow  chan 
nels,  and  ambuscades  for  riflemen  were  planted  in  the  jungle 
and  tall  grass  along  the  shore.  The  miasma  of  these  marshy 
shores  rendered  this  service  far  more  unhealthy  than  that  upon 
the  open  sea ;  and  although  the  work  of  fever  was  far  less  dead 
ly  both  for  our  soldiers  and  sailors  in  the  South  than  the  rebels 
hoped,  still  it  largely  increased  the  hazards  of  the  service  and 
the  percentage  of  deaths  beyond  what  these  would  have  been 
in  more  northern  localities. 

In  the  minor  expeditions  and  daily  skirmishes  there  was 
very  little  glory  to  be  obtained  even  by  the  officers,  and  none 
by  the  common  sailor,  and  there  were  few  prizes  to  compensate 
them  somewhat  for  unusual  effort,  such  as  were  won  by  the 
blockading  squadron,  and  there  was  only  devotion  to  the  cause 
to  keep  the  mind  and  body  to  the  proper  tone.  That  certainly 
was  not  a  very  inviting  service  in  which,  while  threading  the 
narrow  channels  and  crooked  rivers,  men  knew  that  at  any  mo 
ment  a  torpedo  might  blow  them  in  pieces,  or  send  them  to  the 
bottom,  or  a  concealed  battery  might  open  upon  them,  or  hid 
den  riflemen  sweep  the  deck.  Yet  these  were  the  daily  ex 
periences  of  our  seamen  on  our  rivers,  both  East  and  West. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 

DESTRUCTION    OF   THE    REBEL   FLEET   AT   ELIZABETH    CITY. 

AFTER  the  battle  at  Roanoke  Island,  the  rebel  fleet,  with  the 
exception  of  the  Curlew,  which  was  destroyed,  fled  up  the  sound 
and  took  refuge  in  the  Pasquotank  River,  whither  our  squadron 
immediately  prepared  to  pursue  them. 

On  the  9th  of  February  a  flotilla,  under  the  command  of 
Commander  S.  C.  Rowan,  and  composed  of  the  following  ves 
sels,  entered  Albemarle  Sound  in  search  of  the  rebel  fleet :  the 
Louisiana,  Lieutenant  Commanding  Murray;  Hetzel,  Lieu 
tenant  Commanding  Davenport;  Underwriter,  Lieutenant 
Commanding  Jeffers ;  Delaware  (flag-ship),  Lieutenant  Com 
manding  Quackenbush ;  Commodore  Perry,  Lieutenant  Com 
manding  Flusser  ;  Valley  City,  Lieutenant  Commanding  Chap 
lin  ;  Morse,  Acting  Master  French ;  Lockwood,  Acting  Master 
Graves ;  Ceres,  Acting  Master  McDiarmid ;  Shawsheen,  Acting 
Master  Woodward;  Brincker,  Acting  Master  Giddings;  and 
Putnam,  Acting  Master  Hotchkiss.  It  was  3  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon  when  this  fleet  of  rather  diminutive  men-of-war  entered 
the  sound,  and  soon  after  the  smoke  of  two  rebel  steamers  was 
descried.  They  were  apparently  heading  for  Pasquotank 
River.  Signal  was  made  to  chase,  and  an  attempt  made  to  cut 
them  off,  but  without  success ;  and  as  night  was  coming,  and 
the  channel  unknown,  the  chase  was  discontinued,  and  the  ves 
sels  steamed  on  slowly  over  the  bar,  and  then  up  the  river,  and 
about  8  o'clock  in  the  evening  it  was  deemed  prudent  to  anchor 
for  the  night,  ten  miles  distant  from  Fort  Cobb,  on  Cobb's  Point. 

Although  the  Union  fleet  outnumbered  that  of  the  rebels, 
and  although  officers  arid  men  felt  certain  of  success,  the  situa- 


406  HISTORY    OF    THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

tion  was  by  no  means  entirely  satisfactory.  It  was  ascertained 
that  batteries  were  established  at  certain  points  on  the  river,  but 
the  exact  strength  of  these  was  not  known.  The  rebel  vessels 
would  be  supported  of  course  by  these,  for  they  could  select  the 
point  of  attack  or  defence,  and  our  small,  light  steamers  were 
ill-fitted  to  withstand  heavy  artillery,  and  some  of  them  had 
been  seriously  injured  already  in  the  storms,  by  collisions  and 
strain  in  getting  over  the  bulkhead,  and  in  the  fight  at  Roa- 
noke  Island. 

There  was,  then,  a  prospect  of  a  contest  which  might  be 
very  serious  in  its  consequences  to  these  frail  vessels,  even 
though  a  victory  should  be  won.  Another  fact  in  their  case 
was  still  more  perplexing  to  the  officers.  Their  ammunition 
was  reduced  to  twenty  rounds  for  each  gun,  and  a  protracted 
conflict  was  therefore  out  of  the  question,  for  such  a  battle 
would  necessarily  end  in  the  capture  of  their  fleet. 

Under  these  circumstances,  Commanding  Officer  Rowan 
called  on  board  his  ship  the  officers  in  command,  and  having 
informed  them  of  the  nature  of  the  case,  conferred  with  them 
in  regard  to  measures  proper  to  be  adopted.  It  was  evident 
that  a  failure  would  cause  the  loss  of  nearly  or  quite  all  the 
advantages  already  gained,  and  postpone  for  an  indefinite  time 
the  control  of  the  sounds,  so  necessary  for  the  progress  of  the 
cause  of  the  Government.  It  was  expected  that  the  rebel  fleet 
would  take  position  behind  the  battery  at  Cobb's  Point,  and 
there  await  the  attack  of  the  Union  squadron,  with  many  and 
decided  advantages  on  the  side  of  the  rebel  commander. 

After  due  consideration  of  the  state  of  affairs,  it  was  deter 
mined  to  organize  the  force  in  close  order,  so  that  the  movement 
might  be  either  a  reconnoissance  in  force  or  a  serious  attack,  as 
events  should  indicate.  Each  commander  was  enjoined  most 
positively  not  to  fire  a  single  shot  without  direct  orders ;  and  in 
order  to  prevent  any  unnecessary  use  of  ammunition,  each  one 
was  directed  to  run  his  adversary  down,  if  possible,  and  engage 
him  hand  to  hand.  All  expected  that  the  fight  might  prove  a 
desperate  affray,  and  the  officers  returned  to  their  respective 
ships  feeling  the  difficulties  and  responsibilities  of  their  position, 
and  thus  prepared,  as  brave  men  ever  are  in  such  a  case,  to  do 
what  skill  and  courage  may  to  insure  success. 


DESTRUCTION   OF  THE   REBEL  FLEET    AT    ELIZABETH  CITY.    407 

On  the  10th  of  February,  at  daylight,  the  little  fleet  weighed 
anchor,  and  forming,  proceeded  in  the  prescribed  order,  the  Un 
derwriter,  Perry,  Morse,  and  Delaware  keeping  in  advance  as 
pickets,  the  little  Ceres  nearer  shore  on  the  right  flank ;  the  Lou 
isiana  and  the  Hetzel  led  up  the  remainder.  The  Yalley  City 
and  the  "Whitehead,  however,  were  ordered  to  leave  the  lines  as 
soon  as  the  battery  was  passed,  and  attack  it  in  reverse.  In  this 
manner  the  squadron  moved  slowly  and  together  up  the  river. 

At  half-past  8,  A.  M.,  the  rebel  steamers  were  discovered 
drawn  up  in  battle  order  behind  the  battery,  which,  mounting 
four  heavy  32-pounders,  was  quite  a  formidable  work  for  such 
slightly-built  steamers.  On  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  the 
schooner  Black  Warrior,  mounting  two  heavy  guns,  was  moored. 
Beyond  the  battery  and  schooner  lay  the  rebel  gunboats,  the 
whole  force  being  under  the  command  of  Commodore  Lynch 
in  person.  The  enemy's  line  was  drawn  diagonally  across  the 
river  in  front  of  the  town,  the  right  resting  on  the  battery,  the 
left  flank  protected  by  the  two  large  guns  of  the  Black  Warrior. 
So  soon  as  the  Union  fleet  came  wdthin  long  range,  fire  was 
opened  on  them  both  by  the  battery  and  the  schooner,  and  this 
was  immediately  followed  by  the  80-pounder  rifles  from  the 
rebel  steamers. 

To  this  fire  the  Union  vessels,  wisely  considering  the  state 
of  their  ammunition,  made  no  reply.  Shot  and  shell  passed 
over  the  foremost  vessels  and  fell  rapidly  in  the  midst  of  the 
main  columns,  but  they  all  pressed  steadily  but  silently  on,  not 
a  shot  being  fired  in  return.  When  within  short  range,  the 
signal  was  made,  u  Dash  at  the  enemy ! "  and  every  vessel 
was  instantly  put  at  full  speed.  The  whole  fleet  then  opened 
fire  and  swept  forward  as  rapidly  as  their  engines  could  drive 
them,  and  in  a  few  minutes  they  were  in  the  midst  of  the  foe, 
startled  and  demoralized  by  so  bold  and  unexpected  a  move 
ment,  A  panic  seized  the  rebels.  They  set  the  Black  Warrior 
on  fire,  and  deserted  their  battery  as  the  steamers  came  abreast 
of  it,  The  steamers  beyond  vainly  endeavored  to  save  them 
selves  ;  their  flagship,  the  Seabird,  was  run  down  and  sunk  by 
the  Perry,  Lieutenant  Commanding  Plusser,  and  her  officers 
and  crew  were  made  prisoners.  Some  of  the  rebel  boats 
were  boarded  and  captured  by  hand-to-hand  fighting  on  their 


4:08  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

decks  ;  some  were  deserted  and  set  on  fire,  the  crews  es 
caping  as  they  could  to  the  shore.  Thus,  in  an  action  of  not 
more  than  fifteen  minutes'  duration  after  our  steamers  opened 
fire  and  were  put  to  their  speed  for  the  "  dash,"  the  sound  fleet 
of  the  rebels  was  annihilated,  and  their  control  over  the  interior 
waters  of  North  Carolina  was  gone,  to  be  regained  no  more.  It 
was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  and  spirited  little  battles  of  the 
war,  when  quite  as  much  skill  and  "  dash  "  were  displayed  as  in 
some  of  the  bloodier  conflicts  that  are  more  widely  known. 

It  was  well  denominated  a  "  dash."  A  whole  fleet  of  steam 
ers  proceeding  deliberately  and  in  silence,  though  shot  and 
shell  were  plunging  and  hissing  around  them,  suddenly  sprang, 
as  it  were,  at  full  speed,  and  delivering  their  fire,  "  dashed " 
upon  the  foe,  shattering  them  with  a  close-range  fire,  crushing 
in  their  sides,  sinking  some,  and  boarding  and  capturing  such 
as  could  be  rescued  from  the  flames  which  the  rebels  themselves 
had  kindled. 

After  the  fight  was  over,  a  few  of  our  steamers  were  sent  up 
to  Elizabeth  City,  and  went  alongside  the  wharves.  At  their 
approach  a  battery  of  field  artillery  made  a  hasty  retreat  down 
the  street.  A  mounted  artillery  ofiicer  belonging  to  the  Wise 
Legion,  who,  by  the  orders  of  General  Ilenningsen,  was  com 
pelling  the  inhabitants  to  set  fire  to  their  house?,  was  arrested 
and  taken  on  board  the  flag-ship.  As  the  evident  intention  was 
to  charge  the  burning  upon  the  Union  forces,  Commodore 
Rowan  ordered  all  on  shore  to  return  to  the  ships,  and  suffered 
no  communication  for  a  time  between  the  ships  and  shore.  No 
houses  were  burned  except  those  set  on  fire  by  the  order  of  the 
rebel  commander.  A  supply  of  fresh  beef,  bread,  and  flour  was 
found  in  the  commissary  store-house,  and  these,  as  public  prop 
erty,  were  taken  for  the  fleet. 

Here,  on  a  small  scale  compared  with  that  at  many  other 
points,  was  exhibited  the  destruction  wTOught  by  war.  The 
steamer  Forrest,  which  had  been  disabled  in  the  fight  at  Roa- 
noke  Island,  one  gunboat,  and  one  lighter  vessel  on  the  stocks, 
were  burned  at  the  ship-yard.  Then  we  are  told  that  "  compe 
tent  engineers  "  were  sent  "  to  destroy  the  machinery,  boilers, 
and  railway ; "  then  three  days  were  "  devoted  to  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  machinery  of  the  Seabird  and  Fanny ; "  and  if  to 


DESTRUCTION  OF  THE   REBEL   FLEET  AT   ELIZABETH    CITY.    409 

this  is  added  the  ruin  of  the  fort  at  Cobb's  Point,  the  vessels 
burned  or  otherwise  destroyed  in  the  battle,  and  eight  cannon 
and  a  vessel  on  the  stocks  of  Edenton,  we  get  a  glimpse  of  what 
the  operations  of  war  are.  These  steamers  and  other  property 
thus  destroyed  were  produced  only  by  a  large  expenditure  of 
labor  and  money ;  and  what  hundreds  of  men  had  wearily  toiled 
to  create,  thus  vanished  in  a  day.  It  was  a  small  exhibition  of 
the  wholesale  ruin  which  the  contrivers  of  the  rebellion  brought 
upon  the  people  and  property  of  the  South. 

Another  step  in  cutting  off  the  communications  of  the  rebels 
was  to  obstruct  the  canals  loading  northwrard  from  the  sounds 
toward  the  Chesapeake.  Four  of  the  squadron  were  sent  for 
ward  by  which  this  work  was  performed  and  the  navigation  of 
the  canals  was  stopped.  By  these  various  operations,  one  of  the 
main  channels  of  intercourse  and  contraband  trade  between  the 
rebels  of  the  South  and  those  along  the  Chesapeake  and  their 
more  northern  friends  was  destroyed,  and  the  means  of  con 
tinuing  the  war  were  proportionately  diminished.  The  first 
pressure  which  the  rebellion  seriously  felt  was  thus  brought  to 
bear  upon  it  by  the  Navy.  From  the  moment  that  a  secure 
lodgment  was  made  upon  the  Southern  coast  at  Hilton  Head 
and  the  sounds  of  North  Carolina,  and  the  Navy  had  with  its 
river  gunboats  opened  a  way  for  the  advance  of  the  armies  into 
Tennessee,  the  rebellion  was  placed  between  two  forces  which 
were  certain  at  length  to  grind  it  to  powder.  From  that 
moment  it  was.  no  longer  a  question  whether  the  South  would 
succeed,  but  merely  how  much  longer  the  rebellion  could  be 
kept  alive. 

The  error  so  long  persisted  in  by  the  North  in  regard  to 
the  slave  system  protracted  the  struggle  far  beyond  the  natural 
limits  of  its  life ;  but  notwithstanding  this,  the  rebel  cause  was  a 
hopeless  one  from  the  moment  of  these  first  important  successes 
of  the  Navy.  Had  the  slaves  been  treated  from  the  first  accord 
ing  to  the  plainest  rules  of  morality,  or  even  of  war,  it  would 
have  saved  thousands  of  lives  and  millions  of  money ;  but  as  the 
natives  refused  to  do  justice,  there  was  no  alternative  but  to 
suffer  the  fitting  retribution.  "While  the  nation  was  slowly 
receiving  the  moral  education  which  would  enable  it  to  per 
ceive  the  design  of  God  in  the  war,  the  Navy  in  the  South,  and 


410  HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

the  Army  and  the  ]STavy  in  the  West,  were  preparing  for  the 
final  triumph. 

In  order  better  to  exhibit  the  share  which  each  vessel  bore 
in  this  gallant  action,  the  following  reports  of  commanding 
officers  are  added  to  the  general  statement.  Such  official  docu 
ments  serve  to  verify  the  narrative  of  the  historian,  and  are 
freely  used  in  the  preparation  of  the  work,  even  at  the  risk  of 
some  repetition,  because  thus  only  can  all  the  facts  be  pre 
sented. 


U.  S.  STEAMER  HKTZEL,  CROATAN  SOUND,  N.  C.,  February  14,  1862. 

SIR  :  In  accordance  with  your  request,  I  beg  leave  to  submit  the  fol 
lowing  report. 

Leaving  this  anchorage  on  Sunday,  the  9th  instant,  in  company  with 
the  rest  of  the  light  squadron,  we  stood  up  Albemarle  Sound,  and  tow 
ard  evening  saw  some  of  the  enemy's  steamers,  which  were  pursued 
into  the  Pasquotank  River,  where  we  anchored  about  three  miles  inside. 

At  a  little  before  1  o'clock  the  next  morning,  got  under  way  and 
stood  up  the  river,  presently  discovering  the  rebel  flotilla  awaiting  our 
approach  above  a  four-gun  battery  on  Cobb's  Point. 

The  position  in  the  column  assigned  to  the  Hetzel  was  such  that  it 
was  not  practicable,  in  this  narrow  stream,  to  fire  at  the  enemy's  steam 
ers  without  endangering  the  lives  of  our  companions ;  but  we  managed 
to  get  two  shots  at  the  battery  and  one  at  an  armed  schooner — the  mis 
siles  of  our  opponents  falling  thick  and  fast  around  us. 

At  9.10  A.  M.  answered  general  signal,  "Make  a  dash  at  the 
enemy ! "  In  fifteen  minutes  from  this  time  the  affair  was  finished, 
the  battery  deserted,  and  the  flotilla  burnt,  sunk,  captured,  or  put  to 
flight.  At  9.45  A.  M.  received  on  board,  for  surgical  assistance,  Acting 
Midshipman  William  C.  Jackson,  aged  eighteen,  mortally  wounded  while 
making  his  way  to  the  shore  from  the  captured  steamer  Ellis.  He  died 
at  10  p.  M.,  and  was  buried  on  shore  the  next  morning,  with  all  possible 
solemnities.  At  11.30  A.  M.  anchored  off  the  battery,  and  sent  Lieu 
tenant  Franklin  with  armed  boat's  crew  to  assist  in  its  destruction. 

In  conclusion,  I  would  respectfully  call  your  attention  to  the  cool 
ness  and  gallant  conduct  of  all  under  my  command,  who  vied  with  one 
another  in  the  steady  and  faithful  performance  of  their  duty. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

H.  K.  DAVENPORT,  Lieutenant  commanding. 

Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  U.  S.  JV.,  comamndiny  Fltoilla,  etc. 


DESTRUCTION   OF  THE   REBEL   FLEET   AT   ELIZABETH   CITY.    411 

U.  S.  STEAMER  UNDERWRITER,  OFF  ELIZABETH  CITY,  February  10,  1862. 

SIB  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report. 

This  morning  I  steamed  up  the  river  toward  Elizabeth  City  in  the 
position  assigned  me.  On  arriving  within  less  than  a  mile  of  the  rebel 
battery  and  ships,  when  the  general  signal  was  made  "  Make  a  dash  at 
the  enemy ! "  I  opened  fire,  and  went  ahead  full  speed.  On  nearing 
the  ships,  I  directed  the  pilot  to  [put]  this  vessel  alongside  the  Sea- 
bird  ;  but  on  closing  within  a  couple  of  hundred  yards,  I  observed  two 
steamers  turning  to  escape,  therefore  passed  on  in  pursuit.  One  of 
them  was  cut  off,  and,  endeavoring  to  pass  across  my  stern,  was  met  by 
another  vessel  and  captured.  The  other  ranged  ahead,  keeping  up  a 
lively  fire  of  musketry,  which  was  returned  with  the  12-pounder  rifle, 
but  did  not  succeed  in  disabling  her  machinery,  and  she  soon  disap 
peared  around  a  turn  in  the  river. 

Arriving  in  front  of  the  town,  a  battery  of  horse  artillery,  standing 
at  the  head  of  Main  Street,  moved  oft'.  I  went  alongside  the  wharf,  and 
remained  until  directed  to  drop  down  off  the  battery. 

The  occasion  ottered  no  opportunity  for  the  display  of  individual  gal 
lantry — all  merit  my  approbation.  I,  however,  mention  particularly  Mr. 
Walter  B.  Griffith,  master's  mate,  and  Mr.  John  Cahill,  second  assistant 
engineer  (acting  chief) ;  the  former,  as  in  the  actions  of  the  7th  and  8th, 
worked  his  rifled  gun  with  coolness  and  precision.  The  latter  was  of 
great  service  in  his  own  department,  and  also  assisted  at  the  after  gun. 

Ammunition  expended:   for  80-pounder  rifle,  nine  shells;   for  12- 
pounder  rifle,  eighteen  shells  and  one  stand  of  grape ;  for  8-inch  gun, 
four  shells;  for  12-pounder  howitzer,  one  shrapnel,  two  canister. 
Respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

WILLIAM  N.  JEFFERS,  Lieutenant  commanding. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  U.  S.  N. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  DELAWARE,  OFF  ELIZABETH  CITY,  February  11,  1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  to  you  the  following  report. 

On  the  9th  instant,  at  2.30  P.  M.,  the  United  States  naval  flotilla, 
consisting  of  fourteen  armed  steamers,  under  your  command,  weighed 
anchor  for  Elizabeth  City.  Late  in  the  afternoon  two  rebel  steamers 
were  discovered  standing  for  Elizabeth  City.  The  United  States  steamer 
Lockwood  with  this  vessel  immediately  gave  chase,  but  darkness  pre 
vented  our  overtaking  them.  At  8  p.  M.  the  flotilla  came  to  anchor, 
distant  about  fourteen  miles  from  Elizabeth  City. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th,  at  6  A.  M.,  signal  was  made  from  this 
ship  for  the  flotilla  to  get  under  way,  and  at  8  A.  M.,  when  standing 


412  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

on  our  course,  discovered  the  enemy's  gunboats,  consisting  of  seven 
steamers  and  one  armed  schooner  of  two  guns,  a  fine  battery  on  our  left 
of  four  guns,  and  one  gun  in  the  city  facing  us.  When  within  range, 
signal  was  made  in  accordance  to  the  orders  of  the  commanding  officer 
of  the  flotilla,  to  "make  a  dash  at  the  enemy,"  which  signal  was  again 
repeated  within  six  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy,  at  the  same  time  doing 
terrible  execution  with  our  guns,  and  filling  the  air  with  shot  and  shell. 

At  9.25  A.  M.,  precisely  nineteen  minutes  from  the  time  the  first  gun 
was  fired,  the  schooner  struck  her  colors,  and  was  found  to  be  on  fire. 
About  the  same  time  the  rebel  flag  on  the  battery  at  Cobb's  Point  was 
taken  down  and  waved  by  the  garrison;  whereupon  the  rebel  gunboats, 
with  two  exceptions,  ran  close  in  shore,  and  were  instantaneously  set  on 
fire  and  abandoned  by  their  crews,  some  of  whom  escaped  in  boats,  and 
others  jumping  overboard,  swam  and  waded  to  the  shore. 

I  now  gave  the  order  to  my  acting  aid,  Assistant  Paymaster  F.  E. 
Curtis,  to  have  the  cutter  manned,  and  bring  off  the  rebel  flag  for  Com 
mander  Rowan,  which  was  flying  on  board  the  rebel  steamer  Fanny. 
J.  H.  Raymond,  acting  master's  mate,  together  with  a  part  of  his 
division,  jumped  into  the  boat  with  F.  R.  Curtis,  and  boarded  the 
steamer  Fanny,  which  was  at  the  time  on  fire,  hauled  down  the  rebel 
flag,  and  then  proceeded  on  shore  to  the  battery,  being  the  first  to  land, 
when  the  stars  and  stripes  were  planted  by  Mr.  Raymond,  amidst  tre 
mendous  cheering  from  the  flotilla;  after  which,  in  obedience  to  a 
recall,  they  returned  on  board  this  vessel,  which  was  moored  to  the  wharf 
at  Elizabeth  City  at  9.45  A.  M.  ;  thus  ending  one  of  the  shortest  and 
most  brilliant  engagements  that  has  occurred  during  this  unfortunate 
civil  war. 

Too  much  praise  cannot  be  awarded  to  the  officers  and  men 
attached  to  this  vessel  for  their  gallant  conduct  during  the  action  of  the 
10th  instant.  Great  credit  is  due  to  our  pilot,  Nasa  S.  Williams,  for 
invaluable  services  rendered  during  the  engagement. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  P.  QUACKENBUSH,  Lieutenant  commanding. 
STEPHEN  C.  ROWAN,  commanding  U.  S.  Flotilla,  etc. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  COMMODORE  PERRY,  ROAXOKE  ISLAND,  February  28,  1862. 
SIR:  In  the  action  of  the  10th  instant,  at  Cobb's  Point  battery,  the 
battery,  schooner,  and  steamers  opened  fire  on  us  about  8  A.  M.  About 
8.15  we  commenced  to  return  it,  firing  at  the  battery  and  Seabird 
alone.  After  passing  the  battery,  we  fired  only  at  the  Seabird.  We 
ran  her  down,  and  took  her  officers  and  crew  prisoners.  In  the  col- 


DESTRUCTION    OF  THE   KEBEL   FLEET  AT    ELIZABETH  CITY.    413 

lision  the  ring-stopper  of  the  anchor  was  snapped,  and  the  anchor  went 
to  the  bottom,  which  accident,  together  with  the  delay  occasioned  by 
receiving  on  board  the  prisoners,  prevented  us  from  making  another 
capture.  While  engaged  in  receiving  the  prisoners,  ten  of  the  enemy's 
small  steamers  ran  around  very  close  to,  firing  at  us  with  musketry,  by 
which  two  of  my  men  were  killed  and  an  officer  wounded.  The  vessel 
was  not  struck  by  shot  or  shell.  We  fired  fifteen  shells,  the  greater 
number  at  the  battery. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

C.  W.  FLUSSER,  Lieutenant  commanding. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  commanding  U.  S.  Naval  Flotilla,  etc. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  VALLEY  CITY,  OFF  ELIZABETH  CITY,  N.  C.,  February  10,  1862. 

SIR  :  I  respectfully  beg  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the  pro 
ceedings  of  this  vessel  in  the  action  off  this  city  on  this  day. 

After  steaming  up  the  river  until  8  o'clock  yesterday  evening,  I 
came  to  anchor  with  the  other  flotilla  about  seventeen  miles  below 
Elizabeth  City. 

February  10. — At  6.30  A.  M.  got  under  way  in  obedience  to  sig 
nal,  and  stood  up  the  river  in  company  with  the  rest  of  the  flotilla. 
When  nearing  the  approaches  of  the  city,  received  the  fire  of  the  rebel 
battery  on  shore.  I  immediately  manned  my  port  battery,  and  kept  up  a 
brisk  return  of  the  fire.  A  steamer  and  schooner,  bearing  the  rebel  flag, 
opened  fire  on  our  starboard  bow ;  returned  their  fire  with  my  starboard 
battery.  A  shell  from  the  enemy,  passing  through  both  my  boats,  ren 
dered  them  entirely  unfit  for  service. 

Upon  signal  "  Make  a  dash  at  the  enemy,"  increased  the  speed,  and 
fired  several  brisk  broadsides  at  the  enemy's  battery.  A  shell  from  the 
shore  penetrated  the  side  and  passed  through  the  magazine,  exploding  out 
side  the  screen  on  the  berth-deck.  Several  of  the  powder  divisions  were 
severely  scorched,  the  protecting  bulkheads  were  torn  to  pieces,  and  the 
forward  part  of  the  berth-deck  set  on  fire  by  the  explosion.  Ordered  the 
pumps  to  be  manned,  and  speedily  got  the  fire  subdued.  In  forty  min 
utes  from  the  commencement  of  the  action,  came  to  anchor  within  the 
precincts  of  Elizabeth  City. 

I  take  pleasure  in  again  bearing  testimony  to  the  gallant  conduct  of  the 
officers  and  crew  of  this  vessel,  and  particularly  I  desire  to  bring  under 
your  notice  the  cool  intrepidity  and  thorough  practical  seamanship  dis 
played  by  master's  mate  J.  A.  J.  Brooks,  in  manoeuvring  this  vessel  while 
under  the  hottest  of  the  enemy's  fire ;  also  to  the  undaunted  presence 
of  mind  of  the  gunner's  mate,  John  Davis,  who,  while  at  his  station  in 


414:  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

the  magazine,  when  the  shell  penetrated  the  side  and  ignited  the  berth- 
deck,  as  above  reported,  did  cover  a  barrel  of  powder  with  his  own  per 
son,  thereby  preventing  an  explosion,  while  at  the  same  time  passing 
powder,  providing  for  the  gun  divisions  on  the  upper  deck. 

I  beg  to  enclose  the  surgeon's  report  of  the  casualties  during  the 
day.  I  am,  very  respectfully,  etc., 

J.  C.  CHAPLIN,  Lieutenant  commanding. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  commanding  Naval  Flotilla,  etc. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  MORSE,  OFF  ELIZABETH  CITY,  N.  C.,  February  15,  1862. 
SIR:  In  obedience  to  your  order  of  the  llth  instant,  I  submit  the 
following  report  of  the  operations  of  this  vessel  during  the  engagement 
of  the  10th  instant. 

At  1  A.  M.,  in  obedience  to  signals,  we  got  under  way.  Opened  fire 
on  the  enemy  with  shells,  at  a  distance  of  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile, 
maintaining  a  steady  fire  until  the  termination  of  the  engagement ;  after 
which  a  few  fragments  of  a  shrapnel  were  found  on  deck,  which,  with  a 
shot  through  the  ensign,  were  the  only  ones  received,  neither  killing 
nor  wounding  any  person  on  board. 

The  officers  and  men  behaved  throughout  with  the  utmost  bravery 
and  coolness.     In  all,  thirteen  shell  and  one  shrapnel  were  expended. 
I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  etc., 

PETER  HAYS,  Acting  Master  commanding. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  commanding  Naval  Flotilla,  etc. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  LOCKWOOD,  ELIZABETH  CITY,  K  C.,  February  12,  1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  forward  the  following  report  of  the  action 
at  Elizabeth  City  on  the  10th  instant. 

At  9  A.  M.  engaged  the  enemy,  directing  my  fire  upon  their  armed 
schooner  until  her  crew  deserted  her,  when  I  hauled  across  the  river 
toward  the  Fanny,  firing  shrapnel  and  volleys  of  musketry.  The  enemy 
took  to  their  boats  (after  setting  fire  to  their  vessel),  and  retreated 
under  a  heavy  fire.  I  boarded  as  soon  as  possible  with  my  boats,  but 
found  the  fire  too  much  spread  to  subdue;  succeeded  in  capturing 
twenty  stand  of  arms.  Received  a  shot  through  our  smoke-stack,  and 
had  our  boat's  davits  unshipped  by  a  spent  shot ;  no  one  injured.  The 
officers  and  men  behaved  nobly.  Expended  eight  rounds  of  80-pounder 
ammunition ;  four  rounds  of  howitzer  ditto ;  fifty  rounds  of  buck  and 
ball  ditto.  Very  respectfully,  etc., 

G.  W.  GRAVES,  Acting  Master  commanding. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  commanding  Naval  Division. 


DESTRUCTION   OF   THE   REBEL   FLEET  AT  ELIZABETH   CITY.    415 

TJ.  S.  STEAMER  WHITEHEAD,  OFF  ELIZABETH  CITY,  N.  C.,  February  10, 1862. 
SIR  :  I  engaged  the  enemy  this  morning  at  8.20 ;  discovered  a  rebel 
schooner  abandoned  and  fired,  mounting  two  thirty-twos.     Not  bemo* 
able  to  extinguish  the  fire,  I  scuttled  her.     I  took  from  her  six  muskets ; 
twelve  boarding-pikes  ;  books  and  papers  of  the  rebel  paymaster. 

I  expended  during  the  action  six  shells.  My  officers  and  men 
behaved  nobly  during  the  fight. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

CHARLES  A.  FRENCH,  Acting  Master  commanding. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  commanding  Naval  Flotilla,  etc. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  SHAWSHEEN,  OFF  ELIZABETH  CITY,  N.  C.,  February  11,  1862. 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  your  order,  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  fol 
lowing  report  of  the  part  taken  by  this  steamer,  under  my  command,  at 
the  attack  on  Cobb's  Point  battery ;  also  on  a  fleet  of  rebel  gunboats 
and  one  armed  schooner,  stationed  near  by  to  support  said  battery. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th  instant,  thirteen  of  our  gunboats  were 
at  anchor  at  the  mouth  of  the  Pasquotank  River,  having  anchored  there 
the  preceding  night.  At  6.30  A.  M.  a  sail  was  discovered  crossing  the 
mouth  of  the  river,  outside  of  the  fleet,  when  some  of  the  gunboats 
gave  chase.  I  also  got  under  way  and  stood  out  in  pursuit,  and,  seeing 
her  running  for  the  land,  I  fired  a  shot  across  her  bows,  which  brought  her 
to,  when  the  Seymour,  being  in  advance  of  the  other  boats,  took  her  in 
tow.  She  proved  to  be  a  schooner  loaded  with  wood.  I  immediately 
stood  up  the  river  after  the  fleet,  which  had  got  under  way,  and  was  pro 
ceeding  slowly  up  the  river  toward  Elizabeth  City.  I  soon  overtook 
them.  At  7.30  A.  M.  some  rebel  steamers  were  discovered  ahead,  appar 
ently  on  the  retreat.  At  8  A.  M.  came  in  sight  of  the  battery,  and  saw 
the  steamers  form  in  order  across  the  river  opposite.  Our  steamers 
advanced  at  a  medium  rate,  when,  being  within  about  two  miles  of  the 
battery,  the  steamers  and  armed  schooners  opened  fire  upon  our  fleet. 
At  8.30  A.  M.  the  battery  commenced  firing,  their  shot  reaching  our 
steamers,  but  doing  no  injury,  when  our  fleet  ran  up  within  good  range. 
Signals  were  made  by  Commander  Rowan  on  his  flag-ship,  the  Delaware, 
to  make  a  dash  at  the  enemy,  and  fire  at  them  at  our  discretion,  when 
all  the  steamers  went  ahead  at  full  speed,  and  opened  on  the  enemy  a 
well-directed  fire,  which  fire  was  repeated  in  quick  succession  as  we 
advanced.  Their  shot  and  shell  fell  rapidly  among  us,  some  of  which 
took  effect,  but  still  we  advanced  on  the  enemy,  which,  with  our  fire, 
threw  them  into  confusion,  although  they  endeavored  to  make  an  able 
resistance ;  but  when  they  discovered  our  intention  to  board,  their  men 


4:16  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

left  their  guns,  their  steamers  were  headed  toward  the  shore,  and  some 
of  them  set  on  fire — the  flag  on  the  fort's  battery  was  hauled  down  and 
deserted — when  our  leading  steamers  made  a  most  gallant  manoeuvre 
and  ran  them  aboard,  sinking  two,  capturing  one,  and  the  schooner  was 
set  on  fire  and  deserted.  I  was  running  for  the  steamer  Fanny,  and 
being  so  near  that  all  hands  were  ready  to  board  and  run,  using  muskets 
and  small-arms  at  the  retreating  rebels,  who  waved  a  flag  in  defiance  at 
us.  As  we  were  about  to  board  her,  discovered  her  to  be  on  fire,  and 
was  ordered  to  back  off  from  her  by  Commander  Rowan,  which  I  did, 
and  followed  other  steamers  in  pursuit  of  one  of  the  rebel  steamers, 
which  was  making  her  escape  by  way  of  the  canal.  After  chasing  her 
some  way  up  the  canal,  the  chase  was  given  up.  Some  of  our  steamers 
went  up  to  the  wharf,  including  the  flag-ship  Delaware.  One  new  gun 
boat  building  and  one  old  gunboat  repairing  were  set  on  fire,  and  the 
city  fired  in  several  places.  After  remaining  some  time  up  at  the  city, 
I  was  ordered  to  anchor  down  near  the  battery  on  Cobb's  Point,  which 
I  did,  as  did  all  the  fleet  soon  afterward ;  having  expended  ten  rounds 
of  ammunition,  for  forward  rifled  gun,  and  fifty  charges  small-arm  am 
munition,  and  receiving  no  injury  throughout  the  engagement.  Permit 
me  to  add  that  all  under  my  command,  both  officers  and  crew,  worked 
with  a  determined  will  worthy  of  themselves  and  the  noble  cause  in 
which  they  are  engaged. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

THOMAS  J.  WOODWARD,  Acting  Master  commanding. 
S.  C.  ROWAN,  commanding  Albemarle  Flotilla. 


U.  S.  STEAMER  HENRY  BRINKER,  OFF  ROANOKE  ISLAND,  March  1,  1862. 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  part  taken  by  the  vessel  under 
my  command  in  the  engagement  at  Elizabeth  City,  on  the  10th  instant. 

At  8  A.  M.  (the  enemy's  gunboats  being  in  sight)  was  in  the  position 
assigned  me  by  my  commander,  in  the  rear  of  the  first  division. 

Owing  to  my  position,  I  was  unable  to  fire  with  either  safety  to  our 
own  vessels  or  eflect  on  the  enemy,  until  nearly  opposite  the  battery  on 
Cobb's  Point,  when  we  fired  three  shots  at  the  schooner  and  battery  on  the 
northern  shore  of  the  river.  The  schooner,  ceasing  to  fire,  approached 
the  battery.  Had  fired  but  four  shots  when  the  order  to  "make  a  dash 
at  the  enemy "  was  given  by  the  flag-ship  Delaware.  Closed  in,  but 
had  no  opportunity  to  engage,  the  enemy  being  completely  routed  by 
the  vessels  in  advance.  Came  to  anchor  near  the  bar,  above  Cobb's 
Point,  and  awaited  orders.  Ammunition  expended,  seven  rounds; 


DESTRUCTION    OF   THE   EEBEL    FLEET  AT   ELIZABETH   CITY.    417 

casualties,  none.     The  vessel  was  not  struck  by  the  enemy's  shot.     My 
officers  and  crew  behav7ed  with  their  usual  gallantry. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

JOHN  E.  GIDDINGS,  Acting  Master  commanding. 
Commander  S.  C.  ROWAN,  commanding  Naval  Forces,  Albemarle  Sound. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  GENERAL  PUTNAM,  ) 
OFF  ELIZABETH  CITY,  February  11, 1862.     J 

SIR  :  As  I  have  the  honor  to  report  to  you  the  proceedings  of  yes 
terday,  I  regret  to  say  that,  owing  to  the  bad  condition  of  our  boiler, 
and  consequently  the  slowness  of  my  boat,  I  did  not  arrive  in  time  to 
take  a  part  in  the  action,  but  rendered  assistance  in  getting  the  Ceres 
and  her  prize  afloat,  they  both  being  ashore;  then  steamed  up  to  the 
city,  and  received  orders  to  anchor  below.  Sent  a  boat  to  put  out  the 
fire  of  the  armed  schooner,  but  the  fire  was  too  far  advanced  to  be  sub 
dued.  Seeing  a  flag  of  truce  on  shore,  I  sent  a  boat  and  brought  off  a 
man,  who  was  one  of  the  crew  of  the  schooner  which  was  burnt.  He 
claims  to  be  a  pilot  through  all  the  waters  of  North  Carolina. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

WILLIAM  J.  HOTCHKISS,  Acting  Master  commanding. 
Lieutenant  DAVENPORT,  commanding  Third  Division. 

ORDER. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  DELAWARE,         » 
OFF  ELIZABETH  CITY,  February  11, 1862.  f 

The  commander  of  the  flotilla  in  Albemarle  Sound  avails  himself  of 
the  earliest  moment  to  make  a  public  acknowledgment  of  the  coolness, 
gallantry,  and  skill  displayed  by  the  officers  and  men  under  his  com 
mand  in  the  capture  and  destruction  of  the  enemy's  battery  and  squad 
ron  at  Cobb's  Point.  The  strict  observance  of  the  plan  of  attack,  and 
the  steady  but  onward  course  of  the  ships,  without  returning  a  shot 
until  within  three-quarters  of  a  mile  of  the  fort,  excited  the  admiration 
of  our  enemies. 

The  undersigned  is  particularly  gratified  at  the  evidence  of  the  high 
discipline  of  the  crews  in  refraining  from  trespassing  in  the  slightest 
degree  upon  the  private  property  of  defenceless  people  in  a  defenceless 
town.  The  generous  offer  to  go  on  shore  and  extinguish  the  flames 
applied  by  the  torch  of  a  vandal  soldiery  to  the  houses  of  their  own  de 
fenceless  women  and  children  is  a  striking  evidence  of  the  justness  of 
our  cause,  and  must  have  its  effect  in  teaching  our  deluded  countrymen 
a  lesson  in  humanity  and  civilization.  S.  C.  ROWAN, 

commanding  Flotilla,  Albemarle  Sound. 
27 


CHAPTER  XXV. 

EXPEDITIONS    TO    HAMILTON,    WASHINGTON,    AND   FRANKLIN. 

SEVERAL  of  the  rivers  that  empty  into  the  Southern  sounds 
are  navigable  for  some  distance  from  the  mouth,  and  at  or  near 
the  head  of  steamboat  navigation  are  small  towns  which  the 
rebels  had  fortified,  not  alone  to  secure  their  trade  from  in 
terruption,  but  with  the  intention  of  accumulating  at  these 
points  military  stores,  and  of  constructing  war-vessels  where 
they  would  be  safe  from  attack.  All  such  locations  it  was 
necessary  to  examine.  One  of  these  was  Hamilton,  on  the  Roa- 
noke,  and  against  this  a  small  expedition  was  sent  on  the  9th 
of  July,  1862. 

It  consisted  of  the  Commodore  Perry,  Lieutenant  C.  "W. 
Flusser ;  the  Ceres,  Lieutenant  John  McDiarmid ;  and  the  Shaw- 
sheen,  Acting  Master  Thomas  J.  Woodward.  These  steamers 
had  on  board  forty  soldiers,  in  addition  to  their  crews.  The 
river  has  in  various  places  high  banks  and  bluffs,  where  rifle 
men  could  be  concealed,  and  where  batteries  could  be  estab 
lished,  or  field  artillery  placed  in  ambush,  and  where  they 
would  be  comparatively  safe  from  the  fire  of  the  gunboats. 

At  12  o'clock  the  steamers  reached  a  barricade,  which,  how 
ever,  was  passed  without  difficulty.  At  1  p.  M.,  while  passing 
some  high  bluffs,  they  were  suddenly  attacked  by  concealed 
riflemen ;  and  although  this  fire  was  promptly  returned  both 
with  muskets  and  cannon,  it  was  impossible  to  do  the  rebels 
much  damage,  sheltered  as  they  were  on  the  bluffs.  For  two 
hours  these  steamers,  compelled  to  run  slowly,  were  held  under 
the  fire  of  these  sharpshooters  that  were  stretched  along  the 
bank  in  small  companies,  the  officers  pushing  on  toward 


ETC.  419 

Hamilton  in  obedience  to  orders,  their  men  struck  down 
around  them  by  an  invisible  foe,  upon  whom  an  almost  random 
fire  produced  of  course  but  little  effect.  Such  battles,  when 
steamers  with  their  crews  and  troops  were  exposed  at  short 
range  to  ambushed  riflemen,  were  among  the  most  dangerous 
and  trying  of  the  service.  Brave  men  are  expected  to  stand 
without  flinching  against  a  visible  foe,  but  it  requires  unusual 
courage  and  the  highest  order  of  discipline  to  fight  with  cool 
ness  an  unseen  enemy,  while  conscious  of  being  constantly  ex 
posed  to  him,  and  within  range  of  his  weapon.  Of  the  little 
band  on  these  boats  ten  were  wounded  and  one  killed.  Some 
of  the  wounded  died  after  the  fight. 

Below  Hamilton  a  deserted  battery  was  found,  and  in  many 
other  instances  the  rebels  deserted  the  less  important  batteries 
after  the  capture  of  the  forts  at  Hatteras  Inlet  and  Roanoke 
Island.  The  rebel  steamer  Wilson  was  captured  at  Hamilton. 
The  little  fleet  returned,  shelling  the  banks  as  it  proceeded,  but 
without  being  fired  upon  again. 

In  the  latter  part  of  October  a  second  expedition  against 
Hamilton  was  planned  by  the  Army  then  under  General  Fos 
ter,  wrho  requested  the  cooperation  of  the  Navy.  On  the  30th 
of  October  the  United  States  steamers  Commodore  Perry, 
Hunchback,  Yalley  City,  and  the  Army  gunboat  Yidette  were 
at  anchor  off  Plymouth,  while  the  Shawsheen  was  on  picket- 
duty  about  six  miles  up  the  river.  It  was  ascertained  that  a 
body  of  about  three  thousand  rebels  were  posted  some  two 
miles  from  the  town.  It  was  agreed  between  the  commanders 
of  these  vessels  and  Captain  Hammill  who  commanded  the 
post  that  an  attempt  should  be  made  to  shell  them  out  of  their 
position. 

The  next  day  the  plan  was  carried  out,  and  it  afforded  one 
of  the  thousand  examples  of  the  efficacy  of  the  shell-gun.  The 
town  lay  between  the  steamers  and  the  rebel  camp,  and  solid 
shot  would  have  effected  little,  even  if  they  could  have  been 
safely  used.  But  the  shell  was  a  very  different  weapon.  At 
mid-day  the  five  gunboats  opened  fire  simultaneously,  and  the 
shells,  arching  over  the  town  harmlessly,  burst  two  miles  away 
in  the  woods  wiiere  the  rebel  army  was  posted.  Such  oper 
ations  have  become  familiar  things  in  modern  war;  so  that 


420  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

we  do  not  pause  to  think  what  an  exhibition  of  skill  and  sci 
ence  it  is  for  a  fleet  to  lie  abreast  of  a  town,  and  with  its  guns 
seemingly  trained  directly  on  its  streets,  shake  the  whole  city 
with  the  thunder  of  its  broadsides,  and  yet  send  every  missile 
curving  over  the  heads  of  the  population,  to  deal  out  death  only 
to  those  who  were  miles  away.  The  result  of  the  shelling  was 
that  the  rebel  encampment  was  broken  up,  and  they  were 
driven  from  their  position. 

On  the  2d  of  November  dispatches  were  received  from 
General  Foster  requesting  an  interview  at  Williamston,  and  to 
that  point  the  little  squadron  repaired,  and  there  met  General 
Foster  and  the  troops  intended  for  the  expedition  against  Wash 
ington.  General  Foster  had  met  a  body  of  rebels  five  miles 
below,  who  endeavored  in  vain  to  oppose  his  advance. 

It  was  agreed  that  they  should  begin  their  joint  advance 
upon  Hamilton  that  night.  At  7  P.  M.  the  fleet  was  got  under 
way,  the  Yalley  City  leading,  and  followed  by  the  Perry, 
Hetzel,  and  Hunchback,  one  gunboat  having  been  sent  to  Ply 
mouth  during  the  afternoon  with  sick  and  wounded  soldiers. 
At  1  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  4th  the  squadron  reached 
one  of  those  barricades  which  were  thrown  across  nearly  every 
navigable  channel  of  the  South,  and  which  the  rebels  thought 
would  effectually  stop  the  progress  of  our  vessels.  This  ob 
struction  was  at  a  point  called  Rainbow  Bluffs,  and  eight 
miles  from  Hamilton.  Here  the  fleet  anchored  for  the  night, 
with  the  double  purpose  of  -avoiding  the  danger  of  passing  the 
barricades  in  the  darkness,  and  of  waiting  for  the  signal  from 
the  advance  of  the  Army.  At  11  A.  M.,  not  having  then  heard 
any  thing  from  the  Army,  the  gunboats  again  proceeded  up 
the  river.  The  main  objects  of  this  expedition  were  to  destroy 
any  works  that  might  be  found  on  the  river,  and  to  ascertain 
whether  any  iron-clads  or  other  vessels  were  being  constructed 
at  any  points.  Some  earthworks  were  found  at  Rainbow 
Bluffs,  whicli  the  troops  took  possession  of  in  their  march,  and 
which  the  crews  of  the  gunboats  destroyed.  The  Army  en 
deavored  to  reach  Tarborough,  but  failing  in  this  object,  turned 
back,  and  the  gunboats  returned  to  Plymouth,  taking  with 
them  about  three  hundred  sick  and  disabled  soldiers.  This 
service,  so  often  performed  by  the  JS"avy  where  unarmed  trans- 


EXPEDITIONS    TO    HAMILTON,   WASHINGTON,    ETC.  421 

ports  could  not  pass,  was  of  immense  importance  to  the  Army, 
facilitating  its  operations,  and  saving  many  lives  that  must  have 
been  lost  by  the  common  method  of  army  transportation. 

In  fact,  no  operation  of  an  army  was  possible  either  in  the 
South  or  the  West  without  the  constant  assistance  of  the  Navy. 
Every  expedition  needed  not  only  transports  but  the  protection 
of  armed  vessels ;  and  then  the  defences  of  the  lines  of  approach 
were  such  that,  as  in  the  cases  already  mentioned,  it  was  neces 
sary  that  they  should  be  reduced  by  the  heavy  guns  of  the 
Navy.  Moreover,  without  the  presence  of  our  fleets  to  hold  in 
check,  capture,  or  destroy  the  steamers  of  the  rebels,  they  could 
have  recaptured  the  forts  on  the  sounds  and  rivers  in  the  same 
manner  that  our  own  gunboats  had  done.  Not  a  single  point 
on  the  Southern  coast  could  have  been  wrested  from  the  rebels 
except  by  the  assistance  of  the  Navy,  nor,  on  the  other  hand, 
could  they  have  been  retained  without  the  cooperation  of 
troops. 

This  cooperating  work  of  our  ships  at  all  points  where  the 
Army  was  present,  forming  everywhere  a  firm  support,  was 
really  more  important  in  the  conduct  of  the  war  than  the  great 
battles ;  and  yet  this  continuous,  perilous,  and  exhausting  labor 
of  the  officers  and  sailors  is  precisely  that  of  which  the  country 
has  heard  the  least. 

In  the  latter  part  of  September,  1862,  a  joint  expedition  of 
the  Army  and  Navy  was  prepared  against  Franklin,  a  small 
town  on  the  Blackwater  River.  The  Army  at  this  time  was 
under  the  command  of  Major-General  Dix.  Between  him  and 
the  officers  commanding  the  gunboats  it  was  agreed  that  the 
attack  should  be  made  on  the  3d  of  October. 

At  5.45  on  that  day  the  steamers  Commodore  Perry, 
Hunchback,  and  Whitehead,  which  during  the  night  had  been 
lying  at  anchor  three  miles  below  Franklin,  got  under  way, 
and  proceeded  up  the  river.  The  river  is  so  narrow  and  so 
crooked  in  places,  that  even  these  small  steamers  could  not 
safely  turn  round  the  bends  without  the  aid  of  hawsers ;  and 
the  woods  and  bluffs  were  well  adapted  to  conceal  an  ambushed 
foe,  and  shelter  them  from  shot.  At  7  o'clock  the  Perry,  being 
ahead,  came  to  one  of  these  short  bends  in  the  stream,  and, 
while  engaged  in  running  out  a  line  to  enable  her  to  turn,  a 


422  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

heavy  fire  was  opened  upon  her  from  the  bluff  above  by  a  body 
of  concealed  riflemen.  The  guns  of  the  steamer  could  not  be 
brought  to  bear,  on  account  of  the  height  of  the  banks,  and  the 
only  method  of  escape  seemed  to  be  to  steam  rapidly  past. 
This  was  attempted,  but  in  turning,  the  gunboat  ran  ashore. 
At  this  moment  a  daring  color-bearer  dashed  out  from  the  rebel 
cover,  trying  to  urge  on  his  comrades  to  board  the  steamer,  but 
was  almost  instantly  shot  down,  and  the  attempt  was  defeated. 
In  a  few  minutes  the  gunboat  was  once  more  afloat  and  passing 
ahead  until  her  guns  would  bear.  She  opened  a  fire  with 
grape  and  shell,  canister  and  shrapnel,  her  decks  in  the  mean 
time  being  constantly  swept  by  rifle-balls  with  deadly  effect. 
Her  fire,  however,  served  to  cover  the  Hunchback  as  she 
rounded  the  bend,  and  she  in  turn  protected  the  Whitehead  in 
similar  manner. 

The  steamers  all  succeeded  in  getting  round  the  bend,  but 
only  to  find  themselves  still  under  a  most  destructive  fire  from 
the  rifles  of  the  concealed  enemy ;  while  a  barricade,  which, 
under  such  circumstances,  could  not  be  removed,  prevented  their 
further  progress  up  the  river.  In  the  mean  tune,  another  body 
of  the  enemy  had  collected  below,  and  were  working  in  all 
haste  to  fell  trees  across  the  river  in  the  rear  of  the  gunboats, 
to  prevent  their  return,  evidently  expecting  to  enclose  them 
between  the  two  barricades  and  capture  them  all.  The  situa 
tion  was  indeed  a  critical  one,  for  it  was  very  difficult  to  work 
the  guns  under  the  fire  of  the  riflemen  without  an  unwarrant 
able  loss  of  life ;  and  should  their  return  be  cut  off  by  the  fallen 
timber,  there  seemed  no  way  of  escape.  Expecting,  however, 
to  hear  the  guns  of  the  land  forces,  they  fought  on. 

The  leading  steamer,  the  Perry,  threw  9-inch  shells  toward 
Franklin ;  with  the  forward  32-pounder  she  poured  grape  and 
canister  into  the  woods  on  her  left ;  with  the  after  32-pounder 
and  field-gun  she  fought  the  rebels  on  the  right ;  and  with  the 
after  9-inch  gun  she  shelled  the  bluff  from  whence  the  heaviest 
fire  proceeded.  Thus  gallantly  the  little  gunboat  met  her  ene 
mies  on  all  sides,  her  men  exposed  every  moment  to  a  deadly 
fire  from  the  riflemen  concealed  in  every  direction  round  her. 

At  a  quarter  past  10  o'clock  the  steamers  started  down  the 
river,  but  were  all  swept  with  volleys  of  rifle-balls  again  from 


WASHINGTON,    ETC.  423 

the  bluff  as  they  passed,  and  for  more  than  two  hours  longer 
they  were  fired  upon  from  every  point  from  which  a  shot  would 
reach.  The  men  were  kept  under  shelter  as  far  as  possible,  or 
the  loss  would  have  been  much  greater,  large  as  it  actually  was, 
for  the  crews  of  three  small  steamers.  Under  a  full  head  of 
steam  they  forced  their  way  through  the  fallen  timber,  and  thus 
passed  out  of  fire.  In  this  action  the  Perry  was  commanded  by 
Lieutenant  C.  W.  Flusser.  In  order  to  show  more  fully  its  se 
verity,  and  illustrate  the  nature  of  this  river  service,  the  follow 
ing  official  reports  are  subjoined : 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  COMMODORE  PEKRY,  October  3, 1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  following  is  a  correct 
report  of  the  killed  and  wounded  on  board  the  "United  States  steamer 
Commodore  Perry,  while  engaged  with  the  enemy  on  the  Blackwater 
River,  near  Franklin,  Virginia,  on  the  3d  day  of  October,  1862. 

Killed. — John  Lynch,  master's  mate,  rifle-ball  through  the  heart; 
Justin  Baker,  quartermaster,  rifle-ball  through  the  head. 

Wounded. — John  W.  Johnson,  landsman,  arm  shattered  by  rifle- 
ball  ;  George  Nicholas,  able  seaman,  rifle-ball  through  the  head ;  James 
Brown,  captain's  steward,  rifle-ball  through  the  hand ;  John  Dowling, 
able  seaman,  rifle-ball  wound  through  the  posterior ;  William  Cornell, 
able  seaman,  rifle-ball  in  the  neck ;  James  McManis,  fireman,  bayonet- 
wound  in  the  leg ;  Isaac  Fisher,  private,  Ninth  New  Jersey  regiment, 
rifle-ball  through  the  body ;  Peter  Gilghassen,  private,  Ninth  New  Jer 
sey,  rifle-ball  through  the  thigh ;  John  E.  French,  private  Ninth  New 
Jersey  regiment,  rifle-ball,  slight  wound  in  the  forehead ;  William  Buck- 
lin,  private,  Fourth  Rhode  Island  regiment,  rifle-ball,  slight,  in  the  neck. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEOEGE  W.  GALE,  Acting  Assistant  Surgeon  U.  S  Navy. 
C.  W.  FLUSSER,  Lieutenant  commander. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  COMMODORE  PERRY,  October  16, 1862. 
SIR  :  We  expended,  as  near  as  I  can  determine,  in  the  fight  of  the 
3d:  9-inch  shells,  102;  6-inch  shells,  54;  stand  of  grape  for  9-inch 
gun,  16  ;  stand  of  grape  for  6-inch  gun,  27 ;  stand  of  canister  for  6-inch 
gun,  26  ;  rounds  of  ammunition  for  the  howitzer,  94.  Total  amount  of 
ammunition  expended,  319.  Respectfully  submitted, 

WM.  B.  GUSHING,  Lieutenant. 
Lieutenant  Commander  C.  W.  FLUSSER, 

commanding  United  States  Steamer  Commodore  Perry. 


424:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  HUNCHBACK,         ) 
OFF  PLYMOUTH,  NORTH  CAROLINA,  October  6, 1862.  ) 

SIR:  The  following  is  an  account  of  the  part  taken  by  this  vessel  on 
the  Blackwater  on  Friday,  the  3d  instant. 

I  got  under  way  at  5.30  A.  M.  from  our  anchorage,  about  four  miles 
below  Franklin,  following  your  vessel  closely — the  Whitehead  being 
astern  of  us.  When  the  enemy  opened  a  heavy  fire  of  musketry  on 
you,  I  pushed  ahead  to  your  support.  The  river  being  very  narrow  at 
that  point,  and  the  turn  "  short  around,"  I  found  great  difficulty  in 
turning  the  bend,  being  detained  there  nearly  half  an  hour  under  a 
heavy  fire  of  musketry  and  one  shot  from  artillery,  which  latter  killed 
two  men — a  grape-shot  passing  through  both,  killing  them  almost  in 
stantly.  From  that  time  until  10.30  A.  M.,  when  we  had  fought  our 
way  to  a  point  within  three-quarters  of  a  mile  of  Franklin,  the  fighting 
was  the  same — here  and  there  high  banks  with  dense  foliage,  a  narrow 
and  very  crooked  stream,  with  frequent  heavy  firing  of  musketry. 

On  our  passage  down  we  met  with  even  a  warmer  reception,  the 
enemy  seeming  determined  to  capture  us — having,  as  you  are  aware, 
cut  down  large  trees  to  close  up  the  river.  We  were  not  idle  all  that 
time ;  but  whenever  I  could  fire  my  9-inch  guns  without  exposing  the 
men,  I  let  them  have  shell,  shrapnel,  and  grape  ;  and  when  the  firing  of 
the  enemy  was  so  hot  that  I  could  not  expose  the  men,  T  worked  my 
two  howitzers  in  the  gangway,  giving  directions  through  the  speaking- 
tube  in  the  pilot-house  how  to  fire.  I  cannot  speak  too  highly  in  praise 
of  the  officers  and  men  under  my  command.  They  did  their  duty 
nobly.  I  have  to  regret  the  loss  of  one  of  my  best  men,  James  Ritchie, 
boatswain's  mate,  who  was  killed  when  about  to  sight  his  gun.  I  would 
bring  to  your  notice  the  heroic  conduct  of  Thomas  C.  Barton,  seaman, 
who,  when  a  shell,  with  cartridge  attached,  fell  out  of  the  howitzer  upon 
the  deck — the  charge,  which  must  have  been  wet,  being  ignited — got  a 
bucket  of  water  and  threw  it  upon  it,  thereby  preventing  its  explosion. 

Our  loss,  as  will  be  seen  by  the  report  of  Acting  Assistant  Surgeon 
George  R.  Mann,  was :  killed — James  Ritchie,  boatswain's  mate,  and 
Frank  Davis,  contraband  ;  wounded — Samuel  B.  Sharp,  seaman,  left 
arm.  We  fired  from  the  9-inch  guns  22  shells,  10  shrapnel,  and  1  stand 
of  grape;  from  the  100-pounder  rifle,  9  percussion  shells;  and  from 
the  howitzers,  9  stand  of  grape,  27  shrapnel,  28  shell,  and  26  canister- 
making  a  total  of  132.  Very  respectfully,  your  ob't  servant, 

EDMUND  R.  COLHOUN, 

Acting  Lieutenant  commanding  U.  S.  Steamer  Hunchback. 
Lieutenant  Commander  C.  W.  FLUSSER,  U.  S.  JV., 

commanding  Naval  Forces,  Albemarle  Sound,  N.  C. 


EXPEDITIONS    TO    HAMILTON,  WASHINGTON,    ETC.  425 

LOSS    OF   THE    STEAMER   ELLIS. 

The  destruction  of  this  small  steamer  presents  an  example 
of  the  desperate  character  of  the  fighting  in  which  our  river 
gunboats  were  often  engaged,  and  the  story  cannot  perhaps  be 
better  told  than  in  the  words  of  the  young  officer  who  com 
manded,  the  same  who  afterward  blew  up  the  rebel  iron-clad 
Albemarle  at  Plymouth. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMEB  HETZEL,  Nm&mber  26, 1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  entered  New  River  Inlet  on 
the  23d  of  this  month,  with  the  United  States  steamer  Ellis  under  my 
command;  succeeded  in  passing  the  narrow  and  shallow  place  called  the 
Rocks,  and  started  up  the  river.  My  object  was  to  sweep  the  river, 
capture  any  vessels  there,  capture  the  town  of  Jacksonville,  or  Onslow 
Court-House,  take  the  Wilmington  mail,  and  destroy  any  salt-works 
that  I  might  find  on  the  banks.  I  expected  to  surprise  the  enemy  in 
going  up,  and  then  to  fight  my  way  out.  Five  miles  from  the  mouth  I 
came  in  sight  of  a  vessel  bound  outward,  with  a  load  of  cotton  and  tur 
pentine.  The  enemy  fired  her  to  prevent  her  falling  into  our  hands.  I 
ran  alongside,  made  sure  that  they  could  not  extinguish  the  flames,  and 
again  steamed  up  the  river.  At  1  p.  M.  I  reached  the  town  of  Jackson 
ville,  landed,  threw  out  my  pickets,  and  placed  guards  over  the  public 
buildings. 

This  place  is  the  county-seat  of  Onslow  County,  and  is  quite  an  im 
portant  town.  It  is  situated  on  the  right  bank  of  the  river  going  up, 
and  is  thirty-five  or  forty  miles  from  the  mouth.  I  captured  twenty- 
five  stand  of  public  arms  in  the  court-house  and  post-office,  quite  a 
large  mail,  and  two  schooners.  I  also  confiscated  the  negroes  of  the 
Confederate  postmaster.  I  forgot  to  mention  that  the  town  is  situated 
on  the  main  dirt-road  to  Wilmington.  Several  rebel  officers  escaped  as 
I  neared  the  place  and  carried  the  news  to  that  city.  At  2.30  p.  M.  I 
started  down  the  river,  and  at  5  p.  M.  came  in  sight  of  a  camp  on  the 
banks,  which.  I  thoroughly  shelled.  At  the  point  where  the  schooner 
captured  in  the  morning  was  still  burning,  the  enemy  opened  fire  on 
the  Ellis  with  rifles,  but  were  soon  silenced  by  our  guns.  I  had  two 
pilots  on  board,  both  of  whom  informed  me  that  it  would  be  impossible 
to  take  the  steamer  from  the  river  that  night.  High  water  and  day 
light  were  two  things  absolutely  essential  in  order  to  take  her  out.  I 
therefore  came  to  anchor  about  five  miles  from  the  outer  bar,  took  my 
prizes  alongside,  and  made  every  preparation  to  repel  an  attack.  All 


426  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

night  long  the  signal-fires  of  the  enemy  could  be  seen  on  the  banks. 
At  daylight  I  got  under  way,  and  had  nearly  reached  the  worst  place  in 
the  channel,  when  the  enemy  opened  on  us  with  two  pieces  of  artillery. 
I  placed  my  vessel  in  position,  at  once  hoisted  the  battle-flag  at  the 
fore,  the  crew  gave  it  three  cheers,  and  we  went  into  action.  In  one 
hour  I  had  driven  the  enemy  from  his  guns  and  from  the  bluff,  and 
passed  within  a  hundred  yards  of  their  position  without  receiving  fire. 
Up  to  this  time  I  had  been  in  every  way  successful,  but  was  here  des 
tined  to  meet  with  an  accident  that  changed  the  fortunes  of  the  day, 
and  resulted  in  the  destruction  of  my  vessel.  About  five  hundred  yards 
from  the  bluffs,  the  pilots,  mistaking  the  channel,  ran  the  Ellis  hard  and 
fast  aground.  All  hands  went  to  work  at  once  to  lighten  her,  and 
anchors  and  steam  used  to  get  her  afloat,  but  without  success.  The 
headway  of  the  steamer  had  forced  her  over  a  shoal,  and  into  a  position 
where,  as  the  centre  of  a  circle,  we  had  a  circumference  of  shoal  all 
around.  When  the  tide  fell,  I  sent  a  party  ashore  to  take  possession 
of  the  artillery  abandoned  in  the  morning,  but  when  they  reached  the 
field  it  was  discovered  that  it  had  been  removed  while  we  were  at  work 
on  the  vessel.  If  I  had  secured  this,  I  proposed  to  construct  a  shore 
battery  to  assist  in  the  defence  of  my  vessel  by  keeping  the  rebels  from 
placing  their  batteries  in  position.  At  dark  I  took  one  of  my  prize 
schooners  alongside,  and  proceeded  to  take  every  thing  out  of  the  Ellis 
excepting  the  pivot-gun,  some  ammunition,  two  tons  of  coal,  and  a  few 
small-arms.  Steam  and  anchor  again  failed  to  get  my  vessel  afloat.  I 
felt  confident  that  the  Confederates  would  come  on  me  in  overwhelming 
force,  and  it  now  became  my  duty  to  save  my  men.  So  all  hands  were 
called  to  muster,  and  the  crew  told  that  they  could  go  aboard  the 
schooner.  I  called  for  six  volunteers  to  remain  with  me  on  board  and 
fight  the  remaining  gun.  Knowing  that  it  was  almost  certain  death,  the 
men  came  forward,  and  two  master's  mates,  Valentine  and  Barton,  were 
amongst  the  number.  These  gentlemen  subsequently  behaved  with 
coolness  and  bravery.  I  ordered  the  schooner  to  drop  down  the  chan 
nel  out  of  range  from  the  bluffs,  and  there  to  wait  for  the  termination  of 
the  impending  engagement,  and  if  we  were  destroyed  to  proceed  to  sea. 
Early  in  the  morning  the  enemy  opened  on  us  from  four  points  with 
heavy  rifled  guns  (one  a  Whitworth).  It  was  a  cross-fire,  and  very 
destructive.  I  replied  as  best  I  could ;  but  in  a  short  time  the  engine 
was  disabled,  and  she  was  much  cut  up  in  every  part ;  and  the  only 
alternatives  left  were  surrender  or  a  pull  of  one  and  a  half  miles  under 
their  fire  in  my  small  boat.  The  first  of  these  was  not,  of  course,  to  be 
thought  of;  the  second  I  resolved  to  attempt.  I  fired  the  Ellis  in  five 


WASHINGTON,    ETC.  427 

places,  and,  having  seen  that  the  battle-flag  was  still  flying,  trained  the 
gun  on  the  enemy,  so  that  the  vessel  might  fight  herself  after  we  had 
left  her  and  started  down  the  river,  reached  the  schooner,  and  made 
sail  for  sea.  It  was  low  water  on  the  bar,  and  a  heavy  surf  was 
rolling  in,  but  the  wind  forced  us  through  after  striking  several  times. 
We  were  just  in  time,  for  about  six  hundred  yards  down  the  beach 
were  several  companies  of  cavalry  trying  to  reach  the  mouth  of  the 
inlet  in  time  to  cut  us  off.  We  hoisted  our  flag  and  gave  three  cheers, 
and  were  oft".  In  four  hours  I  reached  Beaufort.  I  brought  away  all 
my  men,  my  rifled  howitzer  and  ammunition,  the  ship's  stores  and 
clothing,  the  men's  bags  and  hammocks,  and  a  portion  of  the  small- 
arms.  I  retained  aboard  a  few  muskets,  pikes,  and  pistols,  to  repel 
boarders. 

I  neglected  to  state  that  when  I  took  possession  of  the  enemy's 
ground,  on  the  24tb,  a  salt-work  was  destroyed,  and  ten  boats  rendered 
useless  that  were  to  have  been  used  for  boarding.  At  9  A.  M.  the 
United  States  steamer  Ellis  was  blown  in  pieces  by  the  explosion  of  the 
magazine.  Officers  and  men  behaved  nobly,  obeying  orders  strictly 
under  the  most  trying  circumstances.  I  respectfully  request  that  a  court 
of  inquiry  may  be  ordered  to  investigate  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  to  see 
if  the  honor  of  the  flag  has  suffered  in  my  hands. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

WILLIAM  B.  GUSHING,  Lieutenant. 
Commander  H.  K.  DAVENPORT, 

Senior  Officer,  commanding  in  Sounds  of  North  Carolina. 


CHAPTER  XXVI 

EXPEDITION  TO  HILTON  HEAD,  AND  CAPTURE  OF  THE  FORTS. 

THE  capture  of  the  forts  at  Hatteras  Inlet  was  only  a  par 
tial  execution  of  the  plan  which  the  Government  had  formed 
in  regard  to  the  occupation  of  the  Southern  coast.  The  reports 
of  the  Board,  mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  covered  the 
whole  seaboard  from  Hampton  Roads  to  the  passes  of  the  Mis- 
sisippi.  Acting  under  their  suggestion,  the  first  point  aimed  at 
was  Hatteras  Inlet.  In  connection  with  other  methods,  it  was 
recommended,  though  not  by  this  Board,  that  the  inlets  should 
be  obstructed  by  sinking  old  vessels,  loaded  with  stone,  in  the 
channels ;  but  this,  upon  trial,  was  found  to  be  of  little  conse 
quence,  for  the  water,  obstructed  at  one  point,  opened  for  itself 
a  new  channel.  The  English  journals,  in  their  extreme  and 
tender  solicitude  for  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  rebels,  made 
energetic  protests  against  the  attempt  to  seal  up  in  this  manner 
the  harbor  of  Charleston  against  their  neutral  smugglers,  and 
hinted  that  it  was  a  good  cause  for  the  declaration  of  war,  and 
a  cause  of  war  which  would  justify  them  before  the  world ;  for 
hostilities  were  just  then  very  earnestly  sought  for  by  one  class 
of  English  statesmen.  But,  as  the  old  hulks  offered  no  serious 
obstruction,  and  were  even  of  some  positive  advantage  as  marks 
to  steer  by,  and  the  Secretary  of  State  having  assured  Great 
Britain  that  two  good  channels  were  still  left  open,  we  escaped 
a  declaration  of  war  for  our  audacity  in  sinking  some  vessels 
where  we  chose  along  our  own  coast. 

Though  one  portion  of  the  design  of  the  Government  was 
accomplished  by  the  capture  of  the  forts  at  Hatteras,  it  was  but 
one  of  a  series  of  measures.  There  was  no  harbor  at  the  forts 


EXPEDITION    TO    HILTON    HEAD.  429 

or  in  the  adjacent  waters  of  the  sound  which  was  suitable  for  a 
naval  station,  as  the  perils  which  were  encountered  there  by  the 
fleet  of  the  Burnside  expedition  abundantly  proved.  But  the 
gates  of  those  large  interior  waters  were  burst  open  by  the  cap 
ture  and  holding  of  the  forts,  thus  rendering  it  possible  to  enter, 
as  was  soon  after  done,  and  destroy  the  formidable  interior 
works  at  Roanoke  and  along  the  rivers,  and  to  capture  both  the 
rebel  gunboats  in  those  waters  and  the  smaller  piratical  craft, 
which,  darting  out  through  the  narrow  inlets,  had  preyed  to 
some  extent  upon  Northern  commerce. 

But  far  more  than  this  was  required  in  order  to  give  the 
Government  a  substantial  control  of  the  coast  and  its  harbors. 
In  particular,  a  naval  station  was  needed,  a  harbor  where  our 
fleets  could  not  only  find  refuge  and  safe  anchorage,  but  where 
machine-shops  and  docks  could  be  constructed  for  the  refitting 
of  our  ships.  The  question  where  this  spot  should  be  was  ear 
nestly  discussed.  Several  considerations,  independent  of  each 
other,  show  the  importance  of  some  naval  station  south  of  Hat-, 
teras.  It  was  needed  to  facilitate  the  furnishing  of  supplies  for 
the  blockading  squadron.  This  work  of  supplying  the  fleet  of 
blockaders  was  one  of  great  magnitude  and  of  vital  importance. 
This  fleet  occupied  the  whole  line  of  coast  from  the  Rio  Grande 
to  the  capes  of  Virginia,  more  than  three  thousand  miles  in 
length.  The  amount  and  variety  of  stores  required  by  this 
fleet  are  almost  beyond  computation.  There  was,  of  course,  a 
constant  waste,  and  it  was  necessary  that  this  should  be  as  con 
stantly  supplied.  These  supplies  embraced  powder,  shot,  shell, 
materials  for  slight  or  temporary  repairs,  provisions,  medicine, 
clothing,  and  coal  for  all  the  steamers.  In  addition  to  the 
ordinary  provisions  for  a  ship  on  a  voyage,  it  was  the  purpose 
of  the  Department  to  furnish  the  vessels  with  fresh  meats  and 
ice,  while  even  water  at  first  had  to  be  taken  from  Northern 
ports,  as  no  Southern  harbor  was  open,  and  in  the  beginning 
of  the  contest  there  were  no  suitable  condensers  provided. 

It  is  easily  seen,  therefore,  that  it  was  a  very  serious  ques 
tion  how  this  work  could  be  performed  with  certainty  or  safety, 
when  along  that  whole  stretch  of  coast  there  was  not  a  single 
port  open  to  our  ships,  no  place  of  refuge  from  a  storm,  or 
where  a  vessel  could  be  repaired.  Water,  ice,  and  fresh  pro- 


4:30  H1STOKY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

visions  on  ice,  formed  of  themselves  a  very  formidable  item  in 
this  transportation  account ;  and  when  it  is  considered  that  it 
was  necessary  to  keep  a  line  of  supply-ships  going  out  and 
returning  unbroken,  from  the  borders  of  Mexico  to  the  North 
ern  ports,  the  difficulty  of  this  part  of  the  service  of  the  Navy 
may  be  in  part  appreciated. 

Another  important  reason  why  it  was  necessary  for  the 
Government  to  repossess  itself  of  some  Southern  port  was,  that 
it  might  be  used  for  repairing  our  ships.  Enormous  expense 
and  great  waste  of  time  were  occasioned  by  sending  a  vessel  to 
the  distant  Northern  ports ;  and  yet  it  was  often  necessary  to 
do  this,  where  the  work  required  could  be  performed  in  a  few 
hours  at  the  proper  shop. 

It  was  the  first  experiment  which  had  ever  been  made  of 
keeping  a  fleet  of  steamers  constantly  at  sea,  and  even  during 
the  winter  months,  as  a  blockading  squadron.  The  engines  of 
these  vessels  being  put  to  an  unusual  service,  and  often  severely 
taxed  in  the  excitement  of  the  chase,  were  liable  to  accidents 
which  would  not  have  occurred  in  ordinary  work,  while  the 
unavoidable  wear  of  the  machinery  was  also  very  great.  The 
merchant-vessels,  though  the  best  of  their  kind,  and  performing 
excellent  blockading  service,  were  built  of  much  lighter  frames 
than  the  war-ships  built  in  the  Government  yards,  and  the  bills 
of  repairs  upon  them  were  very  heavy.  These  expenses  would, 
of  course,  be  greatly  diminished  if  some  spot  central  to  the 
blockading  line  could  be  obtained,  where  machine-shops  could 
be  established,  and  where  at  least  a  portion  of  this  work  might 
be  done. 

Again,  such  a  harbor  and  station  were  needed  as  a  base  of 
operations  against  other  points.  It  would  have  been  impossible 
to  have  carried  on  the  operations  against  Fort  Sumter  and 
Charleston  with  no  base  nearer  than  New  York  or  Philadel 
phia  ;  and  although  it  will  probably  be  said  that  these  were  of 
little  consequence  as  against  Charleston  itself,  yet  it  must  be 
remembered  that  every  object  was  gained  there  which  could 
have  been  reached  by  the  capture  of  the  city,  except  the  glory 
of  having  taken  the  stronghold  of  the  rebels.  Subsequent 
events  have  shown  that  it  could  have  been  captured  fay  a  deter 
mined  attack,  such  as  was  made  at  New  Orleans,  Mobile,  and 


EXPEDITION   TO   HILTON   HEAD.  431 

Fort  Fisher,  but  the  Government  wisely  determined,  after  the 
first  assault,  that  its  possession  would  not  repay  the  price  of 
blood  it  would  cost ;  and  Admiral  Dahlgren,  with  his  Monitor 
guards  within  the  bar,  sealed  the  port  of  Charleston  as  effec 
tually  as  if  his  fleet  had  been  anchored  between  Sumter  and 
the  wharves. 

This  service  could  not  have  been  performed,  certainly  not 
without  a  much  larger  fleet,  had  not  Port  Royal  been  in  our 
possession,  where  our  ships  could  be  sent  for  all  but  the  most 
important  repairs.  For  a  long  time  the  iron-clads  were  daily 
under  fire  from  the  most  formidable  artillery  which  the  rebels 
and  England  could  produce ;  and,  as  a  necessary  consequence, 
one  or  more  of  them  was  almost  daily  in  need  of  some  repairs, 
which  could  only  be  done  at  the  machine-shop,  for  the  damages 
were  not  such  as  required  a  carpenter,  but  the  blacksmith  and 
the  machinist.  It  was  not  a  plank,  but  an  iron  plate,  which  was 
started;  not  a  shot-hole  to  be  plugged,  but  steam-joints  to  be 
made  tight,  and  rivets  to  be  fastened,  and  boilers  to  be  made 
secure. 

In  this  state  of  things,  the  Government  was  exceedingly 
anxious  to  obtain,  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  possession  of 
some  one  of  the  Southern  ports  where  a  naval  station  could  be 
established.  The  Board,  whose  labors  have  already  been  men 
tioned,  took  the  whole  subject  into  consideration,  and,  after  the 
Hatteras  forts  were  occupied,  submitted  elaborate  reports,  em 
bracing  minute  descriptions  of  every  important  position  on  the 
Southern  coast.  At  the  time  when  so  many  were  busy  in  form 
ing  and  circulating  complaints  against  the  Navy  Department, 
it  was  not  known  that  it  was  acting  under  the  advice  of  the 
men  who,  beyond  all  others,  were  qualified  to  give  an  opinion — 
the  only  men,  perhaps,  in  the  country  whose  counsel  at  that 
moment  the  Government  would  have  been  justified  in  receiv 
ing.  Fernandina,  Brunswick,  Port  Royal,  and  Bull's  Bay  were 
all  duly  considered;  and  when,  after  anxious  deliberation,  a 
decision  was  reached,  such  was  the  state  of  the  country,  that 
it  was  necessary  to  keep  it  a  profound  secret.  The  choice  lay 
between  Bull's  Bay,  Port  Royal,  Brunswick,  and  Fernandina, 
as  Savannah,  Mobile,  Charleston,  and  "Wilmington  were  so 
closed  and  fortified  that  it  seemed  impossible  that  they  could 


432  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

be  taken  by  assault,  and  no  prolonged  operations  could  be 
carried  on  against  them  without  some  secure  base  upon  the 
Southern  coast.  It  was  strongly  urged  upon  the  Department 
that  Fernandina  offered  advantages  beyond  all  others,  both 
because  its  harbor  is  commodious  and  easy  of  access,  and  be 
cause,  by  means  of  the  railroad  across  the  isthmus  from  Fer 
nandina  to  Cedar  Keys,  communication  could  be  kept  open 
with  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  claims  of  Brunswick  were  also 
earnestly  pressed;  and  in  addition  to  the  arguments  of  the 
Board  to  which  the  subject  was  committed,  it  was  whispered 
that  prominent  politicians,  having  received  lands  at  certain 
points,  were  busy  in  endeavoring  to  convince  the  Government 
of  the  surpassing  advantages  of  the  places  where  their  posses 
sions  lay. 

It  would  seem,  from  a  letter  of  Admiral  Du  Pont,  that  Port 
Royal  was  not  the  point  to  which  it  was  intended  to  send  the 
expedition  until  about  the  time  of  its  sailing.  What  place  was 
originally  selected  as  the  point  of  attack  does  not  appear,  but, 
from  the  tenor  of  the  communications  made  to  the  Secretary, 
there  is  reason  to  suppose  that  it  was  Fernandina.  According 
to  Admiral  Du  Pont,  the  change  was  made  at  the  suggestion 
of  the  Assistant  Secretary,  Captain  Fox,  with  the  concurrent 
advice  of  General  Sherman,  who  had  the  command  of  the  land 
forces.  The  expedition  had  grown  to  such  large  proportions 
that  it  was  thought  that  the  object  first  selected,  whatever  that 
was,  would  appear  small  in  the  eyes  of  the  country,  while  it 
was  believed  that  the  capture  of  the  forts  at  Hilton  Head,  and 
the  occupation  of  Port  Eoyal  Harbor,  would  be  of  sufficient 
importance  to  justify  the  preparations  which  had  been  made. 

The  harbor  of  Port  Royal  is  one  of  the  best  on  the  Southern 
coast,  affording  safe  anchorage  for  all  the  vessels  which  are 
likely  to  enter  there.  It  has  a  wide  bar ;  but  the  fact  that  such 
a  frigate  as  the  "Wabash  was  taken  safely  over  it,  is  proof  of  the 
value  of  the  harbor.  It  is  situated  between  Charleston  and 
Savannah,  and  may  be  said  to  be  adjacent  to  both,  as  it  is  but 
a  few  hours'  sail  from  either.  It  affords,  therefore,  a  very  con 
venient  point  from  which  to  carry  on  operations  against  any 
part  of  the  Southern  coast,  and  is  also  a  spot  from  which  sup 
plies  could  be  furnished  to  the  blockading  fleet.  In  addition 


EXPEDITION  TO   HILTON   HEAD.  433 

to  this,  the  harbor  and  the  connected  inland  waters  command 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  Sea  Islands,  on  which  is  raised  the 
peculiar  cotton  called  by  that  name,  and  which  is  so  valuable 
in  every  market  of  the  world. 

As  has  already  been  stated,  such  was  the  state  of  the  coun 
try  that  it  was  necessary  to  keep  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the 
expedition  a  profound  secret.  Until  it  was  in  a  condition  in 
which  it  could  not  be  baffled  either  by  treachery  or  indiscre 
tion,  it  was  not  confided  even  to  the  President.  Not  that  any 
one  doubted  him ;  but  the  experience  bought  so  dearly  in  the 
defeat  of  the  Fort  Sumter  expedition  showed  that,  in  the  multi 
tude  of  his  perplexities,  he  might  innocently  be  involved  in  the 
designs  of  others,  and  the  Secretary  was  not  willing  to  run  the 
hazard  of  having  his  best  ships  taken  from  him  without  his 
consent  or  even  knowledge  at  the  moment  of  their  sailing.  The 
Government  at  that  early  stage  of  the  struggle  knew  not  whom 
it  could  trust.  Endangered  by  a  thousand  acts  of  undisputed 
treachery,  and  perplexed  by  failures  that  could  not  reasonably 
be  ascribed  either  to  accident  or  incompetency,  it  was  quite 
natural  that  loyal  and  true  men  should  sometimes  come  under 
unjust  suspicion. 

Men  looked  back  with  amazement,  after  the  war  was  over, 
at  the  state  of  public  sentiment  when  it  began.  Few,  indeed, 
understood  the  real  nature  of  the  conflict,  and  consequently  the 
only  possible  method  of  success  was  continually  overlooked. 
It  was  regarded  by  many  as  a  mere  political  contest,  and  poli 
ticians  were  ready  with  all  the  usual  nostrums  for  healing  po 
litical  disorders,  and  the  doctors  were  almost  unanimous  in 
thinking  that  compromise  could  be  relied  upon  as  a  specific  in 
the  case.  But  the  disease,  happily  for  the  country,  was  beyond 
the  reach  of  the  quackery  of  compromise.  Then  it  was  be 
lieved  that,  at  the  worst,  it  was  only  a  question  of  military 
strength,  which  could  be  settled  in  a  brief  period,  with  no  per 
manent  disturbance.  Men  would  not  believe  at  that  time  that 
it  involved  the  profoundest  principles  of  morals  and  religion ; 
that  it  was  closely  connected  with  the  progress  of  Christian 
civilization  here  and  elsewhere — a  battle  in  which  it  was  pro 
posed  to  tread  humanity  down,  and  therefore  one  in  which  the 
Redeemer  of  humanity  could  by  no  means  remain  neutral. 
28 


434  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that,  at  the  first,  a  very  large  ma 
jority  of  the  people  of  this  country  were  in  sympathy  with  the 
Sonth  on  the  real  question  of  the  war.  It  was  perfectly  evi 
dent  that,  had  the  question  been  restricted  to  the  single  issue 
of  the  protection  and  perpetuity  of  slaveholding,  that  the  South 
would  have  had  a  speedy  and  a  complete  triumph  without  the 
necessity  of  secession,  or  the  shedding  of  a  single  drop  of  blood. 
It  was  merely  because  the  South  was  given  over  of  God  to 
assail  the  Union  in  her  madness,  that  the  North  was  roused  to 
resistance,  and  then  to  a  war,  miscalled  aggressive,  in  defence 
of  the  integrity  of  the  country.  But  the  conscience  of  the 
people  had  become  so  seared  by  long  toleration  of,  and  com 
plicity  with,  a  great  wrong,  the  virus  of  that  slave  system  had 
so  pervaded  and  corrupted  the  nation's  mind  and  heart,  that 
with  thousands  even  love  for  the  Union  was  either  overborne 
or  cooled  into  indifference  by  the  fear  that  in  some  way  the 
success  of  the  North  would  endanger  the  cherished  institutions 
of  the  South. 

Hence  the  determination,  persisted  in  so  long,  to  preserve 
both  slavery  and  the  Union •  hence  the  damaging  dispatch  of 
the  Secretary  of  State,  that  whatever  issue  the  war  might  have, 
the  status  of  the  slaves  would  remain  unchanged — which  an 
nouncement,  to  the  full  extent  of  its  influence,  weakened  our 
cause  in  England,  and  strengthened  our  enemies  in  their  oppo 
sition  abroad,  while  at  home  it  sapped  the  moral  foundation  of 
the  Government,  and  encouraged  every  lover  of  slavery,  every 
friend  of  the  South,  every  hater  of  what  was  called  radicalism, 
to  become  a  traitor  whenever  he  thought  that  slavery  was  en 
dangered,  or  at  the  most,  to  give  only  a  half-hearted  support  to 
the  cause  of  the  North.  Thousands  of  so-called  loyal  men, 
Union  men,  were  for  the  Union,  with  slavery  preserved  intact, 
and  would  by  far  have  chosen  to  see  the  South  triumphant 
rather  than  the  North  should  win  an  antislavery  victory. 

Hence,  both  in  the  Army  and  Navy,  the  Government  found 
its  plans  thwarted,  and  its  most  reasonable  expectations  blasted, 
by  some  lack  of  energy  or  activity,  or  some  failure  to  execute 
an  order  at  the  critical  moment,  or  some  apparent  blunder 
which  could  scarcely  be  attributed  to  the  lack  of  intelligence, 
or  the  refusal  or  neglect  to  obey  an  order,  under  some  cover 


EXPEDITION  TO    HILTON    HEAD.  435 

wlricli  might  shield  from  punishment,  though  not  from  the  sus 
picion  of  a  disloyal  heart.  Never  before  has  a  government 
triumphed  under  such  overwhelming  disadvantages.  It  was 
crippled  severely  at  first  by  the  resignation  of  so  many  officers 
whose  services  were  greatly  needed,  and  still  more  endangered 
by  the  addition  of  strength  which  the  rebels  thus  received ;  but 
both  these  were  less  embarrassing  than  the  danger  from  the 
disaffected  remaining  still  in  nominal  connection  with  the  Gov 
ernment,  and  who  were  not  only  supposed  to  communicate  con 
tinually  with  the  enemy,  but  who  might  at  any  moment  become 
false  to  a  trust,  when  treachery  might  be  fatal  to  an  enterprise. 
It  required  nothing  more  than  indifference,  a  mere  lack  of 
proper  enthusiasm  in  the  cause  of  the  Government,  to  make 
disaster  certain. 

"When,  therefore,  the  important  expedition  which  captured 
the  Port  Royal  forts  was  being  fitted  out,  the  Secretary  was 
determined  to  confine  his  secret  within  a  very  narrow  circle,  so 
that  there  should  be  no  opportunity  for  such  another  "  acci 
dent,"  as  the  President  called  it  in  his  letter  to  Captain  Fox, 
by  which  the  Sumter  expedition  was  deprived  of  the  ship 
without  which  all  knew  the  plan  must  fail.  A  single  example 
will  show  how  important  interests  were  sometimes  put  in  peril 
merely  because  an  officer  was  not  so  decided  and  earnest  in  the 
cause  of  the  Government  as  to  induce  him  to  disregard  the 
dead  letter  of  an  old  command,  in  order  to  obey  a  new  one  con 
veying  the  real  spirit  and  intention  of  the  Government,  although 
not  technically  binding.  As  has  been  mentioned  in  a  previous 
chapter,  General  Scott,  early  in  March,  1861,  sent  an  order  out 
to  Fort  Pickens  that  the  troops  on  board  the  Brooklyn  should 
be  landed  and  the  fort  made  secure.  The  commander  of  the 
squadron  refused  to  obey,  alleging  that  he  was  bound  by  the 
orders  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  of  the  preceding  adminis 
tration  (Toucey)  not  to  land  the  troops. 

There  are  some,  probably,  who  believe  that  his  wish 
not  to  land  the  troops  gave  vitality  to  the  order  which  lie 
obeyed,  while  that  of  General  Scott  was  disregarded.  He 
stated  that  the  attempt  to  land  troops  might  bring  on  a  col 
lision  and  inaugurate  civil  war.  The  rebels  had  taken  forci 
ble  possession  of  the  United  States  forts  and  navy-yard  at  Pen- 


436  HISTOEY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

sacola,  and  trained  their  batteries  on  Fort  Pickens,  and  war  on 
their  part  had  already  been  most  insolently  begun;  yet  here 
was  an  officer  to  whom  was  intrusted  the  honor  and  prop 
erty  of  his  country,  refusing  to  obey  an  order  from  the  head 
of  the  Army,  not  only  because  it  did  not  come  from  the  (Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  but  because  to  oppose  the  rebels  might  so  offend 
them  that  they  would  begin  civil  war,  and  he  was  not  willing 
to  take  upon  himself  such  a  responsibility  ! 

The  consequence  of  this  was,  that  Secretary  Welles  was  com 
pelled  to  send  Lieutenant  Worden  across  the  country  with  a 
special  order.  Worden  was  arrested  and  kept  for  six  months 
in  a  felon's  prison,  and  an  opportunity  was  given  to  break  up 
the  expedition  for  the  relief  of  Sumter,  under  cover  of  relieving 
Pickens,  which  would  have  been  made  safe  long  before  had 
Captain  Adams's  enthusiasm  in  his  country's  cause  been  strong 
enough  to  overcome  a  doubt  about  a  trifling  technicality.  With 
such  experiences,  it  was  well  for  the  Secretary  to  be  guarded 
in  his  subsequent  expeditions. 

Newspaper  correspondents  and  collectors  of  news  items  gen 
erally  succeed  in  penetrating  all  secrets  but  those  of  the  grave ; 
and  even  these  are  not  always  secure.  They  soon  discovered 
that  something  unusual  was  in  hand,  when  the  work  of  prepara 
tion  was  begun  in  New  York.  That  an  important  expedition 
was  contemplated  the  country  soon  knew ;  and  though  scores  of 
correspondents  and  wise  editors  affected  to  understand  the  whole 
movement,  and  many  confident  opinions  were  expressed,  as  if 
by  authority,  and  the  attention  of  the  public  was  directed,  now 
here,  now  there,  as  the  point  of 'destination,  still  no  one  outside  of 
the  Secretary  and  his  immediate  advisers  knew  its  real  purpose. 
Whether  the  indications  that  Fernandina  would  be  attacked 
were  made  in  order  the  more  effectually  to  conceal  the  real 
intention,  or  whether  the  change  mentioned  in  Admiral  Du 
Pont's  letter  to  the  Secretary,  November  6,  1861,  was  a  real 
departure  from  the  original  plan,  does  not  appear.  The  neces 
sity  of  secrecy,  and  the  great  difficulty  of  concealing  the  plan 
frojn  spies  and  others,  justified  extreme  caution.  The  com 
manders  of  the  vessels  did  not  know  their  destination.  The 
vessels-of-war  all  sailed  under  sealed  orders  furnished  by  Ad 
miral  Du  Pont,  and  the  transports  received  similar  orders  from 


EXPEDITION   TO    HILTON    HEAD.  437 

General  Sherman,  who  commanded  the  troops ;  while  the  coal- 
vessels  which  were  sent  forward  in  advance  of  the  fleet  were 
ordered  to  rendezvous  off  Savannah,  in  order  still  to  veil  the 
real  point  of  attack. 

On  Tuesday,  the  29th  of  October,  1861,  the  most  formidable 
squadron  which  had  ever  been  fitted  out  in  American  waters, 
was  ready  to  leave  Hampton  Roads.  It  numbered,  including 
the  army  transports,  fifty  vessels ;  while  those  with  coal,  twenty- 
five  in  number,  had  sailed  the  day  previous ;  so  that  there  were 
seventy-five  vessels  in  all  engaged  in  this  expedition.  The 
weather  had  been  unpleasant  for  some  time  previous  to  the 
sailing  of  the  fleet,  but  appearances  were  favorable  at  the  time 
of  its  departure,  and  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers,  sailors,  and  offi 
cers  swelled  with  high  expectations  when  they  saw  on  all  sides 
the  preparations  for  getting  under  wray.  All  knew  from  the 
number  and  character  of  the  ships  that  a  decisive  blow  was 
intended  for  some  important  point,  and  they  rejoiced  in  the 
opportunity  to  win  both  victory  and  honor.  When  the  signal 
was  made  for  getting  under  way,  the  various  sounds  of  the  wel 
come  work  rang  out,  mingling  and  floating  shoreward  over  the 
waters  of  the  roadstead  and  around  the  grim  walls  of  the  for 
tress.  The  pipes  of  the  boatswains  sounded  cheerily  as  the 
anchors  went  up,  and  the  measured  tramp  of  the  men  at  the 
capstans  seemed  like  the  march  of  a  little  army.  High  plumes 
of  smoke,  looking  almost  like  black  battle-flags,  rose  and  waved 
over  the  steamers.  The  rigging  of  the  sail-ships  was  full  of  busy 
sailors,  and  "All  ready  !  "  and  "  Let  fall !  "  echoed  from  vessel 
to  vessel  as  the  broad  wings  were  spread,  and  one  after  another 
they  glided  off,  hauled  up  to  their  course,  and  stood  out  for  the 
open  sea.  Soon  the  waters  were  dashed  into  foam  by  the  wheels 
and  "  brazen  fins  "  of  the  huge  steamers,  and  they  too  moved 
away ;  the  great  Wabash,  stateliest  among  them  all,  bearing  the 
flag  of  Du  Pont,  went  off  with  "  majestic  motion,"  as  if  conscious 
of  her  powder,  and  anticipating  victory. 

Fifty  ships  stretching  seaward  in  one  squadron,  bearing  the 
American  flag,  had  not  been  seen  before,  and  it  was  a  sight  to 
warm  an  American  heart,  if,  alas !  there  could  be  any  thing 
gratifying  in  war  except  as  it  sometimes  avenges  the  right. 

The  fleet  had  scarcely  left  Hampton  Koads  before  the  fair 


4:38  HISTOEY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

promise  of  good  weather  disappeared,  and  the  sea  grew  grad 
ually  rougher,  till  off  Hatteras  it  encountered  one  of  the  gales 
so  common  in  the  region  of  the  cape.  Many  of  the  transports 
labored  hard ;  some  of  the  ships  were  driven  into  the  breakers, 
and  were  in  great  peril ;  and  two  of  them  struck,  but  fortunately 
got  off  without  serious  injury. 

On  Friday,  November  1st,  the  gale  increased  in  fierceness 
till  it  became  a  hurricane.  The  fleet  was  scattered  in  every 
direction,  and  on  Saturday  morning  one  single  vessel  was  all 
that  could  be  seen  from  the  deck  of  the  Wabash.  Some  of  the 
transports,  and  some  even  of  the  armed  vessels,  were  by  no 
means  fitted  to  encounter  a  November  cyclone  on  that  stormy 
coast ;  and  the  discomforts,  the  sufferings  of  the  soldiers  and 
sailors  on  board  those  ships  during  the  storm,  is  one  among  the 
thousand  examples  of  heroic  endurance  and  self-sacrifice  for  the 
country's  cause  of  which  those  who  remained  at  home  will 
never  form  any  adequate  conception.  The  unwritten  history 
of  war,  and  that  which  can  never  be  written,  the  scenes  which 
lie  back  of  the  glare  of  battle  and  the  splendor  of  victory — 
these,  could  they  be  known,  would  show,  as  no  official  reports 
and  no  statistics  of  disease  and  death  can  do,  what  was  endured 
by  those  who  saved  our  country.  Let  one  fancy,  if  he  can,  the 
feelings  of  the  poor  mangled  fellows  in  the  cockpit,  berth-deck, 
and  sick-bay  of  the  Cumberland,  when  their  last  attendant 
rushed  on  deck,  and  left  them  there  helpless  and  hopeless,  unable 
to  move,  and  the  water  swelling  up  over  them  and  strangling 
them  as  they  lay  ;  or  of  the  old  Chaplain  Lenhart,  loved  of  all 
on  board,  who  was  seen  going  to  his  room  just  before  the  ship 
went  down,  and  whom  the  waters  doubtless  swallowed  up  while 
on  his  knees  before  God.  "While  commanding  officers  on  sea 
and  land  should  receive  all  the  praise  and  reward  which  has 
been  offered — for  without  their  skill  and  personal  qualities  our 
victories  could  not  have  been  won — it  would  be  well  for  the 
cause  of  humanity,  it  would  give  fresh  power  and  lustre  to  free 
institutions,  if  the  heroism  of  the  common  soldier  and  sailor,  and 
the  courage  of  the  subordinate  officers  could  be  set  in  a  clearer 
light,  and  if  the  sufferings  of  these  could  be  more  fully  known. 

The  world  might  be  less  eager  for  war  sometimes,  if  the 
blinding  veil  of  glory  could  be  drawn  aside,  and  the  fatigue  of 


EXPEDITION   TO    HILTON    HEAD.  439 

the  march,  the  exposure  of  the  wet  and  chilly  bivouac,  the  sick 
ening  wards  of  the  hospital,  the  terrible  scenes  of  the  battle  and 
after  the  battle,  all  forms  of  exposure  by  night  and  day,  in 
storms  at  sea,  the  wreck,  and  foundering  ship,  if  these  could  be 
more  distinctly  seen ;  and  while  all  due  honor  would  still  be  ren 
dered  to  noble  leadership,  the  people,  the  crews,  the  rank  and 
file,  who  endured  the  suffering  and  performed  the  work,  would 
also  receive,  as  they  do  not  now,  the  due  reward  of  their  hero 
ism.  Every  effort  to  show  what  the  people  did  and  suffered  in 
our  war  strengthens  the  popular  cause. 

The  scene  on  board  of  one  of  the  transports  in  this  storm 
illustrates  these  remarks.  The  steamer  Governor  left  Hampton 
Roads  with  the  rest  of  the  fleet  on  the  29th  of  October,  having 
on  board  the  Marine  Battalion.  She  continued  near  the  "Wa- 
bash  until  the  1st  of  November,  when  she  met  the  gale,  which 
about  mid-day  became  so  violent  from  the  southeast  as  to  compel 
them  to  keep  the  steamer's  head  to  the  sea.  As  was  soon  per 
ceived,  she  was  in  no  condition  to  encounter  an  ocean  storm, 
and  that  the  lives  of  all  on  board  were  likely  to  be  in  great 
peril  unless  some  stancher  ship  could  be  brought  to  their  assist 
ance.  Not  a  sail,  however,  wras  in  sight  over  all  the  sea,  whose 
every  wave  seemed  ready  to  overwhelm  or  dash  in  pieces  their 
frail  ship,  which  shuddered  to  each  shock  as  if  conscious  that 
her  end  was  near.  Laboring  heavily  in  the  great  seas  that 
seemed  to  show  ill-will  in  dashing  against  her,  she  bore  it 
bravely  till  4  p.  M.,  when  several  heavy  seas  smote  her  in  quick 
succession,  with  such  force  as  to  break  the  port  hog-brace  in 
two  places,  thus  materially  weakening  the  vessel.  Before  this 
could  be  properly  supported,  the  opposite  starboard  brace  also 
gave  way,  bringing  a  fresh  danger.  Soldiers  and  sailors  now 
labored  together  with  that  energy  which  a  question  of  life  or 
death  inspires,  and  with  great  exertions  succeeded  in  so  staying 
and  bracing  the  shattered  timbers  as  to  ward  off  the  immediate 
danger.  Soon  after,  with  a  sudden  lurch,  the  brace-chains  of 
the  smoke-stack  parted,  and  it  was  pitched  overboard.  It 
broke,  however,  some  three  feet  above  the  deck,  and  thus  they 
were  enabled  still  to  keep  up  the  fires.  The  discomfort,  more 
than  that,  the  positive  suffering  of  even  well  men,  on  a  steamer 
under  such  circumstances,  in  a  November  storm,  crowded  in 


440  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

every  part,  huddled  together,  with  no  fire  except  under  the 
boilers,  no  warm  food  or  drink,  drenched  and  shivering,  no  one 
dry  and  comfortable  in  his  home  can  understand. 

Soon  after  the  smoke-pipe  was  carried  away,  the  steam-pipe 
burst,  and  they  were  confronted  by  a  new  danger.  The  loss  of 
the  chimney  prevented  them  from  making  more  than  fourteen 
pounds  of  steam ;  and  as  soon  as  the  engine  began  to  work,  it 
ran  down  to  four  or  five  pounds,  and  this  was  all  the  power 
they  had  for  keeping  the  vessel's  head  to  the  sea,  and  to  work 
the  pumps,  which  now  were  needed,  as  from  her  straining  she 
was  leaking  badly.  The  engineer  was  then  obliged  to  stop  the 
engine  frequently,  in  order  to  get  up  a  head  of  steam.  The 
steamer  now  began  to  leak  more  and  more ;  still  when  the  en 
gine  could  be  worked  there  was  not  much  difficulty  in  keeping 
her  clear.  When  it  was  nearly  dark — and  the  prospect  was 
that  they  might  never  see  the  light  of  another  morning — all  on 
board  were  gladdened  by  the  sight  of  a  steamer  with  a  ship  in 
tow.  They  sent  up  a  rocket,  and  then  another,  and  at  length 
they  saw  and  answered  the  signal.  There  were,  however,  but 
six  rockets  on  board,  and  when  these  were  all  gone,  they  had 
no  resource  but  to  fire  their  muskets.  This  was  kept  up  for  a 
long  time,  but  the  wind  was  blowing  a  hurricane,  and  the  sea 
was  running  so  high,  that  the  steamer  could  render  the  Gov 
ernor  no  assistance,  although  visible  nearly  the  whole  night. 
At  3  o'clock  Saturday  morning  there  came  another  very 
serious  disaster.  The  packing  around  the  cylinder-head  flew 
out,  and  thus  the  engine  was  for  a  time  perfectly  useless,  and 
the  steamer  of  course  unmanageable.  When  the  engine  could 
once  more  be  started,  it  worked  very  slowly,  and  there  was 
scarcely  power  enough  to  keep  her  head  to  the  sea ;  the  rudder- 
chain  was  broken  away,  the  water  was  constantly  gaining  upon 
them,  and  the  laboring  boat  appeared  as  if  she  would  be  liter 
ally  dashed  in  pieces  by  the  waves.  At  every  lurch  it  was 
feared  that  the  hog-braces  would  be  carried  entirely  away,  and 
they  knew  that  this  would  be  their  speedy  destruction,  for  it 
would  wrench  away  the  side  of  the  boat,  collapse  the  boiler,  and 
tear  off  the  wheel-house.  A  large  number  of  men  held  on  to 
ropes,  by  which  the  effect  of  the  lurch  of  the  boat  was  counter 
acted,  and  one  can  imagine  what  hours  of  anxiety  and  toil  were 


EXPEDITION   TO    HILTON    HEAD.  441 

thus  spent  watching  every  motion  of  the  almost  foundering 
ship,  and  straining  upon  the  ropes  that  held  the  broken  tim 
bers,  so  as  to  ward  off  the  stroke  of  the  waves,  or  the  roll  and 
pitch  of  the  boat.  All  this  time  the  water  was  gaining  rapidly, 
so  that  it  required  a  hundred  men  to  bail  and  pump,  in  addition 
to  what  the  engine  could  do,  to  keep  themselves  afloat.  Then 
the  rudder-head  was  also  broken,  the  engine  was  of  very  little 
use,  and  they  were  at  the  mercy  of  the  winds  and  the  sea  (and 
this  was  in  a  dark  and  stormy  November  night),  drenched,  with 
out  rest,  and  almost  without  food.  Toward  morning  the  wind 
lulled  somewhat,  and  the  sky  looked  brighter.  At  daybreak, 
when  nearly  all  hope  was  gone,  all  hearts  were  once  more  glad 
dened  by  the  sight  of  two  vessels  on  the  starboard  bow,  one  of 
which  proved  to  be  the  United  States  steamer  Isaac  P.  Smith. 
They  had  flying  on  the  Governor  a  signal  of  distress,  which  the 
officers  of  the  gunboat  descried,  and  immediately  went  to  her 
relief. 

At  10  A.  M.  the  Isaac  P.  Smith  was  in  hailing  distance,  and 
encouraged  them  by  the  promise  to  receive  them  all  on  board. 
A  boat  was  lowered  from  the  Smith,  and  a  hawser  carried  out 
and  taken  on  board  the  Governor ;  but  very  soon,  and  before 
any  relief  could  be  afforded,  the  hawser,  by  some  inattention, 
was  let  go.  The  water  was  gaining  very  rapidly,  the  engine 
could  be  moved  with  great  difficulty,  and  was  nearly  useless, 
and  death  seemed  nearer  than  ever  to  the  brave  but  nearly  ex 
hausted  men.  The  Smith  was  obliged  to  haul  off,  but  soon  re 
turned,  and  with  difficulty  another  hawser  was  got  on  board, 
and  they  were  taken  in  tow j  but  it  was  evident  that  they  could 
not  float  long,  even  when  towed,  and  how  they  were  to  be 
safely  transferred  from  their  sinking  boat  to  another,  in  that 
wild  sea,  did  not  appear.  Another  vessel,  the  propeller  Young 
Eover,  now  appeared,  and  proffered  all  possible  assistance,  but 
such  was  the  violence  of  the  wind  that  nothing  could  at  the 
time  be  done.  The  remainder  of  the  story  of  the  rescue  of 
these  men  is  given  in  the  very  words  of  the  official  report  of 
Major  Reynolds,  who  commanded  the  marines  on  board : 

The  hawser  from  the  Smith  again  parted,  and  we  were  once  more 
adrift.  The  Young  Rover  now  stood  for  us  again,  and  the  captain  said 


44:2  HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES   NAYY. 

lie  would  stand  by  us  to  the  last,  for  which  encouragement  he  received 
a  heart-felt  cheer  from  the  men.  He  also  informed  us  a  large  frigate 
was  ahead  standing  for  us.  He  then  stood  for  the  frigate,  made  signals 
of  distress,  and  returned.  The  frigate  soon  came  into  view,  and  hope 
once  more  cheered  the  hearts  of  all  on  board  the  transport.  Between 
2  and  3  o'clock  the  United  States  frigate  Sabine  (Captain  Ringgold) 
was  within  hail,  and  the  assurance  given  that  all  hands  would  be  taken 
on  board.  After  a  little  delay,  the  Sabine  came  to  anchor.  We  fol 
lowed  her  example,  and  a  hawser  was  passed  to  us.  It  was  now  late  in 
the  day,  and  there  were  no  signs  of  an  abatement  of  the  gale.  It  was 
evident  that  whatever  was  to  be  done  for  our  safety  must  be  done  with 
out  delay.  About  8  or  9  o'clock  the  Sabine  had  paid  out  enough 
chain  to  bring  her  stern  close  to  our  bow.  Spars  were  rigged  out  over 
the  stern  of  the  frigate,  and  every  arrangement  made  for  whipping  our 
men  on  board,  and  some  thirty  men  were  rescued  by  this  means.  Three 
or  four  hawsers  and  an  iron  stream  cable  were  parted  by  the  plunging  of 
the  vessels.  The  Governor,  at  this  time,  had  three  feet  water,  which  was 
rapidly  increasing.  It  .was  evidently  intended  by  the  commanding  offi 
cer  of  the  Sabine  to  get  the  Governor  alongside,  and  let  our  men  jump 
from  the  boat  to  the  frigate.  In  our  condition  this  appeared  extremely 
hazardous.  It  seemed  impossible  for  us  to  strike  the  frigate  without 
instantly  going  to  pieces.  We  were,  however,  brought  alongside,  and 
some  forty  men  succeeded  in  getting  on  board  the  frigate ;  one  was 
crushed  to  death  between  the  frigate  and  the  steamer  in  attempting  to 
gain  a  foothold  on  the  frigate. 

Shortly  after  being  brought  alongside  the  frigate,  the  starboard 
quarter  of  the  Sabine  struck  the  port  bow  of  the  Governor  and  carried 
away  about  twenty  feet  of  the  hurricane  deck  from  the  stem  to  the 
wheel-house.  The  sea  was  running  so  high,  and  we  being  tossed  so 
violently,  it  was  deemed  prudent  to  slack  up  the  hawser  and  let  the 
Governor  fall  astern  of  the  frigate,  with  the  faint  hope  of  weathering  the 
gale  till  morning.  All  our  provisions  and  other  stores,  indeed  every 
movable  article,  were  thrown  overboard,  and  the  water-casks  started  to 
lighten  the  vessel.  From  half-past  three  until  daybreak  the  Governor 
floated  in  comparative  safety,  notwithstanding  the  water  was  rapidly 
gaining  on  her.  At  daybreak  preparations  were  made  for  sending  boats 
to  our  relief,  although  the  sea  was  running  high ;  and  it  being  exceed 
ingly  dangerous  for  a  boat  to  approach  the  guards  of  the  steamer,  in  con 
sequence,  the  boats  lay  off,  and  the  men  were  obliged  to  jump  into  the 
sea  and  were  then  hauled  into  the  boats.  All  hands  were  thus  providential 
ly  rescued  from  the  wreck,  with  the  exception,  I  am  pained  to  say,  of  one 


EXPEDITION   TO    HILTON    HEAD.  443 

corporal  and  six  privates,  who  were  drowned  or  killed  by  the  crush  or 
contact  of  the  vessels.  Those  drowned  were  lost  through  their  disobe 
dience  of  orders  in  leaving  the  ranks  or  abandoning  their  posts.  After 
the  troops  were  safely  reembarked,  every  exertion  was  directed  to  se 
curing  the  arms,  accoutrements,  ammunition,  and  other  property  which 
might  have  been  saved  after  lightening  the  wreck.  I  am  gratified  in 
being  able  to  say  nearly  all  the  arms  were  saved,  and  about  half  the  ac 
coutrements.  The  knapsacks,  haversacks,  and  canteens  were  nearly  all 
lost.  About  ten  thousand  rounds  of  cartridges  were  fortunately  saved, 
and  nine  thousand  lost.  Since  being  on  board  of  this  ship  every  atten 
tion  has  been  bestowed  by  Captain  Ringgold  and  his  officers  toward 
recruiting  the  strength  of  our  men,  and  restoring  them  to  such  a  condi 
tion  as  will  enable  us  to  take  the  field  at  the  earliest  possible  moment. 
Too  much  praise  cannot  be  bestowed  upon  the  officers  and  men  under 
rny  command — all  did  nobly.  The  firmness  with  which  they  performed 
their  duty  is  beyond  all  praise.  For  forty-eight  hours  they  stood  at 
ropes,  and  passed  water  to  keep  the  ship  afloat.  Refreshments  in  both 
eating  and  drinking  were  passed  to  them  at  their  posts  by  non-commis 
sioned  officers.  It  is  impossible  for  troops  to  have  conducted  them 
selves  better  under  such  trying  circumstances.  The  transport  continued 
to  float  some  hours  after  she  was  abandoned,  carrying  with  her  when 
she  sunk,  I  am  grieved  to  say,  company  books  and  staff  returns.  In 
order  to  complete  the  personnel  of  the  battalion,  I  have  requested  Cap 
tain  Ringgold  to  meet  a  requisition  for  seven  privates,  to  which  he  has 
readily  assented.  I  considered  this  requisition  in  order,  as  I  have  been 
informed  by  Captain  Ringgold  it  is  his  intention,  or  orders  were  given 
for  his  ship,  to  repair  to  a  Northern  port,  in  which  event  he  can  be 
easily  supplied,  and  my  command  by  the  accommodation  rendered 
complete,  in  order  to  meet  any  demand  you  may  make  for  our  services. 

Under  God  we  owe  our  preservation  to  Captain  Ringgold  and  the 
officers  of  the  Sabine,  to  whom  we  tender  our  heart-felt  thanks  for  their 
untiring  labors  while  we  were  in  danger,  and  their  unceasing  kindness 
since  we  have  been  on  board  the  frigate. 

This  report  is  respectfully  submitted. 

I  am,  commodore,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOHN  GEORGE  REYNOLDS, 

Commanding  Battalion  Marines,  Southern  Division. 
Flag-Officer  SAMUEL  F.  Du  PONT, 

Com'dg  U.  S.  Naval  Expedition,  Southern  Coast  U.  S.N.America. 

The  steamer  Isaac  P.  Smith  was  obliged  to  throw  her  arma 
ment  overboard  in  tbe  gale,  and  the  men  and  crew  were  res- 


444  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

cued  from  the  Peerless  transport  while  she  was  in  a  sinking 
condition.  Such  was  the  gale  which  Du  Font's  squadron  en 
countered  before  reaching  Hilton  Head.  It  seemed  an  un 
promising  commencement  of  an  enterprise  which  had  such  a 
triumphant  termination.  In  this  case,  as  in  that  of  Burnside's 
expedition  to  Roanoke,  the  rebels  were  inclined  to  interpret  the 
gale  as  indicative  that  God  was  on  their  side ;  and  the  result 
showed  how  often,  through  narrowness  of  view,  or  the  influence 
of  our  own  feelings  controlling  the  judgment,  w^e  misconstrue 
the  providences  of  God. 

With  far  less  damage  than  was  reasonably  expected  from  so 
fierce  a  tempest,  twenty-five  vessels  of  the  fleet,  in  company 
with  the  Wabash,  anchored  off  the  bar  at  Port  Royal  Harbor, 
on  Monday,  November  the  4th,  at  8  o'clock  in  the  morning, 
while  many  more  vessels  of  the  squadron  were  heaving  in  sight. 
Even  then,  though  in  comparative  safety,  the  position  of  the 
fleet  was  by  no  means  a  pleasant  one.  The  bar  lies  ten  miles 
seaward,  the  coast  has  no  feature  prominent  enough  to  guide 
the  navigator,  and  the  lights  were  extinguished,  and  the  buoys 
and  channel-marks  had  all  been  destroyed  or  misplaced. 

But  the  skill  and  science  of  that  accomplished  officer,  Ad 
miral  (then  Commander)  Charles  H.  Davis,  aided  by  Mr.  Bou- 
telle,  the  able  assistant  of  the  Coast  Survey,  enabled  them  to 
overcome  all  difficulties.  Under  the  eye  of  these  gentlemen,  a 
search  for  the  channel  was  at  once  commenced,  which,  from 
their  intimate  knowledge  of  the  locality,  was  soon  successful, 
and  by  3  p.  M.  it  had  been  sounded  out  and  buoyed.  The 
transports  and  gunboats  were  immediately  ordered  in,  and  be 
fore  dark  these  had  all  crossed  the  bar,  and  were  anchored  in 
the  roadstead  of  Port  Royal,  the  gunboats  having  first  chased 
Commodore  Tatnall's  rebel  steamers  under  the  shelter  of  their 
batteries.  On  Monday  evening  Commander  Davis  reported 
that  there  was  water  enough  to  allow  the  Wabash  to  enter  the 
harbor.  Admiral  Du  Pont  felt  the  great  responsibility  of  risk 
ing  the  noble  frigate  in  the  passage  of  a  bar  two  miles  wide, 
where,  in  places  in  the  channel-way,  there  was  no  more  than 
from  one  to  two  feet  of  water  to  spare,  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  expedition  depended  mainly  upon  this  frigate's  powerful 
battery.  The  admiral  decided  that,  however  great  the  risk,  it 


EXPEDITION   TO    HILTON    HEAD.  445 

must  be  taken,  and  on  Tuesday  morning  the  W  abash  was  got 
under  way,  and  stood  slowly  into  the  harbor.  Every  possible 
precaution  was  taken,  for  such  was  the  rise  and  fall  of  the 
spring-tide  that,  had  she  grounded,  the  chances  would  have 
been  in  favor  of  her  total  loss.  Slowly  feeling  their  way  along 
the  channel  with  the  lead,  and  with  faculties  all  awake  to  every 
peril,  the  officers  guided  the  great  ship  gently,  as  if  leading  a 
little  child,  but  with  such  delicate  skill  that  she  did  not  touch  ; 
and  when,  followed  by  the  Yanderbilt,  the  Susquehanna,  and 
the  Atlantic,  she  at  length  glided  into  deep  water,  and  passed 
into  the  midst  of  the  fleet  already  anchored,  cheer  after  cheer 
burst  from  the  excited  thousands  who  almost  breathlessly  had 
watched  her  perilous  passage.  The  "VVabash  was  anchored, 
and  immediately  they  commenced  preparations  for  action 
throughout  the  whole  fleet.  But  the  necessary  examinations 
of  the  harbor  could  not  be  completed  in  season  for  an  attack 
that  day,  as  buoys  had  to  be  planted  in  various  places,  and 
especially  on  a  dangerous  shoal  called  the  Fishing  Rip.  A 
reconnoissance  in  force  had  been  made  in  the  morning,  under 
the  command  of  Commander  John  P.  Rodgers  and  Brigadier- 
General  Wright,  with  four  gunboats — the  Ottawa,  Lieutenant 
Commanding  Stevens;  the  Seneca,  Lieutenant  Commanding 
Ammen ;  the  Curlew,  Acting  Commander  "Watmougb ;  and 
the  Isaac  P.  Smith,  Lieutenant  Commanding  Nicholson.  These 
proceeded  far  enough  to  draw  the  fire  of  the  batteries  on  Hilton 
Head  and  Bay  Point,  and  showed  that  the  vast  fortifications 
were  works  of  strength,  and  scientifically  constructed.  This 
done,  the  gunboats  withdrew,  and  all  was  made  snug  for  the 
night  out  of  gunshot  from  the  forts.  The  next  day  the  wind 
blew  a  gale  from  the  southward  and  westward,  and  the  attack 
was  necessarily  deferred.  The  forts  which  the  fleet  was  thus 
ready  to  assault  are  situated  at  the  entrance  of  Port  Royal  Har 
bor — the  one,  Fort  Walker,  on  the  south,  on  Hilton  Head  ;  and 
the  other,  Fort  Beauregard,  on  the  north,  on  Bay  Point.  These 
forts  are  nearly  two  and  a  half  miles  distant  from  each  other, 
and  consequently  could  not  be  engaged  at  the  same  time  except 
at  long  range — too  long  for  the  most  effective  use  of  the  bat 
teries  of  the  ships,  while  they  might  be  reached  with  heavy 
rifled  cannon  from  the  batteries  on  shore. 


44:6  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

These  fortifications  were  by  no  means  insignificant  works, 
Fort  Walker,  on  Hilton  Head,  mounting  twenty-three  guns, 
two  of  which  were  6-inch  rifles,  and  one  a  10-inch  Columbiad. 
Fort  Beauregard  and  its  outworks  mounted  twenty  guns  in  all, 
some  of  them  6-inch  rifles,  one  10-inch  and  one  8-inch  Colum 
biad.  The  ships  could  not  pass  between  these  forts  without 
being  in  range  of  the  rifles  and  heavy  guns  of  both,  and  they 
had  therefore  every  reason  to  expect  a  severe  encounter,  espe 
cially  as  one  fort  had  the  means  of  throwing  hot  shot.  Less 
formidable  fortifications  than  these  had  been  successful  in  re 
pelling  fleets  of  heavy  ships,  and  it  showed  no  lack  of  courage 
if  some  doubts  were  entertained  of  the  result.  The  experience 
of  Stringham  at  the  Hatteras  forts  was  encouraging,  but  then 
those  works  were  by  no  means  as  well  constructed  and  formi 
dable  as  these.  It  was  a  fleet  of  powerful  steamers  that  was  to 
attack,  and  calculations  based  upon  the  inefficiency  of  sailing 
vessels  were  no  proper  guide. 

The  plan  of  Fort  "Walker,  on  Hilton  Head,  was  such  that 
its  principal  guns  were  mounted  on  two  water-faces,  which 
were  so  nearly  in  line  as  to  admit  of  an  enfilading  fire  from  a 
certain  point,  while  the  flanks  were  much  wreaker.  It  was  de 
termined  to  direct  the  weight  of  the  attack  first  upon  this,  the 
strongest  work,  and  then  turn  to  Fort  Beauregard.  The  plan 
was  for  the  fleet  to  pass  up  midway  between  the  forts  and  en 
gage  both  at  long  range ;  and  when  the  line  reached  a  point 
about  two  and  a  half  miles  north  of  the  forts,  to  turn  to  the 
south  round  by  the  west,  and  come  to  close  action  with  Fort 
Walker,  attacking  on  the  weakest  flank,  while  at  the  same  time 
the  shot  would  enfilade  the  two  water-faces.  The  plan  of  the 
fight  comprised  a  main  squadron  to  attack  in  line,  and  a  flank 
ing  squadron,  to  be  thrown  off  in  the  northern  part  of  the  har 
bor,  to  engage  the  rebel  fleet  of  gunboats,  and  prevent  them 
from  attacking  the  rear  of  the  line,  or  cutting  off  any  disabled 
ship. 

The  main  squadron  consisted  of  the  Wabash  and  the  Sus 
queh anna  frigates,  the  sloop  Mohican,  the  sloop  Seminole,  the 
sloop  Pawnee,  the  gunboat  IJnadilla,  the  gunboat  Ottawa,  the 
gunboat  Pembina,  and  the  sailing  sloop  Yandalia  towed  by  the 
Isaac  P.  Smith. 


EXPEDITION   TO    HILTON    HEAD. 

The  flanking  squadron  was  composed  of  the  gunboats  Bien- 
ville,  the  Seneca,  the  Curlew,  the  Penguin,  and  the  Augusta. 
To  these  should  be  added  the  Pocahontas,  which,  owing  to  the 
effects  of  the  gale,  did  not  reach  the  scene  of  action  until  about 
mid-day. 

The  captains  of  all  the  ships  had  been  summoned  on  board 
the  flag- ship,  and  were  minutely  instructed  in  regard  to  the 
plan  of  attack,  and  the  place  which  each  ship  was  to  occupy  in 
the  line,  and  how  to  meet  such  contingencies  as  might  probably 
arise  in  the  progress  of  the  fight.  Early  in  the  morning  of  the 
7th  of  November  every  ship  was  prepared  for  action  with  the 
most  scrupulous  care,  for  all  felt  that  important  consequences 
must  follow  the  battle,  and  they  knew  that  they  were  to  en 
counter  very  formidable  works,  and  they  had  good  reason  to 
believe  that  they  mounted  some  heavy  rifled  guns.  Every 
spar,  not  absolutely  needed  in  its  place,  was  sent  down  ;  every 
sail  was  taken  in,  as  was  also  every  superfluous  piece  of  rigging ; 
every  thing  loose  was  made  fast,  and  every  thing  was  snugly 
stowed.  Nothing  remained  on  deck  which  could  impede  the 
freest  action ;  the  ports  were  all  open,  the  guns  all  loaded  and 
cast  loose ;  the  magazines  were  opened  ;  hammocks  and  splinter- 
nettings  were  in  their  places ;  the  carpenters  all  ready  with 
tools  and  shot-plugs  prepared.  Each  gun's  crew  at  their  sta 
tions  ;  buckets  of  water  were  placed  about  the  decks  to  extin 
guish  a  fire  or  quench  the  thirst  of  the  men  ;  the  gratings  were 
on  the  hatches,  and  the  tarpaulins  were  battened  down ;  the 
grim  arrangements  of  the  cockpit  were  made ;  the  sand  to  re 
ceive  the  expected  blood  spread  on  the  decks ;  hammocks  were 
slung  over  the  hatches  to  lower  the  wounded,  and  the  signal- 
officers  were  watching  the  flag-ship.  The  vessels  were  literally 
stripped  for  a  fight,  and  the  engines  seemed  panting  with  eager 
ness  to  start.  When  all  was  ready,  for  a  few  minutes  the  ships 
were  silent.  The  men  looked,  without  speaking,  in  each 
other's  faces,  and  seemed  to  be  thinking  what  an  hour  might 
bring. 

At  8  o'clock  the  ships  were  all  riding  to  the  flood,  their 
bows  pointing  seaward,  the  forts  just  visible  in  the  distance, 
the  ships  and  the  forts  all  silent  alike.  The  signal  was  made 
to  get  under  way,  and  at  8h.  10m.  the  flag-ship  tripped  her 


448  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

anchor,  and  slowly,  as  if  with  conscious  dignity,  the  huge  frig 
ate  turned  and  headed  in  for  the  forts,  and  the  whole  fleet  fol 
lowed  in  order  the  movements  of  the  leader,  the  Susquehanna 
pressing  close  to  the  Wabash.  The  signal  for  close  order  was 
made  at  9,  and  for  nearly  half  an  hour  longer  the  ships  moved 
silently  on.  At  9h.  26m.  a  jet  of  smoke  shot  out  from  Fort 
Walker,  and  then  a  shell  struck  the  water  far  short  of  its  mark, 
and  then  the  dull  roar  of  the  gun  came  rolling  along  the  line. 
Fort  Beauregard  was  also  ready,  and  a  flash,  and  the  leap  of 
the  curling  smoke,  and  the  splash  of  the  shot,  and  then  the  re 
port  brought  the  rebel  challenge  and  defiance  to  the  fleet.  It 
was  speedily  answered.  The  huge  pivot-guns  of  the  Wabash 
and  Susquehanna  were  trained  on  the  forts,  and  each  received 
from  the  ships  an  answering  shot. 

It  was  probably  one  of  the  best  exhibitions  of  scientific 
battle  made  during  the  war — one  for  which  the  commanding 
officer  received  due  credit  at  home  and  abroad.  The  fleet 
•passed  into  the  harbor  midway  between  the  forts,  receiving  the 
fire  from  both,  and  returning  it  at  long  range.  When  about 
two  and  a  half  miles  above  the  forts  the  flag-ship  turned  to  the 
southward,  and  at  lOh.  15m.  the  signal  for  close  action  was 
made,  and  the  Wabash  passed  Fort  Walker  at  a  distance  when 
abreast  of  eight  hundred  yards,  the  other  vessels  of  the  line  fol 
lowing.  This  gave  each  vessel  an  opportunity  of  attacking  the 
weak  flank  as  they  approached  the  forts  from  the  north,  and  of 
enfilading,  or  nearly  so,  the  two  water-faces,  which  fire  was  of 
course  a  destructive  one,  while,  as  they  passed  the  forts  abreast, 
they  could  sweep  the  men  from  their  guns  by  the  storm  of  their 
full  broadsides.  ISTor  was  this  all.  They  passed  the  forts  when 
moving  southward  at  a  distance  of  eight  hundred  yards.  Of 
course  the  rebel  guns  were  sighted  as  near  as  possible  for  that 
distance;  but  when  the  ships  made  the  second  circuit,  they 
passed  much  nearer,  sighting  their  own  guns  for  five  hundred 
and  fifty  yards  ;  and  so  the  gunners  of  the  fort  had  not  only  to 
fire  at  a  moving  object,  but  the  ships  were  some  three  hundred 
yards  nearer  than  when  they  passed  at  first.  Of  course  their 
aim  was  rendered  doubly  uncertain,  and  this  probably  accounts, 
as  it  did  at  Hatteras,  for  the  vessels  receiving  much  less  damage 
than  was  anticipated.  To  add  to  the  confusion  of  the  rebels, 


EXPEDITION   TO    HILTON    HEAD.  449 

some  of  the  gunboats  took  up  a  position  where,  on  the  flank, 
they  could  enfilade  the  main  works,  and  kept  up  there  a  very 
accurate  and  destructive  fire.  The  management  of  the  battle 
on  the  part  of  the  commanding  officer  could  scarcely  have  been 
better.  The  forts  were  at  once  overmatched  by  skill  and  sci 
ence.  Each  vessel,  as  it  came  down  from  the  north,  sent  some 
enfilading  shot  into  the  fort  from  its  pivot-guns,  and  then 
poured  in  the  whole  starboard  broadside ;  and  when  this  was 
repeated  in  quick  succession  by  the  whole  fleet,  it  will  be  seen 
that  there  was  scarcely  an  intermission  to  the  terrible  hail  of 
shot  and  shell  sweeping  the  parapet  and  traverses,  plunging 
through  the  embrasures,  and  bursting  over  and  within  the 
area  of  the  works.  Having  come  down  from  the  north  and 
delivered  their  fire,  each  ship  went  round,  and,  approaching 
the  fort  from  the  south,  and  on  a  different  line,  again  opened 
with  the  port  broadside,  though  the  main  dependence  was 
not  on  the  port  battery ;  then  again,  as  soon  as  the  ship  could 
be  brought  round,  the  starboard  broadside  was  ready.  The  fire 
of  the  fort  could  not  be  kept  up  under  such  a  terrible  fire,  and 
it  began  to  slacken  almost  from  the  beginning  of  the  action. 
After  the  third  round  of  the  ships,  and  the  starboard  broadsides 
had  been  delivered  three  times,  the  fort  was  abandoned,  the 
garrison  running  literally  to  the  woods  for  shelter,  the  battle 
was  over,  and  at  twenty  minutes  after  two,  Commander  John 
Rodgers  hoisted  the  flag  of  the, Union  over  the  deserted  works. 
At  sunset  it  was  discovered  that  Fort  Beauregard  had  also  been 
abandoned.  The  next  morning  our  flag  wras  also  floating  over 
that  work,  and  a  lodgment  was  gained  upon  the  Southern  coast 
of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  Union  cause — one  where  the 
authority  of  the  Government  was  never  disputed  again.  The 
victory  gained  us  undisputed  possession  of  one  of  the  finest  har 
bors  on  the  Southern  coast,  and  a  sufficient  base  and  depot  for 
all  the  operations  which  have  been  mentioned  in  a  former  part 
of  this  chapter.  It  afforded  the  means,  as  was  afterward  shown, 
of  sealing  up  the  harbor  of  Charleston  as  effectually  as  if  the 
city  was  in  our  hands ;  and  the  capture  of  Port  Royal  included 
in  its  direct  consequences  all  that  was  essential  in  the  occupa 
tion  of  that  rebel  stronghold.  It  was  rendered  perfectly  useless 
to  the  rebel  cause. 
29 


450  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

It  gave  the  world  another  successful  example  of  the  manner 
in  which  steamships  with  an  American  battery  can  deal  with 
forts,  and  changed  materially  on  this  point  what  were  thought 
settled  opinions  in  regard  to  naval  war.  The  Wabash  carried 
on  her  spar-deck  as  heavy  guns  as  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
had  been  mounted  on  a  French  or  English  ship,  while  the  bat 
tery  of  her  gun-deck  was  composed  of  9-inch  guns,  and  her 
pivot-guns  were  heavier  still.  The  broadsides  from  such  ships 
are  literally  crushing  ones.  Delivered  in  quick  succession  by 
steamers  passing  a  fort,  and  then  returning  on  a  different  track 
to  fire  the  other  broadside,  and  at  distances  varying  from  eight 
hundred  yards  to  half  that  distance,  nothing  can  withstand 
them.  For  although  an  earthwork  may  not  thus  be  battered 
down,  the  defenders  of  it  cannot  stand  to  their  guns  ;  and  a  fleet 
of  stanch  steamers  with  such  batteries  can  pass  a  fort  without 
a  greater  risk  than  may  reasonably  be  taken,  as  was  afterward 
clearly  shown. 

The  successful  experiments  made  at  liatteras  and  Port 
Royal  showed  clearly  that  even  wooden  steamers  could  en 
counter  formidable  works  on  land  with  comparative  safety ; 
and  the  experience  of  th'ese  victories,  and  their  moral  effect, 
prepared  the  way  for  the  more  important  operations  against 
forts  at  a  later  period  of  the  war.  It  is,  at  least,  doubtful 
whether  a  fleet  would  have  been  risked  at  New  Orleans,  had 
not  the  forts  at  Port  Royal  first  been  taken.  This  novel  expe 
dition  placed  also  in  the  hands  of  the  Government  those  famous 
Sea  Island  cotton-lands  which  had  so  enriched  their  owners  by 
the  unrequited  labor  of  the  slave.  In  that  region  lived  the 
men  who,  for  years,  had  cherished  and  strengthened,  as  they 
could,  the  spirit  of  rebellion,  fattened  on  the  riches  of  their 
lands,  and  the  hopeless  toils  of  their  bondmen ;  and  from  that 
portion  of  South  Carolina  came  the  corrupting  spell  that  blind 
ed  and  maddened  the  South,  and  prepared  her  for  rebellion 
and  ruin. 


CHAPTER  XXVII 

CAPTURE  OF  FORT  CLINCH,  FERNANDINA,   AND  ST.   MART'S. 

AFTER  the  capture  of  Port  Royal,  it  was  determined  to  cap 
ture  some  points  farther  south,  among  the  most  important  of 
which  is  Fernandina,  on  the  coast  of  Florida,  at  the  head  of  the 
peninsula,  and  connected  with  the  Gulf  by  the  Cedar  Keys  Rail 
road.  The  preparations  for  the  defence  of  Fernandina  had  been 
very  carefully  made ;  the  works  were  well  constructed,  and  were 
considered  by  the  rebel  officers  quite  sufficient  for  the  protec 
tion  of  the  city.  The  batteries,  to  use  the  language  of  Commo 
dore  Du  Pont,  were  as  complete  as  art  could  make  them.  Six 
were  well  concealed,  protected  in  front  by  ranges  of  sand-hills, 
and  contained  perfect  shelters  for  the  men.  They  covered  so 
small  an  extent  of  ground,  and  were  so  concealed  by  the  natural 
growth  and  the  formation  of  the  land,  that  it  would  have  been 
almost  impossible  to  strike  them  from  the  water.  Another  bat 
tery  of  six  guns,  though  larger,  and  on  that  account  offering  a 
better  mark,  was  equally  well  sheltered  and  marked. 

These  batteries  and  the  heavy  guns  mounted  on  Fort  Clinch 
commanded  every  part  of  the  main  ship-channel,  and  could  rake 
an  approaching  vessel.  Besides  these,  there  was  another  battery 
of  four  guns  on  the  south  end  of  Cumberland  Island,  the  fire  of 
which  crossed  the  channel  inside  the  bar.  Moreover,  the  water 
was  so  shoal  upon  the  bar,  and  the  channel  so  crooked,  that  a 
vessel  would  necessarily  remain  a  long  time  under  fire,  and  at 
great  disadvantage  ;  and  even  when  a  fleet  had  passed  all  these 
defences  successfully,  there  still  remained  a  well-constructed  and 
naturally  masked  battery  at  the  town  which  commanded  the 
inner  anchorage.  The  precipitate  abandonment  of  all  these 


452  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

formidable  works,  including  Fort  Clinch,  when  there  were 
troops  sufficient  to  man  them,  shows  the  fear  which  had  been 
inspired  by  the  capture  of  the  forts  at  Hatteras  Inlet  and  Roa- 
noke  Island,  and  more  especially  of  those  at  Port  Royal. 

The  old  theory  of  the  superiority  of  forts  as  against  ships 
had  been  thoroughly  exploded  by  the  use  of  shell-guns,  and  as 
yet  they  had  no  settled  opinions  as  to  what  limit  might  be  set 
to  the  power  of  this  new  method  of  attack  by  steamers  with 
such  an  armament.  They  only  knew  that  thus  far  they  had 
conquered  in  every  battle,  with  no  serious  injury  to  the  ships  ; 
and  the  garrisons  of  these  works  seemed  to  have  thought  that 
inasmuch  as  they  wrould  be  beaten  in  the  fight,  it  would  be 
better  to  save  life  by  leaving  their  defences '  than  to  make  a 
vain  attempt  to  save  them. 

The  expedition  intended  to  operate  against  Fort  Clinch  and 
the  connected  works  around  Fernandina,  left  Port  Royal  on  the 
last  day  of  February,  and  on  the  2d  of  March  entered  Cumber 
land  Sound  by  St.  Andrew's  Inlet.  The  fleet  comprised  the 
following  vessels :  Ottawa,  Mohican,  Ellen,  Seminole,  Pawnee, 
Pocahontas,  Flag,  Florida,  Bienville,  James  Adger,  Alabama, 
Keystone  State,  Seneca,  Huron,  Pembina,  Penguin,  Isaac 
Smith,  Potomska,  armed  cutter  Henrietta,  and  the  transports 
McClellan,  Empire  City,  Marion,  Star  of  the  South,  Belvidere, 
Boston,  and  George  Creek,  with  a  brigade  of  troops  and  bat 
talion  of  marines.  This  squadron  entered  Cumberland  Sound 
instead  of  approaching  by  the  ocean,  in  order  to  turn  the  heavy 
works  on  the  south  end  of  Cumberland  and  the  north  end  of 
Amelia  Islands,  works  to  which  reference  has  already  been 
made. 

Soon  after  entering  the  sound,  information  was  received 
through  a  colored  man  that  the  rebels  wrere  abandoning  all  the 
fortifications  around  Fernandina,  and  were  retreating  from  Ame 
lia  Island.  Commodore  Du  Pont  at  once  sent  forward  the  light- 
draught  gunboats  and  transports,  with  orders  to  push  through 
the  sound  as  rapidly  as  possible,  and  prevent  the  destruction  of 
private  and  public  property,  or  any  other  outrages  which  might 
be  committed.  These  vessels  were  placed  under  the  command 
of  Commander  P.  Dray  ton ;  and  Commodore  Du  Pont,  with  some 
of  the  heavier  ships,  left  the  sound  and  went  to  Fernandina  by 


CAPTURE   OF   FORT   CLIXCH,    FERNANDIXA,    ETC.  453 

sea.  The  detachment  of  the  squadron  which  went  down  the  sound 
found  the  navigation  intricate  and  difficult,  and  upon  reaching 
the  flats  where  the  tides  from  the  north  and  south  meet,  it  was 
found  that  only  three  vessels,  the  Pawnee,  the  Ottawa,  and  Huron, 
were  able  to  cross.  With  these,  Commander  Drayton  pushed 
on,  and  when  only  three  miles  from  Fort  Clinch,  two  out  of 
these  three  grounded  as  the  tide  was  falling,  and  the  squadron 
was  thus  reduced  to  one  vessel,  the  Ottawa,  and  three  launches 
from  the  "Wabash.  These  incidents  show  that  the  expedition 
would  have  had  a  different  issue  if  the  rebel  soldiers  had  re 
mained  to  defend  their  works.  On  approaching  Fort  Clinch  it 
was  evident  that  it  w^as  deserted,  and  a  boat  was  sent  on  shore 
to  raise  over  it  the  American  flag ;  and  in  this  bloodless  man 
ner  the  first  national  fort  was  recovered  from  the  rebels.  When 
they  reached  Fernandina,  a  small  steamer  was  seen  endeavoring 
to  escape  up  a  creek,  but  she  was  pursued  by  the  launches, 
captured  and  brought  back.  She  was  filled  principally  with 
women  and  children,  who  were  hurrying  away  as  if  escaping 
from  savages.  She  had  also  on  board  some  military  stores. 
The  rebel  leaders,  as  it  would  seem,  had  purposely  alarmed  and 
exasperated  the  people  by  the  most  extravagant  and  false  re 
ports  of  what  might  be  expected  from  the  Yankees ;  and  when 
the  troops  left,  evidently  in  a  panic,  the  inhabitants  fled  also  in 
perfect  dismay. 

The  capture  of  St.  Mary's  and  of  St.  Augustine  followed 
almost  immediately  the  occupation  of  Fernandina,  and  thus 
before  the  close  of  the  year  1862  great  progress  had  been  made 
in  reoccupying  the  Southern  coast — a  work  by  far  the  most  im 
portant  part  of  which  was  necessarily  performed  by  the  Navy. 
The  historian  of  the  Navy,  however,  has  not  the  slightest  temp 
tation  to  underrate,  in  any  particular,  the  gallant  exploits  of  the 
Army.  It  had  a  work  of  its  own  which  it  nobly  performed, 
and  won  its  own  proper  glory.  In  all  the  operations  on  the 
Southern  coast  there  appears  to  have  been  the  most  cordial 
good  feeling  and  harmonious  cooperation  between  the  two  arms 
of  the  service ;  yet  necessarily  a  large  part  of  the  severe  and 
dangerous  labor  was  performed  by  the  Navy.  The  ships  and 
boats  were  the  pioneers  in  every  enterprise ;  the  great  guns 
cleared  the  path  for  the  Army,  and  covered  the  landing,  the 


4:54  HISTOET    OF    THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

advance,  and  the  retreat.  It  transported  or  protected  their 
stores,  received  on  board  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  silenced 
forts  and  batteries,  so  that  the  troops  could  approach  with  com 
parative  safety.  The  explorations  of  the  country  were  neces 
sarily  made  by  the  Navy,  with  its  boats  or  light-draught  steam 
ers,  along  the  shallow  waters  of  the  bays,  the  rivers,  and  muddy 
creeks — a  service  always  laborious,  always  dangerous,  and  often 
attended  with  a  loss  of  life  in  fearful  proportion  to  the  numbers 
engaged. 

Wilmington,  Charleston,  and  Savannah,  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  and  Mobile,  on  the  Gulf,  still  remained  in  the  hands  of 
the  rebels;  but  although  these  were  the  chief  cities,  yet,  as 
these  were  closely  blockaded,  "Wilmington  alone  excepted,  the 
operations  along  the  sounds  and  rivers  by  which  the  trade  on 
these  inner  waters  was  broken  up,  was  really  a  greater  injury 
to  the  rebel  cause  than  the  capture  of  all  the  large  cities  would 
have  been  without  the  occupation  of  the  inner  waters  of  North 
Carolina,  Georgia,  and  the  upper  portion  of  the  Florida  penin 
sula. 

So  soon  as  this  work  was  accomplished,  and  it  was  seen  that 
these  points  could  not  be  again  wrested  from  the  possession  of 
the  United  States,  it  was  evident  that  the  fall  of  these  cities  was 
certain  to  follow  in  due  time,  and  the  possession  of  Charleston 
and  Mobile  was  of  far  more  importance,  from  the  moral  influ 
ence  of  a  victory,  than  from  their  military  value. 

When  the  coast  had  thus  been  occupied,  and  a  lodgment 
had  also  been  made  for  the  Army  in  Tennessee  by  the  capture 
of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  the  defeat  of  the  rebellion  be 
came  only  a  question  of  time.  It  had  already  lost  its  expansive 
power ;  and  although  it  might  still  be  capable  of  making  strong 
efforts  in  particular  directions,  it  had  passed  the  climax  of  its 
strength  and  successes. 

As  in  the  North  Carolina  sounds,  after  the  capture  of  the 
Hatteras  forts  and  Roanoke  Island,  there  were  still  many 
points  w^here  the  rebels  had  established  batteries,  and  from 
which  they  fitted  out  expeditions  both  by  land  and  water,  so 
on  the  coast  of  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  and  Florida.  After 
Port  .Royal,  Brunswick,  and  Fernandina  had  been  occupied, 
there  were  along  the  rivers  and  creeks,  inlets  and  sounds,  which 


455 

are  almost  innumerable,  fortified  positions  in  all  directions — on 
the  small  islands  and  headlands — designed  to  protect  the  chan 
nels  which  form  the  highways  of  that  low  and  marshy  region. 
The  Department  believed  it  to  be  of  the  utmost  importance  to 
search  out  all  such  places,  destroy  any  works  which  might  be 
found,  capture  or  destroy  shipping  and  boats  used  in  traffic, 
and  scatter  any  bodies  of  troops  that  might  collect  within  reach 
of  the  guns  of  our  ships. 

This  perplexing  task,  so  laborious  and  dangerous  for  the 
seamen  and  inferior  officers,  was  well  performed  by  Commodore 
Du  Pont  and  his  associates  in  arms. 

These  expeditions  and  small  battles,  taken  singly,  seem  of 
little  importance,  and  yet  it  was  a  process  in  which  daily  pro 
gress  was  made  in  weakening  the  rebellion,  and  in  recovering 
the  territory  of  the  United  States  from  the  foe,  and  in  which 
daily  deeds  of  heroism  and  daring  were  performed,  and  lives 
were  sacrificed,  and  mourning  was  brought  to  many  distant 
homes.  They  formed  one  important,  though  not  prominent,  fea 
ture  of  the  war,  and  are  worthy  of  a  place  in  history,  not  only 
as  a  record  of  acts  of  peril  and  bravery,  but  as  showing  how 
extensive  and  complete  the  plan  of  the  rebels  for  defending  the 
coast  was,  and  how  great  the  labor  of  destroying  the  whole  net 
work  of  forts,  batteries,  and  obstructions,  until  at  length  all  the 
interior  channels  of  navigation,  extending  from  Norfolk  to 
Florida,  with  few  interruptions,  were  brought  under  the  control 
of  the  Government. 

One  of  these  lesser  expeditions  was  made  in  November, 
1861,  up  St.  Helena  Sound,  under  the  command  of  Commander 
Drayton.  On  the  25th  of  that  month  the  Pawnee,  the  Una- 
dilla,  the  Pembina,  and  the  Yixen  left  Port  Eoyal,  and  pro 
ceeded  up  the  sound  to  ascertain  what  works  of  defence  might 
be  found  on  the  connecting  waters.  Off  the  entrance  of  South 
Edisto  River  a  small  steamer  was  discovered,  but  her  speed 
and  light  draught  enabled  her  to  escape  up  the  river.  Soon 
after  coming  in  sight  of  the  point  of  Otter  Island,  a  formidable 
looking  earthwork  was  discovered.  The  Pawnee  and  the  gun 
boats  halted,  and  threw  some  shells  into  the  battery,  but  there 
being  no  response,  they  ceased  firing,  and  sent  a  boat  on  shore 
to  reconnoitre.  They  found  a  well-constructed  but  deserted 


456  HISTOKY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

work,  triangular  in  form,  with  two  faces  on  the  water,  of  two 
hundred  and  fifty  feet  in  length  each,  with  bastions  and  a  cur 
tain  on  the  land  side,  and  the  whole  surrounded  by  a  ditch. 
The  magazine  had  been  blown  up,  and  the  whole  was  dis 
mantled.  The  fragments  of  an  80-pounder  rifled  gun  were 
lying  there,  and  large  quantities  of  timber  and  palmetto-logs 
had  been  collected. 

This  fort  was  in  a  very  commanding  position.  All  vessels 
on  the  inland  route  to  Charleston  passed  necessarily  under  its 
guns,  and  four  miles  above  the  fort  the  South  Edisto  and 
Ashepoo  Rivers  approach  each  other  so  closely  that  a  few  guns 
on  the  narrow  neck  of  land  could  easily  control  each  stream, 
while  under  the  guns  of  the  work  on  Otter  Island  is  the  best 
anchorage  that  can  be  found  in  the  vicinity.  It  is  not  easy  to 
see  why  such  a  position  should  have  been  abandoned,  except 
through  fear  of  the  fleet  which  had  been  inspired  by  the  cap 
ture  of  Port  Royal  and  the  forts  of  the  Carolina  sounds. 

After  the  examination  of  this  work,  the  little  fleet  continued 
up  the  Coosaw,  piloted  by  Captain  Boutelle  of  the  Yixen.  Ten 
miles  from  Otter  Island,  at  the  junction  of  Barn  well  Creek 
with  the  Coosaw,  another  fort  was  discovered,  directly  ahead. 
The  engines  were  slowed  at  the  distance  of  a  mile,  and  the 
usual  complement  of  a  few  shells  was  paid  to  the  supposed  gar 
rison.  There  was  no  reply,  and  no  signs  of  occupation,  and  a 
boat  was  sent  on  shore  to  take  possession.  It  was  a  redoubt, 
with  a  ditch  on  three  sides,  the  top  of  the  parapet  being  about 
thirty  feet  above  the  water.  The  armament  had  consisted  of 
three  guns,  one  rifled  one  that  had  been  removed,  and  two  old 
18-pounders.  From  these  old  pieces  the  sailors  knocked  off  the 
trunnions,  gathered  up  a  quantity  of  intrenching-tools,  and 
some  siege-gun  carriages,  and  then  the  vessels  returned  to  Otter 
Island,  and  there  anchored  for  the  night.  The  next  day  they 
ascended  the  Ashepoo  River,  and  after  running  four  miles 
another  redoubt  was  discovered,  also  abandoned.  ':  Like  the 
others,  it  was  very  carefully  and  skilfully  constructed  with  a 
deep  ditch  around  it.  The  armament  had  been  removed,  ex 
cept  an  18-pounder  smooth-bore  and  a  20-pounder  rifle,  and 
these  had  been  burst.  At  Hunting  Island  they  found  that  the 
light-house  had  been  blown  up,  and  every  thing  valuable  had 


CAPTURE    OF   FOET   CLINCH,    FERNANDINA,    ETC.  457 

been  carried  away.  The  whole  country  seemed  quite  deserted 
by  white  men,  and  wherever  it  was  practicable  the  negroes  had 
been  removed.  On  the  south  side  of  the  river  many  still  re 
mained,  and  all  of  them  showed  the  most  friendly  spirit,  and 
were  rejoiced  at  the  coming  of  the  Yankees,  for  whom  they  had 
long  been  looking,  they  said,  and  to  whom  they  turned  with 
confidence  that  their  freedom  would  now  be  obtained.  It  is  a 
subject  worthy  of  consideration  that  the  first  serious  and  effect 
ual  blow  given  to  slavery  was  by  the  Navy,  in  the  very  focus 
and  proudest  centre  of  the  slaveholding  aristocracy  at  Beaufort, 
and  in  the  vicinity,  and  that  the  cannon  of  the  Union  fleet  at 
Hilton  Head  must  have  shaken  the  grave  of  Calhoun.  'No 
liberated  slaves  have  been  more  secure  in  their  freedom  than 
those  of  the  Sea  Islands,  and  although  the  most  ignorant  and 
degraded  of  all  the  four  millions,  in  less  than  two  years  after 
the  close  of  the  war  they  had  made  such  progress  under  North 
ern  teachers  as  to  cause  the  islands  to  produce  more  cotton  to 
the  acre  than  ever  before.  Another  account  of  a  similar  expedi 
tion  is  here  added  in  the  words  of  Commander  Kodgers  him 
self: 

IT.  S.  FLAG-SHIP  WABASH,  POKT  ROYAL  HARBOK,  December  6, 1861. 

SIR:  On  yesterday  morning  I  left  Tybee  Roads  before  daylight, 
with  the  steamers  Ottawa,  Seneca,  and  Pembina,  and  crossed  the  bar  of 
Wassaw  Sound  at  half  tide,  not  having  less  than  eighteen  feet  of  water 
upon  it. 

We  approached  the  fort  on  Wassaw  Island  witbin  a  mile,  and  see 
ing  neither  guns  nor  men,  we  did  not  fire,  but  I  sent  Lieutenant  Barnes 
to  it  with  a  white  flag.  He  found  it  an  enclosed  octagonal  work,  with 
platforms  for  eight  guns  on  the  water-faces.  The  land-faces  were  pro 
tected  by  abatis.  The  work  was  well  constructed.  The  guns  had 
been  removed,  the  platforms  cut,  and  the  magazine  blown  up.  From 
the  freshness  of  the  footprints,  and  other  signs,  it  appeared  to  have 
been  abandoned  very  recently.  Adjoining  the  fort  are  huts  or  sheds 
for  a  large  garrison.  Some  lumber  and  bricks  remain ;  every  thing  else 
had  been  carried  away. 

We  immediately  pushed  on  to  Cabbage  Island,  where  we  had  been 
led  to  look  for  another  battery,  but  there  was  nothing  of  the  kind  there. 
We  went  to  the  mouth  of  the  creek,  through  the  Romilly  Marsh,  and  to 
the  mouth  of  Wilmington  River. 

From  the  mouth  of  Wilmington  River  we  observed  a  battery  bear- 


458  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

ing  from  us  about  N.  W.  by  W.  half  W.,  and  distant  about  three  miles. 
It  is  on  the  river,  and  just  above  a  house  with  a  red  cupola,  which  is 
one  of  the  Coast  Survey's  points  of  triangulation,  and  is  about  ten  miles 
from  Savannah.  Between  the  ho'use  and  the  fort  was  a  large  encamp 
ment,  but  we  could  not  count  the  tents.  We  counted  five  guns,  appar 
ently  of  large  calibre,  on  the  face  of  the  battery  toward  us.  We  could 
only  see  one  gun  upon  the  other  face,  but  there  may  have  been  more. 
We  were  near  enough  to  see  the  men  on  the  ramparts  and  the  glitter 
ing  of  their  bayonets.  We  saw  several  small  vessels  ;  some  of  them  in 
Eomilly  Marsh  were  in  tow  of  a  small  steam-tug,  but  they  were  all  be 
yond  our  reach. 

Upon  Little  Tybee  Island  we  could  see  no  earthworks,  but  could 
not  get  nearer  to  it  than  two  miles,  because  of  the  shoals.  In  coming 
out  of  Wassaw  Sound  at  high  tide  we  had  not  less  than  twenty-one  feet 
of  water  on  the  bar. 

Returning  to  Tybee  Roads  at  1  o'clock,  I  landed  and  made  a  recon^ 
noissance  on  foot  with  the  marines  of  the  Savannah,  and  detachments 
of  small-arm  men  from  that  ship  and  the  Ottawa.  Upon  reaching  the 
mouth  of  the  Lazaretto  Creek,  having  no  boats  in  which  to  cross,  our 
progress  was  stopped.  We  waited  until  low  tide,  but  the  creek  was 
unfordable.  I  was  able,  however,  with  the  assistance  of  Lieutenant 
Luce,  to  obtain,  from  the  top  of  a  tree,  the  position  in  which  a  battery 
has  been  supposed  to  exist,  and  am  satisfied  that  there  is  no  battery 
there.  The  spar,  which  was  mistaken  for  a  derrick,  is  simply  a  place 
of  look-out,  and  there  was  no  appearance  of  any  earthwork  or  position 
for  guns.  A  battery  at  such  a  place  would  be  of  no  use  whatever. 
There  may,  however,  have  been  a  signal-gun  placed  there,  as  the  dune 
upon  which  the  spar  is  raised  is  upon  the  southeastern  part  of  Little 
Tybee  Island,  and  is  a  commanding  point  of  observation. 

I  have  to  thank  Lieutenant  Commanding  Stevens  for  the  most 
earnest,  cordial,  and  efficient  cooperation ;  and  also  Lieutenants  Com 
manding  Ammen  and  Bankhead,  whose  vessels  were  always  in  the  right 
place,  and  always  well  handled. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

G.  R.  P.  RODGERS,  Commander. 
Flag-Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT,  commanding,  etc. 

Another  and  interesting  expedition  was  made  to  St.  Helena 
Sound,  and  one  to  the  North  Edisto,  by  Commander  Drayton, 
and  by  him  is  thus  described  : 


CAPTURE   OF   FORT   CLINCH,    FERNANDINA,    ETC.  459 

TJ.  S.  STEAMER  PAWNEE,  PORT  ROYAL  HARBOR,  S.  C.,  December  9, 1861. 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  your  order  of  the  4th  instant,  I  proceeded  to 
sea  at  daylight  of  the  5th,  accompanied  by  the  gunboat  Unadilla,  Lieu 
tenant  Commanding  N.  Collins;  steamer  Isaac  Smith,  Lieutenant 
Commanding  J.  ~VV.  A.  Nicholson ;  and  Coast  Survey  steamer  Vixen, 
Captain  Boutelle,  and  reached  the  anchorage  off  the  fort  on  Otter 
Island,  St.  Helena  Sound,  at  mid-day.  In  the  course  of  the  afternoon, 
some  negroes  coming  on  board,  and  reporting  that  there  was  a  body  of 
soldiers  at  the  entrance  of  Mosquito  Creek,  a  place  up  the  Ashepoo 
where  the  inland  route  to  Charleston  commences,  I  proceeded  as  far  as 
that  place,  when  the  night  coming  on,  obliged  rne  to  return. 

I  saw,  however,  no  signs  of  the  presence  of  white  people,  excepting 
that  some  buildings,  which  I  discovered  the  next  day  to  have  been  in 
Hutchinson's  Island,  were  burning.  On  the  morning  of  the  6th,  the 
United  States  sloop  Dale,  Lieutenant  Commanding  W.  F.  Truxton,  ap~ 
pearing  off  the  harbor,  I  sent  the  Isaac  Smith  to  tow  her  in,  a  pilot  being 
furnished  by  Captain  Boutelle. 

Unfortunately,  however,  when  half-way  up,  the  Dale  stuck  fast,  and 
as  it  was  then  about  high  water,  no  exertion  could  get  her  afloat  until 
11  o'clock  of  that  night,  when  she  was  forced  into  deep  water,  without 
having  suffered  any  apparent  injury,  and  towed  the  following  morning, 
by  Captain  Boutelle,  in  the  Vixen,  around  Morgan  Island,  this  having 
become  necessary,  owing  to  her  having  forced  over  the  shoal  which 
divides  that  channel  from  the  one  she  was  in  originally.  So  soon  as  she 
was  safely  at  her  anchorage  near  us,  I  proceeded  up  the  Ashepoo  with 
the  Unadilla,  Isaac  Smith,  and  Vixen,  to  examine  that  river  farther 
up  than  I  had  been  able  to  do  on  the  previous  occasion.  On  approach 
ing  Mosquito  Creek,  we  saw  a  picket  of  soldiers,  who  took  to  their 
horses,  however,  on  our  approach,  and  escaped  into  the  woods,  hast 
ened,  perhaps,  in  their  flight  by  a  shot  or  two  which  were  thrown  after 
them. 

Continuing  up  the  river,  I  landed  on  Hutchinson's  Island,  and  found 
that  two  days  before  all  the  negro  houses,  overseer's  house,  and  out 
buildings,  together  with  the  picked  cotton,  had  been  burned. 

•  The  attempt  had  at  the  same  time  been  made  to  drive  off  the  ne 
groes,  but  many  had  escaped,  although  some  of  their  number,  they  said, 
had  been  shot  in  attempting  to  do  so.  The  scene  was  one  of  complete 
desolation;  the  smoking  ruins,  and  the  cowering  figures  which  sur 
rounded  them,  of  those  negroes,  who  still  instinctively  clung  to  their 
hearthstones,  although  there  was  no  longer  shelter  there  for  them,  pre 
sented  a  most  melancholy  sight,  the  impression  of  which  was  made 


460  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

even  stronger  by  the  piteous  wailing  of  the  poor  creatures,  a  large  por 
tion  of  whom  consisted  of  the  old  and  decrepit.  We  were  not  able  to 
leave  until  some  time  after  dark,  and  singular  enough,  the  moment  we 
were  fairly  under  way,  a  bright  signal-light  was  burned  on  the  very 
plantation  we  had  just  quitted,  showing  that  some  of  the  blacks,  for 
there  was  certainly  no  white  man  there,  were  communicating  the  fact 
of  our  departure.  On  the  following  morning,  with  the  same  vessels,  I 
stalled  to  explore  the  Coosaw  River,  but  very  soon  after  leaving,  the 
Unadilla,  unfortunately,  was  completely  disabled  by  the  breaking  .  of  a 
main  crosshead,  and  I  was  obliged  to  leave  her  at  anchor,  and  continue 
on  with  the  other  two  vessels.  When  off  Fort  Hey  ward,  I  left  the  Isaac 
Smith,  it  not  being  quite  safe  to  take  so  long  a  vessel  higher  up,  and 
continued  in  the  Vixen  as  far  as  the  entrance  of  the  Beaufort  Creek  to 
a  place  called  the  Brick  Yards,  where  I  had  been  told  there  was  either 
a  fort  or  a  guard  of  soldiers.  Nothing,  hewever,  being  seen  of  either, 
I  anchored  off  a  plantation  belonging  to  Mr.  By  the  wood  close  by, 
for  the  purpose  of  getting  information,  as  I  saw  a  great  many  negroes 
there. 

On  landing,  I  found  that  a  short  time  previously  the  cotton-house 
with  its  contents  had  been  burned,  and  all  of  the  negroes  that  could  be 
caught  had  been  taken  away.  Here  were  large  numbers  of  those,  how 
ever,  who  had  left  Hutchinson's  Island  after  their  houses  had  been 
burned,  and  who,  with  their  household  effects  piled  up  about  them, 
lined  the  beach ;  some  of  them  begging  to  be  permitted  to  go  to  Otter 
Island,  saying  that  they  had  neither  shelter  nor  food,  were  taken  back 
with  us. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  I  returned  down  the  river,  reaching  our  an 
choring  off  Fort  Otter  at  sunset,  the  Unadilla  having  been  towed  to 
the  same  place  by  the  Isaac  Smith.  As  I  did  not  see  that  the  services 
of  the  Pawnee  were  any  longer  necessary  in  St.  Helena  Sound,  and 
thinking  it  important  to  get  the  Unadilla  as  soon  as  possible  to  a  place 
where  her  engines  could  be  repaired,  I  determined  this  morning  to  tow 
that  vessel  to  Port  Royal  Harbor,  which  I  have  done,  reaching  here,  in 
company  with  the  Vixen,  at  half-past  seven  this  evening. 

In  obedience  to  your  instructions,  before  leaving,  I  transferred  the 
charge  of  the  fort  and  adjacent  waters  to  Lieutenant  Commanding 
Nicholson,  who,  with  the  Isaac  Smith  and  Dale,  will  remain  there  until 
he  receives  further  orders  from  yourself. 

As  about  one  hundred  and  forty  negroes,  most  of  them  in  a  very 
destitute  condition,  had  collected  at  Otter  Island  before  my  departure, 
I  directed  Lieutenant  Commanding  Nicholson  to  see  that  they  were 


CAPTUEE    OF   FOET   CLINCH,    FERXANDENA,    ETC.  461 

supplied  with  food  until  some  disposition  could  be  made  of  them,  or 
until  he  had  heard  from  you. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

P.  DRAYTON,  Commander. 
Flag- Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT, 

commanding  South  Atlantic  Squadron, 

Port  Royal  Harbor,  South  Carolina. 


U.  S.  STEAMER  PAWNEE,  PORT  ROTAL,  S.  C.,  December '21, 1861. 

SIR:  In  obedience  to  your  order  of  the  14th  instant,  I  left  this  har 
bor  at  daylight  of  the  16th  instant,  accompanied  by  the  gunboat  Sen 
eca,  Lieutenant  Commanding  Daniel  Ammen,  and  Coast  Survey  steamer 
Vixen,  Captain  C.  O.  Boutelle,  but  at  the  bar  found  that  the  heavy 
northeaster  which  was  blowing  had  raised  such  a  sea  as  to  render  it  out 
of  the  question  to  attempt  entering  the  rivers  which  I  was  directed  to 
examine.  I  therefore  returned  to  my  anchorage,  which  I  left  a  second 
time,  however,  on  the  following  morning,  and  reached  the  North  Edisto 
at  2  o'clock.  Shortly  after  I  crossed  the  bar  with  the  Seneca,  piloted 
in  by  Captain  Boutelle  in  the  Vixen,  which  vessel  he,  however,  left 
when  we  were  inside  for  the  Pawnee,  his  vessel  remaining  astern  of  us. 

At  this  time  we  could  plainly  see  fortifications  ahead  on  Edisto 
Island,  distant  a  mile  and  a  half.  As  it  was  reported  to  me  they  were 
filled  with  men,  I  commenced  firing  slowly  from  my  bow-guns,  as  did 
the  Seneca,  but  receiving  no  answer  soon  ceased,  and  running  by  the 
batteries  anchored  in  the  North  Edisto  River.  On  landing  I  found  the 
fort,  which  was  entirely  deserted,  to  consist  of  two  redoubts  for  five 
guns  each,  connected  by  a  long  curtain,  and  protected  in  the  rear  by  a 
double  fence  of  thick  plank,  with  earth  between,  and  loop-holed.  The 
guns,  as  the  negroes  informed  me,  had  all  been  removed  toward  Charles 
ton  some  weeks  back.  "While  I  was  making  this  examination  Lieuten 
ant  Commanding  Ammen  had  proceeded  up  the  river  for  about  five 
miles,  the  effect  of  which  was  immediately  apparent  in  the  firing  of 
cotton-houses  and  out-buildings. 

As  during  the  night  some  negroes  came  on  board  and  informed  us 
that  at  the  small  town  of  Rockville,  which  was  in  full  sight,  there  was  a 
large  encampment  of  soldiers,  at  least  five  hundred,  and  Captain  Bou 
telle  offering  to  go  up  the  creek  on  which  it  was,  I  determined  to  make 
them  a  visit  in  the  Vixen,  and  at  daylight  on  the  17th  went  on  board 
that  vessel  for  the  purpose,  taking  with  rne  the  boats  and  marines  of  the 
Pawnee  and  Seneca,  under  charge  of  Acting  Master  Snell.  Owing  to 
our  running  ashore  we  did  not  reach  the  town  until  near  8  o'clock,  a 


462  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

little  above  which  was  a  sloop  laden  with  cotton  and  provisions,  which 
I  took  possession  of  and  towed  alongside. 

There  being  still  no  signs  of  life  on  shore,  I  landed  with  about  fifty 
men  to  reconnoitre,  and  was  soon  satisfied  that  the  troops  had  left,  as 
the  first  thing  seen  was  the  negroes  pillaging  a  building,  in  which  was  a 
large  quantity  of  commissariat  stores,  consisting  of  rice,  sugar,  bacon, 
corn,  etc.  This  I  stopped  at  once,  and  had  what  remained  removed  to 
the  Vixen. 

Being  then  informed  that  the  camp,  which  was  a  mile  from  the 
water,  was  entirely  deserted,  I  went  there,  but  although,  so  far  as  I 
could  learn,  the  troops  had  left  at  daylight,  and  it  was  then  only  a  little 
after  eight,  the  negroes,  whom  I  found  as  busy  as  bees,  had  removed 
the  most  valuable  part  of  what  had  been  left,  which  was  nearly  every 
thing,  excepting  their  arms.  The  encampment  was  a  large  one,  had 
been  occupied  for  many  months,  and  its  late  tenants  had  evidently  been 
in  the  possession  of  every  comfort.  I  removed  to  the  boats  forty  Sibley 
and  four  ordinary  tents,  besides  a  quantity  of  articles  of  no  particular 
value,  which  were  lying  about ;  and  found  at  a  neighboring  house,  which 
seemed  to  have  been  used  as  headquarters,  a  Confederate  flag. 

Having  pretty  well  cleared  the  ground  of  what  was  worth  removing, 
and  being  desirous  of  examining  above,  I  left  at  2  o'clock,  and  proceed 
ing  up  the  river  with  the  Vixen,  not  liking  to  trust  the  Pawnee  in  so 
narrow  a  channel,  came  on  the  Seneca,  which  had  started  at  9  o'clock 
to  explore,  fast  on  a  mud-bank.  We  remained  by  her  until  9  o'clock, 
but  found  it  impossible  to  pull  her  off,  owing  to  the  night  tide  not 
being  as  high  as  the  morning  one.  While  lying  here,  however,  I  sent 
the  boats  and  burnt  a  sloop  which  had  been  run  ashore  some  distance 
beyond,  while  attempting  to  escape  from  the  Seneca,  and  which  could 
not  be  got  afloat. 

The  Vixen  afterward  returned  for  the  night  to  the  neighborhood  of 
the  Pawnee,  but  went  back  at  daylight  of  the  following  morning  with  a 
party  of  men  and  boats  from  this  vessel  to  lighten  the  Seneca,  which 
vessel  was  got  off  at  high  tide. 

While  the  Vixen  was  running  up  the  river  she  came  on  a  small 
sloop  laden  with  cotton,  from  which  two  white  men  were  taken,  whom 
I  now  have  on  board  as  prisoners.  As  in  the  mean  time  nearly  a  hun 
dred  and  fifty  negroes,  all  in  a  great  state  of  alarm,  had  collected  on 
board  the  different  vessels,  I  determined  to  land  them  on  the  point,  and 
called  in  the  United  States  steamer  Penguin,  which  was  cruising  off  the 
port,  and  to  leave  Lieutenant  Commanding  Budd  in  charge  of  the  river, 
after  my  departure,  until  he  could  hear  from  you.  Captain  Boutelle 


FERNA^TDINA,    ETC.  463 

was  kind  enough  to  go  out  in  the  Vixen  and  pilot  the  Penguin  into  her 
anchorage  off  the  fort,  where  she  now  is. 

On  the  morning  of  the  10th  I  ran  down  to  the  South  Edisto,  and 
leaving  the  Pawnee  and  Seneca  at  the  bar,  went  in  with  the  Vixen.  I 
found  the  fortifications  which  are  on  Edisto  Island  entirely  deserted 
and  partially  destroyed.  They  consisted  of  two  redoubts,  which  mount 
ed,  as  far  as  I  could  judge,  four  guns  each,  but  the  guns  had  been  re 
moved.  The  Dale  being  in  sight  across  Otter  Island,  in  the  Ashepoo,  I 
made  signal,  and  Lieutenant  Commanding  Truxton  pulled  over  with 
four  boats.  He  reported  that  every  thing  was  quiet  in  the  neighbor 
hood  of  his  anchorage,  and  that  the  fort  on  Otter  Island  was  rapidly 
being  placed  in  a  state  of  defence.  Up  to  the  present  time,  although 
they  had  been  in  sight  of  the  South  Edisto  forts,  where  we  were  lying, 
they  had  not  yet  landed  there. 

Having  finished  my  examination  of  the  South  Edisto,  I  returned  to 
the  Pawnee  and  stood  north,  with  the  intention  of  lying  oft'  Stono  for 
the  night;  but,  as  the  weather  looked  threatening,  and  the  Vixen  was 
almost  out  of  coal,  I  went  into  the  North  Edisto  again  for  the  night,  in 
order  to  have  an  opportunity  of  supplying  her  with  some.  Lieutenant 
Commanding  Budd  reported  every  thing  as  when  I  left ;  but  on  the 
following  morning  negroes  came  in  and  stated  that  the  troops  who  had 
left  the  encampment  at  Rockville,  being  largely  reen  forced,  showed  a 
disposition  to  reoccupy  that  place. 

As  the  weather  was  too  threatening  to  permit  my  making  a  careful 
examination  of  the  Stono,  as  I  intended,  I  determined  now  to  return  at 
once  to  this  place  and  report  to  you  the  state  of  affairs  at  the  North 
Edisto.  This  I  have  done,  reaching  my  anchorage  here  at  3  o'clock  to 
day,  although  somewhat  delayed  by  the  sea  raised  by  a  very  heavy 
northeaster  which  is  blowing  outside.  Lieutenant  Commanding  Ammen 
I  sent  to  Charleston,  to  report  that  the  Penguin  was  in  the  North  Edisto, 
and  with  directions  to  look  into  the  Stono  River  on  his  way,  and  see  if 
he  could  make  out  the  fortifications,  which  the  negroes  tell  me  are  there 
in  great  strength. 

I  cannot  conclude  without  expressing  my  indebtedness  for  the  ready 
assistance  rendered  by  Lieutenant  Commanding  Ammen  and  Captain 
Boutelle  in  carrying  out  the  objects  of  the  expedition. 
Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

P.  DRAYTON,  commanding. 
Flag-Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT,  commanding  South  Atlantic  Squadron. 


CHAPTER   XXVIII. 


MOVEMENTS  OF  THE  REBELS.— OPERATIONS  ON  THE  SOUNDS,  INLETS, 

AND  RIVERS. 


IF  the  reader  will  examine  a  map  of  the  coast  from  Charles 
ton  to  St.  Augustine,  he  will  see  that  within  the  coast-line  there 
is  a  perfect  net- work  of  rivers,  small  sounds,  bays,  inlets,  and 
connecting  channels,  covering  the  whole  country  adjacent  to 
the  ocean.  As  indicated  in  the  preceding  chapter,  almost 
countless  earthworks  had  been  constructed  to  guard  these  water 
highways;  forming,  as  they  did,  not  only  an  inland  channel 
between  Charleston  and  Savannah,  but  the  means  of  extended 
communication  with  the  surrounding  country.  The  shock  occa 
sioned  by  the  capture  of  the  forts  at  Port  Royal  was  so  great 
that  most  of  these  which  could  be  reached  by  our  gunboats 
appeared  at  first  deserted,  and  the  troops  and  the  inhabitants, 
except  the  blacks,  fled  together.  But  ere  long  there  were  evi 
dences  of  a  reaction.  Some  deserted  positions  were  reoccupied, 
bodies  of  troops  assembled,  as  if  with  the  purpose  of  combining 
for  an  attack,  and  it  was  evident  that  the  rebels  would  attempt 
to  recover  what  they  had  lost. 

In  the  latter  part  of  December  one  of  the  plans  of  the  ene 
my  was  so  far  disclosed  as  to  demand  immediate  attention. 
This  plan  was  to  shut  up  and  capture  our  troops  on  Port  Royal 
Island.  The  method  proposed  wras  to  place  obstructions  in  the 
Coosaw  River  and  the  channel  called  the  Whale  Branch,  and, 
in  addition  to  these,  to  construct  batteries  at  Port  Royal  Ferry, 
at  Seabrook,  and  at  Boyd's  Neck.  By  these  they  hoped  to  iso 
late  the  troopSj  prevent  the  approach  of  the  gunboats,  while 
they  assembled  some  three  thousand  men  at  points  from  which 


OPEEATIONS    ON   THE    SOUNDS,    INLETS,    AND   KIYEES.         465 

they  could  easily  make  a  combined  attack.     This  scheme  it 
was  thought  necessary  to  defeat. 

For  this  purpose  a  joint  expedition  was  planned  by  General 
Sherman  and  Commander  Du  Pont,  and,  the  troops  having 
been  put  under  the  command  of  General  Stevens,  it  was  de 
cided  to  move  on  E"ew- Year's  day.  The  naval  force  was  as  fol 
lows  :  the  Ottawa.  Lieutenant  Commanding  Stevens ;  Pembina, 
Lieutenant  Bankhead;  the  four  armed  boats  of  the  "Wabash, 
commanded  by  Lieutenants  Upshur,  Luce,  Irwin,  and  Acting 
Master  Kempff,  to  enter  the  Coosaw  by  Beaufort  River  ;  while 
the  Seneca,  Lieutenant  Ammen,  and  the  tug-boat  Ellen  were  to 
move  up  Beaufort  River  and  approach  the  batteries  at  Sea- 
brook  and  Port  Royal  Ferry  by  Whale  Branch.  The  armed 
tug  C.  B.  Hale  was  afterward  sent  forward,  and  the  whole  was 
placed  under  the  command  of  Commodore  G.  R.  P.  Rodgers. 
The  work  assigned  the  JSTavy  was,  to  cover  the  landing  of  the 
troops,  to  clear  the  woods  for  their  advance,  and  silence  the 
batteries  as  they  were  reached. 

This  force,  having  been  collected  at  Beaufort  on  the  31st  of 
December,  remained  there  until  after  dark,  that  no  intimation 
might  be  given  of  the  proposed  attack.  So  soon  as  the  night 
had  closed  in,  so  as  to  conceal  the  vessels,  they  moved  up  to  a 
point  two  miles  from  the  Coosaw,  and  anchored  until  daylight. 
At  4  o'clock  in  the  morning  they  moved  forward  to  the  ap 
pointed  rendezvous,  received  on  board  General  Stevens  with 
his  troops,  and  crossing  the  Coosaw  to  Heywood's  plantation, 
where  a  part  of  the  troops  were  landed  under  cover  of  the  gun 
boats.  Two  howitzers  from  the  Wabash  were  sent  with  the 
troops,  to  serve  as  a  section  of  light  artillery,  under  Lieutenant 
Irwin.  At  a  place  called  the  Brick  Yards  is  a  very  difficult 
passage,  through  which  Lieutenant  Stevens  with  much  labor 
succeeded  in  bringing  the  Ottawa.  At  10  o'clock  the  gunboats 
and  launches  were  stationed  at  the  point  chosen  for  landing  the 
second  body  of  the  troops,  so  as  to  cover  the  landing  and  the 
line  of  march.  At  1.30  P.  M.  General  Stevens  was  ready  to 
move.  The  gunboats  took  their  positions,  and,  steaming  slowly 
just  in  advance  of  the  skirmishers,  swept  the  woods  with  their 
shells,  cleared  the  road  for  the  column,  and  then  advancing 
poured  a  heavy  fire  into  the  fort  at  Port  Royal  Ferry. 
30 


466  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

This  new  feature  in  war  is  deserving  of  more  notice  than 
it  has  hitherto  received.  So  far  as  is  known  to  the  writer,  it 
was  an  American  invention,  a  new  creation  produced  by  the 
peculiar  character  of  our  struggle.  In  fact,  it  was  an  operation 
requiring  for  its  successful  performance  what  had  no  existence 
before  the  rebellion — light-draught  gunboats  armed  with  heav 
ier  guns  than  had  been  mounted  before  on  a  broadside  ship.  It 
was  a  combination  of  power  that  no  land  force  could  in  any 
manner  resist.  The  gunboats  on  the  water  and  the  troops  on 
land  formed  the  two  parts  of  one  grand  column,  advancing 
with  equal  movement,  before  which  bodies  of  troops  and  field 
artillery  were  as  chaff  before  the  whirlwind,  and  to  which  even 
forts  could  ofter  no  effectual  resistance.  The  gunboats,  armed 
with  heavy  Parrott  rifles,  and  11-inch  smooth-bores,  firing  shells, 
grape,  or  canister,  as  the  case  required,  keeping  just  in  advance 
of  the  land  column,  could  clear  the  front  of  every  living  thing 
capable  of  opposition,  so  that  the  troops  marched  on  secure. 
The  accuracy  with  which  the  rifles  threw  their  shells  rendered 
it  unsafe  for  even  small  bodies  of  cavalry  to  show  themselves 
within  a  distance  of  one  and  even  two  miles,  and  the  range 
of  grape  and  canister  from  the  11-inch  guns  was  found  to  be 
greater  than  had  been  supposed. 

Within  two  miles  of  the  gunboats  the  rebels  learned  to  feel 
unsafe,  and  the  idea  of  attacking  a  column  advancing  under 
cover  of  the  big  guns  was  entirely  out  of  the  question.  Within 
reach  of  these  they  could  form  no  safe  ambush  or  camping- 
ground,  for  the  shells  tore  through  the  forest,  scattering  death 
with  their  own  fragments  and  the  splinters  and  limbs  of  trees, 
while  the  grape  and  canister,  hurled  almost  by  the  bushel  from 
the  11-inch  guns,  swept  every  covert  in  the  grass  and  under 
brush,  so  that  there  could  be  no  safety  in  concealment.  Wher 
ever  the  Army  marched  within  range  of  navigable  water,  the 
gunboats,  from  the  celerity  of  their  movements,  might  be  said 
to  form  a  tight  artillery  of  11-inch  guns,  and  30-pounder,  50- 
pounder,  and  100-pounder  rifles,  more  effective  for  destruction 
or  defence  than  if  they  could  have  been  moved  with  equal 
speed  and  swiftness  on  the  land.  The  gunboats  were  a  line  of 
skirmishers  armed  with  11-inch  guns.  The  experience  which 
the  rebels  had  with  the  gunboats  at  Roanoke  and  Newbern, 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE    SOUNDS,    INLETS,    AND   EIVERS.          467 

at  Shiloh,  Belmont,  Malvern  Hill,  and  generally  along  all  their 
rivers,  made  them  objects  of  terror  to  their  armies.  For  bodies 
of  troops  to  stand  within  range  of  these  broadsides  was  simply 
an  impossible  thing,  whatever  their  courage  or  daring  might  be. 

The  enemy  did  not  wait  for  the  attack,  and  the  squadron 
anchored  in  front  of  the  battery  at  2.40  p.  M.  A  quantity  of 
8-inch  shells  and  30-pounder  rifled  shells  were  found  in  the 
magazine,  but  the  guns  had  been  removed.  In  the  mean  time 
the  other  vessels  had  succeeded  in  destroying  the  works  at  Sea- 
brook,  but  were  unable  to  get  up  the  river  because  of  the  low 
water. 

In  the  course  of  the  afternoon  the  enemy  appeared  in  force 
and  in  line  of  battle  on  the  right  of  our  advancing  column, 
where  they  had  planted  a  battery  of  several  pieces  of  field  ar 
tillery,  and  had  opened  fire.  The  value  of  these  light-draught 
gunboats  and  their  heavy  armament  was  soon  seen.  The  Otta 
wa  and  Pembina  moved  a  short  distance  down  the  river  and 
opened  upon  the  enemy  a  destructive  fire  from  11-inch  and 
Parrott  guns.  The  shells  fell  in  the  midst  of  the  troops,  and 
burst  on  all  sides  with  such  fatal  and  demoralizing  effect  as  to 
scatter  them  in  confusion,  and  drive  them  for  shelter  into  the 
more  distant  woods,  and  the  flank  of  our  column  was  cleared. 

The  rebels  sent  a  flag  of  truce,  asking  permission  to  carry 
off  their  killed  and  wounded.  Before  General  Stevens  could 
send  a  reply  the  gunboats,  which  had  ceased  firing  for  a  time, 
reopened  without  knowing  that  such  a  request  had  been  sent. 
Soon  after,  firing  ceased  for  the  night.  Next  morning  the  ene 
my  again  appeared  in  the  woods,  as  if  contemplating  a  fresh 
attack.  Five  of  the  gunboats  at  once  took  position,  and  hurled 
upon  them  a  storm  of  shells  that  scattered  them  once  more. 
The  object  of  the  expedition,  the  dismantling  of  the  forts,  and 
clearing  out  obstructions,  having  been  accomplished,  the  troops 
were  reembarked.  The  channel  of  the  Coosaw  is  so  narrow 
that  the  gunboats  could  not  turn  in  the  usual  manner,  and  they 
were  very  often  aground,  yet  none  of  them  were  injured,  and 
their  adaptation  to  this  service  in  the  tortuous  river  channels 
and  shallow  waters  of  the  sounds  and  bays  was  admirably 
shown.  Thus  was  frustrated  one  of  the  first  attempts  of  the 
rebels  to  recover  their  lost  ground. 


468  HISTORY   OF    THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

About  the  same  time  with  the  expedition  just  mentioned, 
a  blockade-runner  was  caught  by  the  bark  Gem  of  the  Seas. 
She  was  cruising  off  the  north  end  of  North  Island,  when,  about 
half-past  7  o'clock  in  the  morning,  a  schooner  was  seen 
running  down  the  coast,  close  in  shore.  The  Gem  at  once 
tacked,  and  stood  to  the  northeast  for  the  purpose  of  cutting 
her  off.  The  schooner  thereupon  hauled  to  the  wind,  and  stood 
in  for  the  land.  The  Gem  at  once  tacked  again,  hoisted  her 
colors,  and  gave  chase.  As  the  schooner  refused  to  show  any 
colors,  a  shot  was  fired  across  her  bows,  to  which  she  paid  no 
attention.  A  second  shot  was  fired,  which  fell  astern.  The 
third  one  struck  her,  passing  through  her  bulwarks,  and  glancing, 
passed  through  her  deck.  She,  however,  kept  on  her  course, 
and  soon  passed  into  the  north  entrance,  but  after  running  a 
quarter  of  a  mile  grounded,  and  was  set  afire  and  deserted  by 
her  crew.  Boats  were  immediately  dispatched  in  the  hope  of 
saving  her.  She  proved  to  be  the  English  schooner  Prince  of 
"Wales,  from  Nassau,  one  of  the  neutral  squadron  which  England 
so  vigorously  maintained  during  the  war,  forfeiting  a  friendship 
which  afterward  she  would  have  been  most  happy  to  regain, 
when,  alas  for  her,  it  could  not  be  easily  obtained.  Her  cabin 
was  in  flames,  and  the  wind  was  rapidly  driving  the  fire  for 
ward.  As  the  tide  rose,  she  swung  off  with  her  head  to  the 
wind,  and  thus  taking  the  flames  over  the  stern.  The  sailors 
seized  whatever  came  to  hand,  saucepans,  kettles,  coffee-pots, 
dishes,  anything  that  would  hold  water,  and  after  an  hour's 
hard  labor  in  throwing  on  water  and  salt,  the  fire  was  subdued. 
They  then  began  to  tow  her  out  of  the  creek  with  the  boats,  and 
for  a  short  time  the  prospect  for  a  little  prize-money  was  quite 
encouraging,  but  suddenly  a  volley  of  rifle-balls  from  the  shore 
compelled  them  to  abandon  their  course,  and  attempt  to  take 
her  through  the  breakers.  Here  she  grounded,  and  finding  no 
channel  which  did  not  run  within  range  of  the  rifles,  they  were 
compelled  to  abandon  her,  having  first  set  her  on  fire  in  several 
places.  When  the  last  boat  was  ready  to  leave,  and  was  cross 
ing  the  breakers,  some  rebel  riflemen  who  had  crept  along  the 
beach  suddenly  rose  up  and  opened  fire  upon  them,  and  a  run 
ning  but  bloodless  fight  was  kept  up  until  the  boats  were  out 
of  range.  The  schooner  was  finally  consumed. 


OPERATIONS   ON   THE    SOUNDS,    INLETS,    AND   RIVERS.          469 

Incidents  like  this  are  recorded,  not  because  they  are  in 
themselves  of  great  importance,  but  because  they  serve  to  show 
the  almost  daily  occupation  of  our  seamen,  and  bring  to  light 
that  continuous  work  of  the  Navy  which,  although  hidden  by 
the  splendor  of  more  brilliant  exploits,  was  absolutely  essential 
to  final  success,  and  without  which  the  great  battles  could  not 
have  been  fought.  The  daily  work  of  the  Xavy  was  the  foun 
dation  on  which  the  war  in  the  Southwest  rested.  One  purpose 
of  the  officers  in  the  neighborhood  of  Charleston,  Savannah, 
Brunswick,  and  Fernandina,  was  to  gather  the  negroes  from 
the  abandoned  plantations,  and  locate  them  in  colonies  in 
order  to  protect  them,  and  to  provide  some  reliable  method  of 
supplying  them  with  food,  which  at  first,  at  that  season  of  the 
year,  and  in  the  condition  of  the  country,  was  a  matter  of  some 
difficulty.  It  was  an  affecting  sight  to  see  these  poor  creatures 
taken  away  from  the  only  homes  they  knew,  and  gathered  by 
hundreds  into  encampments  under  the  guns  of  our  ships,  where 
they  could  not  have  even  the  slender  comforts  of  their  plantation 
home,  and  where  the  sick  and  infirm  old  men  and  women,  and 
children,  necessarily  suffered  much;  and  yet  they  hailed  the 
ships  everywhere  with  delight,  and  regarded  our  sailors  as 
deliverers,  and  welcomed  freedom  even  with  these  hard  con. 
ditions,  and  from  the  discomforts  and  sufferings  of  these  rude 
colonies  they  took  their  first  upward  step  in  progress  and  civil 
ization.  Their  loyalty  which  no  suffering  could  diminish,  their 
steadfast  faith  that  the  hour  of  their  deliverance  had  come, 
appeared  like  an  inspiration.  It  seemed  like  a  spell  upon  every 
mind  which  kept  them  hopeful  and  believing  under  every  dis 
couragement.  What  seemed  the  hard  necessity  of  gathering 
them  up  from  the  plantations  into  encampments  or  colonies  was 
made  by  the  Lord  in  whom  they  trusted  the  occasion  of  confer 
ring  upon  them  their  first  great  blessing.  It  made  it  possible  to 
reach  them  with  teachers,  and  the  foundations  were  laid  of  that 
system  of  instruction  by  which  they  soon  made  rapid  progress 
in  a  true  civilization. 

So  soon  as  the  rebels  had  recovered  somewhat  from  their 
panic,  their  first  thought  seemed  to  be  to  return  to  the  deserted 
plantations,  and  gather  up  all  the  negroes  that  could  be  found, 
and  drive  them  into  the  interior,  or  shoot  them  down  in  revenge 


4YO  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

for  their  having  favored  the  cause  of  the  Union,  and  fled  to  our 
soldiers  and  sailors  for  protection.     The  islands  and  the  adjacent 
country  were  the  scenes  of  daily  outrage  and  murder.     Squads 
of  rebel  cavalry  prowled   around    every  accessible    spot,   and 
troops  gathered  where  they  could  be  secure  from  the  gunboats, 
or  they  brought  field  batteries  and  planted  them  in  ambush  at 
points  where  our  vessels  would  pass,  or  attempted  to  reoccupy 
the  batteries  that  had  been   dismantled,  or  they  scouted  the 
country  to  destroy  cotton  that  they  feared  might  fall  into  our 
hands,  or  carried  oif  or  destroyed  corn  that  the  negroes  might 
use.     To  watch  against,  meet,  and  defeat  these  ever-varying 
methods  of  attack  in  such  a  country  was  a  service  whose  per 
plexity,  labor,  and  peril,  had  no  intermission  by  night  or  by  day. 
The  light-draught  gunboats  were  constantly  pushing  their  way 
through  the  only  half-fluid  water  of  the  narrow  and  shallow 
channels,  and  their  boats  in  every  direction  along  the  creeks, 
exposed  ever  to  hidden  riflemen.      The  negroes  could  not  be 
sent  to  gather  corn  without  the  guard  of  one  or  more  boats  and 
a  howitzer  ;  and  when  it  is  considered  that  some  of  the  colonies 
numbered  more  than  a  thousand,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  task 
of  collecting  food  for  them  under  such  circumstances  was  by 
no  means  a  small  one.     But  the  N"avy  was,  in  this,  performing 
a  work  nobler  even  than  fighting  great  battles.     It  was  helping 
to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  new  civilization  for  four  millions  of 
people ;  it  was  the  beginning  of  the  successful  solution  of  the 
great  problem  of  free  labor  and  civilization  for  the  enslaved 
race ;  it  was  an  experiment  which  settled  the  question  in  favor 
of  freedom  forever.     The  sailors  and  soldiers  who  protected  and 
fed  the  freedmen  of  the  Sea  Islands,  the  far-seeing  Christian 
philanthropists  who  at  once  arranged  to  send  them  teachers,  the 
noble  men  and  women  who  offered  themselves  for  that  service, 
performed  one  of  the  most  heroic  and  important  works  of  the  war. 
The  gunners,  by  daily  practice,  became  so  skilful  in  the  use 
of  their  immense  rifles  and  smooth-bore  shell-guns,  they  learned 
to  calculate  distances  by  the  eye  with  such  wonderful  accuracy, 
so  as  to  decide  whether  a  five-second,  or  ten-second,  or  fifteen  - 
second  fuse  was  needed,  that  it  was  a  very  perilous  thing  for 
even  a  small  company  of  rebels  to   show  themselves  within 
range,  and  these  squads  often  made  fatal  mistakes  in  miscalcu- 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE    SOUNDS,    INLETS,    AND   RIVERS.         471 

lating  the  distance  at  which  a  shell  could  reach  them.  In  this 
manner  the  rebels  were  prevented  from  making  any  formidable 
concentration  of  troops  for  the  recovery  of  the  islands,  for  the 
dreaded  gunboats  could  shell  them  out  of  any  position ;  and 
thus  effectual  protection  was  given  to  the  negroes,  who  ere  long, 
under  the  guidance  of  their  friends,  began  to  show  the  rudiments 
of  social  order,  and  started  in  that  progress  which,  though  the 
first  steps  were  slow  and  painful,  was  not  afterward  seriously 
interrupted. 

Inasmuch  as,  early  in  1862,  the  means  were  not  at  command 
to  attempt  the  reduction  of  Fort  Pulaski,  it  was  thought  pos 
sible  that  some  channel  might  be  discovered  whereby  the  Savan 
nah  River  might  be  entered  by  our  gunboats  above  the  fort,  and 
so  communication  would  be  cut  off  between  it  and  Savannah  ; 
or,  if  it  should  be  found  impracticable  to  enter  the  river,  it  was 
deemed  probable  that  some  one  of  the  numerous  channels  would 
permit  the  gunboats  to  approach  near  enough  to  command  the 
river  with  their  guns.  On  the  first  of  February  an  expedition 
was  fitted  out  under  the  command  of  Fleet-Captain  C.  II.  Davis, 
for  the  purpose  of  making  this  reconnoissance.  It  consisted  of 
the  Ottawa,  Lieutenant  Stevens  ;  the  Seneca,  Captain  Ammen, 
and  the  armed  steamers  Isaac  Smith,  Nicholson,  Potomska,  and 
Watmough;  the  Ellen,  the  Western  "World,  and  two  armed 
launches,  and  the  transports  Cosmopolitan,  Delaware,  and  Bos 
ton  ;  on  board  of  which  were  twenty-four  hundred  men  under 
the  command  of  Brigadier-General  H.  G.  Wright.  The  object 
of  this  reconnoissance  was  to  explore  the  channels  connected 
with  Wassaw  Sound.  In  this  sound  the  fleet  anchored  for  the 
night.  The  next  morning,  owing  to  the  shoalness  of  the 
water  and  the  difficulties  of  the  channel  it  was  half-past  8 
o'clock  before  they  could  enter  the  passage  called  Little  Tybee 
River,  or  Freeborn  Cut,  a  channel  which  passes  within  long  rifle 
range  of  Fort  Pulaski,  on  its  southern  face,  which  was  not  pre 
pared  for  an  enemy  on  that  side.  The  fleet,  therefore,  was  not 
fired  upon  from  the  fort  as  they  passed  it  about  half-past  one 
o'clock,  but  the  garrison  could  be  seen  actively  engaged  in 
making  preparations  to  open  upon  them  on  their  return.  Soon 
after  passing  the  high  land  on  Wilmington  Island,  they  came  to 
a  double  row  of  heavy  piles  driven  across  the  channel,  which 


472  HISTOEY   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

prevented  the  further  progress  of  the  gunboats.  Presuming 
that,  as  usual,  batteries  had  been  erected,  by  which  these  obstruc 
tions  were  commanded,  boats  were  sent  on  shore,  and  a  thorough 
examination  made,  but  no  traces  of  such  works  were  discovered. 
The  rebels,  as  soon  appeared,  depended  upon  their  fleet  to  aid 
in  guarding  the  channel.  At  5  o'clock  this  fleet  of  five  steam 
ers,  under  Commodore  Tatnall,  came  down  the  Savannah 
Eiver  and  anchored  in  the  mouth  of  the  creek.  As  our  gunboats 
could  not  pass  the  piles,  the  rebels  had  the  power  to  choose  their 
distance,  and  a  battle  was  expected.  The  night,  however,  passed 
quietly.  The  next  morning  the  rebel  steamers  attempted  to 
pass  down  the  river  with  some  scows  in  tow,  when  our  gunboats 
opened  fire  upon  them,  and  after  a  fight  of  half  an  hour,  the 
enemy's  flag-ship  and  one  other  steamer  were  driven  back,  and 
the  other  three  escaped  without  injury  and  went  down  to  Fort 
Pulask;i.  One  of  the  steamers  driven  back  was  said  to  have 
sunk  at  the  wharf  after  reaching  the  city. 

At  2  o'clock  the  three  steamers  returned  from  the  fort,  and 
the  fight  was  recommenced.  It  was,  however,  then  low  water, 
and  the  decks  of  the  steamers  on  both  sides  were  sunk  almost  to 
the  level  of  the  marsh  between  them,  and  the  shot  which  on  the 
water  would  have  reached  by  ricochet,  spent  their  force  gener 
ally  in  the  marsh.  As  a  fight,  it  was  of  very  small  importance. 
Pulaski  was  passed  on  the  way  back  before  daylight,  and  they 
were  not  perceived.  As  a  reconnoissance,  it  produced  some 
valuable  results.  Information  was  gained  which  served  to  shape 
the  future  operations  of  the  fleet  and  army.  Savannah  was 
thrown  into  great  excitement,  and  troops  were  brought  from 
other  points  to  strengthen  its  defences.  It  was  feared  that  our 
fleet  would  soon  be  before  the  city.  It  was  found,  however, 
that  although  the  cut  could  be  navigated  without  difficulty,  yet 
it  would  require  that  Wilmington  Island  should  be  occupied 
with  a  strong  force,  and  works  which  would  probably  require 
more  time  and  labor  than  the  erection  of  batteries  for  the  reduc 
tion  of  Fort  Pulaski.  Gunboats  could  not  lie  in  safety  in  any 
part  of  the  narrow  passage,  with  the  island  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  and,  with  Pulaski  also  in  their  possession,  they  would 
soon  find  the  means  of  planting  guns  so  as  to  prevent  the  safe 
passage  of  a  fleet. 


NLETS,    AND   RIVERS.         473 

Soon  after  the  last-named  expedition,  an  attempt  was  made 
to  discover  an  entrance  into  the  Savannah  River  on  the  north 
side,  and  above  the  fort.  Wright  Eiver  is  one  of  the  approaches 
to  Savannah,  and  has  two  entrances  to  the  Savannah  River,  one 
through  its  mouth,  and  one  through  a  branch  called  Mud  River. 
These  are  little  more  than  cuts  or  natural  canals  through  the 
marshes.  Mud  River  is  bare  at  low  tides,  but  the  bottom  being; 
semi-fluid,  gunboats  can  be  pushed  through  in  the  high  spring 
tides.  Wright  River  has  only  four  feet  of  water  on  the  bar  at  low 
tide,  and  eleven  at  high  tide.  Considering  the  mud  in  which 
our  gunboats  were  compelled  to  operate  in  these  Southern 
bays  and  creeks,  one  sees  why  Mr.  Lincoln  applied  to  them  the 
term  "  web-footed."  Operating  as  they  did  with  land  forces, 
often  forming  a  part  of  land  expeditions,  and  floundering  in  mud, 
they  might  be  said  to  belong  to  the  amphibious  class  of  vessels. 
At  one  point,  Wright  River  approaches  Fort  Pulaski  within  one 
mile  and  three-quarters,  and  consequently  within  range  of  its 
guns,  though  the  distance  is  too  great  for  accurate  firing.  The 
expedition  examined  and  staked  out  both  of  these  passages, 
being  a  part  of  the  time  under  the  fire  of  the  fort,  which,  how 
ever,  did  them  no  damage. 

At  this  time  the  army  was  engaged  in  erecting  a  battery  on 
Yenus  Point,  for  the  purpose  of  commanding  the  Savannah 
above  Pulaski,  and  cutting  off  its  supplies  from  the  city.  This 
point  is  within  range  from  the  mouth  of  Mud  River,  and,  in  order 
to  protect  the  working-parties,  one  gunboat  was  moored  across 
Mud  River,  with  her  broadside  bearing  up  the  Savannah  River, 
and  the  other  was  anchored  parallel  with  the  channel,  with  her 
battery  sweeping  the  right  flank  of  the  shore  battery.  In  this 
manner  the  soldiers  were  protected  both  against  Tatnall's  fleet 
and  an  attack  on  land.  On  the  14th  of  February  the  rebel 
fleet  came  down,  four  in  number,  for  the  purpose  of  driving  the 
soldiers  away,  but,  with  the  aid  of  the  guns  already  mounted  on 
the  battery,  they  were  repulsed  and  driven  back.  At  the  mouth 
of  New  River  the  rebels  had  constructed  a  boom  with  great  care 
and  skill.  This  the  gunboats  removed,  and  towed  it  down,  and 
moored  it  across  the  mouth  of  Mud  River,  within  reach  of  grape 
and  canister  from  the  gunboats.  This  was  necessary  both  to 
guard  against  fire-rafts,  a  favorite  weapon  of  the  rebels,  and  to 


4: 74  HISTOEY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

prevent  an  overwhelming  attack  of  boarders  from  boats,  a  thing 
to  be  apprehended,  because  the  steamers  moored  in  Mud  River 
were  much  of  the  time  aground.  At  night,  and  in  case  of  fog, 
which  prevented  the  boom  from  being  clearly  seen,  picket-boats 
with  signals  arranged,  were  kept  on  duty,  so  as  to  give  timely 
warning  of  the  approach  of  an  enemy.  These  show  a  part  of 
the  operations  of  the  Navy  in  giving  at  all  points  support  and 
protection  to  the  army  while  preparing  those  works  which  eoon 
enabled  them  to  command  the  Savannah  River,  and  to  compel 
the  surrender  of  Fort  Pulaski. 

During  these  operations  the  rebels  were  not  idle.  Soon  after 
this  reconnoissance,  and  the  staking  out  of  the  channels  just 
mentioned,  while  the  sailors  were  placing  buoys  to  mark  the 
course,  a  torpedo  was  discovered  at  the  mouth  of  Wright  River, 
in  the  very  channel  selected  for  the  passage  of  the  gunboats.  It 
consisted  of  five  metal  cases  which  served  as  air-chambers,  and 
buoys  for  five  others  which  contained  about  thirty  pounds  of 
powder.  They  were  so  fastened  as  to  be  covered  by  water 
whenever  vessels  could  pass  the  bar,  but  were  exposed  at  low 
water.  As  it  was  a  somewhat  dangerous  machine  to  handle,  a 
rifle-ball  was  fired  through  it,  when  it  exploded,  but  the  ma 
chinery  was  uninjured,  and  could  be  thoroughly  examined.  The 
exploding  charge  was  connected  with  a  common  friction  primer, 
and  that  connected  by  a  string  with  a  wire  coiled  in  the  top  of 
the  buoy.  The  passing  vessel  was  expected  to  strike  the  buoy, 
draw  out  the  wire,  and  explode  the  charge.  Several  of  these 
infernal  machines  had  been  placed  at  the  mouth  of  Wright  River. 
They  appeared  at  first  sight  like  empty  tin  cans,  and  were 
thought  worthy  of  no  attention.  Lieutenant  Sproston,  however,  of 
the  Seneca,  having  observed  them  more  closely,  suspected  that 
they  might  be  buoys  of  torpedoes,  and  communicated  his  opinion 
to  others,  and  it  was  determined  to  examine  them.  It  was  soon 
found  that  these  suspicions  were  correct.  They  were  left  until 
the  next  day,  and  about  midnight  one  of  them  exploded  just  after 
the  launches  of  the  Susquehanna,  with  a  flat  and  artillery  for 
Point  Yenus,  had  passed.  The  next  day  these  boats  were  sent 
out,  provided  with  grapnels  and  lead-lines,  so  that  the  buoys 
might  be  grappled  at  a  safe  distance.  They  caught  the  wires, 
but  could  not,  by  pulling,  produce  an  explosion.  "With  great 


NXETS,    AND   RIVERS.         475 

caution  they  then  cut  such  connecting  wires  as  they  could 
reach,  and  the  next  day  the  remainder  were  sunk  by  firing  rifle- 
balls  through  the  buoys.  Thus  far,  the  torpedo  system  of  the 
rebels  was  a  complete  failure.  Neither  on  the  Potomac  Kiver, 
nor  at  ISTewbern,  nor  in  this  case,  had  any  damage  been  done. 
Subsequently,  however,  they  demonstrated  at  Charleston, 
Mobile,  and  other  places,  that  torpedoes  may  be  used  with 
deadly  effect  in  coast  and  harbor  defences,  and  the  attention  of 
scientific  men,  both  here  and  in  Europe,  was  seriously  turned  to 
the  question  whether  the  torpedo  will  not  hereafter  become  a 
regular  weapon  of  war,  and  perhaps  the  most  formidable  on  the 
list.  Should  this  be  so,  and  should  the  results  now  clearly  indi 
cated  by  experiments  with  the  new  heavy  artillery  be  attained, 
scarcely  a  trace  will  remain  of  the  old  methods  of  warfare  on 
the  water,  or  in  fortifications  for  coast  and  harbor  defence.  The 
old  navies  of  the  world,  and  the  huge  old  stone  and  brick  forts, 
may  be  regarded  already  as  worthless  rubbish ;  granite,  cased 
with  iron,  is  demolished  by  the  15-inch  smooth-bore  and  12-inch 
rifled  gun,  and  it  seems  difficult  to  conceive  of  any  defences 
which  will  resist  the  stroke  of  the  20-inch  shot. 

On  the  14th  of  February  a  boat  expedition  was  sent  by  Lieu 
tenant  Conroy,  commanding  the  armed  bark  Restless,  into  Bull's 
Bay,  in  search  of  any  small  craft  that  might  be  found  in  that 
vicinity.  Inside  the  shoals  they  discovered  four  small  vessels, 
three  schooners  and  one  sloop,  that  were  loaded  with  rice,  and 
wrere  going  through  the  inner  passage  to  Charleston.  They  had 
on  board  nearly  eight  thousand  bushels  of  rice.  The  vessels 
and  their  cargoes  were  burned.  By  operations  of  this  sort, 
which  were  continually  carried  on  in  all  directions,  the  trade  on 
the  inner  channels  was  interrupted  or  broken  up,  while  the 
blockaders  intercepted  to  a  great  extent  that  which  came  by 
sea,  and  thus  every  week  the  resources  of  the  rebels  were  dimin 
ished.  At  every  point  the  power  of  the  Navy  bore  heavily 
on  the  rebellion.  It  stretched  an  almost  impenetrable  wall 
along  the  coast,  the  heavy  vessels  demolished  their  forts,  the 
web-footed  gunboats  seemed  to  be  able  to  go  wherever  there  was 
soft  mud,  and  the  small  boats  searched  even  the  little  creeks  so 
thoroughly,  that  few  movements  of  the  rebels  escaped  their 
scrutiny.  Such  was  the  activity  and  apparent  omnipresence  of 


476  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

the  gunboats,  that  the  negroes  felt,  in  their  surprise  and  igno 
rance,  the  utmost  confidence  that  the  "  Linkum  ships "  would 
protect  them  though  they  might  be  twenty  miles  away. 

The  nature  of  the  warfare  which  the  rebels  waged,  and  the 
perilous  nature  of  the  service  on  these  rivers,  is  well  illustrated 
by  the  attack  in  which  Lieutenant  Budd  lost  his  life.  In 
March  this  valuable  and  lamented  officer  organized  a  boat 
expedition  from  the  Penguin  and  the  Henry  Andrew  to  proceed 
from  Mosquito  Inlet  on  the  Florida  coast,  and  make  a  recon- 
noissance  through  a  passage  leading  into  Mosquito  lagoon. 
The  expedition  consisted  of  five  light  boats,  which  carried  forty- 
three  men.  They  passed  on  some  eighteen  miles  without  any 
accident,  and  without  seeing  an  enemy.  On  their  return,  and 
when  within  sight  of  their  vessel,  the  two  commanding  officers, 
quite  in  advance  of  the  party,  landed  at  some  abandoned  earth 
works  which  were  surrounded  by  dense  thickets.  Here  a  mur 
derous  volley  was  poured  into  them  from  an  ambush,  by  which 
Lieutenant  Budd,  Acting  Master  Mather,  and  three  of  the  five 
seamen  composing  the  crew  were  instantly  killed,  and  the  re 
maining  two  wounded  and  taken  prisoners.  A  heavy  fire  was 
also  opened  upon  the  remaining  boats  as  they  came  up,  and  they 
also  suffered  severely,  without  being  able  to  offer  any  effectual 
defence.  This  was  one  of  the  most  unfortunate  of  the  smaller 
expeditions  of  the  Navy.  Doubtless  there  was  a  want  of  proper 
precaution,  or  the  useless  sacrifice  of  life  would  have  been 
avoided,  but  they  who  committed  the  error  expiated  it  with 
their  own  lives.  Of  the  forty-three  composing  the  expedition, 
eight  were  killed  and  seven  wounded,  more  than  one-third  of 
the  whole ;  and  for  this  severe  loss  no  compensatory  advantage? 
whatever  were  gained.  It  was  a  useless  sacrifice  to  the  spirit 
of  adventure. 

Another  and  still  more  severe  case  of  sudden  attack,  char 
acteristic  of  determined  men,  and  agreeing  with  the  spirit 
in  which  so  much  of  the  war  was  conducted  by  the  rebels, 
occurred  in  March,  near  Brunswick,  Florida.  On  the  after 
noon  of  the  llth  of  March,  the  assistant  surgeon  of  the  Poca- 
hoiitas,  A.  C.  Rhodes,  landed  with  a  boat's  crew  for  the  pur 
pose  of  procuring  some  fresh  beef  for  the  ships.  Having  re 
ceived  the  meat  and  paid  for  it,  he  started  to  return  to  his 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE    SOUNDS,    INLETS,    AND   RIVERS.          477 

ship.  He  had  scarcely  gone  fifty  feet  from  the  beach,  when  he 
was  fired  upon  by  a  company  of  rebels  concealed  in  a  thicket,  and 
two  of  the  boat's  crew  instantly  killed  and  seven  wounded.  After 
the  fire,  not  before,  they  called  to  them  to  surrender.  Surprised 
as  were  the  boat's  crew,  and  almost  disabled  by  the  murderous 
fire,  they  bravely  refused  to  surrender,  and  pulled  with  their  re 
maining  strength  for  the  ship,  the  rebels  continuing  their  fire. 
Fortunately,  the  attack  was  observed  from  the  Mohican,  and  just 
as  a  company  of  sixty  were  hastening  at  double-quick  to  join 
those  who  had  fired  on  the  now  defenceless  boat,  an  11-inch 
shell  dropped  in  their  midst  and  sent  them  scattering  in  all 
directions.  This  relieved  the  boat,  and  almost  immediately  the 
Pocahontas  and  Potomska  opened  from  some  of  their  shell 
guns,  and  these  concealed  foes  were  driven  away.  They  ran 
in  confusion  to  some  railway  cars,  the  shells  bursting  among 
them  as  they  went,  but  of  course  they  sent  back  no  account  of 
their  losses.  Such  was  the  promptness  and  activity  on  board 
the  ships  to  rescue  their  comrades,  that  before  the  crippled  boat 
was  out  of  range  of  the  rifles,  Lieutenant  Balch  of  the  Pocahon 
tas  reached  them  with  his  own  boat,  and  took  them  in  tow. 
The  bravery  of  the  men  left  in  the  crippled  boat,  the  prompt 
ness  with  which  the  Mohican  trained  on  them  her  pivot-gun, 
and  the  rapidity  with  which  the  boat  of  the  Pocahontas  was 
manned  and  pulled  to  their  relief,  deserve  to  be  held  in  remem 
brance. 

In  June  one  of  our  most  esteemed  officers  was  murdered  at 
May  port  Mills,  Florida,  on  the  St.  John's  River.  George  Hus 
ton,  a  most  desperate  character,  was  the  captain  of  a  company 
of  guerillas  who  committed  savage  outrages  on  all  Union 
men,  and  the  usual  barbarities  on  such  prisoners  as  fell  into 
their  hands.  Huston  boasted  that  he  had  hung  the  negro  pilot 
taken  prisoner  when  Lieutenant  Budd  lost  his  life,  and  probably 
the  savage  boast  was  true.  Captain  Ammen,  of  the  gunboat 
Seneca,  thought  it  important  to  secure  this  man,  and  Lieutenant 
John  Sproston,  the  executive  officer  of  the  ship,  was  sent  on 
shore  with  seventy  men  to  take  him  prisoner.  He  landed  at 
daylight,  and  proceeded  to  his  house.  Huston  had  been 
apprised  of  his  coming,  and  armed  with  two  pistols,  a  double- 
barrelled  gun,  and  a  knife,  met  him  at  the  door,  and  shot  Lieu- 


4:78  HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

tenant  Sproston  dead.  He  then  fired  his  other  pistol  and 
double-barrelled  gun,  but  no  other  one  of  the  party  was  struck. 
Huston  was  of  course  shot  down,  mortally  wounded,  and  was 
taken  on  board  the  vessel.  Lieutenant  Sproston  was  a  highly 
accomplished  and  valuable  officer,  and  great  indignation  was 
felt  throughout  the  Navy  that  a  noble  and  true  man  should  be 
murdered  by  such  a  wretch. 

No  adequate  idea  can  be  given  of  the  operations  of  the 
Navy  by  merely  selecting  important  engagements,  and  con 
fining  the  narrative  to  these.  It  was  the  daily  work  of  the 
officers  and  seamen,  the  unending  succession  of  toils  and  perils, 
amid  the  marshes  and  mud  channels  and  ambushes  of  this 
Southern  coast  which  the  country  should  know  in  order  to 
estimate  aright  what  was  performed  and  suffered  by  this  branch 
of  our  service.  The  work  of  the  Navy  was  entirely  different 
from  what  ships  and  seamen  had  been  before  called  upon  to 
perform,  except  as  occasional  service.  Never  before  had  it 
formed  the  main  business  of  a  great  war.  The  history  of  the 
naval  wars  in  Europe  is  a  narrative  of  the  combats  of  squadrons 
and  single  ships  on  the  ocean,  and  in  the  same  manner  the 
interest  of  our  naval  war  of  1812  centred  upon  battles  between 
ships,  and  all  else  presented  only  the  common  routine  of  the 
sailing  of  the  ship.  These  sea-fights,  therefore,  formed  almost 
the  sole  material  for  the  history.  But  in  the  war  of  the  rebel 
lion,  with  the  exception  of  the  fights  between  iron-clads,  and 
the  one  battle  between  the  Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama,  the 
combats  at  sea  were  few  and  comparatively  unimportant.  It 
was  not  a  conflict  of  one  navy  with  another,  squadron  with 
squadron,  or  ship  with  ship,  but  with  forts  and  batteries,  and 
ambushed  riflemen,  and  torpedoes,  and  hidden  obstructions — a 
service  partly  on  land  with  ships'  light  batteries,  partly  on  water, 
and  partly  in  the  mud,  where  there  was  neither  land  to  stand 
upon  nor  water  to  float  in.  It  was  a  work  entirely  unique,  an 
incessant  labor,  with  scarcely  enough  of  stirring  incident  to 
keep  up  the  spirit  of  the  men,  and  yet  one  whose  value  in  the 
aggregate  no  history  can  adequately  describe.  The  only  thing 
which  can  be  done  is  to  present  a  brief  narrative  of  events 
as  they  occurred. 

This  narrative  is  often  best  given  in  the  very  words  of  the 


INLETS,    AND   EIVERS.          479 

officers  who  were  engaged,  and  the  following  accounts  will  show 
something  of  the  daily  operations  of  the  gunboats  and  their 
crews  in  the  neighborhood  of  Charleston  and  Savannah  during 
the  few  weeks  that  preceded  the  fall  of  Fort  Pulaski. 


NIGHT    RECONNOISSANCE    AT    BEARDS    BLUFF,    NORTH    EDISTO. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  CRUSADER,  NORTH  EDISTO,  March  3, 1862. 

SIR:  On  the  23d  instant  I  received  information  that  the  enemy 
were  building  a  battery  at  Bear's  Bluff,  opposite  White  Point.  On  the 
night  of  the  24th,  accompanied  by  Lieutenant  Prentiss,  I  went  up  in 
our  dingy,  with  three  men,  and  landed  without  being  discovered  by 
the  guard.  Lieutenant  Prentiss  and  I  went  up  and  found  the  battery  in 
an  unfinished  state,  and  looking  about  us,  discovered  the  magazine ; 
found  two  of  the  picket-guard  asleep  in  it ;  got  one  musket  from  beside 
them  without  awakening  them ;  returned  to  the  boat,  and  brought  up 
two  of  the  men  to  secure  them.  In  doing  so,  I  regret  to  say,  one  of 
them  was  shot  through  the  head  and  instantly  killed,  the  pistol  in  my 
hand  going  off  accidentally  in  the  struggle.  We  carried  both  to  the 
boat,  and  escaped  without  discovery. 

The  picket-guard  at  the  battery  that  night  consisted  of  fifteen  infan 
try  and  two  mounted  men,  in  command  of  a  lieutenant,  so  the  surviving 
prisoner  states.  We  buried  the  other  properly  the  next  day  near  the 
camp  of  the  Forty-seventh  regiment.  His  name  was  Joseph  A.  Wilson, 
company  C,  Moore's  battalion,  stationed  at  Church  Flats ;  the  other, 
now  on  board  this  vessel,  is  William  M.  Evins,  from  Rabun  County, 
Georgia,  of  the  same  company.  According  to  his  account,  there  are 
two  regiments  at  Church  Flats,  sending  pickets  out  regularly  to  Rock- 
ville,  Bear's  Bluff,  and  other  points  on  the  east  side  of  the  river ;  their 
men  ill-fed,  not  paid  or  clothed,  and  badly  treated.  Wilson  was  from 
Pickens  District,  South  Carolina.  The  musket  we  have  taken  from 
them  is  of  the  Enfield  pattern,  has  the  Tower  mark,  date  1861.  Both 
cartridge-boxes  contained  Ely's  London  stamped  cartridges. 

I  sent  a  boat,  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Prentiss,  into  Rockville  on 
the  night  of  the  28th ;  but  they  were  discovered,  though  proceeding 
cautiously,  and  a  volley  fired  into  them  as  they  touched  the  shore,  with 
out  hitting  any  one,  however.  Having  orders  to  return,  if  discovered, 
they  withdrew.  The  bad  weather  to-day  prevented  my  going  up  the 
river,  as  I  intended. 

We  have  picked  up  several  contrabands  from  the  east  side  lately ; 
one,  coming  from  Charleston,  reached  here  by  way  of  John's  Island  in 


480  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

twenty-four  hours.     Though  arrested  by  a  picket  and  detained  on  the 
way,  he  succeeded  in  escaping  again  at  night. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  C.  RIIIND,  Lieutenant  commanding. 
S.  F.  Du  PONT,  Flag- Officer, 

commanding  South  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 

EXPEDITION   TO    BRUNSWICK. 

TJ.  S.  STEAMER  MOHICAN,  OFF  BRUNSWICK,  GEORGIA,  March  10, 1869. 

SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that,  in  obedience  to  your  order  of 
March  5,  I  left  Fernandina  on  the  morning  of  the  8th,  accompanied  by 
the  Pocahontas,  Lieutenant  Commanding  Balch,  and  the  Potomska, 
Acting  Lieutenant  Commanding  Watmough,  and  crossed  Fernandina 
Bar  with  just  water  enough  to  comfortably  float  this  ship,  made  the 
best  of  my  way  to  St.  Simon's  Bar,  and  reached  it  at  dead  low  water, 
passing  it,  and  getting  into  St.  Simon's  Channel,  through  which  I  car 
ried  about  seventeen  feet  to  within  two  miles  of  the  forts,  which  we 
could  plainly  see,  commanding  St.  Simon's  entrance. 

Here,  at  sundown,  I  anchored  for  the  night.  After  dark  I  shifted 
the  anchorage  of  the  ship,  to  alter  the  range  of  any  guns  that  might  be 
left  in  the  batteries.  At  daylight  made  preparations  to  pass  the  batter 
ies,  and  at  sunrise  weighed  anchor  and  stood  in.  Soon  discovered  that 
the  batteries  were  evidently  abandoned,  and  anchored  my  little  force 
inside  and  beyond  range  of  the  guns,  and  made  signal  to  land  from  the 
vessels.  Lieutenant  Commanding  Balch,  of  the  Pocahontas,  with  three 
boats,  took  possession  of  the  fort  on  St.  Simon's  Island,  consisting  of 
strong  earthworks  of  considerable  extent  and  having  had  eleven  guns 
mounted.  Some  solid  10-inch  shot  found  in  the  fort  would  indicate  the 
calibre  of  some  of  the  guns  there.  I  enclose  a  detailed  report  of  that 
battery  by  Lieutenant  Commanding  Balch.  Lieutenant  Miller,  of  this 
ship,  at  the  same  time  occupied  the  fort  on  Jekyl  Island,  which  was,  it 
seems,  a  much  stronger  position.  It  was  a  sand-work,  with  five  case 
mates  finished,  covered  with  railroad  iron  and  very  well  built,  and  two 
unfinished  casemates,  the  iron  rails  ready  to  be  put  up.  These  two  forts 
commanded  the  channel  for  a  long  distance,  and  their  fire  crossed  the 
entrance,  which  is  about  a  mile  (or  a  little  more)  wide.  Once  the  bat 
teries  were  passed,  they  could  offer  but  little  difficulty,  as  in  five  minutes 
the  guns  of  the  vessels  would  have  enfiladed  them,  and  could  even  fire 
directly  in  the  rear ;  but  they  would  have  given  a  number  of  vessels 
severe  trouble  in  getting  beyond  them.  I  enclose  the  report  of  Lieu 
tenant  Miller  of  the  fort  on  Jekyl  Island. 


INLETS,    AND   EIVEES.         481 

As  soon  as  the  boats  returned  I  went  on  the  Potomska,  and  pro 
ceeded  in  her  up  the  river  to  Brunswick.  So  soon  as  we  opened  the 
town  to  view  a  heavy  fire  commenced  at  the  wharf,  and,  at  the  same 
moment,  we  perceived  the  railroad  cars  moving  at  full  speed  in  the 
woods.  I  at  once  determined  to  bring  up  the  ships  and  place  myself 
off  the  town,  in  hopes  of  preventing  by  my  presence  the  place  from 
being  burned,  and  I  at  once  returned  in  the  Potomska,  as  I  had  the 
pilot  with  me.  Both  the  Mohican  and  Pocahontas  were  under  way  be 
fore  I  reached  them,  and  we  proceeded  to  Brunswick,  off  which  place  I 
anchored  as  the  sun  went  down.  The  cars  had  returned,  but  again 
started  at  our  approach.  The  Pocahontas  anchored  opposite  the  town, 
but  outside  of  Buzzard  Roost  Island ;  the  Potomska  still  higher  up,  and 
her  guns  commanded  the  railroad  beyond  the  town.  The  following  morn 
ing  I  sent  the  Potomska  into  the  branch  opposite  the  town.  Neither 
this  ship  nor  the  Pocahontas  can  well  get  in,  as  at  high  water  only 
twelve  feet  was  found  in  the  bulkhead,  and  between  the  wharf  and 
Buzzard  Roost  Island  the  river  is  but  about  four  hundred  feet  wide. 

With  the  Potomska,  Lieutenant  Balch  took  charge  of  a  landing 
party,  consisting  of  twenty-five  marines  from  this  ship  and  the  Poca 
hontas,  and  two  1 2-pound er  guns,  with  forty  riflemen  from  the  different 
vessels,  landed,  and  hoisted  the  flag.  The  place  was  deserted,  and  most 
of  the  furniture  of  the  houses  removed ;  still  there  was  much  private 
property  about,  some  in  scows  on  the  wharf,  ready  to  be  removed. 
After  a  careful  examination  of  such  buildings  as  might  be  supposed  to 
contain  public  property,  and  a  careful  survey  was  had,  I  visited  the 
town,  and  then  directed  the  command  to  return  to  the  ship ;  having 
posted  a  notice  urging  the  inhabitants  to  return,  and  promising  protec 
tion  to  all  property  for  all  good  citizens.  I  enclose  Lieutenant  Balch's 
report  of  his  landing,  etc.  Nothing  in  the  place  was  touched  by  the 
landing  party,  and  such  houses  as  were  not  open  were  not  even  entered. 
I  sincerely  hope  that  at  least  some  good  citizens  may  be  found  willing 
to  resume  their  homes  under  my  public  notice,  and  I  shall  not  allow 
the  place  to  be  visited  except  on  duty. 

The  fire  we  noticed  was  the  work  of  retiring  soldiers,  and  proved  to 
be  the  railroad  depot  and  wharf.  The  lenses  belonging  to  the  light 
house  were  not  found ;  the  channel  buoys  for  the  river  are  in  the  river, 
but  out  of  place,  and  the  light-house  destroyed.  The  town  is  closely 
surrounded  by  woods,  is  generally  well  built,  and  extends  over  a  con 
siderable  space.  Several  contrabands  have  come  on  board.  Soldiers 
are  said  to  be  in  the  woods,  not  very  distant,  and  most  of  the  inhabi 
tants  are  said  to  be  about  fourteen  or  sixteen  miles  back,  encamped.  I 
31 


482  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

have  sent  the  Potomska  and  Pocahontas  up  the  river,  as  far  as  they 
could  go,  to  reconnoitre.  There  is  a  schooner  of  considerable  size  on 
the  stocks  unfinished.  Fires  have  been  burning  about  us,  but  I  believe 
it  is  the  brush  being  consumed ;  nor  have  I  noticed,  as  far  as  the  people 
are  concerned,  that  they  are  willing  to  follow  the  advice  of  Messrs. 
Tombs  and  Cobb,  by  placing  the  torch  in  the  hands  of  the  children  to 
consume  their  property.  All  that  is  done  in  that  way  seems  to  be 
done  by  the  order  of  military  commanders,  who,  having  no  local  inter 
est  in  the  neighborhood  of  their  commands,  have  the  heroism  to  con 
sume  the  property  in  which  they  have  no  immediate  interest. 
I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  W.  GODON,  Commander  and  Senior  Officer. 
Flag-Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT, 

commanding  South  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 

RECONNOISSANCE    FROM    BRUNSWICK    TO    DARIEN. 

U.  S.  STEAMER  MOHICAN,  ST.  SIMON'S  ISLAND,  March  16,  1862. 
SIR:  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  on  the  13th  instant  I  started 
in  the  Potomska,  accompanied  by  the  Pocahontas,  with  the  launch  and 
howitzer  of  this  ship,  in  charge  of  Lieutenant  Miller,  in  tow,  and  pro 
ceeded  through  the  inland  passage  toward  the  Altamaha  River. 

O  A  O 

I  had  heard  that  there  were  one  or  two  rebel  steamers  at  Darien, 
and  I  hoped  that  I  might  get  possession  of  them.  About  five  miles 
from  the  anchorage  at  this  place,  and  where  I  had  left  the  Mohican 
(between  the  batteries),  we  found,  as  I  had  heard  from  contrabands, 
that  the  river  was  staked  entirely  across.  We  reached  the  spot  at  low 
water  and  found  a  double  row  of  heavy  piles,  with  their  heads  just  above 
water.  I  at  once  got  to  work  with  both  vessels,  and  in  a  few  hours 
hauled  enough  out  of  each  row  to  allow  a  passage  for  both  vessels,  say 
forty  feet,  and  here  for  the  first  time  I  learned  that  about  five  miles  be 
yond  another  obstruction  of  the  same  kind  had  been  placed.  We 
reached  the  second  difficulty  at  midnight,  placed  our  hawser,  as  the  tide 
was  rising,  but  unfortunately  the  hawser  disengaged  itself  from  the  pile, 
and  in  the  night,  with  the  rising  tide,  we  could  not  find  them  to  go  on 
with  the  work,  and  my  hope  of  passing  through  during  the  night  was 
lost.  My  object  was  to  get  into  the  river  so  as  to  make  a  dash  up  to 
Darien  by  early  daylight ;  we,  however,  worked  hard  that  day,  and  by 
twelve  o'clock  got  through  the  last  obstruction.  Between  the  two  ob 
structions,  midway,  a  battery  had  been  built  of  mud,  with  the  seeming 
object  of  firing  at  the  vessels  employed  in  removing  the  piles,  but  which 
could  not  be  observed  from  those  vessels. 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE    SOUNDS,    INLETS,   AND   KIVERS.         483 

As  we  passed  the  second  obstruction  and  turned  the  river,  we  saw 
the  steamers  moving  off  from  the  wharf  at  Darien  with  full  head  of 
steam,  going  up  the  Altamaha  River. 

At  sundown  I  anchored  both  vessels  at  Doboy  Island,  passing  to 
reach  that  spot,  which  is  on  the  Altamaha  River,  through  Mud  River  at 
high  water,  with  just  twelve  feet.  We  remained  that  day  at  Doboy, 
the  wind  blowing  quite  a  gale  from  southwest  to  west. 

As  I  had  lost  hope  of  the  capture  of  the  steamers,  and  observing 
several  large  fires  in  the  neighborhood  of  Darien,  I  determined  to  pro 
ceed  no  farther  at  this  time,  more  particularly  as  we  found  that  the 
brasses  of  the  Potomska's  shaft-bearing  had  broken,  and  I  feared  she 
might  become  disabled.  I  had  indeed  accomplished  my  object,  which 
was  to  open  the  inland  passage  to  Darien,  and  if  the  Potoraska  had  not 
been  in,  what  I  fear,  a  crippled  condition,  I  should  have  placed  her  at 
Doboy,  which  commands  the  river  outlet,  or  at  Sapelow  Island,  which 
commands  the  entire  entrance  to  the  Altamaha  and  the  island  passage 
to  Savannah. 

Darien  has  been  deserted,  as  was  Brunswick.  This  we  learned  from 
some  contrabands  who  came  off  to  us,  a  company  of  horsemen  only  re 
maining  in  town,  with  the  intention  of  firing  the  place  should  we  ap 
proach  it. 

I  have  now  been  from  one  end  of  St.  Simon's  Island  to  the  other; 
but  one  white  man  is  left  in  it.  I  saw  him ;  he  is  with  his  aged  mother 
and  little  child.  He  had  never  been  in  the  army,  refused  to  leave  his 
home,  and  was  in  mortal  dread  of  our  coming,  as  the  military  informed 
him  that  we  came  for  the  purpose  of  destroying  even  the  women  and  chil 
dren.  We  procured  beef  for  the  vessels  at  his  plantation,  for  which  we 
paid  the  price  he  asked,  and  furnished  the  family  with  some  articles, 
such  as  coffee,  salt,  etc.,  which  articles  they  had  not  even  seen  for 
months.  We  stopped  at  one  or  two  other  plantations  on  our  way  back, 
all  deserted,  but  had  been  tenanted  by  the  military  at  various  times,  for 
as  late  as  November  some  one  thousand  five  hundred  troops  were  quar 
tered  on  St.  Simon's.  We  found  some  of  the  places  to  contain  large 
quantities  of  cattle,  and  at  King's  plantation,  not  three  miles  from  this 
anchorage,  we  counted  some  fifty  head  near  where  we  landed. 

All  the  blacks  have  been  removed  from  St.  Simon's,  and  at  Doboy 
we  met  the  only  negro  seen,  who  was  old  and  alone  on  the  place.  He 
had  been  the  father  of  thirteen  children,  but  he  informed  me  that  every 
one  had  been  sold  as  they  reached  about  eighteen  years  of  age,  and,  as 
he  graphically  expressed  it,  "  for  pocket-money  for  his  master." 

Your  orders  did  not  embrace  the  reconnoissance  I  have  just  made, 


484:  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

and  which  has  caused  a  delay  of  several  days  in  communicating  to  you 
my  progress  to  Brunswick.  I  hope,  however,  you  will  approve  my  con 
duct  in  the  matter. 

I  have  now  cleared  the  passage  to  Darien  from  inside,  which  can  be 
performed  rapidly  by  gunboats  of  ten  feet  draught  at  any  time ;  at  low 
tides  eleven  feet;  the  draught  of  the  Pocahontas  and  Potomska  is 
rather  great,  as  they  might  be  caught  and  delayed  for  higher  tides. 

I  now  beg  leave,  sir,  to  express  myself  in  warm  terms  of  commenda 
tion  for  the  energy  and  skill  of  Lieutenant  Commanding  Balch  and 
Acting  Lieutenant  Commanding  W'atmough,  and  for  the  aid  they  have 
rendered  me  in  the  active  work  we  have  been  engaged  in  for  the  last 
eight  days,  and  I  take  equal  pleasure  in  mentioning  the  cheerfulness  in 
this  work  of  the  officers  and  crews  of  the  three  vessels  engaged.  *  *  * 

I  cannot  speak  too  highly  of  the  service  rendered  by  Mr.  Godfrey, 
the  pilot.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

S.  W.  GOD  ON,  Commander. 
Flag- Officer  S.  R  Du  PONT, 

commanding  South  Atlantic  Blockading  Squadron. 

BATTERIES    ABANDONED    ON    SKIDDAWAY    AND    GREEN    ISLANDS. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMER  SEMINOLE,  ABREAST  OF     ) 
SKIDDAWAY  BATTERY,  WILMINGTON  EIVER,  GA.,  March  25, 1862.  ) 

SIR  :  In  obedience  to  your  order  dated  2d  instant,  we  proceeded 
from  Cumberland  Sound  to  Wassaw  Sound,  Georgia,  to  blockade  as 
directed.  Having  waited  some  days  for  the  weather  to  settle  and  the 
wind  to  lull,  we  this  afternoon  felt  our  way  with  the  lead  up  the  narrow 
channel  of  the  Wilmington  River  to  the  battery  on  Skiddaway  Island, 
accompanied  by  the  Norwich,  Lieutenant  Commanding  J.  M.  Duncan, 
and  Wyandot,  Lieutenant  Commanding  W.  D.  Whiting.  I  sent 
our  launch,  with  the  howitzer  and  crew,  under  charge  of  Master  Mc- 
Nair  and  Acting  Master  Steele,  alongside  the  Norwich,  and  went  on 
board  of  her.  She  being  the  shortest  vessel,  and  of  lightest  draught,  was 
sent  ahead.  After  firing  a.  shell  or  two  at  some  horsemen  near  the 
house  on  the  left,  and  a  picket-guard  at  the  fort,  as  we  approached,  I 
proceeded  in  the  gig,  with  Paymaster  Sands,  to  the  shore,  followed  by 
the  launch.  We  found  the  battery  a  strong  bastioned  work  for  ten 
guns,  with  bomb-proof  trenches,  etc.  The  enemy  had  abandoned  it, 
leaving  imitation  guns,  covered  with  canvas,  in  position.  Other  boats 
from  the  vessels  coming  on  shore,  we  destroyed  the  works,  boats,  light 
ers,  etc.,  of  the  enemy,  and  having  hoisted  the  Union  flag  over  the  fort 
and  house  with  the  red  cupola,  we  returned  on  board  our  respective 
vessels.  I  learn  that  the  Confederate  battery  on  Green  Island  is  aban- 


NLETS,    AND   RIVERS.          485 

doned.     Several  houses  in  sight  are  burning  this  morning,  the  red  cu 
pola  house  included.     I  send  to  Port  Royal  a  prisoner  taken  in  the 
marshes  by  the  Release.     His  statement  accompanies  this. 
I  am,  sir,  respectfully,  etc., 

JOHN  P.  GILLIS,  Commander. 
Flag- Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT. 

CONTRABAND'S  STATEMENT. 

UNITED  STATES  STEAMSHIP  SEMINOLE,     j 
WASSAW  SOUND,  GEOEGIA,  March  26, 1S62.  ) 

SIR  :  The  following  statement  is  derived  from  London  Middleton,  a 
contraband  picked  up  this  afternoon  by  the  Norwich,  and  sent  on  board 
this  ship,  viz. : 

His  master  was  William  P.  Fulton,  of  Savannah.  He  left  that  city 
on  the  22d  instant  (Saturday),  coming  by  way  of  White  Bluff  and  Green 
Island  to  Raccoon  Keys,  from  whence  he  expected  to  reach  a  "  saw 
mill,"  which  it  was  said  he  had  on  Wassaw  Island,  with  three  thousand 
troops. 

All  provisions  are  scarce  at  Savannah,  and  very  dear,  particularly 
bacon,  rum,  liquors,  and  "such  like."  Fresh  beef  is  plenty,  but  costs 
twenty-five  to  thirty  cents  for  what  used  to  sell  at  six,  eight,  and  ten 
cents  per  pound.  Eggs  were  selling  at  fifty  cents  per  dozen  ;  chickens 
$1.50  per  pair.  Tea  scarce ;  coffee  selling  at  $1.50  to  $1.75  per  pound. 
They  are  "  very  bad  off"  for  rum  and  liquors,  and  "  almost  have  to  give 
them  up,"  and  these,  with  bacon,  they  expected  from  the  West,  some 
where  where  the  Federals  now  hold  possession. 

Folks  are  "  going  and  coming."  Some  who  had  left  are  returning, 
and  they  are  sending  the  "  negroes  and  cotton  "  inland,  and  moving  all 
the  "  cash  money "  to  Macon,  and  threaten  to  burn  the  city  if  they 
should  be  unable  to  hold  it,  and  are  in  daily  expectation  of  our  attack. 
They  had  given  up  the  idea  of  defending  the  Savannah  River  by  torpe 
does,  because  one  of  the  principal  men  who  was  sinking  them  got 
drowned  while  down  in  a  diving-bell,  and  they  now  talk  of  piling  the 
river  across.  He  knows  of  no  raft  near  Fort  Jackson,  near  which  Tat- 
nal  is,  on  board  the  Savannah  (late  Everglade).  When  he  was  last  near 
Thunderbolt,  some- time  since,  they  had  eight  guns  mounted.  There  is 
a  battery  (number  of  guns  unknown)  at  Costan's  Bluff,  and  they  said 
they  were  mounting  guns  at  "  the  old  fort "  above  Fort  Jackson,  below 
the  "gas-house,"  and  near  the  first  ferry  wharf;  but  he  knows  but  little 
of  this  part  of  the  river,  having  been  a  fisherman  around  about  White 
Bluff  and  Green  Island,  but  more  recently  waiting  on  the  soldiers. 


486  HISTORY   OF  THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

All  the  approaches  to  the  city,  not  only  main,  but  also  the  l^-roads, 
are  "being  fortified,  and  they  told  him  that  "they  had  one  hundred 
thousand  men." 

Green  and  Skiddaway  Islands  are  abandoned  except  by  a  few  cav 
alry.  The  guns  from  Green  Island  were  taken  to  fortify  Benley,  and 
those  from  Skiddaway  to  Montgomery  (a  part  of  Benley,  but  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  separate),  both  on  the  Winingberg  River,  which 
runs  from  Raccoon  Keys  up,  making  Green  Island,  the  first  land  to  the 
northeast  going  up,  and  thence  running  up  to  Benley,  Montgomery,  and 
White  Bluff. 

They  expect  us  to  cross  Skiddaway  Island,  and  have  guns  and  pick 
ets  at  the  two  bridges  to  cut  them  away  and  fight  our  forces  on  their 
arrival.  The  first  bridge  is  reckoned  to  be  five  miles  across  from  the 
cupola  house  (last  night  burned  by  the  rebels),  near  the  Skiddaway 
abandoned  battery.  Respectfully,  etc., 

JOHN  P.  GILLIS,  Commander. 
Flag- Officer  S.  F.  Du  PONT. 


CHAPTER  XXIX. 

FALL     OF    FORT     PULASKI. 

AFTER  it  was  discovered,  by  the  reconnoissances  made  both 
on  the  north  and  south  side  of  the  Savannah  River,  that  the 
ships  could  not  be  safely  carried  through  any  of  the  channels 
into  the  river  above  the  fort,  the  attention  of  both  the  Army 
and  Navy  was  turned  to  the  erection  of  batteries  by  which 
Pulaski  could  be  invested  and  bombarded. 

As  the  Navy  was  still  connected  with  these  operations,  and 
as  the  bombardment  of  this  work  illustrates  the  power  of  the 
new  American  ordnance,  a  subject  which  forms  a  prominent 
feature  in  this  history,  it  was  thought  that  some  account  of  its 
capture  would  not  be  out  of  place.  The  construction  of  the 
battery  at  Venus  Point,  to  which  reference  has  been  already 
made,  is  also  worthy  of  notice,  as  showing  the  nature  of  the  ex 
posure  and  toil  of  the  daily  service  performed  by  soldiers  and 
sailors  in  the  pestilential  marshes  of  the  South.  The  object 
of  this  battery  was  to  interrupt  communication  between  Pulaski 
and  the  city. 

Jones's  Island  is  simply  a  marsh,  mostly  covered  at  high  tide 
with  water,  except  the  marsh  grass  and  weeds.  It  lies  between 
Mud  River,  Wright  River,  and  the  Savannah,  and  the  inland 
side  can  be  reached  by  gunboats  through  Mud  and  Wright 
Rivers.  From  the  point  where  steamboats  could  reach  the 
island  in  the  rear,  to  the  opposite  spot  on  the  Savannah  where 
the  battery  was  to  be  placed,  was  one  mile,  and  the  question 
how  heavy  siege  guns  were  to  be  transported  that  distance, 
through  or  over  the  mud  and  water,  was  one  not  easily  to  be 
solved.  Still  it  was  necessary  that  the  solution  should  be 


488  HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

attempted  ;  and  once  decided  upon,  both  men  and  officers  were 
determined  that  it  should  succeed,  not  only  on  account  of  its 
intrinsic  importance,  but  because  of  the  influence  which  would 
be  excited,  both  upon  our  own  men  and  the  rebels,  by  the 
performance  of  an  almost  impossible  work. 

On  the  night  of  the  10th  of  February  a  party  of  soldiers 
struggled  through  the  marsh,  and  partially  laid  the  platforms 
for  the  guns.  The  next  night  the  guns,  32-pounders,  were 
embarked  on  flats  at  Daufurkie  Island,  and  towed  by  small 
steamers  across  to  Jones's  Island.  Then  they  were  landed,  if 
landing  it  could  be  called,  not  upon,  but  into  the  marsh.  Poles 
were  first  laid  across  the  proposed  path,  forming  a  rude  cordu 
roy,  and  on  these  planks  thirty  feet  long  were  laid  for  the  gun- 
carriages,  and  these  planks  were  shifted  ahead  as  the  guns  were 
moved  on.  The  first  thing  was  to  place  the  guns,  weighing 
three  tons  each,  on  a  pile  of  sand-bags  called  a  wharf,  and  then 
start  them  along  the  extemporized  wooden  railway.  The  nature 
of  the  work  may  be  conceived,  by  thinking  of  the  men  in  the 
night  in  a  heavy  storm  in  the  winter,  floundering  in  mud  and 
water-pools,  often  up  to  their  waists,  pushing  and  dragging  the 
guns  along  a  track  sunk  in  the  mud,  the  carriages  constantly 
slipping  oif  or  running  off  the  planks,  and  sinking  in  the  mire, 
from  which  position  they  were  to  be  lifted  and  dragged  back  to 
the  track  again.  It  is  not  surprising  that  during  the  whole  of 
the  first  night  the  guns  were  moved  only  two  hundred  yards. 
The  next  night  the  soldiers  were  more  successful,  and  the  guns 
were  got  across  the  marsh  and  placed  in  position  on  the  plat 
forms,  and  the  next  morning  when  Commodore  Tatnall's  fleet 
appeared,  they  were  confronted  by  the  guns  of  the  new  bat 
tery,  and  compelled  to  return.  The  men  were  so  overpowered 
by  this  exhausting  labor  and  exposure  to  storm  and  water,  that 
they  would  lie  down  and  sleep  in  the  mud  of  the  marsh. 

As  an  engineering  feat,  and  as  testing  the  courage  and 
endurance  of  our  men,  probably  this  was  scarcely  surpassed 
during  the  war,  but  there  were  many  others  showing  similar 
determination  and  daring.  To  aid  this  battery,  two  gunboats 
were  immediately  moored  in  Mud  River,  as  has  been  previously 
stated.  By  the  erection  of  two  other  small  batteries,  the  work 
of  cutting  off  Pulaski  from  supplies  was  completed,  and  then  the 


FALL    OF   FORT   PULASKI.  489 

army  began  the  erection  of  the  works  by  which  the  fort  was  to 
be  reduced,  the  Navy  giving  to  them  in  all  ways  its  full  support. 
These  batteries  were  erected  upon  Tybee  Island,  which  lies  to 
the  southwest  of  Pulaski,  and  about  one  mile  distant  at  the 
points  where  the  siege  guns  were  placed.  The  surface  of  the 
island  is  sufficient  to  conceal  the  batteries  from  the  fort  while 
they  were  being  erected,  so  that  the  working-parties  suffered 
little  from  its  fire.  Here  also  the  labor  of  loading  and  trans 
porting  guns  and  ammunition  was  immense.  A  heavy  surf 
made  the  work  of  landing  the  enormous  cannon — some  of  them 
10-inch  columbiads — a  very  dangerous  one,  and  then  they  were 
to  be  dragged  two  miles  through  the  sand  by  the  soldiers  them 
selves.  Here  was  to  be  made  a  new  and  very  important  experi 
ment  in  breaching  the  walls  of  a  strong  casemated  fort.  It  had 
before  been  considered  as  settled  that  such  walls  could  not  be 
breached  at  a  greater  distance  than  eight  hundred  yards ;  and 
it  is  well  to  remember  this,  as  the  limit  which  the  nations  had 
then  reached  in  the  use  of  artillery,  and  this  will  show  the  extent 
of  the  revolution  which  has  been  wrought  in  the  world's  opinions 
by  the  experiments  of  the  war,  and  by  the  new  American  cannon. 
The  batteries  planted  before  the  fort  were  eleven  in  number, 
and  were  armed  with  13-inch  and  10-inch  mortars,  10-inch  and 
8-inch  columbiads,  30-ponnder  Parrott  rifles,  and  24,  32,  and 
42-pounder  rifles,  with  James's  projectiles.  Four  of  the  colum 
biads  and  the  rifles  were  placed  about  one  mile  from  the  fort, 
others  of  the  columbiads  for  shell-firing,  and  the  mortars,  were 
planted  about  two  miles  distant.  The  fire  of  the  columbiads, 
using  solid  shot,  and  the  largest  rifles,  was  concentrated  upon  a 
single  point  in  range  of  the  magazine,  for  the  double  purpose  of 
breaching  the  wall  and  of  reaching  the  magazine.  The  firing 
continued  for  thirty  hours,  but  the  walls  were  breached  in  a 
little  more  than  half  that  time.  On  the  second  day  the  fire 
from  the  batteries  was  far  more  effective.  The  range  of  the 
guns  had  been  obtained,  and  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  shot 
and  the  shell  from  the  rifles  reached  their  mark.  The  wall  was 
breached  opposite  the  magazine  so  that  an  assault  was  practi 
cable.  The  shells  and  shot  passed  through  this,  and  tore  away 
the  defences  of  the  magazine,  so  that  it  was  liable  at  any 
moment  to  be  exploded  by  a  shell ;  and  the  commander,  deeming 


490  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

that  lie  was  exposing  the  garrison  to  destruction,  with  no  pros 
pect  of  ultimate  success,  hauled  down  the  traitor  nag  and  hoisted 
a  white  one. 

So  confident  were  the  rebel  officers  in  the  established  maxims 
in  regard  to  the  effective  range  of  artillery,  that  they  felt  entirely 
secure,  although  they  knew  that  works  were  being  erected  on 
Tybee  Island,  believing  that  the  walls  of  the  fort,  said  to  have 
been  sixteen  feet  thick,  could  not  be  penetrated  at  that  distance. 
As  this  was  the  first  trial  of  the  solid  shot  of  the  10-inch  colum- 
biad,  and  of  the  new  rifled  guns  against  a  well-constructed  fort, 
it  excited  the  liveliest  interest  throughout  the  country  and  in 
Europe.     Inasmuch  as  the  rifled  gun  was  then  a  new  weapon 
for  breaching  purposes,  it  drew  to  itself  the  chief  attention  of 
the  country,  and  the  effect  of  the  heavy  spherical  shot  was 
overlooked.     Although  there  is  no  method  by  which  the  com 
parative  effect  of  the  rifles  and  smooth-bores  can  be  measured, 
inasmuch  as  the  fire  of  both  was  concentrated  upon  the  same 
spot,  yet  enough  is  known  to  show  that  while  the  projectile  from 
the  rifled  gun  had  greater  penetration,  being  much  smaller,  it  < 
was  what  eye-witnesses  called  the  trip-hammer  ~blow  of  the  pon 
derous  10-inch  shot,  that  shattered  the  solid  masonry  and  hurled 
it  in  masses  down.     The  small  shot,  moving  with  great  velocity, 
bored  into  the  brick- work  like  a  drill ;  the  solid  mass  from  the 
columbiad   shook  and  loosened  the    masonry    far  beyond  the 
point  of  impact,  and  would  necessarily  in  time  reduce  it  to  a 
crumbling  ruin.     The  smaller  rifle  projectile  may  bore  the  wall 
like  a  honeycomb,  but  not  shatter  it  extensively ;    while   the 
massive  shot,  whether  from  a  rifle  or  smooth-bore,  produces  an 
entirely  different  effect,  loosening  on  all  sides  the  joints  of  the 
masonry,  and  breaking  up  instead  of  cutting  through  the  mate 
rial.     The  greater  range  of  the  heavy  rifle  renders  it  of  course 
more  effective  at  a  great  distance,  as  was  afterward  shown  at 
Charleston ;  but  the  stroke  of  a  heavy  mass,  from  whatever  gun 
it  may  be   thrown,  is  needed  to  demolish  the  walls  of  a  fort 
or  the  armor  of  an  iron-clad.     The  fall  of  Pulaski  showed,  as 
many  then  believed,  that  the  era  of  stone  and  brick  forts  was 
gone,  as  completely  as  that  of  wooden  ships  was  closed  by  the 
battle  of  the  Monitor  and  the  Merrimack.     Subsequent  experi 
ments  have  shown  the  opinion  to  be  correct. 


CHAPTER    XXX. 

THE  NAVY  OF  THE  WEST  AND  OUR  INLAND  WATERS  IN  ITS  RELA- 
TIONS  TO  OUR  NAVAL  POWER  AND  THE  FUTURE  POLICY  OF  OUR 
COUNTRY. 

As  has  been  previously  stated,  there  was  not  a  gnn  belong 
ing  to  the  United  States  on  the  Mississippi  or  its  tributaries  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war ;  and  before  the  close  there  were  a 
hundred  steamers  fully  armed  upon  these  waters,  and  these, 
with  a  few  exceptions,  were  built  there.  This  presents  an  en 
tirely  new  feature  in  the  history  of  the  progress  of  the  nation, 
and  one  whose  bearing  upon  our  future  demands  our  earnest 
attention.  It  shows  what  unlimited,  and  before  unthought-of, 
resources  that  "  Great  West "  contains  both  for  the  defence  of 
the  country  and  for  the  increase  of  our  national  power.  We 
had  before  considered  with  pride  and  hope  its  boundless  grain- 
fields,  its  capacity  for  the  support  of  hundreds  of  millions  of 
people,  its  vast  manufacturing  power,  and  its  mineral  wealth ; 
but  it  had  not  occurred  perhaps  to  any  that  its  power  to  create 
and  maintain  a  navy  might  rival  that  of  the  States  that  lie  on 
the  seaboard.  The  bearing  which  this  will  have  upon  our  not 
remote  future  cannot  be  measured  now,  but  a  few  suggestions 
may  partially  indicate  its  importance. 

One  conclusion  has  been  already  reached  by  the  American 
people,  and  that  is,  that  no  European  power  shall  interfere  with 
the  affairs  of  this  continent,  much  less  shall  any  be  permitted 
to  establish  and  maintain  a  monarchy  upon  our  borders.  That 
conclusion  will  be  enforced,  if  need  be,  by  the  whole  power  of 
the  nation.  Another  thought  is  fast  assuming  a  fixed  and  defi 
nite  character  in  the  American  mind,  and  that  is,  that  our 
Government  niust  and  will  control  this  North.  American  Conti- 


492  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

nent  from  the  Isthmus  to  the  Poles,  and  from  ocean  to  ocean. 
Toward  this,  as  the  territorial  goal  of  our  national  career,  all 
controlling  influences  and  all  leading  events  irresistibly  tend. 
It  is  one  of  those  popular  impulses  which  no  objections  weaken 
and  no  difficulties  will  check.  It  is  useless  to  speculate  upon 
the  morality  of  the  measures  which  may  be  adopted  for  the 
acquisition  of  territory,  for  we  know  not  now  what  their  char 
acter  may  be.  If  wrong  is  done  to  any  people,  then  we  may 
be  certain  that  it  will  be  avenged  by  a  just  God,  the  King  of 
nations,  who  is  bound  to  defend  the  weak  and  break  the  op 
pressor's  power.  But  the  rebellion  has  taught  us  a  lesson  in 
regard  to  the  danger  of  hostile  neighbors  that  will  not  be,  and 
ought  not  to  be,  forgotten. 

The  imminent  peril  in  which  we  were  placed  by  the  French 
occupation  of  Mexico  compels  the  nation  to  inquire  how  such  a 
danger  can  be  best  averted  in  the  future ;  the  harboring  and  en 
couraging  of  the  conspirators  in  Canada,  and  the  fitting  out  of 
expeditions  from  thence  to  poison,  rob,  and  burn,  raises  neces 
sarily  the  question  whether  our  national  safety  does  not  de 
mand  an  effectual  safeguard ;  while  the  closing  of  the  Missis 
sippi  by  the  rebels  has  caused  our  people  of  the  Northwest  to 
consider  whether  the  great  Lakes  shall  be  permitted  to  float  a 
hostile  navy  which  might  threaten  and  perhaps  destroy  all  the 
beautiful  cities  that  adorn  the  American  coast  of  our  Mediter 
ranean  Seas,  and  put  in  peril  or  sweep  away  the  immense  com 
merce  which  has  been  created  there  by  American  enterprise 
and  capital.  Those  who  expect  that  England  or  France,  or  any 
other  power  of  Western  Europe,  will  prove  more  friendly  to  us 
in  the  future  than  they  have  been  in  the  past,  will  perceive 
their  error  the  moment  either  one  of  them  believes  that  we  can 
be  safely  attacked.  It  needed  only  the  evidence  afforded  us 
during  the  rebellion  to  convince  us  that  this  is  true,  and  no 
present  professions  of  friendship  will  throw  the  American  peo 
ple  off  their  guard,  or  induce  them  to  neglect  any  proper  means 
of  defence. 

The  control  of  the  waters  of  this  continent,  of  the  St.  Law 
rence  and  the  Lakes,  as  well  as  the  Mississippi  and  the  seaboard, 
is  a  necessity  of  our  national  existence,  and,  as  certainly  as  the 
nation  remains  undivided  and  unchecked,  no  long  time  can 


THE   NAVY    OF   THE   WEST.  493 

elapse  before  its  flag  will  cover  and  protect  all.  This  is  no 
threat  against  any,  nor  is  it  a  boast  of  national  power  or  a  puff* 
of  vanity.  It  is  a  simple  statement  of  the  not  remote  result  of 
the  natural  growth  of  the  nation,  the  inevitable  effect  of  ade 
quate  causes  already  in  operation. 

It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  things  that  a  power  which  has 
manifested  toward  us  the  spirit  which  England  showed  during 
the  rebellion,  which  sent  her  fleets  of  smugglers  from  Nassau, 
and  her  raiders,  her  poisoners,  and  her  incendiaries  from  Can 
ada,  should  long  be  permitted  to  hold  possession  of  any  part  of 
these  inland  seas  and  mighty  rivers.  Our  people  will  not  con 
sent  that  our  national  safety  should  thus  be  perilled.  They  will 
at  no  remote  period  become  the  exclusive  property  of  the 
American  Union. 

In  view  of  what  was  done  on  the  Mississippi  and  its  tribu 
taries  during  the  rebellion,  we  can  easily  see  that,  if  the  St. 
Lawrence  and  the  Lakes  were  exclusively  ours,  and  the  Lakes 
and  the  Mississippi  were  suitably  connected,  the  power  of  the 
"West  to  create  and  maintain  a  navy  would  exceed  that  of  our 
seaboard.  The  whole  chain  of  waters  from  the  mouth  of  the 
St.  Lawrence  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  might  be  fitted, 
not  alone  with  river  steamers,  but  with  ocean  cruisers  also  that 
no  power  of  earth  could  even  approach.  In  a  very  short  time 
the  West,  if  need  be,  will  be  able  to  construct  and  hold  in  these 
secure  harbors  a  thousand  ships,  which  she  could  send  forth  at 
her  pleasure  through  the  great  gate  of  the  North,  or  that  of  the 
South,  or  withdraw  them  from  the  seas,  keep  them  secure  in 
her  far-away  inland  fastnesses,  while  land  and  floating  batteries, 
obstructions,  and  torpedoes,  could  so  seal  up  the  Mississippi  and 
St.  Lawrence,  that  they  could  not  be  entered,  or  if  that  were 
possible  for  any  foe,  he  would  enter  only  to  encounter  a  force 
superior  to  his  own.  The  Western  waters  are  likely  to  become 
hereafter  the  great  naval  depot  of  the  nation,  and  the  time  may 
not  be  far  distant  when  the  destruction  of  all  the  ship-yards  of 
the  seaboard,  were  that  possible,  would  not  seriously  cripple 
the  naval  power  of  the  United  States.  When  once  the  Lakes 
and  the  St.  Lawrence  are  all  American,  and  the  inland  seas  are 
properly  connected  both  with  the  Mississippi  and  the  North 
Atlantic,  a  navy,  limited  only  by  the  producing  power  of  the 


494:  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

country,  can  be  created  and  maintained  on  waters  inaccessible 
to  any  hostile  nation.  This  is  one  of  the  important  facts  which 
the  war  has  brought  to  light,  and  it  is  one  to  which  the  states 
men  of  the  country  will  be  compelled  to  give  earnest  attention. 
Should  it  be  possible  for  the  nations  of  Western  Europe  to  com 
bine  and  harass  our  seaboard,  the  Great  West,  if  cherished 
and  developed  by  a  wise  and  liberal  policy,  will  have  the 
means  both  to  defend  and  avenge  the  nation. 


CHAPTER  XXXI. 

THE    MISSISSIPPI    SQUADRON. 

THE  facts  thus  far  presented  exhibit  in  general  terms  the 
nature  of  the  preparations  which  were  made  by  the  Navy  De 
partment  for  carrying  on  the  war  upon  the  Atlantic  coast.  It 
was  called  upon  to  provide  for  the  recovery  of  the  forts  and 
harbors  which  the  rebels  had  seized ;  to  establish  and  maintain 
an  effective  blockade  along  thirty-five  hundred  miles  of  coast,  a 
large  portion  of  which  coast  has  also  an  interior  line  requiring 
to  be  guarded ;  to  prevent  the  egress  of  rebel  cruisers,  and  espe 
cially  of  such  iron-clads  as  the  Merrimack  •  to  provide  the  means 
for  the  supply  of  the  Army  along  all  its  extended  lines  of  com 
munication  ;  to  keep  the  Potomac  open,  and  to  protect  the  sea 
board  cities.  Nor  must  it  be  forgotten  that  all  this  was  to  be 
done  under  the  continual  menace  of  a  foreign  war.  This  task, 
however,  great  as  it  was,  is  only  a  part  of  the  work  which  al 
most  from  the  first  was  laid  upon  the  Secretary. 

An  interior  department  of  naval  operations  was  forced  upon 
the  attention  of  the  Department  in  the  early  stages  of  the  re 
bellion,  and  it  was  soon  seen  that  it  was  scarcely  less  important 
or  less  difficult  to  control  than  that  of  the  ocean  and  the  coast. 
It  was  seen  that  there  must  be  a  navy  of  the  rivers  as  well  as 
for  the  sea ;  and  such  was  the  extent  of  navigation  on  these  in 
ternal  waters  that  it  required  a  very  large  and  very  powerful 
squadron  to  make  any  serious  impression  upon  the  lines  of  the 
enemy,  or  to  maintain  the  communications  of  the  Army  as  it 
advanced  into  the  enemy's  country.  The  magnitude  of  the  de 
mand  made  upon  the  Department  from  this  quarter  may  be 
better  understood  by  considering  the  position  then  held  by  the 


496  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

rebel  armies.  Their  northern  battle-line  in  the  West  stretched 
along  the  southern  bank  of  the  Ohio  to  near  its  mouth,  and 
south  of  that  they  held  the  rivers  and  the  country  to  the  Gulf 
by  fortifications  or  batteries  at  every  strategic  point.  Ken 
tucky  proposed  to  hold  herself  neutral  and  indifferent  between 
the  Government  which  had  fostered  and  protected  her  and  the 
rebels  who  had  conspired  for  its  overthrow ;  yet  on  her  soil,  un 
hindered  and  unmolested,  these  conspirators  had  seized  Colum 
bus,  on  the  Mississippi,  a  short  distance  below  the  mouth  of  the 
Ohio,  and  had  converted  it  into  a  strongly  fortified  position. 
Farther  down,  in  Tennessee,  at  Island  "No.  10,  where  a  bend  in 
the  river  gave  great  facilities  for  the  work,  batteries  were  con 
structed  so  powerful  that  no  craft  then  on  the  Western  waters 
could  pass  them.  Still  below  this  point  Fort  Pillow  guarded 
the  river  at  Memphis ;  then  at  Yicksburg  wras  the  river  Gib 
raltar  ;  and  beyond  were  the  formidable  batteries  at  Grand 
Gulf;  and  then  Port  Hudson  and  Baton  Rouge.  All  these 
were  to  be  approached  from  above,  if  at  all,  unless  the  forts 
below  New  Orleans  could  be  captured,  and  this  was  not  done 
until  most  of  the  work  had  been  finished  on  the  river  above.  In 
addition  to  these  strongholds,  Fort  Henry  guarded  the  Tennes 
see,  and  Fort  Donelson  the  Cumberland;  and  these  were  the 
only  channels  by  which  an  army  advancing  into  Tennessee 
could  be  supplied,  for  the  railway  line  that  ran  from  the  Ohio 
to  Nashville  was  not  safe  for  an  hour  even  in  neutral  Ken 
tucky  after  our  Army  held  the  country  below,  while  at  first  it 
was  in  the  hands  of  the  rebels  from  Lexington,  south,  and  was 
frequently,  by  the  neutral  friends  of  the  conspirators,  between 
Lexington  and  Cincinnati.  Besides  this,  the  rebels,  when  they 
closed  the  upper  Mississippi  by  their  batteries,  seized  all  the 
boats  that  were  below  and  strengthened  and  armed  them ;  so 
that,  in  addition  to  their  land  fortifications,  they  had  from  the 
first  a  really  formidable  fleet. 

The  main  features  of  the  rebel  plan  of  war  in  the  West  were, 
to  seize  and  hold  Missouri,  and,  as  a  consequence,  Kansas  and 
Nebraska,  and  thus  threaten  or  invade  the  free  States  of  the 
Northwest  from  that  point ;  to  hold  Kentucky  and  Tennessee, 
and,  if  possible,  cross  the  Ohio,  and  make  the  Northern  States 
the  theatre  of  the  war ;  or,  in  case  they  should  be  unable  to 


THE   MISSISSIPPI    SQUADRON.  497 

invade  the  North,  to  maintain  their  battle-line  unbroken  along 
the  Ohio  and  through  Missouri ;  to  keep  the  great  rivers  closed ; 
and  thus  holding  back  the  North,  and  secure  within  their  own 
territory,  compel  at  length  the  recognition  of  their  indepen 
dence.  They  presented  certainly  to  the  North  a  most  formi 
dable  front,  a  line  of  defences  which  was  indeed  impregnable 
to  any  means  of  assault  which  the  Government  at  first  possessed. 
No  army  could  be  moved  into  Tennessee  by  land  alone,  because 
the  line  of  communication  with  a  Northern  base  could  not  be 
held  secure,  and  a  defeat  far  from  the  Ohio  would  be  the  de 
struction  of  an  army,  and  open  the  road  for  an  invasion  of  Illi 
nois,  Indiana,  and  Ohio,  and  the  destruction  of  their  cities. 

It  was  quite  evident  that  no  impression  could  be  made  upon 
the  power  of  the  rebellion  in  the  "West,  until  a  firm  foothold  could 
be  gained  in  Kentucky  and  Tennessee,  and  until  the  Mississippi 
could  be  wrested  from  the  conspirators'  control.  It  was  clear 
that  the  whole  seaboard  might  be  regained,  even  to  Florida,  and 
yet  the  rebellion  remain  as  dangerous  as  ever,  if  the  rebels  could 
hold  the  Mississippi  River  and  the  valley  up  to  or  near  the  Ohio. 

France  was  looking  with  eager  eyes  toward  Texas,  in  the 
hope  of  securing  and  extending  her  Mexican  usurpation. 
England  wras  ready  to  give  all  the  assistance  in  her  power  to 
any  step  which  would  weaken  the  North ;  and  had  the  rebels 
been  pressed  back  from  the  seaports  and  the  Northern  Atlantic 
slope,  they  would  have  had  it  in  their  power,  if  still  holding  the 
Mississippi,  the  Southwest,  including  Tennessee,  and  the  great 
natural  fortresses  of  the  mountains,  to  have  so  connected  them 
selves  with  Mexico  and  France  as  to  have  caused  the  most  serious 
embarrassment.  It  became  absolutely  necessary  to  the  success 
of  the  Government  that  the  rebels'  northern  line  of  defences 
should  be  broken  through,  and  that  the  Mississippi  should  be 
opened  to  its  mouth. 

At  first,  and  before  the  nature  of  the  work  was  fully  under 
stood,  the  whole  was  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  War  De 
partment,  as  it  was  thought  the  few  armed  transports  which 
would  be  needed  would  be  a  mere  appendage  of  the  Army. 
The  idea  of  a  formidable  river  navy  of  a  hundred  powerful 
steamers  did  not,  in  the  beginning,  enter  into  the  minds  of  any. 

It  was  soon  seen,  however,  that  an  entirely  new  description 
32 


498  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

of  craft  was  needed  for  this  work.  It  was  clear  that  the  river 
boats,  which  had  been  built  for  the  common  purposes  of  freight 
and  passage,  were  not  capable  of  resisting  the  fire  of  heavy 
artillery,  and  that  the  batteries  of  the  rebels  could  not  be  cap 
tured  nor  even  passed  by  them.  They  could  not  even  be  safely 
employed  alone  in  the  transport  of  troops,  for  they  could  be 
sunk  or  crippled  by  the  field  batteries  that  could  be  moved  from 
point  to  point.  The  question  of  iron-clads  was  proposed,  but 
with  only  the  ocean  iron-clads  as  a  guide,  who  should  conceive 
the  proper  form  of  an  armored  boat  which  could  navigate  our 
rivers,  and  compete  successfully  with  the  heavy  guns,  rifled  as 
well  as  smooth-bore,  of  the  fortifications  ?  It  was  by  no  means 
easy  to  solve  this  problem,  but  it  was  absolutely  necessary  that 
the  attempt  should  be  made. 

The  first  movement  of  the  Government  had  a  double  pur 
pose.  It  was  to  throw  a  body  of  troops  into  Middle  Tennessee 
by  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee  Rivers,  in  order  to  gain  a 
permanent  position  within  the  rebel  lines,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  turn  by  this  operation  the  fortifications  at  Columbus  on  the 
Mississippi.  But  both  the  Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee 
were  as  has  been  stated,  strongly  guarded  by  forts,  and  these 
forts  could  only  be  reduced  by  the  aid  of  gunboats,  and  these 
were  almost  literally  to  be  created.  Fortunately  for  the  Gov 
ernment,  a  gentleman  was  found  whose  genius,  energy,  and  re 
sources  were  equal  to  the  exigency,  as  the  following  statement 
of  facts  will  very  clearly  show. 

On  the  17th  of  April,  three  days  after  the  surrender  of  Fort 
Sumter,  Attorney-General  Bates  wrote  to  James  B.  Eads,  of  St. 
Louis,  as  follows  :  "  Be  not  surprised  if  you  are  called  here  sud 
denly  by  telegram.  If  called,  come  instantly.  In  a  certain  con 
tingency  it  will  be  necessary  to  have  the  aid  of  the  most  thor 
ough  knowledge  of  our  Western  rivers,  and  the  use  of  steam  on 
them,  and  in  that  event  I  have  advised  that  you  should  be  con 
sulted." 

This  fact  shows  how  early  the  Government  was  considering 
the  question  of  the  best  method  of  occupying  and  defending  our 
Western  waters. 

As  the  gentleman  above  mentioned,  Mr.  Eads,  was  so  inti 
mately  connected  with  the  operations  of  the  Government  on  the 


' 

• 

. 


. 


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• 
• 


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. 
the  W( 


500  HISTOBY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

The  dispatch  before  mentioned  came  soon  after  the  letter, 
and  Mr.  Eads  repaired  to  Washington.  The  Attorney- General 
explained  to  him  at  length  his  views  in  regard  to  the  occupation 
of  Cairo,  and  the  placing  of  gunboats  on  the  Mississippi. 
Through  the  Attorney-General  he  was  introduced  to  the  mem 
bers  of  the  Cabinet,  and  the  plan  of  operations  on  the  Western 
rivers  was  considered.  Secretary  Cameron  seemed  to  think 
that  the  idea  of  Judge  Bates  in  regard  to  gunboats  for  the  rivers 
was  useless  or  impracticable,  and  manifested  no  interest  what 
ever  in  the  plan.  The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  however,  con 
sidered  the  subject  to  be  one  of  great  importance,  and  requested 
Mr.  Eads  to  prepare  a  written  statement  of  his  own  views,  and 
embodying  the  general  plan  of  Judge  Bates.  This  was  accord 
ingly  done  on  the  29th  of  April.  The  paper  contained  pro 
posals  for  placing  gunboats  on  the  rivers,  suggestions  as  to  the 
kind  of  boats  best  fitted  for  the  service,  and  also  in  regard  to 
batteries  to  be  erected  at  several  points. 

This  paper  was  referred  to  Commodore  Paulding,  who,  after 
hearing  Mr.  Eads's  explanation  of  the  plan,  reported  at  once  in 
favor  of  its  adoption.  Upon  receiving  this  report,  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  detailed  an  officer  to  accompany  Mr.  Eads  West  to 
purchase  and  fit  out  the  necessary  vessels.  Up  to  this  point  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  obliged  to  act  almost  alone  in  the 
matter — the  Secretary  of  War,  Mr.  Cameron,  to  say  the  least, 
appearing  wholly  indifferent.  The  officer  selected  for  this  ser 
vice  was  Captain  John  Eodgers,  but  at  the  next  Cabinet  meet 
ing  the  War  Department  claimed  jurisdiction  over  the  whole 
movement.  After  some  vexatious  delay,  arising  apparently  from 
the  little  interest  which  was  felt  by  the  War  Department  in  the 
matter,  an  order  was  obtained  from  Mr.  Cameron,  directing 
Captain  Kodgers  and  Mr.  Eads  to  proceed  with  the  purchase  of 
the  vessels.  The  project  was  submitted  to  General  McClellan, 
then  just  appointed  to  his  Western  command,  and  being  by  him 
approved,  active  operations  were  commenced.  They  found  at 
Cairo  one  of  the  former  snag-boat  fleet,  called  the  Benton.  It 
was  believed  that  her  strong  hull  was  well  calculated  for  the 
service  proposed,  and  that,  with  certain  alterations  suggested  by 
Mr.  Eads,  who  formerly  had  owned  the  boat,  she  could  be  fitted 
to  bear  the  heavy  armament  which  was  required. 


THE   MISSISSIPPI    SQUADRON.  501 

A  plan  of  alterations,  including  a  sloping  iron-clad  case 
mate,  was  presented  to  Captain  Rodgers.  That  officer,  how 
ever,  did  not  approve  it.  Mr.  Eads  then  proposed  instead,  that 
they  should  purchase  some  of  the  strong  and  swift  boats  used 
on  the  Missouri  River,  and  have  them  altered  at  St.  Louis,  to 
avoid  the  uncertain  navigation  of  the  Ohio.  Captain  Rodgers, 
however,  did  not  approve  of  this  plan,  and  proceeded  up  the 
Ohio  to  Cincinnati,  and  there  altered  the  Conestoga,  Tyler, 
and  Lexington,  and  armed  them  as  gunboats.  This  was  during 
the  latter  part  of  May  and  in  June.  Sometime  in  July  they 
were  started  down  the  river,  but  were  detained  for  six  or  seven 
weeks  on  the  bars  of  the  Ohio,  on  account  of  the  low  water, 
and  did  not  arrive  at  Cairo  until  near  the  1st  of  September, 
1861.  These  vessels  were  not  plated  with  iron.  The  boilers 
and  machinery  were  partially  protected  with  coal-bunkers,  and 
they  had  oak  bulwarks  of  sufficient  thickness  to  prevent  the 
penetration  of  musket-balls.  They  had  side-wheels,  and  were 
originally  used  for  freight  and  passengers  on  the  Ohio  River. 
On  their  arrival  at  Cairo  the  Tyler  was  found  to  be  so  badly 
injured  by  the  sand-bars  that  she  had  to  be  placed  on  the  ma 
rine  ways  for  repairs. 

During  the  month  of  July,  1861,  the  Quartermaster-Gen 
eral  advertised  for  proposals  to  construct  a  number  of  iron-clad 
gunboats  for  service  on  the  Mississippi  River.  The  bids  were 
opened  on  the  5th  of  August,  and  Mr.  Eads  was  found  to  be 
the  best  bidder  for  the  whole  number,  both  in  regard  to  the 
time  of  completion  and  price.  The  Department  decided  to 
construct  seven  of  these  vessels,  each  of  about  six  hundred  tons, 
to  draw  six  feet,  to  carry  thirteen  heavy  guns,  to  be  plated  with 
iron  two  and  half  inches  thick,  and  to  steam  nine  miles  per 
hour.  They  were  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  feet  long,  and 
fifty-one  and  a  half  feet  wide ;  the  hulls  of  wood ;  their  sides 
placed  out  from  the  bottom  of  the  boat  to  the  water-line  at  an 
angle  of  about  thirty-five  degrees,  and  from  the  water-line  the 
sides  fell  back  at  about  the  same  angle  to  form  a  slanting  case 
mate,  the  gun-deck  being  but  a  foot  above  water.  This  slant 
ing  casemate  extended  across  the  hull,  near  the  bow  and  stern, 
forming  a  quadrilateral  gun-deck.  Three  9  or  10-inch  guns 
were  placed  in  the  bow,  four  similar  ones  on  each  side,  and  two 


502  HISTOEY   OF   THE    UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

smaller  ones  astern.  The  casemate  enclosed  the  wheel,  which 
was  placed  in  a  recess  at  the  stern  of  the  vessel.  The  plating 
was  two  and  a  half  inches  thick,  thirteen  inches  wide,  and  was 
rabbeted  on  the  edges  to  make  a  more  perfect  joint. 

On  the  7th  of  August,  1861,  Mr.  Eads  signed  a  contract 
with  Quartermaster-General  Meigs  to  construct  these  seven 
vessels  ready  for  their  crews  and  armaments  in  sixty-five  days. 
At  this  early  period  the  people  in  the  border  States,  especially 
in  the  slave  States,  had  not  yet  learned  to  accommodate  them 
selves  to  a  state  of  war.  The  pursuits  of  peace  were  inter 
rupted  ;  but  the  energy  and  enterprise  which  was  to  provide 
the  vast  material  required  for  an  energetic  prosecution  of  the 
war  had  not  then  been  aroused.  None  could  foresee  the  result, 
and  a  spirit  of  doubt  and  distrust  pervaded  financial  and  com 
mercial  circles.  It  was  at  this  time  that  the  contractor  re 
turned  to  St.  Louis  with  an  obligation  to  perform  what,  under 
ordinary  circumstances,  would  have  been  deemed  by  most  men 
an  impossibility.  Rolling-mills,  machine-shops,  founderies, 
forges,  and  saw-mills  were  all  idle.  The  demands  of  peace  had 
ceased  for  months  before,  and  the  working-men  were  enlisting, 
or  seeking  in  States  more  quiet  their  accustomed  employment. 
The  engines  that  were  to  drive  this  our  first  iron-clad  fleet  were 
yet  to  be  built.  The  timber  to  form  their  hulls  was  uncut  in 
the  forest,  and  the  huge  rollers  and  machinery  that  were  to  form 
their  iron  armor  were  not  yet  constructed.  The  rapidity  with 
wrhich  all  these  various  parts  were  to  be  supplied  forbade  de 
pending  alone  on  any  two  or  three  establishments  in  the  coun 
try,  no  matter  how  great  were  their  resources. 

The  signatures  were  scarcely  dry  upon  this  important  con 
tract  before  persons  in  different  parts  of  the  country  were  em 
ployed  upon  the  work  through  telegraphic  orders  issued  from 
Washington.  Special  agents  were  dispatched  in  every  direc 
tion,  and  saw-mills  were  simultaneously  occupied  in  cutting  the 
timber  required  in  the  construction  of  the  vessels  in  Ken 
tucky,  Tennessee,  Illinois,  Indiana,  Ohio,  Minnesota,  and  Mis 
souri  ;  and  railroads,  steamboats,  and  barges  were  engaged  for 
its  immediate  transportation.  Nearly  all  of  the  largest  ma 
chine-shops  and  founderies  in  St.  Louis,  and  many  small  ones, 
were  at  once  set  at  work  day  and  night,  and  the  telegraph  lines 


fe 


r  < 

O  5 

I? 


. 


THE   MISSISSIPPI   SQUADRON.  505 

a  rotating  turret  six  inches  thick.  The  plans  of  these  vessels 
contemplated  turrets  of  Mr.  Eads's  own  invention,  and  differing 
entirely  from  those  of  Ericsson  and  Coles.  The  guns  were  de 
signed  to  be  placed  on  a  movable  platform,  supported  upon  a 
piston  moving  in  a  central  vertical  cylinder.  By  the  action 
of  steam  in  this  cylinder  the  platform  was  elevated  or  lowered. 
The  guns  were  to  be  loaded  in  the  hold  of  the  vessel,  and  in 
stantly  raised  by  the  steam  to  the  level  of  the  embrasures. 
These  were  but  little  larger  than  the  muzzles  of  the  guns,  and, 
by  a  simple  contrivance  controlling  the  breech  of  the  guns,  the 
muzzles  were  kept  in  constant  range  with  the  embrasures,  so 
that  depressing  the  platform  gave  elevation  to  the  guns,  while 
raising  it  lessened  the  elevation,  and,  when  continued,  caused 
the  aim  of  the  guns  to  be  depressed.  By  this  means  an  eleva 
tion  of  twenty-one  degrees  and  a  depression  of  five  degrees  was 
obtained  through  port-holes  barely  larger  than  the  muzzles  of 
the  guns.  The  guns  had  each  a  horizontal  steam  cylinder 
placed  between  the  gun-slides  v/hich  ran  them  into  battery  and 
held  them  there  until  fired,  when  the  force  of  the  recoil  was 
absorbed  by  their  pistons  (the  rods  of  which  were  attached  to  the 
gun-carriages)  compressing  the  steam  in  the  cylinders  until  the 
guns  came  to  rest,  at  which  moment  the  steam  was  allowed  to 
escape.  The  ports  were  also  opened  by  steam,  and  closed  at  the 
instant  of  recoil.  The  walls  of  the  turret  were  supported  upon 
small  iron  spheres  rolling  in  a  circular  base  on  the  bottom  of 
the  vessel.  The  vertical  central  cylinder,  the  recoil  cylinders, 
and  the  two  small  engines  to  rotate  the  turret,  were  all  within 
the  turret,  below  the  level  of  the  deck,  and  all  revolved  with 
the  turret.  Steam  was  supplied  and  exhausted  through  a  cen 
tral  steam-joint  at  the  bottom  of  the  turret.  Although  Mr. 
Eads  offered  to  guarantee  the  performance  of  this  turret  to  the 
complete  satisfaction  of  the  Department,  he  was  not  permitted 
to  put  them  on  these  vessels — the  reason  given  being  that  the 
Ericsson  turret  had  been  tried  one  month  before  in  the  contest 
with  the  Merrimack,  and  was  a  success.  These  vessels  were 
much  needed,  and  a  possibility  of  failure  in  the  turret,  which 
would  involve  several  months'  delay  in  replacing  it  with  one  of 
Ericsson's,  could  not  be  risked  at  that  time.  The  plans  of  the 
light-draught  vessels  before  mentioned  were  accepted,  and  Mr. 


506  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Eads  was  authorized  to  construct  two  of  them,  the  Osage  and 
JS'eosho.  Their  hulls  were  to  be  of  iron.  The  deck-plating  was 
to  be  three-quarters  of  an  inch,  and  the  side-plating  two  and  a 
half  inches.  The  paddle-wheels  were  protected  by  iron  two 
inches  thick.  Although  Mr.  Eads  was  not  permitted  to  put  his 
turrets  on  them,  he  was  allowed  to  modify  the  form  of  Mr. 
Ericsson's,  with  a  view  to  obtaining  the  least  possible  weight. 
This  he  did  by  lessening  the  height  of  it  from  nine  to  seven 
feet,  making  the  turret  six  inches  thick,  and  bending  the  turret 
floor-beams  to  allow  the  guns  to  be  worked  at  a  lower  level, 
thus  requiring  less  height  of  turret.  When  launched  with  their 
weights  all  on  board,  it  was  found  that  the  vessels  would  be 
really  lighter  than  the  contract  called  for,  and  that  they  could 
carry  an  extra  half  inch  of  armor  all  over  their  decks.  This 
was  ordered  to  be  put  on  them,  and,  when  they  were  completed 
and  ready  for  action,  they  drew  less  than  four  feet. 

The  Osage  was  sunk  by  a  torpedo  in  Mobile  Bay,  after  hav 
ing  gallantly  led  the  van  of  Porter's  Red  River  expedition  both 
going  and  returning.  She  was  afterward  raised.  In  May  of 
1862  the  Navy  Department  solicited  plans  for  four  iron-clads, 
iron-hull  propellers,  to  carry  two  turrets  each  of  eight  inches 
thickness,  four  11-inch  guns,  and  three-quarters  inch  deck-ar 
mor,  and  to  steam  nine  nautical  miles  per  hour,  with  capacity 
of  three  days'  coal,  and  not  to  exceed  six  feet  draught  of  water. 
Mr.  Eads's  plans  were  accepted  for  these  vessels,  and  he  was 
immediately  authorized  to  construct  the  four,  to  wit,  the  Win- 
nebago,  Milwaukee,  Chickasaw,  and  Kickapoo.  So  well  were 
his  designs  matured,  that  these  vessels  were  also,  like  the  Osage 
and  Neosho,  found  to  be  of  less  draught  than  the  contract  stipu 
lation,  and  the  Department  ordered  an  extra  coating  of  armor 
three-quarters  of  an  inch  thick  over  the  entire  decks  of  the  four 
vessels.  Three  of  them  were  also  officially  reported  to  exceed 
the  contract  speed,  and  the  other  to  be  fully  equal  to  its  re 
quirements. 

In  addition  to  the  fourteen  heavily-armored  gunboats  thus 
constructed,  he  converted  during  the  time  seven  transports  into 
what  were  called  tin-dads  or  musket-proof  gunboats,  and  four 
heavy  mortar-boats  were  built  by  him  during  the  same  period. 
Thus  was  commenced  the  squadron  on  the  Western  waters 


THE   MISSISSIPPI    SQUADRON.  50 V 

•which  became  afterward  such  an  important  and  even  indis 
pensable  arm  of  defensive  and  offensive  operations.  Without  it 
the  rebellion  could  not  have  been  overcome,  for  the  Mississippi 
could  not  have  been  opened,  and  the  lines  of  the  rebels  could 
not  have  been  broken  through.  Others  shared  nobly  in  the 
subsequent  work,  but  Mr.  Eads  was  the  efficient  and  successful 
pioneer,  and  by  him,  almost  unaided,  the  Government  was  en 
abled  to  put  the  first  fleet  of  iron-clads  on  the  Mississippi  and 
its  tributaries.  Such  men  deserve  a  place  in  history  by  the  side 
of  those  who  fought  our  battles. 


CHAPTER  XXXII. 

BEGINNING  OF  ACTIVE    OPERATIONS    ON  THE    WESTERN   RIVERS. 

As  it  has  been  previously  stated,  Captain  Rodgers,  who  had 
been  sent  West  in  the  latter  part  of  the  spring  of  1861  to  pur 
chase  and  prepare  gunboats  for  the  rivers,  procured  and  altered 
three  boats  at  Cincinnati — the  Lexington,  the  Conestoga,  and  the 
Tyler.  Owing  to  low  water  these  boats  did  not  reach  the  Mis 
sissippi  till  about  the  1st  of  September.  One  was  injured,  so  as 
to  need  repairs,  in  her  passage  down  the  Ohio,  but  the  other 
two  were  at  once  engaged  in  active  service. 

Before  any  important  movements  were  made  on  the  rivers, 
Captain  Rodgers  returned  East,  and  Commodore  A.  H.  Foote 
assumed  the  command  of  the  Western  flotilla.  The  appoint 
ment  of  this  officer  to  that  post  was  considered  by  those  who 
knew  him  a  sufficient  guaranty  of  success.  ~No  one  probably 
in  the  Navy  enjoyed  more  of  the  affectionate  confidence  of  the 
Government  and  of  the  country,  so  far  as  he  was  known,  than 
Commodore  Foote.  To  all  the  qualities  that  belong  to  the 
officer  and  gentleman,  he  added  those  of  the  devoted  Christian, 
and  he  knew  how  to  obtain  success,  not  alone  by  the  arts  and 
weapons  of  war,  but  by  asking  it  directly  from  Christ. 

It  was  well  for  our  country  that  we  had  so  many,  both  in 
the  Navy  and  Army,  who  were  accustomed  to  seek  daily  an 
audience  with  the  Lord.  E"o  one  began  the  war  more  bril 
liantly  than  the  lamented  Foote.  He  struck  at  Fort  Henry, 
the  first  important  blow  upon  the  rebel  lines  in  the  West,  and 
gained  the  first  of  those  victories  which  gave  to  us  the  heart  of 
the  rebellion.  He  did  this,  however,  at  the  expense  of  a  wound, 
which  withdrew  him  from  active  service,  and  was  probably  the 


OPEEATIONS    ON   THE   WESTEEN    EIVEE8.  509 

cause  of  his  death.     The  following  order  shows  the  date  of  his 
appointment  to  service  in  the  West : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT.  WASHINGTON.  30th  August,  1861. 

SIR  :  You  have  been  selected  to  take  command  of  the  naval  opera 
tions  upon  the  Western  waters,  now  organizing  under  the  direction  of 
the  War  Department. 

You  will,  therefore,  proceed  to  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  with  all  practical 
dispatch,  and  place  yourself  in  communication  with  Major-General  J.  C. 
Fremont,  United  States  Army,  who  commands  the  Army  of  the  West. 
You  will  cooperate  fully  and  freely  with  him  as  to  your  movements. 

Requisitions  must  be  made  upon  the  War  Department  through 
General  Fremont,  and  whatever  the  Army  cannot  furnish,  the  Navy 
will  endeavor  to  supply,  having  due  regard  to  its  operations  on  the 
coast. 

The  Western  movement  is  of  the  greatest  importance,  and  the  De 
partment  assigns  you  this  duty,  having  full  confidence  in  your  zeal, 
fidelity,  and  judgment. 

I  am,  respectfully, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
Captair  ANDREW  H.  FOOTE,  U.  S.  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 

When  this  officer  arrived  at  St.  Louis,  and  on  the  6th  of 
September,  1861,  assumed  command  of  the  Western  flotilla,  the 
forces  consisted  of  three  wooden  vessels  in  commission,  which 
had  been  purchased,  equipped,  and  armed  as  gunboats  by 
Commander  John  Rodgers,  and  there  were  nine  iron-clad  gun 
boats  and  thirty-eight  mortar-boats  in  course  of  construction. 
In  his  report  for  1862  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  thus  speaks 
of  this  river  service  :  "  The  service  was  anomalous  in  its  char 
acter,  and  there  was  with  many  great  incredulity  as  to  the  util 
ity  and  practicability  of  gunboats  in  carrying  on  hostilities  on 
the  rivers  where  it  was  believed  batteries  on  the  banks  could 
prevent  their  passage.  There  were  also  embarrassments  for 
want  of  funds  and  of  material  for  naval  purposes,  there  being 
no  navy-yard  or  naval  depot  on  the  Western  waters.  All  these 
difficulties  were  met  and  surmounted  by  the  energetic  and  effi 
cient  officer  to  whom  the  duty  was  intrusted,  whose  persever 
ance  and  courage  in  overcoming  the  obstacles  that  impeded  and 
retarded  his  operations  in  creating  a  river  navy  were  scarcely 


510  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

surpassed  by  the  heroic  qualities  displayed  in  subsequent  well- 
fought  actions  on  the  decks  of  the  gunboats  he  had  under  so 
many  discouragements  prepared." 

The  country  has  fully  indorsed  the  graceful  compliment 
here  paid  to  Commodore  Foote,  and  no  officer  of  whom  the  war 
deprived  us  was  more  widely  and  deeply  lamented.  The  esti 
mation  in  which  he  was  held  by  the  Government  was  subse 
quently  shown,  when,  after  the  failure  of  Du  Pont,  he  was  se 
lected  to  direct  the  operations  against  Charleston.  All  expected 
that  the  rebel  stronghold  would  yield  to  his  skill  and  energy, 
when  death  put  an  end  to  his  labors  and  the  country's  hopes. 

The  first  service  in  which  the  gunboats  were  engaged  were 
merely  reconnoitring  expeditions,  and  were  important  mainly,  be 
cause  they  showed  the  capabilities  of  this  novel  war-vessel,  and 
gave  the  officers  an  opportunity  of  testing  the  power  and  range 
of  their  guns.  The  rebel  batteries  at  Columbus,  only  a  few 
miles  below  Cairo,  were  of  a  very  formidable  character ;  they 
had  field  batteries  of  rifled  cannon  and  some  heavy  guns  in  bat 
tery  at  different  points  on  the  Missouri  side  of  the  river,  and 
one  or  more  gunboats  were  sheltered  under  the  guns  of  the  for 
tifications  at  Columbus.  From  Cairo  to  the  Balize  the  rebels 
held  by  strong  works  and  gunboats  the  entire  control  of  the 
Mississippi  and  its  tributaries.  Of  course,  our  little  fleet  of  gun 
boats  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  could  make  no  movement  with 
out  being  liable  to  an  attack  either  from  the  shore  or  from  the 
flotilla  of  the  rebels. 

Early  in  September,  General  Grant,  then  in  command  of 
the  troops  at  and  about  Cairo,  determined  to  make  an  expedi 
tion  against  a  body  of  rebels  at  Norfolk,  a  town  in  Missouri,  eight 
miles  below  Cairo.  The  flotilla  was  at  that  time  under  the  di 
rection  of  the  War  Department,  and  the  two  gunboats  Lexington 
and  Conestoga  were  ordered  to  go  down  and  support  the  troops. 
The  Conestoga  went  down  as  far  as  Lucas  Bend,  the  point 
above  Columbus,  without  discovering  any  enemy.  There,  how 
ever,  the  rebels  had  gathered  in  force.  They  had,  it  appeared, 
sixteen  pieces  of  field  artillery,  several  of  which  were  rifled,  and 
one  heavy  piece  in  battery.  With  these  was  a  body  of  cavalry, 
that  assisted  in  transporting  the  guns  from  point  to  point  along 
the  bank.  The  shot  and  shells  from  the  rifled  cannon  ranged 


OPERATIONS   ON    THE   WESTEEN   EIVEES.  511 

to  and  beyond  the  gunboat,  striking  all  around  her,  but  doing 
her  no  damage.  The  difficulty  of  striking  a  moving  mark  at 
long  range  was  very  apparent,  as  was  also  the  superiority  of  the 
gunboats  to  a  land  force  operating  upon  the  shore  without  the 
shelter  of  fortifications.  The  shells  from  the  heavy  guns  of  the 
boats,  bursting  in  the  midst  of  or  near  the  cavalry,  threw  them 
into  confusion,  and  for  the  same  reason  their  field  batteries 
would  soon  be  silenced,  and  they  would  be  compelled  to  move 
to  some  other  point,  only,  however,  to  be  followed  by  the  gun 
boats  and  be  scattered  again.  The  batteries  finally  retreated, 
and  were  apparently  taken  across  the  river  to  Columbus  by  a 
steamboat  in  waiting,  where  our  gunboats  could  not  reach 
them,  because  of  the  Columbus  forts.  In  the  course  of  the 
afternoon  the  rebel  gunboat  Yankee  came  up  from  Columbus 
and  opened  fire  upon  the  Conestoga  and  Lexington  at  long 
range.  The  first  shot  from  the  Conestoga  struck  the  Yankee 
on  the  ricochet,  bounding  from  the  water  close  by  her  side,  and 
she  immediately  started  down-stream.  Before  she  was  entirely 
out  of  range,  and  when  at  the  estimated  distance  of  two  miles 
and  a  half,  the  Lexington  fired  a  shell  from  an  8-inch  gun, 
which  struck  the  Yankee  on  the  starboard  wheel-house,  and 
there  exploded,  seriously  crippling  her,  so  that  she  could  use 
but  one  engine  in  getting  under  the  cover  of  the  Columbus  bat 
teries. 

While  our  gunboats  were  retiring  from  this  fight,  the 
Conestoga  encountered  what,  through  the  whole  war,  was  the 
chief  peril  of  these  river  skirmishes,  a  fire  from  an  ambush 
on  shore.  Only  one  man,  however,  was  seriously  wounded.  In 
such  a  fight  these  concealed  enemies  had  of  course  an  impor 
tant  advantage.  Crouched  like  savages  close  to  the  ground  in 
the  thickets,  or  the  long  grass  of  the  banks,  they  were  able  to 
take  deliberate  aim  at  any  man  exposed  on  the  boat,  while  the 
return  fire  was  "necessarily  very  much  at  random,  and  the  shot 
in  most  cases  passed  over  the  ambushed  foe.  Several  skir 
mishes  of  this  kind  were  had  on  the  different  rivers,  with  no 
very  important  results,  except  that  the  crews  of  the  gunboats 
learned  how  to  handle  with  skill  and  effect  the  vessels  and 
their  armament,  so  that  what  was  at  first  scoffed  at,  became 
daily  more  and  more  a  terror  to  the  rebels. 


512  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

The  first  opportunity  which  the  new  flotilla  had  of  winning 
a  marked  success  was  at  the  battle  of  Belmont.  The  expedi 
tion  which  brought  on  this  conflict  was  undertaken  by  General 
Grant  to  surprise,  if  possible,  and  capture  or  disperse  a  body  of 
men,  of  about  seven  thousand,  that  occupied  the  little  village 
of  Belmont,  opposite  Columbus,  and  thus  prevent  General  Polk 
from  sending  reinforcements  into  Missouri.  This  was  in  No 
vember,  1861.  The  Union  troops,  consisting  of  five  skeleton 
regiments  of  "Western  men,  numbering  in  all  less  than  three 
thousand,  were  embarked  on  transports  at  Cairo,  and  were 
convoyed  down  the  river  by  the  gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexington. 
The  troops  were  landed  some  two  miles  above  Belmont ;  and 
then  the  gunboats,  in  order  to  cover  the  movement  and  mislead 
the  enemy,  dropped  down  within  range  of  the  batteries  at  Colum 
bus,  and  opened  fire  upon  them,  occupying  their  attention  while 
the  troops  were  advancing.  These  batteries,  however,  after  a 
short  practice,  succeeded  in  getting  the  exact  range  of  the  boats 
writh  their  heavy  rifles,  one  of  which  was  a  94-pounder.  They 
were  obliged  to  haul  off,  as  they  were  not  prepared  to  make  a 
serious  attack.  In  the  mean  time  the  Union  forces  had  met 
and  gallantly  driven  back  the  rebels  toward  their  camp ;  but 
there  they  had  secured  themselves  by  a  broad  line  of  fallen 
trees,  in  which,  and  behind  which,  they  were  posted. 

There  the  fight  was  nearly  hand  to  hand,  and  stubbornly 
contested  on  both  sides ;  gradually,  however,  the  rebel  line  was 
forced  backward,  pushed  from  tree  to  tree,  until  they  finally 
broke  and  fled  in  all  directions,  and  the  field  and  their  camp 
were  completely  won.  So  soon,  however,  as  it  was  discovered 
at  Columbus  that  their  camp  wras  captured,  the  guns  of 
their  batteries  were  trained  upon  it,  and  as  they  completely 
commanded  the  spot,  it  was  evident  that  a  speedy  retreat  must 
be  made.  Nor  wras  there  any  reason  for  delay,  for  the  object 
of  the  expedition  was  gained :  the  enemy  were  dispersed,  and 
their  camp,  stores,  and  artillery  had  been  captured.  But  the 
men  were  elated  with  victory,  and  leaving  their  ranks  to 
secure  the  spoils,  were  scattered  so  much  that  they  could 
not  at  once  be  recalled  and  re-formed.  In  the  mean  time  the 
rebel  commanders  on  the  opposite  shore,  perceiving  the  state  of 
things,  hastily  collected  six  regiments  of  their  best  troops  and 


OPERATIONS    ON   THE    WESTERN   RIVERS.  513 

sent  them  over  to  cut  off  the  retreat  to  the  boats  of  our  scat 
tered  men.  In  this  they  nearly  succeeded.  But  although  they 
threw  themselves  in  part  between  the  Union  soldiers  and  the 
boats,  our  men  were  collected  and  re-formed  in  season  to  com 
mence  an  orderly  march,  and  they  literally  cut  their  way 
through  the  rebels  to  the  transports.  Here  the  gunboats  came 
in  with  much-needed  and  most  effective  aid.  With  their  heavy 
guns  they  threw  shot  and  shell  into  the  dense  masses  of  the 
enemy  with  deadly  effect,  throwing  them  into  confusion,  and 
preventing  them  from  using  with  success  their  superior  numbers. 
When  the  troops  reached  the  transports  the  rebels  were  in  close 
pursuit,  and  pressed  up  within  a  short  distance  both  with  mus 
ketry  and  artillery.  Here  they  first  learned  the  real  terrors  of 
this  novel  craft.  The  Lexington  and  Tyler  dropped  down,  so 
as  to  leave  the  transports  outside  of  their  line  of  fire,  and  then 
poured  a  perfect  storm  of  death  into  the  rebel  masses.  Guns, 
carriages,  horses,  and  men  were  scattered  and  hurled  into  the 
air  by  the  explosion  of  their  heavy  shells,  and  whole  ranks  were 
mowed  down  at  a  broadside;  and  it  was  most  conclusively 
proved  that  it  is  sheer  madness  for  any  body  of  men,  however 
.numerous,  to  attack  these  gunboats  with  musketry  and  field 
artillery.  It  is  only  to  rush  on  slaughter.  These  fearful  shells, 
if  they  explode  over  a  body  of  men,  send  down  a  fiery  hail  of 
bullets  and  broken  iron  ;  and  if  one  strikes  a  mass  of  soldiers, 
it  cuts  its  way  through  like  a  solid  shot,  and  then  exploding, 
sweeps  down  all  within  its  reach. 

As  a  means  of  covering  troops  marching  within  range  of 
their  guns,  or  of  repelling  an  attack  upon  any  point  which  their 
shells  could  reach,  the  value  of  the  gunboats  was  very  clearly 
shown,  and  the  rebel  authorities  became  more  anxious  in  re 
gard  to  the  issue  when  they  understood  the  power  of  this  new 
weapon  of  river  warfare. 

The  terrible  havoc  which  these  boats  are  capable  of  making 
may  be  learned  from  the  fact  that,  in  a  little  more  than  half  an 
hour,  as  was  reported,  the  Lexington  and  Tyler  threw  more  than 
a  hundred  rounds  of  shot  and  shell  into  those  masses  of  rebels. 
They  fought  desperately  with  their  new  enemy,  forming  only 
to  be  scattered,  maimed,  or  killed,  by  the  deadly  missiles,  and 
putting  their  artillery  in  position  only  to  see  their  pieces  cap- 
33 


514  HISTOEY   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

sized  or  thrown  into  the  air  by  the  shells.  Covered  thus  by  the 
gunboats,  the  army  transports  returned  to  Cairo.  It  was  a 
bloody  fight  on  both  sides,  the  loss  of  the  rebels  being  greatest, 
because  of  their  exposure  to  the  fire  of  the  boats.  An  oppor 
tunity  was  soon  to  be  given  to  try  the  power  of  the  river  fleet 
against  the  heavy  armament  of  forts. 


CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

CAPTURE  OF  FORT  HENRY.— EXPEDITION  UP  THE  TENNESSEE. 

THE  three  strong  points  in  the  northern  rebel  line  of  de 
fence  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Cumberland  Mountains 
were — Bowling  Green,  to  prevent  an  advance  by  the  line  of  the 
railways  from  Cincinnati  to  Chattanooga ;  Forts  Henry  and 
Donelson,  on  the  Cumberland  and  Tennessee,  to  close  these 
rivers  against  the  passage  of  an  army  into  Tennessee  by  trans 
ports  ;  and  Columbus,  strongly  fortified,  to  command  the  Mis 
sissippi.  How  to  break  through  this  line  of  defence  was  the 
problem  to  be  solved,  and  one  for  which  a  solution  was  to  be 
found  before  any  effectual  movement  could  be  made  from  the 
Ohio  southward.  It  was  quite  evident  that  no  overland  expe 
dition  against  Bowling  Green  could  be  made,  for  the  line  of 
communication  with  the  base  at  Cincinnati  would  be  no  more 
safe  in  neutral  Kentucky  than  in  any  openly  hostile  State. 
The  height  of  the  river  bluffs  at  Columbus  forbade  the  hope  of 
any  successful  attack  from  the  river,  and  General  Grant  had 
not  the  troops  to  cope  with  the  twenty  thousand  men  said  to  be 
stationed  there  under  General  Polk. 

The  only  plan  by  which  success  seemed  even  possible,  was 
to  attack  the  central  stronghold  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson. 
If  these  could  be  gained,  Columbus  and  Bowling  Green  would 
both  be  turned  and  necessarily  evacuated. 

This  latter  course  was  determined  upon,  and  early  in  Jan 
uary,  1862,  the  preparations  were  being  made.  The  plan  em 
braced  a  united  attack  by  land  and  from  the  river.  Commodore 
Foote  was  to  ascend  the  Cumberland  with  his  flotilla,  and  Gen- 


516  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

eral  Grant  was  to  cooperate  by  a  land  force  from  Cairo.  As 
this  was  the  first  serious  trial  of  the  gunboats,  and  particularly 
of  the  iron-clads  constructed  by  Mr.  Eads,  it  will  be  interesting 
to  know  the  character  and  armament  of  these  floating  batteries. 
The  flotilla  consisted  of  four  iron-clad  and  three  wooden  ves 
sels,  carrying  in  all  seventy-five  guns,  as  follows :  Essex  (iron 
clad),  9  guns,  Commander  D.  D.  Porter ;  St.  Louis  (iron-clad), 
13  guns,  Lieutenant  Leonard  Paulding  ;  Cincinnati  (iron-clad), 
13  guns,  Commander  R.  !N".  Stembel ;  Carondelet  (iron-clad), 
13  guns,  Commander  Henry  "Walke ;  Conestoga  (wooden),  9 
guns,  Lieutenant  Phelps  ;  Tyler  (wooden),  9  guns,  Lieutenant 
"W.  Gwin  ;  Lexington  (wooden),  9  guns. 

This  statement  of  the  armament  of  these  boats  must  be  re 
ceived  only  as  approximating  correctness,  as  it  is  not  taken  from 
an  official  report.  The  guns  on  board  our  vessels  were  so  fre 
quently  changed  during  the  war  that  it  is  somewhat  difficult  to 
determine  what  the  precise  battery  was  at  a  specified  time,  un 
less  the  commanding  officer  made  a  special  report.  Some  of 
these  gunboats  carried  9-inch  smooth-bore  guns,  and  100- 
pounder  rifles  ;  and  it  is  easy  to  see,  therefore,  that  they  were 
very  formidable  vessels.  The  Essex  mounted  a  10-inch  colum- 
biad,  with  which  she  often,  it  was  said,  threw  shells  from  Lucas 
Bend  into  the  streets  of  Columbus. 

When  the  preparations  were  nearly  complete  for  this  expe 
dition,  General  Grant  ordered  a  reconnoissance  in  force  in  the 
direction  of  Columbus.  This  force  is  reported  to  have  consisted 
of  some  fifteen  regiments  of  infantry,  several  batteries  of  artil 
lery,  and  a  few  companies  of  cavalry.  No  serious  attack  was 
meditated,  but  the  movement  was  probably  intended  to  mislead 
both  the  commander  at  Columbus  as  well  as  those  at  Forts 
Henry  and  Donelson. 

At  the  same  time  with  the  march  toward  Columbus,  Brigadier- 
General  C.  F.  Smith,  with  six  thousand  men,  made  a  reconnois 
sance  by  a  march  overland  to  Fort  Henry,  and,  having  made 
satisfactory  observations,  returned  to  Paducah.  The  intention 
of  this  movement  does  not  appear,  unless  it  was  to  induce  the 
rebels  to  believe  that  all  idea  of  attacking  the  fort  had  been 
abandoned.  However  this  may  have  been,  the  attack  when 
made  seems  to  have  been  entirely  unexpected. 


ETC.  517 

The  expedition  left  Cairo  on  the  3d  of  February,  and  pro 
ceeded  on  that  day  only  as  far  as  Paducah.  Proceeding  up  the 
river  the  next  day,  the  troops  were  landed  a  few  miles  from  the 
fort,  with  the  intention  of  having  them  occupy  certain  points  to 
prevent  reinforcements,  and,  if  possible,  a  retreat  of  the  garri 
son.  General  Grant  and  staff  then  went  on  board  the  Essex, 
and,  accompanied  by  the  St.  Louis  and  the  Cincinnati,  moved 
up  the  river  to  reconnoitre  the  fort.  This  resulted  in  quite  a 
spirited  skirmish,  in  which  the  Essex  was  struck  by  a  rifled  shot, 
which  went  through  the  private  stateroom  of  Captain  Porter. 
Beyond  this  no  damage  was  done  to  the  gunboats. 

Before  describing  the  battle  of  the  next  day  it  may  be  well 
to  give  the  reader  an  idea  of  Fort  Henry.  It  is  situated  on  the 
Tennessee,  on  the  river  bottom,  and  is  near  the  northern  boun 
dary  of  Tennessee.  During  high  water  it  is  surrounded,  or 
nearly  so,  by  the  river,  and  can  thus  be  approached  only  by  a 
causeway.  It  is  a  regularly  constructed  work,  having  nine  bas 
tions,  and  its  armament  at  the  time  of  its  capture  was  seventeen 
guns.  One  was  a  10-inch  columbiad  (120-pounder),  one  24- 
pounder  rifle,  twelve  32-pounders,  one  24-pounder  siege-gun, 
and  two  12-pounders.  It  had  accommodations  for  a  large  num 
ber  of  men,  but  how  large  the  garrison  was  at  the  time  of  the 
attack  is  not  known.  A  large  body  of  troops  were  said  to  have 
been  encamped  outside  of  the  main  works,  who,  during  the  at 
tack,  retreated  to  Fort  Donelson,  leaving  only  men  enough  be 
hind  to  work  the  guns.  A  portion  of  the  garrison  also  left  on 
a  steamboat.  The  fort  stood  at  the  end  of  a  straight  reach  in 
the  river  of  two  miles  in  length,  and  of  course  commanded 
the  stream  for  that  distance.  A  battery  of  two  64-pounders 
on  a  neighboring  eminence  commanded  the  works,  which, 
detached  as  it  was,  might  easily  have  been  stormed  by 
our  troops  and  used  to  destroy  the  works  it  was  intended  to 
defend. 

Wednesday  night  was  one  of  great  discomfort  to  the  troops 
on  shore.  A  heavy  thunder-storm  swept  over  the  river  and 
roared  among  the  hills,  drenching  the  camps,  putting  out  the 
cheerful  fires,  and  chilling  all  with  the  piercing  dampness  of  a 
mountain-rain.  The  soldiers  were  willing  to  believe  that  the 
flash  and  roar  of  the  tempest  over  Fort  Henry,  where  the  centre 


518  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

of  the  storm  seemed  to  be,  were  prophetic  of  coming  wrath  for 
the  rebels  and  their  cause. 

The  morning  of  Thursday  was  dark  and  threatening,  but 
ere  the  fleet  was  ready  to  move  the  sun  came  out  brightly  and 
warm,  and  the  discomforts  of  the  night  were  forgotten  in  the 
bustle  of  preparation  and  anticipation  of  the  battle.     About  10 
o'clock  the  fleet  got  under  way,  the  four  iron-clads  leading  and 
moving  abreast  up  the  stream — the  Conestoga,  Lexington,  and 
Tyler  following  about  one  mile  in  the  rear  and  also  moving 
abreast.     Immediately  upon  passing  the  lower  end  of  Panther 
Island  the  fort  was  in  range,  but  few  shots  were  fired  on  either 
side  for  some  minutes  after.     The  boats  moved  on  till  within  a 
mile  of  the  works,  with  only  occasional  firing.     Thus  they  went 
on  till  only  a  third  of  a  mile  lay  between  them,  and  the  guns,  the 
gunners,  and  even  the  shells  piled  near  were  all  clearly  seen. 
The  fort  was  waiting  for  the  attack  ;  but  the  bow  guns  of  the 
boats  were  all  ready,  and  when  at  a  distance  of  six  hundred 
yards  the  flag-ship  delivered  her  fire,  followed  in  the  same  in 
stant  by  all  the  bow  guns  of  her  three  consorts.     Before  the 
echo  of  their  roar  had  died  away,  ten  guns  from  the  fort  replied 
with  an  accuracy  of  aim  that  proved  the  value  of  the  gunboats' 
iron  mail.     The  three  wooden  boats  in  the  rear  then  added 
their  fire,  and  the  action  was  fairly  and  fully  begun.     The 
firing  on  both  sides,  owing  to  the  short  range,  was  exceedingly 
accurate.      The  iron-clads  were  repeatedly  struck,  but  in  no 
case,  as  was  said,  was  the  plating  penetrated.     The  damage 
done  was  by  shells  and  balls  that  entered  the  ports  or  went 
through  the  unprotected  parts  of  the  boats.     The  fire  of  the 
gunboats  was  so  severe  that  a  part  of  the  guns  of  the  fort  were 
silenced.     One  of  the  most  efficient  guns  of  the  rebels,  a  24- 
pound  rifle,  burst  at  the  sixth  round,  stunning  and  disabling  all 
about  it.     The  10-inch  columbiad  was  so  filled  with  mud  by 
the  bursting  of  a  shell  as  to  be  useless  ;  and  then  two  of  their 
32-pounders  were   disabled  by  shot  or   shell,  and  thus  their 
power  of  defence  was  seriously  impaired  quite  early  in  the  ac 
tion.     The  little  garrison  fought  bravely,  but  the  commanding 
officer,  Brigadier-General  Tilghman,  soon  saw  that  prolonged 
resistance  would  only  cause  a  useless  slaughter.     One-third  or 
more  of  his  small  company  were  killed  or  wounded  in  an  hour, 


CAPTURE   OF   FORT   HENRY,   ETC.  519 

the  inside  of  his  works  in  ruins,  and  his  best  guns  disabled, 
while  only  one  of  the  gunboats  had  been  injured.  He  there 
fore  very  properly  struck  his  flag  after  a  battle  of  little  more 
than  an  hour.  The  gunboats  were  struck  in  many  places,  and 
their  unprotected  upper  works  much  cut  up ;  but  the  only 
serious  injury  was  on  board  the  Essex,  and  it  was  caused  by  a 
single  shot.  It  entered  a  larboard  port  and  took  off  the  head 
of  young  Brittan,  master's  mate,  who  was  standing  by  the  side 
of  Captain  Porter,  who  thus  had  one  of  the  narrow  escapes  of  a 
battle.  The  shot  then  entered  the  boiler,  and  spread  instant 
death  and  terror  through  the  ship.  Twenty  men  and  officers 
were  killed  or  scalded  by  this  explosion.  Among  the  wounded, 
was  Captain  Porter  himself.  The  men  in  the  pilot-house  were 
suffocated,  there  being  no  way  of  egress  except  by  the  passage 
from  below,  lip  which  the  hot  steam  was  rushing.  The  Essex 
was  of  course  rendered  unmanageable  by  this  fatal  shot,  and 
"drifted  down  the  stream  till  taken  in  tow  by  another  boat.  One 
brave  fellow,  so  terribly  scalded  that  he  knew  he  must  soon  die, 
inquired  how  the  fight  was  going,  and  being  told  of  victory, 
shouted  "  Glory  to  God !  "  and  died.  Such  incidents  show  how 
the  whole  soul  is  absorbed  in  the  terrible  excitement  of  a  battle, 
excluding  for  a  time  every  thought  of  self,  so  that  a  man  step 
ping  off  into  eternity  forgets  the  awfulness  of  death  in  his 
anxiety  for  victory. 

Thus  the  first  serious  battle  of  our  iron-clads  against  land- 
batteries,  protected  by  regular  works,  ended  in  complete  success. 
Their  light  armor  would  have  been  no  protection  against  the  ar 
tillery  afterward  encountered  by  the  Monitors,  but  was  a  good 
defence  against  such  guns  as  were  then  mostly  found  in  the 
rebel  works  of  the  "West.  The  10-inch  solid  shot,  or  that  of 
their  heaviest  rifles,  would  probably  have  broken  it  through  had 
it  been  fairly  struck  ;  but  such  risks  it  was  found  could  be  very 
properly  taken,  and  from  that  hour  it  was  seen  that  the  forti 
fications  of  the  rivers,  where  they  could  be  reached  at  short 
range  by  the  guns  of  our  iron-clads,  would  not  be  an  insuperable 
obstacle  to  the  progress  of  our  armies.  To  Commodore  Foote 
belongs  the  praise  of  first  solving  this  problem,  and  of  forcing 
open  the  first  gateway  through  which  our  army  could  enter  the 
South.  When  Fort  Donelson  was  soon  after  captured  the 


520  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

northern  line  of  the  rebels  was  broken,  never  to  be  re-formed. 
The  permanent  occupation  of  the  South  was  begun,  and  this 
occupation  was  rendered  possible  by  the  iron-clad  navy  of  the 
Western  rivers.  For  although  the  gunboats  could  have  effected 
a  prominent  lodgment  without  the  Army,  neither  could  the 
Army  have  advanced  without  the  Navy.  The  work  of  both 
was  bravely  and  successfully  done. 

Soon  after  the  surrender  of  Fort  Henry,  Commodore  Foote 
sent  an  expedition  of  three  gunboats  up  the  Tennessee  Eiver, 
under  the  command  of  Lieutenant  S.  L.  Phelps.  These  boats 
were  the  Conestoga,  Lieutenant  Phelps  ;  the  Taylor,  Lieutenant 
Gwin  ;  and  the  Lexington,  Lieutenant  Shirk.  This  expedition 
left  Fort  Henry  on  the  6th  of  February,  and  reached  the  bridge 
of  the  Memphis  and  Louisville  Railroad  in  the  evening.  The 
draw  was  closed,  and  the  machinery  for  opening  it  was  de 
stroyed.  Above  the  bridge,  several  steamers  were  seen  escaping 
up  the  stream.  A  party  was  landed,  and  after  an  hour's  labor 
they  succeeded  in  forcing  open  the  draw.  The  Conestoga  and 
Lexington  immediately  started  in  chase  of  the  fleeing  boats, 
some  of  which,  it  was  known,  were  loaded  with  military  stores. 
After  a  five  hours'  run  a  portion  of  the  rebel  fleet  was  over 
hauled.  Two  of  them  loaded  with  stores  were  fired,  and  they 
soon  exploded,  and  with  such  force  as  to  break  the  skylights 
and  slightly  damage  the  woodwork  of  the  Conestoga  at  the  dis 
tance  of  a  thousand  yards. 

On  the  evening  of  the  7th  they  reached  Cerro  Gordo,  in 
Hardin  County,  Tennessee,  where  was  a  very  fine  steamer,  the 
Eastport,  being  converted  into  an  iron-plated  gunboat.  She 
was  two  hundred  and  eighty  feet  long,  in  fine  condition,  about 
half  finished,  and  large  quantities  of  excellent  lumber  and  iron 
were  ready  for  the  completion  of  the  work.  These,  with  the 
boat,  a  very  valuable  prize,  were  secured. 

At  Chickasaw,  Mississippi,  two  steamers  were  found  and 
seized,  one  of  which  was  loaded  with  iron  for  Richmond. 
From  this  point  the  fleet  proceeded  to  Florence,  in  Alabama, 
at  the  foot  of  Muscle  Shoals.  Three  steamers  were  found  here, 
which  the  rebels  fired  on  the  approach  of  the  boats.  A  portion 
of  the  cargoes  of  these  boats  was  saved.  They  were  loaded 
with  stores  either  for  or  from  Fort  Henry.  The  result  of  this 


ETC.  521 

expedition  was  the  capture  of  three  steamers,  including  the 
rebel  gunboat,  and  the  burning  of  six  others,  with  the  loss  of 
their  valuable  cargoes. 

During  the  progress  of  this  expedition  so  large  an  amount 
of  Union  sentiment  was  exhibited  as  greatly  to  encourage  the 
officers  in  command.  They  were  often  told,  "  Send  us  a  small 
organized  force,  and  arms,  and  we  will  put  down  this  rebellion 
among  us  ourselves."  What  became  of  this  Union  sentiment 
afterward  is  a  question  of  much  interest.  It  certainly  seemed 
to  have  disappeared  in  the  progress  of  the  war. 

The  fall  of  Fort  Henry,  and  the  possible  loss  of  Fort  Donel- 
son,  seem  to  have  determined  the  rebels  at  once  upon  that  new 
plan  of  defence,  in  which  one  culminating  point  was  the  fierce 
battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing.  It  was  merely  the  removal  of  their 
main  line  farther  South.  Columbus  and  Bowling  Green  were  to 
be  evacuated,  and  then  the  line  reestablished  with  Island  No. 
10,  Fort  Pillow  and  Memphis  fortified  on  the  Mississippi,  a 
point  on  the  Tennessee  at  or  near  Pittsburg  was  to  be  fortified, 
and  Chattanooga  made  a  stronghold  on  the  east,  making  of  it  a 
gate  to  close  up  Eastern  Tennessee,  and  also  to  prevent  a  south 
ern  march  of  our  army.  Pittsburg  was  to  be  made  a  more  central 
position,  not  only  to  check  Halleck  and  Grant,  but,  if  possible, 
it  was  to  be  made  the  starting-point  for  an  invasion  of  the  States 
north  of  the  Ohio.  The  first  movement  in  this  plan  was  to  oc 
cupy  Pittsburg  with  a  considerable  force,  and  to  commence  the 
establishment  of  batteries  there,  in  anticipation  of  a  concen 
tration  of  troops  at  or  near  that  point.  This  was  begun  about 
the  time  of  the  fall  of  Fort  Donelson.  Lieutenant  Gwin,  com 
manding  the  gunboat  Taylor,  having  learned  that  the  rebels 
were  thus  employed,  left  Savannah,  where  he  was  then  lying, 
nine  miles  below  Pittsburg,  and  with  the  Lexington,  Lieutenant 
Shirk  commanding,  proceeded  up  the  river.  Upon  reaching 
Pittsburg  they  encountered  a  force,  which,  as  was  afterward 
learned,  consisted  of  one  thousand  infantry,  four  hundred  cav 
alry,  and  six  pieces  of  artillery,  some  32-pounders,  and  some 
rifled.  This  force  opened  fire  upon  the  gunboats  at  the  dis 
tance  of  twelve  hundred  yards.  TVTien  within  a  thousand 
yards  the  gunboats  returned  the  fire,  and  soon  silenced  the  bat 
teries.  They  then  moved  up  abreast  of  the  place,  and  under 


522  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   JSTAVY. 

cover  of  grape  and  canister,  four  armed  boats  landed,  with  a  por 
tion  of  two  companies,  sharpshooters,  in  addition  to  the  crew. 

The  object  of  the  landing  was  to  destroy  a  house  near  the 
batteries,  and  to  learn  the  real  strength  and  purpose  of  the 
enemy.  This  small  force  actually  drove  the  rebels  back,  and 
held  them  in  check  until  their  work  was  done.  They  were  of 
course  under  the  guns  of  the  boats,  but,  except  in  landing  and 
in  covering  the  retreat,  these  could  not  be  used  without  destroy 
ing  our  own  men.  Heavy  volleys  of  musketry  were  poured 
into  the  boats,  and  they  were  riddled  with  balls  wherever  they 
could  penetrate.  The  fight  was  short  and  severe,  as  will  be 
seen  by  the  amount  of  ammunition  expended  by  the  two  gun 
boats  :  one  hundred  and  sixty-five  shells,  forty-six  stand  of 
grape,  and  sixty-seven  rounds  of  shrapnel  and  grape  from  the 
howitzers.  The  loss  of  the  rebels  in  this  engagement  was  said 
to  be  twenty  killed  and  one  hundred  wounded.  Our  own  re 
ported  loss  was  only  eleven  killed  and  wrounded.  It  was  ascer 
tained  that  the  rebels  had  begun  extensive  works,  and  the  opera 
tion  shows  the  important  work  which  was  continually  done  by 
these  gunboats  on  the  Western  rivers.  After  this  they  did  not 
renew  the  attempt  to  fortify  at  Pittsburg,  but  concentrated 
their  troops  at  Corinth,  where  the  gunboats  could  not  reach 
them.  In  the  mean  time  the  river  fleet  was  engaged  in  con 
veying  troops  from  point  to  point,  protecting  them  against  am 
bushes  and  shore  batteries,  thus  making  it  possible  to  gather 
the  army  that  wTon  the  great  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing. 

Some  of  the  operations  of  the  Western  fleet  between  the  bat 
tle  of  Belmont  and  the  movement  upon  Fort  Henry,  as  well 
as  the  difficulties  experienced  by  Commodore  Foote,  are  worthy 
of  note  before  proceeding  to  the  more  important  features  of  the 
war. 

On  the  7th  of  January,  1862,  Commodore  Foote,  with  the 
Essex,  Captain  Porter ;  the  Lexington,  Lieutenant  Shirk ;  and 
the  Taylor,  Captain  "Walke,  made  a  reconnoissance  down  the 
river  toward  Columbus.  In  regard  to  this  the  Commodore 
wrote  as  follows : 

I  ran  down  within  range  of  the  rebel  batteries,  but  the  enemy  did 
not  open  fire.  My  object  was  fully  attained  in  seeing  the  river  down  to 


ETC.  523 

the  point  we  reached  clear  of  submarine  batteries  and  other  obstacles. 
I  did  not  consider  it  policy  to  open  fire  on  the  batteries,  as  we  had  not 
the  force  to  attempt  to  carry  them,  which  would  have  induced  the  rebels 
to  claim  a  victory,  if  we  had  retired  after  first  opening  upon  them.  One 
of  their  gunboats,  which  we  had  driven  down  the  river,  followed  us  upon 
our  return.  I  fired  at  her  and  then  gave  chase,  compelling  her  to  return 
to  Columbus,  after  an  exchange  of  two  or  three  shots,  one  of  which  was 
fired  from  the  Columbus  batteries.  The  object  of  the  reconnoissance 
was  satisfactorily  accomplished  in  all  respects,  showing  that  the  rumors 
of  obstacles  being  in  the  river  and  dangerous  torpedoes,  are  unfounded, 
at  least,  until  within  range  of  the  rebel  batteries. 

The  commanding  officer  found  great  difficulty  in  procuring 
men  to  man  his  river  fleet,  as  well  as  in  collecting  naval  stores 
so  far  inland,  and  where  they  had  not  been  needed  before. 
Under  date  of  the  12th  of  January,  1862,  he  wrote  as  follows 
to  the  Navy  Department : 

As  we  are  getting  stores,  etc.,  aboard  the  remaining  gunboats,  pre 
paratory  to  putting  them  in  commission,  I  necessarily  spend  all  my  time 
in  looking  after  these  boats,  which  is  not  required  in  looking  after  our 
interests  down  the  river.  We  are  now  in  immediate  want  of  a  thousand 
men  for  the  gunboats.  In  the  mean  time,  I  am  getting  the  boats  into 
the  middle  of  the  river,  and  putting  their  ordnance  and  other  equip 
ments  and  stores  on  board,  and  by  the  20th  instant  expect  to  have  all 
the  gunboats  in  commission,  although  with  but  one-third  of  a  crew  to 
each  boat. 

On  the  llth  of  January,  the  day  previous  to  the  date  of  the 
above  letter,  a  skirmish  was  had  with  the  rebel  gunboats  which 
came  up  from  Columbus.  An  account  of  this  little  action, 
written  by  Captain  W.  D.  Porter,  commanding  the  Essex,  is 
minute  and  official,  and  is  as  follows  : 

U.  S.  GUNBOAT  ESSEX,  FORT  JEFFERSOX,  January  13,  1862. 
SIR  :  On  the  morning  of  the  llth  General  McClernand  sent  on  board 
this  vessel  and  informed  me  that  the  enemy  were  moving  up  the  river 
from  Columbus  with  several  vessels,  towing  up  a  battery.  I  immediately 
signalled  Lieutenant  Commanding  Paulding,  of  the  St.  Louis,  to  get  un 
der  way  and  prepare  for  action.  A  very  thick  fog  coming  on,  we  were 
compelled  to  steam  slowly  down  the  river,  but  about  10  o'clock,  or  a 


524:  HISTOEY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

little  after,  it  rose,  and  showed  us  a  large  steamer  at  tlic  head  of  Lucas's 
Bend.  We  heard  her  whistle  the  moment  we  were  seen  by  them. 
Shortly  after  whistling  she  was  joined  by  another  large  and  a  small 
steamer.  We  pursued  our  course  steadily  down  the  river,  and  when 
within  long  range  the  large  steamer  fired  a  heavy  shell-gun,  which  struck 
the  sand-bar  between  us,  and  ricochetted  within  about  two  hundred  yards 
of  this  vessel,  and  burst.  We  at  this  time  did  not  return  the  fire,  but 
continued  our  course  down  in  order  to  near  the  vessel.  By  this  time 
the  large  steamer  was  joined  by  her  consorts,  and  they  opened  a  brisk 
fire  upon  us.  I  now  hailed  Lieutenant  Commanding  Paulding,  and  di 
rected  him  to  try  one  of  his  rifle-cannon.  He  instantly  fired,  and  sent 
his  shot  completely  over  the  enemy.  I  then  opened  from  my  bow  guns, 
and  the  action  became  brisk  on  both  sides  for  about  twenty  minutes,  the 
enemy  firing  by  broadsides.  At  the  end  of  this  time  the  enemy  hauled 
off,  and  stood  down  the  river,  rounding  to  occasionally  and  giving  us 
broadsides.  This  running  fight  continued  until  he  reached  the  shelter 
of  his  batteries  on  the  Iron  Banks  above  Columbus.  We  continued  the 
action  and  drove  him  behind  their  batteries  in  a  crippled  condition,  as 
we  could  distinctly  see  our  shell  explode  on  his  decks.  The  action 
lasted  over  an  hour,  and  terminated,  as  I  think,  in  a  complete  defeat  of 
the  enemy's  boats,  superior  in  size  and  number  of  guns  to  the  Essex  and 
St.  Louis.  On  the  12th  General  McClernand  requested  me  to  make  a 
rcconnoissance  toward  the  Iron  Banks.  I  did  so,  and  offered  the  enemy 
battle  by  firing  a  round  shot  at  their  battery ;  but  they  did  not  respond, 
nor  did  I  see  any  thing  of  their  boats.  I  have  since  been  informed 
through  the  general  that  the  boats  of  the  enemy  were  completely  dis 
abled,  and  the  panic  became  so  great  at  the  Iron  Banks,  that  the  gun 
ners  deserted  their  guns. 

The  fire  of  the  St.  Louis  was  precise,  and  the  shot  told  well.  The 
officers  and  men  of  this  vessel  behaved  with  firmness — Mr.  Riley,  our 
first  master,  carrying  out  all  my  orders  strictly,  while  the  officers  of  the 
gun  divisions,  Messrs.  Laning  and  Ferry,  paid  particular  attention  to  the 
pointing  of  their  respective  guns.  Mr.  Brittan,  my  aide,  paid  all  atten 
tion  to  my  orders,  and  conveyed  them  correctly  and  with  alacrity.  In 
fact,  all  the  officers  and  men  on  board  behaved  like  veterans. 
I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

W.  D.  PORTEE,   Commander. 
Flag-Officer  A.  H.  FOOTE. 

The  following  letter  from  Commodore  Foote,  written  from 
Paducah,  gives  an  account  of  the  condition  of  affairs  when  the 
expedition  moved  up  the  Tennessee  against  Fort  Henry.  His 


CAPTURE   OF   FORT    HEKRY,    ETC.  525 

Christian  character  shines  out  even  in  his  official  papers.  He 
has  "  every  confidence,"  he  says,  "  under  God,"  that  he  shall 
silence  the  guns  of  Fort  Henry.  He  recognizes  a  Power  above 
greater  than  powder  and  shot  and  shell : 

U.  S.  GUNBOAT  TAYLOR,  PADUCAH,  February  3,  1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  I  left  Cairo  yesterday 
with  this  vessel,  having  ordered  the  armored  gunboats  Essex,  Caron- 
delet,  Cincinnati,  and  St.  Louis,  to  precede  me  to  Paducah,  and  arrived 
here  last  evening. 

To-day  I  purpose  ascending  the  Tennessee  River  with  the  four  new 
armored  boats  and  the  old  gunboats  Taylor,  Conestoga,  and  Lexington, 
in  convoy  of  the  troops  under  General  Grant,  for  the  purpose  of  con 
jointly  attacking  and  occupying  Fort  Henry  and  the  railroad  bridge 
connecting  Bowling  Green  with  Columbus.  The  transports  have  not 
yet  arrived,  although  expected  last  night  from  Cairo,  which  causes  de 
tention  ;  while  in  the  mean  time,  unfortunately,  the  river  is  falling.  I 
am  ready  with  the  seven  gunboats  to  act  offensively  whenever  the  army 
is  in  condition  to  advance,  and  have  every  confidence,  under  God,  that 
we  shall  be  able  to  silence  the  guns  at  Fort  Henry  and  its  surroundings, 
notwithstanding  I  have  been  obliged,  for  want  of  men,  to  take  from  the 
five  boats  remaining  at  Cairo  all  the  men,  except  a  sufficient  number  to 
man  one  gunboat  for  the  protection  of  that  important  post. 

I  have  left  Commander  Kilty  as  senior  officer  in  charge  of  the  guns 
and  mortar-boats  at  Cairo,  ordering  him,  with  the  assistance  of  Fleet- 
Captain  Pennock,  to  use  every  effort  in  obtaining  more  men  and  for 
warding  the  early  equipment  of  the  mortar-boats.  It  is  peculiarly  un 
fortunate  that  we  have  not  been  able  to  obtain  men  for  the  flotilla,  as 
they  only  are  wanting  to  enable  me  to  have  at  this  moment  eleven  full- 
manned,  instead  of  seven  partially-manned  gunboats  ready  for  efficient 
operations  at  any  point.  The  volunteers  from  the  army  to  go  in  the 
gunboats  exceed  the  number  of  men  required ;  but  the  derangement  of 
companies  and  regiments,  in  permitting  them  to  leave,  is  the  reason  as 
signed  for  not  more  than  fifty  of  the  number  having  been  thus  far  trans 
ferred  to  the  flotilla. 

I  enclose  a  copy  of  my  orders  to  the  commanders  of  the  gunboats,  in 
anticipation  of  the  attack  on  Fort  Henry ;  also,  a  copy  of  orders  to 
Lieutenant  Commanding  Phelps,  who  will  have  more  especial  charge  of 
the  old  gunboats,  and  operate  in  a  less  exposed  condition  than  the  ar 
mored  boats.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-Officer. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 


526  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

P.  S. — Several  transports  with  troops  have  just  arrived.  I  proceed 
up  the  Tennessee  early  in  the  morning,  and  will  there  make  the  Cincin 
nati  my  flag-ship.  A.  H.  F. 

The  following  special  order,  issued  before  moving  up  the 
river  to  attack  the  fort,  shows  how  carefully  this  experienced 
officer  had  considered  the  probable  circumstances  of  the  fight ; 
and  that  while  he  put  his  trust  in  God,  he  also  recognized  the 
necessity  of  the  careful  and  skilful  use  of  all  means  at  human 
disposal.  He  neglected  nothing  which,  in  his  estimation,  could 
secure  success. 

SPECIAL   ORDER. 

U.  S.  GUNBOAT  TAYLOR,  OHIO  RIVER,  February  2,  1862. 

The  captains  of  the  gunboats,  before  going  into  action,  will  always 
see  that  the  hoods  covering  the  gratings  of  the  hatches  at  the  bows,  and 
sterns,  and  elsewhere,  are  taken  off;  otherwise  great  injury  will  result 
from  the  concussion  of  the  guns  in  firing.  The  anchors,  also,  must  be 
unstocked,  if  they  interfere  with  the  range  of  the  bow  guns. 

In  attacking  the  fort,  the  first  order  of  steaming  will  be  observed,  as, 
by  the  vessels  being  parallel,  they  will  be  much  less  exposed  to  the  ene 
my's  range  than  if  not  in  a  parallel  line,  and  by  moving  ahead  or  astern, 
which  all  the  vessels  will  do  by  following  the  motions  of  the  flag-ship,  it 
will  be  difficult  for  the  enemy  to  get  an  accurate  range  of  the  gunboats. 

Equal  distances  from  one  another  must  be  observed  by  all  the  vessels 
in  action.  The  flag-ship  will,  of  course,  open  the  fire  first,  and  then 
others  will  follow  when  good  sight  of  the  enemy's  guns  in  the  fort  can 
be  obtained.  There  must  be  no  firing  until  correct  sights  can  be  ob 
tained,  as  this  would  not  only  be  throwing  away  ammunition,  but  it 
would  encourage  the  enemy  to  see  us  firing  wildly  and  harmlessly  at  the 
fort.  The  captains  will  enforce  upon  their  men  the  absolute  necessity 
of  observing  this  order ;  and  let  it  be  also  distinctly  impressed  on  the 
mind  of  every  man  firing  a  gun,  that,  while  the  first  shot  may  be  either 
of  too  much  elevation  or  too  little,  there  is  no  excuse  for  a  second  wild 
fire,  as  the  first  will  indicate  the  inaccuracy  of  the  aim  of  the  gun,  which 
must  be  elevated,  or  depressed,  or  trained,  as  circumstances  require. 
Let  it  be  reiterated  that  random  firing  is  not  a  mere  waste  of  ammu 
nition,  but,  what  is  far  worse,  it  encourages  the  enemy  when  he  sees 
shot  and  shell  falling  harmlessly  about  and  beyond  him. 

The  great  object  is  to  dismount  the  guns  in  the  fort  by  the  accuracy 
of  our  fire,  although  a  shell  in  the  mean  time  may  occasionally  be 


CAPTUEE    OF   FORT   HEXEY,    ETC.  527 

thrown  in  among  a  body  of  the  enemy's  troops.     Great  caution  will  be 
observed  lest  our  own  troops  be  mistaken  for  the  enemy. 

When  the  flag-ship  ceases  firing,  it  will  be  a  signal  for  the  other  ves 
sels  also  to  cease,  as  the  ceasing  of  fire  will  indicate  the  surrender,  or 
the  readiness  to  surrender,  the  fort.  As  the  vessels  will  all  be  so  near 
one  another,  verbal  communication  will  be  held  with  the  commander-in- 
chief  when  it  is  wanted.  The  commander-in-chief  has  every  confidence 
in  the  spirit  and  valor  of  officers  and  men  under  his  command,  and  his 
only  solicitude  arises  lest  the  firing  should  be  too  rapid  for  precision,  and 
that  coolness  and  order,  so  essential  to  complete  success,  should  not  be 
observed  ;  and  hence  he  has,  in  this  general  order,  expressed  his  views, 
which  must  be  observed  by  all  under  his  command. 

A.  H.  FOOTE, 
Flag- Officer  commanding  Naval  Forces  on  Western  Waters. 


CHAPTER  XXXIV. 

CAPTURE  OF  FORT  DONELSON. 

AT  a  point  opposite  Fort  Henry  the  Cumberland  approaches 
within  twelve  miles  of  the  Tennessee,  and  there  the  rebels  had 
constructed  Fort  Donelson,  a  much  larger  and  stronger  work 
than  Henry,  and  armed  with  heavier  guns.  It  was  garrisoned 
by  from  fifteen  thousand  to  twenty  thousand  men,  under  the 
command  of  Generals  Pillow  and  Buckner.  The  fort  is  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  river,  about  one  hundred  miles  from  its 
mouth.  It  was  resolved  to  follow  up  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry 
with  a  joint  attack  by  land  and  water  on  this  more  important 
work.  In  a  military  point  of  view,  the  possession  of  the  Cum 
berland  was  more  important  than  that  of  the  Tennessee.  Ex 
tensive  iron-works  were  located  upon  its  banks ;  it  is  navigable 
at  times  for  large  boats  some  four  hundred  miles,  and  for  half 
that  distance  boats  have  sufficient  water  all  the  year.  The 
country  which  it  drains  is  capable  of  furnishing  a  large  amount 
of  supplies,  for  which  the  river  affords  the  means  of  transport, 
while  at  Nashville  very  large  factories  were  employed  in  pre 
paring  supplies  for  the  rebel  army.  Besides,  no  advance  could 
be  made  into  Tennessee  with  this  fort  and  its  strong  garrison 
behind.  The  land  forces,  eighteen  thousand  strong,  were  moved 
across  from  Fort  Henry,  over  almost  impassable  roads,  on  the 
12th  of  February.  These  troops  reached  the  enemy's  lines  on 
that  day,  and,  driving  in  his  pickets,  proceeded  to  invest  the 
fort. 

The  gunboat  Carondelet  (iron-clad)  had  been  sent  forward 
ahead  of  the  rest  of  the  flotilla,  and  on  the  13th  was  ordered  to 
attack  the  water  batteries  single-handed.  In  order  that  the 


CAPTUKE  OF  FOBT  DONELSOX.  529 

reader  may  know  what  work  this  was  for  such  a  steamer,  a 
brief  statement  is  given  of  the  character  of  the  works.  The 
fort  is  situated  on  a  sloping  bluff  which  rises  about  one  hundred 
and  fifty  feet  above  the  river.  According  to  the  report  of  Com 
modore  Foote,  it  mounted  twenty  guns,  which  were  disposed  as 
follows:  one  battery,  about  twenty  feet  above  the  water,  of 
32-pounder  and  64-pounder  guns;  the  second,  with  a  similar 
armament,  sixty  feet  higher  up ;  and  the  third,  on  the  summit 
of  the  hill,  mounting  128-pounder  guns  ;  while  the  garrison,  all 
but  those  who  manned  the  guns,  were  over  the  crest  of  the  hill, 
and  occupying  outworks  beyond  the  effectual  reach  of  shot 
or  shell  except  from  mortars.  It  is  very  easily  seen  that  it 
would  be  utterly  vain  for  a  single  steamer,  and  she  able  to  use 
only  her  bow  guns,  to  attack  such  a  position  as  that  with  any 
hope  of  doing  serious  injury,  or  of  escape  without  damage  to 
herself.  She  fired  one  hundred  and  thirty-eight  shots  when  a 
128-pound  ball  entered  one  of  her  ports  and  injured  her  ma 
chinery,  compelling  her  to  withdraw.  Having  repaired  dam 
ages  she  made  another  attack  in  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day, 
but  without  effect  on  the  works.  Both  parties  now  prepared 
for  what  was  expected  to  be  the  decisive  battle  of  the  next  day. 
On  the  14th  six  gunboats  were  ordered  to  attack  the  fort ; 
four  of  these  were  iron-dads,  and  two  were  wooden  ones.  They 
got  under  way  at  2  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  and  proceeded 
toward  the  works  four  abreast,  or  as  nearly  so  as  the  narrow 
stream  would  permit.  The  rebels  opened  fire  from  the  battery 
of  heavy  guns  on  the  top  of  the  hill  at  2|  P.  M.,  but  the  boats 
moved  steadily  without  reply,  intending  to  come  at  once  to 
close  action.  The  gunboats  opened  fire  at  the  distance  of  a 
mile,  but  did  not  diminish  their  speed  till  within  four  hundred 
yards  of  the  lower  battery.  At  this  point  the  firing  on  both 
sides  was  very  rapid  and  unusually  destructive.  Shot  and  shell 
from  the  fleet  plunged  point-blank  into  the  lower  batteries  of 
the  fort,  dismounting  their  guns  and  driving  the  gunners  away, 
while  heavy  shot  and  shell  came  not  singly,  but  in  volleys 
against  the  sides  and  upon  the  decks  of  the  gunboats.  Sev 
eral  entered  their  ports,  and  some  of  the  128-pound  shot  broke 
through  the  iron  armor.  Many  were  killed  and  wounded  on 
board  the  steamers,  but  their  fighting  power  was  not  sensibly 
34 


530  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

diminished,  and  the  rebel  batteries  evidently  began  to  fail. 
Several  of  their  guns  were  dismounted,  and  they  were  driven 
out  of  the  lower  battery ;  and  the  action  was  evidently  going 
against  them,  when  three  of  the  gunboats  were  almost  at  once 
disabled  by  shots  that  struck  the  steering  apparatus  and  a 
wheel-house.  These  were  of  course  compelled  to  drift  out  of  ac 
tion,  and  as  it  was  impossible  for  the  remaining  vessels  to  carry 
the  action  to  any  successful  result,  they  also  withdrew. 

The  gunboats  fought  with  twelve  guns  against  twenty  in  bat 
tery,  and  planted  upon  ground  far  above  the  level  of  their  decks, 
the  highest  battery  mounting  128-pounders,  which  could  send 
upon  them  a  plunging  fire,  with  almost  entire  safety  to  them 
selves.  The  result  of  the  action  showed  that  the  light  armor 
of  the  gunboats  could  be  pierced  by  the  shot  of  the  heavy  guns, 
and  that  the  machinery  and  steering  apparatus  needed  addi 
tional  protection.  Still,  the  great  importance  of  the  iron  armor 
was  fully  shown,  for  the  St.  Louis  was  struck  fifty-nine  times, 
with  only  one  man  killed  and  nine  wounded ;  and  the  Pitts- 
burg  was  hit  forty  times,  and  only  two  men  were  wounded ; 
and  on  board  the  whole  fleet  only  eleven  were  killed  and  forty- 
three  wounded,  a  small  number  considering  the  severity  of  the 
action.  Nothing  important  seems  to  have  been  accomplished 
by  this  attack ;  and  although  it  was  thought  that  but  for  the  dis 
abling  of  the  steering  gear  the  batteries  would  have  been  silenced 
in  a  few  minutes,  it  is  not  very  clear  how  this  would  have  been 
decisive  when  twenty  thousand  men  were  within  the  works 
ready  to  man  the  guns  again  ;  and  when,  though  the  river  bat 
teries  had  been  destroyed,  the  works  beyond  still  remained  to 
be  carried  by  assault,  as  they  actually  were  at  the  close  of  the 
fight,  when  the  fort  was  so  gallantly  won. 

It  may  be,  however,  that  too  little  consideration  is  thus 
given  to  the  moral  effect  of  the  fire  of  the  gunboats  upon  the 
garrison  in  diminishing  their  confidence  in  their  defences,  for 
they  found  themselves  unable  to  stand  to  their  guns,  and  their 
river  batteries  were  being  effectually  silenced  by  the  dismount 
ing  of  the  cannon ;  and  they  had  good  reason  to  dread  the 
effect  of  the  shells  when  the  gunboats  should  take  a  position 
where  they  could  command  the  camp.  Such  seems  to  have 
been  the  opinion  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  who,  in  direct 


CAPTURE  OF  FOKT  DONELSON.  531 

communication  with  Commodore  Foote,  had  the  best  possible 
means  of  knowing  the  truth.  The  following  passage  is  found 
in  the  Eeport  of  1862  in  regard  to  this  point :  "  The  rebels 
were  so  greatly  demoralized  that  they  could  not  be  brought 
into  effective  action  on  the  following  day,  which  resulted  in  the 
defeat  of  the  insurgents  and  the  surrender  of  Fort  Donelson  to 
the  army  the  next  morning." 

Justice  to  Commodore  Foote  and  to  the  officers  and  men  of 
the  fleet  requires  that  the  following  statement  in  regard  to  the 
disadvantages  under  which  the  action  was  fought  should  be 
given  to  the  public.  On  the  llth  of  February  he  wrote  as  fol 
lows  to  the  Secretary : 

I  leave  again  to-night  with  the  Louisville,  Pittsburg,  and  St.  Louis, 
for  the  Cumberland  River,  to  cooperate  with  the  army  in  the  attack  on 
Fort  Donelson.  I  go  reluctantly,  as  we  are  very  short  of  men,  and  trans 
ferring  men  from  vessel  to  vessel,  as  we  have  to  do,  is  having  a  very  de 
moralizing  effect  upon  them.  Twenty-eight  ran  off  to-day,  hearing  that 
they  were  to  be  sent  out  of  their  vessels.  I  do  hope  that  the  six  hun 
dred  men  will  be  sent  immediately.  I  shall  do  all  in  my  power  to  ren 
der  the  gunboats  effective  in  the  fight,  although  they  are  not  properly 
manned ;  but  I  must  go,  as  General  Halleck  wishes  it.  If  we  could 
wait  ten  days,  and  /  had  the  men,  I  would  go  with  eight  mortar-boats 
and  six  armored  boats. 

Instead  of  the  armament  which  he  thought  necessary  for  the 
reduction  of  the  fort,  he  had  only  the  four  iron-dads  which 
could  be  brought  into  close  action,  and  they  imperfectly 
manned.  These  facts  place  the  action  of  the  gunboats  with 
Fort  Donelson  in  a  new  light,  and  the  wonder  is,  not  that  they 
did  not  capture  the  fort,  but  that  they  were  not  themselves  de 
stroyed. 

The  capture  of  their  central  strongholds  on  the  Cumberland 
and  Tennessee,  and  of  the  surrender  and  dispersing  of  their 
army  of  twenty  thousand  men,  fifteen  thousand  of  whom  were 
made  prisoners  at  Donelson,  created  a  panic  among  the  rebels, 
which  made  Commodore  Foote  very  anxious  to  proceed  at  once 
to  Nashville  before  the  enemy  could  recover  from  these  severe 
blows.  He  pressed  upon  General  Grant  an  immediate  pursuit 
with  at  least  four  thousand  men.  General  Halleck,  however, 


532  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

for  reasons  which  do  not  appear,  prohibited  the  gunboats  from 
proceeding  above  Clarksville.  Inasmuch  as  Nashville,  a  most 
important  depot  and  centre  of  operations  for  the  rebels,  was 
entirely  at  our  mercy,  it  does  not  appear  why  the  river  fleet 
was  not  permitted  to  ascend  and  occupy  the  place.  Whatever 
may  have  been  the  reason,  the  gunboats  were  held  back,  with  an 
open  river  before  them,  and  on  the  27th  of  February  the  army, 
with  two  gunboats  only  with  it,  took  possession  of  Nashville. 

By  these  brilliant  operations  of  the  Army  and  Navy,  the 
rebel  line  of  defence  was  broken  at  the  centre,  and  this  made 
it  a  necessity  for  them  to  abandon  the  two  wings  of  this  line — 
Bowling  Green  on  their  right,  and  Columbus  on  the  Mississippi. 
It  was  one  of  the  great  hinge-points  of  the  war,  the  first  great 
How  which  the  rebellion  received.  A  firm  lodgment  in  the 
heart  of  Tennessee  involved,  almost  of  necessity,  the  final  over 
throw  of  the  rebel  cause.  The  naval  battles  which  had  been 
fought  on  the  Atlantic  coast  were  perhaps  more  brilliant ;  but 
none,  unless  it  was  that  between  the  Monitor  and  the  Merri- 
niack,  were  followed  by  more  important  results. 

After  he  had  taken  possession  of  Clarksville,  Commodore 
Foote,  not  having  obtained  the  consent  of  General  Halleck  to 
proceed  to  Nashville,  returned  to  Cairo  and  prepared  for  oper 
ations  on  the  Mississippi.  On  the  23d  of  February  he  moved 
toward  Columbus  for  the  purpose  of  a  reconnoissance  with  four 
iron-clads,  two  mortar-boats,  and  three  transports,  carrying  one 
thousand  men.  This  expedition  was  to  meet  a  flag  of  truce  from 
General  Polk,  to  which  Commodore  Foote  promised  to  reply. 

On  the  2d  of  March  he  once  more  moved  down  the  river  in 
force  to  receive  a  flag  of  truce  from  General  Polk.  The  rebels 
probably  availed  themselves  of  this  method  of  ascertaining  the 
force  which  our  commanders  had  at  their  disposal.  Commodore 
Foote  was  quite  willing  to  gratify  them  in  this  particular,  and 
with  good  reason ;  for  on  seeing  the  number  of  the  boats  and 
transports,  they  at  once  began  the  evacuation  of  the  northern 
most  of  their  fortified  forts  on  the  Mississippi. 

The  rebels  were  soon  seen  burning  their  winter  quarters,  and 
other  large  fires  indicated  the  destruction  of  their  stores.  The 
heavy  guns  on  the  bluffs  were  removed,  but  "•  lose  in  the  water 
batteries  were  left.  The  works  at  Columbia  were  very  formi- 


CAPTUKE  OF  FORT  DONELSON.  533 

dable,  consisting  of  tiers  of  batteries  on  the  land  side,  and  they 
were  surrounded  by  a  ditch  and  abatis.  Here  also  an  immense 
chain  had  been  prepared  to  throw  across  the  river,  and  a  large 
number  of  torpedoes  were  found.  Great  quantities  of  shot,  shell, 
and  anchors  were  also  secured. 

General  Sherman  and  Lieutenant  Phelps,  with  six  gunboats, 
four  mortar-boats,  and  three  transports,  with  two  regiments  and 
two  battalions  of  infantry,  went  down  and  landed,  but  found  that 
the  place  was  already  occupied  by  some  four  hundred  of  the 
Second  Illinois  cavalry,  who,  being  out  on  a  scouting  party,  had 
dashed  into  the  place.  General  Cullom,  who,  with  General 
Sherman,  was  in  command  of  the  troops  that  came  down  the 
river,  discovered  on  landing  a  train  of  fire  leading  to  a  maga 
zine,  which  he  cut  in  season  to  save  the  lives  of  the  soldiers. 

The  nobleness  of  Commodore  Foote's  character  was  ever 
seen  in  the  very  warm  commendation  with  which  he  men 
tioned  in  his  dispatches  every  officer  whom  he  thought  de 
serving.  He  was  a  warm  admirer  of  General  Cullom,  of  Gen 
eral  Halleck's  staff,  and  in  the  dispatch  announcing  the  fall  of 
Columbus  he  took  especial  pains  to  commend  to  the  Secretary 
Commanders  Dove,  Walke,  and  Stembel,  and  Lieutenants 
Paulding,  Thompson,  Shirk,  Phelps,  and  Sanford.  He  had 
before  bestowed  very  emphatic  praise  upon  Lieutenant  Phelps 
for  the  manner  in  which  he  conducted  the  expedition  to 
Florence  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Henry. 


CHAPTEE  XXXV. 

OPERATIONS  AGAINST  AND  CAPTURE  OF  ISLAND  NUMBER  TEN. 

AFTER  the  centre  of  the  rebel  line  had  been  broken  by  the 
capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  these  victories  had 
been  followed  by  the  occupation  of  Nashville  and  the  evac 
uation  of  Bowling  Green  on  their  right  wing,  and  Columbus 
on  the  Mississippi,  it  was  decided  to  move  down  that  river  with 
a  more  formidable  force  than  had  yet  been  organized,  and  at 
tempt  to  remove  the  various  obstructions,  forts,  and  batteries 
with  which  the  rebels  had  blockaded  the  stream.  The  first  of 
these  were  the  very  formidable  works  at  Island  No.  10,,  a  spot 
admirably  fitted  for  blockading  the  river,  and  which  it  was  by 
no  means  easy  to  attack  either  by  land  or  water.  This  island 
is  at  the  bottom  of  a  long  bend  in  the  river  some  forty  miles 
from  Columbus.  The  fortifications  on  the  island  and  on  the 
opposite  shores  mounted  seventy  heavy  guns,  and  there  was 
also  a  floating  battery  with  some  sixteen  guns.  In  addition  to 
these,  field-batteries  were  established  at  intervals  for  ten  or 
twelve  miles  where  they  could  command  the  channel.  The 
river  from  this  island  runs  for  several  miles  northwest,  and  then 
turns  west  and  south.  At  the  top  of  this  bend  and  north  of 
the  island  is  New  Madrid,  which  the  rebels  had  fortified  and 
occupied  with  several  thousand  troops  to  prevent  the  wwks  on 
the  island  from  being  approached  by  land  from  the  Missouri 
side.  Below  New  Madrid  they  had  also  batteries  on  the  west 
side  to  prevent  that  shore  being  occupied ;  and  on  the  east  side, 
to  prevent  troops  from  crossing  and  attacking  the  island  from 
the  Tennessee  shore.  A  few  miles  below  New  Madrid  large 
swamps  occupy  both  sides  of  the  Mississippi,  so  that  a  force  es- 


CAPTURE    OF    ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  535 

caping  from  the  island  would  have  to  land  above  these  swamps 
at  Tiptonville  in  order  to  reach  the  interior.  Above  this,  on 
the  Tennessee  shore,  it  is  swampy,  and  in  most  places  over 
flown,  so  as  to  prevent  the  rebels  from  leaving  in  that  direction 
by  land. 

While,  therefore,  our  gunboats  held  the  river  above,  if  New 
Madrid  could  be  occupied  by  our  land  forces,  and  these  bat 
teries  be  placed  along  the  river  below,  to  the  edge  of  the  great 
swamp  that  could  command  the  stream,  the  garrison  of  the 
island  would  be  hemmed  in,  though  it  could  not  thus  be  cap 
tured  until  the  supplies  should  fail.  The  somewhat  difficult 
task  of  occupying  New  Madrid  was  committed  to  General  Pope, 
who  had  under  his  command  some  twenty  thousand  men.  The 
peril  of  this  enterprise  was  greatly  increased  by  the  presence 
below  the  island  of  the  rebel  gunboats,  and  by  the  stage  of  the 
water  in  the  river.  The  stream  was  so  high  as  to  raise  the  guns 
of  the  boats  above  the  banks ;  and  as  the  country  around  New 
Madrid  is  flat,  they  commanded  it  to  the  extreme  range  of  their 
cannon,  some  of  which  were  rifles. 

General  Pope,  in  meeting  these  difficulties,  showed  both 
energy  and  fertility  of  resource.  He  established  in  the  night 
sunken  batteries,  on  which  the  guns  were  only  high  enough  to 
fire  over  the  surface  of  the  ground,  so  that  it  was  nearly  impos 
sible  for  the  gunboats  to  strike  them  or  get  a  shell  into  the 
trenches,  while,  as  they  were  within  rifle  shot  of  the  point  from 
which  the  boats  usually  attacked,  many  of  their  men  were  shot 
down  at  the  guns.  Owing  to  peculiar  circumstances,  it  was  one 
of  the  few  cases  where  the  gunboats  of  the  rivers  fought  at  dis 
advantage  with  troops  on  shore.  Nine  of  these  boats  at  some 
times  engaged  the  batteries,  but  with  little  eifect,  because  their 
shot  and  shells  went  mostly  over  the  trenches,  while  they,  lying 
high  out  of  water,  and  above  the  banks,  were  conspicuous 
marks,  and  therefore  suffered  severely. 

On  the  14th  of  March,  General  Pope  having  nearly  silenced 
the  rebel  batteries  on  shore,  they  retreated  to  their  boats,  and 
our  troops  took  possession  of  the  place.  By  extending  his  bat 
teries  to  the  south,  he  gained  command  of  the  river  below 
the  island,  and  at  the  same  time  shut  up  a  part  of  the  rebel 
fleet  above  him,  for  these  wooden  boats  could  not,  without  great 


536  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

peril,  pass  his  heavy  siege-guns.  Thus,  when  Commodore 
Foote  moved  down  from  Columbus,  Island  ~No.  10  might  be  said 
to  be  invested,  the  swamps  on  two  sides  serving  instead  of  lines 
of  troops.  To  attack  these  batteries  of  the  island  from  above 
was  a  work  of  immense  peril.  The  current  of  the  river  is 
swift,  and  the  most  heavily  armored  boats  of  Commodore 
Foote's  fleet  were  very  deficient  in  steam-power.  Under  the 
most  favorable  circumstances  they  could  barely  stem  the  stream, 
making  but  little  progress,  and,  of  course,  should  one  of  them 
meet  with  any  accident  depriving  her  of  even  a  part  of  her 
motive  power,  she  would  at  once  drift  helplessly  under  the  ene 
my's  guns.  To  fight  with  only  the  forward  guns,  bow  on  and 
down-stream,  required  great  caution.  It  was  for  this  reason 
that  the  gunboats  could  not  be  brought  into  close  action,  as  was 
the  case  at  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson.  The  experience  there 
was  an  admonition  not  to  be  disregarded.  Had  they  been 
fighting  down-stream  then,  all  their  disabled  boats  would  have 
been  captured  or  destroyed,  for  they  would  have  been  carried 
in  a  few  minutes  directly  under  the  guns  of  the  water  batteries. 
Commodore  Foote  was  compelled,  therefore,  to  fight  at  long 
range,  not  approaching  nearer  than  one  mile  and  a  half  or  two 
miles.  He  expected  much  from  his  mortar-boats,  but  although 
they  compelled  the  enemy  to  move  his  encampments  out  of 
range,  the  separate  forts  and  batteries  were  a  small  mark  for 
shell  practice  at  a  distance  of  two  miles.  There  was  yet  anoth 
er  weighty  reason  why  it  was  very  important  to  be  careful  of 
the  gunboats.  The  rebels  had  a  fleet  on  the  river  below,  out 
numbering  our  own,  and  the  Louisiana,  soon  after  destroyed 
below  New  Orleans,  was  expected  daily  to  come  up  the  river; 
and  should  our  fleet  be  weakened  materially,  there  was  nothing 
to  prevent  the  flotilla  of  the  enemy  from  reaching  the  cities  of 
the  Mississippi  and  Ohio,  for  no  batteries  had  yet  been  finished 
above,  by  which  they  could  have  been  stopped.  It  was  neces 
sary,  therefore,  for  Commodore  Foote  to  exercise  the  greatest 
vigilance  and  caution.  During  this  time,  also,  he  was  suffering 
greatly  from  the  wound  received  at  Donelson. 

On  the  14th  of  March,  1862,  the  fleet  which  the  commodore 
had  prepared,  consisting  of  seven  iron-clads  and  ten  mortar- 
boats  left  Cairo,  and  having  been  joined  at  Columbus  on  the 


CAPTUEE   OF   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  537 

same  day  by  twelve  hundred  troops,  under  Colonel  Buford, 
reached  Hickman  the  same  evening.  Here  the  Louisville  was 
found  partially  disabled  by  the  leaking  of  her  boilers,  and  was 
sent  back  to  Columbus  for  repairs.  On  the  15th,  at  daylight, 
the  fleet  moved  on,  and  arrived  in  the  vicinity  of  Island  No.  10 
at  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning.  The  fog  on  the  river  was  so 
dense  as  to  hide  all  objects  at  a  little  distance,  and  a  heavy  rain 
was  also  falling.  Nothing  could  be  done  that  day  except  to  get 
two  of  the  mortar-boats  in  a  position  where  they  could  try  the 
range.  On  the  morning  of  the  16th  the  mortar-boats  were 
placed  in  as  good  a  position  as  possible,  and  they  were  soon  en 
abled  to  shell  several  regiments  out  of  their  encampments.  At 
this  extreme  range,  they  could  just  reach  the  batteries  on  the 
island,  the  floating  batteries,  and  those  on  the  Tennessee  shore. 
These  mortar-boats  were  under  the  charge  of  Captain  Maynar- 
din,  United  States  Army,  as  ordnance  officer,  assisted  by  Lieu 
tenant  J.  P.  Sandford,  of  the  Navy.  The  mortars  were  very 
heavy,  throwing  thirteen-inch  shells.  On  the  morning  of  the 
17th  the  first  attack  with  the  gunboats  was  made.  The  Ben- 
ton,  Cincinnati,  and  St.  Louis  were  lashed  together,  on  account 
of  the  deficient  steam-power  of  the  Benton,  which  in  other  re 
spects  was  the  most  formidable  boat  in  the  fleet.  They  main 
tained,  on  account  of  the  rapidity  of  the  stream,  a  distance  of 
nearly  two  miles,  and,  of  course,  their  fire  could  not  be  very 
effective.  The  forts  and  batteries  were  isolated  from  each  other, 
and  at  that  distance  any  one  of  them  presented  a  small  mark 
to  the  gunners,  and  it  was  found  very  difficult  to  throw  shells 
from  the  mortars  with  much  accuracy,  although  they  succeeded 
in  forcing  back  the  rebel  encampments  out  of  range.  Indeed, 
the  enemy  kept  no  more  men  within  range  than  was  necessary 
to  man  their  guns.  The  action  was  continued  from  mid-day 
until  the  forts  were  hidden  by  the  darkness,  with  no  very  im 
portant  results.  The  Benton  was  struck  four  times,  but  not  se 
riously  injured.  The  Cincinnati  had  her  engines  injured  some 
what  ;  but  the  most  serious  disaster  was  the  bursting  of  a  rifled 
gun  on  the  St.  Louis,  by  which  fifteen  men  were  killed  and 
wounded. 

From  the  time  of  the  first  attack  on  the  17th  to  the  26th  of 
March  this  firing  upon  the  batteries  at  long  range  was  kept  up, 


538  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

the  rebels  having  withdrawn  their  troops  beyond  the  reach  of 
the  shells,  leaving  only  the  men  at  the  guns,  so  that  little  dam 
age  was  done.  Occasionally  a  gun  was  dismounted,  but  this 
was  of  small  consequence,  when  it  could  be  so  easily  replaced. 

At  this  time,  the  commodore  reported  his  fleet  as  numbering 
sixteen  mortar-boats,  six  iron-clads,  and  one  wooden  gunboat. 
The  rebels,  he  stated,  had  at  that  date  thirteen  gunboats,  inde 
pendent  of  the  five  below  New  Madrid,  and  the  Manassas  at 
Memphis.  There  was,  as  he  thought,  great  danger  that  the 
rebel  fleet  would  attempt  to  ascend  the  river,  and  lay  under 
contribution,  or  burn,  St.  Louis,  Cincinnati,  and  other  river 
towns.  He  was,  therefore,  very  cautious  in  regard  to  exposing 
his  gunboats.  He  also  wrote  to  the  Secretary  that  it  would 
be  useless,  even  if  he  should  succeed  in  driving  the  enemy  from 
their  forts,  for,  with  no  troops  to  hold  them,  they  would  be  re- 
occupied  by  the  rebels  so  soon  as  the  fleet  had  passed.  He  saw, 
therefore,  that  the  only  hope  of  capturing  this  stronghold  was 
in  some  manner  to  send  transports  and  gunboats  to  Gen 
eral  Pope,  in  order  that  he  might  cross  the  river  with  troops 
that  could  attack  the  rebel  works  from  below,  and  on  the  Ten 
nessee  shore.  How  to  supply  General  Pope  with  the  boats  lie 
needed,  and  not  so  \veaken  his  fleet  that  the  rebel  flotilla  might 
succeed  in  passing  up  the  river,  was  a  question  not  easily  solved. 
Two  methods  were  discussed,  both  difficult  and  perilous.  One 
was  to  send  two  gunboats  past  the  batteries,  if  that  could  be 
done.  In  a  council  of  war  called  by  the  commodore  it  was 
found  that  the  officers  of  the  fleet,  with  but  one  exception,  be 
lieved  that  any  vessel  would  certainly  be  destroyed  in  an  at 
tempt  to  run  the  blockade,  exposed  as  it  would  be  to  the  fire  of 
at  least  seventy  guns.  This  plan  was  temporarily  abandoned. 
The  other  was  to  send  some  boats  around  the  forts  and  island, 
through  the  swamps  and  bayou  on  the  western  side  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  so  bring  them  out  to  the  river  again  at  New 
Madrid.  It  was  decided  that  this  should  be  undertaken.  This 
plan,  as  is  said,  was  first  suggested  by  General  Schuyler  Hamil 
ton.  In  the  execution  of  it  the  Navy  and  Army  cooperated, 
but  the  success  of  the  enterprise  was  mainly  due  to  the  skill 
and  energy  of  Colonel  T.  W.  Bissell  and  his  regiment  of  reso 
lute  and  skilful  engineers.  Opposite  the  point  where  Commo- 


CAPTURE    OF    ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  539 

dore  Foote's  fleet  was  lying,  a  swamp  on  the  Missouri  side  ap 
proached  the  river,  so  that  in  high  water  about  five  hundred 
feet  of  dry  ground  lay  between  it  and  the  river  bank.  In  this 
swamp,  reaching  out  west  and  southwest,  were  several  small 
bayous  or  swamp-lakes,  partly  connected  by  narrow  channels, 
and  at  or  near  New  Madrid  a  small  stream  came  down  from  the 
direction  of  the  swamp.  The  swampy  ground  was  covered 
in  places  with  heavy  timber,  so  that  six  miles  of  timber  in  all, 
had  to  be  cut  through,  while  the  whole  length  of  the  proposed 
canal  was  twelve  miles.  Through  the  solid  ground,  through 
the  narrow  swamp  channels,  through  the  underbrush  and  heavy 
timber,  through  the  shallow  lakes,  a  passage  was  to  be  opened 
fifty  feet  wide  and  deep  enough  to  float  the  boats.  "Water, 
swamp-mud,  slough-holes,  great  trees,  brush,  stumps,  and  solid 
earth,  these  were  the  obstacles  which  for  twelve  miles  confronted 
our  men  in  the  chilly  weather  of  the  spring.  The  first  work 
was  the  construction  of  the  canal  from  the  river-bank  to  the 
edge  of  the  swamp.  "When  this  was  finished  it  was  a  difficult 
matter  to  pass  even  some  of  the  small  boats  through,  for  the 
water  in  the  Mississippi  was  so  much  higher  than  the  land  be 
low  that  the  water  rushed  with  great  violence  through  the  cut, 
and  the  boats  could  only  be  passed  down  by  a  large  company 
of  men  on  either  side  with  guy-ropes  to  guide  and  hold  them 
back. 

It  was  found  impracticable  to  cut  a  channel  deep  enough 
for  the  passage  of  the  gunboats,  and  therefore  the  plan  em 
braced  only  the  transports  and  tugs.  This  required  the  canal 
to  be  fifty  feet  wide  and  four  feet  deep.  The  obstacles  in  the 
swamp  seemed  at  times  almost  too  great  for  the  skill  and  energy 
of  man.  Fallen  timber,  some  sunk  entirely  in  the  mud ;  great 
stumps,  some  of  whose  tops  were  below  the  water  ;  huge  trees, 
with  the  water  now  several  feet  around  them,  these  often  threat 
ened  to  stop  their  progress  altogether.  The  steam  machinery 
of  the  transports  and  the  capstans  were  used  in  dragging  out 
the  logs  and  tearing  up  the  stumps,  while  with  saws  rigged  for 
the  purpose  the  trees  which  stood  in  the  water  were  sawed  off 
four  feet  beneath  the  surface,  and  thus  an  avenue,  in  all  six 
miles  long  and  fifty  feet  wide,  was  cut  through  this  grove  of  the 
huge  trees  of  the  West.  The  small  swamp  channels  were  to  be 


540  HISTOEY    OF    THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

straightened  and  made  larger,  and  the  mud  scooped  out  of  the 
shallow  places  in  the  bayous. 

Thus  a  large  body  of  troops,  assisted  by  the  sailors  of  the 
fleet,  worked  for  nineteen  days,  digging  in  the  mud  and  water, 
cutting  down  and  dragging  away  the  trees,  and  hauling  along  the 
transports,  and  at  the  end  of  that  time  had  the  satisfaction  of 
reaching  New  Madrid  with  their  amphibious  flotilla.  The  troops 
there  received  them  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm,  and  all  felt 
that  the  rebel  stronghold  would  soon  be  in  their  hands.  This 
little  fleet  of  steamboats,  gliding  along  through  the  forest  and 
swamps,  apparently  without  the  aid  of  water,  presented  one  of 
the  most  curious  scenes  of  the  war.  But  the  work  was  not  yet 
completed.  These  unarmed  transports  could  not  be  used  for 
conveying  the  troops  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  and  gunboats, 
and  the  question  again  recurred,  "  Is  it  possible  for  any  of  our 
iron-clads  to  run  the  gantlet  of  the  batteries  ?  "  General  Pope 
urged  this  upon  Commodore  Foote  with  great  earnestness,  but 
this  prudent  officer  hesitated  for  reasons  already  given,  to  risk 
his  boats,  unless  such  a  measure  should  become  absolutely  ne 
cessary.  He  was  the  more  inclined  to  wait  a  little  the  progress 
of  events,  because  General  Halleck  had  intimated  that  meas 
ures  had  already  been  taken  by  him  which  would  compel  the 
evacuation  of  the  enemy's  works.  The  opinions  of  Commodore 
Foote,  and  also  of  General  Halleck,  will  appear  from  the  fol 
lowing  documents : 

FLAG-STEAMER  BENTON,  OFF  ISLAND  No.  10,  March  20, 1862. 
SIR  :  Most  of  the  iron-clad  steamers,  including  this  vessel,  are  still 
lying  within  long  range  of  the  rebel  forts,  and  occasionally,  with  the 
mortar-boats,  are  throwing  shells  into  the  enemy's  batteries,  which  have 
induced  them  to  withdraw  all  their  superfluous  men  not  required  for 
serving  their  guns.  To-day  the  upper  battery  opened  upon  us,  but  was 
silenced  in  half  an  hour,  this  ship  dismounting  a  gun.  I  send,  to-night, 
a  boat  to  sound  in  a  narrow  and  shallow  channel,  in  hopes  the  present 
rise  of  water  in  the  river  will  enable  me  to  dispatch  a  small  steamer 
with  light  draught  to  General  Pope,  near  New  Madrid,  who,  as  I  have  al 
ready  informed  the  Department,  has  several  times  requested  that  I  would 
send  him  two  or  three  gunboats  to  enable  him  to  cross  over  to  the  Ten 
nessee  side,  with  the  view  of  attacking  the  rebels  in  the  rear  at  this 
point,  while  we  make  the  attack  in  front  or  on  the  river-side.  I  am  ap 
prehensive,  however,  from  our  ill  success  thus  far,  that  this  project  may 


CAPTURE    OF    ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  541 

not  prove  feasible.  To-day,  for  the  first  time  since  I  Lave  been  in  com 
mand  of  the  flotilla,  I  called  a  council  of  war,  with  the  view  of  ascer 
taining  the  opinions  of  the  officers  with  reference  to  sending,  or  attempt 
ing  to  send,  aid  to  General  Pope.  The  officers,  with  one  exception, 
were  decidedly  opposed  to  running  the  blockade,  believing  it  would 
result  in  the  almost  certain  destruction  of  the  boats  which  should 
attempt  to  pass  the  six  forts,  with  fifty  guns  bearing  upon  the  vessels. 
I  have  been  seriously  disposed  to  run  the  blockade  myself  with  this  ves 
sel,  which  is  better  protected  than  the  other  boats,  although  she  is  slow 
and  works  sluggishly  ;  but,  upon  reconsideration,  as  her  loss  would  be  so 
great  if  we  failed,  and  my  personal  services  here  are  considered  so  im 
portant  with  the  fleet  and  transports,  I  have,  for  the  present,  abandoned 
the  idea. 

This  place  is  admirably  chosen  for  defence  by  the  rebels,  as  its  rear 
can  only  be  approached,  in  this  stage  of  water,  from  the  river-side  oppo 
site  New  Madrid,  it  being  surrounded  by  bayous  or  sloughs,  while  its 
long  line  of  six  forts,  commanding  one  another  from  the  river  front, 
render  it  almost  impregnable  to  an  attacking  force.  General  Pope  has 
no  transports,  and,  without  our  reaching  him  by  running  the  blockade, 
is  unable  to  cross  over  to  the  Tennessee  side  from  New  Madrid,  where  he 
now  is  in  force,  and  it  is  impossible  for  him,  from  the  inundated  state  of 
the  country,  to  send  or  march  his  troops  to  this  point.  Were  we  to  at 
tempt  to  attack  these  heavy  batteries  with  the  gunboats,  or  attempt  to  run 
the  blockade  and  fail,  as  I  have  already  stated  in  a  former  communica 
tion,  the  rivers  above  us — Mississippi,  Ohio,  and  Cumberland — would  be 
greatly  exposed,  not  only  frustrating  the  grand  object  of  the  expedition, 
but  exposing  our  towns  and  cities  bordering  those  rivers  ;  especially  so 
should  General  Pope  be  unable  to  hold  his  position  at  New  Madrid. 
Under  these  circumstances,  and  our  boats  being  so  ill-adapted  to  fight 
ing  down  the  river,  with  two  rifle-guns  having  burst,  and  our  shells  im 
perfect,  I  am  induced  to  act  with  great  caution,  and  expose  the  flotilla 
less  than  under  more  favorable  circumstances  it  would  be  my  duty  to 
do,  for  the  great  object  for  which  the  fleet  was  created.  For  the  future, 
in  the  absence  of  instructions  from  higher  authority,  I  shall  be  governed 
by  circumstances  as  they  may  arise.  When  the  object  of  running  the 
blockade  becomes  adequate  to  the  risk,  I  shall  not  hesitate  to  do  it. 
The  place  may  be  occupied  by  us  in  a  short  time  without  an  assault,  as 
the  rebels  must  be  cut  off  from  their  necessary  supplies.  Still,  if  this 
does  not  soon  take  place,  it  may  become  necessary  to  force  the  block 
ade,  or  adopt  some  other  measures  which  have  not  yet  suggested  them 
selves.  Your  obedient  servant,  A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-Officer. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 


54:2  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

U.  S.  FLAG-SHIP  BENTON,  ISLAND  No.  10,  March  26,  1862. 

SIR  :  Since  my  communication  of  the  20th  instant,  we  have  been 
lying  off  the  forts  at  long  range,  occasionally  giving  a  rifle-shot,  and 
more  frequently  throwing  mortar-shells  upon  the  island  and  at  the  for 
tifications  on  the  Tennessee  shore.  The  rebels  still  hold  the  forts,  but 
the  encampments  are  moved  beyond  range,  with  a  sufficient  number  of 
men  to  serve  their  heavy  guns,  which  seem  to  be  well  protected  from 
our  shells  by  their  breastworks.  A  communication  from  General  Hal- 
leek  (a  copy  of  which  is  enclosed)  leads  me  to  hope  that  we  may  yet 
derive  support  from  the  Army,  irrespective  of  General  Pope's  force, 
which  will  cross  over  from  New  Madrid  and  attack  the  rebels  in  the 
rear,  while  we  make  the  attack  in  front,  in  case  we  succeed  in  getting 
two  steamers  and  several  cutters,  which  are  now  working  their  way 
toward  that  point,  through  the  bayous  or  sloughs.  Should  this  effort 
be  successful,  I  hope  to  hear  that  a  land  force  of  some  ten  thousand 
men  will  be  in  the  rebels'  rear  in  the  course  of  five  or  six  days.  With 
the  exception  of  a  ridge,  or  higher  land,  on  the  river-bank  on  the  Ten 
nessee  side,  from  directly  opposite  New  Madrid  to  nearly  opposite  Island 
No.  10,  the  whole  country  is  inundated,  or  at  least  so  much  so  as  to 
prevent  troops  from  other  points  reaching  the  rebels'  rear,  showing  how 
admirably  their  position  has  been  chosen  for  defence. 

We  now  have  here  six  iron-plated  gunboats,  one  wooden  gunboat, 
the  Conestoga,  and  sixteen  mortar-boats ;  one  iron-clad  gunboat  being 
at  Nashville,  one  guarding  Columbus  and  Hickman,  and  two  wooden 
boats  up  the  Tennessee  ;  while  the  Essex,  Commander  Porter,  is  repair 
ing  at  St.  Louis.  We  have  all  the  mortar-boats  that  we  use  to  any  ad 
vantage,  and  still  want  two  tow-boats  for  these  in  greater  force,  as  we 
have  a  strong  current,  requiring  the  greatest  vigilance  to  prevent  them 
and  the  gunboats  from  being  carried  down-stream,  from  the  want  of 
steam-power  of  the  latter.  Colonel  Buford,  commanding  the  troops, 
has  a  force  of  between  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  two  thousand 
men ;  but  who,  in  fact,  living  as  they  necessarily  do,  aboard  the  trans 
ports — the  banks  being  overflowed,  and  they  surrounded  by  water — 
cannot  accomplish  any  thing  of  consequence.  Thus  we  are  waiting  to 
open  communication  with  General  Pope  at  New  Madrid. 

I  forward  herewith  a  copy  of  a  letter  sent  to  me  by  General  Strong, 
commanding  at  Cairo,  from  which  it  will  be  seen  that  the  rebels  have 
thirteen  gunboats,  independent  of  the  five  below  New  Madrid,  and  the 
Manassas  or  ram,  at  Memphis.  I  presume  that  these  boats  are  not  equal 
to  ours ;  still,  we  have  no  means  of  ascertaining  their  character,  espe 
cially  those  at  New  Orleans.  I  have  ordered  the  rifle-guns  as  they  ar- 


CAPTURE   OF   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  543 

rive  at  Cairo  to  be  sent  us,  as  our  rifles  are  unsafe,  and  must  be  con 
demned  as  soon  as  others  can  be  supplied.  The  rifle-shells,  as  well  as 
those  of  the  8-inch  guns  and  32-pounders,  also  burst  prematurely,  and 
I  have  been  obliged  to  drown  all  fuses  at  a  distance  exceeding  one  thou 
sand  yards. 

I  shall  proceed  with  caution  in  our  work  here,  being  fully  aware  of 
our  disadvantages.  If,  however,  any  disaster  should  occur  from  circum 
stances  beyond  my  control,  I  have  ordered  the  two  iron-clad  gunboats, 
Cairo  and  Louisville,  with  the  wooden  boats  Taylor  and  Lexington,  to 
meet  at  Cairo,  or  as  far  down  as  Columbus  and  even  Hickman,  to  pre 
vent  the  rebel  gunboats  from  ascending  the  river  beyond  Cairo,  which 
place  is  now  so  nearly  overflowed  as  to  render  it  necessary  for  us  to  re 
move  all  our  ammunition.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc., 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-Officer. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

P.  S. — Were  we  able  even  to  shell  the  forces  out  of  their  fortifica 
tions,  they  would  reoccupy  as  we  passed  down  the  river,  as  we  have 
less  than  two  thousand  troops  to  take  possession.  A.  H.  F. 

HEADQUARTERS,  DEPARTMENT  OF  THE  MISSISSIPPI,  ) 
ST.  Louis,  March  21,  1862.       j" 

SIR  :  I  have  just  received  your  report  (without  date)  of  your  opera 
tions  against  the  enemy's  batteries  in  the  vicinity  of  Island  No.  10. 
While  I  am  certain  that  you  have  done  every  thing  that  could  be  done 
successfully  to  reduce  these  works,  I  am  very  glad  that  you  have  not 
unnecessarily  exposed  your  gunboats.  If  they  had  been  disabled,  it 
would  have  been  a  most  serious  loss  to  us  in  the  future  operations  of 
the  campaign  ;  whereas  the  reduction  of  these  batteries,  this  week  or 
next,  is  a  matter  of  very  little  importance  indeed.  I  think  it  will  turn 
out  in  the  end  that  it  is  much  better  for  us  that  they  are  not  reduced  till 
we  can  fully  cut  off  the  retreat  of  their  troops. 

Every  thing  is  now  progressing  well  on  the  Tennessee  River  toward 
opening  your  way  down  the  Mississippi.  The  reduction  of  these  works 
is  only  a  question  of  time,  and  we  are  in  no  hurry  on  that  point.  Nothing 
is  lost  by  a  little  delay  there.  I  am  directing  all  my  attention  now  to 
another  object,  and  when  that  is  accomplished  the  enemy  must  evacuate 
or  surrender.  Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  HALLECK,  Major-General  commanding. 
Flag-Officer  A.  H.  FOOTE,  commanding  Naval  Forces,  etc. 

The  following  letter  also  indicates  the  movements  of  the 


544  HISTORY    OF   THE    UNITED    STATES    NAVY. 

rebels,  who,  not  thinking  it  possible  that  the  passage  below 
ISTew  Orleans  could  be  forced,  were  not  only  concentrating  their 
troops  at  or  near  Corinth  for  a  northern  movement,  but  were 
intending  at  the  same  time  to  send  their  most  formidable  iron 
clads  up  from  New  Orleans  to  destroy  our  fleet  on .  the  Missis 
sippi,  and  then  meet  the  army  of  invasion  on  the  Ohio,  perhaps 
at  Cincinnati : 

CAIRO,  ILLINOIS,  March  24,  1862. 

GENERAL  :  I  left  Savannah,  Tennessee,  yesterday  morning,  and  while 
at  Perrysville,  some  forty  miles  this  side  of  Savannah,  we  took  on  board 
a  man  by  the  name  of  M.  A.  Clark,  formerly  of  Paducah,  Kentucky, 
late  of  New  Orleans.  He  left  New  Orleans  a  week  ago  last  Thursday. 
I  gained  from  him  the  following  statement :  Fort  Pillow  was  being  evac 
uated  when  he  was  at  Memphis  last  Wednesday ;  Confederates  moving 
all  their  stores  from  Memphis  to  Corinth.  The  heavy  guns  of  Fort  Pil 
low  were  left  under  water;  Beauregard  was  at  Jackson  on  Thursday 
last ;  would  leave  with  his  troops  on  Friday  for  Corinth.  Eleven  engines 
and  two  hundred  cars  were  taken  from  the  Mississippi  Central  Eailroad 
to  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Eailroad,  to  move  Johnston's  forces  from 
Decatur  to  Corinth.  Confederates  are  building  thirteen  gunboats  at 
New  Orleans — twelve  of  them  for  river  and  one  for  sea  service.  One — 
Murray's  boat — carries  thirty,  guns,  would  be  ready  last  week,  and  bal 
ance  this  week  ;  were  to  come  up  the  river  as  soon  as  finished  ;  Bragg 
and  Polk  were  at  Corinth.  Very  respectfully, 

JASPAR  M.  DRESSER,  Captain. 
Brigadier-General  STRONG,  commanding,  Cairo. 

These  will  explain  why  Commodore  Foote  hesitated  to  risk 
his  gunboats  in  running  the  batteries.  In  order  to  diminish,  if 
possible,  the  risk  to  the  gunboats  in  running  the  batteries,  should 
it  finally  become  necessary  to  make  the  trial,  a  boat  expedition 
was  fitted  out  on  the  1st  of  April  with  the  intention  of  seizing 
the  upper  fort  on  the  island,  in  which  was  mounted  one  very 
dangerous  gun,  a  10-inch  columbiad. 

The  expedition  comprised  five  boats,  furnished  by  the  gun 
boats  Benton,  St.  Louis,  Cincinnati,  Pittsburg,  and  Mound 
City.  Each  of  these  boats  carried  a  crew  of  ten  men  from  the 
vessels,  and  they  also  took  fifty  men  from  Company  A,  Forty- 
second  regiment  Illinois  Yolunteers,  making  in  all  one  hundred 
men,  exclusive* of  officers,  all  under  the  command  of  Colonel 


CAPTURE    OF   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  515 

George  W.  Roberts,  of  that  regiment.  It  was  the  intention 
to  proceed  through  the  overflowed  woodland  on  the  eastern  side 
of  the  river,  but  this,  on  trial,  was  found  impracticable,  on  ac 
count  of  the  large  amount  of  drift-wood  among  the  trees.  They 
then  dropped  down  as  far  as  was  practicable  without  being  dis 
covered  and  waited  until  11  o'clock  at  night  when  all  the 
boats  were  got  under  way,  and  proceeded  one  after  another, 
hugging  the  shore,  and  keeping  in  the  shadow.  When  so  near 
that  the  outlines  of  the  battery  could  be  seen,  three  of  the  boats 
formed  in  line,  and  the  other  two  followed  only  a  few  yards  be 
hind.  In  this  manner  they  approached  the  fort,  so  silently  with 
muffled  oars,  that  they  were  not  discovered  even  by  the  sentinels 
at  the  guns  until  the  boats  were  within  less  than  thirty  feet  of 
them.  These  guards  uttered  a  cry  of  surprise,  fired  their  mus 
kets,  and  ran.  All  now  depended  upon  the  rapidity  with  which 
they  could  work,  for  not  only  was  the  encampment  roused  by 
the  sentinels'  alarm,  but  the  rebel  steamboat  Grampus  had  also 
taken  the  alarm  and  got  under  way,  standing  toward  the  battery. 
A  detachment  of  twenty  men  was  thrown  out  between  the  party 
and  the  rebel  camp  to  give  the  alarm,  or  fight  if  necessary,  and 
the  work  went  on  rapidly.  Colonel  Roberts  gave  personal  at 
tention  to  every  gun  to  see  that  the  spiking  was  effectually 
done.  Having  finished  their  work,  the  men  regained  without 
loss  their  boats,  and  returned  to  the  fleet.  This  was  among 
the  most  gallant  feats  of  a  war  distinguished  for  such,  its  very 
boldness  probably  contributing  largely  to  its  success. 

The  following  letters  will  throw  some  additional  light  upon 
the  reasons  for  delay  on  the  part  of  Commodore  Foote,  and  of 
the  nature  of  the  work  he  was  doing,  in  order  that  a  gunboat 
might  successfully  pass  the  batteries.  It  appears  that  the  bat 
tery  at  the  head  of  the  island,  whose  guns  were  spiked  in  the 
night  expedition  of  boats  under  Colonel  Roberts,  was  the  one 
mainly  relied  upon  by  the  rebels.  It  mounted  eleven  guns,  and 
a  boat  would  have  to  pass  within  three  hundred  yards  of  this 
strong  work.  In  addition  to  this,  there  was  a  floating  battery 
moored  also  at  the  head  of  the  island,  which  was  also  a  very 
dangerous  affair  for  a  passing  boat.  To  remove  these  two  de 
fences  was,  therefore,  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  having 
spiked  the  guns  of  the  shore  battery,  the  guns  of  the  fleet  were 
35 


546  HISTOET   OF  THE   UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

concentrated  the  next  day  upon  the  floating  one.  They  were 
fortunate  enough  either  to  cut  the  lashings  with  their  shells, 
or  to  compel  the  crew  to  do  it  by  the  severity  of  their  fire,  and 
it  floated  .down  the  stream  and  lodged  at  some  distance  below, 
on  the  Missouri  shore : 

FLAG-STEAMER  BENTON,  OFF  ISLAND  No.  10,  April  6,  1862. 

GENERAL  :  Your  letter  of  this  day's  date,  announcing  the  safe  arrival 
of  the  Carondelet  at  New  Madrid,  was  received  at  8  o'clock  this  evening. 
The  telegram  of  Assistant  Secretary  Scott  reached  me  a  few  minutes 
later. 

Colonel  Bissel,  who  has  charge  of  the  steamers  and  barges  now  in 
the  slough,  en  route  to  New  Madrid,  lias  requested  that  two  tugs,  even, 
might  be  sent  to  you,  which  would,  with  arrangements  he  could  make, 
enable  you  to  transport  your  forces  to  the  opposite  side  of  the  river,  in 
case  it  was  deemed  inexpedient  to  send  a  gunboat  for  that  purpose. 
You,  yourself,  in  a  late  letter,  apply  for  a  gunboat,  our  smallest  gun 
boat,  even,  for  that  purpose.  I  could,  last  night,  had  you  made  a  point 
of  having  two  gunboats,  sent  them  with  comparative  safety,  as  the  night 
was  dark,  while  the  vivid  lightning  enabled  the  pilots  to  keep  the  chan 
nel.  Again,  it  is  now  too  late  to  obtain  the  hay  and  other  necessary 
articles  for  the  protection  of  the  gunboat  to-night,  to  say  nothing  of  the 
clear  atmosphere,  rendering  a  boat  as  visible,  or  as  good  an  object  to 
sight,  as  in  the  daytime.  For  these  reasons  I  cannot,  neither  does  a 
single  navy  officer,  and,  I  presume,  not  a  pilot  in  the  squadron,  consider 
that  a  gunboat  could  run  the  blockade  to-night  without  an  almost  cer 
tainty  of  its  being  sunk  in  the  attempt,  especially  if  the  guns  were 
served  with  any  degree  of  skill  or  ability  whatever. 

I  am  sorry  to  find  the  expression  in  your  letter,  "  The  success  of  our 
operations  hangs  upon  your  [my]  decision,"  especially  referring  to  my 
directing  a  gunboat  to  attempt  running  the  blockade  in  this  clear  night ; 
for,  in  my  judgment,  and  that  of  all  the  other  officers,  the  boat  might 
as  well  expect  to  run  it  in  the  daytime.  I  cannot  consider  the  running 
of  your  blockade,  where  the  river  is  nearly  a  mile  wide,  and  only  ex 
posed  to  a  few  light  guns,  at  all  comparable  to  running  it  here,  where  a 
boat  has  not  only  to  pass  seven  batteries,  but  has  to  be  kept  "head 
on  "  to  a  battery  of  eleven  heavy  guns  at  the  head  of  Island  No.  10, 
and  to  pass  within  three  hundred  yards  of  this  strong  battery.  If  it 
did  not  sink  the  gunboat,  we  would,  in  the  Navy,  consider  the  gunners 
totally  unfit  for  employment  in  the  service  ;  and,  therefore,  my  respon- 
sibilitv  for  the  lives  of  the  officers  and  men  under  mv  charge  induces 


CAPTURE   OF   ISLAND   XUMBEB   TEN.  547 

me  to  decline  a  request  which  would,  especially  without  protection  to 
the  boat,  were  the  rebels  at  all  competent  to  perform  their  duty,  result 
in  the  sacrifice  of  the  boat,  her  officers  and  men,  which  sacrifice  I  should 
not  be  justified  in  making — certainly  not  now,  when,  by  your  own  ad 
mission,  it  will  be  easy  for  the  new  rebel  steamers,  reported  to  be  on 
their  way  up  the  river,  to  pass  your  batteries  in  the  night,  and  if  they 
meet  my  squadron,  reduced  by  loss,  so  as  to  be  unable  to  cope  with 
them,  can  continue  up  the  Mississippi  or  Ohio  to  St.  Louis  or  to  Cin 
cinnati 

In  view,  however,  of  rendering  you  all  the  aid  you  request,  and  no 
doubt  require,  while  I  regret  that  you  had  not  earlier  expressed  the  ap 
prehension  of  the  necessity  of  two  gunboats,  instead  of  the  smaller  gun 
boat,  I  will,  to-morrow,  endeavor  to  prepare  another  boat ;  and  if  the 
night  is  such  as  will  render  her  running  tbe  blockade  without  serious 
disaster  at  all  probable,  I  will  make  the  attempt  to  send  you  the  addi 
tional  boat  requested  in  your  letter  of  this  day's  date. 

I  am,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  H.  FOOTE, 

Flag-Officer,  commanding  Naval  Forces,  Western  Waters. 
Maj or- General  JOHN  POPE,  commanding  Army  at  New  Madrid. 

U.  S.  FLAG-STEAMER  BEXTOK,  OFT  ISLAXD  Xo.  10,  April  5,  18ML 
SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  several  letters  and  papers  referring 
to  our  action  here  within  the  last  three  or  four  days. 

By  spiking  the  rebel  guns  in  one  fort,  and  compelling  the  floating 
battery  to  cut  adrift  from  her  moorings  on  the  following  day  from  our 
effective  fire  upon  her,  these  have  enabled  the  Carondelet,  Commander 
Walke,  to  run,  as  I  hope,  successfully  the  blockade,  and  join  General 
Pope  at  Xew  Madrid,  who  has  been  urging  me  to  send  him  one  or  two 
gunboats  to  cover  his  troops  while  he  lands  in  force  to  attack  them  in 
front.  \Vhile  the  Carondelet  was  running  the  blockade  last  night  in  the 
midst  of  a  heavy  thunder-storm,  the  batteries  opened  upon  her  with 
forty-seven  guns.  Still,  as  the  preconcerted  signal  with  that  vessel  of 
firing  minute-cruns  was  made  as  far  as  the  heavy  thunder  would  enable 
us  to  hear,  I  trust  that  she  is  now  safely  at  Xew  Madrid. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-Officer . 
Hon.  GIDEOX  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Nary,  Washington,  D.  C. 

The  risk  of  passing  the  rebel  works  having  been  thus  some 
what  diminished.  Commodore  Foote  waited  only  for  a  favorable 


548  HISTOET  OF  THE   UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

night  to  make  the  trial.     He  had  already  issued  the  following 
order  to  the  commander  of  the  Carondelet : 

U.  S.  FLAG-STEAMER  BENTON,  OFF  ISLAND  No.  10,  March  30,  1862. 

SIR  :  You  will  avail  yourself  of  the  first  fog  or  rainy  night,  and  drift 
your  steamer  down  past  the  batteries  on  the  Tennessee  shore  and  Island 
No.  10,  until  you  reach  New  Madrid. 

I  assign  you  this  service,  as  it  is  vitally  important  to  the  capture 
of  this  place  that  a  gunboat  should  soon  be  at  New  Madrid  for  the  pur 
pose  of  covering  General  Pope's  army  while  he  crosses  at  that  point  to 
the  opposite  or  to  the  Tennessee  side  of  the  river,  that  he  may  move 
his  army  up  to  Island  No.  10,  and  attack  the  rebels  in  rear  while  we 
attack  them  in  front. 

Should  you  succeed  in  reaching  General  Pope,  you  will  freely  confer 
with  him,  and  adopt  his  suggestions,  so  far  as  your  superior  knowledge 
of  what  your  boat  will  perform  and  enable  you  to  do,  for  the  purpose 
of  protecting  his  force  while  crossing  the' river. 

You  will  also,  if  you  have  coal,  and  the  current  of  the  river  will  per 
mit,  steam  up  the  river  when  the  army  moves,  for  the  purpose  of  attack 
ing  their  fortifications.  Still  you  will  act  cautiously  here,  as  your  own 
will  be  the  only  boat  below. 

You  will  capture  or  destroy  the  rebel  steam-gunboat  Grampus,  and 
the  transports,  if  possible,  between  this  place  and  Island  No.  10,  at  such 
time  as  will  not  embarrass  you  in  placing  yourself  in  communication 
with  General  Pope,  at  the  earliest  possible  time  after  leaving  this  place. 

On  this  delicate  and  somewhat  hazardous  service  to  which  I  assign 
you,  I  must  enjoin  upon  you  the  importance  of  keeping  your  lights 
secreted  in  the  hold  or  put  out,  keeping  your  officers  and  men  from 
speaking  at  all  when  passing  the  forts  above  a  whisper,  and  then  only 
on  duty,  and  of  using  every  other  precaution  to  prevent  the  rebels  sus 
pecting  that  you  are  dropping  below  their  batteries. 

If  you  successfully  perform  this  duty  assigned  you,  which  you  so 
willingly  undertake,  it  will  reflect  the  highest  credit  upon  you  and  all 
belonging  to  your  vessel,  and  I  doubt  not  but  that  the  Government  will 
fully  appreciate  and  reward  you  for  a  service  which,  I  trust,  will  enable 
the  army  to  cross  the  river  and  make  a  successful  attack  in  rear  while 
we  storm  the  batteries  in  front  of  this  stronghold  of  the  rebels. 

Commending  you  and  all  who  compose  "your  command  to  the  care 
and  protection  of  God,  who  rules  the  world  and  directs  all  things,  I  am, 
respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag- Officer. 

Commander  H.  WALKE,  commanding  Carondelet. 


CAPTURE    OF   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  549 

P.  S. — Should  you. meet  with  disaster,  you  will,  as  a  last  resort,  de 
stroy  the  steam  machinery,  and,  if  impossible  to  escape,  set  fire  to  your 
gunboat,  or  sink  her,  and  prevent  her  from  falling  into  the  hands  of  the 
rebels.  A.  II.  F. 

On  the  morning  of  the  4th  of  April  preparations  were  be 
gun  for  executing  the  above  order,  should  the  state  of  the  wea 
ther  permit.  The  deck  was  defended  somewhat  against  plun 
ging  shot  by  planks  stripped  from  the  wreck  of  an  old  barge. 
All  surplus  chains  were  coiled  over  the  most  vulnerable  parts 
of  the  boat,  a  device  employed  soon  after  at  New  Orleans  on  a 
larger  scale.  A  very  large  hawser  (11-inch)  was  wound  round 
the  pilot-house  as  high  as  the  windows,  the  hammocks  were 
stowed  in  the  nettings,  and  for  greater  security  still,  cord-wood 
was  piled  up  around  the  boilers  on  the  exposed  side,  and  every 
other  precaution  that  ingenuity  could  suggest  was  used  to  ren 
der  the  boat  safe  during  her  short  but  perilous  voyage.  Each 
changing  aspect  of  the  heavens  was  anxiously  studied  during 
the  day,  for  in  a  bright,  clear  night  the  passage  would  have 
been  nearly  as  dangerous  as  at  mid-day,  and  the  moon  was  at  a 
stage  when  her  light  would  have  revealed  the  boat  as  fully,  for 
every  purpose  of  the  rebel  gunners,  as  the  sun  itself. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  there  was  every  prospect  of  a  clear, 
moonlight  night,  and  it  was  determined  to  wait  until  the  moon 
was  down,  and  then  to  make  the  attempt,  whatever  the  pros 
pect  might  be,  because,  after  such  extensive  preparations  had 
been  made,  the  moral  effect  of  abandoning  the  scheme  would 
be  nearly  equal  to  a  failure.  At  sundown,  however,  there  were 
signs  of  an  approaching  change  in  the  weather.  A  haze  began 
to  spread  itself  over  the  more  distant  scene,  and  to  creep  along 
the  river.  The  wind  shifted,  and,  as  evening  drew  on,  dark 
clouds,  indicating  a  thunder-storm,  began  to  lift  themselves 
above  the  northwestern  horizon.  The  precautions  adopted  were 
very  minute,  and  the  orders  for  observing  them  were  positive 
and  strict.  No  lights  were  to  be  allowed  where  they  could  be 
visible,  the  guns  were  all  run  in,  and  the  ports  were  closed.  The 
sailors  were  all  heavily  armed ;  pistols,  cutlasses,  muskets,  and 
boarding-pikes  were  within  reach  on  all  sides  or  in  hand,  on 
the  supposition  that,  if  the  vessel  should  be  partially  disabled, 
there  would  be  an  attempt  to  capture  her  by  boarding.  Hand 


550  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

grenades  were  provided,  and  hose  was  attached  to  the  boilers 
for  throwing  scalding  water  over  any  who  might  attempt  to 
board. 

It  was  decided  to  sink  the  boat  rather  than  burn  her,  if  it 
should  be  found  impossible  to  save  her,  because  the  loss  of  life 
would  probably  be  very  great  by  the  explosion  of  her  maga 
zines.  At  dusk  twenty  sharpshooters  came  on  board  from  the 
Forty-second  Illinois  regiment,  under  Captain  Ilollenstein.  At  8 
o'clock  the  gunboat  went  up  the  river  about  a  mile  for  a  barge 
containing  baled  hay,  which  was  to  be  lashed  to  the  exposed 
side.  One  course  of  bales  was  laid  over  the  stern  casemates,  as 
these  would  be  exposed  for  a  long  distance  after  the  batteries 
had  been  passed.  The  barge  and  the  piled  hay  reached  as  high 
as  the  broadside  port-holes,  but  as  the  batteries  on  shore  were 
some  twenty  feet  above  the  water,  the  protection  thus  given  was 
not  very  important. 

At  10  o'clock  the  moon  had  gone  down,  and  the  sky,  the 
earth,  and  river  were  alike  hidden  in  the  black  shadow  of  the 
thunder-storm,  which  had  now  spread  itself  over  all  the  heav 
ens.  The  time  seemed  most  opportune  for  starting ;  the  order 
was  given ;  the  lines  cast  off,  and,  with  her  barge  of  hay  on  one 
side,  and  another  with  coal  on  the  starboard  side,  the  gunboat 
rounded  out  heavily  and  slowly,  and  laid  her  course  down  the 
river.  In  order  to  avoid  the  puffing  sound  of  the  high- pressure 
engine,  the  escape-steam  was  led  into  the  wheel-house,  where  its 
harsh  voice  was  muffled,  a  device  which  probably  led  to  their 
discovery  by  the  fire  from  the  chimneys.  For  half  a  mile, 
every  thing  went  smoothly  and  quietly,  and  all  thought  they 
might  succeed  in  passing  the  batteries  unobserved,  when  sud 
denly  a  bright,  steady  flame  rose  several  feet  high  from  each 
chimney-top,  and  for  a  moment  it  seemed  as  if  the  steamer  was 
carrying  aloft  two  immense  torches,  to  light  her  on  her  way. 
Her  upper  decks  and  all  about  her  brightened  for  a  moment  in 
the  red  glare.  Strange  as  it  may  appear,  what  was  deemed  by 
all  a  serious  accident,  which  would  bring  upon  them  at  once  the 
enemy's  fire,  created  no  movement  in  the  rebel  batteries.  When 
nearly  opposite  the  upper  fort  the  chimneys  again  took  fire,  and 
at  once  the  sentinels  there  gave  the  alarm  to  the  fort  below,  by 
firing  their  muskets. 


f 
CAPTURE   OF   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  551 

Signal-rockets  were  sent  up  both  from  the  mainland  and  the 
island,  and  a  cannon-shot  came  from  Fort  No.  2.  It  was  evi 
dent  that  the  alarm  was  now  thoroughly  given.  Not  a  shot, 
however,  came  from  the  upper  battery,  a  fact  which  showed 
how  thoroughly  its  dangerous  guns  had  been  silenced  by  the 
party  that  had  landed  and  spiked  them.  This,  and  the  drifting 
away  of  the  floating  battery,  had  very  much  to  do  with  the 
safety  of  the  Carondelet. 

But  one  course  was  now  possible  for  the  officers  of  the  gunboat. 
The  vessel  was  at  once  put  under  a  full  head  of  steam,  and  was 
urged  down  the  river  at  her  utmost  speed,  for  the. rebels  were 
now  making  swift  preparations  at  every  gun  that  could  be 
brought  to  bear.  The  storm  was  then  at  its  height,  and  its 
fearful  character,  which  would  have  been  thought  dangerous 
at  any  other  time,  was  welcomed,  as  increasing  the  chances 
of  escape.  The  darkness  was  so  intense  as  to  shut  out  earth 
and  heaven  alike,  except  as  lighted  momentarily  by  the  light 
ning's  glare.  The  gleam  and  roar  of  the  guns  of  the  batteries 
could  scarcely  be  distinguished  from  the  flash  and  the  thunder 
of  the  cloud.  The  fires  of  heaven  and  earth  were  mingled,  and 
none  could  tell  whether  the  deck  was  shaken  by  the  explosion 
above  or  the  cannon  below.  The  rain  fell  in  the  sweeping  tor 
rents  of  a  summer  shower.  Shot  and  shell,  and  rifle  and  mus 
ket  balls  sang  and  shrieked  and  roared  around  them  so  as  to  be 
heard  above  the  storm.  Each  flash  of  lightning  revealed  the 
rebels  loading,  training,  and  firing  their  guns  as  the  boat  came 
within  range.  The  steamer,  also,  was  disclosed  for  a  moment, 
but  as  she  was  moving  swiftly  with  the  current,  it  was  nearly 
impossible  to  get  her  range ;  it  was  evident  that  only-  what  is 
called  a  chance  shot  would  strike  her.  Most  of  the  baflls  and 
shell  flew  high  above  her,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  alternations 
of  light  and  darkness  were  so  rapid  as  to  deceive  the  rebel  gun 
ners  as  to  the  gunboat's  position.  She  was  much  nearer  to  them 
than  they  supposed,  and  they  fired  at  a  wrong  elevation.  The 
boat  was  guided  as  close  along  the  bank  as  she  could  safely  run, 
where,  indeed,  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  depress  their  guns 
so  as  to  strike  her,  even  had  she  been  plainly  seen.  At  this 
point  their  greatest  danger  was  not  from  the  rebel  batteries :  the 
current  was  not  only  rapid,  but  shifted  from  side  to  side  with 


552  HISTORY    OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

the  sharp  curve  of  the  stream,  and  bars  also  ran  out  from  either 
shore.  The  intense  darkness  prevented  the  pilots  from  knowing 
the  exact  position  of  the  boat,  and  the  pilots  learned  their  posi 
tion  only  as  they  caught  glimpses  of  the  shore  by  the  flashes  of 
lightning.  On  the  forecastle  the  lead  was  kept  going,  and  the 
depth  of  water  was  constantly  reported.  It  contributed  largely 
to  the  steamer's  safety  that  she  had  on  board  Captain  Hoel,  first 
master  of  the  Cincinnati,  who  had  been  engaged  in  navigating 
the  Mississippi  for  more  than  twenty  years.  This  gentleman 
stood- on  the  deck,  exposed  to  the  double  torrent  of  rain  and 
bullets,  and,  watching  for  each  momentary  revelation  which  the 
lightning  made,  gave  directions  for  steering  the  boat.  The 
gleams  of  lightning,  the  momentary  report  of  the  soundings, 
and  his  intimate  knowledge  of  localities,  enabled  Captain  Hoel 
to  judge  correctly  in  the  main,  of  the  gunboat's  position.  Once, 
however,  during  the  passage  she  was  in  great  danger  of  being 
lost.  The  steamboat  and  her  barges  of  course  presented  a  very 
large  surface  to  the  current,  and  this  gave  her  occasionally  a 
heavy  sheer.  In  the  darkness,  and  the  blinding  rush  of  the 
storm,  these  were  not  always  on  the  instant  noticed.  Caught 
in  this  manner  by  the  swift  stream,  she  was  drifting  toward  a 
dangerous  bar,  where  she  would  have  grounded  under  the  guns 
of  the  batteries,  when  a  broad  flash  lit  up  the  river  a  moment, 
followed  instantly  by  the  sharp,  repeated  command,  "  Hard  a- 
port !  "  and  she  obeyed  her  helm,  and  regained  the  current  just 
in  season  to  save  her. 

Contrary  to  expectation,  they  found  no  battery  at  the  foot  of 
the  island,  where  it  was  reported  that  one  of  long-range  guns 
had  been  planted.  The  floating  battery,  which  had  drifted  from 
its  moorings  at  the  head  of  the  island,  was  three  miles  below, 
and  this  remained  to  be  passed.  As  the  gunboat  was  not  in 
fighting  trim,  she  kept  close  on  the  Missouri  shore,  the  battery 
firing  only  a  few  harmless  shots  as  the  Carondelet  passed,  and 
then  the  peril  of  the  passage  was  over,  and  exulting  shouts 
burst  from  the  crew  and  the  soldiers,  and  the  signal-guns  were 
fired  announcing  their  safety  to  the  fleet  above,  and  soon  the 
gunboat  rounded  to  at  New  Madrid,  welcomed  by  bonfires  and 
every  possible  exhibition  of  joy.  All  felt  that  the  fate  of  Island 
No.  10  at  length  was  sealed.  In  rounding  to,  a  slight  accident  oc- 


CAPTURE    OF   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  553 

curred,  through  a  misunderstanding  of  an  order  by  the  engineer, 
and  the  boat  was  run  hard  aground ;  but  after  an  hour  of  effort, 
by  shifting  some  of  the  bow-guns  to  the  stern,  and  bringing  all 
the  men  aft,  she  was  safely  backed  off,  and  the  perilous  voyage 
was  over  at  I  A.  M.  Great  credit  was  due,  and  was  duly  given, 
to  the  brave  and  skilful -men  by  whom  this  important  service 
was  executed,  proving  that  the  strong  river  gates  of  the  rebels 
could  be  opened  by  the  iron-clads.  On  the  evening  of  the  6th 
the  Pittsburg  followed  the  Carondelet  through  the  gantlet  of 
the  batteries,  and  these  two  were  deemed  sufficient  to  protect 
the  transports  in  conveying  over  the  troops. 

On  the  morning  of  the  7th  the  Carondelet  and  the  Pitts- 
burg  went  down  the  river,  and  engaged  and  silenced  the  bat 
teries  of  field-guns  which  had  been  planted  to  prevent  the  land 
ing  of  our  forces ;  and  the  way  having  thus  been  prepared,  by 
12  o'clock  that  night,  all  the  troops  which  were  designed 
for  crossing  the  river  had  been  safely  landed.  So  soon  as  the 
rebels  saw  that  their  works  could  no  longer  be  held,  they  began 
to  evacuate  them,  and  at  3.25  on  the  morning  of  April  7th,  be 
fore  any  troops  had  been  crossed  over,  Island  Xo.  10  was  sur 
rendered  to  Commodore  Foote.  This  surrender  was  made  be 
fore  the  gunboats  had  attacked  and  silenced  the  land  batteries 
on  the  Tennessee  shore.  The  following  is  Commodore  Foote's 
official  report  of  the  surrender : 

FLAG-STEAMER  BENTON,  OFF  ISLAND  No.  10,  April  8 — 1  A.  M. 

My  telegram,  three  hours  since,  informed  the  Department  that  Island 
No.  10  had  surrendered  to  the  gunboats.  Captain  Phelps  has  this  in 
stant  returned,  after  having  had  an  interview  with  the  late  commandant. 
I  have  requested  General  Buford,  commanding  the  troops,  to  proceed  im 
mediately,  in  company  with  two  of  the  gunboats,  and  take  possession 
of  the  island.  The  batteries  on  the  Tennessee  shore  have  been  hastily 
evacuated,  where  we  shall  find,  no  doubt,  in  the  morning,  large  quan 
tities  of  munitions  of  war. 

I  communicate  with  General  Pope,  who  has,  under  cover  of  the  two 
gunboats  which  gallantly  ran  the  blockade  in  the  thunder-storm,  crossed 
the  river  in  force,  and  was  ready,  as  well  as  the  gun  and  mortar  boats, 
with  General  Buford  and  his  troops,  to  make  a  simultaneous  attack  upon 
the  rebels,  had  they  not  so  hastily  evacuated  the  Tennessee  shore  and 
surrendered  Island  No.  10. 


554  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAYY. 

A  full  report  will  be  made  as  soon  as  we  can  obtain  possession  of  the 
land  batteries,  and  I  am  able  to  communicate 'with  General  Pope. 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-Officer,  etc. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

FLAG-SHIP  BENTON,  ISLAND  No.  10,  April  8,  1862  (via  CAIRO). 

I  have  the  honor  to  inform  the  Department  that  since  I  sent  the 
telegram  last  night,  announcing  the  surrender  to  me  of  Island  No.  10, 
possession  has  been  taken  of  both  the  island  and  the  works  upon  the 
Tennessee  shore  by  the  gunboats  and  the  troops  under  command  of 
General  Buford.  Seventeen  officers  and  three  hundred  and  sixty-eight 
privates,  besides  one  hundred  of  their  sick  and  one  hundred  men  em 
ployed  on  board  the  transports,  are  in  our  hands,  unconditional  prison 
ers  of  war. 

I  have  caused  a  hasty  examination  to  be  made  of  the  forts,  batteries, 
and  munitions  of  war  captured.  There  are  eleven  earthworks,  with 
seventy  heavy  cannon,  varying  in  calibre  from  32  to  100-pounders, 
rifled.  The  magazines  are  well  supplied  with  powder,  and  there  are 
large  quantities  of  shot,  shells,  and  other  munitions  of  war,  and  also 
great  quantities  of  provisions.  Four  steamers  afloat  have  fallen  into  our 
hands,  and  two  others,  with  the  rebel  gunboat  Grampus,  are  sunk,  but 
will  be  easily  raised.  The  floating  battery  of  sixteen  heavy  guns,  turned 
adrift  by  the  rebels,  is  said  to  be  lying  on  the  Missouri  shore  below  New 
Madrid.  Two  wharf-boats,  loaded  with  provisions,  are  also  in  our  pos 
session. 

The  enemy  upon  the  mainland  appears  to  have  fled  with  great  pre 
cipitation  after  dark  last  night,  leaving,  in  many  cases,  half-prepared 
meal*  in  their  quarters ;  and  there  seems  to  have  been  no  concert  of 
action  between  the  rebels  upon  the  island  and  those  occupying  the 
shore,  but  the  latter  fled,  leaving  the  former  to  their  fate.  These  works, 
erected  with  the  highest  engineering  skill,  are  of  great  strength,  and, 
with  their  natural  advantages,  would  have  been  impregnable  if  defended 
by  men  fighting  in  a  better  cause. 

A  combined  attack  of  the  naval  and  land  forces  would  have  taken 
place  this  afternoon  or  to-morrow  morning  had  not  the  rebels  abandoned 
this  stronghold.  To  mature  these  plans  of  attack  absolutely  required 
the  last  twenty-three  days  of  preparation.  General  Pope  is  momentarily 
expected  to  arrive  w7ith  his  army  at  this  point,  he  having  successfully 
crossed  the  river  yesterday,  under  a  heavy  fire,  which,  no  doubt,  led  to 
the  hasty  abandonment  of  the  works  last  night.  I  am  unofficially  in 
formed  that  the  two  gunboats  which  so  gallantly  ran  the  fire  of  the  rebel 


CAPTURE   OF   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  555 

batteries  a  few  nights  since,  yesterday  attacked  and  reduced  a  fort  of 
the  enemy  opposite,  mounting  eight  heavy  guns. 
I  am,  sir,  respectfully,  etc., 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-Officer, 
Commanding  Naval  Forces,  Western  Waters. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  following  congratulatory  letter  was  telegraphed  to  Com 
modore  Foote  on  the  9th  of  April: 

Flag- Officer  A.  H.  FOOTE,  commanding  Gunboats  of  Western  Waters  : 

SIR  :  A  nation's  thanks  are  due  you  and  the  brave  officers  and  men 
of  the  flotilla  on  the  Mississippi,  whose  labors  and  gallantry  at  Island 
No.  10,  which  surrendered  to  you,  have  for  weeks  been  watched  with 
intense  interest.  Your  triumph  is  not  the  less  appreciated  because  it 
was  protracted  and  finally  bloodless. 

To  that  Being  who  has  protected  you  through  so  many  perils,  and 
carried  you  onward  through  successive  victories,  be  the  praise  for  His 
continued  goodness  to  our  country,  and  especially  for  this  last  great  suc 
cess  of  our  arms. 

Let  the  congratulations  to  yourself  and  your  command  be  also  ex 
tended  to  the  officers  and  soldiers  who  cooperated  with  you. 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

The  following  letter  seems  necessary,  in  order  to  present 
officially  some  facts  connected  with  the  surrender  of  Island  JS^o. 
10,  and  the  operations  of  the  gunboats  below  New  Madrid, 
Reference  is  also  made  to  the  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing, 
which  will  be  considered  in  another  place  : 

U.  S.  FLAG-STEAMER  BENTOX,  OFF  ISLAND  No.  10,  April  11,  1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  ep close  a  report  from  Commander  Walke, 
of  the  gunboat  Carondelet,  detailing  the  services  rendered  by  him,  and 
the  Pittsburg,  Lieutenant  Commanding  Thompson,  in  the  vicinity  of 
New  Madrid,  from  which  it  will  be  seen  that  the  boats  opened  upon  and 
effectually  silenced  and  captured  several  heavy  batteries  on  the  Tennes 
see  side  of  the  river,  on  the  6th  and  7th  instant,  without  which  destruc 
tion  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  General  Pope  to  have  crossed  the 
river  for  the  purpose  of  attacking  the  rebels  in  the  rear  at  Island  No. 
10,  while  the  gun  and  mortar  boats  would  make  the  attack  in  front. 

There  has  been  an  effective  and  harmonious  cooperation  between  the 


556  HISTOKY   OF   THE   UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

land  and  naval  forces,  whiah  has,  under  Providence,  led  to  the  glorious 
result  of  the  fall  of  this  stronghold,  Island  No.  10,  with  the  garrison 
and  munitions  of  war;  and  I  regret  to  see  in  the  dispatches  of  Major- 
General  Halleck,  from  St.  Louis,  no  reference  is  made  to  the  capture  of 
forts,  and  the  continuous  shelling  of  gun  and  mortar  boats,  and  the 
Navy's  receiving  the  surrender  of  Island  No.  10,  when,  in  reality,  it 
should  be  recorded  as  an  historical  fact,  that  both  services  equally  con 
tributed  to  the  victory — a  bloodless  victory — more  creditable  to  hu 
manity  than  if  thousands  had  been  slain. 

I  also  enclose  reports  from  Lieutenants  Commanding  Gwin  and  Shirk, 
of  the  gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexington,  in  the  Tennessee,  giving  a  graphic 
account  of  that  great  battle,  and  the  assistance  rendered  by  these  boats 
near  Pittsburg ;  stating  that  "  when  the  left  wing  of  our  army  was  being 
driven  into  the  river,  at  short  range,  they  opened  fire  upon  them,  si 
lencing  the  enemy,  and,  as  I  hear  from  many  army  officers  on  the  field, 
totally  demoralizing  his  forces,  and  driving  them  from  their  position  in 
a  perfect  rout,  in  the  space  of  ten  minutes." 

These  officers  and  men,  as  well  as  those  of  Commander  Walke,  and 
the  officers  and  men  of  the  Carondelet  and  Pittsburg,  behaved  with  a 
degree  of  gallantry  highly  creditable  to  themselves  and  the  Navy. 

I  proceed  to-day,  with  the  entire  flotilla,  to  New  Madrid,  and  leave 
to-morrow  for  Fort  Pillow,  or  the  next  point  down  the  river  which  may 
attempt  to  resist  the  raising  of  the  blockade. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-Officer. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 

The  importance  of  the  capture  of  this  strongly  fortified  po 
sition,  the  destruction  of  a  part  of  the  river  fleet  of  the  rebels, 
and  the  preservation  of  our  own  iron-clads  can  only  be  clearly 
seen  in  connection  with  the  great  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing, 
which  was  fought  near  the  same  time,  on  the  6th  and  Yth  of 
April.  By  these  two  victories  the  second  grand  line  of  Western 
defence  which  the  rebels  had  established,  and  which  reached 
from  the  Mississippi  to  Chattanooga,  was  utterly  broken,  and 
the  proposed  northern  advance  by  the  Mississippi,  and  by  the 
main  army  from  Corinth,  was  turned  into  disastrous  defeat.  It  „ 
detracts  nothing  from  the  gallantry  of  the  armies  to  state  that 
neither  of  these  victories  could  have  been  won  without  our  gun 
boats.  It  does  not  disparage  the  river  navy,  then  so  small,  to 
say  that  it  could  have  done  little  or  nothing  alone.  They  were 


CAPTURE   OF   ISLAND   NUMBER   TEN.  557 

both  necessary  in  the  national  movement,  and  neither  could 
have  been  spared  without  making  certain  the  success  of  the 
rebels.  If  any  officer  or  soldier  of  the  Army  should  feel  that 
the  Army  in  these  pages  appears  only  in  the  background,  let 
such  a  one  consider  that  this  is  not  a  history  of  the  war,  but  of 
the  operations  of  the  Navy ;  and  while  it  has  been  the  wish  of 
the  writer  to  place  these  in  their  proper  light,  he  remembers 
with  equal  gratitude  and  pride  the  sacrifices  and  the  heroism  of 
those  who  fought  on  land,  but  whose  deeds  it  is  not  the  special 
province  of  this  history  to  relate. 

With  the  surrender  of  Island  No.  10,  the  public  career  of 
Commodore  Foote  was  brought  nearly  to  a  close.  The  wound 
which  he  received  at  Donelson  did  not  heal,  and  it  was  of  a 
very  painful  and  irritating  nature,  depriving  him  of  the  sleep 
which,  amid  incessant  labor,  he  needed  so  much ;  and  this,  with 
the  intense  anxiety,  was  rapidly  sapping  his  vitality.  On  the 
22d  of  April,  as  will  be  seen  by  the  following  order,  Captain 
(now  Admiral)  Charles  H.  Davis  was  sent  out  to  assist  him  : 

NAVY  DEPARTMENT,  WASHINGTON,  April  22,  1862. 

SIR  :  Upon  the  completion  of  your  present  duties  you  will  proceed 
to  Cairo,  Illinois,  without  delay,  and  report  to  Flag-Officer  A.  II.  Foote 
for  such  duty  as  he  may  assign  you  in  the  naval  forces  under  his  com 
mand.  I  am,  respectfully, 

GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
Captain  CHARLES  H.  DAVIS,  U.  S.  Navy,  N.  Y. 


CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  PITTSBURG  LANDING.— THE  WORK  OF  THE  GUNBOATS 
IN  THAT  ACTION. 

THE  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  or  perhaps  more  properly 
of  Shiloh,  was  the  first  great  conflict  of  the  war.  The  battle 
of  Bull  Run,  viewed  as  a  military  operation  merely,  was  by  no 
means  a  very  important  affair,  though  in  its  first  moral  conse 
quences  it  equalled  a  great  defeat.  But  at  Pittsburg  there  was 
desperate  fighting  for  two  days  between  powerful  armies,  led 
by  some  of  the  most  skilful  officers  of  the  country,  and  who 
knew  that  the  struggle  there  must  be  one  of  the  hinge-points 
of  the  war ;  and  now,  when  we  look  back  over  the  whole  field 
of  strife,  and  consider  the  places  which  have  been  made  sadly 
illustrious  by  blood,  this  still  ranks  among  the  greatest  and 
fiercest  battles  of  the  rebellion. 

After  the  capture  of  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson,  and  the 
evacuation  of  Bowling  Green  and  Columbus,  the  rebel  leaders 
in  the  "West  changed  somewhat  their  plan,  and  concentrated 
their  strength  upon  two  main  points,  intending  to  unite  their 
land  forces  with  their  river  flotilla  for  the  purpose  of  an  over 
whelming  movement  upon  the  North.  Leaving  only  enough  to 
hold,  as  they  thought,  securely  Island  "No.  10,  they  drew  in 
their  troops  from  the  Mississippi  and  from  other  points,  and 
massed  them  at  Corinth,  a  point  from  which  they  could  easily 
move  down  the  Tennessee  to  the  Ohio,  if  the  way  could  once 
be  opened.  At  the  same  time  the  Mississippi  flotilla  was  held 
in  readiness  to  ascend  that  river  and  go  up  to  t.  Louis,  or  enter 
the  Ohio,  if  the  opportunity  should  offer.  }ome  iron-clads,. 
which  they  were  building  at  New  Orleans,  were  nearly  ready, 


T3E   BATTLE    OF   PITTSBUEG   LANDING.  559 

and  the  Louisiana  in  particular  was  expected  to  destroy  the 
fleet  of  Foote,  and  thus  open  all  the  upper  rivers.  With  the 
rebel  fleet  thus  commanding  the  rivers,  should  their  land  forces 
win  a  decided  victory  on  the  upper  Tennessee,  the  Northwest, 
at  least  for  the  time,  would  be  at  their  mercy.  It  has  been 
shown  already  how  these  considerations  influenced  Commodore 
Foote  to  be  very  cautious  in  regard  to  exposing  his  gunboats 
when  it  was  not  absolutely  necessary. 

The  rebel  army  has  been  variously  estimated  at  from  sixty 
to  one  hundred  thousand  men ;  the  exact  number  can  only  be 
ascertained  from  their  own  official  papers,  not  now  within  reach. 
The  forces  at  any  one  time  at  the  disposal  of  General  Grant 
probably  did  not  exceed  fifty  thousand ;  but  as  the  available 
troops  varied  constantly  by  the  casualties  of  the  fight,  and  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements,  the  exact  number  cannot  be  deter 
mined.  The  rebel  army,  as  well  as  our  own,  had  been  rather 
hastily  assembled,  and  the  plan  of  their  officers  was  to  strike 
Grant  before  Buell  could  join  him  with  the  army  that  had  been 
confronting  Johnston  in  Middle  Tennessee,  and  as  Buell  was 
near,  the  attack  was  hastily  made. 

It  is  not,  of  course,  within  the  province  of  this  work  to  give 
a  detailed  account  of  this  bloody  fight.  All  that  will  be  at 
tempted  is,  so  far  to  present  some  of  the  principal  movements  as 
to  show  the  part  which  was  taken  in  the  battle  by  the  gunboats. 
Our  army  was  stationed  just  above  Pittsburg  Landing,  in  a 
semicircular  form,  with  both  wings  resting  near  the  river,  while 
the  most  distant  point  in  the  convex  line  was  perhaps  five  miles 
away.  Stretched  around  this  semicircle,  and  parallel  to  it,  lay 
the  forces  of  the  rebels  on  Sunday  morning.  They  had  marched 
out  from  Corinth  on  Friday  and  Saturday,  and,  under  cover  of 
the  woods,  had  prepared  themselves  for  a  surprise  attack  early 
on  Sunday  morning.  Of  this  army,  probably  the  ablest  officer 
in  the  rebel  service,  General  A.  S.  Johnston,  had  the  chief  com 
mand.  Under  him  were  Beauregard,  Bragg,  Hardee,  Polk, 
Breckenridge,  and  Cheatham. 

At  about  h  lf-past  5  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  Sunday, 
April  7th,  the  r°  tel  lines  were  in  motion,  and  they  dashed  on 
with  an  enthusf"  in  which  showed  that  they  were  entirely  con 
fident  of  success.%nd  certainly  not  until  near  the  close  of  that 


560  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

bloody  and  disastrous  day  did  any  thing  occur  by  which  that 
confidence  was  diminished.     The  main  attack  of  the  rebels  was 
directed  upon  our  centre,  which  they  expected  to  pierce,  and 
then,  by  sweeping  round  to  the  right  and  left,  strike  both  our 
wings  in  the  rear.    Their  first  purpose  was  nearly  accomplished. 
The  division  of  General  Prentiss,  who  held  the  advance,  was 
nearly  overwhelmed  at  the  first  onset,  and,  though  partially  dis 
organized  by  an  assault  for  which  they  were  not  prepared,  they 
bravely  held  their  ground  as  firmly  as  possible,  when  forced 
gradually  back  by  numbers,  till  at  length,  attacked  on  both 
flanks  as  well  as  in  front,  their  organization  was  broken  up  and 
they  were  swept  away,  the  rebels  occupying  their  camps,  and 
then  pressing  onward  still.     By  10  o'clock  nearly  the  whole 
of  our  centre  had  been  swept  out  and  forced  back  toward  the 
river,  and  the  two  wings  only  were  left  with  their  organizations 
entire.     These  two  bodies  made  a  gallant  stand,  even  when  the 
last  brigade  of  the  front  had  given  way,  and  many  of  the 
troops  of  the  broken  divisions  were  rallied  in  the  rear,  and  were 
to  some  extent  made  available  again.     Gradually  the  rebel  at 
tack  veered  to  the  left,  and  about  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  a 
desperate  effort  was  made  to  turn  General  Hurlbut's  position 
on  the  left,  and  get  possession  of  the  landing,  the  stores,  and 
the  transports.     Had  this  succeeded,  all  would  have  been  lost. 
Our  troops  had  been  forced  back  until  they  occupied  a  line  not 
more  than  two-thirds  of  a  mile  in  length,  from  the  river  bank 
on  the  right,  round  to  the  river  on  the  left.     They  were  greatly 
disordered  and  huddled  together,  a  victorious  army  surrounding 
them,  and  the  deep,  swift  river  behind  them,  with  no  possibility 
of  retreat.     One  more  successful  charge  would  force  them  to 
the  river's  bank,  or  over  into  the  stream.     For  this  the  rebels 
were  evidently  preparing,  but  for  a  little  while  it  was  uncertain 
on  what  point  the  coming  rush  would  be  made.  * 

From  the  beginning  of  the  fight  until  after  1  o'clock,  p.  M., 
the  wooden  gunboats  Tyler  and  Lexington  had  been  moving  up 
and  down  the  stream,  anxious  to  render  some  assistance,  but  re 
ceiving  no  orders  to  do  so.  At  that  time  Lieutenant  Gwin,  of 
the  Tyler,  having  as  yet  received  no  instructions  from  any 
quarter,  and  growing  impatient,  as  shot  and  shell  from  the 
enemy's  batteries  were  falling  thick  around  them,  sent  an  officer 


THE   BATTLE   OF   PITTSBURG   LANDING.  561 

to  communicate  with  General  Hurlbut,  and  requested  permis 
sion  to  open  fire  upon  the  woods,  in  the  direction  of  the  rebel 
batteries.  General  Hurlbut  expressed  his  thanks  for  this  offer 
of  support,  saying,  that  without  aid  he  could  not  hold  his  posi 
tion  for  an  hour,  and  indicated  the  proper  line  of  fire.  At  ten 
minutes  before  3  o'clock  the  Tyler  opened  fire,  and  with  such 
fine  effect,  that  in  a  short  time  the  rebel  batteries  at  that  point 
were  silenced. 

About  4   o'clock   the   Tyler   dropped   down  to  Pittsburg 
Landing,  in  order  to  communicate  with  General  Grant.     His 
reply  was,  that  the  commander  of  the  gunboats  must  use  his 
own  judgment  in  the  case.     At  4  p.  M.  the  Lexington  and  Ty 
ler  went  up  in  company  and  took  a  position  only  three-fourths 
of  a  mile  above  the  landing ;  so  near  had  the  rebel  batteries  al 
ready  come,  that  our  troops  were  being  pressed  back.     In  thirty- 
five  minutes  the  batteries  of  the  enemy's  right  were   again 
silenced,  thus  relieving  for  a  time  our  left.     But  at  half-past 
5  P.  M.  our  lines  had  been  so  forced  in  toward  the  river,  that 
the  rebels  gained  position  on  our  left,  only  an  eighth  of  a  mile 
from  the  landing,  and  massed  their  troops  for  a  final  charge,  with 
which  they  expected,  and  not  without  reason,  to  crush  what 
remained  of  the  organization  of  our  army.     Between  our  posi 
tion  and  where  the  rebels  were  preparing  for  this  last  rush  on 
our  contracted  lines,  was  a  ravine  which  they  must  cross  in  the 
assault,  and  here  the  two  gunboats  took  up  position.     At  the 
same  time  Colonel  Webster,  of  the  staff  of  General  Grant,  and 
an  accomplished  artillery  officer,  hastily  collected  some  scattered 
guns  within  reach,    among   which   were    two   siege-guns,  32- 
pounders,  and    placed  them  where  they  would  play   on  the 
left  flank  of  the  rebel  line  when  they  should  advance.     This 
was  the  decisive  point  in  the  great  battle.     The  next  half 
hour  would  settle  the  question  whether  a  victorious  rebel  army 
should  occupy  and  lay  under  contribution  the  States  north  of 
the  Ohio,  and  their  cities  be  plundered  or  burned.     There  was 
a  brief  lull  in  the  firing  while  the  rebel  host  was  making  the 
final  preparation.     In  a  semicircular  mass,  the  centre  not  half 
a  mile  from  the  river,  lay  our  partially  disorganized  troops, 
who,  with  the  exception  of  the  shameless  skulkers,  had  fought 
with  persistent  bravery,  and  whose  main  apparent  defence  from 
36 


562  HISTORY   OF   THE    UNITED    STATES   NAVY. 

the  coming  storm  were  the  guns  collected  so  hastily  by  Colonel 
Webster.  Only  those,  as  it  seemed,  to  check  the  fierce  onset  so 
soon  to  come.  The  delay  was  for  a  few  minutes  only,  and  they 
came,  preceded  by  a  storm  of  shot  from  their  batteries,  that 
swept  over  all  the  space,  and  up  to  the  very  banks  of  the  river. 
As  stated  by  General  Grant,  their  troops  went  massed  so  as  to 
strike  the  main  blow  at  the  left,  so  that,  by  turning  it,  the 
landing,  stores,  and  transports,  could  be  seized.  It  seems  not 
to  have  occurred  to  them  that  this  would  bring  their  columns 
under  the  guns  of  the  steamers  at  point-blank  range.  The  two 
gunboats  had  rounded  to,  opposite  the  ravine,  so  that  their  broad 
sides  could  be  brought  to  bear.  The  dense  masses  swarmed  in 
across  the  line  of  their  fire,  and  then  from  those  heavy  broad 
side  guns  such  a  hail  of  shells  tore  through  them  as  probably 
never  before  struck  a  body  of  men  at  that  short  range.  They  cut 
down  the  ranks  like  solid  shot,  and  then  added  to  the  slaughter 
by  explosion ;  they  screamed  over  their  heads  and  burst  in  the 
air,  sending  down  a  storm  of  death ;  they  cut  the  trunks  and 
heavy  branches  of  trees,  that  fell  upon  them,  and  that  ravine,  by 
the  rapid  fire  from  the  gunboats,  became  a  valley  of  death  that 
the  living  could  not  pass.  At  the  same  time  the  field-guns, 
under  Colonel  Webster,  were  also  making  a  fearful  havoc  on 
the  other  flank,  and  that  last  charge  was  checked  and  turned 
back,  and  in  that  brief  artillery-fire  the  question  of  the  great 
Northern  invasion  was  settled,  and  the  victory  of  the  rebels  be 
gan  in  that  hour  to  be  turned  into  defeat.  Some  of  the  first 
hours  of  the  evening  were  anxious  ones.  The  rebels,  it  was  said, 
intended  a  night  attack,  but  the  gunboats  searched  the  woods 
and  their  camps  with  their  terrible  shells,  forcing  their  lines 
farther  and  farther  back,  until,  when  Nelson  was  ready  next 
morning  to  attack,  he  had  to  march  some  distance  in  search  of 
the  foe.  That  day,  as  is  known,  sent  the  shattered  remnant  of 
the  rebel  army  back  to  its  camps  at  Corinth. 

Others  have  criticised  severely  the  disposition  of  our  troops 
upon  that  bloody  field,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  were 
handled.  The  writer  of  this  history  does  not  propose  to  discuss 
these  points.  That  the  rebel  army  was  managed  with  consum 
mate  skill  is  conceded  by  those  who  are  capable  of  judging ;  and 
all  agree  that,  except  the  few  thousand  cowards  who  left  their 


THE    BATTLE    OF    PITTSBUKG   LANDING.  563 

regiments  and  skulked  in  the  rear  and  under  the  bluffs,  our 
soldiers  fought  with  steady,  enduring  bravery,  and  brigades  and 
divisions  were,  on  the  whole,  skilfully  handled :  and  yet,  at  half- 
past  5  o'clock  on  Sunday  evening,  they  had  been  forced  back 
almost  to  the  bank  of  the  river,  and  into  a  position  where  it 
would  seem  nothing  could  save  them  from  destruction  but  the 
rapid  broadsides  of  the  gunboats,  and  the  shelling  of  their  lines 
during  the  night,  preventing  any  new  attack,  and  forcing  them 
gradually  back. 

To  authenticate  this  statement,  the  following  extract  from 
the  official  report  of  Lieutenant  William  Gwin,  commanding 
the  gunboat  Tyler,  is  here  given,  and  the  reader  can  judge  of 
the  rapidity  of  the  fire,  by  observing  the  number  of  shells  (188) 
thrown  by  this  one  boat. 

U.  S.  GUNBOAT  TYLER,  PITTSBURG,  TENNESSEE,  April  8,  1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  the  enemy  attacked  our 
lines  on  the  left  the  morning  of  the  6th  instant,  at  6.30,  and,  by  his 
overwhelming  numbers,  forced  our  men  to  fall  back  in  some  confusion. 
At  9.25,  finding  that  the  rebels  were  still  driving  our  left  wing  back,  I 
steamed  up  to  a  point  one  mile  above  Pittsburg,  taking  a  good  position 
to  support  our  troops,  should  they  be  forced  down  to  the  banks  of  the 
river.  At  10.15  the  Lexington,  Lieutenant  Commanding  Shirk,  joined 
me,  having  come  up  from  Crump's  Landing.  After  a  short  time  she  re 
turned,  for  the  purpose  of  supporting  the  command  of  General  Wallace, 
which  occupied  that  point. 

Not  having  received  any  instructions  from  the  commanding  general 
in  regard  to  the  service  to  be  rendered  by  the  gunboats,  I  awaited  them 
patiently,  although,  for  an  hour  or  more,  shot  and  shell  were  falling  all 
around  us.  Feeling  that,  could  some  system  of  communication  be  es 
tablished,  the  Tyler  might  be  of  great  advantage  to  our  left  wing,  at 
1.25  P.  M.  I  sent  an  officer,  requesting  that  I  might  be  allowed  to  open 
on  the  woods  in  the  direction  of  the  batteries  and  advancing  forces  of 
the  enemy.  General  Hurlbut,  who  commanded  on  our  left,  sent  me 
word  to  do  so,  giving  me  directions  how  to  fire  that  I  might  do  it  with 
no  danger  to  our  troops,  and  expressing  himself  grateful  for  this  offer  of 
support,  saying  that  without  reinforcements  he  would  not  be  able  to 
maintain  the  position  he  then  occupied  for  an  hour.  Therefore,  at  2.50, 
I  opened  fire  in  the  line  directed,  with  good  effect,  silencing  their  hair 
tery  on  our  left ;  at  3.50  ceased  firing,  and  dropped  down  opposite  the 
landing  at  Pittsburg. 


564  HISTOET   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

Sent  Mr.  Peters,  gunner*  on  shore,  to  communicate  with  General 
Grant  for  further  instructions.  His  response  was,  to  use  my  own  judg 
ment  in  the  matter.  At  4  p.  M.  the  Lexington,  Lieutenant  Commanding 
Shirk,  having  arrived  from  Crump's  Landing,  the  Tyler,  in  company 
with  the  Lexington,  took  position  three-quarters  of  a  mile  above  Pitts- 
burg,  and  opened  a  heavy  fire  in  the  direction  of  the  rebel  batteries  on 
their  right,  the  missiles  from  which  were  falling  all  around  us.  We 
silenced  them  in  thirty  minutes.  At  5.30,  the  rebels  having  succeeded 
in  gaining  a  position  on  our  left,  an  eighth  of  a  mile  above  the  landing 
at  Pittsburg  and  half  a  mile  from  the  river,  both  vessels  opened  a  heavy 
and  well-directed  fire  on  them,  and  in  a  short  time,  in  conjunction  with 
our  artillery  on  shore,  succeeded  in  silencing  their  artillery,  driving 
them  back  in  confusion. 

At  6  P.  M.  the  Tyler  opened  deliberate  fire  in  the  direction  of  the 
enemy's  right  wing,  throwing  five-second  and  ten-second  shell ;  at  6.25 
ceased  firing. 

At  9  p.  M.  the  Tyler  again  opened  fire,  by  direction  of  General  Nel 
son  (who  greatly  distinguished  himself  in  yesterday's  engagement), 
throwing  five-second,  ten-second,  and  fifteen-second  shell,  and  an  occa 
sional  shrapnel  from  the  howitzer,  at  intervals  of  ten  minutes,  in  the  di 
rection  of  the  enemy's  right  wing,  until  1  A.  M.,  when  the  Lexington 
relieved  us,  and  continued  the  fire  at  intervals  of  fifteen  minutes,  till  5 
A.  M.,  when,  our  land  forces  having  attacked  the  enemy,  forcing  them 
gradually  back,  it  made  it  dangerous  for  the  gunboats  to  fire. 

At  7  I  received  a  communication  from  General  Grant — enclosed  is 
a  copy — which  prevented  the  gunboats  taking  an  active  part  throughout 
the  rest  of  the  day.  Lieutenant  Commanding  Shirk  deserves  the  high 
est  praise  for  the  efficient  manner  in  which  the  battery  of  the  Lexington 
was  served.  At  5.35  p.  M.  the  enemy  were  forced  to  retreat  in  haste, 
having  contested  every  inch  of  ground  with  great  stubbornness  during 
the  entire  day. 

The  officers  and  men  of  this  vessel  displayed  their  usual  gallantry 
and  enthusiasm  during  the  entire  day  and  night.  Your  "  old  wooden 
boats,"  I  feel  confident,  rendered  invaluable  service  on  the  6th  instant 
to  the  land  forces.  Gunner  Herman  Peters  deserves  great  credit  for  the 
prompt  and  courageous  manner  in  which  he  traversed  our  lines,  convey 
ing  communications  from  this  vessel  to  the  commanding  general. 

The  rebels  had  a  force  of  one  hundred  thousand  men.  A.  S.  John 
ston  (killed,  body  found  on  the  field),  Beauregard,  Hardee,  Bragg,  and 
Polk  being  their  commanding  generals.  Governor  Johnson,  provisional 
governor  of  Kentucky,  is  a  prisoner  in  our  hands,  mortally  wounded. 


THE   BATTLE    OF   PITTSBURG   LANDING.  565 

Loss  severe  on  both  sides ;  ours  probably  ten  thousand  ;  the  rebels  suf 
fered  a  much  greater  one.  I  think  this  has  been  a  crushing  blow  to  the 
rebellion. 

I  am  happy  to  state  that  .no  casualties  occurred  on  either  of  the 
gunboats.  The  Tyler  expended  one  hundred  and  eighty-eight  shell, 
four  solid  shot,  two  stand  of  grape,  and  six  shrapnel.  Enclosed  I  send 
you  Lieutenant  Commanding  Shirk's  report. 

Your  obedient  servant,  WILLIAM  GWIN, 

Lieutenant  commanding  division  of  Gunboats  on  Tennessee  River. 
Flag- Officer  A.  H.  FOOTE, 

commanding  Naval  Forces  on  Western  Waters. 

Thus,  on  the  same  day,  the  navy  of  the  Western  rivers  re 
ceived  the  surrender  of  one  of  the  rebel  fortifications  on  the 
Mississippi,  and  aided  very  materially  in  saving  from  destruc 
tion  our  army  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  repelling  the  last  attack 
of  the  rebels,  demoralizing  their  army  by  the  destructive  broad 
sides  of  the  steamers'  heavy  guns,  and  holding  them  back  during 
the  night  until  Buell  and  Nelson  were  ready  to  attack. 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

FURTHER  OPERATIONS  ON  THE  TENNESSEE.— MOVEMENTS  ON  THE  MIS 
SISSIPPI—ATTACK  ON  FORT  PILLOW.— FIGHT  WITH  THE  GUNBOATS. 

SOON  after  the  battle  of  Pittsburg  the  value  of  the  gunboats 
in  connection  with  the  campaign  in  the  "West  was  very  clearly 
shown.  It  was  important  to  cut  the  rebel  lines  of  communica 
tion  leading  southward  from  the  Tennessee,  and  the  great  trunk 
railway  running  from  Virginia  through  East  Tennessee  to  Mem 
phis.  One  of  these  lines  was  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 
Railway.  ISTot  far  from  Chickasaw,  a  point  in  Alabama  which 
can  be  reached  by  steamers,  this  railway  crosses  Bear  Creek  by 
a  bridge  of  two  spans,  and  about  five  hundred  feet  of  trestle- 
work.  If  this  could  be  destroyed,  it  would  seriously  interrupt 
travel  and  the  transportation  of  troops  and  munitions  over  a  very 
important  road.  But  a  small  body  of  troops  could  not  be 
marched  there  for  such  a  purpose,  nor  could  unarmed  trans 
ports  pass  over  a  river  held  by  an  enemy,  and  on  whose  banks 
batteries  could  be  placed  at  every  convenient  point.  It  was, 
therefore,  determined  to  send  a  detachment  of  two  thousand 
troops  in  transports,  under  convoy  of  the  Lexington  and  Tyler. 
This  work  was  successfully  performed  by  these  gunboats.  The 
troops  were  safely  taken  there,  the  bridge  and  trestle-work 
and  telegraph  wires  were  destroyed,  and  the  soldiers  were  re 
turned  to  Pittsburg  Landing  without  loss. 

The  great  rivers  of  the  West  were  the  only  lines  of  com 
munication  which  were  available  for  our  armies  moving  South, 
because  the  railways  could  be  so  easily  destroyed  in  an  enemy's 
country ;  but  so  long  as  our  gunboats  could  control  the  river 
channel,  troops  could  be  transported  rapidly  and  cheaply,  with 
out  the  fatigue  of  a  march  from  point  to  point,  and  at  short 
notice  could  be  concentrated  at  any  spot.  In  the  same  manner 


OPEKATIONS  ON  THE  MISSISSIPPI  AND  TENNESSEE.  567 

supplies  of  all  sorts  could  be  sent  forward  securely  under  the 
protection  of  these  armed  steamers.  Whenever  a  battle  could 
be  fought  within  the  range  of  their  guns,  they  could,  as  at  Pitts- 
burg  Landing,  sweep  the  enemy  away  from  any  position  which 
their  broadsides  commanded;  and  with  their  heavy  guns  and 
shells,  their  showers  of  grape  and  canister,  they  were  found 
an  overmatch  for  the  fortifications  on  the  rivers  of  the  West,  and 
the  streams  and  the  sounds  of  the  South.  Rosecrans's  army 
must  have  been  captured  when  cooped  up  in  Chattanooga,  if 
troops  could  not  have  been  sent  to  their  relief  over  the  rivers ; 
and  it  was  by  the  rivers  that  the  supplies  reached  them  after  our 
forces  had  effected  a  lodgment  on  the  banks  of  the  Tennessee 
under  Lookout  Mountain. 

By  the  capture  of  Island  No.  10,  the  river  was  opened  to 
Fort  Pillow,  a  short  distance  above  Memphis,  and  General  Pope's 
army  could,  of  course,  move  safely  on  in  transports  under  pro 
tection  of  the  gunboats.  This  army  of  twenty  thousand  men 
reached  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Pillow  on  the  13th  of  April,  and 
preparations  were  made  for  attacking  the  forts.  But  before  the 
forts  were  reached,  five  rebel  gunboats  appeared  below.  Chase 
was  immediately  given  and  shots  exchanged  without  effect,  until 
the  rebel  fleet  took  refuge  under  the  guns  of  the  forts.  The 
plan  of  attack  was  to  place  the  mortar-boats  on  the  Arkansas 
shore  within  range  of  the  forts,  to  be  protected  by  the  gunboats, 
while  General  Pope  and  army  should  be  landed  five  miles  above, 
and  if  possible  gain  the  rear  of  the  fortifications,  while  the  gun 
and  mortar  boats  should  make  the  attack  in  front. 

In  the  afternoon  General  Pope  returned  with  the  transports, 
having  found  that  he  could  not  reach  the  rear  of  the  rebel  works 
from  any  point  above.  From  the  success  of  the  canal  at  Island 
No.  10,  it  was  proposed  to  cut  one  on  the  Arkansas  shore  oppo 
site  Fort  Pillow,  and  so  pass  some  of  the  gunboats  below  the 
fortifications.  At  this  date  (April  14th)  Commodore  Foote  wrote 
as  follows,  in  a  note  to  the  Secretary :  "  The  effects  of  my  wound 
have  quite  a  dispiriting  effect  upon  me,  from  the  increased  in 
flammation  and  swelling  of  my  foot  and  leg,  which  have  in. 
duced  a  febrile  action,  depriving  me  of  a  good  deal  of  sleep  and 
energy.  I  cannot  give  the  wound  that  attention  and  rest  it  ab 
solutely  requires  until  this  place  is  captured." 


568  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

He  was  drawing  very  near  the  close  of  his  brilliant  career. 
A  few  days  after  this  he  left  the  active  service  never  to  return, 
leaving  a  place  which  it  was  by  no  means  easy  to  fill.  The  last 
official  letters  of  this  lamented  officer  have  for  the  whole  country 
a  melancholy  interest,  and  they  are  inserted  here  both  on  that 
account  and  because  they  set  forth  very  clearly  and  better  than 
any  more  condensed  statement  could,  the  events  as  they  were 
then  occurring,  and  the  actual  situation  of  Western  affairs. 

U.  S.  FLAG-STEAMER  BENTON,  OFF  FORT  PILLOW,  April  17,  1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  the  Department  that  yesterday,  and 
the  day  preceding,  I  Lad,  with  General  Pope,  made  such  arrangements, 
by  combining  our  own  with  the  forces  of  the  army,  that  our  possession 
of  this  stronghold  seemed  to  be  inevitable  in  less  than  six  days.  I  liad 
even  stronger  hopes  of  this  desirable  result  than  I  entertained  even ,  at 
No.  10,  till  the  actual  surrender  was  tendered.  Our  object  then,  after 
leaving  a  force  to  garrison  the  place,  was  to  proceed  to  Memphis  imme 
diately,  where,  I  have  good  authority  for  stating,  we  would  have  been 
received  without  opposition.  But  the  sudden  withdrawal  of  the  entire 
army  of  General  Pope  this  morning,  under  orders  to  proceed  directly  up 
the  Tennessee  River  to  join  General  Halleck's  command  at  Pittsburg,  has 
frustrated  the  best  matured  and  most  hopeful  plans  and  expectations  thus 
far  formed  in  this  expedition.  Two  volunteer  regiments,  under  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Fitch,  were  left  here  by  General  Pope  to  cooperate  with 
the  flotilla.  While  I  deeply  regret  the  withdrawal  of  General  Pope's 
command,  I  am  not  at  all  questioning  the  propriety,  and  even  the  neces 
sity,  of  its  presence  at  Pittsburg,  and  I  shall  use  every  exertion  with  the 
force  remaining  to  accomplish  good  results. 

It  is  a  great  object  to  obtain  early  possession  of  this  place  and  Mem 
phis,  as  ten  of  the  rebel  gunboats  are  now  at  Fort  Pillow,  and  ten  others 
are  reported  as  en  route  to  Memphis,  and  daily  expected  at  that  place. 
It  is  reported  that  Commodore  Hollins  left  Fort  Pillow  on  Sunday  to 
bring  up  the  heavy  gunboat  Louisiana,  now  about  completed  at  New 
Orleans.  With  the  exception  of  this  vessel,  however,  we  have  little  to 
apprehend  from  the  other  rebel  gunboats,  according  to  the  representa 
tion  of  the  four  or  six  deserters  lately  coming  to  us  from  the  gunboats 
at  Fort  Pillow.  At  all  events,  the  Department  may  rest  assured  of  every 
exertion  being  made  on  our  part  to  accomplish  the  great  work  intrusted 

to  this  expedition 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  your  obedient  servant, 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-Officer. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 


OPERATIONS  ON  THE  MISSISSIPPI  AND  TENNESSEE.  569 

U.  S.  FLAG-STEAMER  BENTOX,  OFF  FORT  PILLOW,  April  19,  1862. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  the  Department  that  since  my  last 
communication  of  the  lYth  instant,  we  have  been  occasionally  throwing 
shells  into  the  rebel  fortifications  from  the  mortar-boats,  which  have  been 
returned  from  their  rifled  guns,  without  producing  any  effect.  Ours 
have  compelled  one  encampment  to  remove  its  quarters,  and  from  several 
deserters  we  learn  have  otherwise  discomforted  them. 

One  or  two  examinations  made  by  Colonel  Fitch,  commanding  the 
two  regiments  left  to  cooperate  with  the  flotilla  by  General  Pope  on 
withdrawing  his  army,  have  been  unsuccessful,  thus  far,  in  finding  a 
bayou  for  our  boats,  and  a  position  below  Fort  Pillow,  where  a  battery 
can  be  placed  to  command  the  river  below.  I  shall  again  render  him 
assistance  by  sending  over  small  boats,  in  hopes  that  at  a  distance  farther 
up  the  river  we  may  be  able  to  discover  a  bayou  leading  into  a  lake,  in 
which  water  sufficient  may  be  found  for  our  gunboats,  with  a  view  of 
erecting  a  battery  under  their  protection,  which  will  blockade  the  river 
below  and  enable  his  force,  although  not  exceeding  fifteen  hundred  men, 
to  come  upon  the  rebels  in  rear,  while,  with  the  remaining  gunboats 
here,  we  attack  them  in  front. 

I  am  greatly  exercised  about  our  position  here,  on  account  of  the  with 
drawal  of  the  army  of  twenty  thousand  men,  so  important  an  element  to 
the  capture  of  the  place.  Fort  Pillow  has  for  its  defence  at  least  forty  heavy 
guns  in  position  and  nine  gunboats — six  of  them,  however,  being  wooden 
boats,  but  armed  with  heavy  guns — with  a  force  of  six  thousand  troops. 
Our  force  consists  of  seven  iron-clad  and  one  wooden  gunboat,  sixteen 
mortar-boats,  only  available  in  throwing  shells  at  a  distance,  and  even 
vvorse  than  useless  for  defence,  and  a  land  force  of  two  regiments,  not  ex 
ceeding  fifteen  hundred  troops.  Under  these  circumstances  an  attack  on 
our  part  unless  we  can  at  first  establish  a  battery  below  the  fort  under  the 
protection  of  the  gunboats,  and  to  cooperate  with  it  after  its  completion, 
would  be  extremely  hazardous,  although  its  attempt  might  prove  successful, 
and  even  be  good  policy  under  other  circumstances ;  but  it  can  hardly  now 
be  so  regarded,  as  a  disaster  would  place  all  that  we  have  gained  on  this 
and  other  rivers  at  the  mercy  of  the  rebel  fleet,  unless  the  batteries  de 
signed  to  command  the  river  from  below  are  completed  at  No.  10,  or  at 
Columbus,  which  I  very  much  doubt.  I  therefore  hesitate  about  a  direct 
attack  upon  this  place  now,  more  than  I  should  were  the  river  above 
properly  protected,  although  by  it  and  loss  of  time  the  rebels  may  suc 
ceed  in  getting  up  to  Fort  Pillow  their  entire  fleet  of  gunboats.  As 
I  stated  in  my  last  communication,  had  not  General  Pope's  army  been 
withdrawn,  we  have  every  reason  for  believing  that  a  plan  we  had  adopted 
would  have  insured  the  fall  of  Fort  Pillow  in  four  days,  and  enabled  us 


5  TO  HISTORY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

to  have  moved  on  Memphis  two  days  afterward.  It  has  always  been 
my  expectation  that  a  large  army  would  cooperate  with  the  gunboats, 
and  now  the  fall  of  Corinth  and  movements  of  our  troops  on  to  Memphis 
seem  to  be  essential  to  our  holding  this  place  and  reaching  Memphis 
with  the  flotilla.  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  etc.,  etc., 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag-  Officer. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  C. 

U.  S.  FLAG-STEAMER  BENTON,  OFF  FORT  PILLOW,  April  23,  1863. 

SIR  :  I  have  the  honor  to  inform  the  Department  that  since  my  last 
communication,  with  the  exception  of  a  day  or  two,  when  the  heavy 
rains  caused  the  mortars  to  recoil  dangerously  on  the  wet  platform,  we 
have  been  shelling  the  rebel  batteries  at  Fort  Pillow,  and  most  of  the 
time  kept  their  gunboats  beyond  our  range.  Colonel  Fitch,  in  command 
of  the  twelve  Hundred  infantry,  left  here  by  General  Pope,  has  been  ex 
amining  bayous  and  creeks,  with  a  view  of  getting  guns  to  blockade  the 
river,  and  prevent  the  new  gunboats  from  coming  up  from  New  Orleans 
and  Memphis ;  but  as  the  rebels  are  in  great  force,  and  no  tools  or  con 
veniences  for  cutting  through  the  swamps  were  left  by  General  Pope 
when  his  army,  so  unfortunately  for  us,  was  withdrawn,  he  has  made  as 
yet  no  satisfactory  progress. 

I  am  doing  all  in  my  power  toward  devising  ways  and  means  pre 
paratory  to  a  successful  attack  on  the  forts,  and  shall  continue  to  do  so ; 
but  as  the  capture  of  this  place  was  predicated  upon  a  large  land  force 
cooperating  with  the  flotilla,  or  its  being  turned  by  the  army  marching 
upon  Memphis,  and  considering  the  difficulties  of  fighting  the  flotilla 
down-stream  with  our  slow  boats  compared  with  up-stream  work,  the 
Department  will  not  be  surprised  at  our  delay  and  having  made  no  further 
progress  toward  the  capture  of  this  stronghold  of  the  rebels.  I  shall, 
however,  do  all  in  my  power  to  be  successful  here,  and  exert  myself, 
even  beyond  my  impaired  health  and  strength,  toward  the  accomplish 
ment  of  this  great  object. 

The  rebels  are  strongly  fortified  on  land,  and  have  eleven  gunboats 
lying  near,  or  rather  below  their  fortifications.  A  resident  of  the  place 
informs  me  this  morning  that  thirteen  gunboats  are  now  here,  seven  of 
which,  however,  are  mere  river  steamers  with  boilers  and  machinery 
sunk  into  the  hold,  and  otherwise  protected ;  but  they  carry  from  four, 
six,  to  eight  guns  of  heavy  calibre,  some  of  which  are  rifled.  The  other 
boats  are  iron-plated  or  filled  in  with  cotton.  The  large  steamer  of  six 
teen  or  twenty  guns  being  plated,  and  named  the  Louisiana,  has  not 
arrived,  but  is  daily  expected  from  New  Orleans.  I  have,  etc., 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Flag- Officer. 
Hon.  GIDEON  WELLES,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Washington,  D.  G. 


OPERATIONS    ON  THE  MISSISSIPPI  AND  TENNESSEE.  571 

Soon  after  the  date  of  these  letters  Commodore  Foote  left 
the  fleet,  on  account  of  his  wound;  and  before  Commodore 
Davis  had  received  the  formal  order  appointing  him  to  this  im 
portant  command,  he  had  an  opportunity  of  testing  his  fitness 
for  the  position,  and  winning  the  honors  of  a  successful  fight. 
On  the  morning  of  the  10th  of  May  the  rebel  fleet  which  was 
lying  at  Fort  Pillow  got  under  way,  and  came  round  the  point 
at  the  bend  above  the  fort  about  7  o'clock,  evidently  prepared 
for  an  engagement,  and  steered  directly  up  the  river.  Our  gun 
boats  were  then  tied  up,  four  on  one  side  of  the  river  and  three 
on  the  other,  but  they  were  ready  for  action.  Some  of  the  rebel 
boats  were  fitted  as  rams,  and  they  evidently  hoped  to  run  our 
vessels  down.  The  rebel  steamers  in  advance  made  directly  for 
a  mortar-boat,  which  for  a  time  was  unprotected,  but  the  Cin 
cinnati  and  the  Mound  City  hastened  to  her  rescue,  and  she 
was  saved.  There  were  eight  of  the  enemy's  gunboats  iron 
clad,  and  they  came  on  in  three  divisions.  The  Cincinnati, 
Commander  Stembel,  and  the  Mound  City,  Commander  Kitly, 
encountered  the  eastern  division,  and  were  repeatedly  struck  by 
the  rams,  while  the  fight  often  went  on  at  pistol-shot  distance,  and 
sometimes  almost  hand  to  hand,  as  the  vessels  struck  each  other 
and  ground  along  each  other's  sides.  Our  iron-clads  seemed 
more  stoutly  built  than  the  rebel  boats,  and  therefore  succeeded 
in  disabling  them  and  driving  them  back.  The  Benton  was  re 
markably  strong,  having  been  built  originally  for  a  snag-boat ; 
and  although  she  had  very  little  steam-power  in  proportion  to 
her  size,  she  was  able  to  endure  both  collisions  and  shot.  She 
met  the  two  leading  vessels  of  the  rebel  middle  division,  and 
they  were  soon  disabled  by  her  heavy  battery.  The  boilers  of  one 
of  them  were  exploded  by  the  Benton's  shot ;  the  other  was 
speedily  disabled,  and  they,  with  the  one  which  the  Cincinnati 
first  encountered,  went  drifting  down  the  stream.  In  the  third 
division  of  the  rebel  line,  a  gunboat  engaged  with  the  Caronde- 
let  received  a  50-pound  shot  through  her  boilers,  and  she  was 
also  disabled.  Thus  one-half  of  the  enemy's  fleet  in  less  than 
an  hour  were  rendered  helpless,  and  the  remainder  retreated 
under  the  guns  of  Fort  Pillow.  The  injured  boats  might  easily 
have  been  captured,  had  our  gunboats  been  able  to  tow  them 
out  of  action ;  but,  deficient  as  they  were  in  power  proportioned- 


572  HISTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

to  weight  and  size,  had  they  grappled  the  crippled  boats  in  the 
swift  current,  the  prizes  would  have  been  very  likely  to  drag 
them  under  the  guns  of  the  forts.  But  though  slow,  loaded  as 
they  were  with  their  plating  and  their  guns,  and  with  only  the 
engines  they  had  while  they  were  unarmed  and  unplated,  they 
were  much  more  than  a  match  for  the  boats  of  the  rebel  flotilla. 
Their  armor-plates  were  thicker,  and,  in  general,  their  batteries 
were  heavier.  The  rebels  constructed  some  very  formidable 
iron-clads  during  the  war,  but  the  river  boats  which  they  pre 
pared  on  the  Mississippi  were  too  light  to  meet  on  equal  terms 
our  better  constructed  iron-clads.  Still  many  of  them  carried 
rifled  guns,  and  they  had  an  advantage  in  speed  over  our  more 
heavily  laden  boats. 

Some  interesting  incidents  have  been  related  of  this  fight. 
The  rebel  ram  Louisiana  made  the  first  attack  on  the  Cincin 
nati,  and  attempted  to  run  her  down.  Instead  of  receiving  her 
blow;  the  Cincinnati  sheered  so  far  that  the  ram  ran  along-side, 
instead  of  striking.  At  this  moment  Lieutenant  Stembel  shot 
the  pilot  of  the  ram,  and  was  himself  instantly  struck  in  the 
shoulder  by  a  musket-shot,  which  caused  a  severe  but  not  dan 
gerous  wound.  The  crews  of  the  two  vessels  then  had  a  fierce 
hand-to-hand  fight.  The  ram  endeavored  to  get  her  head 
round,  so  as  to  strike  our  gunboat,  but  the  hot-water  pipes  from 
the  Cincinnati  drove  the  crew  from  the  deck,  and  the  ram  with 
drew.  Yery  soon  after  the  Cincinnati  was  attacked  by  three  rebel 
boats  at  once,  but  the  St.  Louis  now  came  to  her  aid,  and  strik 
ing  one  amidships,  quite  disabled  her.  Our  fleet  seems  to  have 
been  handled  with  great  skill  by  Admiral  Davis,  and  the  battle 
soon  ended  in  a  complete  victory,  except,  as  has  been  said,  that 
our  gunboats  could  not  tow  up-stream  their  disabled  enemies, 
and  they  therefore  drifted  down. 


illlllilllllllli 


CHAPTER  XXXVm. 

BATTLE  WITH  THE  REBEL  FLEET  AT  MEMPHIS,  AND  CAPTURE  OF 

THE  CITY. 

SOON  after  the  attack  on  Fort  Pillow,  and  the  action  with 
the  rebel  flotilla  at  that  point,  the  fortifications  there  were  aban 
doned,  the  enemy  deeming  it  more  important  to  concentrate 
troops  in  the  neighborhood  of  Corinth  than  to  hold  the  forts  on 
this  portion  of  the  Mississippi. 

The  rebel  fleet  retreated  to  Memphis,  and  having  repaired 
their  damages,  its  officers  held  themselves  in  readiness  for  anoth 
er  engagement.  Memphis  is  the  most  important  city  between 
New  Orleans  and  St.  Louis.  It  possesses  great  commercial  ad 
vantages,  from  its  being  the  western  terminus  of  a  very  exten 
sive  system  of  railways.  The  great  trunk  line,  which  runs 
westward  from  the  Atlantic  cities,  through  Virginia,  East  Ten 
nessee,  and  skirting  Northern  Georgia,  Alabama,  and  Missis 
sippi,  reaches  the  Mississippi  at  Memphis.  "With  this  main  line 
a  road  from  Charleston,  and  another  from  Mobile  and  New  Or 
leans,  connect  on  the  south,  while  on  the  north  the  Nashville 
road  unites  it  with  the  valley  of  the  Cumberland  and  the  Ohio. 
After  the  completion  of  these  roads  Memphis  very  soon  became 
an  important  commercial  centre,  and  was  growing  very  rapidly 
at  the  commencement  of  the  rebellion.  So  long  as  the  rebels 
could  control  the  Mississippi,  and  hold  Memphis  and  the  rail 
roads  centring  there,  the  cause  was  safe;  for  from  the  great 
river  and  its  tributaries,  and  from  Texas,  and  from  these  long 
lines  of  railways,  almost  unlimited  supplies  could  be  drawn, 
and  these  supplies  and  troops  could  be  sent  along  these  channels 
in  every  direction.  To  crush  the  rebellion  it  was  not  only  ne- 


574  HTSTOEY   OF   THE   UNITED   STATES   NAVY. 

cessary  to  blockade  the  whole  Atlantic  coast,  but  to  establish 
another  internal  one  along  the  Mississippi  and  the  trunk  lines 
of  railway.  Memphis  was  not  fortified.  It  was,  as  was  thought, 
securely  guarded  by  the  strong  forts  above  and  by  Yicksburg  be 
low  ;  and  in  addition  to  the  works  on  land,  the  rebel  river  fleet 
was  superior  in  numbers  to  our  own.  Memphis,  then,  was  not 
at  first  supposed  to  be  in  danger.  Another  reason  for  not  forti 
fying  it  was,  that  an  attack  either  by  the  gunboats  or  on  the  land 
side  would  destroy  the  town.  "When,  therefore,  Columbus, 
Island  No.  10,  and  Fort  Pillow  had  fallen,  Memphis  was  left 
with  no  defence,  except  the  rebel  flotilla.  In  the  mean  time  New 
Orleans  had  been  captured,  and  the  whole  rebel  navy  there,  in 
cluding  some  of  their  most  formidable  iron-clads,  had  been  de 
stroyed,  and  the  gunboat  fleet  above  could  not  be  reenforced. 
The  rebels,  however,  concentrated  their  remaining  strength  be 
fore  Memphis,  and  concluded  to  risk  all  upon  a  final  battle. 
They  held  some  advantages,  to  which  they  trusted  for  victory. 

On  the  5th  of  June,  Flag-officer  Davis  got  under  way  from 
Fort  Pillow,  leaving  the  iron-clads  Pittsburg  and  Mound  City 
still  at  the  fort  for  the  protection  of  the  place,  and  to  convoy 
some  transports  not  then  ready  to  leave.  On  the  way  down  the 
rebel  transport  Sovereign  was  surprised  in  turning  a  bend  in 
the  river,  and  was  captured.  On  reaching  Island  No.  44,  the 
mortar-boats,  tow-boats,  ordnance,  commissary,  and  other  ves 
sels  of  the  fleet  tied  up  for  the  night,  while  the  gunboats  an 
chored  at  8  o'clock  p.  M.  at  the  lower  end  of  Island  No.  45,  one 
mile  and  a  half  from  the  city  of  Memphis. 

At  daylight  the  next  morning  the  rebel  fleet,  numbering 
eight  vessels,  were  seen  lying  at  the  levee.  They  dropped  down 
below  Railroad  Point,  and  immediately  returning,  arranged 
themselves  in  front  of  the  city.  In  addition  to  the  gunboats 
there  were  four  rams,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Ellet. 
Colonel  Ellet  had  very  earnestly  urged  upon  the  Government  to 
try  this  method  of  attack,  being  enthusiastic  in  his  belief  of  its 
success.  His  plan  was  to  select  some  of  the  swiftest  of  the 
river  boats  which  could  be  obtained,  and  strengthen  them  by 
heavy  fore  and  aft  timbers,  and  other  methods,  so  that  they 
could  endure  a  shock,  and  then  depend  upon  the  blow  which 
could  be  given  to  crush  in  the  sides  of  his  enemy's  ship  when 


CAPTURE   OF   MEMPHIS.  575 

going  at  full  speed.  He  had  prepared  in  this  manner  the  Lan 
caster,  the  Switzerland,  the  Monarch,  and  the  Queen  of  the 
West ;  the  work  which  they  performed  will  appear  in  the  ac 
count  of  the  battle. 

The  gunboats  engaged  were  the  flag-ship  Benton,  Lieutenant 
Commanding  S.  L.  Phelps ;  the  Louisville,  Commander  B.  M. 
Dove ;  the  Carondelet,  Commander  Henry  Walke ;  the  Cairo, 
Commander  C.  Bryant ;  and  the  St.  Louis,  Commander  "Wilson 
McGunegh.  These  got  under  way  at  4.20  A.  M.,  and  dropped 
down  the  river.  The  rebel  fleet  opened  fire  while  still  in  front 
of  the  town,  and  it  was  returned  by  our  gunboats,  but  in  such 
a  manner  that  the  shot  might  not  reach  the  city. 

Before  the  gunboats  could  be  brought  into  close  action,  two 
of  Colonel  Ellet's  rams,  the  Monarch  and  Queen  of  the  West, 
ran  swiftly  past,  and  dashed  boldly  into  the  rebel  line.  The 
enemy's  rams  endeavored  to  back  down-stream,  and  then  turn ; 
the  Queen  struck  one  of  them,  and  sank  her  almost  immediately. 
She  was  then  struck  by  a  rebel  ram,  and  herself  disabled.  The 
Monarch  then  struck  the  ram  that  had  injured  the  Queen,  and 
sank  her  at  a  blow.  The  gunboats  were  now  pouring  in  a  de 
structive  fire,  and  at  the  instant  when  the  Beauregard  was  hit 
by  the  Monarch,  a  shot  passed  through  her  boilers,  and  she 
blew  up.  The  General  Price  was  struck  by  one  of  their  own 
rams,  and,  running  in  shore  on  the  Arkansas  side,  careened  over 
and  sank.  The  Little  Eebel,  crippled  by  our  shot,  made  for 
the  shore,  followed  by  the  ram  Switzerland,  which  pushed  her 
on,  having  too  little  headway  to  crush  her  side.  The  Rebel 
was  the  flag-ship,  and  Commodore  Montgomery  and  his  crew, 
instead  of  surrendering,  swam  and  waded  ashore,  and  took  ref 
uge  in  the  woods.  The  shells  of  our  gunboats  set  the  Jeff. 
Thompson  on  fire,  and  she  was  run  on  shore  by  the  crew  and 
abandoned;  she  burned  to  the  water's  edge,  and  blew  up. 
Three  of  the  rebel  rams  seemed  at  one  time  to  be  locked  to 
gether,  and  while  in  that  condition,  affording  a  fine  target,  they 
were  riddled  by  shot  and  shell.  The  §umter  was  captured, 
though  badly  cut  up,  and  the  General  Bragg  was  also  kept 
afloat,  though  shattered  by  our  shot.  Of  the  whole  rebel  fleet, 
one  only,  the  Yan  Dorn,  escaped,  by  her  superior  speed,  and 
went  down  the  river. 


576  HISTORY   OF  THE  UNITED   STATES  NAVY. 

It  is  not  often  that  so  many  elements  of  destruction  enter 
into  a  single  combat ;  and  when  all  were  busy  in  the  work  of 
death,  they  formed  a  scene  whose  terribleness  at  the  moment 
could  not  be  fully  known,  because  of  the  confusion  of  the  bat 
tle,  and  because  it  passed  so  quickly.  The  crisis  of  the  fight 
was  over  in  half  an  hour ;  and  when  it  is  remembered  that  our 
own  gunboats  fired  in  the  action  over  three  hundred  rounds  of 
shell  and  solid  shot,  and  if  we  add  to  this  the  fire  of  the  rebels, 
the  rattle  of  small-arms,  the  explosion  of  boilers  pierced  by 
shot,  the  blowing  up  of  magazines,  and  the  crash  of  timbers  in 
collisions  with  the  ranis,  some  idea  may  be  formed  of  the  roar 
and  tumult  and  havoc  of  the  fight. 

The  thousands  of  spectators  who  thronged  the  high  river 
banks  were  not  long  kept  in  suspense.  When  the  smoke  lifted 
after  the  brief  struggle,  and  the  roar  of  the  guns  was  over,  they 
saw  that  the  rebel  fleet  was  annihilated,  and  the  city  was  at  the 
mercy  of  the  Yankees.  This  battle  ended  the  naval  power  of 
the  rebels  on  the  Western  rivers,  and  only  the  forts  of  Yicks- 
burg  remained  to  obstruct  the  navigation  of  the  Mississippi ;  for, 
previous  to  this,  Farragut  had  dashed  open  the  gates  below  ISTew 
Orleans,  an  account  of  which  must  be  deferred  until  the  second 
volume.  Above  and  below  Yicksburg  the  great  river  was  re 
stored  to  the  control  of  the  Government,  and  the  Cumberland, 
the  Tennessee,  and  the  Ohio  floated  not  a  hostile  boat. 


END    OF   VOLUME    I. 


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